

IV Case studies: Integrating the HST in four European regions

1 Case selection

The four urban regions of Lyon, Amsterdam, Stuttgart and Barcelona have been chosen for analysis. This selection is based on the criteria and plausibility considerations detailed below. The combination of these urban regions fulfils basic requirements for comparability and appears to correspond well to the research questions. In this context, the problem of spatial terminology in the different national planning systems also needs to be addressed.

1.1 Previous considerations

Currently there are 28 urban regions in Europe where *several* HST station locations are realized or concretely planned. Because of the specific implications of multiple HST stations at the urban-regional scale, these form the totality of potential cases for analysis. 21 urban regions comprise two HST stations within the city area, 5 are provided with (an) HST stop(s) inside the urban region, and 12 with an airport stop (Fig.IV.1).

country	de	de	de	de	de	de	de	fr	fr	fr	fr	fr	fr	it	it	it	it	it	ch	ch	ch	es	es	uk	nl	be	dk	pt
central city	Berlin	Hamburg	Frankfurt	Stuttgart	Munich	Cologne	Hannover	Paris	Lyon	Lille	Poitiers	Calais	Milan	Naples	Genoa	Venice	Rome	Geneva	Zurich	Basel	Madrid	Barcelona	London	Amsterdam	Brussels	Copenhagen	Lisbon	
urban region						1	4			1	1											1						
city area	6	3	1	1	2	2	1	4	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	5	2	2	1	2
airport			→	→				→	→				→					→	→			→		→	→	→		

Fig.IV. 1: European urban regions with several HST station locations; source: UIC (Georger 2001)

1.2 Selection criteria

To select the cases for analysis, three criteria of exclusion have been applied.

- From the outset, the two *capital regions* of London and Paris have been discarded since they represent a substantially different urban scale, which limits the comparability with other urban regions (the Paris region counts not less than 10 HST stops and two international airports - London respectively 5 and 3). Also the Berlin region has been excluded with respect to the scale (6 HST stations, 2 international airports) and due to the specific conditions resulting from the German division and unification.
- Second, the planning process for the integration of the HST had to be in an *advanced stage* so that sufficient documentation was already available. This refers especially to the development of HST related urban projects, since here the degree of implementation largely differs from case to case.

- Third, the language skills of the author have also limited the case selection as an important practical condition.

After applying these criteria of exclusion, 11 urban regions have remained on the panel. In order to obtain a feasible number of cases for analysis, the selection has been further focused on similarities and diversities that correspond to the research questions:

- On the one hand, the spatial scale has been considered by forming three ballpark categories. A direct comparison of small urban regions (< 0.5million inhabitants) with large ones (> 1.5million inhabitants) has been avoided, as it would obviously lead to distortions regarding the implications of several HST station locations.
- Likewise, another criterion has been the existing regional economic dynamic and thus the “role” the HST investment is supposed to play.¹ This perspective assesses whether an urban region already has achieved a high degree in terms of economic dynamics and structural change, or if it aims to do so with the help of the HST. Comparing cases where the approach to the HST in terms of urban development is basically *demand-driven* with those where it is *supply-driven* will necessarily highlight these structural differences, but deflect from the more specific implications of integrating the HST.²
- On the other hand, less variation in terms of scale and economic dynamic should be complemented by a diversity of other crucial parameters that may influence the planning approaches. These are the institutional framework (different countries), urban structures (mono- and polycentric), the HST network position (different number of HST axes and node type), the station locations (different combinations of city center, city area, airport, urban region) as well as the relative position of the airport in the transport system (different sizes).

Based on these considerations, the four urban regions of Lyon, Amsterdam, Stuttgart and Barcelona and their respective regions of Rhône-Alpes, Noord-Holland, Baden-Württemberg and Catalonia have finally been selected (Fig.IV.2).

¹ cf. chapter III.1.2.3; van den Berg/ Pol 1999, 5

² cf. Bertolini/ Spit 1998, 25

country	de	de	de	de	de	de	de	fr	fr	fr	fr	fr	fr	fr	it	it	it	it	it	ch	ch	ch	es	es	uk	nl	be	dk	pt
central city	Berlin	Hamburg	Frankfurt	Stuttgart	Munich	Cologne	Hannover	Paris	Lyon	Lille	Poitiers	Calais	Milan	Naples	Genoa	Venice	Rome	Geneva	Zurich	Basel	Madrid	Barcelona	London	Amsterdam	Brussels	Copenhagen	Lisbon		
exclusion																													
capitals (-3)	XL							XL																XL					
stage (-6)																													
language (-7)																													
similarity																													
scale (-2)		L		L			M		M	M	S	S								M	M		L	L		M			
dynamic (-2)		fc		fc			ct		fc	ct										fc	fc		fc	fc		fc			
diversity																													
urb. structure				pp					m											p	p		m	m		p			
no. HST axes				1					4											1	2		2	1		2			
mio. air pass.				8					5											-	-		-	16		34			

Fig.IV. 2: Exclusion criteria and discarded urban regions (grey); Key:

- scale: S < 0.5mio. inh.; M = 0.5-1.5mio. inh.; L > 1.5mio. inh.
- dynamic: fc - facilitating role of the HST; ct - catalyzing role of the HST
- urban structure: p - polycentric; m – monocentric;
- mio. air passengers: in 1999

1.3 Harmonization of terminology

At this point it is also necessary to clarify some notions in reference to political, administrative and geographical delimitations, since their meanings differ not only between countries and languages, but often also show different interpretations within the same national context. To avoid confusion and simplify the terminology the following regulation has been adopted for this study:

- The term “region” is used only in reference to the *first level below national government*, both as political authority and the corresponding geographical unit. In respect to the case studies, these units are in France the “Région”, in the Netherlands the “Provincie”, in Germany the “Land” and in Spain the “Provincia (autónoma)”. For the Dutch case, however, due to the physical dimensions the adequate comparison scale is rather the country.
- The term “urban region” is employed for the polycentric urban area characterized by a *high density of functional and transport interrelations* between centers. The urban region is partly represented by some form of administrative coordination or constitution i.e. the “Région Urbaine de Lyon”, “RegioRandstad” and “Verband Region Stuttgart”, while in Barcelona it only forms a theoretical reference in planning (“Regiò` Metropolitana de Barcelona”).
- The term “agglomeration” is used for *continuous urban areas within the urban region*, characterized by a very high density (settlement and population). At this level we also find administrative bodies in charge of planning tasks i.e. the “Communauté Urbaine de Lyon”, the “Regionaal Orgaan

Amsterdam” and the “Área Metropolitana de Barcelona”, while in Stuttgart this level has no administrative representation.³

- The terms “city center” and “downtown” are used as synonyms, referring to the area comprising the *historic center and the adjacent concentrations of centrality functions* (administration, services, retail). Without entering the debate about precise criteria for a delimitation, this is the understanding that corresponds to the terms *centre ville, binnenstad, Innenstadt, and centro de la ciudad/ casco urbano*.

These definitions do not deny the important differences that exist between the administrative delimitations in terms of constitutions and competencies, deeply rooted in the corresponding socio-political cultures, but is introduced exclusively for purposes of comparison (Fig.IV.3 and IV.4).⁴

central city	Stuttgart	Lyon	Barcelona	Amsterdam
area (km ²)	210	48	97	165
inhab. (mio.)	0.6	0.4	1.6	0.7
inhab./km ²	2.657	8.679	16.840	4.401
agglomeration	Verdichtungsraum¹	Grand Lyon	Àrea Metropolitana	ROA
area (km ²)	2.286	500	585	983
inhab. (mio.)	2.4	1.2	3.0	1.3
inhab./km ²	1.075	2.829	5.190	1.411
municipalities	99	55	29	16
urban region	Region Stuttgart	RUL	Regió Metropolitana¹	Randstad
area (km ²)	3.650	8.050	3.235	5.642
inhab. (mio.)	2.6	2.5	4.3	6.1
inhab./km ²	702	310	1.318	1.081
municipalities	179	678	163	
region	Baden-Württemberg	Rhône-Alpes	Catalonia	Netherlands
area (km ²)	35.751	44.000	31.895	33.936
inhab. (mio.)	10.2	5.6	6.0	15.0
inhab./km ²	286	128	90	442

Fig.IV. 3: Overview: Spatial and administrative delimitations; 1= no institutional representation

³ In Stuttgart, also the existing delimitation of the “Verdichtungsraum” does not coincide with the suggested understanding of “agglomeration”, but rather with the “urban region”, as it also comprises the degree of urbanization, workplace density, land price levels, commuter shares and population growth rates as parameters. cf. WMBW 2000

⁴ see also CEC 1997, 23-25

Fig.IV. 4: Location of the four case study regions in a future European HST network; Plan source: UIC 2000



2 Case study Lyon/ Rhône-Alpes

In the TEN schemes, Rhône-Alpes is affected by several European HST lines that connect the North of France with Italy, and Germany with Spain. These lines converge on the Rhône axis, the traditional North-South transport corridor, and cross the Lyon region.⁵

Since the opening of the first HST line to Paris in 1981, Lyon is provided with two HST stops: The former main station in the center (Perrache) and a new station in the Eastern city area (La Part Dieu). While the creation of La Part Dieu in 1982 was linked to the development of a 46ha conversion site comprising a total 733.000m² gross floor space (GFS), at Perrache a major urban redevelopment project is being planned only since 1998 (150ha/1.2mio.m² GFS). After the construction of a new track, which bypasses Lyon in the East towards Marseille (TGV Méditerranée), a third HST station has been opened at the airport Lyon-Satolas in 1994. So far, only minor functional extensions have taken place there.

Since 2001, the TGV Méditerranée serves a new stop at the intersection with a regional railway line, 80km (20') south of Satolas. Here, the development of a business district and a "theme park" is planned. Finally, after the completion of the new HST track Lyon-Turin by 2010, a further stop is envisaged in the surroundings of Montmélian, 80km east of Satolas. Nevertheless, the HST equally stops in other towns in the region, which are not located on the new tracks. Thus, in the cases of Grénoble, St.Etienne, Valence, Chambéry, Annecy, Roanne and Bourg-en-Bresse, travel time changes are less clear-cut (Fig.IV.5+6).





Fig.IV. 5: Planned HST connection of Rhône-Alpes and the Lyon region; Source: RRA 1997, 18 - modified

⁵ cf. chapters III.2.2, IV.0.3

Fig.IV. 6: HST station locations in the Lyon region: Satolas airport, La Part Dieu and Perrache; Source: RRA 1991



2.1 Context analysis – space and institutions

2.1.1 Space-functional structure and dynamics

The urban geography of France is characterized by a relatively small number of major centers spread over a vast territory with a medium population density. Paris (Île de France) is located in the north of the country and represents the largest urban concentration by far, followed at a considerable distance by Lyon, capital of the Rhône-Alpes region.

The centralist tradition in France has favoured the present radial structure of the road and rail transport networks focused on Paris. Moreover, the principal international airports are both located in Paris, whereas Lyon, Nice and Marseille each have less than 1/10 of the air traffic volume as Paris/Charles de Gaulle and a limited share of international flights.

Within Rhône-Alpes, the urban structure shows a strong concentration in the Lyon region, including the neighbouring city of St.Etienne. Grenoble is the most important regional center and forms part of an urban axis along the Alps that comprises the cities of Valence, Chambéry and Annecy. The Lyon agglomeration is contained by a hilly landscape west of the Rhône river, contrasting with a large plain in the East. This is the area where peri-urbanization of economic activities has taken place massively since the 1960s, while

in the 1990s the West has also become more and more urbanized, especially through low-density housing.⁶

2.1.2 Institutional framework: Actors involved in HST planning

Government structures and competencies

The French planning system has been characterized as “napoleonic”, which reflects both the long tradition and the strong centralistic elements it comprises.⁷ It is largely shaped by a national codified law that regulates the principal interventions of public authorities in spatial development (*Code de l’Urbanisme et l’Habitat*). There are four government levels involved, all run by elected councils of representatives: The national government, the regions (*Régions*), the counties (*Départements*) and the municipalities (*Communes*).

The state periodically produces national structure plans and guidelines e.g. for spatial development, transport systems, housing, etc (*Schéma Directeur*), and also determines and finances the major infrastructure developments. In this task, the government has been assessed since 1963 by a national planning and research agency with considerable influence on policy making at the regional and urban level (*Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale – DATAR*). In the large cities the government is additionally intervening through a local representation that has a direct say in urban development issues (*Préfecture*) and is assisted by an agency responsible in particular for regional economic development (*Secrétaire General aux Affaires Régionales – SGAR*). This constellation has assured a strong control of the central administration over spatial, but also economic and social developments in the regions (“aux Provinces”).⁸

However, since the 1980s a development towards more autonomy and elbowroom for the regional level has taken place. The regions have a direct political representation with a regional parliament and executive council (*Conseil Régional*). Although initially provided with very limited competencies, the regions have seen their authority extended for the planning of infrastructures, housing and economic development, and have also received the full planning authority for regional rail transport.⁹ In particular, the negotiation with national government concerning “contract plans” that regulate the contribution of the state for major infrastructure works and development programmes for a four-year period represents a key lever here. The contract plans need to be based on regional structure plans for spatial and transport development.

Nevertheless, the artificial delimitation of the regions, based on the equilibration of demographic weight, still implies that there is a problem of regional identity. It has often caused conflicts with the historical units of *Département* and *Communes*, but due to the recent reinforcement, the periodical debate about reshaping the regions is not likely to lead to concrete results in the near future.

⁶ cf. Bonneville 1997

⁷ Newman/ Thornley 1996, 45-47

⁸ *ibid.*; Bertolini/Spit 1998, 60; Marcou 1994, 61-66

⁹ Valkhoff 1999, 27-28

The *Départements* do not have specific instruments concerning spatial planning. Yet, they do have a range of functions and budget rights that indirectly influence urban and spatial development. Furthermore, they are involved through interadministrative consultation and the accumulation of mandates by representatives.

Finally, the municipalities are provided with the instruments for immediate local planning control such as the zoning plans (*Plan d'Occupation des Sols* – POS) or the possibility for a compulsory purchase of land. For urban redevelopment operations, project plans that regulate the programme and the cooperation between the authority and private developers are the most important instrument (*Zone d'Aménagement Concerté* – ZAC). These plans can also include the creation of a public-private partnership in the form of limited liability agencies with a public stakeholder majority (*Société d'Economie Mixte* – SEM).¹⁰

The decentralization policy of the 1960s instigated by the DATAR led to the creation of an intermunicipal council in 8 major agglomerations by law. In Lyon, this entity (*Communauté Urbaine de Lyon* – COURLY) is constituted of representatives from 55 municipalities according to demographic weight, so that municipal politics have a strong influence on the common policy agenda, especially those of Lyon. The COURLY is responsible for urban planning, economic development, housing, transport and supply policies within its boundaries.¹¹

Furthermore, at the intermunicipal level, orientating structure plans can be set up on a voluntary basis (*Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement Urbain* - SDAU). Their delimitation depends on the number of cooperating municipalities, e.g. 71 in the case of the SDAU Lyon, and thus surpasses the administrative limits of *Départements* and the *Communauté Urbaine*.

Therefore, intermunicipal planning at the scale of the agglomeration and urban region has remained a subject of continuous institutional confrontation. After an initial failed attempt to rationalize spatial planning in the Lyon region in the 1960s¹², the DATAR promoted a “change of scale” through the creation of a new administrative structure after 1970. The envisaged perimeter comprised an urban region of 2.5 million inhabitants instead of the 1.2 million in the COURLY, and included St.Etienne and the international airport at Satolas.

Also in 1970, an association for the economic promotion of the Lyon region was created by the initiative of the entrepreneurial milieu (*Agence pour le Développement de la Région Lyonnaise* – ADERLY), financed by the chambers of commerce Lyon and the COURLY.

Both impulses led the Préfet, the DATAR and the mayor of Lyon in 1974 to prompt an informal entity of consultation at the scale of the Lyon region (*Région Urbaine de Lyon* – RUL). But despite the support from the central administration and the regional economic leaders, the RUL lacked the backing of the municipalities and *Départements* and could not develop a significant influence. However, this structure persisted and reappeared in the 90s in the context of the planning process for the HST.

¹⁰ Newman/ Thornley 1996, 45-47; Betrolini/Spit 1998, 60

¹¹ Mabrouk/ Jouve 1999, 106-12

¹² Organisations d'Études d'Aménagement des Aires Métropolitaines – OREAM; cf. Mabrouk/ Jouve 1999, 105

Railway transport

In 1982 the French railways (*Société Nationale des Chémins de Fer – SNCF*) were transformed by law from a public-private company into a public agency with a strongly centralized structure and their own budget. The SNCF comprises more than 150 affiliates in transport, but also in multiple other sectors e.g. energy (with *Electricité de France*), tourism (*Frantour*), real estate, engineering, parking, editorial, publicity, etc. and is a major shareholder of AirFrance and various road infrastructure providers.¹³ This constellation also explains the initiative and cooperations that advanced the development of the TGV, since technical, commercial and operative know-how appeared to be combined within the SNCF.¹⁴ Despite their public ownership, the affiliates pursued commercial aims so that the company started to function as a holding.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the government appoints the president and the managing director of the SNCF and carries out the technical, economical and financial control.

In fulfilment of the EC directive 91/440 the SNCF was then divided in 1995 into an infrastructure provider (*Réseau Ferré Français – RFF*), operational units for long-distance (including HST) and regional passenger travel, freight, rolling stock, and for the development of stations (*Agence d'étude de gare*). In regional transport, where the SNCF is the only operator, the services and infrastructure developments have been subject to the contract plans with the regions as the responsible authorities. In the large agglomerations this practice has enhanced the creation of diameter lines that also serve regional transport functions (*Transport Express Régional – TER*). For interregional/-national transport, the government still assigns the budgets of the SNCF and has so far stayed reserved regarding the operation of foreign companies on French territory.¹⁶

Air transport

In France, international air traffic is heavily focused on Paris and its two airports Roissy and Charles de Gaulle (CDG). Lyon-Satolas occupies the third position, followed closely by Nice and Marseille, but each with less than 1/10 of the passenger volume of the Paris airports. The national airline, AirFrance, operates from Paris as its main hub. For both transport operators, SNCF and AirFrance, the introduction of the HST has proved to be particularly advantageous as it allows easy access to the Paris airports and therefore ensures the demand resulting from a centralist ground transport infrastructure.

The operation of the HST Paris-Lyon from 1981 has practically erased the domestic flights from the schedules at Lyon-Satolas.¹⁷ However, the conditions for the airport to improve its relative position in the transport market are quite positive. The absence of competitive hubs within a distance of 400km (the closest one is Geneva), the improved accessibility by road and since 1994 also by HST, the existing regional demand, and the ownership of vast land for physical extension are important factors here. With future extensions, the access by HST alone is expected to extend the catchment area to some 15mio.

¹³ LeDuc/ Baye/ Drouet 1995, 81-83

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Decoutère et al. 1993, 35

¹⁶ LeDuc/ Baye/ Drouet 1995, 84-86; Schütz, 1996, 119

¹⁷ Schütz 1996, 57

inhabitants. Thus, from 1975 to 1995 Lyon Satolas was able to triple its passenger volume to 4.4mio./a and reached 5.2mio. in 1998.¹⁸

The airport is managed by the Lyon chamber of commerce and industry (CCI), with the COURLY and the region as associate partners. Supported by national subsidy, the council of Rhône-Alpes and the CCI have financed a programme of extension that allows the airport to handle already up to 8mio. passengers and offer new space for freight activities (22.500m²) as well as parking space (2002:9.500 lots). On the downside, the airport still lacks a rail connection with Lyon but also adequate regional rail access. Furthermore, the coordination of the air and rail operators appears to be a major problem of the airport, although expert studies indicate that with the future interconnection of HST lines at Lyon-Satolas, both sides would gain around 200.000 passengers per year.¹⁹

¹⁸ Aéroport Lyon-Satolas 1996, 20-21, 25; Aéroport Lyon-Satolas 1998

¹⁹ Aéroport Lyon-Satolas 1996, 39-40; LET 1999, 40

2.2 Process analysis - plans, policies and decisions

The planning process for the integration of the HST in Lyon, apparently the longest of all cases, is characterized by four stages. It commenced already in the 1960s with the designation of La Part Dieu as a second city center for Lyon, both by national and municipal development plans. After the realization of the Paris-Lyon line, the role of the HST has become interpreted in a broader context, based on the government's regionalization policy and the economic and institutional dynamics in the Lyon region. These issues were then taken up in the revision of the national spatial planning act in 1999 that brought a shift towards subsidiarity, but at the same time maintained central state control. In parallel, within the agglomeration of Lyon the spatial development policies have become further differentiated in respect to the role of the HST, linking new forms of strategic planning.

2.2.1 National and local policy orientations: New center La Part-Dieu

The creation of a new city center and the HST station at La Part Dieu is based on two different initiatives. In the 1960s, the national government and the DATAR pursued a decentralization policy with the aim to balance the gravitation force of the Paris region. They designated seven "metropolises of equilibrium" (*métropoles d'équilibre*) that should assume important centrality functions. The principal measures were to relocate administrative services and industrial activity (in the case of Lyon especially chemical and petrochemical) from Paris and to restructure the city centers to attract investment. In Lyon, the former freight station area at La Part Dieu was thus promoted as an opportunity to combine strategies and develop a new "tertiary center" that would also contribute to relieve the congested downtown area.

At the local level, a debate about the restructuring of the city center had equally been started. In 1967 a study of the city's planning department proposed "shared functions" between the downtown area ("high grade services, finance, leisure") and La Part-Dieu ("regional tertiary, indispensable facilities"). Furthermore, La Part Dieu was discussed as a new location for the central railway station, but without arriving at a decision.

Thus, the first project was oriented by urban and economic development policies. For the management of the operation a project company with mixed capital was created (*Société d'équipement de la région de Lyon* - SERL). The initial programme included an administrative center, a shopping mall (50.000m²), a cultural complex, a public park, a new railway station, a bus station and a metro station.

But as private investments were made only hesitantly and national budgets were tightened during the oil-crisis, the state decided to withdraw its subsidy from the project. In consequence, financial pressures became the dominant orientation for the SERL, while a lack of public control and awareness allowed substantial modifications of the urban project. Thus, the surface of the shopping center was increased to 120.000m² and its physical orientation was changed in such a way that it impedes the connection between the envisaged railway station and the city center. The metro station was built inside the shopping mall and not connected with the railway station. Cultural facilities were reduced and split up, and a strict

separation of functions and transport modes was realized (road on ground level, pedestrians at +6m).²⁰ Therefore, the project concluded in 1975 completely failed to achieve its quality objectives. However, it initiated the development at La Part Dieu, created excellent road access and added two important functional concentrations with the shopping mall and the administrative center.

The motivation for a second project at La Part Dieu then arose from the plans of the SNCF for an HST connection between Paris and the South of France. The geography and urban structure of the Lyon agglomeration led the SNCF to the decision for a new track through the eastern sector in favor of faster travel times and lower infrastructure costs. Thus, the local debate about a new HST station location was revived.

Furthermore, the institutional context experienced an important modification with the creation of a planning agency by the COURLY in 1978 (*Agence d'Urbanisme*). The orientation of this new entity at strategic planning for the entire urban region appeared as a political challenge for the concerned authorities. In its plans, the agency identified the opportunity to promote the increasing tertiarization of the city through the development of the HST station area at La Part Dieu. This was seen as a strategic response to the acute problem with the relocations of headquarters from Lyon to Paris during the 70s.²¹

The potentials of La Part Dieu were clear: A favourable road access, the proximity of the tertiary center, land for development from the SNCF and therefore the overall opportunity to animate the area and create new office space. Together with the infrastructure solution this perspective led the city to the decision for La Part-Dieu as its new HST station location. By contrast, the Perrache station was initially foreseen to become a stop for regional transport. Only after the massive protest of the retail trade in the city center was an agreement to maintain Perrache as an HST stop signed with the SNCF. However, the SNCF itself showed limited trust in the prospect of the urban operation at La Part Dieu. With the start of the project, the railway company immediately sold all of its land in order to finance the new infrastructures.²²

For the development of La Part-Dieu the COURLY created a ZAC (Zone d'Aménagement Concerté) in 1979. Its programme was comprised of housing, offices, public spaces and the railway station, including improvements for the pedestrian connection to the metro. The railway station was realized as a bridge-construction that allows East-West relations on the ground level to be maintained. Furthermore, financial control mechanisms and close cooperation between actors, as well as new experiences with citizen's participation helped to improve the efficiency and quality of the project. Finally, the station could open in 1983 i.e. two years after the first HST operation from Perrache (Fig.IV.7).²³

²⁰ Decoutère et al. 1993, 21

²¹ Mabrouk/ Jouve 1999, 115-17

²² Decoutère et al. 1993, 34

²³ *ibid.*, 28




Fig.IV. 7: ZAC La Part Dieu 1982 – an attempt to mitigate the results of the failed development previous to the HST station locations decision; source: Decoutère et al. 1993, 31

In respect to the HST, the development of La Part Dieu thus shows an inverted order of events. First, there was the creation of a second urban center out of national initiative. This initiative coincided with local interests but eventually failed due to the primacy of commercial benefits. The question of the station locations, however, was entirely postponed. Second, the first decision for a new station location was made out of technical and operational considerations by the SNCF. The municipal urban project then took the chance for a re-qualification of the area and the development of a new business district.

In the 90s, La Part-Dieu has developed from a secondary “tertiary center” to the core business center of Lyon. It is also the main railway station and represents a focus in the city’s economic development policies. In turn, Perrache has become a mainly regional railway station, with a special significance for the relation with St.Etienne, but its role as an HST stop has turned out to be secondary. Additionally, the construction of a motorway and transport-changeover in the downtown area in 1976 contributed to the relative spatial isolation of the station area. In the following, Perrache also experienced problems of urban deterioration, counting the functional degradation of the surroundings, security deficits, and de-industrialization of the adjacent district.²⁴

²⁴ Dorbec 1999

2.2.2 Regionalization, economic dynamics and institutional context

HST station location debate

The realization of the TGV Atlantique (Paris-Nantes/ Bordeaux) demonstrated a problematic practice of the SNCF: The concentration of investments on the HST and a parallel suppression of regional services. For destinations along the main HST lines, the railway company thus showed a clear preference for peri-urban stops at the intersection with regional lines in order to limit infrastructure expenses and reduce travel times for the HST. The proposals for these stations (*“gare-bis”*) e.g. in Vendôme, Le Creusot, Haut Picardie, etc. initiated a nation-wide debate about HST station locations. The affected cities and towns were also conscious of the potential urban and economic development effects, soon labelled as *“effet TGV”*, and demanded to serve only the central stops.²⁵

As a consequence, in October 1990 an association of cities and towns with a (potential) HST stop was founded, called *“Villes TGV”*. This association started to play a role as an intermediary between state, SNCF, municipalities and private actors involved in the development of HST station locations. It also carried out studies and organized meetings that helped to spread the notion of the interdependence between the HST and urban development.²⁶

Satolas: Diverging objectives

In Lyon, however, the situation was different since the urban stations were already served by HST. But in 1989, a study carried out on behalf of the COURLY by transport experts from the Lyon university (*Laboratoire d'Economie du Transport - LET*), already responsible for the evaluation of the Paris-Lyon project, proposed a third HST station at Satolas airport for the interconnection of future HST lines in Lyon.²⁷ In the context of the general station location debate, this meant an entirely new perspective for the Lyon region.

In 1990, the government issued the national transport structure plans for motorways and HST (*Schémas Directeurs*). The HST scheme envisaged an overall network of HST lines, connected to the neighboring countries. It placed Lyon at the intersection of four principal axes: Towards the North of France/ BeNeLux, South of France/ Spain, Germany/ Switzerland, and Italy. But the concrete access to the city of Lyon appeared to be a bypass, while the main track crossed the eastern periphery of the agglomeration close to the airport. In principle the plans supported the proposal of the LET, but the government's position was hesitant as the national operators SNCF and AirFrance were both not interested in an HST connection of Satolas. While for AirFrance this would have questioned its strategy of concentration and hub development in Paris, the SNCF initially feared the competition of the airplane. Additionally, the position of Lyon was weakened due to the personal discrepancies of the interior minister (C.Pasqua) and the mayor of Lyon (M.Noir).²⁸

²⁵ Koleskas 1992

²⁶ Schütz 1996, 118

²⁷ COURLY/ LET 1989

²⁸ DATAR 1994; Mabrouk/ Jouve 1999, 125

The airport station then received support from two other directions. First, with the regionalization the region Rhône-Alpes had started to apply its new competencies and elaborated its own approach to spatial and transport planning. In 1992 the region approved a spatial development plan titled “Rhône-Alpes tomorrow”, that questioned the overall ambitions of the national HST scheme, but gave priority to the three new HST lines through Lyon. It also envisaged to take advantage of the new infrastructure to realize a *regional* HST network and thereby strengthen the urban centers and new development poles. For this purpose, the construction of two new HST stops on the tracks to Turin (around Montmélian) and Marseille (RoValTain²⁹) was strongly supported. In this perspective, Satolas figured as the central interconnecting node between all HST lines, regional trains and the airport.³⁰

Second, at the level of the agglomeration, the COURLY approved in 1992 a new revised spatial structure plan (*Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement Urbain* - SDAU). Reinforced by the decentralization policy of the state and presided since 1989 by an ambitious mayor with an entrepreneurial policy approach (M.Noir), the COURLY proposed an intensified development of transport infrastructures and large scale facilities to improve the external accessibility of the agglomeration and extend its territorial scope. For this growth programme, the mayor successfully managed to instrumentalize the so far inefficient structure of the *Région Urbain de Lyon* (RUL) for the realization of plans and projects beyond the scale of the COURLY. Thus, the HST station at Satolas also received new backing because, due to its origins, the RUL counted with better relations to the responsible ministries in Paris.³¹

In 1994 the RUL approved a “Charta” that fixed the strategic objectives for the urban region. The document confirmed the development of the HST stations at La Part Dieu and Satolas as important cornerstones of a “metropolitan” development.³² However, in 1995 the sudden end of the political career of M.Noir also interrupted the dynamics of this entity, which then continued with its difficulties of institutional positioning.³³

Agreement and coordination

In spite of that, by the end of 1992 the negotiations between the state, region and the SNCF had already led to the decision to build the HST station at Satolas. The positions of the region and the RUL have been crucial for this decision, as well as the support of the Lyon CCI responsible for the airport management. The region assumed the costs for the construction of the station building and the SNCF paid for the tracks. Yet, the realization of a regional railway station parallel to the HST stop could not be agreed upon due to the resistance of the SNCF. Moreover, the actual HST service of the station opened in 1994 remained rather limited and uncoordinated: Still, in 1999, only 5 out of 9 daily stops coincided with relevant air transport activity.³⁴

²⁹ Acronym for the municipalities of Romans, Valence and Tain

³⁰ RRA 1991; RRA 1992, 84-96

³¹ Mabrouk/ Jouve 1999, 128

³² RUL 1994, 27-29

³³ Mabrouk/ Jouve 1999, 130

³⁴ SEMALY/ ISIS 1996, 7

By initiative of the *Préfecture* in Lyon, the government incepted in 1995 a working group for the evaluation of future prospects of the airport junction. Under participation of the region, the surrounding *Départements*, the COURLY and the Lyon CCI, a common report was elaborated. It demanded a coordination of transport services at Lyon-Satolas in order to develop the airport as the “second hub” in France. However, the SNCF remained at the margins and was only associated to this working group.³⁵

The transport ministry reacted to the apparent need of coordination and initiated the creation of a joint project group for the planning of the Lyon-Turin track, involving the region and the SNCF (*Groupement d'Intérêt Public* – GIP transalpes). Furthermore the GIP also associated the Piedmont region (Italy), motorway and tunnel exploitation companies from the Alps area and the airport Satolas. The new entity started with the realization of studies on the accessibility of Satolas, track alternatives for the HST and the location of the station at Montmélian.³⁶

2.2.3 National control and subsidiarity

After the change of national government from the Gaulliste party to a coalition of social democrats and the Green party in 1997, the new authorities sought to change the recently established framework for spatial development. The spatial planning act approved in 1995 (*Loi d'Orientation pour l'Aménagement et le Développement du Territoire* – LOADT, known as “*Loi Pasqua*”) constituted the focus of criticism in respect to its strong orientation at the national transport structure plans, overall accessibility of the territory and a lack of social and environmental consideration.³⁷

Eventually, the ministry of the interior came up with a new regulation for intermunicipal cooperation (known as “*Loi Chevènement*”) in 1999. It encouraged the formation of partnerships between municipalities and established a mechanism for tax redistribution in order to prevent undesirable location competition within urban agglomerations.³⁸ In parallel, with the intention to introduce the concept of “sustainable development”, the lately merged ministry for spatial planning and the environment elaborated a thorough revision of the spatial planning act (*Loi d'Orientation pour l'Aménagement et Développement Durable du Territoire* – LOADDT, known as “*Loi Voynet*”). The law, finally approved in June 1999, decisively supported the process of spatial decentralization and the ambitions of the large agglomerations as alternative locations to Paris. It de-emphasized the role of infrastructure expansions such as the HST, but demanded the creation of intermodal transport networks by using existing infrastructure. Furthermore, it enhanced the possibilities for local and regional initiative and institutional cooperation.³⁹

The regions, specifically, resulted in being reinforced as they received the responsibility for the negotiation of infrastructure investments with the state (“contract-plans”) and the regional railway planning authority. At the regional level, the SNCF was thus restricted to the operator role. With the 1997 transport structure plan, Rhône-Alpes used this strengthened position to fix the aims defined by the regional spatial

³⁵ Aéroport Lyon-Satolas 1996

³⁶ Maisonnier 1999; GIP transalpes 1996a; GIP transalpes 1996b

³⁷ Scherrer 1999

³⁸ Parlement Français 1999a

³⁹ *idem* 1999b; Valkhoff 1999

structure plan regarding a regional HST network and new regional HST stops. Therefore, when the SNCF presented the draft project Lyon-Turin in the same year, it already incorporated the construction of a new HST station at Montmélian. The project had since been further elaborated by the GIP and was included in the 1999 contract plan (total cost estimation: €9-11bill.).⁴⁰

The other new HST station at RoValTain was also supported by the schemes of the region. Since here the plans of the SNCF for the *TGV Méditerranée* have been known since the 80s, a partnership between 25 neighboring municipalities in 1989 had already been created for the promotion of an urban development project in the HST station area. The local actors expected the station to contribute to curb the economic decline and create employment. They conceived of a touristic development project that included the wider area, but should respect the environment. Yet, it was only in 1994 that the development plans were becoming concrete. After the pre-emption right had been assured by the associated municipalities, a coordinated development plan comprising 160ha land was created (ZAC). Subsequently, the entire terrain was acquired and maintained to avoid a “brownfield landscape”. The ZAC envisages the construction of a bus and taxi station, a business area and a “theme park”, focusing on nutrition- and gastronomy related activities.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the LOADT 1995 had also created a new instrument for direct government intervention in selected territories through overall spatial development plans (*Directive Territoriale d'Aménagement – DTA*). These plans should define development objectives and measures at an intermediate scale and provide coherence for the different plans of lower tiers. Yet their realization was lagging behind, although in 1996 a first decision had been taken to apply this “experimental” approach within five areas. In 1998 the *Préfecture* in Lyon also started with the elaboration of a DTA in concert with the region, the *Départements* and the COURLY. The proposed perimeter of the plan was derived from the major infrastructure connections, but smaller than the RUL. The plan identified four large peripheral development areas of future importance for the urban region in every point of the compass, among which was the environs of Satolas airport.

2.2.4 Le Grand Lyon: Space-economic qualification and participative planning

During the second half of the 90s, the COURLY further elaborated plans and projects for a development based on the structure plan of 1992 (SDAU). A first generation of projects initiated before the change of the mayor in 1995 already focused on the promotion of business activities (e.g. Cité Internationale, Eurexpo, Ecully) and the rehabilitation of the old city center (e.g. “*Plan lumière*”, cultural facilities, public space). Later projects then started to concentrate on providing a competitive functional equipment for the entire agglomeration, establishing specialized centers and creating the physical and functional links between them. In this strategy, Satolas still plays an important role since it assures international accessibility, but it also turns out to be a potential competitor located outside the perimeter of the


⁴⁰ GIP Transalpes 1999b

⁴¹ RoValTain 1999

COURLY.⁴² The initiatives are therefore limited to a space-economic qualification of their own territory with the two HST stations as key locations.

The new strategies include the “*Plan technopole*” adopted in 1998, which identified four major sites for the development of R&D centers. These “technopoles” were envisaged to have different functional orientations, linked to existing facilities and location conditions (Gerland, Porte des Alpes, Techlid, La Doua). Also, the “*Plan Université 2000*” aimed at the creation of complementary university poles with diverse specializations in the center as well as in the periphery. In this context, the rehabilitation of the center was now approached with two focal points, envisaged to complement each other: La Part Dieu and Perrache. Both sites have also become interconnected by a new tramway line that links the areas with important university and technopole locations (Fig.IV.8).

Fig.IV. 8: “Plan technopole” – external accessibility and the 4 principal development locations for high-technology activities: COURLY 1997a, 3



At La Part-Dieu, the principal development concerns have been the improvement of the public space and pedestrian accessibility, the creation of further office space and housing close to the HST station, and the rehabilitation of the station building and its access (new car parking). The vocation of the area is clearly defined as becoming the principal business district of the Lyon agglomeration.

For Perrache, a new large scale project has been designed (“*Confluence*”), dealing with the redevelopment of industrial conversion areas behind the railway station (150ha). The *Confluence* project has been initiated by the COURLY and comprises the creation of a mixed urban area that should ensure

⁴² Delaygue/ Morandas 1999

the continuity of the city center. New space for 22.000 inhabitants and 16.000 workplaces will be built here, combining offices, housing, commercial and leisure facilities, as well as a major research center. But while for the COURLY and the city the HST has now become an important feature of the location that supports its development, the SNCF continues to see Perrache as a regional railway station. Furthermore, the project also largely depends on the deviation of the motorway that crosses the center and the demolition of the related changeover center, both mainly financed by the state. A definite affirmation from the government in this respect has not yet been achieved. These difficulties have led the city to opt for a gradual implementation of small (public) projects that indicate change but do not require infrastructural modifications (Fig.IV.9).




Fig.IV. 9: Confluence project – structure plan; source: COURLY 1999b, 10

Finally, the COURLY also initiated a process of inhabitant participation and cooperation with local actors, titled “*Millénaire3*”. The objective of this strategic planning approach was to define and consent development objectives for the Lyon agglomeration and agree upon a priority of steps and measures that need to be undertaken for the realization of these objectives. Necessarily, this debate has also dealt with the role of the HST station areas in the Lyon agglomeration. It has basically confirmed the strategies envisaged by the COURLY, introducing a stronger emphasis on environmental conscience.⁴³

⁴³ COURLY 1999; *idem* 2000

2.3 Text analysis - planning documents and publications

2.3.1 National government and DATAR

During the 90s, the policy orientations of the nation state in spatial planning matters have been modified significantly, most of all after the governmental change of 1997. Initially, the main concept for the integration of the HST had been the development of a national HST network, conceived of as an instrument for the reinforcement of the cohesion of the French territory and the modernization of the railways. At the same time, the connection with a European HST network was seen as a measure for the strengthening of national competitiveness. It was also supposed to facilitate a revalorization of the local living environment as a primary location factor.

Yet, this perspective has increasingly been overlapped by a concentration on the development of the former “metropoles of equilibrium” and a decentralized planning approach, for which the HST network appears as a prerequisite. The introduction of the concept of “sustainable spatial development” has especially shifted the focus from large scale infrastructures like the HST to the development of competitive urban regional *locations*. Correspondingly, the emphasis is now put on intermodal transport schemes, regional/ local institutional cooperation and resource management.

HST network: From “integral high speed” to “intermodal transport schemes”

According to the DATAR, the initial choice for the construction of a railway network exclusively used by the HST was justified by the (urban) geography of the country. The fastest connection between the distant main centers was deemed to be best achieved by providing the HST with its own infrastructure network. This network would thus allow “integral” service of the specialized transport mode HST (“*grand vitesse integrale*”). The HST would therefore be able to successfully “substitute” air and road transport and gain market shares for the railways if its connection with the other transport modes was ensured (“victorious competition”).⁴⁴ Together with the profitable operation potentials, this perspective formed the basis for the decision to build the first HST line between Paris and Lyon, and for the design of the national railway structure plan (*Schéma Directeur Ferroviaire National*).

Furthermore, apart from the stops at urban central stations, “ex-urban” stations, in particular those stations at airports, were considered a “natural consequence” of the HST regarding its system properties (air transport competition and complementation, high infrastructure costs, environmental nuisance). In order to assure the accessibility of the HST stations, frequent public transport connections and a moratorium for the suppression of regional railway lines were demanded, thus criticizing the practice of the SNCF. Yet, the spatial implications of the new stations remained largely disregarded.⁴⁵

At the same time the understanding of the relationship between HST and road transport appeared to be ambiguous, since the motorways were also presented as a “second high speed network”, complementing the HST (*Schéma Directeur Routier National*). To ensure the economic exchange and “overcome natural

⁴⁴ DATAR 1991, 31

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 33

borders”, an overall accessibility of the territory by car was envisaged by adding “missing links”.⁴⁶ This orientation became reflected explicitly in the 1995 spatial planning act:⁴⁷

“By 2015, no part of the territory will be located at more than 50km, or 45min. by car, either from a motorway, or an expressway with 2x2 lanes in continuity of the national network, or from a station served by TGV.” (Parlement Français 1995, art.17; *translation*)

The revised spatial planning act of 1999 has changed these concepts substantially. It does not contain the controversial article 17 on overall territorial accessibility anymore, but introduces the concept of “service schemes” for the organization of the transport system. Instead of the five modal transport plans envisaged in 1995, these “schemes” should propose demand-oriented and intermodal connections with an emphasis on the use of existing infrastructures for both passenger and freight transport. Rather than further network extensions, the law envisages to review expenditures for new HST and motorway infrastructure, to favour public transport and improve the organization of the changeover points. Investments could then be assigned by contract financing based on regional transport plans, for which an explicit weighing of social and environmental implications through indicator systems is demanded.⁴⁸ Apparently, this reorientation has been linked to the notion of “sustainable spatial development” and a different conceptualization of the national urban structure.

Urban competitiveness: “regional metropolises” or “agglomeration projects”

In the debate about national spatial development of 1993, the government related the construction of the HST network to two main objectives: National competitiveness and territorial equilibration. In general, the expansion of large scale transport infrastructures was presented as an “accessibility strategy”, derived from the observed growth of the European spatial “backbone” (*dorsale*). These investments in transport networks were expected to strengthen the position of France as an “economic crossroads” and prevent a “marginalization of the country”, since it would present a delay in infrastructure endowment.⁴⁹

“This interconnection corresponds to the economic era that we enter: An economy which sees the exchanges, flows, the circulation of people and goods accelerate and grow, a network economy. (DATAR 1994, 17; translation)

On the other hand, both the HST and motorways were supposed to contribute to avoid the “main threat” of excessive concentration in the Paris region by reinforcing tangential connections between “regional metropolises” capable of attracting foreign investment. Particularly in respect to the South-East of France, the development of HST lines was seen as an “instrument for territorial integration”, starting with the

⁴⁶ DATAR 1991, 35

⁴⁷ In order to enhance the “mobility” of enterprise personnel the government even suggested the introduction of a “mobile mortgage” (DATAR 1994, 39)

⁴⁸ Parlement Français 1999b, art. 2, 3, 19, 21

⁴⁹ DATAR 1994, 3, 17, 19, 56

Rhône-axis via Lyon and Marseille.⁵⁰ Priority was thus given to European connections, followed by links between agglomerations and finally the connection of regions “outside the networks”. Respectively, three types of “city networks” were proposed to be articulated by transport links: Networks between metropolises and medium towns, between medium towns alone, and between medium towns and smaller centers. The HST was conceived as a direct link between the “regional metropolises”.⁵¹

“This truly European structuration of France is essential to the creation of metropolitan spaces of international rank in our country, the spaces that it needs.” (DATAR 1994, 15; *translation*)

With the new spatial planning act of 1999, a policy shift from infrastructure to location development has been performed. The law defines four “strategic choices” as basic orientations: To reinforce and develop “international poles” as “alternative” for Paris, “agglomeration projects”, “pays” and “territories in difficulty”.⁵² In reference to the principle of subsidiarity, this typology is used to define processes for the development of different regional and local approaches based on quality criteria.⁵³ Mutual consultation procedures are regulated including the creation of new inter-administrative bodies at the national and the regional level that should enhance cooperation. Here, the “agglomeration projects” are partnerships and strategic plans for the development of “international poles”. In this, the overall objective of national competitiveness stays equally crucial as reflects the following comment of minister D.Voynet:

“The increasing competition between cities and regions asks for a new spatial dynamic, aiming in the first place to make the existing situation more attractive. The development of the large French agglomerations with international orientation has to position France in the center of the European competition and provide more counterweight for Paris. The ‘pays’ are the rural counterpart of the agglomerations and will be the pioneers of a new development of the countryside.” (ROM Magazine 1999, 28; *translation*)

The *Préfecture* in Lyon has taken up these concepts in the development of the strategic plan for the Lyon region (DTA). Yet, its vision of an “international metropolis” equally appears to fall back on the previous policy guidelines. Therefore, we find as main orientation the “international positioning” through infrastructure extension (airport, HST lines to Turin and Barcelona), but also a focus on economic specialization (attract high-grade services, international headquarters, reinforce strong sectors) and “large connecting projects” between sectoral strategies. In particular, the airport as a “multi-modal exchange center”, and the *Confluence* area are considered as “strategic locations” to support the envisaged process of “metropolization”. To this end, the importance of the “attractiveness of the living environment” is also underlined, identified with leisure, culture and environmental quality. The urban region of Lyon is understood as the “pertinent scale”, where the resulting spatial structuration should take place.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ DATAR 1991, 32

⁵¹ *idem* 1994, 13, 14, 16

⁵² Parlement Français 1999b, art.2

⁵³ Criteria are: detailed diagnosis, cooperation and participation, self-organization, intersectorality, mid-term strategy (implementation oriented) and coherence of objectives/strategy/actions (Parlement Français 1999b, art.23)

⁵⁴ SGAR 1999, 13-21, 34-40

“One of the characteristics of the large metropolises resides in the broad spectrum of activities and functions they incorporate. Therefore, in a global economy, excellence in general can be obtained by specialization. . . It is thus necessary for the Lyon metropolis to exceed the dilemma scale/specialization to become a true European metropolis. (SGAR 1999, 34; *translation*)

Revalorization of the “(living) environment” or “sustainable development”

Environmental arguments appear not to be related explicitly to the integration of the HST. However, they initially form the counterpart for the expansion of large scale transport infrastructures, as the environment was conceived of as an important source of competitiveness, complementary to external accessibility. Thus, environmental protection and the “polluter pays” principle as well as the “revalorization” of nature, culture and patrimony at the scale of the “living environment” (*bassin de vie*) were proposed to assure a “sustainable development”.⁵⁵

“Managing the national heritage thus means to privilege the concept of sustainable development, which will have to take into account the future needs as much as the present needs. (DATAR 1994, 54; *translation*)

“The environment is a determining factor for the attractiveness of the territories. The economic development has to be performed by using these assets. (DATAR 1994, 55; *translation*)

The spatial planning act of 1999 then declared “sustainable spatial development” as the overall objective. Yet, compared to the previous guidelines, the focus on the institutional dimension and the demanded explicit weighing of diverging objectives through indicator development reflect a different understanding of this concept.⁵⁶ The new interpretation has also affected the priority role of HST investments and modified the spatial development strategy. It is now focused on decentralization, subsidiarity and the constitution of the large urban agglomerations through regional actor coalitions. Therefore, the DTA also invokes the concept as a condition for the “metropolitan” ambitions it defends, and as a legitimation for the extended delimitation.⁵⁷

“Yet the statute of ‘international metropolis’ cannot be the carrier of a sustainable development, unless this development is shared by everyone and unless the territory permanently offers trumps managed in an optimal way and at the pertinent territorial scale” (SGAR 1999, 32; *translation*)

2.3.2 Région Rhône-Alpes

The approach of the region is mainly derived from its infrastructural “geoposition” in a unified Europe, and the ambition to overcome the consequences of French centralism by developing as a location alternative to Paris. In this perspective, the improvement of the external and internal regional accessibility are prime strategies to achieve the “double objective” of competitiveness and equilibration. Hence, the development of the HST lines and their connection with the airport as central regional node constitute strategic priority

⁵⁵ DATAR 1994, 15,16, 54, 55

⁵⁶ Parlement Français 1999b, art.21

⁵⁷ SGAR 1999, 12

projects that also influence the conceptualization of urban space. Regional HST services are expected to support the formation of a “network of cities”, and to create new economic growth poles (“spaces at stake”). The rural areas are also expected to be restructured around the decentralized poles of this network. Furthermore, the orientation at railway and public transport development is generally supported by environmental considerations, but these are not related directly to the HST. Spatial structure, accessibility and economic effects are therefore the argumentative categories that define the approach to the integration of the HST.

“European crossroads”, competitiveness and “regional equilibration”

In its analysis of Rhône-Alpes, the region places itself in the European context, both in a historical perspective and in respect to the current developments. The region should take advantage of its traditional “geoposition” as a “European crossroads” for the flows of merchandises along the Rhône, now connecting with the growing “Mediterranean axis”. However, due to a “scissor effect” between the increasing transport demand and saturated supply, the infrastructure investments envisaged in the national transport structure plans are considered clearly insufficient for motorways, whereas for the HST they are deemed “too ambitious”. Therefore, and in reference to the TEN guidelines of the European Commission, priority should be given to the three “European” HST lines converging in Rhône-Alpes (Mediterranean, Rhine-Rhône, Transalpine) in order to link France to the “backbone” (dorsale) and maintain the region competitive.⁵⁸

“The transport flows often do nothing but cross a region, without any exchange with it. Rhône-Alpes must therefore choose and control the flows for which it ensures the passage.” (RRA 1992, 42)

In the regional structure plan, titled “reinventing proximity”, two main strategies are derived: Internationalization (“opening up to the exterior”) and regional equilibration (“dialogue in the interior”). Thus, the development of Satolas as the airport of Rhône-Alpes and the South-East of France and its extension as an “essential node” are proposed. Equally, the three HST lines are classified as “priority projects”, as they should equally ensure the interconnection between the regional centers and the access to the airport. A better integration is demanded for the urban axis along the Alps (Valence, Grénoble, Chambéry, Annecy), not included in the national HST scheme,. Furthermore, important road connections are still deemed necessary in order to extend capacities through “multi-modality”. Together, these infrastructure expansions should improve both the external accessibility and the regional interconnection.⁵⁹

“Metropolitan region”, “network of cities” and “spaces at stake”

An important role is attributed to the region in respect to national decentralization. To overcome centralism, Rhône-Alpes would represent an “alternative for Paris” as a location for international functions

⁵⁸ RRA 1991, 7-11, 22; *idem* 1992, 7, 30

⁵⁹ *idem* 1992, 43, 91-95, 118

and is described as a “motor of Europe” and “metropolitan region”.⁶⁰ At the same time the region’s internal structure is said to be characterized by a diverse grouping of urban centers or “poles of competence”. Yet, its structure would also be threatened in its cohesion by the “structural fragility” of rural areas and the spatial trends of peri-urbanization and sprawl. In order to avoid a monocentric development focused on Lyon, the region proposes to develop a “network of cities” to strengthen the different centers. Their development should be orientated at “specialization” and “mutual complementarity”. On the one hand, this network formation is seen as the condition for Rhône-Alpes to “change the category” and maintain its competitiveness within the EU. On the other hand, rural areas with “insufficient mass” for the maintenance of certain services could be supported and integrated by accessibility (Fig.IV.10).⁶¹

“The different agglomerations in Rhône-Alpes constitute many poles, rich in diversity. For logical reasons of spatial planning, their specific large facilities that are of interest at the regional level cannot be multiplied within the region. But at same time the different cities are handicapped by an insufficient effect of mass in the European competition. It thus appears essential to guarantee the access to these poles to all ‘Rhonalpins’: Regional spatial planning and the reinforcement of regional identity depend on the structuration as a network.” (RRA 1991, 29; *translation*)




Fig.IV. 10: City network Rhône-Alpes; source: RRA 1992, 75

The functional restructuring of the region is envisaged to be achieved through different spatial concepts. Social and economic networks would form “project spaces” between the different centers in order to coordinate specializations and avoid excessive concentration. Moreover, the accessibility within one hour is used to define “everyday-life spaces” that would include remote areas in the development dynamics of the centers and assure all necessary services. Here, the accessibility of services is considered the principal criterion for the achieved “quality of life”. Due to the diverging speed of transport modes, these

⁶⁰ *idem* 1992, 12

⁶¹ RRA 1992, 16,17, 74-83; *idem* 1997, 11

spaces would have “different scales”, thus comprising either various centers with a fast link or single agglomerations and their area of influence, defined by the (public) transport systems.⁶²

Furthermore, the envisaged HST lines and motorways are expected to enhance the development of seven “spaces at stake”. These concentrations of economic and transport activities “benefiting from new flows” at the intersection of infrastructure axes would help to redistribute economic development in the region. Three of these sites are the new HST station areas at RoValTain, Montmélian and the airport, while the other four are more road-oriented “logistic poles”.⁶³ Together, these concepts imply a spatial scale enlargement, which is said to benefit its inhabitants, describing Rhône-Alpes as “one large agglomeration.”

“The region is rich in a large variety of geographical territories; It already functions as a great agglomeration, where the districts would be the main cities. To support the exchanges does not mean to encourage mobility for itself, but to promote proximity by favourable conditions and a homogeneous quality of life in the entire territory. (RRA 1997, 27; *translation*)

2.3.3 City of Lyon and Communauté Urbaine de Lyon (COURLY)

For the city of Lyon and the COURLY, the connection to the HST has repeatedly represented an important development orientation. The background forms the strategic objective of internationalization and identification of Lyon as a “European metropolis”, improving the external accessibility and establishing “metropolitan” functions. The spatial reference for the derived measures is the entire COURLY area, but the urban project for Lyon also reaches beyond these boundaries. These ideas first appear in the decision for the development of a new HST station at La Part Dieu and the adjacent business district. Later, they also frame the identification of Satolas airport as third HST station of Lyon, and finally appear as the principal reference for the redevelopment of the *Confluence* area as a downtown extension. However, the initiated strategy is also perceived as a potential threat for the local “quality of life”, which is made the subject of other measures.

New centrality La Part Dieu: “Internationalization” and tertiarization

By the end of the 70s, the strategic orientation of the *Agence d’Urbanisme* already attributed a catalyst role for the tertiarization of the city to the development of the HST station area at La Part Dieu. The problem with the relocation of headquarters from Lyon to Paris formed the background for the objective to attract more foreign investments through the development of this site. Therefore, La Part Dieu appeared from the first debates about a relocation of the main station as a new “central business district” that should compensate for the lacking extension possibilities in the inner city, and concentrate the expected demand for high-grade office space.⁶⁴

⁶² *idem* 1992, 58, 76

⁶³ RRA 1992, 96

⁶⁴ Mabrouk/ Jouve 1999, 115-117; Decoutère et al. 1993, 30-34

“Crossroads of Europe”, “European metropolis” and “scale enlargement”

After the construction of the station at La Part Dieu, the strategic approach to HST integration has been largely guided by the structure plan of 1992. In this plan, European integration and decentralization in France turn out as the principal motivations for a new positioning of Lyon and its agglomeration. The expected increase and strategic importance attributed to international exchange form the starting point for the formulation of three major policy lines: International accessibility, development of “metropolitan functions” and “scale enlargement”.

Lyon is characterized as a “crossroads of Europe” and “inevitable logistic pole” so that the international development of the airport and the connection of the agglomeration with the three new HST lines were considered to be crucial.⁶⁵ Already with its title, the structure plan aims at the development of Lyon as a “European metropolis”, a decision which is characterized as “historic” as it would imply to choose among the alternatives of “growth or decline”. Furthermore, in respect of the region Rhône-Alpes, Lyon is portrayed as the international “central pole” necessary for regional development, which would act as the “leader of a city network” connected by regional intercity services. In respect to the only average ranking of Lyon compared to other European cities, a reinforcement of its “poles of excellence” is demanded through specialization and complementation with functions of “international radiation”.

“The tendency towards ‘metropolization’, i.e. towards the concentration of economic enterprises in very wide urban zones (a 150 to 200km radius can be reached), will further accentuate. (COURLY 1992, 37; translation)

18 “strategic locations”, among which in the first place La Part Dieu and *Confluence*, but also the Cité Internationale, the trade fair (Eurexpo) and the airport, were identified to enhance this development through “ambitious projects” and large scale facilities.

At the same time, this functional extension and restructuring should be accompanied by a territorial “scale enlargement” in order to achieve the “critical mass” required for international competitiveness. Therefore, the interconnection of the city center and strategic development poles by fast public transport and easy road access to the “economic activity zones” across the urban region were envisaged in order to “mobilize the totality of territory”. The agglomeration would thus develop towards a polycentric structure, with the centers of finance, reception, high-grade services and retail in the central city, the “technopoles” for health, research, education, technology, etc. within the COURLY area, and the “logistic poles” at the fringe of the agglomeration (Fig.IV.11).⁶⁶

⁶⁵ COURLY/ SEPAL 1992, 33, 41, 72

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 190, 242-66




Fig.IV. 11: Schéma directeur – large scale development sectors of the agglomeration; source: COURLY 1992, 181

HST station areas: “Multi-modal platform”, “new CBD” and “downtown continuation”

The detailing of the projects at the HST station areas reflects their general strategic orientation and their differentiation in respect to the envisaged “metropolitan” development. For the functional expansion of the peri-urban airport location, the structure plan proposes to create a “multi-modal platform” that would support the establishment of activities related to the different transport modes, including commerce, services, a freight zone, a business center and extended parking facilities. This new “activity pole” is attributed a key role for the economic development of the urban region and is said to require an improved connection to La Part Dieu by rail transport.⁶⁷

At La Part Dieu, the location of high-grade “contemporary services” and the development of high-rise buildings that should “express modernity” is foreseen. Improved road access and parking capacities are demanded at the same time with a higher quality of public space. The functional scope of this new “CBD” is deemed to go far beyond the agglomeration and to strongly rely on the “privileged accessibility” by HST and further urban densification. In turn, no concrete proposals are made yet for the Perrache area, but the necessity of an improved interlinkage of the downtown and La Part Dieu is underlined.⁶⁸

With the initiation of the large scale project at Confluence in 1998, the development orientation has been defined as “continuation of the downtown”, aiming to make the size of the city center “correspond to the European ambitions” of Lyon. This enlarged downtown area would attract inhabitants and activities as it “promises centrality as against the periphery”. Mixed functions including offices, housing, parks and leisure facilities that offer a high degree of “urban quality” are envisaged. The immediate station area is planned to concentrate offices and commercial activities, but no explicit reference is made to the accessibility by HST.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ COURLY/ SEPAL 1992, 268

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 242-44

⁶⁹ COURLY/ Ville de Lyon 1999a, 22; *idem* 1999b, 7

But at the same time the competitive position inside the agglomeration is underlined with the demand to suppress the motorway and the transport exchange center that would “block and hide the area”, form “sources of terrible pollutants” and be responsible for the “asphyxia provoked by motorway traffic”. The motorway, it is concluded, must “leave the center for the periphery”.⁷⁰ Thus the negative impacts of the large scale infrastructure are justified in a peripheral location, but condemned in the center in process of revalorization. Apparently, the strategy implies contradictions that need a solution through changing the scale.

“Double ambition”: “Internationalization” and “authenticity”

In spite of this differentiation and specialization of the functional development of HST station areas and other “poles” in the envisaged polycentric urban structure, their common orientation at internationalization and economic development is also feared to create a tension field with respect to the local environs and necessities. This is reflected in the statement of a “double ambition”, which should take into account both the requirements of becoming a “European metropolis”, and the “authenticity” or “aspirations of daily life” of the present city and its inhabitants. In order to avoid an “agglomeration at two speeds”, housing policies and risk management should especially contribute to “maintain the equilibrium.”⁷¹

This idea can be found again in the “strategic axes”, defined in the Millenaire3 debate in 1999, where a “dynamic equilibrium between international opening and local rootedness” is demanded. New large scale facilities, the optimized accessibility of the “crossroads Lyon” and the design of the “gates” (La Part Dieu, Satolas) should be achieved together with the city’s attractiveness, “quality of life” and the “practice of more participative democracy”, it is argued.⁷²

2.3.4 Société Nationale de Chemin de Fer – SNCF

Regarding the argumentation of the operator, it is especially important to consider its cooperation with the region Rhône-Alpes on the project Lyon-Turin in the common steering group “GIP transalpes” after 1995. The basic legitimation for the HST plans is achieved through the reference to the TEN policy and its supposed effects on European integration, economic growth and “sustainable development”. The influence of the region then appears to be noticeable in the emphasis on regional development implications and territorial equilibration, as well as the objective of establishing a regional urban network structure at a “metropolitan scale” based on the “crossroads” position of Rhône-Alpes. Together, both actors underline the dynamizing functions of the new HST stations and the support of the HST for regional growth poles. However, the SNCF tends to regard regional rail connections mainly as a feeder system for its profitable HST operation, while any concrete statements are avoided with respect to the airport/HST relationship.

⁷⁰ *idem* 1999a, 7, 14, 20

⁷¹ COURLY/ SEPAL 1992, 59

⁷² COURLY 1998, 3-7; *idem* 1999a, 2-11

Element of TEN: “European integration” and “equilibration”

In its justification for the HST project Lyon-Turin, the SNCF largely makes use of the concepts and arguments provided by the Transeuropean network policy of the European Commission. The new line would constitute a “missing link” in the railway network and “overcome the obstacle Alps”. As a “tool for European integration” it would contribute to establish a “network of cities” and “approach poles”, so that a re-equilibration between the North and the South of Europe could be achieved.

In particular, the track Lyon-Turin would form part of an historic transport corridor from Holland to the Toscana, often interpreted as the “blue banana”. Its reinforcement by the HST would therefore be essential for regional development since it coincides with important economic relations, as well as for the environment regarding the substitution of transport flows currently carried by other modes.⁷³

“Crossroads” Rhône-Alpes, “regional network” and “spaces at stake”

The HST project Lyon-Turin is said to benefit the whole region as it would improve the slow rail connections between regional centers, allow new station developments at Satolas and Montmélian, and add to the international accessibility of the entire region—Lyon in particular. The Transeuropean HST network would create a new “space for exchange” that supported the external cooperations of the region, such as the “4 motors for Europe”⁷⁴, and the European ambitions of the “infrastructure crossroads Rhône-Alpes”. The region could thus be organized as “one large agglomeration” at a new scale, corresponding to international metropolises like London, Tokyo or Los Angeles (100x100km), if its railway infrastructures would develop “from patchwork to network”.⁷⁵

Thus, the aim would be to connect the HST with the regional lines, in order to allow a maximum access to the HST. It is estimated that the most dynamic territories would also benefit most from the structuration through the HST and the expected employment effects, i.e. the axes along the Alps and Lyon-Montmélian. In particular, five out of the seven “spaces at stake” envisaged by the regional structure plan would profit from the new line, including the two HST station areas. For Satolas airport, three features are derived from the project: The new interconnections of HST lines, the access to the airport by *regional* HST, and the link between Lyon and Satolas, while a relation with air transport development is not made a subject. In turn, at Montmélian no development is expected in the immediate surroundings since the station would function mainly as a “connecting pole”, but an effect of “valorization” for the wider area is assumed (Fig.IV.12).⁷⁶


⁷³ SNCF 1997, 1.5-1.11; GIP transalpes 1999a, 2, LF2

⁷⁴ Cooperation between Baden-Württemberg, Rhône-Alpes, Catalonia and Lombardia

⁷⁵ SNCF 1997, 1.16, 4.13; GIP transalpes 1999a, LF10, 17

⁷⁶ SNCF 1997, 4.18-20, 6.20-27

Fig.IV. 12: "A common scheme for Rhône-Alpes and its neighbors"; source: GIP Transalpes 1999a, LF21



HST for "sustainable development"

The new HST line is presented as a measure that "illustrates the policy of sustainable development". Thus, the advantages of the transport mode railways in terms of environment and transport safety are underlined, and the contribution of the new line to "decongest the road", since transport flows would further increase with market liberalization. Furthermore, a support for European integration in a social dimension invoked as "facilitating transports" is said to "approach people". The maintained priority of the project after the revision of the national transport structure plan is finally seen as a confirmation of a shared valuation of the government and the SNCF in this respect.⁷⁷

2.3.5 Région Urbain de Lyon - RUL

The argumentation of this urban-regional entity is equally based on the interpretation of the RUL area as a European "crossroads" and the overall objective of becoming a "European metropolis". On the one hand, this perspective is used to legitimize the larger operating scale of the RUL compared to the COURLY. On the other hand, it emphasizes the polycentric spatial structure and a hierarchical development of new and old transport nodes. In particular, the HST stations at La Part Dieu and Satolas would assure the required international accessibility and economic development potentials, while fast accessibility between the centers in the RUL is said to condition their complementarity. As a spatial unit, the Lyon region is then attributed the leading role in the "city network of Rhône-Alpes". However, its internationalization is also seen both as a risk and a condition for the aim of a local "quality of life".

⁷⁷ SNCF 1997, 1.7-10; GIP transalpes 1999a, 1; *idem* 1999b

RUL as “crossroads” and “European metropolis”

From the point of view of the RUL, the new HST connections would “shift the gravity center” from the “blue banana” towards Rhône-Alpes. Since the “prosperity axis” would currently “bypass France”, the HST is seen as an “historical stake” that could recover the role as a “crossroads” for European flows which Lyon had during the middle age. The vocation of the RUL is thus summarized in the formula of a “second chance for France in Europe”.⁷⁸

To enhance international cooperations, attract “superior functions” and reinforce existing economic strengths are the corresponding development strategies proposed, but not only in the central area of Lyon and the COURLY. In order to “count in the EU”, the “scale of the pertinent territory” in respect to the economic, financial, industrial and demographical weight should be considered in these strategies. Also, Rhône-Alpes is said to profit from the location of high-grade functions in the RUL area, which would assume a “role of animation” for the region. The RUL as a “unitary system” should then form a “network of complementary cities” where each pole could develop its “own competencies”, it is argued.⁷⁹

“Network structure” and “node development”

Transit and easy circulation between the cities of the RUL should be assured by additional ringroads and bypasses, as well as by frequent intercity rail services. Together they should establish an “express network” for public transport by combined modes. Overall accessibility is seen as the condition for the functional specialization of the poles, the preservation of space from urban development pressures and a “complementarity of the urban and the rural”.

The “exchange centers” in this network are envisaged to become specialized according to a hierarchy derived from their accessibility scope. La Part Dieu is confirmed as the central station area of the RUL, whereas the *Confluence* area is not mentioned at all. In particular, Satolas should become reinforced as a “multi-modal platform”, but “protected from urbanization”, thus emphasizing its logistic and changeover function and the objective of air transport growth. Due to the improvement of the HST connection of the airport, more intercontinental flights are expected so that “partnerships” are proposed with the other regional airports with respect to the resulting transport shifts.

Finally, seven “development spaces” are identified around the central area, covering almost the entire RUL territory. One of these areas comprises Satolas airport, a logistic park (Plaine de l’Aine) and a new town from the 1960s (Isle d’Abbeau) and is suggested for the development of “Euro-regional” logistic functions. Also for the other areas, development priorities are established according to their functional specificities and accessibility, thus indicating logistic sites, “business parks”, shopping centers, cultural and touristic facilities.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ RUL 1994, 4, 17, 27

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 11-12, 27-34

⁸⁰ RUL 1994, 9, 29, 51-55

“Double objective”: “Internationalization” and “quality of life”

The strategic orientation of the RUL is said to imply a “double objective”, as it would mean to strive for both, high-grade functions and international infrastructure communications, and an improved “quality of life”. To develop as other “Eurocities” do should thus be accompanied by “adding own qualities” and “preserving traditions”, since the “crossroads” function would also be linked to “certain risks for the environment and quality of life”. Nevertheless, this improvement of the “everyday quality of life” is seen to be conditioned by the prior realization of those measures designed to “equilibrate the economic development of the territory”. In 1999, this order had been seemingly inverted by defining that the first development objective of the RUL should be environmental quality as an “essential factor for the attractiveness of a territory and the performance of its enterprises”.⁸¹

⁸¹ *ibid.*, 19, 65, 85; *idem* 1999, 3

2.4 Lyon/ Rhône-Alpes - reconstruction of the planning discourse

At first sight, the argumentation for the integration of the HST and the development of the different station locations in Lyon and Rhône-Alpes appears as a grand discourse coalition among the participating actors. The design of a Transeuropean HST network, territorial equilibration, and international accessibility as a condition for competitiveness form the basic orientations here.

Yet, the conclusions that are derived from this common background largely differ. Despite the shared discourse structures, the planning approach is characterized by the initial divergences between the government and the national transport operators on the one hand, and the regional and local actors on the other. Consequently, the connection, development and role of the airport has resulted in being conflictive. The station developments at La Part Dieu and Perrache have also experienced significant drawbacks resulting from divergent actor motives. The new HST stations at regional infrastructure intersections have not been subject to relevant controversies. Conceptual guidance has only been provided here by the region and, in part, the SNCF.

In the course of the planning process, an approximation of positions has taken place in that the concepts of the regional and local actors have become adopted *in general*. These concepts have been brought up in particular at the level of the COURLY, but were immediately interpreted and applied by the region as well. The continuous transformation of the discourse structure has been accompanied by considerable institutional changes and new cooperations, including the modification of the national spatial policy framework, the regionalization of the railways, and the emergence of the RUL and the GIP transalpes as crucial intermediaries. Thus, a new and more sophisticated discourse coalition for the HST has appeared, focusing the support for a “metropolitan” development of the Lyon region.

2.4.1 Discursive concepts and coalition

In France, the integration of the HST emerged on the policy agenda as a national project, promoted by the SNCF and the government. They were main initiators of the PBKA project and also contributed to prepare the ground for the European TEN policy. Thus, the initial focus was on the creation of an overall HST network that should guarantee national cohesion and competitiveness by connecting the principal urban centers.

This is reflected in the national infrastructure plans and the idea of a “grand vitesse integrale”, operated independently from the conventional railway network. The emphasis here was on a successful transport *competition*, instead of substitution, where the connection with other modes was envisaged to improve the competitive position of the railways on the transport market. Equally, the creation of “exurban” stations was considered a mere consequence of the infrastructure requirements of the HST, while spatial development implications were left aside.

“Crossroads” as identity

Based on these commitments, a number of concepts appear to be fully shared by all actors throughout the planning process. The HST is considered a condition for competitiveness since it improves the *external accessibility* of the territory, and vice versa for territorial equilibrium as it improves *internal*

accessibility. This “double objective” appears in both the national and the regional planning documents, while at the local level only external accessibility counts.

Particularly striking is the common use of the “crossroads” metaphor, applied equally for France, Rhône-Alpes, the RUL, COURLY and the city. It has a twofold connotation as it defines a geoposition (intersection of certain axes), and at the same time a function of the respective territory (concentrate and redirect transport flows). Thus, economic and spatial structures appear to be based on external transport connections as the most significant development orientation and identity offer.

“Metropolitan” developments

In the course of the planning process, the specific implications of the HST for the spatial development of the Lyon region are described with varying concepts. These concepts seem to be compatible, but in fact contain relevant shifts of signification, depending on the actor who employs them and the scale considered.

The government’s notion of “metropoles of equilibrium” originated already in the 1970s, but stayed important also for the integration of the HST. It attributes the function of avoiding a total congestion of the Paris region to the respective territory. The corresponding measures were a state-controlled decentralization of activities towards the large cities, and their tangential interconnection by transport infrastructure since its emergence, especially by HST. Yet, this abstract orientation shows little relation to the urban territories and their specificities and was also contradicted by the practice of first building the radial lines towards Paris. A repositioning of government policies then took place with the “Loi Voynet”. Its explicit emphasis of enabling “agglomeration projects” as *alternatives* to Paris not only leaves space for regional and local initiative. It even makes the spatial development rely on a decentral dynamics for which the interconnection by HST appears to form a necessary condition. Nevertheless, the government also attempts to maintain a certain control through the elaboration of the strategic development plans (DTA).

By contrast, the development of the Lyon agglomeration as a “European metropolis” defended by the COURLY and the city aimed from the outset at playing its own role in a unified Europe. Thus, the agglomeration is seen to be in competition with Paris for external accessibility by air and HST, as well as for enterprise locations and foreign investments. Also at the regional level, the COURLY underlines its functional specialization (internationalization) and the leading role it should play within Rhône-Alpes. The development of Satolas airport and its access by HST are welcome to create a “multi-modal platform”, well connected with its double center of La Part Dieu and Perrache. However, despite its commitment for a space-functional development of the location in the 1989 structure plan, an active interest is not shown since a competition with the COURLY area is feared. This tension between center and periphery can be found especially in the argumentation for the *Confluence* project. The envisaged scale enlargement as a “European metropolis” therefore principally aims to increase the influence and centrality of Lyon, but does not offer a coherent vision for the affected territory.⁸²

⁸² This assessment is shared by individual planners of the city/ COURLY, but still requires an institutional response. See: COURLY 1999b, 171-77

The objective of becoming a “European metropolis” is shared by the RUL, but the different scale considered also leads to different development priorities. Therefore, the metropolitan territory is conceived of as a network structure with greater autonomy of the sub-centers and the identified “development spaces”. Here, the growth and development of Satolas as a “multi-modal platform” in conjunction with its surroundings is deemed crucial for the entire urban region.

Finally, the region Rhône-Alpes also uses the concept of a “metropolitan region”, yet again with a different understanding derived from the scale regarded. Hence, a regional network of cities should form this “metropolis”, articulated through the connection by HST. Special emphasis is put on this *regional* HST operation in order to achieve an equilibrated development, strengthen the transversal Alps axis (Valence-Annecy), and support the new growth poles (RoValTain, Montmélian). In this perspective, Satolas airport appears both as the main international gateway, and as the central station of Rhône-Alpes.

Specialized and complementary poles

Within the “metropolitan” territory, the concepts of specialization and complementarity between poles appear to dominate the discourse structure. These poles can be urban centers, space-functional centralities or transport nodes. The HST station areas, in particular, are conceived of as highly specialized centers where the secondary transport connections depend on the spatial functions attributed.

Within the city area, the preferences are unequivocal. Thus, the development of La Part Dieu aims at creating a high-grade business center, and that of Perrache/Confluence at an enlarged downtown, while both locations become interconnected by a new tramway line. For Satolas, the priorities appear to diverge. Whereas the COURLY demands an improved public transport connection with the center, the RUL emphasizes road access and the interconnection of different HST lines. Additionally, Rhône-Alpes plans the construction of a regional railway station and the government attempts to improve the coordination of air and HST operators. Together, there is a strong support for the airport’s growth and interconnection by HST, but the different priorities have impeded a straightforward development.

For the new station areas Montmélian and RoValTain, the positioning is far more difficult. Supported only by the region and later also the SNCF, the concrete development proposals remained faint for a long time. At Montmélian, functional development is still not envisaged, but a support for the existing (logistic) functions is expected. At RoValTain, the municipal partnership has finally chosen to develop a “theme park”. For these new growth poles in the “metropolitan region”, the quality of access apart from the HST will be crucial. In respect to their “exurban” location, however, their contribution to a more equilibrated spatial structure still has to be proved.

Environmental implications: The second “double objective”

The environmental benefits attributed to the HST have not played a substantial role for the planning process. Only the SNCF invokes the general environmental advantages of the railways in order to support and legitimize the construction of the HST. However, the “substitution” potentials of the HST are underlined in respect to road transport, but not for *air* transport. This reflects the delicate relation of the

two affected operators and their awaiting position regarding the development of Satolas and the pending decision for a third airport in Paris.

In the plans of practically all actors, the environment is conceived of both as a *potential* and as a *problem*. On the one hand, the use of the environment as a location factor and growth branch is being encouraged. On the other hand, it is perceived as a protected resource, threatened by economic and transport growth. But the contradiction resulting from the proposal of measures that aim at the increase of transport and economic activity (i.e. the integration of the HST) is not approached systematically. Instead, a *dualism* of internationalization and local development is constructed. Only by formulating them as two equivalent objective dimensions, the clear orientation at external transport flows (“crossroads”) and related economic development are brought in line with the “authenticity” and “quality of life” of the place.

Hence, the concept of “sustainable development” has not had a significant influence on the integration of the HST either. It was mainly the national government that introduced it as an orientation for the new spatial development framework. This is also the only document that offers a practical strategy for implementation, based on social and institutional consensus building. By contrast, other references invoke the concept with questionable definitions (“revalorize nature, culture and patrimony”) or simply without any definition as a given objective that the HST contributes to (SNCF).

2.4.2 Diverging arguments and conflicts

Apparently, the planning process has not been free from substantial conflicts between actors. This did not concern the connection with the HST or infrastructure variants as such since this was commonly supported by all actors, but rather the particular development options for the different HST station locations. Here, the resulting conflicts are based on the *spatial scale* that forms the reference for the integration of the HST, or the *constitutional and/or operational logic* of the respective actors (different public authorities, operators, chambers of commerce). Thus, for each station location type, characteristic confrontations of interests and arguments can be identified.

National or local priorities

For both station locations within the city area, the principal difficulty consisted in integrating the different priorities of the nation state and the SNCF, as against the local authorities. In the development of La Part Dieu, neither the government nor the SNCF have thoroughly assumed their responsibility for the local level and each has thus provided insufficient support. The conceptual orientation at “metropolises of equilibrium” and “integral HST” did not offer the necessary links to the local strategies of internationalization and space-functional requalification. Consequently, the first project failed completely, while for the second attempt the initiative and commitment of the local authorities compensated for the limited confidence of state and SNCF.

This pattern has been repeated subsequently in the (non) development of the Perrache area. The development of the city centres was not (yet) a priority action for the national government. Furthermore, maintaining the station as an HST stop as against the opposition of the SNCF required the massive intervention of the retail trade in the downtown area to achieve a final agreement. The HST thus played a

negative role here, since the conflict was about *removing* the connection. In order to compensate for the shift towards La Part Dieu and foster the accessibility of the downtown, city and COURLY started the construction of the motorway and the transport exchange center. However, this measure actually further contributed to the decay of the location. At present, the enormous costs for *removing* the motorway still represent a major obstacle for an agreement between the state and the COURLY, desired for the next contract-plan after 2004. But this appears to be the condition for the re-development project at Perrache to take shape (*Confluence*).

Satolas airport: Gate, node or growth pole

The connection and development of the airport formed the most polemic subject in the planning process. Two characteristic conflict lines have accompanied the debate. On the one hand, government and the (affined) operators SNCF and AirFrance objected or obstructed the HST connection of Satolas as it affected the established beneficial hub system. By contrast, \ the region and the CCI Lyon, in particular, but also the RUL, strongly supported the HST stop at Satolas, additionally demanding the creation of a regional railway station. In their respective views, Satolas appears as the central transport node (“multi-modal platform”) and new growth pole of the region or the RUL. The fact that the region practically financed the HST station, as well as the gradual approximation with the SNCF through the regionalization of the railways and the creation of the GIP transalpes, finally improved the perspective for a coordinated transport interconnection at Satolas.

On the other hand, the COURLY maintained an ambiguous position regarding the development of Satolas, as opposed to the region and the RUL. The location of the airport on the outside of the COURLY delimitation has favored an approach that supports its HST connection and the accessibility from the center, but remains critical with respect to any functional developments that could reinforce the location competition between center and periphery. For the COURLY, Satolas needs to be the international gate of the agglomeration, but limited to transport and logistic functions.