

4 Case study Stuttgart/ Baden-Württemberg


Regarding the TEN scheme for HST, Stuttgart is located on only one East-West axis running from Paris to Budapest. In spite of this major direction (“Magistrale”), especially the connection to France could be achieved on two alternative tracks via Karlsruhe/ Strasbourg or via Mannheim/ Heidelberg. Towards the East, the HST connects Stuttgart with Munich and the major Austrian cities.¹

For the Stuttgart region two HST stops are envisaged: One in the city center, where an underground station will be built below the present central terminus (*Hauptbahnhof*), and one at the airport, equally provided with a new underground station. While in the center the conversion of 109 ha railway land for the development of 1.4mio.m² total surface is planned, the connection of the airport is linked to the creation of a new regional growth pole including a new trade-fair and congress center close to the HST station.

Within the region of Baden-Württemberg the next HST stops are the central stations of Ulm, Karlsruhe, and Mannheim/ Heidelberg at a travel distance of ca.30min. respectively (Fig.IV.26+27).


Fig.IV. 26: Planned HST connection of Baden-Württemberg and the Stuttgart region; source: WMBW 1998,

45 – modified



¹ cf. chapter III.2.2

Fig.IV. 27: HST station locations in the Stuttgart region: Hauptbahnhof and Stuttgart airport; source: VRS 1999, Annex1, Fig.3 - *modified*



4.1 Context analysis – space and institutions

4.1.1 Space-functional structure and dynamics

The urban geography of Germany shows a strong polycentric structure with a high average density. The major urban concentrations of Hamburg, Berlin, Ruhr area, Cologne/ Düsseldorf, Stuttgart, Munich and Leipzig/ Halle are distributed evenly over the territory, while a large number of medium sized cities structures the intermediate spaces. The urban centers are interconnected by dense road and rail infrastructure networks. For air traffic, the principal hub is Frankfurt, followed by the international airports in Munich, Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Stuttgart, Hannover and Cologne/ Bonn.

Within Baden-Württemberg, the Stuttgart region forms the largest urban concentration. Other regional urban poles are the agglomerations of Mannheim/ Heidelberg, Karlsruhe and Freiburg in the West, and Ulm towards the East. These cities are located on the regional North-South transport axis along the Rhine, and the East-West axis towards Munich.

The Stuttgart region is also the most important concentration of economic activities and the location of the only international airport in Baden-Württemberg, south of Stuttgart. It is situated within an irregular topography, shows an extremely polycentric settlement structure, and the capital in its core is relatively small compared to the surrounding centers. The process of suburbanization has significantly contributed

to the growth of these smaller centers. In particular the southern area, which offers the only larger plain in the urban region, has become a recent focus for enterprise relocations and housing development.²

4.1.2 Institutional framework: Actors involved in HST planning

Government structures and competencies

Due to the federal system the 16 region states (*Länder*) in Germany enjoy strong autonomy. Only main guidelines are defined on the national level e.g. for taxation, environmental or infrastructural networks according to the principle of “federal law breaks regional law”. Within government spatial planning/ housing and transport were independent ministries until 1998 when they were merged after government change.

While the development of the national transport network is defined in periodically elaborated transport structure plans (last revisions in '85, '92 and '99), for spatial development policies a general orientating framework is defined in a national spatial planning act (*Raumordnungsgesetz* - ROG). Each *Land* is obliged to elaborate its own spatial development and transport plans. Coordination with national plans and policies is carried out regularly through a council of regional ministers responsible for spatial planning (*Ministerkonferenz für Raumordnung* - MKRO). Although decisions and resolutions of the MKRO are only indicative, it has seen its position reinforced with the revision of federal policies during the 90s that brought a shift from overall national plans towards more autonomous approaches by the regions.

The administrative structure of Baden-Württemberg shows four levels: The government, the four regional government districts (*Regierungsbezirk*), the counties (*Kreis*) and the municipalities (*Gemeinde*). Within regional government spatial planning is not an independent portfolio. The relevant competencies are divided between the ministry of economy, where a department for spatial planning is integrated, and the ministry of transport.

The government districts are responsible for the implementation of regional policies but do not elaborate plans. Officials in their central administration (*Regierungspräsidium*) are appointed and financed by the ministries of the *Land* and have the authority for the control of lower sectoral administrations and the coordination between the national, regional and the local levels.

The Stuttgart region is subdivided into the central city and five *Kreise* which in turn comprise a total of 178 municipalities. Although the municipalities form the lowest level they hold a very strong position in the administrative hierarchy due to their constitutionally guaranteed sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity. They control their own budgets by local rates and are provided with the primary means to control transport and space-functional structures within their perimeter such as the zoning plans and legally binding building development plans.

Therefore intermunicipal competition represents a pronounced problem for spatial planning and is further accentuated by the constitution of the *Kreise*. These are supramunicipal authorities with a directly elected representation and responsible e.g. for the organization and management of certain public facilities,

² cf. Gaebe 1997

transport services and utilities, but do not have a spatial planning competence. The influence of the Kreise on spatial development is however significant at the urban regional scale since they defend the interests of the municipalities they comprise as against the *Land* and, in particular, the central city

In response to the competition conflicts and development, the law in Baden-Württemberg defines a delimitation of 12 “regions” only for spatial planning, which should provide coherence to the different municipal plans at the urban regional scale. The corresponding administrations (*Regionalverband*) are financed by a subsidy from the region state and a contribution charged from the *Kreise* and the municipalities. They are responsible for the elaboration of urban development plans and a landscape master plan, both with indicative character. However, the position of a *Regionalverband* results in being rather weak as they do not have their own budget, complementary legal instruments or realization competencies and thus depend on the willingness of the counties and municipalities.

4.1.3 Railway transport

In January 1994 the two public railway companies operating in the East (DR) and the West (DB) of Germany were fused by national law into a private limited company with the federal state as the only shareholder.³ According to EU directive 91/440 operation and infrastructure provisions were separated and the network was opened for competition. Moreover, in 1996 the responsibility for the regional railway transport was transferred to the regions which receive a share of the petrol tax for this new task. The federal state retained the legal liability of developing and maintaining the long distance network.

The DB has become reorganized in the five branches of long distance passenger transport, regional transport, freight transport, infrastructure and stations/ services, which in a second step were established as separate private limited companies coordinated and controlled by a single holding-company in 1999.⁴ The property of railway facilities and -land was distributed between the branches which in turn commissioned the administration and development to a 100% DB-subsiary (DB Imm).⁵

The DB Imm is also responsible for defining those facilities and real estate “not necessary for railway operation”, which are administrated by another 100% subsidiary of the DB (*Eisenbahnmobilienmanagement GmbH* - EIM). This company has the task of performing development and optimizing revenues within a limited period of 15 years. The achieved benefits are mainly destined to settle the debts of the railway company taken over by federal state, while a part will be available for rail infrastructure investment through the budget of the transport ministry.⁶

4.1.4 Air transport

The principal international airport of Baden-Württemberg is located in the Stuttgart region within the confines of the municipality of Leinfelden-Echterdingen. Most of the territory is owned by the city of Stuttgart. In 1999 the airport was used by 7.7mio. passengers and handled 74.000t cargo. Expansions of

³ Eisenbahnneuordnungsgesetz - ENG

⁴ DB AG Holding: DB Reise- und Touristik AG, DB Regio AG, DB Cargo AG, DB Netz AG, DB Station und Service AG

⁵ For stations: DB Station und Service AG; For tracks: DB Netz AG; For real estate: DB AG Holding

⁶ DST 1999, 17-28

the land side facilities currently under way target a transport volume of 12mio.passengers and 120.000t cargo in 2010.⁷ Since the construction of a second runway for further increases is not feasible in respect to the urbanized surroundings, the liberation of capacities for long distance flights appears to be an important strategy to maintain international relevance.

Due to the proximity of several bigger airports (Frankfurt, Munich, Zurich, Basel/ Mulhouse) there are little possibilities for developing Stuttgart into a transfer-hub, so that mainly national and continental flights are offered. The catchment area of the airport is thus mainly Baden-Württemberg. Strategic alliances exist neither with airlines nor with other airports, also since the principal German airline Lufthansa operates via Frankfurt and Munich as hubs.⁸ The number of intercontinental flights had nevertheless been growing by the end of the 90s.

The airport is managed by a private limited company owned by the city of Stuttgart and the *Land* going half-shares. Plans and studies for expansions and investments are carried out in cooperation with the regional chamber of commerce and industry (*Industrie- und Handelskammer* - IHK) and have to be accepted by the city and the Land. According to the management, the company considers itself an infrastructure provider and operates the airport on a non-profit basis without ambitions to develop additional profitable functions.⁹ However, the airport company aims at expansions in order to facilitate the increasing transport demand. Thus, a contradictory situation appeared when in 1998 the city council of Stuttgart refused a runway extension that it actually applied for as a shareholder.

⁷ Flughafen Stuttgart 2000, 2

⁸ Jung 2000

⁹ *ibid.*

4.2 Process analysis - plans, policies and decisions

The planning process for HST integration in Stuttgart and Baden-Württemberg is presented here in five main stages: The reformulation of national spatial planning policies and the creation of new institutions at the urban-regional scale form the background. The more specific components of the process are the development of the *Filder* area including the new HST station at the airport, the interdependence of urban re-development and infrastructure financing related to the central station location and finally, the crisis of the project for HST integration and its temporary solution.

4.2.1 National policy orientations

The German reunification and the process of European integration were the main incentives for a revision of the orientations and priorities of the spatial development policies in Germany since the beginning of the 90s. The first step was the elaboration of a new national transport structure plan by the federal ministry of transport. Finished in 1992, the new plan focused on two main subjects: Transport connections between the East and the West, and the development of an HST network in Germany and Europe.¹⁰

Baden-Württemberg appeared to be affected by the prioritization of a new HST track Stuttgart-Ulm as well as by the upgrading of other tracks that form part of the HST network within the horizon of 2012. However, the political priority within this large infrastructure investment programme lay in developing East Germany.

In 1993 the responsible ministry published a new orientating framework for spatial planning (*Raumordnungspolitischer Orientierungsrahmen – ORA*).¹¹ It was deemed to provide general perspectives and strategies that would allow a larger autonomy of the regions for a decentral policy implementation. The ORA formed the basis for the elaboration of a spatial development action framework in cooperation with the regions, approved by the MKRO in March 1995. With this step the responsible regional ministers contributed in focusing spatial policy implementation on eight major subjects among which are the elaboration of the ESDP, the creation of “city networks” and the strengthening of the large urban regions, designated as “European metropolitan regions” (EMR).¹² The EMR concept represents a key element in the envisaged spatial development. It has been further elaborated by the MKRO that issued in 1997 a resolution with proposals for the strengthening of the “European metropolitan regions”.¹³

Finally, a revision of the spatial planning act (*Raumordnungsgesetz - ROG*) has been put into effect from 1998 that adapts the legal framework to the modified orientations.¹⁴ The new ROG therefore incorporates the main items considered in the ORA, in particular the reinforcement of the decentral planning system and the strengthening of spatial planning in large urban regions and introduced the overall aim of a “sustainable spatial development”.

¹⁰ BMV 1992

¹¹ BMBau 1993

¹² *idem* 1995

¹³ *idem* 1997

¹⁴ Deutscher Bundestag 1997

4.2.2 Creation of the Verband Region Stuttgart - VRS

Already in 1991 the regional government had made institutional cooperation and decision making at the scale of the Stuttgart region a focus of its initiatives. The affected actors were invited for two “regional conferences” held between 1991 and '93 in order to debate the constitution and competencies of a new entity at the scale of the urban region. Apart from the public authorities (*Regierungspräsidium, Kreise, Gemeinden*), the chambers, unions and other associations also participated. Finally, the form of an association was agreed upon and realized by regional law in 1994. The required political consensus for the creation of this association of the Stuttgart region (*Verband Region Stuttgart - VRS*) was facilitated by the circumstance of a grand coalition in regional government (1992-'96).

The model of the VRS is based on the direct election of a parliament by proportional representation of the central city and five counties. Its decisions are carried out by a common administration which has incorporated and/ or substituted previously existing regional associations (e.g. *Regionalverband*). The VRS is financed approximately half and half by a subsidy from national and regional government (35%, 15% respectively) and a contribution charged from the counties and municipalities (40%, 10% respectively).¹⁵

This new organization is not a fourth government level nor does it replace any existing ones. Nevertheless, competencies and budgets have been redistributed in favour of a direct intervention. The VRS now elaborates legally binding regional development-, landscape- and transport plans, it is the authority for the *S-Bahn*¹⁶ planning and operation and can take over the responsibility for tasks in the fields of sports, culture, congress and trade fair at the scale of the urban region. Furthermore it has been complemented by agencies for tourism marketing and for economic promotion, closely cooperating with the chamber of commerce. The creation of the VRS therefore represents a significant innovation of the planning practice and corresponds to the re-orientation of the national policies. However, this type of institutional reform is not a general phenomenon in Germany since similar arrangements have only been achieved in Hannover so far, while in other cities discussions still continue.¹⁷

The VRS has been involved in the plans for the integration of the HST from its foundation in 1994. Its first major tasks have been the planning for the relocation of the trade fair (approved October 1996), the revision of the urban regional development plan (approved July 1998) and the elaboration of an integrated transport plan (approved July 1999). Together with the chamber of commerce the VRS also prepared in 1997 and '98 a study on the competitiveness of the Stuttgart region compared to other (urban) regions in Germany and Europe as a decision making support for the ongoing planning process.

¹⁵ WMBW 1993; IMBW 1993

¹⁶ The *S-Bahn* is the German version of an urban-regional (heavy) railway system comparable to the French *RER*, Dutch *Stoptrein*, or Spanish *Cercanías* - yet with an important inner-urban public transport function due to multiple stops inside the city area and tracks built underground.

¹⁷ cf. Benz/ Frenzel 1999

4.2.3 Airport station and growth pole *Filder* area


Track variants and station locations

The first steps towards the integration of the HST concerned the decisions of the regional government and the DB about the new track Stuttgart-Ulm and a possible remodeling of the railway node in Stuttgart. Based on the content of the former federal transport structure plan of 1985, the DB first envisaged a new HST track along the Neckar valley that would have included a relocation of the central station and its subsequent separation from the present public transport node.

In 1988 the transport expert G.Heimerl from the University of Stuttgart proposed an alternative solution: The HST would cross the city underground, stop in a through-station under the central terminus and continue towards Ulm parallel to the A8 motorway, which would also allow the location of a new HST station at the airport. However, the DB finished its studies of track alternatives without consideration of this variant. The railway company favoured a single through-station north of the city center (*Rosenstein*) and moreover suggested a bypass of Ulm in order to reduce travel times towards Munich.

At the same time the plans also demonstrated that the entire track system of the terminus resulted dispensable and could thus be used for urban re-development. However, in reaction to this proposal the regional government demanded a further examination of the variant suggested by the transport expert and categorically rejected a bypass of Ulm. After the DB handed in further elaborated alternatives in 1991 both maintaining the terminus and replacing it by an underground through-station, the regional government finally decided in September 1992 to base further studies on the second alternative, explicitly including the option for a future HST station at the airport (Fig.IV.28).

Fig.IV. 28: Track alternatives for the HST in the central area of the Stuttgart region; source: DB Projekt 1996a, 79



Entertainment center “SI-Centrum”

Since 1992 the city of Stuttgart had been dealing with the application of a private investor to develop a large-scale entertainment center located close to the airport but within the boundaries of the municipality and provided with excellent road accessibility. The starting point of the project was an existing four-star hotel owned by the same investor. Already in June 1993 the city council approved a building development plan in the fear of losing an opportunity in times of recession, although the site actually lacked urban integration and adequate public transport accessibility, and a spatial development strategy for the new concentration was entirely missing.

The “SI-Centrum” could be opened in a basic configuration in December 1994. Further facilities were then added until 1997, creating a total of 1.200 jobs. The functional programme now comprises two musical theaters (3.600 seats), hotel and conference facilities, a boarding house (200app.), a multiplex-cinema (1.500 seats), event catering, a wellness-center and parking facilities (2.600 spaces), and covers a total of 218.000m² floor space. Therefore, in spite of the questionable planning approach, the “SI-Centrum” has become an important factor of spatial dynamics in the northern *Filder* area.

New trade fair and growth pole Filder

In parallel to the ongoing discussions about the HST and the realization of the “SI-Centrum”, different plans and projects forwarded the notion of the *Filder* area as a strategic location for future development. By the end of 1992 the Stuttgart trade fair company (*Stuttgarter Messe- und Kongreßgesellschaft mbH - SMK*), owned 100% by the city, commissioned a private consultancy to study possible relocation sites for the trade fair at present situated close to the city center. In December 1993 this study was concluded, proposing a site between the airport and the A8 motorway as an optimal location. Despite the previous decision of the regional government about the HST track, a new HST station was not yet included in the evaluation criteria of this study, but only recommended for the connection of a trade fair in general.

In the same month the regional government commissioned the elaboration of a development vision for the *Filder* area to a semi-public consulting agency (*Kommunalentwicklung Baden-Württemberg*). Presented in 1994, this study was however already based on the assumption that both an HST station and the new trade fair would be built next to the airport.¹⁸

However, the plans for the new trade fair met the firm resistance of the affected municipality Leinfelden-Echterdingen that rejected the project for its environmental impacts and the restrictions it would impose on the future development of the municipality. Furthermore the lack of dialogue with the promoting actors from the SMK and the regional government was criticized. Based on its planning authority, the municipal council thus refused the installation of the trade fair.

In October 1995 the VRS parliament approved the principle of relocating the trade fair to the airport and envisaged to accelerate the plans by decoupling them from the revision of the development plan. The decision about the partial revision was then taken in October 1996. The VRS also developed a proposal


¹⁸ KEBW 1994

for a “*Filder landscape park*” in 1997 that already incorporated the facility. However, as the affected municipality did not change its position it became clear that the regional government would even take legal action in order to get the trade fair plans through.

In May 1998 the region, the city and the VRS founded a project company for the development of the new trade fair, now responsible for planning and realization.¹⁹ Two months later a revision of the relocation study for the trade fair was commissioned, but this time on behalf of the VRS. In parallel, the region, the VRS, the airport company and the SMK jointly elaborated an integral assessment of environmental impacts caused by the infrastructure projects in the *Filder* area (trade fair construction, new railway tracks and HST station, extension of the airport and of the A8 motorway). More important than the resulting proposal of a strategy of “anticipated compensation” was here the fact of this voluntary actor cooperation supporting the common objectives.

As both studies were presented in November 1998 and the proposed relocation site remained the same as before, the government finally handed in a trade fair law (*Landesmessegesetz*) approved by the regional parliament in December 1998. The law determined the necessity of this facility and fixed the envisaged location next to the airport. A realization competition was then performed by the new project company in spring 2000 (Fig.IV.29).

Fig.IV. 29: HST station between new trade fair and airport extension;
source: Wulf & Partner
2000 - *modified*



4.2.4 Central station: urban redevelopment versus infrastructure finance

During 1993 the variants for the integration of the HST had been reconsidered by the DB. After the company’s privatization had become official in January 1994 the plans were exposed anew in April 1994 in a joint press conference of the chief executive of the DB, the mayor of Stuttgart and the respective transport ministers of the *Land* and the federal government. The proposal included the building of an underground through-station in the center that allowed the re-development of the entire railway land, and

¹⁹ Projektgesellschaft Neue Messe GmbH&Co KG; shares: 45% Land, 45% city, 10% VRS

a new terminus station connecting the airport and the trade fair. Yet the point of the project was that the financing of the expensive tunnel constructions was expected to be covered by the revenues from the urban development. The presented solution thus appeared in the form of a large-scale project and multi-level public-private partnership for which the marketing name of “Stuttgart21”, created by the DB, became the principal reference.

While the DB published elaborate drafts for the possible urbanization of the re-development area already on the next day of the presentation, it was not until September 1994 that the city developed a first urban design framework for this area (*Städtebauliches Rahmenkonzept*).²⁰ In the meantime a newly founded project company (DB Projekt Stuttgart21 - 100% affiliate of the DB) was commissioned to prepare a feasibility study for Stuttgart21. The positive results were presented in January 1995 and a further refinement for the clearing of financial questions was agreed upon. In November 1995 the DB Projekt then presented a pre-project under the heading “The synergy concept”. According to the company, the comparison of different infrastructure variants and the elaboration of a financing concept had demonstrated that the project was not only technically feasible but also economically profitable.²¹

In the same month, the DB, the city, the region, the federal state and now also the VRS signed an outline agreement based on this pre-project that fixed the duties of the project partners: The total costs of €2.5bill. were distributed between the federal state (32% subsidies and loans), region (7% subsidies), and the DB (44% land sale revenues). The remaining 16% were to be covered by bank loans and increased transport volumes of the DB. Region and city took over a financial responsibility for the deficits from the urban redevelopment of up to €87mio. Furthermore, the city also had to provide a structure plan that allowed the settlement of “24.000 jobs and 11.000 inhabitants” in the conversion areas within 18 months. The linkage of the urban development of the 50ha net building land and the financial feasibility of the project was therefore essential.²²

Already after the presentation of the feasibility study in January 1995 different local professional and civil associations manifested their critical view of the project Stuttgart21. In 1996 first alternative projects were elaborated by “*Umkehr Stuttgart*” (Stuttgart return), an association of critics founded in reaction to the project.²³ Key to their proposals was the maintenance of the terminus which demonstrated the possibility of a separation between the urban development of still 45ha and the infrastructure financing. Thus, the concentration of public expenses and the high financial and development risks were criticized.²⁴

²⁰ Stadt Stuttgart 1996b

²¹ DB Projekt 1996b

²² *idem* 1996a

²³ Architektur-Forum, ADFC, BUND, LNV, Naturfreunde, ProBahn, VCD


²⁴ cf. Wolf 1995; Umkehr Stuttgart 1998, 2000

Equally the limited improvements for the regional rail transport, the need for an HST connection of the airport in respect of its limited area of influence, and the priority and chosen location site of a new trade fair were questioned. Furthermore, especially the ecological risks of the projects were underlined since the tunnel constructions could affect the ground water level and Stuttgart's mineral springs, while the urban densification in the center could deteriorate the climatic conditions due to the particular topographic situation. Stuttgart21 thus also turned out to be the main issue in the campaign for the mayoral elections in 1996, and the slim majority of the conservative candidate against the candidate of the Green Party that strictly rejected the project reflected a growing polarization among the local electorate.

During 1996 the city conducted an expert consultation for the urban design of the re-development area and the selected proposals were taken as a basis for the preparation of a structure plan. In reaction to the continued criticism, the city performed a moderated citizen's participation procedure from March to June 1997 in order to improve the support and legitimation of the plans. The resulting suggestions for improvements of functional and design aspects were partially considered, but already in July 1997 the structure plan was officially approved by the city council (Fig.IV.30). Four months *after* the approval, an external expert study worked out on behalf of the city, which had examined the functional development possibilities of the central area, was finished.²⁵ This study represented the first concrete statement with respect to the contents of the new urban districts.

Fig.IV. 30: Structure plan "Stuttgart21" – concentration of „retail, culture and services“ in the HST station area; source: Stadt Stuttgart 1997a

In the meantime the further technical elaboration of the plans by the DB Projekt had been handed in to the *Regierungspräsidium* for evaluation. The project was then approved in parallel to the city's structure plan in July 1997, although minor modifications for the regional railway transport were demanded. With the incorporation of the projects Stuttgart21 and the new trade fair into the urban regional development plan and the transport structure plan by the VRS the legal planning framework was finally



²⁵ Prognos 1997

completed. Perhaps except for the realization of the participation procedure, the alternative proposals did not influence the official plans at all.

4.2.5 Conflicts and crisis

After federal elections in October 1998 the national conservative-liberal government was replaced by a coalition of the social-democrats and the Green Party. Consequently the constitution of the DB executive board changed because the national government appoints three members, while short before the former DB chief executive already had dismissed because of internal conflicts.

The partial change of the key actors soon influenced the planning process. Both the responsible minister and the DB announced a revision of the financial bases of Stuttgart21 and uttered doubts about the previous calculations or identified changed general conditions of the project. In 1999 the increasingly difficult financial situation of the DB became evident: Miscalculation in respect to other large scale projects (e.g. Berlin) and the acute deficits of the company intensified the interior and exterior pressure on the management. While the infrastructure affiliate of the DB (DB Netz) affirmed that Stuttgart21 would not be a priority and scheduled the realization for 2011, the regional government and the city insisted on the importance of the project. However, the federal minister attributed the financial responsibility for a previous realization to the region. In consequence the DB executive board postponed a decision about the project several times during 1999 and 2000.²⁶

Finally, the regional government assumed the financial burden of the finance in advance (€860mio. for Stuttgart21 and the track Stuttgart-Ulm). In order to facilitate a favourable decision of the DB a long term concession for regional rail operation was offered, thus even undermining EU guidelines for competition in transport markets. Moreover, the purchase of additional rolling stock for the regional transport was assured (€102mio.).²⁷

Also the VRS accepted the notion to contribute in case of cost increases for the S-Bahn or the regional transport. As a result, an agreement could be reached with the DB and the federal government in February 2001, although still with the possibility of withdrawal for the DB in the case of further cost increases. In parallel the city had also decided to act in respect to the increasing deterioration of the investment climate. The investors of the only concrete projects by then were the city itself, the Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and a single private developer. Therefore, the city ultimately assured its planning authority for the development area through the purchase of the entire land for a total of €424mio. in the period from 1999-2001.²⁸

However, the instability of the project as a whole also affected the formation of concepts for the development by the city. In order to improve the image of the project Stuttgart21 and to soothe the frictions with the local opposition the city council approved in August 1998 a new proposal to organize the development of a small sector (13ha) as an international building exhibition (IBA) to take place between

²⁶ cf. Reuter 2001

²⁷ ProBahn 2001

²⁸ Pfeifer 2000

2002-07. Despite its limited scope this event should have explicitly introduced the concept of “sustainable urban development” and was expected by the city to improve the reputation of Stuttgart21. Yet, after the first steps of preparation the city council turned the IBA-event down in March 2000 in fear of the possible negative image effects due to the linkage with a possible failure of the Stuttgart21 project.

4.3 Text analysis - planning documents and publications

4.3.1 National government and MKRO

The orientation of the railways at the development of a European HST network and the introduction of the concept of “European metropolitan regions” represent closely interrelated modifications of the national spatial planning policies. The adoption of the overall objective of “sustainable spatial development” in the course of the 90s did not alter, but rather reinforced these concepts with an emphasis on their environmental dimension and the intersectoral character of policies, although “protection” remained the principal approach to the environment. All three concepts appear as mutually conditioning and justifying each other and provide the principal orientation for the integration of the HST in Germany.

“EMR”: “Decentralization”, “internationalization”, and “institutional cooperation”

The orientating framework for spatial planning (ORA) underlines four basic objectives for the spatial development in Germany: Achieve equal living conditions in all sub-areas, integrate the consideration of changes in the European context, assure and develop the decentral settlement structure and protect the natural bases of life.²⁹ For this reason, a special role is attributed to the large urban regions, since they are seen as “motors of growth” and “spatial bases of performance”, while also suffering from the highest environmental stress. The ORA identifies seven major urban regions in Germany but recognizes similar conditions for seven smaller urban regions.³⁰ In order to “strengthen the strong economic centers” more autonomy and cooperation is suggested for the development of these regions, especially with respect to the extension of the settlement structure, technical infrastructure and the improvement of location qualities.³¹

The designation of “European metropolitan regions” then first appears in 1995 in the spatial planning action framework and is further elaborated in the “proposals for the strengthening of EMR’s in Germany” made by the MKRO in 1997.³² This new concept is understood as an “answer to the challenge of globalization of economical, social and ecological processes.” It is important to note that the German term “Metropole” has also not been used as a spatial planning category before, but represented rather a journalistic reference to large capital agglomerations abroad, such as London or Paris. Although relativized by the combination with the term “Region”, the designation of EMR thus means a significant and ambitious shift of scale and scope.

“As motors of the societal, economic, social and cultural development they should maintain the capacity of performance and competitiveness of Germany and Europe, and contribute to accelerate the process of European integration.” (BMBau 1997, 52; translation)

²⁹ BMBau 1993, 2

³⁰ Berlin, Hamburg, Ruhrgebiet, Düsseldorf/Köln, Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich - Bremen, Hannover, Saarbrücken, Mannheim, Nürnberg, Leipzig, Dresden; BMBau 1993, 4, 6

³¹ BMBau 1993, 4, 21

³² *idem* 1995, 5

Instead of a spatial concentration in one large “supermetropole” with the subsequent negative environmental impacts, the MKRO proposes to strengthen those urban regions “of a European rank” according to the model of “decentral concentration”. The decentral configuration is explicitly seen as a location advantage in comparison to other EU states. Polycentric urban and transport structures should equally be the characteristic of the interior organization of the EMR’s, while the question of the spatial scale is kept open rejecting any delimitation.³³

However, with the definition of EMR’s the composition of the considered urban regions has been slightly altered in comparison to the ORA. The previously separated regions Ruhrgebiet and Düsseldorf/ Cologne are now merged into a single “Rhine-Ruhr” region, while Halle/ Leipzig-Dresden-Chemnitz are integrated into a “potential EMR” (“*Sachsendreieck*”) (Fig.IV.31). The other urban regions result in being excluded from the new status. However, to prevent the possible anxieties it is stressed that:


“The concept of Metropolitan Regions, mainly orientated at international interconnection, does not represent an additional level for the existing system of central places in Germany.” (BMBau 1997, 53, *translation*)

“European Metropolitan Regions must not lead to the weakening of the regions and cities located in their wider area of influence. Rather, these should participate in the positive development of the Metropolitan Regions.” (BMBau 1997, 54; *translation*)

Fig.IV. 31: Six “European Metropolitan Regions” and “connecting corridors”; source: BMBau 1997, 57

For their development, four main features to be improved are underlined: International accessibility, environmental conditions, regional marketing and the spatial organization and cooperation of the municipalities. Special emphasis is put on the latter subject, since this “self-organization” should enhance the economic promotion and marketing as well as activities in the fields of culture, sports and tourism at the scale of the urban region. In particular trade fair facilities, high-tech services and major events are subjects suggested for intensified cooperation.³⁴

In this sense, the revised spatial planning act (ROG) strengthens the position of regional planning correspondingly as it explicitly allows



³³ BMBau 1995, 11; *idem* 1997, 51, 52

³⁴ *idem* 1997, 51, 53, 56

and encourages the operationalization of (urban) regional plans through the creation of regional associations and contractualization in (public-private) partnerships.³⁵

“Transeuropean HST network”: EMR connection, “cohesion” and accessibility

In 1992 the federal transport ministry defined the development of an HST network in Germany and Europe as a “priority requirement” and envisaged new and upgraded HST links between the mayor cities to be realized until 2012.³⁶ The ORA integrates this perspective, arguing that the development of the HST network would contribute to an improved interconnection of “high-ranking centers” and to “disentangle transport relations with different scopes.”

Furthermore the HST could shift individual transport to the railways and relieve European air transport “to a certain degree”, which would require the connection with public transport and the international airports. It demands a “swift development of the Transeuropean networks” and sees the integration of the eastern *Länder* into the TENs as a “central condition” for the realization of the cohesion objectives of the EC.³⁷

In the same sense, the MKRO demands in 1998 closer connections between the EMRs and to assure their international accessibility by an “optimal integration” into the Transeuropean networks. This should also lead to a “relief of intercontinental and international airports by shifting short distance flights to neighbouring airports or the rail.”³⁸

“Sustainable development”: Transport shifts, “environmental protection” and “mutual conditioning”

Environmental arguments play an important role both in the ORA and the proposals of the MKRO. The “priority of the railways as against the road” as well as the extension of the HST network are said to aim at transport shifts for the reduction of transport emissions.³⁹ In general, the ORA suggests to “relieve, rehabilitate, protect” environmental resources through corresponding measures. It also proposes to consider “ecological structural weakness” of certain regions and asserts that “the environment is an important location factor.” A conflict between economy and ecology is denied since they would maintain a relation of “mutual conditioning.”⁴⁰

In the conception of the EMR “resource protection and a sustainable urban development” are said to be particularly important for the development of these large urban regions. To limit and concentrate urban growth, establish compensatory ecological spaces and reduce emissions are the corresponding measures proposed.⁴¹ The overall objective of a sustainable spatial development is then defined in the

³⁵ Deutscher Bundestag 1997, §9, §13

³⁶ BMV 1992, 5

³⁷ BMBau 1993, 15, 16, 20

³⁸ *idem* 1997, 54

³⁹ *idem* 1993, 15; *idem* 1997a, 53

⁴⁰ *idem* 1993, 12

⁴¹ *idem* 1993, 54

ROG as a development that “harmonizes the social and economic spatial claims with the ecologic functions of space and leads towards a lasting, spatially equilibrated order.”⁴²

4.3.2 Regional government

The argumentation of the *Land* in respect to the HST appears to focus two main objectives: The integration into the Transeuropean networks and the strengthening of the business location Baden-Württemberg and its capital region (EMR), thus in principal coinciding with the federal state. Also the achievement of implicit environmental benefits is attributed to the envisaged transformations, labelled as “sustainable”.

The derived measures concentrate in particular on the development of the *Filder* area as a new regional growth pole, the improvement of regional rail connections and the re-development of the central station area as a high-grade location. A corresponding operationalization strategy for the linkage of these measures has been the creation of the VRS which provides enhanced management capacities at the scale of the urban region.

“TEN integration” and “accessibility improvements”

The objective of integrating the region into the Transeuropean networks forms the starting point of the plans for the HST in Baden-Württemberg. Together with the higher capacity and shorter travel times, it is the main justification given for the initial choice of the underground track variant “in order to improve the favourable position of the region in Europe.”⁴³

Consequently the general transport plan demands the upgrading of the track Karlsruhe-Basel, both possible HST connections with France via Karlsruhe and Mannheim as well as the new HST track Stuttgart-Ulm. The project Stuttgart21 is explicitly said to contribute to the aim of “integrating Baden-Württemberg into the Transeuropean network”.⁴⁴

With respect to the HST connection of the airport a shift of short-distance flights to the HST is expected to augment the offer of European and intercontinental flights. The envisaged measures are said to “further increase the importance of the airport for the region”. Accordingly, the catchment area is seen to be the region since also other international airports would contribute to the accessibility of Baden-Württemberg (Frankfurt, Munich, Basel, Strasbourg, Zurich).⁴⁵

In the same sense, the *Regierungspräsidium* Stuttgart emphasizes that Stuttgart21 would “close a gap in the European HST network”. Since the process of European integration would further increase the transport volume, a shift of the transport growth to the railways is said to be necessary. The HST would

⁴² Bundestag 1997, §1 (2)

⁴³ VMBW 1992, 8, 16

⁴⁴ *idem* 1995, 9, 16, 85, 86

⁴⁵ *idem* 1995, 108, 111

thus contribute to a “higher transport share of the railways” and its connection to the airport would help to “shift short distance flights”, but also to “gain valuable transport capacities”.⁴⁶

At the same time the linkage of the improvements for the regional rail transport to the construction of the new HST track represents an important argument of the regional government. The initial choice of the track variant is justified with a better accessibility of the *Filder* area and Tübingen/ Reutlingen.⁴⁷ Equally, in the evaluation of the Stuttgart21 project the improved accessibility of these areas and the possibilities for travel time reductions in regional transport relations are emphasized.⁴⁸

“The predicted growth of the transport volume on this relation [Stuttgart-Ulm] shows that the HST is oriented both at the future and at the demand, and that it contributes to an increase of the railway share in the total transport volume” (RP Stuttgart, 1997a, 26; *translation*)

“EMR Stuttgart”: “Scale enlargement”, competitiveness, accessibility

The strengthening of the business location Baden-Württemberg appears as an overall aim in the argumentation of the regional government, stated in a parliament decision in December 1992. In this respect, the construction of the HST figures in a prominent place as a corresponding measure that improves the international accessibility, orientates the spatial location of economic activity and enhances the creation of employment. In more general terms these ideas can be found in the development vision of the advisory board on innovation which points out that “infrastructure stays a condition for a flourishing economy” and should thus be extended and modernized. It also recommends to favour the “regional concentration of performing centers of competence (cluster)”, while the process of globalization is identified as the driving force that divides active winners from passive losers.⁴⁹

“We will belong to the winners of globalization if we flexibly adapt our structures in state and society to the changed context . . . Without [initiative and reforms], growth, prosperity and the necessary competitiveness of Baden-Württemberg are endangered” (IBBW 1998, 8; *translation*)

Also the *Regierungspräsidium* emphasized that an “improved railway connection strengthens the business location Baden-Württemberg and relieves the agglomeration”. In comparison to the examined alternative variants it highlights as “additional advantages” of the proposal that “the economy benefits from fast and liable connections” and that the “trade fair is fostered by the connection to interregional rail”. In a somewhat enthusiastic confusion in the support for the project it is even argued that “Stuttgart21 creates 24.000 jobs in the inner-city, especially in the high-grade service sector”.⁵⁰

Finally, it is the concept of EMR introduced by the regional development plan which brings together international accessibility, economic development and spatial structure of the region. The significance of

⁴⁶ RP Stuttgart 1997a, 1, 26; *idem* 1997b, 53, 73

⁴⁷ VMBW 1992, 12,16

⁴⁸ RP Stuttgart 1997a, 25

⁴⁹ IBBW 1998, 8

⁵⁰ RP Stuttgart 1997a, 7, 25 *emphasis added*

the region as “transit-land” and “crossroads” and the “further increasing international and global interweaving” are the arguments for an “adequate adaptation” of the infrastructure. The extension of the airport and its integration into the transeuropean network as well as the construction of a new trade fair “close to airport with performing road and rail connections” should be achieved “to support the functions of the metropolitan region”. The TENs ought to form the connection between the EMR Stuttgart and other EMRs in Germany and abroad, it is argued. Therefore, the cross-border railway lines to Switzerland should also be extended since “in the view of the region they belong to the TEN”.⁵¹

“For the European Metropolitan Region Stuttgart the regional structure plan sees a need for action especially in respect to international accessibility and the interconnection between the European Metropolitan Regions. Therefore, the plan emphasizes the further development and the interconnection of the transeuropean infrastructures: Airport [Landesflughafen], high-speed transport on rail and performing roadways.” (WMBW 2000, B69; *translation*)

The basic assumption is that in terms of competitiveness, to strengthen the center will strengthen the region if a “continuous exchange of services and information within Baden-Württemberg by performing transport and communication infrastructure and all kinds of networking” is achieved. Thus a concentration of internationally relevant facilities and infrastructures is envisaged, underlining the HST, the new trade fair and the airport. Equally, the general transport plan emphasizes the development of the airport as a “vital interest for the export oriented regional economy” and “location factor”.⁵²

“The European Metropolitan Region Stuttgart should in particular contribute to the strengthening of the capacity for performance and competitiveness of the Land in Europe. Therefore, especially in the European Metropolitan Region Stuttgart, the institutions and infrastructures of international importance need to be maintained, expanded and located.” (WMBW 2000, 54; *translation*)

The principal instrument with which the regional government started to tackle these objectives for the Stuttgart region is the creation of the association of the Stuttgart region (VRS). Already before the concept of the European metropolitan region was officially introduced, the discussions about the statute and functions of this new entity between 1991 and '92 indicate that the basic ideas were present. As a result, the strategic competencies assigned to the VRS coincide precisely with the recommendations of the MKRO for the institutional cooperation in EMRs, as does the ultimate objective of the VRS stated in the law for its creation:

“The position of the Stuttgart Region in the European and international competition shall be strengthened. For that, the regional cooperation shall be improved by the foundation of a regional association (VRS), also in order to resolve the aggravating problems between the city and its surroundings and to fulfil the corresponding tasks of regional significance purposefully.” (Landtag 1994, 1; *translation*)

⁵¹ WMBW 2000, 54, B43, B45

⁵² VMBW 1995, 107, 109

However, in a future perspective this focus on the Stuttgart region might become further extended. On the one hand, the general transport plan demands to increase the HST offer for more day-return trips especially in the relation Stuttgart–Mannheim.⁵³ Furthermore, in the regional development plan it is argued that the connections between the three urban regions of Stuttgart, Karlsruhe and Mannheim/Heidelberg should become intensified, since in respect to their demographic weight this “polycentric EMR Rhine-Neckar” could “actively accept the challenge of a further expanding EU.”⁵⁴

On the other hand, for the city of Ulm a more autonomous development is envisaged. The designation as “Ulm - city of science”, the reinforcement of the location of high-grade services and the assignation of a “relief function” as alternative for the large agglomerations Munich and Stuttgart are used to justify the connection of Ulm to the new HST track. In spite of the proximity to these EMRs (100km), the city and its agglomeration are rather expected to “give impulses” for the rural areas.⁵⁵ Hence, the HST appears as an instrument for the shaping of a new space functional configuration within the region, providing both *interdependent* and *independent* development perspectives.

Filder area: “Development zone”, “transport hub”, “growth pole”

The above mentioned arguments appear to converge upon the *Filder* area as a site of strategic development. Already in the 1992 statement of the regional government concerning the track proposals of the DB it is argued that the chosen variant with an option for an HST station in the *Filder* area provides the opportunity to “develop an integrated transport system that points to the future with especially positive effects on the favourable position of the region”.⁵⁶ Eight years later the regional development plan finally states that through the connection with the HST and the regional railway lines the airport would “gain as a location for business oriented facilities”.⁵⁷ This objective has become clearer in the course of the planning process.

The development vision elaborated in 1994 already starts from the fact the “urban and transport pressure will increase with the *envisaged* extension of the airport *and* HST connection”, thus exploring the corresponding development potentials.⁵⁸ An “increasing importance as central development space” is identified as well as the favourable location factors of transport infrastructures and the proximity of university facilities, research institutes and the regional capital. The study proposes a central “development zone” stretching from the airport approximately 20km eastwards for the concentration of urban settlement, the location of focal points for housing and business and a connection with the *S-Bahn* system.⁵⁹ In the long run however, the need to expand this development zone is already acknowledged so that a new regional development axis is suggested to admit future growth.⁶⁰

⁵³ VMBW 1995, 83

⁵⁴ *idem* 2000, B69

⁵⁵ IMBW 1989, 11; WMBW 2000, B72

⁵⁶ VMBW 1992, 12

⁵⁷ *idem* 2000, B47

⁵⁸ KEBW 1994, 2 *emphasis added*

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 3, 4

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, 11, 13

Economic activities within this zone should be concentrated around the airport in a “business and service park *Filder*” featuring four components: an intermunicipal business area, a service area of the Stuttgart region (VRS), an “innovation center transport and communication” and the new trade fair with congress facilities. Furthermore, the study also proposes the use of the new HST track connecting the airport and the city center for *S-Bahn* shuttle-services that could include a new station at the entertainment center “SI-centrum”.⁶¹

In sum, the development vision defends the creation of a new regional centrality provided with an excellent accessibility, densely interweaving existing facilities and new components. Yet it avoids the label of “center” in favour of more open spatial denominators such as “zone” or “park”. The general transport plan appears to be more direct in this respect when it argues that the stations for HST and regional rail at the airport represent a “great opportunity for the creation of new regional growth poles”.⁶²

Therefore it is not surprising that the *Regierungspräsidium* demands of the DB to further develop the variant with a through-station closest to airport and trade fair and create a “transport hub”, thus also discarding the initially envisaged terminus. The *Filder* area would “suggest itself as a complementation to the *Oberzentrum*⁶³ Stuttgart”. Yet the question of competition and oversupply in terms of housing and business space between the city centre and the *Filder* area is also raised, but remains unanswered.⁶⁴

The strategic interest of the regional government to develop the *Filder* area into a new growth pole is particularly evident in the changing designations of the trade fair and the airport. Whereas the statement about the DB proposal in 1992 only mentions the connection of “Stuttgart airport”, the general transport plan starts to consequently employ the designation as “airport of the region” (*Landesflughafen*).⁶⁵ In the same sense, while the first expert study in 1993 still envisaged an “international trade fair Stuttgart region”, the second study in 1998 only refers to the “trade fair of the region” (*Landesmesse*).⁶⁶

Finally, the strategic interest in the pursuit of the location site for the new trade fair even leads the regional government to take legal action in order to break local resistances. The law approved in 1999 thus demands unmistakably that the trade fair has to be provided with “performing railway and road network connections and located in spatial proximity to the *Landesflughafen*.”⁶⁷

Central station area: High-grade functions, “renaissance of the railway stations”

The development of the central station area appears as a relatively generic objective in comparison to the plans for the *Filder* area. First and foremost the regional government categorically rejected the initial plans of the DB to locate the station outside the city center since public transport connections would be

⁶¹ KEBW 1994, 18, 26

⁶² VMBW 1995, 86

⁶³ Highest level in the German planning hierarchy of central places.

⁶⁴ RP Stuttgart 1997a, 5, 26, 29; *idem* 1997b, 202

⁶⁵ VMBW 1992; *idem* 1995

⁶⁶ SMK/ Weidleplan 1993; VRS/ Weidleplan 1998

⁶⁷ Landtag Baden-Württemberg 1998, 1

affected very negatively.⁶⁸ In general, the possibility for the redevelopment of the railway land in the city center is welcomed as a “great opportunity for transport and urban development”.⁶⁹ However, when getting more specific, the arguments resemble those presented by the DB (see below).

Thus, the *Regierungspräsidium* emphasizes the “synergy-effects between urban and transport development”, refers to the “renaissance of the railway stations” and celebrates the opportunities resulting from modern railway operation for urban development and the “*Zukunftsfähigkeit*”⁷⁰ of the transport mode railways.⁷¹ The most precise proposal with respect to the HST station area development is made in the regional development plan:

“The favorable accessibility of stations in the HST network should be taken advantage of even more by the development of their surrounding areas as high-grade locations for services and housing.” (WMBW 2000, 32; *translation*)

Environment: “Air transport substitution”, “urban concentration”, “compatibility with economy”

Improving environmental conditions implicitly forms part of the argumentation for HST integration, especially in reference to transport shifts and “substitution”. The fact that better regional rail connections can contribute to shift car transport to the railways is an argument initially used to support the track choice of the regional government, especially concerning the *Filder* area and the South of the region.⁷² More concretely, the change in the modal shift of the feeder transport of the airport is underlined as a positive effect of the railway connection of the airport.⁷³

For the air transport it is argued that the development of the Transeuropean railway network will reduce the volume of short distance flights, while the demand for middle range and intercontinental flights will further increase. This increase should be mastered “in the most environmentally friendly way”, but also “substitution potentials” should be used by the connection of the airport to the rail. The development of the Transeuropean network is thus presented as a “basic condition for a sustainable transport world.”⁷⁴

At the same time, the modifications of the urban structure and accessibility patterns linked to the HST are considered to be compatible with environmental concerns, although a conflict potential is always recognized. Therefore, the development vision for the *Filder* area concludes that “it is possible to meet economic and ecologic requirements.”⁷⁵

⁶⁸ VMBW 1992, 8

⁶⁹ *idem* 1995, 86

⁷⁰ “Aptitude for the future” – In the German discourse, “*Nachhaltigkeit*” (sustainability) and “*Zukunftsfähigkeit*” often appear as synonyms, yet without reflecting the shift of signification towards arbitrariness.

⁷¹ RP Stuttgart 1997a, 1, 8, 9

⁷² VMBW 1992, 12, 16

⁷³ *idem* 1995, 109; RP Stuttgart 1997, 26

⁷⁴ WMBW 2000, B44, B46

⁷⁵ KEBW 1994, 4

Equally, the *Regierungspräsidium* finds that in respect to the project Stuttgart21 “unavoidable contradictions to the objectives of protection of open space, saving of landscapes and agriculture have to be accepted”, since on the other hand the “railway land conversion reduces the urban development pressure and land consumption.”⁷⁶ The advisory board on innovation underlines in this respect that “the consensus in society and the technical-economic development” must not come into conflict. The economic development has to be compatible with the ecologic and social conditions.”⁷⁷

4.3.3 Deutsche Bahn AG (DB)

Rationalization and the urge for market share increases are the driving forces of HST development in the perspective of the DB, summarized in the formula of a “railway station renaissance”. Here, apart from appearing as a condition for the competitiveness of the territory, the argument of “TEN integration” thus also refers to a general scenario of railway modernization. Furthermore an interdependence of infrastructure and urban redevelopment in the center is defended in order to justify the solution that best matches with the new development strategy of the railway company. Together with the “environmental advantages” and the possibility of “auto-financing” attributed to the integration of the HST, the DB therefore employs a multisectoral range of arguments synthesized under the umbrella of a “synergy concept”.

“Railway station renaissance”

The argumentation of the DB has to be regarded against the background of the company's privatization in 1994. The planning process for Stuttgart21 coincides with the first years of profit-oriented practice: Financial deficits and a constantly decreasing transport market share are the starting points of the development strategy designed by a new management. Therefore, the conditioning pressures for an increased productivity by means of specialized operation, travel time reduction and rationalization of facilities as defined in the investment strategy “Netz21” in 1995.⁷⁸ This streamlining of railway business is however portrayed as a process of (technological) modernization where the HST functions as a trigger for an increased attractiveness of the railways.

“Despite all efforts, the offer and facilities of the DB are often not yet in conformity with the market . . . whereas on the few newly constructed tracks in Germany as well as abroad considerable economic success is achieved with speeds of 250km/h and higher.” (DB 1996a, 6; *translation*)

Thus a “renaissance” of the railway stations is announced that links the envisaged infrastructural renewal to the functional renewal of the station and its surroundings.⁷⁹ The projects “21”, in particular, planned in several German cities rise from this basic idea of using railway facilities in the city centers for urban re-

⁷⁶ RP Stuttgart 1997, 7

⁷⁷ IBBW 1998, 8

⁷⁸ DB Projekt 1996a, 1,5

⁷⁹ *idem* 1996a, 6, 32; “The renaissance of the railway stations” was equally the programmatic title of a travelling exhibition organized by the German architects association (BDA) and the DB. This shows that the formulation served as a common denominator for quite different interests. See: BDA/ DB 1996

development. For this purpose the corresponding facilities had to be discursively debarred as “obsolete”, “outdated”, or as hindering modernization.

The development of Stuttgart21 corresponds to this new enterprise philosophy. Two basic facts were important for the position of the DB: First, the railway node could be functionally resolved with a new through-station located *independently* from the central station and second, the track system of the terminus could become available for urban redevelopment. Thus, while a potential relocation of the central station could be used to exercise pressure, the urban development opportunity constituted the tempting motive.

“Stuttgart kills two birds with one stone: On the one hand it is achieved that the long distance transport does not bypass the city, but stops at the central station. On the other hand, a continuous urban development area of 100ha is gained.” (DB Projekt 1997a, 2; *translation*)

“TEN integration” versus isolation and “regional accessibility”

As a starting point in the argumentation of the DB the references to railway plans at the European (UIC, TEN) and national scale (transport structure plan) underline the legitimation and priority of the project. At the same time the “integration” or “connection” of the urban region (in)to the Transeuropean network is emphasized as “decisive” for its development and exclusively linked to the central station location. It would allow shorter travel times between European cities and connect Stuttgart to important centers abroad: “The metropolises move closer”.⁸⁰ The arguments thus contrast with the initial relocation proposals made by the DB so that the fact of an HST stop at the central station already seems to be an important achievement of Stuttgart21.⁸¹

“For Stuttgart as an enterprise location – and thus for the quality of life and future prospect of the citizens – the integration into this long-distance network is of great importance. Still, transport accessibility is a decisive factor for the economic and cultural life of a city.” (DB Projekt 1998, 1; *translation*)

The benefits of the project for the regional rail transport constitute an important argument, but orientated at the improved HST connections. In particular the enhanced accessibility of the *Filder* area and the airport, as well as of the South of the urban region (Tübingen/ Reutlingen) through the new *Filder* station and the operation of new diameter lines are accentuated. However, the understanding of the regional rail transport as a feeder system for the HST is made explicit, stating that the number of inhabitants which can reach the central station within 45min. will be increased from 2.5 to 3.5mio so that also “The region moves closer”.⁸²

⁸⁰ DB Projekt 1998, 1

⁸¹ *idem* 1996b, 1; *idem* 1997b, 1; *idem* 1997a, 2; *idem* 1997c, 1

⁸² *idem* 1996b, 3; *idem* 1997b, 3,4; *idem* 1997c, 4,5; *idem* 1999, 1

“Urban redevelopment” and “infrastructure renewal”

The attractive exchange between real estate ownership and the financing of new infrastructure became the crucial idea to be optimized throughout the planning process. The urban re-development opportunity for the city figures as a cause and consequence of the new transport infrastructure. However, both would depend on the abandonment of the “outdated terminus” and the clearing of the “obstructing track system”: The specific infrastructure solution of Stuttgart21 appears as inseparable from the conversion project in the center.⁸³

Since the urban development depends on the city’s planning authority, the potentials are pictured in multiple attractive forms regarding physical urban space, new functions and economic effects.⁸⁴

Corresponding to the interests of the DB, the “high-grade” character of the real estate investment and the hypothetical quantification of jobs and inhabitants to be located form key elements of the argumentation.⁸⁵

In this the distinction between the construction of the required space and the creation of employment or attraction of inhabitants has been deliberately blurred. Yet, in the course of the project more emphasis is put on a functional mix to be attained.⁸⁶

”According to preliminary estimations, the cleared railway area allows an urban development with 11.000 inhabitants and 24.000 steady jobs, most of which will be high-grade occupations in the service and the retail sector. This site is in any case predestined for the location of investors of high standing” DB Projekt 1996b, 4; *translation*)

“Environmental advantages”, “transport shifts” and “land conversion”

The environmental advantages attributed to the project are mainly based on two arguments. On the one hand, transport shifts from the road are predicted and quantified in absolute figures for the urban region (5mio. car trips/a) and interregional relations (570mio. km/a).⁸⁷ However, these figures are employed manipulatively if one considers the actual number of car trips in the urban region *on a single day* (1995: 5.03mio.) and the interregional car transport volume only within Baden-Württemberg and without consideration of growth rates (1990: 38bill. km/a).⁸⁸

On the other hand the conversion of the railway land would “reduce the urban development pressure on the city edge”.⁸⁹ Furthermore, general environmental advantages of the transport system railways are

⁸³ DB Projekt 1996a, 84; *idem* 1997a, 1

⁸⁴ *idem* 1996a, 117,118; *idem* 1996b, 4;

⁸⁵ *idem* 1996b, 4

⁸⁶ *idem* 1998, 2

⁸⁷ *idem* 1995; *idem* 1996b, 4

⁸⁸ VRS 1999, 42; VMBW 1995, 52

⁸⁹ DB Projekt 1996a, 118; *idem* 1996b, 5; Nevertheless, in the EIA it is recognized that negative ecological impacts especially on the mineral water deposits and ground water are expected or cannot be excluded, so that compensatory measures should be envisaged. DB Projekt 1996a, 132-134

invoked — such as less consumption of land and energy or less noise and emissions — yet without consideration of the specific characteristics of the HST, apart from beneficial transport shifts.⁹⁰

“Synergy” and “auto-financing”

As a result of the basic project idea, the idea of “auto-financing” holds an important position in the argumentation of the DB. It emphasizes the risk-taking role of the company while at the same time soothing the criticism of those observing the distribution and cost/ benefit relation of public expenses. For the railway company the financial feasibility of the project completely depends on the revenues from real estate development and rail transport increases, each counting for 30% of total costs. “Auto-financing” is thus also a reference to the duties of the city as fixed in the outline agreement.

Therefore, the most prominent feature of the DB argumentation in favour of the envisaged integration of the HST consists in the attribution of “synergy effects” between all mentioned arguments. Their interconnection forms a circular logic of advantages that mutually reinforce each other. The emphasis on the multisectoral constitution of the project provides the particular interests of the company with a broad policy legitimation. Principal expression of this perspective is the title of the pre-project: “The synergy concept” (Fig.IV.32).⁹¹

Fig.IV. 32: “The synergy-concept”, summarized in a diagram; source: DB Projekt 1996, 2 - *modified*



⁹⁰ DB Projekt 1996a, 7; *idem* 1996b, 4;

⁹¹ *idem* 1996b, 2

“Stuttgart21 combines the modernization of the railway node in Stuttgart and the improvement of the transport offer in regional and long distance rail travel with opportunities for urban development, improvements for the environment and an increased attractiveness of the enterprise location Stuttgart.” (DB Projekt 1997b, 1; *translation*)

However, the main criteria the DB uses to evaluate plans and alternatives are chosen to assure its own interests, understood as the conditions for the “synergetic” features: Costs and benefits for the company, travel time reduction for the HST, size of the re-development area and transport shifts from the road.⁹² Therefore the argumentation with which the DB discards alternative proposals finds fault with less transport capacities and higher costs for maintenance, limited urban development possibilities, less revenues from transport growth and longer travel times.⁹³ As a consequence, for the DB the project results in lacking any alternatives in terms of form and contents, apart from the zero-option that is kept open.

Finally, it should be noted that any explicit arguments for the construction of an HST station *at the airport* are missing in the documents, as well as references to the corresponding transport shifts. It is clear that the airport stop has never been an objective for the DB, since in 1992 the variant with a track close to the airport had been discarded because the track “requires the highest investments, while the higher costs . . . cannot be justified by an additional transport potential”.⁹⁴

4.3.4 City of Stuttgart

For the city, the integration of the HST has been conditioned by the dilemma of infrastructural financing and urban development. An important effort has therefore been made to separate these components, first conceptually and at last factually. Since the primary concern of the city has been the opportunity to enhance the process of economic structural change, the connection to the TEN as well as the improvements of the regional accessibility are interpreted as crucial measures for this purpose. Secondary effects as the possibility to extend the urban park areas or obtain environmental advantages provide argumentative support for the envisaged urban development that, after all, should be “sustainable”.

“Railway project” and “urban development project”

The argumentation of the city is characterized by the attempt to maintain a careful but theoretical separation between “the railway project” and “the urban development project.”⁹⁵ Thus, arguments concerning the transport dimension appear to be limited to the general “improvement” of accessibility. Instead of relating the two components conceptually, a self-restriction to the questions of urban development has been practiced that reflects the key interests of the city. Equally, the subject of the development of the *Filder* area has not been articulated or dealt with by the city publicly. Nevertheless the

⁹² DB Projekt 1996a, 102; *idem* 1997b, 8

⁹³ *idem* 1997a, 3; *idem* 1997b, 2, 3, 7

⁹⁴ *idem* 1996a, 81

⁹⁵ Stadt Stuttgart 1996b, 8

principle of the project Stuttgart21 – infrastructure financing through urban re-development – has been defended in spite of the inherent contradiction, since questioning this would have meant to question the project as a whole. The “three important themes” in the project Stuttgart21 for the city are identified as: The improvement of the inter-/regional rail transport, brownfield instead of greenfield development as a “chance for an important step towards sustainable urban development”, and the orientation of the city towards its central parks.⁹⁶

„Stuttgart21 is based on a project of the Deutsche Bahn AG, that aims at the redesign of the railway node in Stuttgart . . .” (Stadt Stuttgart 1996c, 11; *translation*)

„However, Stuttgart21 is much more than a rail- and transport project. Since in the future the entire tracks at the ground level and the secondary sites will no longer be needed, for us the chance emerges to redevelop a downtown area of about 100ha, as well as extending the parks . . . considerably.” (Stadt Stuttgart 1997a, 5; *translation*)

“Structural change” and “park extension”

The most important aspect for the city is thus the potential for urban development in the area behind the central station. Recognizing the favourable accessibility of the area, the first development framework proposes functions such as services, retail, culture and high-grade housing. The development should “underline the central significance of the capital as the center of the urban region and economic, financial and trading center of Baden-Württemberg.”

Furthermore, as main objectives, the connection of green spaces and the “extension and strengthening of the city center” are accentuated.⁹⁷ The constant indication of the calculated building space in the units of “jobs” and “inhabitants” (relation 70:30) shows the significance attributed to the project as a measure to “counteract the negative trend” of suburbanization, experienced massively at the beginning of the 90s. It is thus also an argument for the project as an employment creation program and a signal for economic structural change.⁹⁸

„Stuttgart21 is a project of inner urban development, that implies the creation of dwellings for 11.000 inhabitants and space for 24.000 jobs.” (Stadt Stuttgart 1997, 7; *translation*)

„Stuttgart21 offers the capital Stuttgart and its region a unique development opportunity that no comparable European economic metropolis has at present. This project is not only a vision or a vague idea, but rather an important programme for urban development, infrastructure, investment and employment creation for the city and the surrounding region.” (Stadt Stuttgart 2001; *translation*)

The process of form-finding for the area was dominated by the two contradictory demands of high building densities and consideration of the local climatic implications. In the urban design competition the jury voted for those contributions that allowed a high densification of the profitable areas close to the station and at the same time an extension of the park to liberate the decisive ventilation axes. The final

⁹⁶ Stadt Stuttgart 1997a, 7

⁹⁷ *idem* 1996b, 8

⁹⁸ *idem* 1996a


recommendation of two projects representative for each of these orientations is characteristic in this respect.⁹⁹ Furthermore an urban structure based on conventional blocks was considered the most flexible for development.

The structure plan defines the function and character of the conversion area mainly in qualitative terms. It differentiates an extension of the urban park (20ha) and three building sectors. Next to the HST station (29ha) “functions of interregional centrality especially services, retail, cultural or special facilities” are envisaged. Enterprise headquarters are said to be “desirable and have priority” while a housing-share of 20% “should be strived for.” The other two sectors (28ha and 32ha) are subdivided in mixed use areas and a zone for “high-grade housing and offices” (“science park”) close to the urban park. Two sites are envisaged for major leisure and educational facilities in the area, while correspondingly, for the old city center a “city gallery” that would combine retail and exhibition space is planned.¹⁰⁰ However, apart from the recognition of a generally favourable accessibility, references to the specificity of the HST in respect to the functional development are not contained in any of the documents.

The expert study on the development possibilities for the station area sector proposed to consider the project an “extension of the inner city”, to achieve a specific functional mix (45% office space, 20% entertainment and culture, 20% retail, 15% housing) and a complementarity with the old city center.¹⁰¹ With respect to the office space it was expected that the project would mainly lead to a relocation of regional firms. The economic promotion of the region should thus focus the attraction of interregional firms in order to avoid empty capacities.¹⁰²

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the authors identified the “SI-Centrum” as a “disadvantageous location” that would keep visitors from the city center — a trend that is estimated to become reinforced with the opening of the new trade fair (Fig.IV.33).¹⁰³

Fig.IV. 33: Three out of 10 urban design proposals for the central area – The focus on the “urban development project” deflects from other implications of HST integration; source: Stadt Stuttgart 1997b, 9



⁹⁹ Stadt Stuttgart 1997b, 11

¹⁰⁰ *idem* 1997a, 20-25

¹⁰¹ Prognos 1997, XII

¹⁰² *ibid.*, XV

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, VI

“TEN connection” and “regional accessibility”

The city mentions the fact that the HST will finally stop at the central station as an important achievement regarding the previous plans of the DB. Furthermore, to “become connected to the European HST network” is an important concern in the argumentation. The “special significance” of the project Stuttgart21 would rely on the fact that it forms part of the “*Magistrale*” (main transport axis) Paris-Budapest. These features are thus suggested to be exclusively related to the infrastructural solution of the project Stuttgart21.¹⁰⁴ Yet the change of the external accessibility, last but not least in respect to the *Filder* station, and the potential consequences for urban structures are not made a subject.

In regards to the regional rail transport, the relevance of the project is seen in the increased offer that would “benefit the whole *Land*” and result in “more intensive relations between regional middle-sized centers, main centers and Stuttgart”.¹⁰⁵ A consideration of possible space-functional implications has not been undertaken. Thus, although the potential accessibility changes between (urban-) regional centers are considerable, the intensification of relations and the fact that this will be achieved through the railways suffice as objectives.

“The transformation of our central station from a terminal into a through-station allows the connection to the high-speed network in the very center of the city, and sustainably improves the railway connections within the region and beyond.” (Stadt Stuttgart 1997, 5; *translation*)

“Sustainable urban development”

The objective of a sustainable urban development can be found in all official documents.¹⁰⁶ In this, a particular emphasis is put on the aspect of land consumption due to the topographic restrictions of the city and the fact that its land reserves are practically exhausted. Since the project Stuttgart21 is based on the conversion of railway land, it is presented as an important contribution to a sustainable urban development in accordance with the city’s orientation towards re-development and densification.¹⁰⁷ Apart from that, the concept appears as a declaration of intent regarding the consideration of environmental aspects in the further planning stages and construction (energy consumption, construction materials, logistics, local climate, waste, protection of mineral springs).¹⁰⁸

During the period that the international building exhibit (IBA) was envisaged, the concept of sustainable urban development has been related to broader questions and projects such as the “social city”, “environmentally compliant mobility” and an “open planning culture”.¹⁰⁹ Yet, due to the linkage of these

¹⁰⁴ Stadt Stuttgart 1996b, 8; *idem* 1996d, 4; *idem* 1997, 5, 9

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *idem* 1996b, 14; *idem* 1996c, 3; *idem* 1997a, 34; *idem* 1998

¹⁰⁷ *idem* 1996c, 1; *idem* 1998

¹⁰⁸ *idem* 1996b, 14

¹⁰⁹ *idem* 1999, 2, 3

concepts to the *event* of the IBA, a significant influence on the Stuttgart21 project (and others) has become less probable after the cancellation.

4.3.5 Verband Region Stuttgart - VRS

According to its vocation and mission and in reference to the EMR concept, the VRS connects the integration of the HST to the strengthening of the competitiveness and structural change in the urban region. Thus, the relocation of the trade fair constitutes the second key measure that is defended while the re-development of the center is left to the competence of the city. The envisaged projects are nevertheless said to be inscribed in a strategy aiming at a sustainable spatial development and environmental protection.

“EMR” and “structural change”

The revised urban regional development plan states as its basic orientations the enhancement of structural change and education, aim at sustainable development and make Stuttgart a “region of innovation and mobility”. The plan incorporates the concept of “European metropolitan regions” according to MKRO, thus emphasizing the special importance and “motor function” of the Stuttgart region for Baden-Württemberg as well as the need for high-grade infrastructure, exhibition and research facilities.¹¹⁰ It proposes to develop the urban region as a unit with a polycentric structure and complementary centers in conformity with the principle of “decentralized concentration”.¹¹¹

In respect to the general development of the *Filder* area the plan introduces a new regional development axis, arguing that it “considers the intended further concentration of settlement along the planned interregional railway- and *S-Bahn* track airport-Wendlingen-Kirchheim/ Teck”.¹¹² Moreover, the location site for the new trade fair next to the airport is fixed in the plan.

In a study elaborated in cooperation with the chambers of commerce (IHK), the Stuttgart region is positioned in reference to German and European (urban) regions, analyzing its strengths and weaknesses. Against the backdrop of the increasing international competition with “European metropolises”, the study identifies the need for “close cooperation between municipalities, economy and politics”.¹¹³ In its conclusions it considers “continuous innovation” as the “only promising possibility to . . . provide a development advantage that can ensure prosperity and employment”. Consequently, the proposed measures focus on education and qualification, the fostering of “sectoral development focal points (cluster)” as well as the improvement of the regional infrastructure, mentioning Stuttgart21, ICT and the new trade fair (Fig.IV.34).¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ VRS 1998, 7, 11


¹¹¹ *idem* 1998, 16, 23

¹¹² *idem* 1998, 57

¹¹³ VRS/ IHK 1998, 3,15

¹¹⁴ *idem*, 15-18

Fig.IV. 34: Regional structure plan – integration of airport and HST station with a new regional development axis; source: VRS 1998



TEN connection” and “airport connection”

With respect to the demanded accessibility improvements, Stuttgart21 is said to serve both the connection of the urban region with the national and international railway network and a demand oriented development of the (regional) public transport. In particular the accessibility and interconnection of the medium-sized centers would be improved.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the airport’s direct connection to the international and national HST network is said to be necessary “in order to reduce travel times to/ from the airport”, thus neglecting its rather regional catchment area. A “considerable effect on location choices” is attributed to the airport so that the capacities of land and air facilities “should be adapted”.¹¹⁶

“Competitiveness” and trade fair accessibility

The argumentation of the VRS appears to be particularly important in relation to the relocation of the trade fair, for which it brought forward a partial revision of the regional development plan and commissioned a revision of the study on potential relocation sites. In this study, the designation of the trade fair as “Landesmesse” is fully assumed. Its location in the Stuttgart region is considered “evident” according to its classification as “EMR”.¹¹⁷ However, the study essentially argues with accessibility criteria

¹¹⁵ VRS 1998, 213; *idem* 1999, 223

¹¹⁶ *idem*, 233, 234

¹¹⁷ VRS/ Weidleplan 1998, 1;

for the location choice: The maximal distance from the airport should be 45min. by combined transport modes, while also the proximity of an HST station should be guaranteed (i.e. five stations in Baden-Württemberg).

Together, these criteria allow no other location than the *Filder* area. The possibility of developing this facility in Karlsruhe, equally planning to expand and relocate its own trade fair but on an available conversion site close to the central station has not been discussed. Additionally, the competition pressure is underlined in reference to other important trade fair locations in Germany such as Hannover, Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich and Cologne already provided with an HST station.¹¹⁸

“Sustainable spatial development” and “environmental protection”

The aim of a sustainable spatial development is stated in the VRS development plan as a basic principle, especially related to resource consumption and conservation, and the “extension of the transport, information and communication infrastructure while safeguarding the environment”. Yet the concept is not explicitly linked to the integration of the HST or the project Stuttgart21, although the environmental advantage of “developing the center of the region and saving open space” is underlined.¹¹⁹

The comparative study elaborated with the IHK does not mention sustainability, but indicates a particular understanding of “environment”, underlining its “importance for the local population” and as a location factor. Arguing on the level of the enterprise, economic growth is even said to improve environmental protection.¹²⁰

“Factors such as an intact environment and sufficient open space are not only essential bases of life for the population of the Stuttgart region, they also have a great importance for subjective preferences in location choices.” (VRS/IHK 1998, 18)

“Environmental protection is already today an integrated part of production processes and the development of products. That means: Economic growth stands simultaneously also for growth of ‘integrated environmental protection.’” (VRS/ IHK 1998, 22; *translation*)

¹¹⁸ VRS/ Weidleplan 1998, 6-9

¹¹⁹ VRS 1998, 15, 29

¹²⁰ VRS/ IHK 1998, 18, 22

4.4 Stuttgart/ Baden-Württemberg: - reconstruction of the planning discourse

In the case of Stuttgart, the planning discourse is characterized by a broad consensus between all public actors in partnership with the (privatized) railway company DB. This consensus is, however, not the outcome of a discussion that allowed the approximation of previously differing positions but rather results from a coincidence of different strategies: The policy orientations of the national government and the MKRO, the “metropolitan” development policy of the *Land* and VRS, and the rationalization course of the DB. The city of Stuttgart follows in the same direction, but without supplying differential impulses.

As common denominators of the employed arguments appear the “European metropolitan region” (EMR) and the Transeuropean networks. These concepts are closely interrelated and deal in an integrated way with transport and spatial development at various scales. In particular, the objectives of competitiveness and economic development as well as environmental concerns are included in these concepts, frequently brought together under the heading of “sustainable development”.

4.4.1 Discursive concepts and coalition

The first guiding concept for the integration of the HST is the definition of “European metropolitan regions.” It has been initiated in parallel by the national government and the *Land* at the beginning of the 90s. A mutual influence of these developments as well as of those in other German regions is evident due to the constitution and task of the MKRO that also first applies this designation in its action framework in 1995.

The new concept represents a significant modification of the spatial planning orientation in Germany. A focus on seven major urban regions that are attributed a “European” character is certainly a political challenge in a federal state constituted of 16 region states and their respective capitals, but also regarding a largely polycentric settlement structure. The introduction of the term “Metropole” marks the intended difference and sets a new standard, while it also allows the derivation of new claims.

From the national perspective the EMRs are considered primarily as an instrument to enhance competitiveness and an equal territorial distribution of economic development potentials. Taking the model of “decentralized concentration” as a starting point, it is assumed that stimulating effects will be generated for the surroundings (“motor function”) and contribute to the aim of equal living conditions.

For this, a set of preconditions and characteristics is suggested: The extended scale and open delimitation of the EMRs, a polynuclear structure with specialized and complementary centers, the safeguarding of the (urban) environment, the concentration of international facilities, an intensified institutional cooperation and most of all a performing interregional accessibility and interconnection of the EMRs guaranteed by their international airports and the HST network.

The envisaged growth of these urban regions is at the same time understood as part of a “sustainable development”. Thus the dualism of economy and ecology is rhetorically resolved in statements of “mutual conditioning” and the denial of inherent contradictions. However, the understanding of “environment” stays characterized by its presentation as a protected resource and location factor, as well as by the proposal of a (spatial) compensation of (urban) growth effects.

Due to its own analysis (e.g. advisory board on innovation) and based on the role attributed to the EMRs, the regional government of Baden-Württemberg concentrates its efforts on the development of its capital region. The insistence on the extension and relocation of the trade fair next to the airport, the incorporation of a new HST station, the creation of a new institutional framework (VRS), the focus on the regional accessibility of the *Filder* area and the additional financial support to ensure the realization of the Stuttgart21 project clearly point to the leading role of the Land. In order to obtain additional demographic and economic weight the regional government even speculates with an extended “EMR Rhine-Neckar”. With the EMR concept the region state has thus assumed a new protagonism due to its responsibility for regional infrastructure and facilities and the parallel influence on economic policies.

The VRS results in being the effective operationalization of the EMR concept. The new institution helps to accelerate the trade fair decision, prepares the legal framework for the Stuttgart21 project, intensifies the cooperation between actors and finally also provides additional financial support when the project is at stake. However, due to its mission and recent creation regarding the HST project the VRS does not contribute significantly with own concepts or modifications, but acts as the executive of the interests of the *Land* and the regional economy (IHK), also as against local resistances.

For the city of Stuttgart, the emerging discourse as well as the resulting concrete projects are interpreted as welcome opportunities for dealing with some of its principal problems. It thus identifies the chance to accelerate the process of structural change, improve its deficient international positioning, ease the effects of suburbanization and compensate for its topographical limitations. The city also directly benefits from the envisaged projects through its shareholdership in the airport and the trade fair company.

However, the approach of the city results in being opportunistic rather than strategic. Already visible in the disintegrated development of the “SI-Centrum” in 1993, the conceptual deficits become particularly evident with the untimely signing of the outline agreement for Stuttgart21, where the quantification of “space for 11.000 inhabitants and 24.000 jobs” and the extension of the urban park are the only concrete development proposals. In contrast, in the elaboration of the space-functional programme the HST actually does *not* play the dominant role that it is attributed for the support of the project as a whole. This reflects both the tactical use made of the shared concepts for HST integration and the effort of the city to conceptually separate infrastructure- and urban development in reaction to the financial pressure.

The second concept of crucial importance for HST integration is that of the Transeuropean networks. The national government invokes the European HST network as an instrument to achieve the EU aim of “cohesion”. Thus, the “integration” of East Germany is demanded, expecting financial support from the structural funds. Accordingly, a national HST network is supposed to ensure “equal living conditions” in all sub areas and classified as a “priority requirement”: The “network” thus appears as an allegory for spatial equity.

To be able to fulfil this task the HST network should be distinguished by a separation of speeds or “disentangled” transport relations. For both the national government and the DB, this is the condition to allow the HST to realize the fastest connections between the principal centers. The coordination with the regional transport then has to be assumed by the regions which are responsible for this task since the privatization of the DB.

However, the interests of the *Land* are equally focused on the realization of the HST network i.e. those lines that connect with its territory. In the perspective of the *Land*, but also of the urban region and the city, getting connected to the network is a necessary condition to maintain competitiveness. Since the HST provides the links between the “motors of growth”, the connection to the network is equally a *classification of place*.

The understanding of “network connection” has been of particular importance concerning the initial proposal of the DB to construct the new main station outside the city center. This background forms a central thread in the argumentation of the public actors that support their plans with the achievement that the HST will not “bypass the city” —an exaggerated scenario that has never been truly considered. Network “integration” or “connection” appear here as decisive features of future development that necessarily contrast with the associative threats of *isolation* and *disconnection*. In this, the concepts of EMR and TEN form complementary components of the same spatial structure model. The planning process indicates that the advocating of the regional railway transport has been negatively affected by this implicit priority thinking.

Another important argument for the integration of the HST is that of the environmental advantages attributed to the transport system railways, and those resulting from the conversion of the railway land. Transport shifts from the road and the air appear in practically all documents as a basic motivation for the integration of the HST. The reduction of road transport due to the reconfiguration of the regional rail transport is additionally emphasized. Only in the case of the airport does the liberation of capacities result in being more important than the possible air transport shifts, but equally requires the airport connection with a new HST station.

Therefore the “environmental bonus” of the railways seems to impede a discussion of more global effects of the different projects. Though reduced transport emissions or land consumption are only hypotheses difficult to prove or refute, especially in a future perspective, their apparent logic tends to convince. Thus, all actors coincide in arguing that the HST network and the project Stuttgart21 support a “sustainable (urban) development”.

4.4.2 Diverging arguments and opposition

Nevertheless, the planning process has been far from a plain harmonization of actors and interests but shows fundamental conflicts which undermine the legitimation and functioning of the emerging discourse coalition. The principal conflicts appear between *public* and *private* parties (DB) as the limits of commensurability appear, between the *regional* and the *national* level due to a divergent motivation regarding the development pace, and between the *leading actors* and a *local opposition* that questions the shared concepts and values.

Public-private conflict

For the argumentation of the DB, the two concepts of “renaissance of the railway stations” and “synergy effects” have been particularly important. Although they appear to be compatible at first sight, the course

of the planning process indicates that these concepts also carry the main potential for conflict between public interests and the calculations of the DB.

In principle, the “renaissance of the railway stations” is only an appealing marketing slogan in the rationalization strategy of the DB. Yet it evokes and allows the relation of many crucial spatial planning objectives: The concentration of urban development and orientation at public transport nodes, the priority of the transport mode railways, the revitalization of inner cities and station areas in particular through an improved interregional accessibility and the development of services and new facilities, or the principle of “brownfield before greenfield” development. It also fits to the concept of a Transeuropean HST network, suggesting a modernization of the railways and its (“outdated”) facilities through the HST.

However, all these (public) objectives appear to depend on the profitability calculation of the (private) railway company that owns the required land and carefully measures the imminent transport potentials. Yet, the “renaissance” eases these conflicts until facts are created. Additionally, the concept is also not meant to refer to airport stations (although here it would be strikingly appropriate) but maintains a somewhat nostalgic focus on the central stations (“cathedrals of engineering”) and their surroundings.

The attribution of “synergy effects” comes to play a similar role. Based on the idea of an exchange between infrastructure financing and urban development, it is soon extended to further aspects: transport offer, economic development, environment. The resulting argumentative mix appears as a positive sum game for all players, too appealing to reject. Yet, placed in a broader framework each single argument results in being rather questionable: The priority and significance of the envisaged transport connections, the effects of transport shifts, the effect of the financing pressure on urban development, the balance of environmental benefits, impacts and risks, etc. Finally the city has sought to find its way out of the synergetic implications through the purchase of the entire development area.

With respect to the airport station, the objectives and interests show a different background that put its discursive justifications into perspective. These demand extending the capacity of the airport through a shift of short distance flights to the HST, while in the case of Stuttgart a catchment area enlargement does not apply due to the proximity of other international airports.

Yet, the principal reason for the location of the HST station has apparently been to assure the accessibility of the new trade fair and the growth pole *Filder* area in general. Since this perspective has a mid- to long term character, for the DB the economic feasibility was not guaranteed. Thus, the construction of the airport station has been a concession of the DB to the regional government, facilitated by a financial contribution from the airport company.¹²¹

Conflict of government levels

The development strategy of the region focuses a swift reinforcement of its capital region. The envisaged projects are closely interrelated and require major investments that include a considerable percentage of federal subsidies, in particular related to the railways (total €2.0bill.). At the same time, this mutual

¹²¹ An expert study has quantified the loss of passengers to the HST with 400.000/a, while a gain of 1mio./a has been predicted due to the improved regional accessibility, so that the new connection could be supported (Jung 1999).

interdependence has reduced the flexibility of the regional government. In contrast,, the priority of the project Stuttgart21 for the DB is very relative and depends on the expected revenues. The fixation of the construction start in 2011 is thus unacceptable from the point of view of the region, but receives the support of the national government that sees its transport budgets shrink while other regional claims have to be attended to, especially in East Germany. The financial responsibility for a previous realization is therefore attributed to the region and its particular ambitions.

This constellation shows that despite largely coinciding positions and concepts, the limitation of financial resources has led to a distributional conflict between the state and the region. While it is clear that only prosperous regions can assume the corresponding costs, Baden-Württemberg also has to look for the means to sustain its financial commitments — possibly at the expense of the public transport system, it is feared.¹²²

Local opposition

The official plans and projects meet a firm criticism uttered by different civic and professional associations from the city and urban region. The lack of dialogue offers made by the promoting actors even leads them to formulate detailed proposals on their own in order to demonstrate the feasibility of alternatives. However, their efforts remain without significant effects except for the realization of a voluntary public participation procedure. Obviously, the argumentation of the opposition does not match with the concepts of EMR and TEN, neither does the unfortunate title of the associated critics: “Umkehr Stuttgart”.

The planning process points to an open conflict between differing value orientations that are both provided with considerable support by institutions and inhabitants. Yet the authorities have failed to establish the appropriate channels in order to allow a constructive antagonism of positions. Instead, the continuous reproduction of a dominant discourse has impeded the political acceptance of alternative concepts that might still turn out to be helpful. Their recognition is however rather improbable since the corresponding loss of face would be too important.

¹²² ProBahn 2001