Annika Deichsel: The Semantics and Pragmatics of the Indefinite Demonstrative *dieser* in German

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The Semantics and Pragmatics of the Indefinite Demonstrative *dieser* in German

Von der Philosophisch-Historischen Fakultät der Universität Stuttgart zur Erlangung der Würde eines Doktors der Philosophie (Dr. phil.) genehmigte Abhandlung

vorgelegt von

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aus Biberach an der Riß

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2015
Meinen Eltern Dr. Guntram & Kristina Deichsel
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Strong family ties to my brothers Ulrik and Simon (with Alexandra and Ada) and to my cousin and godmother Susanne Riedl and the close friendships to Madhu, Sandra, Bianca, Simone, Jörn, Heidi, Melani, Ewa, Julia and Emma make
me go through life with optimism and a smile – qualities which made my Ph.D.-
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Stuttgart, March 2015

Annika Deichsel
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# Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adj</td>
<td>Adjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Anaphoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det</td>
<td>Determiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Determiner phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRT</td>
<td>Discourse Representation Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERG</td>
<td>Ergative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Functional projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIVEN</td>
<td>Discourse given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Noun phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Relative clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SpecCP</td>
<td>Specifier of the complementizer phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Topic continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Verb phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XP</td>
<td>X Phrase</td>
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**Deutsche Zusammenfassung**

Dieses Buch befasst sich mit einem indefiniten Demonstrativum im Deutschen. Es liefert die erste detaillierte Analyse der semantischen und pragmatischen Eigenschaften des indefiniten, adnominalen Gebrauchs des demonstrativen Determinators *dieser*, so wie in Beispiel (i) dargestellt:

(i) Du wirst nicht glauben, was mir passiert ist. Gestern in der Kneipe hat mich *dieser Typ* angesprochen. Er war sehr nett und wir stellten fest, dass er aus meinem Heimatdorf kommt.

Es wird gezeigt werden, dass der indefinite Gebrauch von *dieser*, so wie in (i), ein gut etablierter Gebrauch des Demonstrativums *dieser* im Deutschen ist und dass indefinite *dieser*-NPs echte Demonstrativa und Indefinita zugleich sind.


Darüber hinaus präsentiert die vorliegende Arbeit einen experimentellen Nachweis für die Beobachtung, dass NPs mit indefinitem *dieser* im Deutschen Diskursprominenz im nachfolgenden Diskurs, also nach ihrer Einführung aufweisen. Dieses Ergebnis stellt eine Verbindung zwischen den semantischen und diskurspragmatischen Eigenschaften von indefiniten *dieser*-NPs her. Indefinite *dieser*-NPs werden verwendet, um hörer-neue Referenten in den Diskurs einzuführen, welche prominent im nachfolgenden Diskurs sind, indem sie nach ihrer Einführung häufig wiedererwähnt werden, so wie in (i).
English Summary

This book is about an indefinite demonstrative expression in German. More specifically, it presents the first in-depth account of the semantics and the pragmatics of the indefinite adnominal use of the demonstrative determiner *dieser* ‘this’ (i) in German (often referred to as indefinite *dieser* NPs or short indefinite *dieser* in this book).

(1) Du wirst nicht glauben, was mir passiert ist. Gestern in der Kneipe hat mich *dieser Typ* angesprochen. Er war sehr nett und wir stellten fest, dass er aus meinem Heimatdorf kommt.

‘You won’t believe what happened to me. Yesterday in the pub, this guy started talking to me. He was really nice and we realized that he’s from the same village as I am.’

I will show in this book that the indefinite use of *dieser*, as in (1), is an established use of the demonstrative *dieser* in German and that indefinite *dieser* NPs are true demonstrative expressions and indefinites at the same time. Providing the formal semantics for indefinite *dieser*, I will argue on the one hand that NPs headed by indefinite *dieser* are directly referential expressions. That they behave very much like demonstrative NPs with *dieser* in its basic use and thus fit in well into the semantic field of demonstrative *dieser*.

Nevertheless, indefinite *dieser* also does behave, from a discourse-based take on (in)definiteness (Kamp 1981), like an indefinite article: it introduces hearer-new referents into the discourse. This may, at first glance, look like a paradox. Traditionally, demonstratives have always been categorized as definite expressions (Ionin 2006). The present work, in contrast, argues that demonstratives should be treated independently from (in)definiteness, as they can either exhibit definite or indefinite uses. Indefinite *dieser* NPs will be categorized as demonstrative expressions on an indefinite use. They systematically behave similar if compared to demonstrative NPs with deictic *dieser* — with respect to sentence semantic and discourse pragmatic properties and they exhibit similarities with indefinite noun phrases. Thus, I investigate a phenomenon, which shows an interaction of demonstrativity and indefiniteness. Those concepts will be investigated separately in this book.

Furthermore, the present analysis provides experimental evidence for the observation that indefinite *dieser* NPs in German exhibit discourse prominence in the upcoming discourse after their introduction and establishes a link between its semantic and discourse pragmatic characteristics. Indefinite *dieser* NPs are used in order to introduce hearer-new discourse referents into the discourse, which will be prominent in the subsequent discourse in that they are frequently re-mentioned after they have been introduced, as in (1).
1 Introduction

This book is about an indefinite demonstrative expression in German. More specifically, it presents the first in-depth account of the semantics and the pragmatics of the indefinite adnominal use of the demonstrative determiner dieser ‘this’ (1) in German (often referred to as indefinite dieser NPs or short indefinite dieser in this book).

(1) Du wirst nicht glauben, was mit passiert ist. Gestern in der Kneipe hat mich dieser Typ angesprochen. Er war sehr nett und wir stellten fest, dass er aus meinem Heimatdorf kommt.

‘You won’t believe what happened to me. Yesterday in the pub, this guy started talking to me. He was really nice and we realized that he’s from the same village as I am.’

I will show in this book that the indefinite use of dieser, as in (1), is an established use of the demonstrative dieser in German and that indefinite dieser NPs are true demonstrative expressions and indefinites at the same time. Providing the formal semantics for indefinite dieser, I will argue on the one hand that NPs headed by indefinite dieser are directly referential expressions. That they behave very much like demonstrative NPs with dieser in its basic use and thus fit in well into the semantic field of demonstrative dieser.

Nevertheless, indefinite dieser also does behave, from a discourse-based take on (in)definiteness (Kamp 1981), like an indefinite article: it introduces hearer-new referents into the discourse. This may, at first glance, look like a paradox. Traditionally, demonstratives have always been categorized as definite expressions (Ionin 2006). The present work, in contrast, argues that demonstratives should be treated independently from (in)definiteness, as they can either exhibit definite or indefinite uses. Indefinite dieser NPs will be categorized as demonstrative expressions on an indefinite use. They systematically behave similar if compared to demonstrative NPs with deictic dieser — with respect to sentence semantic and discourse pragmatic properties and they exhibit similarities with indefinite noun phrases. Thus, I investigate a phenomenon, which shows an

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1 Throughout this work, the term semantics relates to the sentence semantic properties of expressions (such as the referential properties), whereas I use the term pragmatics in order to refer to the discourse pragmatics i.e. to the discourse properties of expressions. (such as, for example, discourse-structuring effects of expressions) Reference to different subtypes of semantics will be indicated using specific terms such as discourse semantics, for example. These terms will be defined when they become relevant.
1 Introduction

interaction of demonstrativity and indefiniteness. Those concepts will be investigated separately in this book.

Furthermore, the present analysis provides experimental evidence for the observation that indefinite dieser NPs in German exhibit discourse prominence in the upcoming discourse after their introduction and establishes a link between its semantic and discourse pragmatic characteristics. Indefinite dieser NPs are used in order to introduce hearer-new discourse referents into the discourse, which will be prominent in the subsequent discourse in that they are frequently re-mentioned after they have been introduced, as in (1).

1.1 The phenomenon: Indefinite ‘dieser’

Most often, indefinite dieser is encountered in spoken, colloquial German. However, there is also written evidence for indefinite dieser. It can also be found in literary texts and regular newspaper articles, as in the examples in (1), (2) and (3). It is always unstressed, very much like its English equivalent indefinite this, which has been labeled as “unstressed this” by Perlman (1969) and it often introduces a referent which is mentioned again in the discourse. In (2) it is re-referred to in a subordinate clause via the demonstrative pronoun der. Interestingly, the word order in the subordinate clause is the word order of a main clause (SVO) – a phenomenon often encountered with indefinite dieser (Ebert, Endriss and Gärtner 2007).

(2) Und da war dieser Bauer aus Ostermiething, der schluckte alle Pillen, die er bekommen und die er von anderen einhandeln konnte.
   ‘And there was this farmer from Ostermiething, who swallowed every pill he could get and he could catch from other people.’
   (Theodor Plievier, Stalingrad, Berlin: Aufbau-Verl. 1946, p. 55)

(3) Da war diese alte Dame, der die Redaktion erklärt hatte, sie müsse ihre Satellitenenschüssel um 19,2 Grad nach Ost ausrichten.
   ‘There was this old lady, who was told by the editors, that she has to adjust her satellite dish to 19,2 degrees east.’
   (Cosmas: HAZ08/JUL.02465 Hannoversche Allgemeine, 12.07.2008, p. 7; Das Fernsehen, dein Freund und Helfer)

The farmer in (2) and the old lady in (3) are introduced with indefinite dieser. They have not been mentioned in the previous discourse and are thus hearer-new discourse referents.

The general replaceability with the indefinite article ein, and the non-replaceability with the definite article, respectively, makes, among other factors,

---

2 With respect to terminology, throughout this work I use the term demonstrativity to refer to the property of being a demonstrative. Demonstratives are defined as a class of words with typical semantic properties in their prototypical use. A more detailed definition is given in Section 2.1.
1.1 The phenomenon: Indefinite ‘dieser’

Indefinite *dieser* NPs look similar if compared to NPs with an indefinite determiner. This replaceability cannot be observed with respect to the main other uses of *dieser* (see Table 1 below).

The table below demonstrates how, with respect to (in)definiteness, the indefinite use of *dieser* clearly differs from the other uses of *dieser*. In those uses *dieser* can be generally replaced by the definite article³ and those uses represent definite discourse contexts in terms of familiarity. In definite discourse contexts the referents are given either physically in the actual utterance situation (deictic use), the previous discourse context (anaphoric use) or in the shared knowledge between hearer and speaker (recognitional use). Indefinite *dieser* NPs, in contrast, are used in order to refer to referents which are discourse-new and hearer-new, i.e. to referents which are “brand-new” (Prince 1981) and known or familiar to the speaker only. This is a similarity which indefinite *dieser* shares with the indefinite article *ein*, which is as well standardly used to introduce completely new referents into the discourse which are not familiar to the hearer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: The main uses of <em>dieser</em></th>
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<tr>
<td>Deictic use</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Anaphoric use</td>
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<td>Recognitional use</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indefinite use</td>
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Note that with respect to the relationship between the four uses of *dieser* displayed in Table 1 above I assume the following (after Diessel 1999): the deictic use is defined as the basic use of demonstratives (and thus of *dieser*) and the other uses to be derivatives from the basic deictic use. Importantly, by “derived uses” or “derivatives” I agree with Diessel (1999) that these uses are very *similar* and thus linked to the basic use in that they share the semantics of direct referentiality.

³ I will show later that even *dieser* in the deictic use cannot always be replaced by the definite article. I use this as a first argument for a parallel analysis of deictic and indefinite *dieser*. Still, *dieser* in the deictic use is used in a so-called definite context (unlike *dieser* in its indefinite use), as the referent is “given” due to its perceptibility in the actual utterance situation.

⁴ Stress is encoded via capitalized letters in this dissertation.

⁵ Note that recognitional *dieser* is translated with *that* in English.
(definition see below) with the basic use, but exhibit derivation in that they are to be interpreted with respect to varying domains of reference. That is, the different uses are assumed to have the same underlying semantics of demonstratives, but applied to different domains. Thus they show similar semantic behavior (direct reference) but interesting different behaviors with respect to definiteness, for example.

The domain of reference of the basic deictic use is the physically perceivable part of the actual utterance situation, and the domains of the derived uses are the discourse context (anaphoric use), shared private and non-encyclopedic knowledge between hearer and speaker (recognitional use) and speaker-exclusive and non-encyclopedic knowledge (indefinite use), respectively, as encyclopedic knowledge only becomes relevant with respect to the definite article.

1.1.1 Indefiniteness: Indefinite dieser is an indefinite expression

My argumentation that indefinite dieser is an indefinite determiner is based on three characteristics which indicate the indefinite nature of indefinite dieser:

(i) Indefinite dieser, unlike all other occurrences of dieser, always can be replaced by the indefinite article. The simple replacement test indicates that indefinite dieser NPs behave like NPs with the indefinite article. Replacement by the simple indefinite article ein is successful for examples with indefinite dieser, as in (4):

(4) Gestern in der Kneipe, da war dieser / ein Fremde(r). Er hat mich angesprochen.
‘Yesterday in the pub, there was this / a stranger. He talked to me.’

(ii) From a discourse-based take on (in)definiteness (see definition of (in)definiteness below), indefinite dieser appears to work very much like an indefinite article in that it introduces completely hearer-new referents into the discourse. It fulfills the Novelty Condition as proposed by Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), who basically claim that indefinites introduce novel referents into the discourse because they are hearer- and discourse new and do not “have the same referential index as any NP to their left“ (Heim 1982: 151). On this view, indefinites are defined as linguistic expressions whose meanings are inserted into the universe of discourse as new discourse referents (Kamp 1981; Heim 1982). This is illustrated in (5) where she can refer to Zola, whereas a dog cannot:

(5) Zola arrived.
   a. She barked.
   b. A dog barked.
1.1 The phenomenon: Indefinite ‘dieser’

Indefinite *dieser* introduces new referents into the discourse and thus differs from the other uses of *this / dieser*, as shown in the examples in (6), which are translated to German in (7):

(6) a. Deictic use:
   Pointing gesture to a chair: Look at this / the / *a chair!

b. Anaphoric use:
   Edith read a book. This / the / *a book was interesting.

c. Recognitional use:
   What happened to that / the / *a cat which used to be in our garden?

(7) a. Deictic use:
   Pointing gesture to a chair: Schau dir diesen /den / *einen Stuhl an!

b. Anaphoric use:
   Edith las ein Buch. Dieses / das / *ein Buch war interessant.

c. Recognitional use:
   Was ist mit dieser /  der / *einer Katze passiert, die immer in unserem Garten war?

The indefinite article cannot be used in the examples above, as the referents are familiar (i.e. not novel) to the hearer, either because they are perceptible in the actual utterance situation, given in the previous discourse, or given due to privately shared knowledge between hearer and speaker. With respect to indefinite *dieser*, no such familiarity condition is fulfilled. Thus, indefinite *dieser* can be labeled indefinite, from this discourse-based take on indefiniteness (based on Kamp’s 1981 DRT approach or Heim’s 1982 file change semantics).

(iii) Thirdly, the occurrence in existential- *there* contexts serves as one of the classic indefiniteness-tests. Since indefinite demonstratives are defined by introducing a new referent into the discourse, one can often identify them in existential- *there*-constructions in the respective languages. These existential constructions give us some guarantee that the respective discourse referents are truly newly introduced into the discourse. They are thus classical indefiniteness contexts, not allowing for definites. The existential constructions can be considered as special cases of presentative constructions, i.e. constructions which primarily introduce new discourse referents, without giving further information about the referents. The relevant information then has to be delivered in a subsequent sentence. Typical presentative constructions have the following form: *There was this man. He was...* According to Huber (2006: 44), it is often claimed that the pragmatic function of existential sentences is to present or introduce an item into the ongoing discourse. Note that indefinite *dieser* can be easily identified in these constructions, but it frequently occurs in non-presentative constructions as well.
1 Introduction

1.1.2 Indefinite *dieser* is a determiner

In this section I will briefly summarize why I consider indefinite *dieser* a determiner which exhibits indefinite reference. I assume, for the sake of the argument, that determiners only occur adnominally and that they cannot appear without a nominal head. Furthermore, they are situated at the edge of the nominal or determiner phrase. I assume the following basic standard structure for German (Haider 1988) in (8):

(8) \[ \text{DP Det } [(\text{Adj} \ N \ (\text{RC}) ] \]

It is generally assumed that German has the definite article *der, die, das* in the singular (with respective plural forms) and the indefinite article *ein, eine, ein* only for the singular. It is controversial whether there is a “null”-article for the indefinite plural. Eisenberg (1994) assumes that there are four articles: beneath the definite and the indefinite article there is possessive *mein* (‘my’), *dein* (‘your’), *sein* (‘his’) and negative *kein* (‘none’). These determiners share one property: they cannot be preceded by other modifiers or determiners of the noun phrase as in (9a) and (9b). We find, however, a combination of the definite article *der* with *ein* (9c), but in that case *ein* is a numeral and not an indefinite article.

(9) a. Peter hat *alle / *die meisten / *einige / *diese die Artikel beendet.  
   ‘Peter has finished *all / *most / *some / *these / *the articles.’

b. Peter hat *alle / *die meisten einen Artikel beendet.  
   ‘Peter has finished *all / *most an article.’

c. Peter hat den einen Artikel beendet.  
   ‘Peter has finished the ONE article.’

According to this simplified view, indefinite *dieser* can be categorized as a determiner, since it occupies the same position as the definite or indefinite article. I leave the question unanswered whether the definite and the indefinite article occupy the same position. The determiner indefinite *dieser* can only be used adnominally and it can’t be used as an independent pronoun. Since indefinite *dieser* is assumed to be derived from the demonstrative in its basic use, the determiner status is already given.

(10) a. Peter hat gestern im Antiquariat *dieses Buch* gefunden.  
   ‘Yesterday Peter found *this book* in the antique shop.’

b. Peter hat gestern *dies indef. gefunden. (Only in a deictic or cataphoric use)  
   ‘Yesterday Peter found *this indef.’

c. Peter hat gestern *einige / *die meisten diese Bücher gefunden.  
   ‘Yesterday Peter found *some / *most these books.’
1.1 The phenomenon: Indefinite ‘dieser’

1.1.3 Diachrony

With respect to the diachronic study of the occurrences of indefinite dieser, von Heusinger (2012) summarizes, on the basis of a diachronic corpus study on indefinite dieser that indefinite dieser can already be frequently identified in written texts from the beginning of the 20th century on, as for example in (11):

(11) Da war diese geschmacklos aufgebaute alte Miss mit dem unmöglichen Phantasiedeckel, die im Baedeker blätterte, und neben ihr …
‘There was this tasteless old miss with the obnoxious fantasy hat, flicking through the Baedeker, and next to her…’
(Ernst Keil, Die Gartenlaube Teil 1, 1910, p. 395; cited in von Heusinger 2012: ex. 8)

1.1.4 Other languages

The present observations may also be applied to other languages. This creates a new picture of the interplay of semantic-pragmatic features. Von Heusinger (2012) also shows, that the phenomenon of indefinite demonstratives is present in other languages beneath English and German, as well. Examples of these languages are Italian (12), Russian (13), but also Mongolian, Dutch, Bulgarian and others. This is a new observation, since most works on English indefinite this assume that English and German are the only languages exhibiting this phenomenon:

(12) Italian – indefinite
Ero in un campo di grano con una mia amica e nel mezzo c’era quest’albero.
‘Ich war in einem Kornfeld mit einem Freund von mir und in der Mitte war dieser Baum.’

(13) Russian – indefinite
Vchera ja zashla v bar i tam byl eto neznakomec,
egestern ich kam in Bar und dort war dieser Fremde
kotoryj menja dolgo rassmatrival.
welcher mich lange anschaut
‘Gestern kam ich in eine Bar und da war dieser Fremde, der mich die ganze Zeit anstarrte.’

1.1.5 Corpus examples

In what follows I will give examples from a first corpus search for the indefinite use of dieser. In order to clearly identify the indefinite use of dieser in the corpora,
I searched for contexts in which definite expressions, i.e. definite *dieser*, cannot occur. These contexts are existential constructions of the type *es gibt da diesen x*, *da war dieser x* ‘there is this x, there was this x’. With respect to these constructions, we can be fairly sure that we are dealing with referents which are newly introduced into the discourse. Von Heusinger (2012: 6) describes these contexts as “special cases of presentative constructions”. That is, they are constructions which primarily introduce new discourse referents without immediately delivering relevant information about the respective referent. The relevant information then has to be delivered in a follow-up sentence. Von Heusinger (2012: 6) gives the following constructions as typical presentative ones: *I met this man. He was... or Then I saw this woman, she had.....*

In the examples below, we can clearly recognize a “discourse-condition” which appears to goes along with indefinite *dieser*. All referents introduced with indefinite *dieser* are mentioned again (various times) in the subsequent discourse. In Chapter 6 I will investigate this discourse function in great detail. I will show that this discourse function can be ascribed to indefinite *dieser* only and that it is not to be traced back to the presentative constructions.

(14) Und *da war dieser Bauer* aus Ostermiething, der schluckte alle Pillen, die er bekommen und die er von anderen einhandeln konnte. Dabei hatte er nichts als seine Äcker....“

‘And there was *this farmer* from Ostermiething, he swallowed all pills he could get and he could get from others. But he did not have more than his acres.’

(Plievier 1946: 62)


‘There was *this other dude* from Kosovo, who could not exactly reconstruct his flight route. This is called missing will to cooperate in the procedure for granting the right of asylum. […] The two-day time limit for filing an appeal was missed by the young Kosovo-Albanian. Why? Because he was moved through three prisons in those two days.’

(Cosmas)

(16) Da war *dieser Typ* aus Deutschland, den ich in einem Hostel auf der neuseeländischen Insel Waiheke kennen lernte. Vielleicht hieß er Wolfgang, vielleicht Volker — nicht so wichtig. Ich erinnere mich nur, dass er nett, aber doch ein komischer Kauz war. Ich meine nicht seine schwäbischen Wurzeln, die er unüberhörbar kundtat.
1.2 State of the art

‘There was this guy from Germany, who I met in a hostel on the New Zealand island of Waiheke. Maybe his name was Wolfgang, maybe Volker. It does not matter. I just remember that he was nice, but still a bit weird. I do not mean his Swabian roots, which he unmistakeably proclaimed.’ (Cosmas)

In all examples the referent is part of the speaker’s knowledge and unknown to the hearer. In these constructions, *dieser* is used in a way, which cannot be described by the other uses postulated (situative, anaphoric, recognitional), since the referent is found in a new, different domain: the speaker-exclusive knowledge. Neither do the referents have to be pointed out in the actual utterance situation, nor are they given in the previous discourse, nor are they familiar to the hearer. Furthermore, *dieser* is interchangeable with the indefinite article in the examples, and it is not interchangeable with the definite article.

To summarize, indefinite *dieser* NPs behave like indefinite determiners. They are part of spoken, informal language, however do we also find them in corpora of written German, from the 20th century on. The discourse referents introduced appear to either directly re-referred to or constitute the topic of the upcoming discourse. Indefinite *dieser* constitutes an interesting, and not well-studied, instance of an indefinite determiner, which also shares characteristics with demonstrative determiners.

1.2 State of the art

With respect to German, there is not yet a detailed account on the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* NPs. The use of indefinite *dieser* in German is, if mentioned at all, only briefly alluded to, without further classification or analysis (Endriss and Gärtner 2005). (But see the work of Wespel 2006; von Heusinger 2011b; Deichsel and von Heusinger 2011 on indefinite *dieser*, which grew out of the research project this book is a part of). None of the German grammars consulted (Engel 2004; Eisenberg 1994; Duden 2005; IDS Grammar 1997) and none of the standard works on German demonstratives (Ahrentholz 2007; Himmelmann 1996, 1997) mentions the indefinite use of *dieser*.

With respect to the very similar phenomenon of the English indefinite *this*, there exists a small body of literature (Perlman 1969; Prince 1981; Maclaran 1982; Wright and Givón 1987; Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989; Ionin 2006), to which I will frequently refer throughout this dissertation. Previous work on English indefinite *this* inspires the research direction pursued in this work.

More generally, a body of work has been written related to the topic of special discourse functions of demonstratives. Demonstratives, in general, have often been described as exhibiting discourse functions in certain uses, indicating a topic shift (Bosch and Umbach 2007) or as being means of topic promotion in certain constructions (Onea and Volodina 2008). They have also been labeled as generalized shift makers with respect to information structure before (Krasavina
and Chiarcos 2007). That is, demonstratives appear to generally be subjects to various information structural effects related to the subsequent discourse. Therefore, demonstratives are one central tool in order to structure not only the reference in the situation but also the reference in discourse. That is, an investigation of demonstratives in a certain use should always include the greater picture of discourse and information structure as well.

1.3 Basic terminology

Before I provide more details about the semantics and pragmatics I suggest for indefinite *dieser*, I want to be clear with respect to some terminology. In what follows I will define my understanding of (i) definiteness and indefiniteness, (ii) reference, (iii) direct reference and (iv) indefinites on wide-scope interpretations.

(i) Definiteness and indefiniteness

Definiteness and indefiniteness are conceptualized as semantic concepts in this work, which are morphologically marked: indefiniteness is marked by the indefinite article and definiteness by the definite article. The difference between the two concepts is reflected in semantic effects. Indefinite are licensed in existential context, while definites are ungrammatical in such contexts. With respect to familiarity, indefinite articles are used in order to introduce completely hearer-new referents into the discourse. They fulfill the “Novelty Condition” as proposed by Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), basically claiming that indefinite noun phrases introduce novel referents which are hearer- and discourse new and do not “have the same referential index as any NP to their left“ (Heim 1982: 151). As a consequence, definite noun phrases are defined as having the same referential index to their left. Thus, definite noun phrases are defined as being given, accessible or familiar in the discourse. The indefinite article and the definite article, respectively, are thus assumed to code this category of familiarity.

(ii) Reference

Reference, in this work, is defined as a relation between expressions and what speakers talk about, i.e. the objects in the world. In the sentence *Barack Obama is the president of the U.S.A.*, we use the proper name *Barack Obama* in order to refer to a particular individual. Although not all words refer, there are various types of expressions (for example demonstratives) which can be argued to be referring expressions. The crucial question concerning reference is: What are the “mechanisms” of reference of referring expressions?, as these mechanisms are subject to variation. The investigation and suggestion of the underlying mechanism of reference for indefinite *dieser* is one of the main contributions of this work.
1.3 Basic terminology

(iii) Direct reference

Direct reference is one of various mechanisms of reference, which is widely accepted to hold for standard demonstratives. A directly referential expression, according to Kaplan (1989a: 493), is an expression whose semantic rules provide directly that it designates one and the same object in every world. In the case of demonstratives, those rules provide directly that it designates the object which is pointed out by the actual speaker in the actual utterance situation. Thus, directly referential expressions are assumed to refer without a description, which would probably get different extensions in different worlds. They behave differently if compared to definite descriptions. Kaplan states that directly referential expressions are expressions with special semantic rules which provide that the referent in all utterance contexts is to be the actual referent (Kaplan 1989a: 493).

So, if one uses a directly referential expression like a deictic *dieser* NP its referent is, in all possible worlds, that very referent to which the speaker intends to refer via a pointing gesture in the actual utterance context. As exemplified below, the referent of the deictic *dieser* NP in (17) is the very cook which is being pointed out in the actual utterance situation of (17), and nobody else. In that sense, directly referential expressions are context-dependent expressions (Zimmermann 1991), as always the actual utterance situation determines the respective referent. Unlike the directly referential demonstrative, the definite article *der* (in (18)) is not context-dependent and not directly referential as it allows for readings of co-variation, if embedded under an intensional operator, for example. The definite NP is a description. Expressions which have the semantics of direct reference are labeled directly referential expressions. The semantic mechanism of direct reference, in contrast to other mechanisms of reference, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

(17) Martina will **DIESEN Koch** loben [pointing gesture].
   ‘Martina wants to praise **THIS cook** [pointing gesture].’
   → Only one possible reading: direct reference of *dieser* to exactly one specific cook, i.e. the one who is pointed out in the utterance situation of (17) only (no co-variation possible)

(18) Martina will (immer) **den Koch** loben.
   ‘Martina (always) wants to praise **the cook**.’
   → Possible reading: non-direct reference: whoever is the cook in utterance situation of (18), Martina wants to praise him (co-variation).

A typical expression of direct reference is deictic *dieser* and also deictic *dieser* NPs. Additionally, I will argue that indefinite NPs may exhibit direct reference as well, such as directly referential indefinites (Fodor and Sag 1982). They are expressions which show inherently and obligatorily the semantics of direct reference (Kaplan 1989a, 1989b) and which are indefinite from a discourse-based perspective as they introduce hearer-new referents into the discourse.
1 Introduction

Indefinite *dieser* will be argued to be such a directly referential indefinite. They are not to be confused with indefinites on wide-scope interpretations (see next paragraph). A detailed semantic analysis of wide-scope indefinites, following the work of Fodor and Sag (1982), is given in Chapter 5.

(iv) Indefinites on wide-scope interpretations
Indefinites like the indefinite article *ein*, for example, may have a wide-scope reading on which they designate an object in the actual world, as in (19a), in contrast to (19b), in which the indefinite article is not on its wide-scope, but on its narrow-scope reading. Using examples with linguistic operators, such as the intensional operator in (19) makes this contrast visible.

Intensional operator:

(19) a. Maria will *einen Spanier* heiraten. Er heißt Pablo.
   ‘Maria wants to marry a Spaniard. His name is Pablo.’
   \( \rightarrow \) *Ein* on wide-scope interpretation

b. Maria will *einen Spanier* heiraten. Sie kennt aber keinen.
   ‘Maria wants to marry a Spaniard. But she does not know one.’
   \( \rightarrow \) *Ein* on narrow scope interpretation

Indefinites on wide-scope interpretations have been previously and misleadingly labeled “referential indefinites” (Fodor and Sag 1982). These two concepts should not be confused.

Even though indefinites NPs on their wide-scope reading may look fairly similar if compared to indefinite *dieser* NPs, I will show in this work that wide-scope indefinites are based on a different mechanism of reference. They are not inherently directly referential expressions, exclusively referring to one and the same object with respect to all worlds. I will show in this work that indefinites on their wide-scope reading can move freely, but they are not necessarily always widest-scope indefinites. That is, they are not (and unlike referential expressions, deictic or indefinite *dieser*) scopeless expressions.

The type of reference present in (19a) has often been explained by the notion of specificity: on its so-called specific reading in 19a) *ein* is often claimed to be used to refer to a specific individual which ‘the speaker has in mind’ (i.e. Pablo) by uttering the indefinite noun phrase (von Heusinger 2011a). Nevertheless, I will try to avoid the term specificity in this work. It is subject to too many manifestations or “species”, as von Heusinger (2010: 1) calls it. The type of specificity exemplified in (19a) above is labeled “referential” or “wide-scope

\[ 6 \] Fodor and Sag’s (1982) concept of “referential indefinites” will become very important later in this work, as it can be appropriately applied to indefinite *dieser*, which will be argued NOT to be an indefinite on a wide-scope reading but a true “referential indefinite” in the original sense of Fodor and Sag (1982). Thus, Fodor and Sag (1982) came up with the correct account of “referential indefinites”, albeit for the wrong morpheme.
1.4 Goal: Determine the semantic and pragmatic properties of indefinite ‘dieser’

specifity” by von Heusinger (2010). I, in turn, will refer to readings of indefinites as in (19a) using the term “wide-scope readings” or “wide-scope interpretations” of the indefinite article — showing in Chapters 5 and 6 in greater detail that the reference mechanisms of (i) directly referential indefinites (such as indefinite *dieser*) and of (ii) indefinites wide-scope readings are to be clearly distinguished and cannot be explained via one and the same mechanism of reference.

1.4 Goal: Determine the semantic and pragmatic properties of indefinite ‘dieser’

Analyzing the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* I will show that it carries features of both demonstrative and indefinite NPs, which are reflected in its discourse semantic, sentence semantic and discourse pragmatic characteristics

(i) **discourse semantics** in terms of dependencies to the previous discourse, which includes concepts of accessibility, givenness, familiarity and as such definiteness (looking back in discourse)

(ii) **sentence semantics** in terms of referential properties

(iii) **discourse pragmatics** with respect to the upcoming discourse in terms of discourse prominence (looking forward in discourse)

(i) Discourse semantic properties

I have shown in the present chapter already, that indefinite *dieser* NPs do *not*, unlike demonstratives in the deictic, anaphoric or recognitional use, exhibit any linking with respect to the previous discourse. The referents of indefinite *dieser* are hearer- and discourse new discourse items.

(ii) Sentence semantic properties: Direct reference per Fodor and Sag (1982)

With respect to sentence semantics, indefinite *dieser* will be shown to give a contribution to the truth conditions of the sentence via its mode of reference fixing: it will be categorized a demonstrative expression which can be accounted for via the semantics of directly referential indefinites, as originally suggested by Fodor and Sag (1982)7. Their account goes back to Kaplan (1977, 1989a, 1989b) who originally proposed the semantics of direct reference for deictic demonstratives such as *dieser* in its basic deictic use: deictic demonstratives refer directly to a referent of the actual world of utterance which is (obligatorily) pointed out by a speaker demonstration in the actual world of utterance (see overview in Table 1 above). Indefinite *dieser*, as a directly referential indefinite, is argued to directly refer to a discourse- and hearer-new referent of the actual world of utterance to which the actual speaker intends to refer to in the actual world of utterance.

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7 Fodor and Sag (1982) assume that there are indefinites which work like demonstratives in that they show direct reference.
utterance. It appears that the speakers have a certain referent in mind, which is not known yet to the hearers. The relevant domain is the speaker-exclusive knowledge, as the referent is not, like in the deictic use, pointed out in the actual utterance situation.

(iii) Discourse pragmatic properties: Discourse prominence
With respect to the analysis of the discourse pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* NPs, I will show that their unique semantics is found to correlate with a certain discourse function, such as discourse prominence (Givón 1983), being manifested as the so-called Discourse Structuring Potential (Chiriacescu and von Heusinger 2010) and being related to prominence of re-reference of the respective referent in the subsequent discourse after its introduction. This discourse effect, interestingly, cannot be accounted for with respect to the indefinite article *ein*, not even for its referential interpretation. Thus, indicating further differences between the indefinite article (even on wide-scope interpretations) and indefinite *dieser*, it serves as an indirect argument supporting the semantic analysis suggested above. The discourse effect is reflected in the examples below, where the referent of indefinite *dieser* is quite prominent in the subsequent discourse (in A), as it is re-mentioned several times. This is not the case for the referent of the *ein*-NP (in B) (for which a wide-scope interpretation is forced due to the presence of the anaphoric pronoun *er* ‘him’ in the follow-up sentence).

Table 2:
Discourse prominence of indefinite *dieser* vs. *ein* on referential interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indefinite <em>dieser</em>: referent is prominent in subsequent discourse after (A), has a high Discourse Structuring Potential</th>
<th>Wide-scope indefinite <em>ein</em>: referent is not (necessarily) prominent in subsequent discourse after (B), has a low Discourse Structuring Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Gestern wollte Maria <em>diesen Fremden</em> ansprechen. Sie sah <em>ihn</em> an der Bar. ‘Last night Maria wanted to talk to this stranger. She saw him at the bar.’</td>
<td>(B) Gestern wollte Maria <em>einen Fremden</em> ansprechen. Sie sah <em>ihn</em> an der Bar. ‘Last night Maria wanted to talk to a stranger. She saw him at the bar.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Er</em> (1) hat ihr dann einfach so einen Sekt ausgegeben. Sie hat sich dann noch länger mit <em>ihn</em> (2) unterhalten, und herausgefunden, dass <em>er</em> (3) bei der gleichen Firma arbeitet wie sie. Sie haben dann Telefonnummern ausgetauscht, und sie wird <em>ihn</em> (4) auf jeden Fall bald wieder sehen. ‘He bought her Champagne. She talked to <em>him</em> for a while and found out that <em>he</em> works for the same company as she does. Then they exchanged phone numbers and she definitely will meet <em>him</em> again.’</td>
<td>Sie hat sich aber dann doch nicht getraut und sie ist dann gegangen. Sie hatte ja schließlich noch viel zu tun. Morgen ist Examen, und sie hat viel zu wenig gelernt. Ich bin dann nochmal alle Unterlagen mit ihr durchgegangen. Jetzt hoffe ich, dass sie gut vorbereitet ist. ‘In the end she did not dare to and went home. She had so much to do anyway. Tomorrow is exam-day and she hasn’t studied enough. I went through all the materials with her. I hope she’s well-prepared now.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14
1.5 The paradox of indefinite demonstratives in a three-layer model of reference

In the example above the referent of the indefinite *dieser* NP (*dieser Fremde,* ‘this stranger’) is re-mentioned four times and appears to be the topic which the subsequent discourse of (A) is about, whereas the referent of the *ein* NP in (B) is not re-mentioned at all. In (B) the topic of the subsequent discourse is *Maria.*

1.5 The paradox of indefinite demonstratives in a three-layer model of reference

Offering a classification of indefinite *dieser* NPs in German this book aims to establish the indefinite use of *dieser* as a genuine use of the demonstrative *dieser,* arguing that it fits in well into the semantic field of demonstratives. Some characteristics of indefinite *dieser* NPs discussed in this chapter, however, may rather suggest that it is an indefinite expression. How do we categorize an expression which is a) directly referential and therefore generally categorized together with other definite expressions, including definite descriptions, and b) indefinite at the same time, in that it introduces discourse new items? Previous accounts on the English analog phenomenon indefinite *this* (Ionin 2006) have argued that indefinite demonstratives are specific indefinite articles, totally unrelated to demonstratives. Therefore, this work also deals with the question if indefinite *dieser* NPs are demonstrative expressions or if they are indefinite determiners, entirely unrelated to demonstratives. As a solution, I propose that the two concepts (indefiniteness and demonstrativity for individuals) are not mutually exclusive. I suggest that indefinite *dieser* NPs carry the core semantics of deictic demonstratives for individuals (in terms of direct reference after Kaplan 1989a, 1989b) and that they exhibit indefiniteness from a discourse-based perspective on indefiniteness, as they introduce hearer-new discourse referents.

This fact does not appear as paradox any more, if we conceptualize the general characteristics of determiners in a model consisting of at least three layers ((i) to (iii) above), which allows for an interaction of indefiniteness and direct referentiality. This allows for a new classification of determiners based on combinations of the values of these three parameters:

Determiners may, amongst other features, (i) either be directly referential or not, (ii) either be linked with respect to the previous discourse or not, i.e. be definite or not, and (iii) either may exhibit high values of discourse prominence or not.
Table 3: Three layer model for determiners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deictic</th>
<th>Indefinite</th>
<th>Definite</th>
<th>Wide scope indefinite</th>
<th>Narrow scope indefinite</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse semantics:</td>
<td>(+) (no</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>dependencies to</td>
<td>dependency</td>
<td>(cf.</td>
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<td>previous discourse</td>
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<td>Chapter 1)</td>
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<td>(definiteness)</td>
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<td>Sentence semantics:</td>
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<td>direct reference</td>
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<td>Discourse pragmatics:</td>
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<td>+/- (less</td>
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<td>discourse prominence</td>
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<td>then</td>
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<td>Chapter 6)</td>
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<td>dieser,</td>
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<td>ein)</td>
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Based on the categories of this three-layer model, this work analyses the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* NPs. In this chapter already, I have investigated its discourse semantics and have shown that indefinite *dieser* is an indefinite determiner. The conclusion was that indefinite *dieser* NPs do not, unlike demonstratives in the deictic, anaphoric or recognitional use, exhibit any linking with respect to the previous discourse. Furthermore I will investigate its sentence semantics in terms of reference, arguing that indefinite *dieser* is a directly referential expression. Linguistic tests will be used to prove this. The conclusion will be that indefinite *dieser* NPs do not, unlike demonstratives in the deictic, anaphoric or recognitional use, exhibit any linking with respect to the previous discourse.

Finally, this book analyzes the discourse pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* with respect to the upcoming discourse, showing that it exhibits high discourse prominence in the upcoming discourse. Discourse prominence which is defined

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8 Both wide-scope *ein* and narrow-scope *ein* are not directly referential expressions with low discourse prominence. They are subject to two different underlying mechanisms of reference. Another layer would be necessary in order to distinguish between these two expressions. However, this difference is not relevant with respect to the present account.
1.6 Structure of the thesis

via the following measurable parameters: referential persistence, topic shift potential and topic continuity. The discourse prominence of indefinite *dieser* will be accounted for experimentally in a story continuation study.

1.6 Summary of the proposal

In order to develop an account of the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* NPs, two main issues are the focus of attention in this dissertation:

(i) An investigation of the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* NPs

(ii) A classification of the determiner indefinite *dieser* based on the categories of the three layer model

The question with respect to (i) is: what is the exact behavior of the indefinite use of *dieser*, with respect to the three layers defined above. This question will also give rise to an interesting discussion with respect to the semantics-pragmatics interplay.

With respect to (ii), from a classificatory point of view, I focus on the question of how indefinite *dieser* can be integrated into the framework of demonstratives and into a typology of uses of *dieser*, (alongside the basic deictic, the anaphoric and the recognitional use, see Table 1 above) – based on the insights received in the analysis of the semantic and pragmatic properties.

Using introspective judgments and experimental data I offer an account of the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser*, establishing this use as a genuine use of the demonstrative dieser which fits in well into the typology of different uses of *dieser*. Based on this argumentation I will generalize that indefinite *dieser* is a demonstrative expression.

To summarize, I will:

(i) show that the indefinite use of *dieser* is an established use of the German demonstrative *dieser*;

(ii) show that the indefinite use of *dieser* may be suitably integrated into the typology of uses of *dieser* (deictic, anaphoric, recognitional) and does not represent a wide-scope indefinite article;

(iii) investigate the sentence semantic, discourse semantic and discourse pragmatic properties of the indefinite use of *dieser* and show how they can be stipulated in a model including the three layers presented above;

(iv) classify indefinite *dieser*, based on the findings from (i) – (iii), as a demonstrative determiner, which shows an interaction between demonstratriority and indefiniteness.
1 Introduction

1.7 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 2 “Demonstratives: The basic use” is the introductory chapter, dealing with the basic notions and definitions which are central for the remainder of this work. Most importantly, it is about the basic deictic use of demonstratives. To explain how reference fixing works for this basic deictic use of demonstratives, this chapter deals with the concepts of indexicality, demonstrativity and the role speaker demonstrations play in the basic use of demonstrative reference. The basic deictic use is defined as the standard, definitional use of demonstratives. I will also show how demonstratives differ from other indexical expressions as “pure indexicals”, such as hier ‘here’ or jetzt ‘now’ and how, generally, the class of indexicals differs from non-indexical expressions such as definite descriptions or quantificational indefinites. I will discuss and develop several tests which can be applied in order to test if a certain expression is indexical, and even demonstrative, and offer theoretical background on the concept of demonstrativity by a summary of Kaplan’s (1989a, 1989b) theory of context.

Chapter 3 “Demonstrative lexemes in German” focuses only on the class of demonstratives, i.e. it leaves “pure indexicals” and non-indexical expressions aside. In this chapter, I will investigate which of the following forms in German (dieser ‘this’, jener ‘that’, DER/DIE/DAS ‘stressed definite article’, derselbe ‘the-same’, solch- ‘such’, so ‘so’, derjenige ‘he-who’, hier ‘here’, dort ‘there’, da ‘there’) are standardly used in the basic deictic use (which is the definitional criterion for demonstratives, developed in Chapter 2) and thus qualify as (nominal) demonstratives in German. The forms in the list above represent the highest common denominator of forms, which are listed in the German grammars as demonstratives. Selected tests of the ones developed and discussed in Chapter 2 will be applied, in order to identify which of the German forms can be labeled demonstratives. Focusing on nominal demonstratives, this chapter will end with the conclusion that only dieser and DER/DIE/DAS qualify as nominal demonstratives in German.

Chapter 4 “A typology of (derived) uses of dieser” aims to present a new and extended domain- and reference-based typology of the various uses of demonstrative dieser and to demarcate this classification of demonstrative uses from other, more general mechanisms of reference such as shifts.

Focusing on dieser only, this chapter introduces three further uses of dieser alongside the basic deictic use as derived uses. Applying selected tests, first arguments will be given showing that all uses of dieser standardly exhibit the core features of direct reference and make reference to demonstrata in certain domains of reference, respectively. It is shown that indefinite dieser also appears to share the essential feature of direct reference with all further uses, according to the tests.

Chapter 5 “Sentence semantics: Referential properties of indefinite dieser” deals with the (sentence) semantic properties of indefinite dieser. I will show that
1.7 Structure of the thesis

indefinite *dieser* truly shares the semantics of direct referentiality with deictic *dieser* and that it can be accounted for using the semantics of referential indefinites originally proposed by Fodor and Sag (1982). This argumentation includes a careful comparison of the referential properties of indefinite *dieser* and *ein* on its referential interpretations, especially with respect to scope-taking behavior in quantifier- and modal-contexts and. It includes, as well, an investigation of the behavior of both expressions in examples with intermediate scope. I will show that there are clear semantic parallels between indefinite *dieser* and deictic *dieser*. Furthermore, I will show that there are systematic differences in terms of referential behavior between indefinite *dieser* and *ein*, even on its referential interpretation. This observation is used as a semantic argument in order to argue for an analysis of indefinite *dieser* as a demonstrative.

**Chapter 6** “The discourse pragmatics of indefinite *dieser*” investigates the discourse pragmatic properties of indefinite *dieser*. By reporting a psycholinguistic experiment (story continuation task) I will show that indefinite *dieser* is found to exhibit a significantly higher Discourse Structuring Potential (Chiriacescu 2011) compared to *ein* on its referential interpretation, which is an additional and supporting argument for the distinction of indefinite *dieser* and indefinite *ein* and for its association with demonstratives. This chapter includes a thorough discussion of the literature on a) general theories of discourse prominence and b) previous accounts investigating the discourse effects of the analogue phenomenon of indefinite *this* in English.

**Chapter 7** “Conclusion” is the final chapter and first discusses the link between the (sentence) semantics and the (discourse) pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* (i.e. the referential and the discourse properties), arguing that the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser* are to be accounted for on the basis of purely pragmatic principles, but that the pragmatics are derived from the respective sentence semantics of direct referentiality. It offers speculative remarks about a general correlation between the referential strength of expressions with indefinite reference and discourse prominence. Finally, a summary of the main claims of this dissertation and an indication of the implications of this thesis with respect to further interesting research areas linked to the topic of indefinite *dieser* (such as cross-linguistics) are provided.
2 Demonstratives: The basic use

2.1 Introduction

Demonstratives typically have a variety of different uses. This chapter focuses on the basic deictic use, as in the sentence *Ich will DIESES* [pointing gesture] ‘I want THIS one [pointing gesture]’. Giving background information on the concept of direct (indexical or deictic) reference and giving an overview of the terminology related to the theory and function of direct reference, this chapter aims to lay the foundations which are relevant for the remainder of this work.

In this work, demonstratives are defined as a morphologically closed class of words with typical semantic properties in their prototypical use. The basic use of *dieser*, which is deictic, is defined via two features: (i) the property of direct reference in combination with (ii) the requirement of a speaker demonstration to a perceptible referent, in order to successfully refer. Investigating these two features and developing tests for the class of demonstratives is the focus of this chapter.

I will approach the discussion of the basic deictic use of demonstratives with some introductory examples. As the examples (20) to (33) below show, demonstratives may appear in a variety of lexemes (e.g. *dieser* ‘this’, *DER* ‘this’ *dort* ‘there’, *da* ‘there’), different uses and, respectively, with a broad variety of different functions. With respect to form, I will show how demonstrative expressions can be either determiners (*dieser* Mann ‘this man’) or pronouns (*dieser* ‘this’, *DER* ‘this’) for individuals, but they can also be locative adverbs (*hier* ‘here’, *dort* ‘there’, *da* ‘there’) or adverbs (*so* ‘so’, *solch-* ‘such’), referring to properties. With respect to usage I will present, in addition to the basic deictic use, at least three further uses of demonstratives (the anaphoric use, the recognitional use and the indefinite use) in Chapter 4. Since most demonstratives can occur in all uses, we are dealing with a rich variety of actual occurrences of the various demonstrative forms:

(20) *Ich hätte gerne DIESEN Hund* [pointing gesture].
   ‘I would like to have THIS dog [pointing gesture].’

(21) *Ich hätte gerne DIESEN (hier/da) [pointing gesture].*
   ‘I would like to have THIS one (here/there) [pointing gesture].’

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9 I will use the term deictic use, but note that the two terms (deictic use and situative use) can be used in an interchangeable fashion.
10 Capitalized letters are used in order to indicate stress.
11 The terms deictic, direct and indexical reference are also used in an interchangeable fashion in this work, following Zimmermann (1991).
2 Demonstratives: The basic use

(22) Ich hätte gerne DEN Hund [pointing gesture].
‘I would like to have DEN [THIS/THAT] dog [pointing gesture].’

(23) Ich hätte gerne DEN (da (drüben)/hier) [pointing gesture].
‘I would like to have THIS/THAT one (there (over there) here) [pointing gesture].’

(24) Ich hätte gerne DAS. [pointing gesture]
‘I would like to have DAS [THIS/THAT] one [pointing gesture].’

(25) Peter ist da/hier [pointing gesture].
‘Peter is there/here [pointing gesture].’

(26) Der Stuhl kommt hier hin [pointing gesture].
‘The chair needs to go here [pointing gesture].’

(27) Dort/da soll der Schrank stehen [pointing gesture].
‘The cupboard should be there [pointing gesture].’

‘Martina has a son. Dieser [this one] is 5 years old.’

(29) Peter hasst Sven. Und DER hasst Martin.
‘Peter hates Sven. DER [he / that one (=Sven)] hates Martin.’

(30) Es war einmal ein König. Dieser König hatte eine wunderschöne Tochter.
‘Once upon a time there was a king. This king had a marvelous daughter.’

‘There were new bombings onto Afghanistan. This war is simply cruel.’

(32) Was ist eigentlich mit diesem Freund von dir, der sonst immer mit dabei war?
‘What has happened to that friend of yours, who usually went out with us?’

(33) Dieser Michael Ballack ist einfach ein Genie!
‘That Michael Ballack is simply a genius!’

The above examples, which are grouped into two groups, should illustrate the variation found with respect to (i) form and (ii) usage of the presumed demonstrative forms. The respective functions, going along with the different combinations of form and usage will be discussed in the following chapters of this thesis.
Looking at the examples, one thing seems to stand out: the presumed demonstrative forms (marked in boldface) in the examples above seem to be categorizable into two main groups. In examples (20) to (27) the marked forms refer to entities which are visible, concrete entities locations (in the case of (28) to (33)) which are part of the perceptible part of the actual utterance situation. These demonstratives also come with a speaker demonstration in form of a pointing gesture. These cases go in line with an intuitive definition of demonstratives as “pointing words” or “words with indicative value”. Variations of these kinds of definition are found in different grammars (Duden 1995: 332; Helbig and Buscha 2001: 209; Hentschel and Weydt 1990: 222). This first group of examples shows demonstratives in their basic use. They are indexical expressions, exhibiting direct reference. They are used in order to make reference to a referent which is a perceptible part of the actual utterance situation and the referent is pointed out by a speaker demonstration. In this group of examples, the meaning of the demonstrative is labeled context-dependent as it clearly depends on a feature of the actual utterance situation, i.e. on the required speaker demonstration.

In contrast to this first group of examples, where the referent of the demonstratives is a perceptible part of the utterance situation and pointed out by a speaker demonstration, there is a second group of items in the examples above which are not necessarily in accordance with the intuitive definition of demonstratives as “pointing words”, literally pointing out perceptible entities in the actual utterance situation: the forms in examples (28) to (33) refer to referents which are not necessarily perceptible entities of the actual utterance situation and which do not come with a speaker demonstration. The referents in (28) to (33) are either given in the previous discourse context ((28) – (30)) or given in the shared common knowledge between hearer and speaker ((31), (32)). These uses exemplify further, non-basic uses of demonstratives. In the next subsection, I will argue in detail, following the main assumptions of mostly Diesel (1999) (but also Brugmann 1904: 7; Bühler 1934: 390; Lyons 1977: 671; Fillmore 1982: 37; Kaplan 1989a; Ahrenholz 2007: 37) that they are derived uses of demonstratives in their basic deictic use and that the deictic use of demonstratives is in fact the basic and defining one.

Taking an even closer look, there is a further variety of more fine-grained sub-groups in the examples given in above. Some of the demonstrative forms stand on their own, replacing full noun phrases whereas others precede a noun phrase. Demonstratives replacing full noun phrases are referred to as pronominal demonstratives, whereas demonstratives which accompany a noun phrase are labeled adnominal demonstratives, operating as determiners (Ahrenholz 2007: 315). Some forms in the examples above are combined with deictic enforcers (in (23)), whereas others appear to be local adverbs themselves (25), (26), (27).

Where this multifaceted bundle of uses and forms may pose a definition problem to others (Dixon 2003), one can give structure to it by assuming one basic use for demonstratives: the basic deictic use. There are further uses, such as the anaphoric, recognitional and indefinite use, which are then assumed to be
secondary, sekundärdeiktisch (Ehrich 1992: 9) or derived uses (Brugmann 1904: 7; Bühler 1934: 390; Lyons 1977: 671). They share the semantics of direct reference with the deictic use but show typological variation in that they exhibit reference to different, derived, domains of reference and without the requirement of a speaker demonstration.

2.2 Defining demonstratives: One basic use

Trying to structure the multifaceted descriptive data existing with respect to demonstratives (see examples (20) to (33)), many researchers agree that the deictic use with its reference to perceptible entities of the actual utterance situation is the basic and defining one (Brugmann 1904: 7; Bühler 1934: 390; Lyons 1977: 671; Fillmore 1982: 37; Kaplan 1989a; Diessel 1999: 119; Ahrenholz 2007: 37). Diessel (1999: 110) offers a range of arguments from language acquisition, markedness theory and grammaticalization for the assumption that the basic deictic use “is indeed the basic use from which all others derive”. Diessel’s main arguments are that (i) the deictic use is prior in language acquisition, that (ii) demonstratives in the deictic use in the languages of the world are morphologically and distributionally unmarked and that (iii) the grammaticalization of demonstratives never originates from a demonstrative in its deictic use, but always from one of the derived uses. A more detailed summary of his main arguments is given below:

Diessel’s (1999: 110) first argument is that the deictic use is prior in language acquisition. He cites from a study on the acquisition of deictic words in English from Clark (1978), who has shown that gestures are crucial for young children to learn deictic words such as this and that and here and there. According to that study, the acquisition of deictic words occurs in four stages: “at first, children use a pointing gesture without any words to focus the hearer’s attention on entities in the surrounding situation. Then they begin to use an isolated demonstrative accompanied by a gesture. Next, they combine demonstratives with other linguistic expressions, producing utterances such as this shoe or that mine. And finally, they learn how to use demonstratives without a deictic gesture” (Diessel 1999: 110). Diessel concludes that, although the study cited does not differentiate between various uses of demonstratives, it is obvious that the deictic use is learned prior to the other uses, since it is the only one which standardly requires a speaker demonstration. This suggests that the deictic use appears to play a superior role within the system of indexicals.

The second argument is that demonstratives in the deictic use in the languages of the world are morphologically unmarked. He states that, in particular, demonstratives in the anaphoric use are often “marked by an affix that is added to a demonstrative root” (Diessel 1999: 111). This is exemplified in the examples from Usan (-ng), Ngiyambaa (-la) and West Greenlandic (ta-) below (taken from Diessel 1999: 111):
2.3 Direct reference

(34) Usan
Deictic use  $e$  this
Anaphoric use  $e$-ng  this-GIVEN

(35) Ngiyambaa
Deictic use  $nilu$  this.ERG
Anaphoric use  $nilu$-la  this.ERG.GIVEN

(36) West Greenlandic
Deictic use  $manna$  this
Anaphoric use  $ta$-manna  ANA-this

Being distributionally unmarked cross-linguistically is a feature that also suggests that the deictic use is of a basic status.

Diessel’s third argument is his claim that the grammaticalization of demonstratives (for example towards the definite article) never originates from a demonstrative in its deictic use, but always from one of the derived uses. He concludes that deictic demonstratives are never immediately reanalyzed as grammatical markers. He states that “the grammaticalization of demonstratives always originates from one of the derived uses” (1999: 112). For example, anaphoric demonstratives are often reanalyzed as third person pronouns, or recognitional demonstratives frequently develop into correlatives. Obviously, demonstratives in one of the derived uses have to be considered as being grammaticalized to some extent already, still serving a language-internal function in that they organize the information flow in the ongoing discourse. The grammaticalization towards purely grammatical markers never originates from the basic deictic use, which is, according to Diessel, fulfilling a language-external function. This is why they cannot be immediately reanalyzed as purely grammatical markers. He concludes that “a demonstrative will always first go through a stage at which it is used with reference to linguistic entities in the surrounding discourse before it assumes a specific grammatical function” (1999: 119). He thinks of the grammaticalization of demonstratives as a continuum ranging from items that are used to orient the hearer in the outside world to items that are purely grammatical markers such as sentence connectives or determinatives. These three arguments support the assumption that the deictic use is indeed the basic use from which the other uses can be assumed to derive. The basic deictic use of demonstratives is described via the concept of direct reference.

2.3 Direct reference

Claiming that the deictic use, exemplified in (20) to (24), is the basic use of demonstratives and defining it via the semantics of direct reference and the requirement of a speaker demonstration, we have to ask ourselves: what does it mean to be a directly referential expression and how does this, with respect to
demonstratives, relate to the requirement of speaker demonstrations? A first, intuitive answer is given by referring to Nunberg (1993: 1), who looks at the class of indexical expressions in general, i.e. not only at demonstratives but also indexicals such as I, you or here. Note that, in what follows, the characteristics of indexicals will often be exemplified using examples like proper names or I, you or here, for the sake of simplicity. The characteristics hold for, with some extensions, the class of demonstratives as well.

[deictic] words like you, here and tomorrow differ from other expressions in two ways. [...] They have different kinds of meanings, which are context dependent (in that they depend on the constitution of the actual utterance situation) in ways that meanings of names and descriptions are not. Second, their meanings play a different kind of role in the interpretation of the utterances that contain them. (Nunberg 1993: 1)

As an example, Nunberg (1993) shows how the meaning of you (37), which is, like demonstratives, an indexical expression, can be paraphrased by a definite description like the addressee of the utterance, but that (37) and (38) do not say the same things, which enforces the intuition that indexicals work in a quite different way, compared to, for example, definite descriptions (Kaplan 1989a: 490).

(37) Oh, it’s you.

(38) ??Oh, it’s the addressee of this utterance.

(Nunberg 1993: 1)

Direct reference is thus defined as the context-dependent denotation of entities via certain linguistic expressions, which are then directly referential expressions. The speaker uses them in order to refer to certain aspects (such as time, place) or entities (objects, persons) which are parts of the actual utterance context and which standardly have to be localized relatively with respect to the speaker’s spatio-temporal coordinates. The situational features which play a decisive role for deictic expressions, are all linked to (or to be evaluated with respect to) the origo (Latin for origin). The term origo goes back to Bühler (1934) and it has to be understood as a type of reference point, with respect to which all deictic expressions have to be evaluated. In the standard case, the origo consists of the speaker at the time and place of speaking. Deviations of this standard case will be discussed in Chapter 5. Later, other researchers had the same intuitions, so Fillmore comes up with the label deictic center and Lyons (1977) defines it as the zero-point of deictic expressions. It represents the spatial, temporal and personal coordinates of an utterance, i.e. the contextual features of the actual utterance situations, on which deictic expressions need to rely (in the standard case). This reference-point for deictic expressions, the origo, is situated with the actual speaker. The actual speaker seems to monopolize deixis, since he has control over the speech situation. That is, in order to understand what is meant with now and here in (i), one has to adapt the coordinates, i.e. the perspective of the speaker:

(i) Barack Obama is here with me now.
2.3 Direct reference

Ehlich (1987: 285) says, relating to the function of indexical expressions, that they are used in order to direct the hearer’s attention towards features which are standardly parts of the actual utterance situation:


‘Deictic expressions are thus linguistic means for the realization of a specific type of linguistic activity during the linguistic acting, the deictic procedure. The deictic procedure is a procedure of orientation which the speaker triggers in the hearer when (s)he uses a deictic expression. Using the deictic expression, the speaker performs a pointer to a certain reference-domain. This pointer is, on the one hand, the expression of the speaker showing that (s)he is focused to the entities in the respective domain of reference. On the other hand, it is a transfer of this state of being-focused onto the hearer, who is asked via the deictic procedure to focus himself and thus establish a common focusing act of speaker and hearer in the respective domain of reference.’ (Author’s translation)

Based on the very short definition in Chapter 1 and the discussion above, the reader should be aware that there is a general dichotomy between indexical (here, now, I, this) and non-indexical expressions such as descriptive expressions (sun, river, blue). This dichotomy was already introduced by Bühler (1934) in his concept of the Zweifelderlehre (concept of two language-fields), which postulates that there are two general types of expressions which are Zeigewörter or (pointing words) on the one hand, like here, now, this whose referents depend on the actual situation in which they are used, i.e. indexical expressions, and Symbolwörter (symbolic words) or naming descriptive words), whose interpretation is not dependent on situational features, but satisfied by the descriptive content alone. Zimmermann (1991: 164) describes this contrast by saying that basic lexical units are always either indexical or absolute. In semantics, indexical expressions are defined as “linguistic signs with direct reference” (Kaplan 1989a: 483). In contrast to non-indexical expressions, such as definite descriptions, for example, indexical expressions do not evoke a concept of some

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5 Not to confuse with Fillmore’s (1982) symbolic use. Bühler’s term symbolic words refers to the exact opposite: to non-indexical expressions.
entity but establish a direct referential link between the actual utterance situation and the language (Diessel 2012).

Demonstratives in their basic deictic use are argued to be indexical expressions \(^{14}\) and therefore express direct reference. The semantic rules of indexical expressions fix their reference dependent on the utterance situation, which means that the referent does not change across possible worlds.

In other words: demonstratives and other indexical expressions are assumed to have a built-in context parameter, which requires information from the actual utterance situation in order to receive their meaning:

(39) I want **this** one [pointing gesture to an apple on a tree].

In (39) above, **this** refers to a perceptible object in the actual utterance situation. Essentially, the referent of **this** actually is the object which is pointed out by the speaker demonstration. The referent of the indexical expression is provided not (primarily) by the semantic conditions imposed by the expression, but “directly” by the pointing gesture which is a part of the actual utterance situation (Levinson 2004: 9). The following examples illustrate how demonstrative reference for *dieser* in its basic use is assumed to work, and how reference fixing works in a fundamentally different way compared to, for example, definite descriptions or indefinite noun phrases. *Dieser* refers to an object, which is determined via an obligatory speaker demonstration performed by the speaker of the utterance containing *dieser*:

(40) At the counter of a bakery:
   a. Ich möchte ein Stück von **DIESEM** [pointing gesture].
      ‘I want a piece of **this** one [pointing gesture].
   b. Ich möchte ein Stück von dem Schokoladenkuchen.
      ‘I want a piece of the chocolate cake.’
      (Umbach 2011/2012.)
   c. Ich möchte ein Stück von einem Schokoladenkuchen.
      ‘I want a piece of a chocolate cake’

   In the a.-version of (40) the referential act can only be successful if the speaker performs a speaker demonstration. The speaker demonstration is obligatory. *Dieser* is an indexical, in that it exhibits direct reference to the very referent which is pointed out by the speaker demonstration in the actual world of (40). This is not the case in the b.- and c.-version where no speaker demonstration is required. The lexical information from the definite and the indefinite noun

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\(^{14}\) According to Zimmermann (1991), the expression *indexical* should not be confused with the German expression *indexikalisch* ‘indexicalic’. This term is also derived from *index*, but relates to linguistic expressions linked via indices (thus to expressions which have linguistic antecedents, which deictic expressions do not have). Thus, it relates to the concrete opposite (anaphors) as to what is meant by *deictic* or *indexical* expressions in English.
2.3 Direct reference

phrase in (40b) and (40c) and the articles suffice in order to guarantee a successful referential act. Note that in the b.-version this holds only if there is one chocolate cake present in the actual utterance situation. In the a.-version the meaning of this, however, constitutes a rule for identifying its referent in a given context and it must be supplemented by an additional feature: the speaker demonstration.

To summarize, indexicals are directly referential expressions. This means that the referent of an indexical, with respect to an utterance context \( c \), is simply the object to which it refers in that utterance context (Kaplan 1989a, 1989b). It does not, unlike definite descriptions, refer to a description with properties which would determine the referent in relation to a certain world or context. For example, the referent of the expression \( I \) in a certain context \( c \) is simply the respective agent of \( c \) and its meaning that context \( c \) “does not include the property of being-the-agent-of-\( c \), or any other sort of property” (Braun 2012). It “directly” refers to the actual speaker of the actual utterance situation. Before I discuss Kaplan’s approach to the concept of direct reference, I will address some terminological issues, as there are at least two types of indexical expressions: demonstratives and pure indexicals.

2.3.1 Demonstratives and pure indexicals

An important distinction related to the concept of direct reference is the one between demonstratives and pure indexicals. Whereas demonstratives are always indexical expressions, not all indexical expressions are demonstratives. This is exemplified, comparing the expressions today and this. Today, for example, is a prototypical so-called pure indexical expression. Its meaning depends on the context of utterance. It varies, depending on the constitution of the context of utterance, respectively, depending on when or on which day it is uttered. That is, it depends on the constitution of the actual utterance situation. Once the reference is fixed, its semantic rules provide that it designates the same referent with respect to all possible worlds, i.e. the referent of the actual utterance situation only.

(41) Ann told Bill that Peter leaves today.

(42) Ann told Bill that Peter wants THIS one [pointing gesture].

Similarly, this is a prototypical indexical expression, since its denotation depends on the context — it varies, depending on the context of utterance, depending on which object is pointed out by the speaker demonstration. The difference between today and this is that (both being indexical expressions) today is a so-called “pure indexical” but not a demonstrative, whereas this is a demonstrative. Today is not a demonstrative, since its use does not standardly require a speaker demonstration in order to make it refer successfully; this is the defining feature of demonstratives in their basic use. We will see that still all demonstratives are indexicals (for an overview see also Figure 1):
2 Demonstratives: The basic use

Table 4: Pure indexicals vs. demonstratives

| (43) Peter has to leave today. | • direct (indexical) reference  
• no speaker demonstration required  
• ➔ pure indexical |
| (44) I want THIS one [pointing gesture]. | • direct (indexical) reference  
• + speaker demonstration required  
• ➔ demonstrative expression |

Thus, the term indexical expression is an umbrella term including (i) demonstratives and, as a second group, (ii) non-demonstrative indexical expressions such as now, today or I. Following Kaplan (1989a), this second group is labeled “pure indexicals”. The additional condition of the required speaker demonstration separates the class of demonstratives from pure indexicals like now or today, which do not depend on a speaker demonstration in order to refer successfully. These relations are depicted in a still fairly simple scheme below, a more complete and complex scheme will be given in Figure 1:

![Figure 1: Demonstratives vs. pure indexicals (author’s illustration)](image)

From a usage-based perspective, Fillmore (1982) offers further terminology for these sub-groups of indexical reference. He uses the labels of a) gestural use, which refers to expressions which standardly depend on speaker demonstrations, i.e. standard demonstrative expressions, versus b) symbolic use, which refers to expressions which do not depend on speaker demonstrations and which make reference in that they refer only to the contextual coordinates available, i.e. pure indexicals (Levinson 1983: 66). In Fillmore’s (1982) view, demonstrative expressions prototypically appear in the gestural use, requiring a speaker
2.3 Direct reference

demonstration, and pure indexicals prototypically appear in the symbolic use, without gestures. However, he notes that “transfers” are sometimes possible in that a demonstrative form may be exceptionally used in the symbolic use, see (44) and (45) below. Conversely, one may find a transfer in that a pure indexical is accompanied by pointing gestures, i.e. appears in the gestural use (see (46) below). These transfer cases are referred to as non-prototypical examples in Fillmore’s account (1982: 37):

(44)  This day is the best day of my life. (~ Today is the best day of my life.)

(45)  This city stinks. (~ It stinks here.)  
→ non-prototypical symbolic uses of this: it works like a pure indexical and can be paraphrased by today or here

(46)  The cupboard should be here [pointing gesture towards one corner of the room].  
→ non-prototypical gestural uses of here: it works like a demonstrative and can be paraphrased with there

To summarize, “deictic or indexical expressions” is the label for both (i) standard demonstratives and (ii) pure indexicals. I will introduce tests later in this chapter which allow us to distinguish between these categories.

From what has been presented above I conclude that demonstratives in their basic and definitory use are indexical expressions, which are obligatorily accompanied by a speaker demonstration in the paradigmatic case. This opinion is widely shared in the literature (Kleiber 1983: 105; Kaplan 1989a: 490; Himmelmann 1997: 86ff.; Levinson 2004: 9; Ahrenholz 2006: 43). The condition of the speaker demonstration separates the class of demonstratives (this, that,) from other indexical expressions (like I, here, now,) which do not depend on a speaker demonstration in order to refer successfully.

2.3.2 Classical theory of context: Kaplan (1989a, 1989b)

The most widespread approach used in order to theoretically explain, capture, and formalize these special characteristics of indexical expressions (as opposed to definite descriptions) is Kaplan’s theory of indexicals and demonstratives (1989a, 1989b), known as the classical context theory (cf. Zimmermann 1991). This theory will be, for reasons of simplicity, exemplified using proper names and pure indexical expressions at first and it will be applied to demonstrative expressions subsequently, due to the fact that an additional condition holds for demonstratives. Kaplan’s theory (1989a, 1989b) is based on the two key-concepts of character

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15 As we have seen, non-prototypical transfers are possible where demonstratives work like other deictic expressions without a speaker demonstration. These transfers will be discussed in detail in the section on hier ‘here’ in Chapter 3.
and content. According to Kaplan the meaning of a deictic expression is not its intension, but a “character”. In order to understand what the character of an expression is, I will have to define the terms “extension”, “intension”, and “character” in context. Carnap (1972) differentiates between two types or two stages of meaning of expressions: intension and extension. While extensions are the actual respective objects or classes of objects referred to, intensions correspond to individual concepts or functions of possible worlds into extensions. For example, the extension of the name Barack Obama is the actual person Barack Obama. The intension of a sentence is a function that is true in a possible world if and only if the sentence is true there: the intension of The president of the U.S.A. is black is true in all worlds where the president of the U.S.A. is black. Thus, the intensions are functions from possible worlds to the object they designate in that world: the intension of the president of the U.S.A. picks out whoever is the president of the U.S.A. in a certain world. Singular terms such as proper names do not have intension, as their “intensions” are their extension. Intensions are necessary, since certain (intensional) operators only operate via intensions, and not via extensions (for example propositional attitude verb such as believe, think, etc).

(47) Peter believes that there is a blue-haired alien in his garden.

A certain type of expressions, however, cannot be captured with the concept of intension: deictic expressions like this, I, here etc. are ambiguous in the sense that their meaning varies, depending on the respective utterance situation. Their fixed, constant meaning is labeled “character” by Kaplan (1989a, 1989b). The character only leads to the intension if it is interpreted in a certain utterance situation / in a certain context. On the sentence level, the content corresponds to the whole proposition of a sentence. If the intension is to be determined in a certain world (maybe under the influence of certain intensional operators, under negation or modals), the extension will be received. Thus, we end up with three “steps” of reference:

1. Character + context (utterance situation) results in
2. Intension + world (evaluation situation) results in
3. Extension

Figure 2: Classical theory of context (illustration from von Heusinger 1997: 113)
2.3 Direct reference

The interpretation of deictic expressions like here, now, this etc. usually exclusively depends on the utterance situation — intensional operators do not affect their meaning. Even if intensional operators are present, the referent of this is still the object being pointed out in the actual utterance situation (47), i.e. its reference is to be evaluated in the actual utterance situation (whereas the referent of a definite description has to be evaluated in the world created by the operator, i.e. in the example (48) below in the world of Mary’s believes). Deictic expressions are “immune” to linguistic operators and thus skip this last step in the three-step-process of reference fixing — unlike, for example, definite descriptions (48).

(47) Mary wants this one [pointing gesture].

(48) Mary wants the next best thing, which will be presented to her.

Deictic expressions do not have an intension, as it is equivalent to their extension — by skipping the last step (see scheme above) they don’t change their meaning depending on the world of evaluation (they are “immune” to linguistic operators that shift the world of evaluation). They only depend on the situation of utterance. Non-deictic expressions like river, sun, wonderful, however, have a non-context-dependent intension and change their extension, depending on the circumstances of the actual world of evaluation. From these different dependencies we can derive a categorization of expressions, which are (i) either depending on the utterance context or (ii) depending on the world of evaluation. The first class has been called directly referential, the second class has been called absolutely referring expressions.

The meaning of deictic expressions explicitly relates them to standard features of the actual utterance situation, assuming that each situation comes with a certain set of defined standard situation-indices like a speaker, a listener, a place, date and time of utterance, and certain demonstrata (objects being pointed out) of the utterance situation. One can think of them as fixed rules, specifying the type of the deictic expression. A deictic expression’s final, extensional meaning then only depends on the actual utterance situation. For today the fixed rule is that it always refers to the day of the actual utterance situation. For I the rule says that it refers to the actual speaker of the utterance and for now the rule says that it refers to the actual time of utterance. The rule for this in its basic deictic use is slightly different as it always refers to the referent which is being pointed out by a speaker demonstration in the actual utterance situation. Demonstratives thus differ from other deictic expressions in that their semantic value is not determined by contextual parameters which are an automatically available aspect of the utterance context (speaker of utterance, date, time, place of utterance). Their meaning constitutes a rule for identifying the referent of the expression in a given utterance context, like for pure indexicals, but it must be supplemented by an
additional requirement: a speaker demonstration (or some other form of externalization of the speaker’s referential intentions).

2.3.3 Testing for indexicals and demonstratives

In the following section I will present tests which enable us to test for indexicals and demonstratives. These tests capture the difference between indexical and non-indexical expressions such as indefinite expressions or definite descriptions and between pure indexicals and demonstratives. More specifically, I will first discuss two tests that allow us to identify indexical expressions: (i) the scopal behavior test, inspired by Wolter (2006) and Hunter (2010) (ii) the disquotation test (Cappelen and Lepore 2005). Then I will discuss (iii) the speaker demonstration test, which will ultimately allow us to distinguish between demonstratives and indexicals.

Testing for indexicals I: The scopal behavior test

Wolter (2006: 16ff.) and Hunter (2010: 7ff.) are also interested in the differences in reference between indexical expressions and definite descriptions. One of the diagnostic contexts Hunter (2010) presents, which underlines the fundamental difference in the way indexical expressions work — compared to non-indexical, definite descriptions is given below in (49) and (50). Hunter summarizes, referring to Kripke’s wide-scope modal argument (Kripke 1972, 1980), that, with respect to scope, “indexicals […] are far more obstinate about their referents than are definite descriptions in modal contexts” (2010: 8), in that they always give the appearance of taking widest scope. These observations go back to Kaplan (1977, 1989a), as well. In Hunter’s words: “indexicals are modally rigid”. This is reflected in the examples in (49a) and (50a). Note that this test was originally developed using proper names (which are not true indexical expressions), however does it work for true indexicals, as well ((50)):

(49) a. (Necessarily) Berlin is Berlin.
   b. (Necessarily) Berlin is the capital of Germany.

(50) a. (Necessarily) I am hungry.
   b. (Necessarily) the current speaker is hungry. (Hunter (2010: 8))

With respect to the truth-conditions, (49a) is always true, whereas (49b) is not always true, for example (49b) would be false in a world in which a different city would be the capital of Germany, or at a different time. Thus, the two sentences have different truth conditions.

Similarly, for (50a) and (50b) holds that (50b) has a reading which can be paraphrased as: whoever is the current speaker in the utterance situation of (50b), is hungry. That is, the definite description in (50b) allows for a so-called co-varying interpretation, in that it allows for co-varying referents of the definite
2.3 Direct reference

description. In contrast to that, no such a reading exists for (50a), which can only be made true in a world w if the person who is actually speaking is hungry in w, so no co-varying readings can arise, which reflects the rigidity of reference.

On the basis of examples like the ones just discussed with modal contexts, Hunter (2010), following Kripke (1972, 1980), and Kaplan (1977, 1989a, 1989b), concludes that, since the truth conditions between the a.- and the b.-version differ, Berlin is not synonymous with the capital of Germany or any other definite description.

These observations are also in line with the generalization proposed by Wolter (2006: 16), who claims that demonstratives in their deictic use exclusively give rise to apparent wide scope readings when embedded under a modal operator. That is, they are assumed to be scopally inert and do not allow for scopal variation. Thus, within contexts including embedded modals, the scopal possibilities of deictic demonstratives seem to be limited to what looks like wide-scope interpretations only and they never allow for co-varying interpretations. With respect to all possible worlds, demonstratives directly denote one and the same object. Definite and indefinite descriptions, on the other hand, allow for narrow-scope interpretations or readings of co-variation under a modal in that the referent of the description co-varies with the worlds being quantified over by the modal. So, contexts which show embedding under semantic operators such as modals, for example, or quantifiers, can be used as diagnostic test contexts, highlighting the difference between indexical and non-indexical expressions.

For example, in (51) below, the definite description the person I’m pointing at “can take narrow scope under the modal would, so that the referent co-varies with the worlds being quantified over. In contrast, the demonstrative noun phrase that person in (52) refers rigidly and cannot co-vary with the worlds being quantified over, and as a result, the sentence is judged false” (Wolter 2006: 16):

(51) [pointing at John throughout] If John and Mary switched places, the person I’m pointing at would be a woman.

(52) *[pointing at John throughout] If John and Mary switched places, that person I’m pointing at would be a woman.
(Kaplan 1989a; Roberts 2002; Wolter 2006)

Note, that this modal argument can be extended, as it generally appears to hold for expressions in opaque contexts (von Stechow 1982), i.e. for contexts that contain modal or intensional operators, but also for contexts including quantifiers and also negation. Generally, indexicals always give the appearance of taking wide scope and that the difference between indexical and non-indexical expressions becomes obvious in referentially opaque contexts. In these contexts, the object which a particular indexical denotes is invariably the same. In contrast, this is not the case for e.g. definite or indefinite descriptions, which allow for co-varying readings in these contexts (see examples below).
Indexicals in these contexts never take narrow scope. Thus, as a test, we can embed the form in question under a modal or a quantifier and then investigate its scopal properties. This is exemplified below for a context including a modal operator and for a context with the universal quantifier. The indefinite article in (53) and the definite description in (54) allow for narrow-scope interpretations, whereas the demonstrative (55) directly refers to one particular Kindergärtnerin ‘kindergarten teacher’, i.e. only the one which is pointed out in the actual utterance situation — it will always refer to this one and never to a different one. Diese Kindergärtnerin ‘this kindergarten teacher’ is ‘immune’ with respect to the (or unaffected by the) linguistic operator jeder ‘every’, under which non-indexical expressions are found to be scopally active in that they allow for narrow-scope (co-varying) readings as well. Co-varying readings cannot be received for DIESER in (55), which indicates that DIESER in (55) is an indexical expression, whereas the definite and the indefinite description are not.

Subordination under quantifier:

(53) Jedes Kind freundet sich mit einer Kindergärtnerin an.
    ‘Every child makes friends with a kindergarten teacher.’
    \[
    \rightarrow \text{possibly different kindergarten teachers (narrow-scope)}
    \]

(54) Jedes Kind freundet sich mit der Kindergärtnerin an.
    ‘Every child makes friends with the kindergarten teacher.’
    \[
    \rightarrow \text{possibly different kindergarten teachers (narrow-scope)}
    \]

    ‘Every child makes friends with THIS kindergarten teacher [pointing
    gesture].’
    \[
    \rightarrow \text{no co-variairion possible, only one kindergarten teacher, i.e. exactly the}
    \text{one which is pointed out (apparent wide-scope reading only)}
    \]

There is, however, an additional reading of dieser, in which it appears, at first glance, to be used in its basic deictic use (with a pointing gesture) but does not appear to exhibit direct reference, as in (56). Mostly, this use is found making reference to inanimate objects or products. These examples exhibit a different type of use of dieser, the so-called type-use, as the speaker is not intending to refer to the actual jacket in the shop window but points out a certain type of jacket. Dieser may also be used as a demonstrative to properties here, in form of a type-token shift. It picks out one representative token (instantiation) of a certain type, exhibiting direct reference with respect to that type:
### 2.3 Direct reference

(56) Standing in front of a shop and pointing to a jacket in the window.
   Jedes Kind will **diese (so eine / solch eine) Jacke** haben.
   ‘Every kid wants to have **this (such a) jacket.**’

   In this work, however, I focus on the standard token-use of **dieser**. In (56) the token-reading is present as well, in that the speaker of (56) wants the exact token (of one type) pointed out by the pointing gesture.

   In examples with embedding under the modal **wollen** ‘want’ (see below), the demonstrative only allows for readings which look like wide-scope readings in that there exists one particular kindergarden teacher, with which Petra aims to become friends (59). The indefinite article (57), in contrast, allows for narrow-scope readings (in that no such kindergarden teacher even exists). This missing existential presupposition, which is not entailed by the modal, found for the narrow-scope readings is made visible by the fact that these sentences are felicitous with a continuation of the type “but there is no x”. The definite article, as well, allows for readings of co-variation, in that there is more than one fixed kindergarden teacher for Petra (58) (or not even a kindergarden teacher at all).

**Semantic operator — intensional verb:**

(57) Petra will sich mit **einer Kindergärtnerin** anfreunden.
   ‘Petra wants to make friends with a kindergarden teacher.’
   \(\rightarrow\) possible reading: narrow scope reading: but there is no kindergarden teacher.

(58) Petra will sich mit **der Kindergärtnerin** anfreunden.
   ‘Petra wants to make friends with the kindergarden teacher.’
   \(\rightarrow\) possible reading: narrow scope reading: but there is no kindergarden teacher.

(59) Petra will sich mit **DIESER Kindergärtnerin** [pointing gesture] anfreunden.
   ‘Petra wants to make friends with **THIS kindergarden teacher** [pointing gesture].’
   \(\rightarrow\) only apparent wide-scope reading possible (there is exactly one kindergarden teacher)
   \(\rightarrow\) narrow-scope reading not possible: # but there is no kindergarden teacher.

   The theory of direct reference for indexicals, pursued by Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) explains the contrast which became visible discussing the two tests for indexical reference. Demonstrative NPs only contribute one entity to the composition of the truth conditions of the respective sentence: exactly the very entity which is being pointed out by the speaker demonstration in the actual utterance situation. Thus, there is no way for the referent of the demonstrative to
co-vary in contexts with semantic operators such as modal operators, intensional verbs or propositional attitude verbs. This characteristic can be used as a test for indexicality: if an expression appears to be scopally inert in contexts with semantic operators, it is an indexical expression.

**Testing for indexicals II: The disquotation test**
Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 88–99) propose the following as a test for indexical expressions\(^\text{16}\), which captures their behavior of direct reference. It shows how they are directly and exclusively anchored to the actual utterance situation in which they are originally uttered:

\[(60) \text{If an expression is indexical}^{17}, \text{then it typically}^{18} \text{blocks inter-contextual disquotation indirect reports.} \]

(Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 88)

Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 89) explain that if we want to test, or at least want to ascertain whether, \(e\) is indexical, we have to take an utterance \(u\) of a sentence \(S\) containing \(e\) in context \(C\). Let \(C'\) be a context relevantly different from \(C\) (i.e. different according to those standards significant according to contextualists about \(e\)). If there’s a true disquotation indirect report of \(u\) in \(C'\), then that’s evidence that \(S\) is context insensitive. (To be ‘disquotational’ just means one can adjust the semantic values of components of \(S\) that are generally recognized as context dependent, i.e., we just test for the controversial components.)

\[(61) \begin{align*} C: \text{Bill: I am male.} \\
C': \text{Mary: # Bill said that I am male.} \\
C' \text{ Mary: Bill said that he is male.} \end{align*} \]

\[(62) \begin{align*} C: \text{Nina: John is American.} \\
C': \text{Mark: Nina said that John is American.} \end{align*} \]

That means if there is no true disquotational report, one can conclude that the respective expression is, using Cappelen and Lepore’s (2005) terms, context sensitive; in my terms it is an indexical expression.

\(^{16}\) In fact, their original motivation which led to the proposal of this test was a different, as they intend to define (almost) all expressions as context-dependent expressions. Still, the test proposed is suitable in order to demarcate indexical from non-indexical expressions as defined in this work.

\(^{17}\) Cappelen and Lepore (2005) use the term “context-sensitive“ for the group of expressions which I labeled indexicals, but they relate to the very same thing, i.e. demonstratives and pure indexicals. They also exclude proper names from context sensitive expressions — as they do not pass their test.

\(^{18}\) The fact that they use the word “typically” in their definition shows that this test will not always be applicable, however it seems to be a good general indicator.
2.3 Direct reference

Let us see how a standard indexical expression, like I, passes this test: If Bill utters *I am male* in a context C, Mary cannot correctly report in a different context C’ by saying *Bill said that I am male*, as she has to report with *Bill said that he is male*. If, however, Nina utters *John is ready*, a third person could correctly quote Nina by saying *Nina said that John is ready*. This tells us that *I* is an indexical expression, whereas *John* is not. The same holds for demonstratives in their basic deictic use, as when Mary says *Peter wants this* (pointing to a dog), John cannot correctly quote her (in a completely different utterance situation) by saying *Mary said that Peter wants this*, which tells us that *this* (in combination with a pointing gesture) is an indexical expression.

The other way around, considering definite and indefinite descriptions and proper names, it can also be shown that they are *not* blocked in inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports, and thus are not assumed to be indexical expressions. Thus, exhibiting indexical reference is a feature which makes the class of indexical expressions special and demarcates it from other non-indexical expressions. In (63) and (64), for example, I postulate two test sentences including a definite description (*the tree in front of John’s house*) and a proper name (*John*):

(63) Definite description: Mary in C: *The tree in front of John’s house* is nice.

(64) Proper name and indefinite: Mary in C: *John* met a girl.

Now, let us check if they can appear in inter-contextual disquotational reports without blocking / adjustment:

(65) Peter in C’: Mary said that *the tree in front of John’s house* is nice.

(66) Peter in C’: Mary said that John met a girl.

According to (65) and (66) the inter-contextual disquotational report is possible without blocking or adjustments. This allows for the conclusion that neither *the tree in front of John’s house* nor *John* are indexicals. Thus, Cappelen and Lepore’s (2005) test enables us to demarcate the class of indexical expressions from the class of non-indexical expressions, such as definite descriptions, indefinites, or proper names.

The discussion of the tests underlines the theoretical observation that the semantics of descriptions and indexicals work in fundamentally different fashions.

Note that when it will become necessary to actually apply the tests in Chapter 3 in order to identify indexical expressions, I will mainly use Cappelen and Lepore’s (2005) test and only come back to investigations of scopal possibilities if Capellen and Lepore’s (2005) test is not applicable. I find Capellen and Lepore’s (2005) test more user-friendly and also closer to natural data since constructed examples with embedding under various semantic operators may sometimes appear slightly forced. Nevertheless, we will encounter situations in
which investigating the scopal possibilities of expressions will be the means of choice in order to determine if they are rigid designators (cf. Chapter 4).

Testing for demonstratives: Speaker demonstration test

Having means to test indexical expressions, the ultimate goal is to develop a test which allows us to distinguish between demonstratives and pure indexicals. Apart from the criterion that demonstratives are indexical expressions in their basic use, the second defining criterion for demonstratives is that their meaning, in the paradigmatic case, is defined as being dependent on an obligatory speaker demonstration which represents the speaker’s intention to refer (Kleiber 1983: 105; Kaplan 1989a: 490; Himmelmann 1997: 86ff.; Ahrenholz 2006: 43). This fact demarcates demonstratives from other deictic expressions like today or I, which do not depend on additional features like speaker demonstrations. This additional condition will be spelled out as a test at the end of this section. According to Kaplan (1989a: 490), a demonstration is “typically, though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing.” “Thus a demonstration is (or at any rate, essentially involves) an act of a certain kind” (Cohen 2008: 1). Kaplan defines demonstratives as indexical expressions which require an associated demonstration referring to the demonstratum, whereas “pure indexicals” like I, now, tomorrow, yesterday do not require any demonstration (Kaplan 1989a: 491).

(67) (At the bakery, looking at all the pastries): *I want THIS one [no speaker demonstration].

(68) (In the museum, looking at a wall with a lot of paintings): *THIS painting is nice [no speaker demonstration].

The examples in (67) and (68) show, that the reference for a demonstrative in the paradigmatic case cannot be fixed without a speaker demonstration which, in form of a pointing gesture in the examples above, is used to point to the intended referent. The use of this provides the hearer with the information, that reference is made to some demonstratum, to some intended referent in the actual utterance situation and that (s)he has to look out for a certain contextual clue, i.e. a speaker demonstration, in order to be able to successfully fix the reference. Without a speaker demonstration in (67) and (68), the hearer is not able to identify the intended referent by the speaker. Later, Kaplan (1989b: 582) further develops parts of his theory and claims that demonstratives do not simply require an associated demonstration but that the relevant factor is “the speaker’s directing intention”. The two concepts are linked in that the accompanying speaker demonstration should always be interpreted as the visualization of the speaker’s referential intentions. The development of this intention-based account was used in order to explain apparent problematic examples such as the case in which one points at a river saying: This is the Thames. Saying this, “one could after all be
pointing to one kilometer of map-grid, or just the left bank, or the sun sparkling on the ripples” (Quine 1961, quoted by Levinson 2004: 12). What we learn from the much longer philosophical discussion about examples like the Thames-example above, is that the value of a demonstrative is always the object that the speaker intends to talk about, and that pointing gestures may be sometimes misleading or ambiguous.

In this thesis I still defend the claim that demonstratives in the deictic use do standardly come with a clear and disambiguating speaker demonstration — since standardly we can assume that the demonstration is the physical manifestation of the speaker’s intention to refer to a given object or individual, and that an externalization of these intentions is required for successful reference. The hearer will only find out about the speaker’s intentions, if they are externalized or made available in some way. In the basic deictic use, this will happen via the use of a speaker demonstration (often in form of a pointing gesture, but there may be other ways making the object of the speaker’s referential intentions available). Thus the standard externalization of an indication of the speaker’s intentions (mostly in form of a speaker demonstration) can be used as a test for demonstrativity. Where a straight-forward example like (69a) requires a speaker demonstration in order to refer successfully, (69b) does not require any form of speaker demonstration. Thus, we can conclude that this is a demonstrative, whereas the is not:

(69) At the counter of a bakery:
   a. Ich möchte ein Stück von Diesem [pointing gesture].
      ‘I want a piece of THIS one [pointing gesture].
   b. Ich möchte ein Stück von dem Schokoladenkuchen.
      ‘I want a piece of the chocolate cake.’
      (Umbach 2011/2012)

Note that a pointing gesture is only one way (yet the most common way) of securing the addressee’s attention to a feature of the extra-linguistic context, towards which the speaker has directed his referring intentions. I assume that pointing gestures are the prototypical externalization of speaker intentions. They may be reduced to directed gaze, a nod of the head, etc. But, standardly, gestures will be assumed to accompany demonstratives, being indicators for the required speaker’s intentions — and this reasoning reconciles Kaplan’s two opinions (1989a and 1989b) with respect to demonstrative reference.

(70) In the bakery: I want THIS one [gazing at or nodding towards a piece of chocolate cake].

Thus, standardly, demonstratives are assumed to come with a speaker demonstration. In order to test if a given expression, which occurs in combination with a speaker demonstration is truly a demonstrative, this observation can be formulated as a test:
2 Demonstratives: The basic use

If, in a given, straightforward example, the reference fails if the pointing gesture is taken away, the expression is a demonstrative. This is the case for THIS in (72):

(71) In the bakery: I want THIS [speaker demonstration].

(72) In the bakery: *I want this [no speaker demonstration].

(73) In the bakery: I want the piece of chocolate cake [speaker demonstration].

(74) In the bakery: I want the piece of chocolate cake [no speaker demonstration].

In (72) the referential act fails, if the speaker demonstration is taken away, whereas this is not the case in (74), assuming that there is only one piece of chocolate cake. The referential act is successful without a speaker demonstration, it may be supplemented with a speaker demonstration which is, however, not obligatory.

2.4 Pronominal and adnominal demonstratives

This section focuses on the distinction between simple and complex nominal demonstratives and especially on demonstratives which appear in both the pronominal (simple) as well as the adnominal (complex) use. Importantly, the distinction between adnominal demonstratives, i.e. demonstrative descriptions like this book and definite descriptions like the book with the red cover will be addressed as well. By pronominal use I refer to uses as in (75) where the demonstrative replaces a complete noun phrase (and thus is a pronoun). Adnominal use refers to demonstratives that accompany a co-referential noun as in (76).

(75) Ich will DIESEN [pointing gesture].
   ‘I want THIS one [pointing gesture].’

(76) Ich will diesen Hund [pointing gesture].
   ‘I want this dog [pointing gesture].’

The differentiation between pronominal and adnominal uses or between simple and complex demonstratives will play an important role at various points of this book. For example, when discussing further possible uses of demonstratives in Chapter 4, I will show that not all of the secondary uses of demonstratives allow for both the adnominal and the pronominal use.

With respect to the status of the adnominal and the pronominal use of demonstratives, it is often assumed, based on frequency investigations, for
2.4 Pronominal and adnominal demonstratives

example, that the pronominal use is the more basic one than the adnominal use (Diessel 1999).

Even though adnominal demonstratives do look fairly similar if compared to definite descriptions, which even occur with (optional) pointing gestures, traditional researchers still hold on to the claim that adnominal demonstratives are indexical expressions. Adnominal demonstratives do have a deictic and a descriptive part and are thus also labeled demonstrative descriptions:

(77) Give me **THIS book** [pointing gesture].

(78) Give me **the book with the red cover** [optional pointing gesture]

As Abbott (2010: 45) notes, there is “at least one clear difference between demonstrative descriptions and definite descriptions: when demonstrative descriptions are used deictically, with a gesture of some kind on the part of the speaker indicating an intended denotation, that gesture plays a crucial role in determining their interpretation. The same cannot be said for definite descriptions, although they may also be accompanied with some kind of gesture on the part of the speaker, such a gesture does not play a role in determining a referent.” This is illustrated by King’s (2001: 27) example (after Levinson 1981), which shows how one can use various tokens of a certain demonstrative noun phrase in one single utterance, as in (79), which is impossible with a definite description:

(79) I like **that house** and **that house**, but not **that house**.

(80) *I like **the house** and **the house**, but not **the house**.

(79) is perfectly fine with different pointing gestures to different houses, whereas the same does not hold for (80).

The majority of theories of demonstratives shares Abbott’s assumptions by postulating that complex demonstratives in the basic deictic use still are directly referential expressions, i.e. that their reference works like it is postulated by Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) for pronominal *this*, for example. The theories do, however, vary with respect to the fact how strong the semantic role is which they assign to the demonstrative noun phrases (Braun 2012). The classical context theory (Kaplan 1989a) argues for an approach that assumes that the common noun phrase in complex demonstratives does help to determine the referent, but says that its content does not appear as a constituent of the content of the complex demonstrative, as the content of the complex demonstrative is just its referent. In such views, an object must be (or at least must be assumed to be) a gardener in order to be the referent of *this gardener* in a given context. Still, the property of

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19 Note that in Chapter 4 we will encounter theories which claim, unlike the present approach, that *dieser* in some of the derived uses is not a means of direct reference any more, but rather a quantificational expression.
2 Demonstratives: The basic use

being-gardener is not assumed to be a constituent of the complex demonstrative’s content (Braun 2012). The semantic content of the complex demonstrative still is, as for pronominal demonstratives, just assumed to be its actual intended referent and nothing else. Thus, the utterance in (81) expresses a sentence whose truth conditions only hold for the specific entity which is the demonstrated object — it does not matter whether that entity is actually really a man (or maybe a women who looks very masculine).

(81) **That man** is a gardener [pointing gesture].

In this view (it has been labeled the “referentialist view” for example by Dever 2001), a complex demonstrative of the form *that* gardener is, with respect to semantics, nothing more than a simple occurrence of *that*. This view successfully captures the intuition that the occurrence of *that* in *that* gardener is a genuine occurrence of the simple demonstrative *that*. The referentialist view also accounts for the clear semantic similarity of complex demonstratives with simple demonstratives. Complex demonstratives appear to continue to exhibit the general intensional rigidity one expects, as in (82):

(82) **That man** in the corner should have stayed home tonight [pointing gesture].

The phrase *that man in the corner* also always refers to the actual demonstrated man even with respect to worlds in which he is not in the corner (or even in which he is not a man). *That man in the corner* will always refer to the demonstrated object in the utterance situation. This rigidity can also be found applying by Cappelen and Lepore’s (2005) test for indexicality. It states that, if an expression is indexical, it typically blocks inter-contextual disquotational reports:

(83) Mary in C: I like **THAT man in the corner** [pointing gesture].
    Peter in C’: *And then Mary said she liked **THAT man in the corner**.
    Adjusted: Peter in C’: Mary said that she liked **a / this / the man who was in the corner**.

In a new utterance context C’ in (83) Peter cannot take over Mary’s previous utterance as it was originally uttered. Mary uttered it in context C where the man in the corner was physically present. In C’ the man cannot be introduced in the discourse using the distal demonstrative *that* in its basic deictic use. In the adjusted version one can see that new referents are generally introduced properly by using the indefinite article: after being introduced this way a statement can be made with a relative clause, for example. Note that, however, *that man* in the report may receive a recognitional interpretation (in that it refers to a referent which is known to speaker and hearer due to shared common knowledge) and would be acceptable then. This would be the case if the listener in C’ was present.
in C as well. However, I do not think that this is what Cappelen and Lepore (2005) had in mind constructing this test. Also, recognitional that would not reflect a true disquotational indirect report in Cappelen and Lepore’s sense, since it represents a different use of that compared to the deictic that used in the original sentence. The report of Mary’s statement with deictic that is blocked in the inter-contextual disquotational report.

As mentioned above, in the referentialist view an object referred to with this X must be (or at least must be assumed to be) X in order to be the referent of this NP in a context. Actually, most often the referent of a demonstrative of the form dieser X also is X, but cases of misdescription have led to the more careful formulation of saying that it suffices if it is only assumed to be NP, and does not necessarily need to be NP. Kaplan’s example of misdescription is the following (1989a: 490 – 491) where a man points to a flower and says that man in the belief that he is pointing to a man who is disguised as a flower. The intention-based account (Kaplan 1989b) can guarantee a successful referential act in this case: the idea is that when a speaker is perceiving an object and forms the intention to talk about it by means of using a demonstrative, the value of the demonstrative the speaker produces in such cases is the object the speaker intends to talk about (King 2012: 5).

The referentialist view, which puts the adnominal use on the same level with the pronominal use of this, has also been subject of criticism. Dever (2001: 276), for example, labels it the “naive referentialist view” since it can, on the one hand, neatly explain basic examples. However, on the other hand, there are some occurrences of demonstratives (in derived uses), which cannot be explained on that view. Examples like (84), where the demonstrative does not behave as Kaplan predicts it for adnominal demonstratives have led King (2001), for example, to claim that complex demonstratives are quantifiers and are used to argue against the referentialist view:

(84) Most avid skiers\textsubscript{1} remember that first black diamond run they\textsubscript{1} attempted to ski.

‘Die meisten begeisterten Skifahrer erinnern sich an „diese erste schwarze Piste, die sie versuchten zu fahren.”

Since they in (84) is bound by most avid skiers, the natural understanding of a complex demonstrative containing a bound pronoun is, according to King (2001), to view it as a quantified expression and not as a deictic term exhibiting direct reference. Being aware of the controversial discussion with respect to the referentialist view (which may not be able to explain all occurrences of demonstratives), I still maintain the referentialist view, as it nicely explains, for the majority of examples, how complex demonstratives work very much like simple demonstratives. This underlines how there are fundamental differences between indexicals and purely descriptive or quantificational expressions. Examples like (84), used by King to argue for a non-referentialist view, are considered non-
prototypical examples in this work. What was used as a case in point against referentialist accounts may hold for English *that*, even though the respective examples are highly controversial. See for example Braun (2007)²⁰ who claims that such occurrences are non-literal. Example (84), for instance, is to be considered as non-prototypical as it is understood as an emphatic description.

German *dieser* is very odd in example (84). Interestingly, with *jener* ‘that’, the example sounds much better. German *jener* is a case in point: we will see in Chapter 3, that it has lost its deictic properties. It has anaphoric or recognitional uses (cf. Chapter 3). The use of *jener* in (84), in any case, does not pose a threat to a referentialist theory of demonstratives.

*Dieser* may only be used in critical examples like (84), if type-token shifts are present. These are cases where *dieser* rather refers to a certain type of referent than to a certain object which is part of the actual utterance situation. *Dieser* may, for example, be used in order to point out a representative token of a certain type with certain properties. In (85), below, a type-token shift is present, as the speaker points out a representative token of a certain type only, making (direct) reference to a given type and its properties, and not to the actual referent which is pointed out by the speaker demonstration. The referent which is actually pointed out represents a selected, prototypical instantiation of that type. Still, direct reference to one particular type of jacket (represented by one token of the type), i.e. the type of which a representative token is pointed out by the actual speaker in the actual utterance situation is present in these examples.

(85) Jedes Mädchen in der Schule hat **DIESES Kleid** [speaker demonstration to a dress in a shop window].

‘Every girl in school has **THIS dress** [speaker demonstration to a dress in a shop window].’

The representative tokens do not always need to be pointed out in the actual utterance situation, type token-shifts also work with recognitional *dieser*, which refers to referents which are given to the hearer in the shared common knowledge. In the case of type token shifts, recognitional *dieser* may be used in order to refer to a certain type which is commonly established:

(86) Jede Frau findet doch **diesen Mann** toll, der Blumen kauft und Schmuck schenkt. Dieser Mann ist leider ausgestorben.

‘Every woman likes this man who buys flowers and gives her jewelry. This man is, unfortunately, extinct.’

In (86), *dieser* does not rigidly refer to one individual, however does it refer directly to a certain type. Types can be tested, if sentences with predicates are

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²⁰ In a paper he delivered at the Cornell Mini Conference on complex demonstratives on April 28, 2007.
added, which only allow for types, like to be extict, in (86). The respective types in (85) and (86) are given in the actual utterance situation, either via a representative token which is physically present in the actual utterance situation (85) or due to shared knowledge between speaker and hearer (86). This illustrates how type-token shifts only work if there is a given type accessible, to which the hearer can establish the reference. The speaker assumes that the hearer is familiar with the type of man in question. Thus, the mechanism of reference present in these shift-examples is fairly similar if compared to standard examples of the deictic use of dieser. Direct reference is made — not to a certain object in the actual utterance situation but to a certain type which is given in the actual utterance situation.

Therefore, I consider these examples as examples which are somewhat odd or different, however should they not pose a problem to the theory of direct reference for demonstratives pursued in this work. The mode of reference stays the same in these examples, it is simply the type of the referent which has been shifted.

2.5 Summary

This chapter aimed to give an introduction, explaining how demonstrative reference works in the prototypical case, i.e. in the basic deictic use of demonstratives. The reader should now be aware of how fundamentally different demonstrative reference fixing is, compared to the mechanisms present for non-indexical expressions such as definite or indefinite descriptions, for example, and also how demonstratives differ if compared to pure indexicals. Demonstratives are indexical expressions that exhibit direct reference in that they rigidly refer to the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists and they never designate anything else. This special means of reference is shared with pure indexicals. It was made testable via two different tests: the disquotation test (Cappelen and Lepore 2005) and the scopal behavior test (inspired by Wolter 2006 and Hunter 2010). Alongside indexicality, a second condition has to be fulfilled in order to define a certain expression as a demonstrative in its basic use. Only if a certain form exhibits indexical reference and is standardly accompanied by an obligatory pointing gesture (speaker demonstration test), it can be labeled a demonstrative in its basic use.

The next chapter is dedicated to a determination and investigation of those German lexemes which fulfill exactly the criteria outlined in this section, i.e. the forms which qualify as demonstrative expressions in German. The application of the tests discussed in the present chapter, according to the scheme presented in (A1) below, will be used in Chapter 3 in order to identify demonstratives.
2 Demonstratives: The basic use

(A1) Scheme for testing demonstratives:

Consideration of a lexeme L in question
1. Application of the disquotation test to L
   → 2 possible results:
   a) form in question is not an indexical
   b) form in question is an indexical → go on with speaker demonstration test

2. Application of the speaker demonstration test in order to test for demonstrativity
   → 2 possible results:
   a) form in question is not a demonstrative but a pure indexical
   b) form in question is a demonstrative

According to this testing scheme we will be able to identify those lexemes which are demonstratives and pure indecixals in German in the upcoming chapter.
3 Demonstrative lexemes in German

3.1 Introduction

Based on the observations of the last chapter I will investigate which lexemes in German standardly fulfill these criteria in their basic use and therefore qualify as demonstratives in German. This chapter aims to identify those forms, which can be considered demonstratives (for individuals) in German. Identifying those lexemes which are, beneath dieser, demonstratives should provide valuable insights with respect to the class of demonstratives in general.

The paradigm for demonstratives listed in the German grammars taken into account are dieser ‘this’ and jener ‘that’. Furthermore, most grammars list stressed DER/DIE/DAS ‘this-one’ as demonstratives as well (Eisenberg 1989; Hentschel and Weydt 1990; Engel 2004). Also, the forms derselbe ‘the-same’, solch- ‘such-‘ (Eisenberg 1989; Hentschel and Weydt 1990), derjenige ‘he-who’ (Eisenberg 1994: 201) and also hier ‘here’, dort ‘there’ and da ‘there’ are listed as demonstratives in some grammars (Hentschel and Weydt 1990). Himmelmann (1997: 49) only considers dieser, jener and stressed DER/DIE/DAS as demonstratives in German. The IDS Grammar 1997 lists stressed DER/DIE/DAS, derselbe, solch-, and derjenige under the label “deictic determinatives”. The Duden Grammar (2005) lists stressed DER/DIE/DAS, dieser, jener, derjenige and derselbe as demonstratives in German. Furthermore, some grammars list modal so ‘so’ (Zifonun et al. 1997; Duden 2005) as a demonstrative (for properties).

Table 5: Grammars and lists of demonstratives in German

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Lexemes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenberg 1989, 1994</td>
<td>dieser, jener, DER, derselbe, solch, derjenige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hentschel and Weydt 1990</td>
<td>dieser, jener, DER, derselbe, solch, hier, dort, da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS Grammar 1997</td>
<td>dieser, jener, DER/ derselbe, solch-, and derjenige, so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himmelmann 1997</td>
<td>dieser, jener and stressed DER/DIE/DAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engel 2004</td>
<td>dieser, jener, DER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duden Grammar 2005</td>
<td>dieser, jener, DER, derjenige, derselbe, so</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This brief overview was given to illustrate how there is no uniform agreement in the literature with respect to the question of which lexemes are to be considered demonstratives in German. The observation that different grammars list different forms as demonstratives mirrors how fuzzy borders and a great
Descriptive variety pose a problem to generating a clear-cut list of demonstrative lexemes. Not all grammars include solch- or so as demonstratives, for example. With respect to the status of stressed DER/DIE/DAS there also is an ongoing controversy related to the question if it is to be considered a demonstrative.

Taking all lexemes listed in the grammars consulted into account, a maximal list of 10 potential demonstratives in German can be generated. The forms listed above represent all lexemes which have been listed in at least one of the grammars consulted. Thus, the maximal list of potential nominal demonstratives (used in order to refer to individuals) contains: dieser, jener, stressed DER/DIE/DAS and derjenige, the adverbs solch- and so and derselbe (in order to refer to properties or degrees) and the locatives: hier, dort and da.

List of potential demonstratives in German, according to the grammars consulted:

- dieser
- jener,
- DER/DIE/DAS
- derjenige
- solch-
- so
- derselbe
- hier
- dort
- da

This work follows the assumption that the deictic use is the basic and defining use for demonstratives. Therefore, in order to qualify as a member of the linguistic class of demonstratives, a certain form must standardly occur in this use. That means that it must prototypically fulfill the following two conditions, as defined in the previous chapters:

(i) The lexeme in question must be an indexical expression

(ii) The lexeme in question must, in addition, require a speaker demonstration in order to refer successfully

In this chapter the lexemes listed above will be tested against the two criteria. In doing so, one may encounter (at least) the following three scenarios, in which the two conditions are not fulfilled (if both conditions are fulfilled, the respective forms are uncontroversially demonstratives). Below I discuss the possible scenarios with their respective interpretations:

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21 Standard uses of indexical expressions typically pass both tests for indexicality presented in Chapter 2.
3.1 Introduction

(i) If a form is not standardly expressing indexical reference at all, it will never be considered a demonstrative. I will show that this is the case for, for example, *jener* ‘that’.

(ii) If a form is standardly expressing indexical reference and if it occurs in examples in which it systematically refers successfully without a speaker demonstration, it will be considered a pure indexical expression, but not a demonstrative. This relates to pure indexicals such as *now* or *I* in (87) and will also be shown to hold for *hier* ‘here’.

(87) I am here now.

Finally, one has to carefully deal with examples of the following scenario:

(iii) imagine a form standardly expresses indexical reference and is accompanied, in a given example, by a speaker demonstration, such as *hier* ‘here’ in (88):

(88) Nächste Woche werden wir **HIER** sein (pointing to a certain point on a map).

‘Next week we will be **HERE** (pointing to a certain point on a map).’

This, however, does not necessarily mean, that the form in question is a demonstrative. We have to check if the speaker demonstration, in this very case, is obligatorily required (i.e. if the referential act *fails*, if the gesture is omitted), or if the form is generally able to refer without the speaker demonstration as well. In other words, we have to check if one of Fillmore’s (1982) transfer cases (see Section 2.3.1) is present. Indexical expressions, or generally almost all expressions, *may* occur in the company of a speaker demonstration (Zimmermann 1991: 194). However, this does not necessarily make the respective expression a demonstrative. The prototypical meaning of pure indexicals (independent of gestures) can be transferred by the presence of speaker demonstrations. *Hier* in (88) is a pure indexical which underwent a transfer (Fillmore 1982). The sentence does not fail if the gesture is taken away. It only undergoes a shift in meaning, back to its original meaning. If the gesture in (88) is taken away, *hier* refers to the location of the actual utterance situation again, whereas the referential act for true demonstratives fails completely if the gesture is taken away as in (89):

(89) Entering a bakery:

Ich will **DAS** [no speaker demonstration].

‘I want **THIS/THAT** one [no speaker demonstration].’

Table 6 summarizes the three scenarios discussed. Remember that in what follows, I aim to determine which of the forms listed above are to be considered demonstratives. After creating clarity with respect to the formal side, I will
discuss more profound aspects of the content of the respective forms and investigate differences between forms and interactions or more complex forms.

Table 6: Deictic expressions with and without speaker demonstrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indexical expression with…</th>
<th>Terminology</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Obligatory speaker demonstration</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) No speaker demonstration</td>
<td>Pure indexical</td>
<td>(87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Additional, but not obligatory speaker demonstration</td>
<td>Pure indexical, (often shifted reference from default meaning)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Testing demonstratives

Recall that in Chapter 2 I presented tests, which allow us to test for indexicality and demonstrativity. For indexicals, I favored the disquotation test (Cappelen and Lepore 2005) and will, at this stage, only apply this one to the potential demonstrative lexemes. For demonstrativity I introduced the speaker demonstration test.

In the following sections, I will apply these tests to the potential demonstrative lexemes in German listed above, in order to develop a clear and comprehensive list of demonstratives in German.

3.2.1 Dieser ‘this’

In the German grammars there is a uniform agreement that adnominal (90) and pronominal (88) dieser is a demonstrative expression. Its main use aims at identifying a person or an object in the situative context and it is, in the basic use, standardly accompanied by a speaker demonstration (Ahrenholz 2007: 11ff.). Ahrenholz (2007: 12) illustrates this main use of dieser with the following example from spoken language with adnominal dieser in (90):

(90) ä:h (h) + hier bei dieser Wertung die würd-ich gar nicht so teilen.  
    <D ZEIGT AUF EINE STELLE IN DER HAUSARBEIT>  
    ‘Umm this evaluation I would not agree with it.’  
    <SPEAKER DEMONSTRATION OF SPEAKER TO PART OF TERM PAPER>’

Even though it is common sense that dieser is a demonstrative in German, the respective tests for indexicality and demonstrativity will now be briefly

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22 If not further specified, by using dieser I refer to the adnominal and the pronominal use at the same time.
3.2 Testing demonstratives

applied to a basic example with *dieser*, proving what is beyond dispute: *dieser* is an indexical expression and a demonstrative.

**Disquotation test:**

(91) Mary in C: Ich hätte gerne **DIESES** (Stück) [pointing to a piece of chocolate cake].
Mary in C: ‘I’d like to have **THIS one** (piece) [pointing to a piece of chocolate cake].’

(92) Peter in C’: *Und dann sagte Mary, sie hätte gerne **DIESES** (Stück).*
Peter in C’: ‘*And then Mary said, she’d like to have **THIS one** (piece).*’

(93) Adjusted: Peter in C’: Und dann sagte Mary, sie will **ein Stück Schokoladenkuchen**.
Adjusted: Peter in C’: ‘And then Mary said, she’d like to have **a piece of the chocolate cake**.’

The disquotation test confirms: in Peter’s report in (92) *dieser* cannot be taken over without adjustments. That is, it has to be adjusted to the new context parameters (93). Thus, for *dieser* intercontextual disquotation in the indirect report is blocked.

**Speaker demonstration test:**
According to the speaker demonstration test, *dieser* is, truly, a demonstrative. If the speaker demonstration in the example above is removed, *dieser* fails to refer and the sentence is infelicitous. Imagine a person walking into a flower shop uttering (91) without any form of a speaker demonstration:

(94) In the flower shop:
*Ich hätte gerne **DIESE** [no speaker demonstration].
‘*I’d like to have **THIS one** [no speaker demonstration].’

In the straightforward example of (91), where reference is made to a perceptible entity, it is impossible for *dieser* (*N*) to refer successfully without any form speaker demonstration (or an alternate form of making the intended referent available, like gazing at the object in question).

The existence of exceptional examples in which *dieser* in its deictic use may refer successfully without a speaker demonstration does not weaken the claim that *dieser* is a demonstrative. One example for non-prototypical uses are Fillmore’s transfer (1982) cases (see Section 3.2.1). Another non-prototypical use is the type-use of *dieser*, in which *dieser* is used to point out a representative token of a certain type with certain properties. In (95), below, a so-called type-token shift is present, as the speaker points out a representative token of a certain type only,
3 Demonstrate lexemes in German

making (direct) reference to a given type and its properties, and not to the actual referent which is pointed out by the speaker demonstration. (The referent which is actually pointed out represents a selected, prototypical instantiation of that type). I will return to this use at various points throughout this dissertation.

(95) Ich möchte **dieses Stück** [speaker demonstration to a piece of cake].
‘I want **this** piece [speaker demonstration to apiece of cake].’

To summarize, I have shown in this section that *dieser*, in its basic use, is a demonstrative in German, according to both the disquotation test and the speaker demonstration test:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>dieser</em></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.2 *Jener* ‘that’

Some grammars (Pons 2009) still claim that pronominal and adnominal *jener* ‘that’ are prototypical demonstratives. They state that it is used as a demonstrative in the basic deictic use in order to express a contrast with respect to the spatial distance of the respective referents in opposition to *dieser*. It is claimed to also exhibit indexical reference and to depend on speaker demonstrations in these cases:

(96) **Dieses (Rad) (hier)** gehört mir, **jenes (Rad) (dort drüben)** meinem Bruder
‘This (wheel) (here) is mine, that (wheel) (over there) belongs to my brother.’
(Pons 2009: 157)

Traditionally, it has been widely accepted, that *dieser* carries a [+proximal]-feature and is thus used to refer to demonstrata which are close to the speaker, whereas *jener* was assumed to carry a [+distal] feature and thus refers to demonstrata which are relatively distant to the speaker — as illustrated in example (96). I will show, however, that these assumptions do not correspond to the actual state of contemporary German any more.

Examples such as (96) above or (97) below have been used to illustrate the claim that *jener* is used in a similar fashion as *dieser* in the basic deictic use of demonstratives:

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23 The ✓-symbol indicates that the respective tests succeeded.
3.2 Testing demonstratives

(97) In an art gallery:

**DIESE** [speaker demonstration to a picture close to the speaker] finde ich schön, aber **JENES** [speaker demonstration to a picture distant to the speaker] gefällt mir nicht.

‘I like **THIS one** [speaker demonstration to a picture close to the speaker], but I don’t like **THAT one** [speaker demonstration to a picture distant to the speaker].’

As we will see, examples such as (93) or (94) are extremely rare or even hardly present at all in contemporary German. I suggest that the German demonstrative system has changed and that *jener* has lost the status of a demonstrative in German, since it is not used in its deictic use any more. Thus, it does not fulfill the defining criteria for demonstratives outlined above. Data from a rough corpus study supports this view: in the Cosmas Corpus 24 (mostly newspaper articles but also prose texts, corpus of written German) I compared occurrences of *dieser* and *jener* in their basic deictic use. In order to make sure to only receive deictic readings of *dieser* and *jener*, I modified both forms with a local adverb: *dieser hier* ‘this one here’ vs. *jener dort* ‘that one there’, in line with the claims with respect to distance-marking found in the literature (see above). The numbers received are quite suggestive with 433 hits for *dieser hier* (98) as opposed to 2 hits only for *jener dort* (99), supporting the claim that *jener* is hardly used at all in the deictic use.


(Cosmas, BRZ10/OKT.09879 Braunschweiger Zeitung, 21.10.2010; Auf der Suche nach dem passenden Hut)

(99) Die meisten der Äpfel konnte Dahlem bereits nach einer ersten Inaugenscheinnahme zuorden. „Das ist der Rheinische Bohnapfel, und **jener dort** ist der Rote Bellefleur“, sagte er.

(Cosmas, RHZ08/NOV.12731 Rhein-Zeitung, 15.11.2008; Seltenen Obstsorten auf der Spur)

Arguing in the same vein, the Duden Grammar (2005: 294) states that the contrastive effect, which used to be expressed by *dieser* and *jener* in the deictic use is disappearing. This is connected to the observation that *jener*, in its deictic use, is almost completely out of use in spoken German. Weinrich (1993: 446) also states that *jener* is a relatively rare variant of *dieser* and just used in a very cultivated register. Ahrenholz (2007: 3) states that nowadays the use of *jener* is

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underlying very restrictive semantic-pragmatic conditions and that its use is very infrequent. Considering the fact that *jener*, as a demonstrative in its basic deictic use extremely rarely found in modern spoken German any more, the conclusion that it should not be considered a demonstrative in German any more appears reasonable. Constructed examples, which try to force *jener* into the basic deictic use sound extremely odd. Gunkel (2006: 3), arguing in the same vein, says that he cannot imagine examples in which *jener* is used as a demonstrative in its deictic use in present German:

(100) In the flower shop:

*Ich hätte gerne **JENE** (Blume) [speaker demonstration to a flower somewhat distant from the speaker].

‘*I’d like to have **THAT** [**JENE**] (flower) [speaker demonstration to a flower somewhat distant from the speaker].’

As it is already evident that *jener* is not used as a deictic demonstrative (any more), there is no need to apply the tests for indexicality postulated above. Even though *jener* is not used as a demonstrative in the basic deictic use any more, it has not disappeared completely. Himmelmann (1997: 49) states that *jener* mainly occurs in two (non-indexical) contexts. In the first context it is in a direct, correlative contrast with *dieser* as in (101), where *dieser* refers to Winnetou and *jener* refers to Old Shatterhand.

(101) Old Shatterhand saß neben Winnetou, und während *dieser* schweigend zuhörte, berichtete ihm *jener* von den Ereignissen der letzten Tage.

‘Old Shatterhand sat next to Winnetou, and while the latter [*this / dieser*] listened silently, the former [*that / jener*] told him about the events of the past days.’

(Hentschel and Weydt 1990: 223)

Secondly, Himmelman (1997: 50) claims that *jener* is used most often introducing establishing (restrictive) relative clauses, as in (102) below. Note that *jener* is not interchangeable with *dieser* in this example. *Jener* is combinable with all kinds of relative clauses, whereas deictic *dieser* can only appear with appositive relative clauses — it is not combinable with additional identifying information from restrictive relative clauses, since it already expressed direct indexical reference and does not require an additional, identifying description (which is delivered by restrictive relative clauses).

(102) US-Präsident Bill Clinton hat entschieden, China weiterhin *jene Handelsvergünstigungen* zu gewähren, *die* im Handelsverkehr mit den meisten Ländern der Welt längst zur Norm geworden sind.
3.2 Testing demonstratives

‘US-President Bill Clinton has decided to grant China those reductions, which have become the norm in most countries of the world.’ (Himmelman 1997: 50)

Diessel (1999: 108) labels expressions like *jener* in the example above determinatives (the term comes from Quirk et al. 1972: 217). The term determinative relates to “semantically empty pro-forms that provide an anchorage point for the relative clauses that follow” (Diessel 1999: 108). Himmelmann, as well, notes similar examples and explains them via grammaticalization: the job of the demonstrative is just being an (semantically empty) antecedent for a following relative clause (1997: 77). Gunkel (2006: 2) offers a similar example with *jener* as the antecedent of a restrictive relative clause:

(103) Die Sowjetunion hat Hitler in diesem Schritt unterstützt und trat am 17. September 1939 mit dem Einmarsch in Ostpolen in *jenen Krieg* ein, der sich 20 Monate später zum Zweiten Weltkrieg ausweitete.

‘The Soviet Union has supported Hitler with this step and entered, on the 17th of September 1939, marching into east Poland, that war, which extended to the Second World War 20 months later.’

Gunkel further notes, referring to Bühler (1982: 101), that the special function of *jener* in (103) is to refer to something which is already assumed to be known by the hearer, that it refers to a referent which is not present in the previous discourse but anchored in specific shared knowledge between speaker and hearer. *Jener* thus functions to cognitively activate this information. This use of *jener* has a strong resemblance with the recognitional use of demonstratives, however does the recognitional use not always require a relative clause to follow. I will discuss this function of *jener* in detail in Chapter 4, investigating the recognitional use of demonstratives.

To summarize, I have shown that *jener* has lost its ability to be used as a demonstrative in the basic deictic use. From a diachronic point of view, however, it is important to mention that *jener was* used as a true demonstrative and that it was used in the basic deictic use earlier. However, the system appears to be subject to change and *jener* appears to have lost its basic and defining deictic use. It may still be used as a non-indexical determinative, but is not considered to be a demonstrative in German in this thesis, as summarized in Table 8.

Table 8: Test results for *jener*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>jener</em></td>
<td>✘ 25</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Determinative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 The ✗-symbol indicates that the respective tests failed.
3 Demonstrative lexemes in German

3.2.3 Stressed DER, DIE, DAS

This section deals with stressed DER, DIE and DAS (short DER). First, I will argue why DER, used pronominally, is considered a demonstrative in this work. I will show that it is a member of the linguistic class of demonstratives, very much like dieser. Being considered a demonstrative means that pronominal DER, like dieser, belongs to this class of words with typical semantic features in their prototypical use. Secondly, I will deal with adnominal DER, a more controversial case. I will show that DER, used adnominally, is also prototypically used to express demonstrative reference, very much like dieser. However, there is a controversy in the literature which deals with the categorization of stressed adnominal DER, which will be addressed as well in this section.

I will now apply the tests for demonstrativity to pronominal DER and show that it fulfills both defining criteria for demonstratives postulated above. Firstly, it is used in order to express indexical reference, which can be proved by the disquotation test. Adjustments need to be made in order to receive an indirect report (104).

**Disquotation test:**

(104) Mary (in C): Ich will DEN [speaker demonstration towards a brown puppy in a basket].

Mary (in C): ‘I want DEN [THIS/THAT one] [speaker demonstration towards a brown puppy in a basket].’

Peter (in C’): *Und dann sagte Mary, dass sie gerne DEN hätte.

Peter (in C’): ‘*And then Mary said that she wanted DEN [THIS/THAT one].’

Peter adjusted (in C’): Und dann sagte Mary, dass sie gerne den braunen Hund aus dem Körbchen hätte.

Peter adjusted (in C’): ‘And then Mary said, that she would like to have the brown dog from the basket.’

Secondly, it can be shown that pronominal DER, very much like deictic dieser, standardly requires a speaker demonstration in order to refer successfully. The reference in the straightforward example in (105) would fail, if no speaker demonstration was available:

**Speaker demonstration test:**

(105) In a pet shop:

Ich hätte gerne DEN [speaker demonstration to a dog].

‘I’d like to have DEN [THIS/THAT one] [speaker demonstration to a dog].’
3.2 Testing demonstratives

Pronominal *DER* standardly refers to entities which are parts of the actual utterance situation. Its meaning constantly varies, depending on the respective utterance situation in which it is uttered in, i.e. on the destination of the speaker demonstrations which accompany it. Thus, it is argued that prototypically, pronominal *DER* requires the presence of a speaker demonstration in order to refer successfully to referents of the actual utterance situation.

The same also seems to hold for stressed *DER* when used adnominally. In (106) stressed *DER* cannot be used in the report without adjustments, very much like adnominal *dieser*. This shows that, at least in straightforward examples as in (106), adnominal *DER* expresses indexical reference.

**Disquotation test:**

(106) Mary (in C): Ich hätte gerne den *Hund* [speaker demonstration to a brown dog in a basket].
Mary (in C): ‘I’d like to have *den* [THIS/THAT] dog (speaker demonstration to a brown dog in a basket).’

Peter (in C’): *Und dann sagte Mary sie hätte gerne *Hund.*
Peter (in C’): ‘*And then Mary said she’d like to have *den* [THIS/THAT] dog.’

Peter adjusted (in C’): Und dann sagte Mary sie hätte gerne den *braunen Hund in dem Körbchen*
Peter adjusted (in C’): And then Mary said she’d like to have the brown dog in the basket.

Furthermore, the speaker demonstration in (107) is obligatory as well. *DER Hund* refers to the very dog which is pointed out by the speaker demonstration, i.e. which is physically present in the utterance situation. If the speaker demonstration was not present the referential act would not be successful.

**Speaker demonstration test:**

(107) Mary, entering a pet shop with lots of dogs:
*Ich hätte gerne den *Hund [no speaker demonstration].
‘*I’d like to have *den* [THIS/THAT] dog [no speaker demonstration].’

The tests show how adnominal *DER* also fulfills both criteria which appear to qualify it as a demonstrative. According to the two requirements postulated, there seems to be enough evidence to claim that stressed adnominal *DER* is a demonstrative. However, for stressed adnominal *DER*, things seem to be more complicated, since some theories — acknowledging that it may be *used* as a demonstrative — do not *categorize* it as a demonstrative but as a stressed definite article which is only sometimes used as a demonstrative.
In order to support this view, these accounts point out (admittedly, quite exceptional) examples of stressed *DER* in which it does not express deictic reference, i.e. in which it does not work like one would expect a demonstrative to work. In (108) there is an example of stressed *DAS*, not expressing deictic reference, but rather prominence, as *DAS Bier* can be paraphrased by ‘the best’ or ‘the tastiest beer’. Examples like (108) are used to argue that stressed adnominal *DER* is not necessarily demonstrative and should thus not be categorized a demonstrative. In (108) *DAS* is a definite article carrying stress in order to express contrast, uniqueness or prominence:

(108) Becks ist nicht ein Bier, es ist *DAS /*dieses Bier*.

‘Becks is not a beer, it is THE /*this beer.’
(modified after Bisle-Müller 1991: 66)

I, in contrast, claim that the basic use of adnominal *DER* is the demonstrative use. I hold on to the assumption that, even if stressed adnominal *DER* may as well function as the definite article (i.e. not exclusively express demonstrative reference), is standardly or prototypically used to express demonstrative reference. This then makes it a demonstrative, assuming deictic reference to be basic and definitory. The arguments for this assumption (based on Diessel 1999 were discussed in Section 2.2) suggest that the deictic use is of a special status and thus, that it is the prototypical use from which all other (thus secondary) uses derive. They clearly speak for the categorization of stressed *DER*, pronominal and adnominal, as a demonstrative in its basic, prototypical use.

My view is supported by examples which underline the difference between demonstrative *DER* and the definite article *der*. One of the standard uses of the definite article is the bridging use or the associative anaphoric use (Hawkins 1978), as exemplified in (109). Demonstratives do not allow for these kinds of uses (109) and thus are subject to a restriction. Stressed *DER* clearly does not allow for this use either. This serves as a clear argument against those theories which claim that stressed *DER* is a definite article:

(109) Gestern war ich auf einer Hochzeit. *Der/*dieser/*DER* Bräutigam sah toll aus.

‘Yesterday, I was at a wedding. The /*this /*DER groom looked great.’

Still, it is not very surprising to find stressed *DER* in non-demonstrative uses, as in (108). Demonstratives generally allow for derived or non-demonstrative uses and also for the loss of stress. The loss of stress is always a first sign for grammaticalization. Himmelman (1997: 49) explains: “stressed *DER* stands at the beginning of the development of the definite article”. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that adnominal demonstrative *DER* is a demonstrative, which was the source for further, secondary development. I conclude, in line with (Engel 1996; Duden 2005; Diessel 1999) that stressed adnominal *DER* is a demonstrative in its standard
3.2 Testing demonstratives

and main use and that it is not the definite article which only happens to be
stressed and to be used as a demonstrative.

Table 9: Test results for DER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DER</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Nominal demonstrative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.4 Derjenige ‘he-who’

Eisenberg (1994: 201) lists, in contrast to almost all other grammars consulted,
abnodinal and pronominal derjenige ‘he-who’ as a demonstrative. He claims that
the morphological part jen- signalizes a pointing towards a following relative
clause, which further specifies the object of “pointing” as in derjenige, der ‘he-
who [the one] who’:

(110) **Derjenige (Mensch),** der als erstes zur Party kommt, bekommt eine
Flasche Sekt umsonst.
‘**He-who [the one person]** who comes first to the party will get a bottle of
champagne for free.’

(111) **Diejenige (Person),** die als erstes zur Party kommt, wird überrascht.
‘**He-who [the one person]** who comes to the party first, will be surprised.’

Having claimed before that jener has lost its ability to refer deictically,
Eisenberg’s argument that derjenige has “pointing” or demonstrative power, like
jener, does not appear convincing.

Similarly to jener, derjenige is categorized by Diessel (1999: 108) as a
“semantically empty proform which provides an anchorage point for a subsequent
relative clause”, i.e. as a determinative. Derjenige, according to Diessel (1999:
108) can only occur with a restrictive relative clause. This is why derjenige is
assumed to exclusively fulfill a grammatical function and not being able to refer
deictically. Sentences like (112), trying to force derjenige into a straightforward
deictic use, are unacceptable in German:

(112) A: Welchen Krug möchtest du haben?
    A: ‘Which mug do you want?’
    B: Ich möchte DIESEN / *denjenigen (Krug) [speaker demonstration].
    B: ‘I want THIS (one) / *he-who (mug) [speaker demonstration].’
    (Gunkel 2006: 1)
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_Derjenige_ does seem to not be able at all to express deictic reference. Gunkel, on the basis of example (105) above, also remarks (2006: 1) that _derjenige_ is not at all able to express indexical reference. An expression which cannot express indexical reference in a simple sentence at all, will by no means be considered a demonstrative in this work. Since _derjenige_ is not able to express indexical reference at all, there is no need to apply the tests for indexicality and demonstrativeness postulated above — as it is already evident that _derjenige_ is not used as a deictic demonstrative (any more).

I conclude that _derjenige_, like _jener_, should not be considered a demonstrative in this work. Both forms lack the ability to refer deictically and are thus not able to appear in the basic deictic use of demonstratives. The findings for _derjenige_ are summarized in the table below:

Table 10: Test results for _derjenige_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>derjenige</em></td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Determinative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.5 _Derselbe_ ‘the-same’

Hentschel and Weydt (1990) and Eisenberg (1989), for example, list the forms of adnominal and pronominal _derselbe_ ‘the-same’ in their section about demonstratives. The forms of _derselbe_ consist of a fusion of the definite article _der/die/das_ and an adjective element, i.e. _-selbe_ ‘same’. _Derselbe_, at first glance, cannot be used in a straightforward deictic way, at least not in order to refer to individuals.

(113) In an art gallery:

Schau dir einmal *dasselbe (Bild) hier an [speaker demonstration pointing towards a certain picture].

‘Look at *the-same (picture) here [speaker demonstration pointing towards a certain picture].’

Taking a closer look, however, we find that _derselbe_ may be used in a way, which appears to be quite similar compared to the straightforward deictic use of _dieser_. It is used in order to point out specific properties of individuals. If the speaker uses _derselbe in combination with a_ speaker demonstration, (s)he points out that the object which is pointed out shares properties with another, very similar referent. In these cases successful reference even appears to depend on the speaker demonstration:
3.2 Testing demonstratives

(114) **Denselben (Anzug)** habe ich zu Hause in meinem Schrank [speaker demonstration towards a light-blue Boss suit in a shop].
‘The-same [this] (suit) I have at home in my wardrobe [speaker demonstration towards a light-blue Boss suit in a shop].’

In (114) *derselbe* relates to the properties of the actual individual being pointed out in the utterance situation, i.e. the property of being a light-blue Boss suit. The object being pointed out can be seen as a representative token or an exemplary instantiation of a certain type, sharing those properties, which the speaker intends to point out. The Duden online\(^{26}\) captures this contrast with the labels *sameness* (relating to the sameness of properties) versus *identity* (relating to truly identical individuals). But can the expression of sameness with the properties of a referent present in the actual utterance situation, as performed by *derselbe*, still be considered deictic reference? In order to check if *derselbe*, in this use, is an indexical, the disquotation test has to be applied to a straight-forward sentence containing *derselbe* where no textual, anaphoric antecedent, but a perceptible antecedent is given:

**Disquotation test:**

(115) Mary (in C): Jenny hat sich *dasselbe (Kleid)* gekauft [pointing towards a pink designer dress in a Boutique].
Mary (in C): ‘Jenny has bought the-same (dress) [pointing towards a pink designer dress in a Boutique].’

(116) Peter (in C’): *Und dann sagte Mary, Jenny sich *dasselbe (Kleid)* gekauft hat.
Peter (in C’): *‘And then Mary said, Jenny has bought the-same (dress).’

In (115) *dasselbe* appears to work like one would expect a deictic expression to work. It is an indexical expression, in that it is blocked in the inter-contextual disquotational indirect report in (116). An adjustment of *derselbe* has to take place in order to capture what was actually said. It is an indexical expression, making reference to the property of being a pink designer dress.

Finally, *derselbe* in its situative use also passes the speaker demonstration test. In examples as in (117) below, the use of *dasselbe* requires a demonstration performed by the speaker. Without any demonstration, the referent (with the identical properties) could not be determined:

\(^{26}\) Duden online, *sub voce* ‘derselbe’; http://www.duden.de/woerterbuch (accessed 22 April 2013).
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Speaker demonstration test:

(117) *Jenny hat sich dasselbe (Kleid) gekauft [no speaker demonstration].
   *’Jenny has bought the-same (dress) [no speaker demonstration].’

Apart from this clearly demonstrative function of *derselbe*, it has further uses. This is not surprising, since demonstrative generally have further non-demonstrative uses. According to the Duden online, *derselbe* has three uses. Firstly, it can be used in order to express true identity as in (118). Secondly it can be used to express sameness (i.e. identity of properties) as in (119) — this is the deictic use discussed above. And thirdly it can be used in order to refer anaphorically to a prior referent as in (120):

(118) Sie stammt aus den selben Dorf wie ich.
   ‘She is from the-same village as I am.’

(119) Ich fahre dasselbe Auto [speaker demonstration].
   ‘I drive the-same car [speaker demonstration].’

(120) Peter baut ein Haus. Das Dach desselben ist bereits marode.
   ‘Peter is building a house. The roof of the-same is already ailing.’

The distributional conditions for *derselbe* and its functions may be more complex than depicted in this section. What is important for the purpose of this chapter (determining the forms of demonstratives in German), though, is the observation that, in the most basic and straightforward cases, as in (115), deictic reference can be assigned to *derselbe*. This justifies its classification as a demonstrative for individuals with similar properties properties. Passing both tests, it fulfills the criteria for demonstratives outlined in Chapter 2 and is thus considered a demonstrative for properties in this thesis.

Table 11: Test results for *derselbe*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test / relative clause test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>derselbe</em></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Demonstrative for individuals with similar properties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.6 *Solch- ‘such-‘*

At least in one of its uses *solch- ‘such-‘* is labeled as a demonstrative in some grammars (Duden 2005: 330; Eisenberg 1994; Hentschel and Weydt 1990)
3.2 Testing demonstratives

Similarly as for *derselbe* in the previous section, I will show for *solch*- that it is used as a demonstrative for properties:

(121) **Solch ein Kleid** hab ich auch zu Hause [speaker demonstration towards a dress in a shop]!
     ‘**Such a dress** I have as home as well [speaker demonstration towards a dress in a shop].’

In (121) *solch*, as well, does not refer to the actual object being pointed out, but to its properties. The object being pointed out serves as a representative token of a certain type (a representative instantiation of a type), sharing the respective properties, i.e. the properties of being a dress of some sort. Therefore, *solch-* is claimed to be a demonstrative for properties in this work. This, however, does not appear to be common sense in the literature. With respect to the status of *solch-* the statements found in the literature differ, since it shows, on the one hand, characteristics of adjectives and on the other hand does it often seem to behave like a pronoun, substituting a noun or a noun phrase. This is the reason why Zifonun et al. (1997: 1973) hypothesize that *solch-* is just in the middle of a grammaticalization process, developing from an article word to an adjective. Their argument is that *solch-* can, like a definite article, cause that following adjectives are weakly inflected:

(122) Ein herausragendes Beispiel für **solche neuen Wege** ist die Selbstverpflichtungserklärung…
     ‘A striking example for **such new ways** is the statement of self-commitment…’
     (Duden 2005: 330)

Other grammars argue that it is an article as it appears, like an adjective, after article words — however only after indefinites (123). Furthermore, it can appear (uninflected) as a degree particle with adjectives (124).

(123) ein solcher Aufwand, keine solchen Vorschläge, einige solche Vorfälle
     (aber: dieser *solche Aufwand, meine *solchen Vorschläge, die *solchen Vorfälle)
     ‘a such effort, no such suggestions, some such events (but: this *such effort, my *such suggestions, the *such events)’
     (Duden 2005: 330)

(124) mit einem solch großen Aufwand
     ‘with such a big effort’
     (Duden 2005: 330)
In the Duden Grammar (2005: 331) it is claimed that inflected solch- is used like an article word, especially in the plural:

(125) Wo kann ich solche Leute finden?
‘Where can I find such people?’

In the singular, solch- is often preceded (or followed, in that case solch- stays uninflected) by thy indefinite article. This does not only hold for countable nouns but also works via sortal readings of nouns and abstract nouns. It can also be used without the article (Duden 2005: 331):

(126) Ich habe einen ungefähren Eindruck, was ein solcher Künstler für eine Gage bekommt.
‘I have a rough idea of what salary a such an artist receives.’

(127) Wird ein solches / solch ein Gras von trächtigen Stuten genossen…
‘If a such a grass is eaten by pregnant mares…’

(128) Mit solchem Aufwand hätte auch niemand gerechnet.
‘Nobody would have expected such effort.’

(129) Die Tiere sind durch solches Gras fehl- und mangelernährt.
‘The animals are wrongly nurtured by such grass.’

Engel (2004: 324), assuming that solcher, solche, solches are adjectives, says that the meaning of ein solches and solch ein in (127) is pretty much the same. However, he claims that solch ein has a very strong emotive marking.

As stated above, Zifonun et al. (1997: 1937) hypothesize that solch- is just in the middle of the grammaticalization process of becoming an adjective. They argue that solch- can only be combined with bare plurals and singular substantial nouns (Substanznomen) (like wine, for example), which can be considered to represent full NPs on their own. Thus, they claim that solch-, syntactically, rather behaves like an adjective. Looking at the inflectional paradigm of solch- one can see that it rather behaves like an adjective as well: the genitive singular forms in neuter and masculine gender show endings one would expect from adjectives and not from determiners (solches/en). With count nouns solch- appears in combination with the indefinite article ein:

(130) Eine solche Frau läügt nicht.
‘A such [such a] woman does not lie.’

Only the Duden Grammar (2005: 330) sheds light on this controversy of the status of solch- and argues in line with the present account on solch-.
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to represent a borderline case between an article word, a pronoun and an adjective. It is suggested that solch- should be categorized as a demonstrative for properties since its meaning does contain a so-called “demonstrative component”. This demonstrative component, according to the Duden, does not direct the attention of the hearer towards an intended referent in the actual utterance situation. It is claimed to be, very much like it was the case for derselbe, a “pro-attribute” in that it points towards certain properties of a representative referent of a certain type (and not towards the referent itself), which may be expressed by an attribute. This explains that solch- can be paraphrased by von dieser Art ‘of this kind’ in these cases:

(131) ein solches Buch → ein Buch von dieser Art
‘a such [such a] book’ → ‘a book of this kind’

Adnominal and pronominal solch- in these straightforward uses, referring to perceptible entities, is a demonstrative according to both tests for demonstrativity. It cannot occur in an inter-contextual disquotational report without adjustments (133) and, in its basic use, it requires the presence of a speaker demonstration (134):

Disquotation test:

(132) Mary (in C): Ein solches (Kleid) hat Jenny auch zu Hause [pointing to a dress in a shop].
Mary (in C): ‘A such (dress) Jenny has at home as well [pointing to a dress in a shop].’

(133) Peter (in C‘): *Dann sagte Mary, dass sie ein solches (Kleid) auch zu Hause hat.
Peter (in C‘): ‘*Then Mary said, that she has a such (dress) at home as well.’

Speaker demonstration test:

(134) In front of a shop with lots of dresses in the windows:
*Solch ein(es) (Kleid) habe ich auch [no speaker demonstration].
‘*Such a (dress) I have as well [no speaker demonstration].’

The disquotation test shows that without an adjustment of context-dependent solch-, Peter cannot quote Mary correctly. A correct report would probably make use of the anaphoric function of solch-: Mary sah ein Kleid in einer Boutique hängen. Dann sagte sie, ein solches hat Jenny auch zu Hause. ‘Mary saw a dress in a boutique. Then she said, Jenny has one like this [a-such] at home as well.’ Furthermore, solch- is a demonstrative according to the speaker
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demonstration test, as well. Without the presence of any form of speaker demonstration in (134), the referential act cannot be solved successfully. *Solch-*, in this deictic use, needs to rely on some form of speaker demonstration in order to receive its denotational meaning. It can thus be considered a demonstrative pointing out “properties” of the same (not the identical) referent (of a referent of the same type / an instantiation of the same type). This type shares relevant properties with the actual object being pointed out by the speaker. Different in comparison to demonstratives for individuals, the speaker demonstration of demonstrative *derselbe* or *solch-* is linked to properties of the referents only, and not to the intended referent itself. Still, *solch-* is to be considered a demonstrative for properties:

Table 12: Test results for *solch-*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>solch-</em></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Demonstrative for properties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.7 *So* ‘so’

Very much like *solch-*,* so is used as a demonstrative for properties or degrees, as well. Umbach and Ebert (2009: 1) state:

German *so* is an extremely versatile expression occurring in a broad variety of uses. German grammars list *so* in various categories, for example as a modal adverb, degree adverb, adverbial connective, and subordinating conjunction (Duden 2005, and Zifonun et al. 1997, König et al. 1990). The primary use of *so*, however, is said to be its use as a demonstrative expression relating to a degree (a) or a property (b). Demonstrative *so* always occurs as a modifier combing with, e.g. nouns, verbs and adjectives and the corresponding maximal projections (NP, VP, AP). If the modified expression is gradable, like the adjective *groß* in [135a], *so* relates to a degree. If it is non-gradable, like *Auto* in [135b], *so* relates to a property.

(135) a. [speaker pointing to a person]
   Anna ist *so* groß.
   ‘Anna is *so* tall.’

   b. [speaker pointing to a car]
   Anna hat *so* ein Auto.
   ‘Anna has such a [*so* a] car.’

Like *solch-*,* so, in these straightforward uses, passes the two tests for demonstrativity:
3.2 Testing demonstratives

Disquotation test and speaker demonstration test (combined):

(136) Mary (in C): Anna hat so ein(s) (Auto) [pointing to a car].
Mary (in C): Anna has so a [such a] (car) [pointing to a car].

(137) Peter (in C’): *Dann hat Mary gesagt, Anna hat so ein(s) (Auto).
Peter (in C’): * Then Mary said that Anna has so a [such a] (car).’

Peter’s report in (137) does not work if he simply takes over what was said by Mary. Context-dependent so has to be adjusted to the new utterance situation, i.e. by introducing the car in the previous discourse, and then being able to anaphorically refer to it as in (138):

(138) Adjusted: Peter (in C’): Dann sind wir an einem Auto1 vorbeigelaufen. Dann hat Mary gesagt Anna hat auch so ein(s) (Auto)1.
Adjusted: Peter (in C’): ‘Then we walked past a car1. Then Mary said Anna has so a [such a] (car)1, as well.’

Without these modifications however, Peter cannot quote Mary correctly. This shows, that so in (136) expresses indexical reference. So, very much like solch-, passes the speaker demonstration test, since the reference of so in its basic use, referring to perceptible entities, in (136) cannot be determined if the speaker demonstration is taken away. In order to receive its denotational meaning, so requires, very much like deictic dieser, contextual information from the speaker demonstration which points out a referent sharing the properties which are intended to be pointed out by the speaker using so. Umbach and Ebert (2009: 1) summarize: “German so is a demonstrative expression which picks up degrees or properties and combines as a modifier with gradable as well as non-gradable expressions.” Note that, like other demonstratives, so exhibits further uses, very much like the anaphoric use, for example. Apart from that, so can also be a connective or a discourse particle as in the use of so in So, jetzt müssen wir gehen ‘so, we have to go now’. A thorough discussion of all uses and functions of so would go beyond the scope of this work. Importantly, so exhibits a use which is clearly defined demonstrative, in which both tests are passed, pointing out degrees or properties:

Table 13: Test results for so

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>so</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Demonstrative for properties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Demonstrative lexemes in German

3.2.8 Locative hier, da, dort

This section investigates if hier ‘here’, dort ‘there-distal’ and da ‘there-neutral’ qualify as adverbial locative demonstratives in German. In what follows, I will test if these expressions fulfill the two defining criteria for demonstratives. In doing so, it has to be tested if hier, dort and da are indexical expressions and if they standardly depend on a speaker demonstration.

Note that da can have various interpretations such as locative, temporal and situational (Hartmann 2008: 189 and Maienborn 2001). Apart from these general uses, da also occurs in sentences that derive an existential meaning. These are the cases in which da and there can be considered the same item as in (137) and don’t have a locative function:

(137) Da war ein Verdacht, aber seien wir froh, dass der ausgeräumt ist.
‘There was some suspicion, but let's be glad that it didn’t prove true.’
(Cosmas)

In this section, however, only the locative meaning of da will be of relevance: I will show that in its locative interpretation, da is clearly indexical. It is also uncontroversially accepted (Bühler 1934; Ehrich 1992; Fricke 2007; and many others), that, like demonstrative dieser, also the German local adverbs hier and dort are indexical expressions. They have an in-built context parameter and refer to certain locations in the actual utterance situation (Ehrich 1992: 4ff.). This can be tested for all three expressions with the test for indexicality, first for da and dort in (138), then for hier (in (141)):

**Disquotation test:**

(138) Mary (in C): Da / Dort soll der Tisch stehen [speaker demonstration towards a marking on the floor].
Mary (in C): ‘The table should be placed there-neutral / there-distal [speaker demonstration towards a marking on the floor].’

(139) Peter (in C’): *Und dann sagte Mary, der Tisch soll da / dort stehen.
Peter (in C’): ‘*And then Mary said the table should be placed there-neutral / there-distal.’

(140) Peter adjusted (in C’): Und dann sagte Mary, dass der Tisch auf der eingezeichneten Markierung stehen soll.
Peter adjusted (in C’): ‘And then Mary said the table should be placed on the marked spot.’

Mary (in C): ‘Petra doesn’t like it here.’
3.2 Testing demonstratives

(142) Peter (in C’): *Mary sagte, dass es Petra **hier** nicht gefällt.
    Peter (in C’): ‘*Mary said that Petra doesn’t like **here**.’

(143) Peter adjusted (in C’): Mary sagte, dass es Petra in **Rom** nicht gefällt.
    Peter adjusted (in C’): ‘Mary said that Petra didn’t like **Rome**.’

For **da**, **dort** and **hier** we see that these expressions cannot be reported without adjusting them to the new utterance situation. According to the disquotation test, the locatives **hier**, **da** and **dort** are indexical expressions. Note that they, like **dieser**, also allow for secondary or non-situative uses such as the anaphoric use. Ehrich (1992: 9), however, in line with what was said in Chapter 2 about the special status of the basic deictic use labels these uses are secondary sękundärdeiktisch (secondary deictic uses). He also assumes that in their basic use **hier**, **da** and **dort** are deictic expressions depending on extra-linguistic information and that all further uses are deferred, and thus not basic or defining. In the examples above I showed how the three expressions need information from the situative context in order to refer successfully. Being indexical expressions, their meanings vary, depending on where the actual speaker is, or depending on where the speaker demonstrations point to. There is a general agreement in the literature (e.g. Bühler 1934; Ehrich 1992; Fricke 2007), that the three expressions are indexical expressions. This is in line with the findings from the speaker demonstration test.

With respect to the differences concerning the semantics of the three expressions, Ehrich (1992: 13) notes that German has with **hier**, **da** and **dort** a tripartite system with respect to positional or locative deixis. Roughly, **hier** is claimed, according to Ehrich, to standardly refer to the region including the exact place of utterance, i.e. the region of the speaker or the origo. I have already discussed how the **extent** of the region of the place of utterance including the speaker may be subject to variation, and how it can be determined via salience. The same holds for the extent for **da** and **dort** as well. With respect to their denotational meaning however, **da** and **dort** are claimed to refer to regions which exclude the actual place of utterance. Bühler (1934: 100f.), arguing in the same vein, states that **hier** standardly refers to the region which is defined by the coordinates of the speaker. He explains that the use of **da** and **dort** (using the terms “distance” and “proximity”) depends on the question if their referents are in the interactive field of the speaker (**da**) or if they are not in the interactive field of the speaker (**dort**). With respect to the semantic differences between the three forms, Ehrich (1992: 62) (my translation) summarizes as follows: “**hier** refers to the proximal surroundings of the place of utterance and **dort** to any distant region with respect to the utterance place.”
3 Demonstrative lexemes in German

(144) Ich bin vor vier Jahren nach Düsseldorf gezogen und hier / dort / da will ich auch bleiben.
‘I moved to Düsseldorf four years ago and I want to stay here / there-distal / there-neutral.’
(Ehrich 1982)

The claim is, that in the standard case hier can only be used if the speaker is in Düsseldorf when uttering (144), and dort can only be used if the speaker is not in Düsseldorf at the time speaking. Da appears more versatile and can be used in both scenarios, respectively. This leads Ehrich to her proposal with respect to da, claiming that da is used to refer to a variable region, which can be the place of utterance, the place of the addressee or a third place somewhere in the context. That is, the interpretation of da in its situative use is not exclusively linked to the place of utterance or the place of the speaker and thus more variable. At this stage, however, the lexical differences between hier, dort and da are not in the main focus of attention, but rather the question if the three forms qualify as demonstratives. We have already seen that the three forms are indexical expressions. But are they, like demonstratives, dependent on externalizations of speaker intentions, i.e. speaker demonstrations in the basic case?

Speaker demonstration test:
For dort and da, I will now argue that the two expressions can be labeled demonstrative adverbs since they, in their basic situational use (145) standardly require a speaker demonstration in order to successfully refer. To describe it from an alternative point of view: in the straight-forward examples below (with reference to a perceptible entity), the referential act fails without the presence of speaker demonstrations. Note that one must not forget that for hier, da and dort, as for all indexical expressions, transfers (in Fillmore’s sense, see Section 2.3.1) are possible.

(145) A: Wo ist mein Hut?
    A: ‘Where is my hat?’
    B: Dort / da [speaker demonstration towards a hat on hook at the wall next to B].
    B: ‘There-distal / there-neutral [speaker demonstration towards a hat on hook at the wall next to B].’

(146) Dort / da steht Thomas [speaker demonstration towards Thomas].
    ‘There-distal / there-neutral is Thomas [speaker demonstration towards Thomas].’

These simple examples show that for dort und da, in their standard, straightforward use, a speaker demonstration is required in order to guarantee a successful referential act. If the speaker demonstrations were canceled in the
above examples, the reference of *da* and *dort* would fail completely, since the hearer would be left with no indication of the speaker’s referential intentions. If I ask somebody where my hat is, and (s)he simply answers *dort*, without any kind of pointing, gazing or nodding that person is not a good help. Thus, for *dort* and *da* I suggest a classification as adverbial locative demonstratives in this thesis.

A more intricate and still controversial case is *hier* (see also Kaplan 1989a). As I showed above, *hier* is definitely an indexical expression, standardly referring to the location of the speaker’s coordinates. Furthermore, it seems like, in the standard case, no demonstrations are needed with respect to the case of *hier*, since it appears to “automatically” refer to the actual place of utterance — which can be determined without speaker demonstrations:

(147) **Hier** gefällt es mir gut.
‘I like it here.’

Taking this assumption for granted, one could easily conclude that *hier* is not a demonstrative. However, Bühler (1934: 135) already points out examples in which *hier* seems to work like a demonstrative, in that its reference is dependent on a speaker demonstration. These are cases where, for example, the speaker points to a certain point on a map and says:

(148)      Nächste Woche werden wir **HIER** sein [speaker demonstration towards a city on a map].
      ‘Next week we’ll be **HIER** [speaker demonstration towards a city on a map].’

This example should look familiar. It represents one of Fillmore’s (1982) transfer cases, which I discussed in Section 2.3.1. In the example (148) above *hier* appears to work like a demonstrative. Its meaning depends on where the speaker demonstration is directed to, and not any more to the coordinates of the speaker. However, examples like (148) for *hier* are non-prototypical or non-standard. This is underlined by the observation that the speaker demonstration can in fact be omitted. This does not lead to reference failure but only to reference-shift back to the original meaning of *hier*, i.e. a salient location of the actual utterance situation:

(149)      Nächste Woche werden wir **hier** sein [no speaker demonstration].
      ‘Next week we will be **here** [no speaker demonstration].’

Without the speaker demonstration, *hier* still may refer successfully, so the presence of the speaker demonstration can be assumed to overwrite the original meaning of *hier*. In (149), without speaker demonstration, *hier* receives its original meaning again and refers to the actual location of the utterance, i.e. to the speaker’s coordinates. Thus, it behaves like a prototypical pure indexical
expression. The existence of non-prototypical transfers should not keep us from categorizing *hier* a pure indexical. Therefore, *hier* differs from *da* and *dort* with respect to the observation that its general meaning does not appear to *standardly* depend on speaker demonstrations and that the referential act does not standardly *fail* if the speaker demonstration is taken away. *Hier* refers, prototypically, to the place of utterance, i.e. the coordinates of the speaker.

To summarize, *hier*, not being standardly dependent on speaker demonstrations in its situative use, will not be considered a demonstrative in this thesis. (For more details with respect to the discussion see Vision 1985; Salmon 1991; Predelli 1998a, 1998b; Corazza et al. 2002; Romdenh-Romluc 2002; and Atkin 2006 for an in depth discussion of the status of *here.*)

Table 14: Test results for *hier, da* and *dort*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>hier</em></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Pure indexical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>da, dort</em></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Locative demonstrative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3 Distance and more complex demonstratives

Most works on demonstratives claim that demonstratives work in order to orient the hearer in the speech situation and that they thus (almost always) encode a meaning of spatial distance or spatial contrast in their meaning. Diessel (1999a), for example, proposes three criteria for defining the categorical status of demonstratives. First, demonstratives are pointing expressions serving syntactic functions. Second, they serve certain pragmatic functions by organizing information flow in a conversation, and by focusing the hearer’s attention on objects in the speech situation. Third, demonstratives encode a meaning of spatial distance. It is commonly acknowledged that demonstratives generally, due to the accompanying pointing gesture, indicate the spatial location of the referent relative to the origo or the deictic center (Lyons 1977: 684; Fillmore 1982). Diessel (1999: 35) calls this characteristic “deictic feature”, since he assumes demonstratives to make crucial reference to some aspect of the speech situation by indicating the relative distance of a referent with respect to the deictic center (i.e. the origo), which is usually assumed to be where the speaker is. Diessel further states that (almost) all languages at least have two demonstratives which locate the respective referents with respect to two points on a distance scale: a proximal demonstrative, which refers to entities *near* the deictic center and a distal demonstrative which indicates that the referent is located at some distance to the deictic center. English, for example, exhibits such a two-term system of indicating deixis in space. It consists, according to Diessel (1999: 36) of two
expressions indicating proximity, the adverb here and demonstrative this and of the two distal expressions, the local adverb there and demonstrative that. A lot of languages are claimed to have a two-term system, whereas three-term systems are not claimed to be rare either. Diessel, in the World Atlas of Language Structures Online lists seven languages only which exhibit no distance contrast between their demonstratives (German being one of them, see discussion about dieser vs. jener in Section 3.2.2), 127 languages with a two-way contrast, 88 languages with a three-way contrast, eight languages with a four-way-contrast and four with a five- or more-way-contrast in his sample of 234 languages (Diessel 2013). These descriptions only apply to the distance-marking feature which is usually present in the basic situational use. This use is in most languages expressed through two different roots, as in English with this and that. An example for a three-term system is Spanish, where este corresponds to this, ese to that and the forms of aquel to that one over there. There are more complex systems than three-term systems, these more complex systems, however are assumed to result, for example, due to choosing the speaker or the addressee as reference points, i.e. via reference described as “close to the speaker” vs. “close to the addressee”. Furthermore, more complex systems may be based on a systematic differentiation between visibility and non-visibility of the proximal, medial or distal referent.

The situation in German appears to be a bit more complicated, as its demonstratives do not exhibit a distance contrast (any more). In the section on jener I provided examples, repeated below as (150) and (151), how dieser and jener were, in traditional grammars, assumed to carry the distance marking features [+proximal] and [+distal], respectively:


(151) Die meisten der Äpfel konnte Dahlem bereits nach einer ersten Inaugenscheinnahme zuordnen. „Das ist der Rheinische Bohnapfel, und jener dort ist der Rote Bellefleur“, sagte er. (Cosmas, RHZ08/NOV.12731 Rhein-Zeitung, 15.11.2008; Seltenen Obstsorten auf der Spur)

Interestingly, das is used in (151) in order to refer deictically to a proximal referent, whereas jener dort then marks the contrast with respect to distance and refers to the distal referent.

I further suggested that jener is not considered a demonstrative in this work, since it is hardly used in its situative use any more and can therefore be assumed to have lost its deictic and thus its potential distance-marking qualities. Furthermore, I showed that jener, also in its non-deictic uses, is generally very infrequent in the German language. With respect to nominal demonstratives, I
argued that German is left with *dieser* and pronominal *DER*. Himmelmann (1997: 49), amongst others, discusses the question if these German nominal demonstratives are marked for distance, or if the German demonstrative system is one rare case representing a one-term system, which is unmarked for distance. First he notes that potential one-term systems do mostly exist with respect to nominal demonstratives, whereas local adverbials are, mostly, marked for distance contrast. In standard German, he says, we find the local adverbials neutral *da* ‘there’ as opposed to proximal *hier* ‘here’ and distal *dort* ‘there’, which can be used to modify the neutral nominal demonstratives. With respect to the nominal demonstratives *dieser* and stressed *DER* Himmelmann (1997: 50) states, that there is a consensus in the literature, that they do not differ from each other with respect to distance-marking. It is widely acknowledged that, at least in informal, spoken German, if a contrast with respect to distance is to be indicated, the local adverbials like *hier, da* or *dort* are used in combination with *dieser* or *DER*. Since both demonstratives *dieser* and *DER* are generally interchangeable in their most basic and straight-forward use, they can be treated on a par while investigating if the German demonstrative system is really neutral when it comes to distance marking. So, are *dieser* (and *DER*) really distance-neutral nominal demonstratives, which would mean that German has a one-term demonstrative system without oppositions? Himmelmann (1997: 53) claims, that *dieser* in modern German does not find itself in an opposition to other, clearly distance marked demonstratives and thus appears to be completely neutral with respect to distance marking. This results in the fact that *dieser* (and also *DER*) is combinable with all local adverbs: *dieses / DER hier* ‘here’, *dieses / DER dort* ‘there-distal’, *dieses / DER da* ‘there-neutral’. Corpus examples for each of the combinations with *dieser* are given below:

(152) Einige gingen sogar so weit und sahen sich schon nach einem zu beziehenden Zimmer um. „Ich nehme dieses *hier*“, meinte lachend ein Mann zu seiner Gattin. ‘Some went so far and even looked around for a potential room they might move in. “I take this one here”, said a man laughing to his wife.’
(Cosmas)

(153) „Ich kann nicht mehr sagen, als ich weiß...“ murmelte das Mädchen verlegen und sah zu Sakura. Diese stand auf. „Ich will dieses dort.“ Sie zeigte auf ein schwarzes Kleid. “I can’t say more than I know”, murmured the girl in embarrassment and looked at Sakura. “I want this [that one] there-distal.” She pointed towards a black dress.’
(Cosmas)
3.4 Summary

(154) „Ah, hier ist das Buch!“ Er zog es hervor. „Und wenn ich schon dabei bin, kann ich auch gleich dieses da herausnehmen.“
“Ah, here is the book!” He pulled it out. “And while I am doing it, I can pull out this one there-neutral, too.”
(Cosmas)

Dieser truly appears to be neutral with respect to the distance feature, other than distance-marked-demonstratives in other languages, which can only be combined with local adverbs which are in “harmony” with respect to their distance parameter. In German we do not encounter a feature conflict, whereas in English, for example *this book there and *that book here are impossible combinations. Himmelmann concludes (1997: 53) saying that he does not see any reason to assume that dieser (and der) in modern (spoken) German carry any distance-marking feature.

3.4 Summary

Assuming a basic and definitory use of demonstratives, I came up with a list of potential demonstratives in German and checked which of them are standardly used in that use. Only dieser and DER/DIE/DAS qualified as members of the class of nominal demonstratives in German, on which this work has put its focus. Being deictic expressions, they standardly require a speaker demonstration as an expression of the speaker’s referential intentions. They may as well appear in a variety of further (non-deictic) uses and there may exist examples in which they do occur without clear speaker demonstrations. These cases, however, are assumed to be derived uses of the basic deictic use of these expressions or exceptional variants of the standard, default case. The findings of this chapter are summarized in Table 15 below.

Being clear about a definition of demonstratives and the two forms which fulfill these requirements in German as demonstratives for individuals, I will now move on and consider the derived uses of demonstratives. In the following, I will focus on nominal demonstratives only, and narrow down my investigations to demonstrative dieser in the remainder of this thesis. Thus, in the next chapter, in order to offer a complete typology of uses of demonstrative dieser, I will discuss the so-called derived uses of dieser and their relation to the basic deictic use of dieser in terms of similarities and differences, arguing that dieser in all its uses, is still to be considered a demonstrative with direct reference.
### 3 Demonstrative lexemes in German

Table 15: Overview of potential demonstrative forms in German

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Disquotation test / relative clause test</th>
<th>Speaker demonstration test</th>
<th>Classification of expression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dieser</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Adnominal / pronominal Demonstrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DER</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Adnominal / pronominal Demonstrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jener</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Determinative (outdated use)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>derjenige</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Determinative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>derselbe</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Demonstrative for individuas with similar properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solch-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Demonstrative for properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Demonstrative for properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hier</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Pure indexical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>da, dort</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Locative Demonstrative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 A typology of (derived) uses of ‘dieser’

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the demonstrative dieser and on its various uses. I will present a typology of the different uses of dieser and show that dieser has three further uses beneath the basic deictic use. These three uses (the anaphoric (155), the recognitional (156) and the indefinite use (157)) are assumed to be derived from the basic deictic use. In these three uses, dieser is still claimed to be a demonstrative. One main argument is the observation that it works as a means of direct reference in each of these uses. In doing so, it shares, amongst others, one main feature with deictic dieser.

The three uses differ from the basic use in that their respective demonstrata are not necessarily perceptible objects in the actual utterance situation, which are pointed out by the speaker with a speaker demonstration. Since their demonstrata are not necessarily perceptible in the actual utterance situation, I assume that they are represented via abstract referents in the speaker’s minds (i.e. cognitive items). Those are found in different referential domains, such as the previous discourse, shared knowledge and speaker-exclusive knowledge. These referents are abstract representations of the real intended object in the world. Intuitively, the demonstrative still serves as a kind of “pointer” within the specific domains, even though the intended referent is not a perceptible part of the actual utterance situation. Dieser, in all uses, seems to function as a means of reference which is used in order to focus the attention of the hearer to a referent in a certain domain.

(155) Anaphoric use:
Ich habe mir gestern ein Buch1 gekauft. Dieses Buch1 handelt von einer Tänzerin.
‘I bought a book1 yesterday. This book1 is about a dancer.’

---

27 I will offer a typological classification of the uses of dieser that is not based on the (in)definiteness distinction, but is sensitive to the varying referential domains in which the referents of the demonstrative NPs are to be found.
28 My understanding of “derivation” and the “derived uses” from the basic deictic use is defined in Chapter 1 already.
29 The term referential domain relates to the domain, in which the referent (i.e. the textual representation — the discourse referent — or the mental representation) of the actual physical object ist o be found.
4 A typology of (derived) uses of ‘dieser’

(156) **Recognitional use:**
Ich habe mir gestern endlich **dieses Buch** gekauft. (Das, welches Du mir mal empfohlen hast.)
‘I finally bought **that** book yesterday. (The one which you recommended to me.)’

(157) **Indefinite use:**
Ich war gestern in der Stadt und habe mir **dieses Buch** gekauft. Es hat mich derart gefesselt, dass ich den ganzen Tag lesend verbracht habe.
‘I was downtown yesterday and bought **this book**. It was so thrilling that I spent the whole day reading.’

This classification of the four uses of **dieser** may not be exhaustive, however does it help to categorize the majority of occurrences of **dieser**. I suggest that almost all occurrences of **dieser** can be categorized as either instantiations of the basic deictic use or as one of the three derived uses.

In addition, in this chapter I want to demarcate the typological classification of the derived uses of **dieser** from other, more general mechanisms of reference which may affect the use of **dieser** such as referential shifts. They will be shown to work on a different level and in an “orthogonal” fashion (von Heusinger 2012 p.c.). These mechanisms may at times apply to **dieser** but should not intermingle with the typology of uses of **dieser** suggested in this chapter.

4.2 **One basic and three derived uses**

Beneath the basic deictic use, two further uses of **dieser** are widely acknowledged (Diessel 1999; Lyons 1977; Ahrenholz 2007; and many others) as derived uses of **dieser**, i.e. (i) the anaphoric use (155) and the (ii) the recognitional use (156). As an extension to previous work, I argue for the inclusion of (iii) the indefinite use of **dieser** (157) into the group of derived demonstrative uses, i.e into the class of demonstratives. The indefinite use has not received much attention in the literature so far and if so, it was rather categorized an exceptional form, which should not be put on a par with demonstratives (for example by Ionin 2006 for English indefinite **this**), due to its indefiniteness.

The deictic, anaphoric and the recognitional use of **dieser** are widely acknowledged to be **definite** as they relate to hearer-given information. Even though indefinite **dieser** is **indefinite**, first arguments speak for the inclusion of **indefinite diesers** into the typology of demonstrative uses: like the deictic, the anaphoric and the recognitional use, (i) it exhibits characteristics of directly referential expressions as well. Secondly, (ii) in all three derived uses, the demonstrata are, quite similarly, **not** perceptible parts of the actual utterance.

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30 Recognitional **dieser** translates to **that** in English.
4.2 One basic and three derived uses

situation, but represented via referents in different domains of reference\textsuperscript{31} such as the actual textual discourse (155), shared knowledge between speaker and hearer of the actual utterance situation (156) or speaker-exclusive knowledge of the speaker in the actual utterance situation (157).

The derived uses of \textit{dieser} will be shown to share the semantics of indexical reference with the basic deictic use. This will be done by making use of the two tests for indexicality introduced in Chapter 2: Cappellen and Lepore’s (2005) disquotation test and the scopal behavior test (inspired by Wolter 2006 and Hunter 2010).

From these assumptions the following scheme results:

```
Figure 3: The basic use and the derived uses of demonstratives (author’s illustration)
```

The following table gives an overview with respect to the similarities and differences of the four uses, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections. The table below indicates that the derived uses of \textit{dieser} share (at least) three features with the basic deictic use: (i) the form, (ii) the fact that their referential behavior matches the one of indexical \textit{dieser} in its deictic use (direct reference), (iii) the domain-specific reference and the intuitive conclusion that, \textit{dieser}, with respect to all domains, fulfills a pointing function.

\textsuperscript{31} The idea that the domain of reference is distinctive for a typology of demonstratives is not new and has been recognized by many others before (Diessel 1999; Himmelmann 1996, 1997; Cornish 1999; Ahrenholz 2007). However, these accounts blur a clear classification of uses by mixing too many further features and factors (e.g. by not drawing a clear line between uses of demonstratives and other usage-independent mechanisms which may apply to indexicals) and categorically rejecting the interaction between demonstrativity and indefiniteness.
4 A typology of (derived) uses of ‘dieser’

Table 16: Features of main uses of *dieser*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Basic deictic use</th>
<th>Anaphoric use</th>
<th>Recognitional use</th>
<th>Indefinite use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form investigated</td>
<td><em>dieser</em></td>
<td><em>dieser</em></td>
<td><em>dieser</em></td>
<td><em>dieser</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indexical reference</td>
<td>yes (tests)</td>
<td>yes (tests)</td>
<td>yes (tests)</td>
<td>yes (tests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Pointing” Function</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointing gesture required?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnominal / pronominal</td>
<td>Adnominal and pronominal</td>
<td>Adnominal and pronominal</td>
<td>Only adnominal</td>
<td>Only adnominal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse status of referent</td>
<td>Introduction of new referent in discourse</td>
<td>Marking discourse old information</td>
<td>Introduction of new referent in discourse</td>
<td>Introduction of new referent in discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking given or new information for hearer?</td>
<td>Given (perceptible)</td>
<td>Given (previous discourse context)</td>
<td>Given (shared knowledge)</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

In what follows I will investigate in detail the characteristics of the different uses of *dieser*. Also, and more importantly, I will show how *dieser* in all uses still exhibits the demonstrative-typical means of direct reference by using the two tests for indexicality presented in Chapter 2:

Testing indexicality (direct reference):

a) disquotation test (Cappellen and Lepore 2005)

b) scopal behavior test (inspired by Wolter 2006 and Hunter 2010)
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

The application of those tests highlights main characteristics of directly referential expressions (cf. Chapter 2). They are, unlike non-referential expressions:

- directly and exclusively anchored to the actual utterance situation in which they are originally uttered
- scopeless expressions, they always give the appearance of taking widest scope under semantic operators
- they do not allow for readings of co-variation in examples with semantic operators
- they are existentially presupposed \(\Rightarrow\) discourse referents

Note that those characteristics partly depend on each other. The tests, however, sheds light on different aspects of direct reference.

4.3.1 The basic deictic use

In Chapter 2, the basic deictic use was presented in detail. It was claimed to be the basic use for demonstratives. Prototypical examples for *dieser* in its basic deictic use (adnominal and pronominal) are given below:

(158) In a bakery:
   Ich hätte gerne ein Stück von **DIESEM Kuchen** [pointing gesture].
   ‘I’d like to have a piece of **THIS chocolate cake** [pointing gesture].’

(159) In a bakery:
   Ich hätte gerne **DIESES** [pointing gesture].
   ‘I’d like to have **THIS one** [pointing gesture].’

The basic deictic use was characterized by the following two obligatory criteria:

(i) Indexicality
(ii) Requirement of a speaker demonstration to the intended demonstratum

Both criteria were shown to hold for deictic *dieser* in chapter 2 on the basis of linguistic tests. Thus, we can summarize what is beyond question: *dieser*, in its basic use, is truly a demonstrative expression.

A summary of the main features of the basic deictic use is given below.
Table 17: Main features of the basic deictic use of ‘dieser’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic deictic use</th>
<th>Example / Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indexicality?</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Test 1: Disquotation test ✔ (cf. Chapter 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Test 2: Scopal behavior test ✔ (cf. Chapter 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointing gesture required?</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                   | ‘Ich hätte gerne ein Stück von diesem Kuchen [pointing gesture].
‘I’d like to have a piece of this cake [pointing gesture].’ |
| Domain where referent is to be found | Perceptible part of utterance situation |
| Adnominal / pronominal? | Adnominal and pronominal      |
|                   | ‘Ich hätte gerne diese (Jacke) [pointing gesture].
‘I’d like to have this (jacket) [pointing gesture].’ |
| Discourse status of referent | Introduction of new referent in discourse |
|                   | Lyons (1979: 102): “The situative use is one of the principal means open to us of putting the intensional correlates of entities into the universe of discourse.” |
| Marking given or new information for hearer? | Given (?)  |
|                   | … since the demonstratum is perceptible in / part of the actual utterance situation. |
| Specific tests for respective use | Test 3: Pointing gesture test ✔ (cf. Chapter 2) |

4.3.2 The anaphoric use

Anaphoric ‘dieser’ is assumed to be a demonstrative, as it will be shown to also exhibit direct reference as well. The relevant referential domain (being responsible for a classification into the anaphoric use) in which the referent is “pointed out” is the explicit (previous) discourse context.

(160) Es war einmal ein König1. Dieser König1 war sehr reich.
‘Once upon a time there was a king1. This king1 was very rich.’

(161) Die 59-Jährige glaubte ihm und händigte einem Mittäter1 das geforderte Geld aus. Dieser Mann1 war laut Polizei ungefähr 40 Jahre alt und zwischen 1,80 bis 1,90 Meter groß.
(Braunschweiger Zeitung, 05.02.2013, Ressort: 1SZ-Lok; Betrüger am Telefon)

If reference is made to an explicit textual antecedent which is identifiable in the previous discourse, we are dealing with the anaphoric use of ‘dieser’.

(162) a. Maria begrüßte Peter1. Dieser1 war hocherfreut.
‘Maria greeted Peter1. Dieser1 [He] was very happy.’
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

b. {Maria hat sich endlich ein neues Handy gekauft}\1. Dies1 / Diese Tatsache1 wird ihre Freunde aber freuen.‘
{Maria finally bought a new phone}\1 This1 / This fact1 will make her friends happy.’

c. Maria hat sich endlich ein neues Handy1 gekauft. Dieses1 wird sie hoffentlich nicht so schnell verlieren.
‘Maria finally bought a new phone\1. She hopefully won’t lose dieses1 [this one] soon.’

Note that the textual antecedent in the anaphoric use can be a noun phrase, as in (162a) or (162c), but it must not necessarily be a noun phrase, as in (162b), where dies refers to the whole proposition of the previous sentence. I will show in the course of this chapter, that co-reference between antecedent (whatsoever type) and anaphoric expression is generally required for demonstrative anaphora. (Whereas co-reference is not generally required for non-demonstrative anaphora via pronouns or definite NPs). Furthermore, the examples above show how anaphoric dieser can occur in the adnominal as well as in the pronominal use (162b).

An adequate definition of anaphora is provided by Carlson (2006: 1): “anaphora refers to referentially dependent expressions in natural language which contribute their meaning by identifying another expression to give them their semantic value”. In this view, anaphora in its primary instances is the establishment of a referential dependency between two (or more) expressions. The pronoun him in the example below is one such instance of anaphora:

(163) Mark1 felt that there was someone watching him1.
(Carlson 2006: 1)

On the understanding that him refers to Mark, the pronoun is the anaphor and the expression Mark is the antecedent. Both expressions refer to the same individual. “The relationship between these expressions is not an equal one, however, since the reference of the pronoun is dependent upon the reference of its antecedent, whereas the reference of the antecedent is established by virtue of its meaning alone. The term co-reference is often used to describe this referential connection between anaphor and antecedent.” (Carlson 2006: 1)

Anaphora is a versatile construction, allowing anaphoric relations between various types of linguistic expressions, which qualify as potential anaphoric expressions (e.g. definite noun phrases (der König ‘the king’), personal pronouns (er ‘he’), demonstrative pronouns (dieser ‘this’), demonstrative noun phrases (dieser König ‘this king’) as in (164)). Furthermore, it also allows for various types of antecedent expressions (definite or indefinite noun phrases, propositions, sentences, events), as already exemplified above in (162).
4 A typology of (derived) uses of ‘dieser’

(164) Es war einmal ein König. Er / dieser / dieser König / der König hatte eine Krone. ‘Once upon a time there was a king. He / this / this king / the king had a crown.’

At this stage, I am mainly interested in the (referential) conditions which license the use of anaphoric demonstrative dieser, in order to point out similarities to dieser in the basic deictic use: I aim to give evidence supporting the hypothesis that anaphoric dieser expresses indexical reference and is a demonstrative expression. Arguing that way, I expect anaphoric dieser to behave differently if compared to non-demonstrative anaphora with definite NPs or pronouns.

4.3.2.1 Referential properties of anaphoric dieser

In order to investigate the referential properties of anaphoric dieser, one has to take into account that anaphora, generally, occurs in different types. The rather unproblematic type of anaphora is labeled direct or referential anaphora (Carlson 2006: 1). It is defined by the relation of co-reference between an antecedent and the anaphoric expression. Co-reference relates to the observation that two linguistic expressions refer to exactly one and the same referent. This type of anaphora does not pose a problem for an account of direct reference for anaphoric dieser. The anaphoric pronouns are those which “pick up” a referent directly from a previous referring expression. Whether in the same sentence or another, the semantics of such anaphoric pronouns is fairly simple: the referent of the anaphoric pronoun is the very referent of its actual antecedent — this reference is fixed and never subject to co-variation:

(165) Peter liebt eine Frau. Sie / Diese liebt Hans. ‘Peter loves a woman. She / this loves Hans.’

In these straightforward examples of direct anaphora (165), dieser clearly refers directly: the only interpretation possible in (165) is a co-referential one, as diese in (165) only refers to one single woman, i.e the one woman who Peter loves.

Apart from these unproblematic examples of demonstrative anaphora there are further types of anaphora in which the relation of co-reference between pronouns used and the respective antecedents is not given (for an overview see Geach 1962; Evans 1977; Kamp 1981; Heim 1990). These types of anaphora are also called identity of sense anaphora, as opposed to identity of referent anaphora in (165) (Carlson 2006: 10). Generally, anaphoric expressions not only find their reference by identifying a co-referential antecedent and directly using the reference of that very antecedent as its own value as in the cases of referential anaphors presented in (165) above. They may, as well, function in ways, in which they allow for non-co-referential, i.e. for co-varying readings in certain contexts.
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

Standardly finding anaphoric *dieser* in these types of anaphora would pose a problem for a direct reference account for anaphoric *dieser*. The non-co-referential types of anaphora are examples with (i) pronouns of laziness (167), (ii) bound variables (168), (iii) e-type anaphora (169) and (iv) examples involving anaphors with indefinite antecedents embedded in opaque contexts (170), i.e. involving an indefinite under an operator (intensional, extensional), under which the anaphoric expression may take narrow scope. In the following, I will investigate the possibilities of demonstrative anaphora in exactly these cases — in which we do not expect anaphoric *dieser*. Let me first provide examples of the referential possibilities underlying the different non-referential types of anaphora with non-demonstrative pronouns and then, in a second step, investigate the possibilities of anaphoric *dieser* in these examples:

(i) Pronouns of laziness:

(167) Die Frau die ihren Gehaltsscheck zur Bank brachte ist weiser als die Frau die ihn / ihren / den Gehaltsscheck ihrem jugendlichen Sohn gab.

‘The woman who deposited her paycheck in the bank is wiser than the woman who gave it / her / the paycheck to her teenage son.’

(Pronoun of laziness is a term coined by Peter Geach (1962) since it is a “lazy” way to avoid repeating an entire noun phrase. In this case, analyzing *ihn* as meaning *her paycheck*, with *her* in this instance relating to the second woman rather than the first, will give the right reading. However, on a co-referential reading of *ihn*, the paycheck would have to be one and the same, a reading which is very unlikely in (167).

(ii) Bound pronouns (bound variable reading):

(168) Jeder Mann, der eine Frau in der Disco anspricht, tanzt dann auch mit ihr / der Frau.

‘Every man, who chats up a woman in the discotheque, then dances with her / the woman.’

In such instances, the “reference” of the pronoun is not determined by the reference of its antecedent NP (as it is the case with co-referential anaphora), but rather by the assignment of values to variables that is determined by the quantifier *jeder*. The pronoun is bound by the quantifier, which results in a non-referential interpretation for the pronoun.

(iii) E-type pronouns (donkey-sentences) (Geach 1962, Evans 1977):

(169) Jeder Mann, der eine Frau in der Disco anspricht, tanzt dann auch mit ihr / der Frau.

‘Every man, who chats up a woman in the discotheque, then dances with her / the woman.’
In these cases, the antecedent of the anaphora is a noun phrase embedded under a quantifier and the anaphoric expression is not within its scope. The problem is that if one takes ihr ‘her’ in this sentence to be a free variable assigned the same reference as eine Frau ‘a woman’, there is, very clearly, no particular woman this sentence is in any way about.

(iv) Semantic operator: Intensional context

(170) John will sich einen VW kaufen. Er hofft, dass er / der VW weniger als 4000 Euro kostet.
‘John wants to buy a VW. He hopes that it / the VW costs less than 4000 Euro.’
\rightarrow there is a car

(171) John will sich einen VW kaufen. Er / der VW steht bei Marty’s Garage und er holt es morgen ab.
‘John wants to buy a VW. It / the VW is at Marty’s garage and he’ll pick it up tomorrow.’
\rightarrow there is a car

Referring back to an indefinite noun phrase embedded under a linguistic operator (Roberts 1989), the scope of the pronoun depends on the scope of its antecedent (Wolter 2003: 2). In (170) ein Auto ‘a car’ takes narrow scope with respect to the intensional operator and so does the pronoun. Es does not refer to a particular car but to any car, which John will choose in the future (narrow-scope interpretation), whereas in (171) ein Auto takes wide scope as it refers to a particular car, which is existentially presupposed.

The examples in (167) to (170) show, that, at least for the anaphoric pronouns and definite NPs present in the examples, anaphora is not always direct, as it was the case in (165) for dieser, where anaphora is to be described by the relation of co-reference between the referents, i.e. where the relevant relation is identity of reference.

In the next stage, I will investigate the referential properties of the anaphoric use of dieser. If dieser in the anaphoric use is a demonstrative, it should behave like a directly referential indexical. That is, it should not standardly allow for the non-referential readings we received in the examples in (167) to (170) above. I will show in what follows that, with respect to the non-referential types of anaphora, dieser cannot be felicitously used. This contrastive behavior compared to personal pronouns and definite NPs is expected in a direct-reference account for dieser: anaphoric dieser is a demonstrative and thus only allows for referential readings with respect to exactly that referent in the actual previous discourse to
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

which it maintains a relation of co-reference. I will consider dieser in the four types of non-referential anaphora presented above in turn:\footnote{Acceptability judgements are based on the opinions of five native German speakers who uniformly rejected dieser in (172) to (174).}

Sentences with pronouns of laziness do not work with anaphoric dieser in its standard reading:

(172) Die Frau die ihren Gehaltsscheck zur Bank bringt ist weiser als die Frau die ihn / den Gehaltsscheck / *diesen (Gehaltsscheck) ihrem jugendlichen Sohn gibt.

‘The woman who deposits her paycheck in the bank is wiser than the woman who gives it / the paycheck / *this (one) (paycheck) to her teenage son.’

Dieser in (172) is only acceptable in the (unlikely) reading in which there is only one paycheck, it does not allow for the non-referential reading in which woman A brings her paycheck to the bank and woman B gives her (i.e. a different) check to her son. Also, there is a non-prominent type reading for dieser in (172).

Neither can dieser be inserted in the bound-pronoun examples:

(173) \textbf{Bound} pronouns (bound variable reading):

Jeder Mann denkt dass er / *dieser (Mann) eine Beförderung verdient.

‘Every man thinks that he / *this (man) deserves a raise.’

And neither dieser cannot standardly replace E-type pronouns in donkey sentences (174). Even though the sentence seems to get better if the head noun Frau is inserted. For an explanation see footnote 33 in this chapter.

(174) Jeder Mann, der eine Frau in der Disco anspricht, tanzt dann auch mit ihr / der Frau / *\textsuperscript{2}dieser (Frau).

‘Every man, who chats up a woman in the discotheque, then dances with her / the woman / *\textsuperscript{2}dieser (woman).’

The examples (172) to (174) above, show how anaphoric dieser is not well-compatible with sentences which force a non-referential interpretation on anaphoric dieser. This observation appears to comply with the conditions required. Anaphoric dieser behaves like we expect a directly referential expression to behave: it does not, and unlike pronouns or definite NPs, allow for readings which lead to co-varying interpretations of the pronoun, and if these co-varying readings are forced, the sentences containing dieser become unfelicitous as in (172) to (174). A small group of native Germans rates dieser acceptable in (174), but still strongly prefers a pronoun. According to these examples, anaphoric dieser differs
from anaphoric pronouns and definite NPs and rather behaves, as one would expect a means of direct reference to behave.

**Testing for indexicality**
The observation that anaphoric *dieser* behaves differently in contrast to other anaphoric expressions in that it standardly only allows for direct anaphora can be further supported if the tests for indexicality are applied to anaphoric uses of *dieser*. I will use the scopal behavior test, as the disquotation test (Cappellen and Lepore 2005) is not applicable (see below). If anaphoric *dieser* behaves like a directly referential expression, it should refer directly in the sense that it should not, unlike personal pronouns or definite NPs, allow for co-varying (non-referential) readings in the test sentences. The antecedents in the test sentences are indefinite descriptions embedded under linguistic operators. As expected, the reference of anaphoric *dieser* is (in contrast to the pronoun or the definite NP) quite odd in (195) and successful in the referential (apparent wide-scope) interpretation of the indefinite in (196):

**Scopal behavior test:**
a) Intensional operator:

(175) John will sich bald nach einem neuen VW mit eingebautem Fernseher umsehen. Er hofft stark, dass er / der VW / *dieser* nicht mehr als 4000 Euro kostet — hat aber noch keinen gefunden.

‘John wants to start looking for a new VW with an in-built TV soon. He desperately hopes that it / the VW / *dieser* won’t cost more than 4000 Euros — and has not found one yet.’
→ non-referential reading: there is no car yet

(176) John will sich ein Auto kaufen. Es / *Dieses* steht bei Marty’s Garage und er holt es morgen ab.

‘John wants to buy a car. It / *Dieses* is at Marty’s garage and he can pick it up tomorrow.’
→ referential reading: there is a car

b) Quantifier (the desired reading is that there are different poems):

(177) Jedes Kind hat ein (unterschiedliches) Gedicht aufgesagt. Die meisten durften es / *dieses* ablesen.

‘Every kid recited a (different) poem. Most of the kids were allowed to read it / *dieses* out.’

Anaphoric *dieser* requires identity of reference with an antecedent referent which is known to the speaker. It does only allow for interpretations which look like wide-scope interpretations with respect to the antecedents which were
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embedded under linguistic operators. Therefore, the use of anaphoric *dieser* in (177) is unfelicitous in the quantificational reading in which there is a different poem for every child. The scopal possibilities of anaphoric demonstrative *dieser* appear to be restricted to apparent wide-scope interpretations only. This inability of anaphoric *dieser* to participate in bound variable readings and scopal ambiguities is expected in a direct reference approach for *dieser*. The investigation of the scopal possibilities of anaphoric *dieser* leads to the conclusion that it standardly behaves like a means of indexical reference, sharing these features with deictic *dieser*.\(^{33}\)

The second test introduced for indexicality, Cappellen and Lepore’s (2005) disquotation test, is not applicable with respect to the anaphoric use of *dieser*. The test operates via the assumption of different utterance situations C and C’, based on the assumption that *dieser* in its basic deictic use shows a context-dependency with respect to features of the actual utterance situation. This allows to show that a sentence containing deictic *dieser* could not be quoted directly in a new utterance situation C’, without an adjustment of the respective contextual parameters. The actual utterance situation, however, is not relevant for the anaphoric use of *dieser*, as the relevant context is the previous discourse, i.e. the domain of discourse. This dependency cannot be captured in the disquotation test.

The observations with respect to the behavior of anaphoric *dieser* in the test sentences of the scopal behavior test, however, suffice in order to exhibit that *dieser*, in the anaphoric use, standardly behaves like one would a referential expression expect to behave: it only allows for co-referential interpretations and is odd or not preferred in non-referential readings. The relation to the respective antecedent can be compared with the relation present with deictic *dieser*. Anaphoric *dieser* also designates the same referent in every context, in that the intended referent in all possible worlds is the actual referent present in the actual previous context.

\(^{33}\) Note, that there are some apparent counter examples in which anaphoric *dieser* appears to enable a bound variable interpretation in that it gives the appearance to take narrow scope as in *Peter sucht eine neue Sekretärin. Sie / ?Diese Sekretärin sollte Englisch und Französisch sprechen können.* (‘Peter is looking for a new secretary. She / ?This secretary should be able to speak English and French’). On my view, some other factor (independent of referentiality) licenses the (rather unexpected) appearance of *dieser* in that example, as I do not believe that *dieser* in that example exhibits a non-referential reading. *Dieser*, in this use, appears to come with some form of proximity condition and appears to simply repeat the antecedent noun phrase without establishing a referential relation to it. Note that the in the following example, where less proximity between the antecedent and *dieser* is given, the use of *dieser* is strikingly worse, not to say unacceptable: *Peter sucht eine neue Sekretärin. Er ist total verzweifelt weil er noch keine gefunden hat. Er hofft stark, dass sie / ?diese Sekretärin Englisch und Französisch sprechen kann* (‘Peter is looking for a new secretary. He is really desperate because he has not found one yet. He strongly hopes that she / ?? this secretary will be able to speak English and French.’) I leave the analysis of these examples open for future research, as they do not appear to pose a direct problem for the present account of anaphoric *dieser*. 

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4.3.2.2 Dealing with anti-referentialist accounts

After investigating the non-referential types of anaphora with anaphoric \textit{dieser} in German, it appears to be clear that \textit{dieser} maintains its direct reference in the anaphoric use. This, however, is not a generally shared opinion. The rigidity and the mode of direct reference, which are substantial features of demonstratives according to Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), are at least for English (anaphoric) demonstratives subjects of a controversy. Recently, researchers (for example King 2001; Roberts 2002; Wolter 2006) started to discuss various examples of demonstrative noun phrases, which do not appear to fit into Kaplan's original account of direct reference for demonstratives. These accounts argue that demonstratives, especially in the anaphoric use, may allow for readings which lead to non-referential narrow-scope interpretations, i.e. which allow co-varying interpretations for the demonstrative (noun phrase). The most influential work is King's (2001) account, which analyzes complex demonstratives as quantificational noun phrases. Similarly, Roberts (2002) and Wolter (2006) have argued, on the basis of examples like the ones below, that anaphoric demonstratives should not be analyzed as instances of direct reference. The observation of these (yet quite artificially-constructed) examples in which anaphoric \textit{that} shows bound variable uses and co-varying interpretations, was then used in order to generally argue against Kaplans (1989a, 1989b) account of direct reference.

In King's (2001) example below (178) the use of the demonstrative anaphoric noun phrase \textit{that} is licensed even though its referent is bound by the universal quantifier, i.e. the referent of that first black diamond run co-varies with respect to the skiers and thus does not show the rigidity of reference proclaimed by Kaplan.

\begin{quote}
(178) Most avid skiers remember \textbf{that /*this first black diamond run} they attempted to ski.
\end{quote}

(King 2001: 10)

What distinguishes the behavior of the demonstrative \textit{that} in (178) from the behavior that Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) predicts for demonstratives, is the observation that the pronoun \textit{they} appears to be bound by the linguistic operator \textit{most}. That is, the quantifier binds variables in another, which results in a non-referential reading for the \textit{that}-noun phrase. These readings cannot be explained in a theory of direct reference. Wolter (2003, 2006) and Roberts (2002), in line with King (2001), also claim that the anaphoric descriptions in the following examples, for instance, lead to non-referential interpretation of the demonstratives, i.e. enable co-variation-readings for the respective demonstrative noun phrases:
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

(179) The grant review board didn’t return any proposal to that /*this proposal’s author.
(Wolter 2003: 13)

(180) Every dog in the neighborhood, even the meanest, has an owner who thinks that that /*this dog is a sweetie.
(Maclaran 1982, cited by Roberts 2002: 4)

These observations may hold for these examples including English that. However they cannot be transferred to German anaphoric dieser (and not even to English this), which is ungrammatical in the translated German sentences (181) to (183):

(181) Die Meisten begabten Skifahrer erinnern sich an die / jene 34 / *diese erste schwarze Piste, die sie versuchten zu fahren.

(182) Das “Grant Review Board” hat kein einziges Proposal zum Autor von dem /*diesem Proposal zurückgeschickt.

(183) Jeder Hund in der Nachbarschaft, sogar der gemeinste, hat einen Besitzer, der denkt dass der / *dieser Hund ein Schatz ist.

What was used as a case in point against referentialist accounts may hold for English that, even though the respective examples in (178) to (180) are controversial (see for example Braun 2007 who claims that such occurrences are deviant in some sense). I, in turn, showed that German dieser in the anaphoric use does not allow for non-referential interpretations of anaphoric dieser resulting in co-variation readings. In contrast, anaphoric dieser always expresses co-reference with respect to that antecedent referent to which it maintains the anaphoric relation in the actual previous discourse. Trying to force non-co-referent readings on anaphoric dieser led to ungrammaticality.

Summary
To summarize, the anaphoric use of dieser can be considered a derived use of the basic deictic use of dieser as it, as well, standardly behaves like a means of direct reference, referring to the (preceding) discourse.

Below an overview of the features of the anaphoric use just discussed is given:

34 Interestingly, jener ‘that’ is felicitous here. In German, it has lost its deictic feature and can therefore be used felicitously rather like a definite article in those contexts.
4.3.3 The recognitional use

Moving on with the domain-based typology of uses of *dieser*, I will present a further derived use in this section: the recognitional use in which *dieser* is always unstressed. The term recognitional use goes back to Diessel (1999). It is, like all derived uses, characterized by the observation that its demonstrata are not standardly perceptible in the actual utterance situation and not obligatorily pointed out by a speaker demonstration. Still, *dieser* in the recognitional is argued to behave like a device of direct reference, as well. The relevant domain for the recognitional use is the (privately) shared knowledge between hearer and speaker in the actual world, in which the referent is anchored (Himmelmann 1996, 1997; Diessel 1999; Ahrenholtz 2007).

(184) Du, was ist denn mit dieser Nachbarskatze passiert? (Die, die immer im Hof herumschlich.)
‘Do you kow what happened to that neighbour’s cat? (The one which used to sift through our backyard.)’

In (184) *diese Nachbarskatze* is not part of the actual utterance situation, it is not pointed out by a speaker demonstration and reference is not made to a previous discourse segment. In (184) *diese Nachbarskatze* is newly introduced into the discourse. However, the speaker refers to shared knowledge, i.e.

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35 Another name for the recognitional use is anamnestic use (Himmelmann 1996, 1997).
36 Note that in the English translation the distal demonstrative *that* has to be used.
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

knowledge (s)he shares with the hearer, probably due to a common interactional history (in that they both saw the cat, talked about it, etc.). The speaker assumes that the hearer is familiar with the referent of the *dieser*-NP and that the referent is rooted in his private knowledge or memory.

The recognitional use can be described as introducing a discourse-new referent (remember that if *dieser* refers to a textual antecedent (i.e. a discourse old referent) we are dealing with the anaphoric use), which is assumed to be known to the hearer. It is thus hearer-old, in that the speaker assumes that the hearer is able to identify the referent due to shared private but not due to encyclopedic knowledge. If encyclopedic knowledge is used in order to identify the referent, the definite article is used:

(185) The pope orders a drink.

In the example below, the additional sentence in brackets is not required. It just illustrates how the speaker assumes that the hearer is familiar with the referent due to a private interactional history. The example in (186), without the follow-up sentence, would be a felicitous example of the recognitional use of *dieser*, as well:

(186) Ich habe mir endlich *diese Jacke* gekauft. (Die, über die ich schon letzte Woche mit dir sprach.)

‘I finally bought *that jacket*. (The one about which we already talked last week.)’

Diessel (1999: 105) notes that this use has not received the same attention in the literature, compared to the basic deictic and the anaphoric use. He states that several studies mention this use (Lakoff 1974; Chen 1990; Gundel et al. 1993), however, Himmelmann (1996, 1997) seems to be the first who systematically accounts for it. Himmelmann states that the recognitional use of demonstratives always has one component of meaning to it which can be paraphrased with tag questions like “*remember?*” or “*you know what I mean?*” (Himmelmann 1997: 60). I will show later that the attachment of these types of tag questions can be used as one test to demarcate the recognitional from the indefinite use, which cannot occur with tag questions of this type. The recognitional use thus seems to work like a reminder, reactivating privately shared knowledge between the speaker and the hearer. Due to the observation that the knowledge state with respect to private knowledge of the hearer is relevant for the recognitional use, the recognitional use does, generally, often appear in questions:

(187) Wo ist denn *diese Hängelampe* (welche bei uns im Flur hing)?

‘Where is that *hanging lamp* (which used to be in our hallway)?’
The hearer assumes that the speaker is able to identify the referent of the demonstrative noun phrase, due to privately shared knowledge, which licenses the occurrence of *dieser* in questions. This is not possible with the indefinite use of *dieser*, since the speaker introduces referents which are completely new to the hearer. The speaker cannot ask the hearer about brand-new referents:

(188) *Do you remember this lamp?*

Himmelmann (1997: 62) notes that the recognitional is to be clearly distinguish from what he calls “abstract situative use” (this matches Hawkin’s 1978 “larger situation use”) of the definite article (as in *the sun, the president of the U.S.A.*). This use also deals with first-mention entities which are known to the hearer and are in that sense definite. He claims that these two uses are similar, but still different. They differ with respect to the type of knowledge which is involved: the recognitional use relates to specific shared knowledge (Himmelmann (1996, 1997) also calls it “private knowledge”) between speaker and hearer, which exists (probably) due to common experiences, whereas the abstract situative use relates to general world knowledge. Depending on general world knowledge, the definites in the abstract situative use go along with a uniqueness condition. It is assumed to be part of the general world knowledge to know that there is only one sun and only one president of the United States. This enables the hearer then to uniquely identify the desired referent. Himmelmann (1996: 233) concludes as follows: “the kind of knowledge involved in the abstract familiar use of the definite article is considered to be generally shared among the members of a given speech community, whereas the recognitional use draws on specific ‘personalized or private’ knowledge that is assumed to be shared by the communicating parties due to a common interactional history or to supposedly shared experiences.”

Testing for indexicality

Being clear about the features of the recognitional use and about the special knowledge-domain in which its referents are to be found, I will now investigate its referential features. I will investigate if it shares its mode of reference with the basic deictic use. That is, I will check if it behaves like a means of indexical reference. This will be done by applying the two tests for indexicality, (i) the disquotation test and the (ii) scopal behavior test; as introduced in Chapter 2.

The disquotation test

Since the relevant domain for the recognitional use is the shared knowledge between hearer and speaker, information about shared knowledge has to be seen as a part of the original context of utterance C, being substantially different in C’. In a new context C’ all the relevant situational features (included the interlocutors and linked to them their state of shared knowledge) must be assumed to have substantially changed. So, imagine C is a context in which Anna talks to her friend Sally in New York, whereas C’ is a context in which Sally talks to her
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

friends in Los Angeles, who only roughly know Anna and don’t know anything about her church:

(189) Anna in C: Ich war am Montag noch in dieser rec Kirche. (Die, über die wir am Sonntag noch sprachen.)
Anna in C: I was in that rec church on Monday. (The one we talked about on Sunday.)
Sally in C’: *Anna sagte, sie war am Montag noch in dieser rec Kirche.
Sally in C’: *Anna said she was in that rec church on Monday.

(190) Adjusted: Sally in C’: Anna sagte, sie war am Montag noch in einer Kirche.
Adjusted: Sally in C’: Anna said she was in a Church on Monday.

The use of dieser rec in C’ is unfelicitous, as diese Kirche does not relate to shared knowledge between Sally and her colleagues in C’, but to shared private knowledge between Anna and Sally in C. The shared knowledge, although, has to be shared between speaker and hearer in the recognitional use. This proves, that dieser, in its recognitional use behaves like an indexical expression as well. The adapted version of Sally’s disquotation in C’ involves the indefinite article, which is usually used in order to introduce a brand-new referent into the discourse (190).

Scopal behavior test:
In the same vein, the scopal behavior tests shows, that recognitional dieser exhibits the features of direct reference and thus behaves similar compared to deictic dieser. Recognitional dieser, as well, cannot be found to allow for co-varying readings if embedded under linguistic operators at all.

In (191) dieser Mathelehrer only refers to one single teacher in the actual world of hearer and speaker, i.e. exactly the one which the hearer is supposed to identify due to privately shared knowledge in the actual world of utterance. (191) has no reading which can be made true in a world w just in case that whoever is the current teacher in w makes friends with every kid in w and thus behaves like one would an indexical expression expect to behave, depending on the actual world of utterance.

In contrast to that, for the definite description dem Mathelehrer in (192), beneath referential readings, co-varying readings with respect to different worlds are licensed in that whoever happens to be teacher in world w makes friends with every child in w. The indefinite article in (193) allows for (among other readings) a prominent reading in which there is no particular teacher at all, it can never be considered to be inherently (directly) referential:
4 A typology of (derived) uses of ‘dieser’

(191) Jedes Kind freundet sich mit diesem Mathelehrer an. (Du weißt schon, der, den wir auf dem Elternabend gesehen haben.)
‘Every child makes friends with that maths teacher. (You know who I mean, the one who we met at the parent-teacher-conference.)’
→ Direct reference: only one teacher, no co-variation-reading possible

(192) Jedes Kind freundet sich mit dem Mathelehrer an.
‘Every child makes friends with the maths teacher.’
→ Possible reading: co-variation: different teachers for different children

(193) Jedes Kind freundet sich mit einem Mathelehrer an.
‘Every child makes friends with a maths teacher.’
→ Possible reading: co-variation: different teachers for different children

Recognitional dieser shows direct reference in these examples, not allowing for readings of co-variation, very much like deictic dieser.
Similarly, in the contexts with an intensional verb below, recognitional dieser in (194) refers rigidly to the very cook which is part of the interactional history of speaker and hearer in the actual world of utterance, whereas the definite article in (195) allows for co-variation in that it can denote various cooks, depending on who is the cook in the situation of evaluation. The indefinite article in (196) allows for a reading in which it does not refer to any particular cook at all.

(194) Maria will diesen Koch loben. (Du weißt schon, der der neulich für uns gekocht hat)
‘Mary wants to praise that cook. (You know who I mean, the one who cooked for us recently.)’
→ Direct reference: there is exactly one cook

(195) Maria will (meistens) den Koch loben.
Maria (most often) wants to praise the cook.
→ Co-variation: possibly different cooks

(196) Maria will einen Koch loben. (Sie hat aber noch keinen kennen gelernt.)
Mary wants to praise a cook. (She hasn’t met one yet).
→ Narrow scope reading possible

The referential behavior of recognitional dieser in these diagnostic contexts strongly reminds us of the one of deictic dieser and thus allows the conclusion that the recognitional use shares, as well, the core means of indexical (direct) reference with deictic dieser. To summarize, the following characteristics for the recognitional use can be listed:
Table 19: Main features of the recognitional use of *dieser*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognitional use</th>
<th>Examples / Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Form</strong></td>
<td><em>Dieser</em> N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indexicality?</strong></td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pointing gesture required?</strong></td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Weißt du noch als wir letzten im Urlaub dieses afrikanische Nationalgericht <em>(pointing gesture) aßen?</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Do you remember eating that African national dish in our holidays?’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domain where referent is to be found</strong></td>
<td>Shared common knowledge between hearer and speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adnominal / pronominal?</strong></td>
<td>Only adnominal (the pronominal form is not felicitous due to purely pragmatic reasons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discourse status of referent</strong></td>
<td>Introduction of new referent in discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marking given or new information for hearer?</strong></td>
<td>Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tests</strong></td>
<td>1. No pointing gesture, no textual antecedent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. “reminder” tag questions possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Can occur in questions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To summarize, in this section I presented the characteristics of the recognitional use of *dieser*, showing that the relevant domain of reference is the shared private knowledge between speaker and hearer and that the feature of direct reference is shared with the basic deictic and the anaphoric use.

### 4.3.4 Indefinite use

This section aims to provide first examples for how the use of indefinite *dieser* behaves similarly compared to the other uses and thus fits in well into the typology of uses of *dieser*. This section aims to give first evidence for the assumption that indefinite *dieser* is a means of indexical reference as well, according to the tests for indexicality.\(^{37}\)

The domain in which the referent is located in the indefinite use is the speaker-exclusive knowledge. That is, the referents of *dieser* in the indefinite use are only identifiable by the speaker. They are speaker-old but hearer-new. Being hearer-new, they are, necessarily, also discourse new. Thus, being discourse- and hearer-new, from a discourse-based take on (in)definiteness (Kamp 1981; Heim 1982), indefinite *dieser*, in the indefinite use, behaves like the indefinite article.

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\(^{37}\) Nevertheless, I will show in the next chapter that *dieser* in its indefinite use has to pass one further test in order to be savely defined a demonstrative — due to its indefiniteness.
This explains the label “indefinite use” and the general interchangeability of indefinite \textit{dieser} with the indefinite article \textit{ein}.

(197) Du glaubst nicht, was mir gestern passiert ist. Ich saß in einem Café und plötzlich sprach mich \textit{dieser / ein / dieser eine}\textsuperscript{38} / \textit{*der / *DER Typ} an.
   ‘You won’t believe what has happened to me. I was in a Café and all of a sudden \textit{this / a / this one / *the / *DER guy} talked to me.’

(198) In meinem Englischkurs, da ist \textit{diese / eine / *die / *DIE Frau}, die ist total verrückt.
   ‘In my English course, there is \textit{this / a / *the / *DIE women} who is totally crazy.’

In the examples (197) and (198) the speaker introduces the referents \textit{dieser Typ} and \textit{diese Frau} into the discourse which are brand-new to the hearer. This use of \textit{dieser} may therefore also be labeled out-of-the-blue use, since it introduces these hearer-new \textit{dieser}-marked referents from “out of nowhere”, very much like indefinites do. In the indefinite use, the demonstrata are not pointed out by speaker demonstrations. Neither do they have antecedents in the discourse to which reference is made, nor is reference made to a referent which is in the shared knowledge between hearer and speaker. In the indefinite use of \textit{dieser}, a completely new referent is presented to the hearer. As the indefinite use is used to introduce new referents into the discourse, it works very much like the indefinite article:

(199) Gestern war ich in der Kneipe und auf einmal war da \textit{ein / *der Mann}.
   Er…
   ‘Last night I was in the pub and all of a sudden there was \textit{a / *the man}. He…’

(200) Gestern war ich in der Kneipe und auf einmal war da \textit{dieser / *der Mann}.
   Er…
   ‘Last night I was in the pub and all of a sudden there was \textit{this / *the man}. He…’

This explains, why \textit{dieser} in the indefinite use can (almost)\textsuperscript{39} always be replaced by the indefinite article (and not by the definite article), as we can see in (200) above.

\textsuperscript{38} The form \textit{dieser eine Typ} ‘this one guy’ works well. It is a mixture of \textit{dieser} and the indefinite article and I leave the modellation of its semantic open for future research.

\textsuperscript{39} I will discuss few exceptional examples in Chapter 5 in which indefinite \textit{dieser} cannot be replaced by the indefinite article (due to pragmatic reasons).
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

Also, the indefinite use of *dieser* may appear quite similar to the recognitional use of *dieser*, since it also introduces discourse-new referents into the discourse which are not pointed out by a speaker demonstration.

In (201a) and (201b) the context disambiguates between the two uses, providing information about the knowledge the hearer (presumably) has. The indefinite use in (201a) introduces discourse- and hearer-new referents whereas the referents in the recognitional use (201b) are only discourse- new.

(201) a. Ich habe gestern **diesen Spanier** kennen gelernt. Du hättest wirklich dabei sein sollen.
   ‘I got to know **this Spaniard** yesterday. You should have been there.’

   b. Ich habe gestern **diesen Spanier** kennen gelernt. Du weißt schon, der, der uns schon immer aus der Ferne aufgefallen ist.
   ‘I got to know **that Spaniard** yesterday. You know who I mean, the one who has always attracted our attention from a distance.’

A test for a typological distinction between *dieser* in the indefinite use and *dieser* in the recognitional use (both are unstressed) is the combinability with reminder-tag-questions or tag-questions which indicate shared knowledge. Since indefinite *dieser* introduces a discourse- and hearer-new referent, it can never be combined with the tag questions which are very typical for the recognitional use like *weißt du noch?* ‘you know?’ / *erinnerst du dich an x?* ‘do you remember x?’ etc. The presence of these types of tag questions indicates the recognitional reading, since it signals that the speaker assumes the hearer to be familiar with the referent. This is not the case for the indefinite use, what explains why it does not co-occur with these types of tag questions. Due to these different knowledge states on the side of the hearer, the indefinite use generally does not occur in questions:

**Recognitional use: combinable with reminder-tag-questions**

(202) Was ist eigentlich mit diesem **diesen Bekannten** von dir los, ✔du weißt doch wen ich meine, der mit der Glatze?
   ‘What happened to **that friend** of yours? ✔You know who I mean, the bald one.’

**Indefinite use: not combinable with reminder-tag-questions**

(203) Gestern war ich alleine in der Disco und dann hat mich **dieser Fremde** angesprochen, # erinnerst du dich?
   ‘Yesterday I was alone in the discotheque and then **this stranger** started talking to me, # do you remember?’
4. Testing for indexicality

In this section I will investigate if *dieser* in the indefinite use also is an indexical expression. Differently, compared to the other uses, indefinite *dieser* shows parallels with the indefinite article. Thus, I have to investigate if it shares the relevant similarities with deictic *dieser* (and the other derived uses) in order to be classified a demonstrative. In other words, I have to check if it exhibits the features of direct reference. This will be done, in a first step, by applying the two tests for indexicality.

**The disquotation test:**

With respect to the indefinite use of *dieser* the relevant contextual parameter is the speaker-knowledge (which also has to be assumed to change from C to C’), as the referent of indefinite *dieser* does not depend on perceptible features of the actual utterance situation, the previous discourse, on shared private knowledge or on other contextual features. Let us consider the example below (204). The fact that Anna’s knowledge is the relevant parameter is indicated in the index of *dieser Fremde* ‘this stranger’ in (204):

(204) Anna to Sally in C: am Montag hat mich in der Kneipe *dieser* ind 
Fremde Anna’s knowledge 
angesprochen.

Anna to Sally in C: ‘on Moday *this* ind stranger Anna’s knowledge talked to me in the pub’.

Anna, in C, successfully uses indefinite *dieser*. *Dieser Fremde* is a brand-new referent for Sally and it refers exclusively to the very referent which is rooted in Anna’s knowledge. Only Anna has knowledge about the referent she intends to refer to via the use of indefinite *dieser* (she met him, he talked to her, etc.). Sally, after she heard Anna’s statement, acquires some knowledge about the referent (that he was in the pub on a Monday, that he talked to Anna). Thus, as a matter of fact, after hearing Anna’s original statement the referent is also part of Sally’s knowledge. That is, Sally could, in an inter-contextual disquotational report, introduce that same referent using indefinite *dieser* as well, relating it now to her own speaker knowledge or, more likely, due to a perspectival shift:

(205) Sally in C’: Anna sagte, am Montag habe sie *dieser* Sally’s knowledge 
Fremde 
angesprochen.

Sally in C’: ‘Anna said that on Monday *this* stranger Sally’s knowledge talked to her in the pub’.

It looks like, at first glance, as if indefinite *dieser* does not pass the disquotation test, since the inter-contextual disquotational indirect report does not appear to be blocked and no overt adjustments have to be made by Sally. Still, I argue that (204) and (205) are not the same and that, in fact, an adjustment has been made, which is simply not visible on the surface. The use of *dieser* in (204)
4.3 Characteristics of the main uses of ‘dieser’

differs from dieser in (205), as both are related to different indices. Dieser in (204) relates to Anna’s speaker knowledge, whereas dieser in (205) relates to Sally’s speaker knowledge due to a perspectival shift. The disquotation test simply appears not to be the ideal test here. This is so since the fact that one speaker is quoting another guarantees that the second speaker has taken up the perspective of the first speaker), which enables the speaker to use indefinite dieser. Thus, one has the impression that the use of indefinite dieser does still depend on the actual utterance situation, i.e. on the knowledge of the actual speaker in the world of utterance. However, this observation is not made visible by the disquotation test. We are left with the intuition that indefinite dieser, as well, is a context-dependent expression, i.e. possibly a demonstrative, even though on the surface, the disquotation test could not overtly verify that this is the case.

**Scopal behavior test:**
Applying the scopal behavior test brings more clarity. It shows that indefinite dieser in opaque contexts (i.e. embedded under intensional operators or a quantifier) behaves like one expects a directly referential expression to behave. It does not allow for co-varying interpretations for the referent of the indefinite dieser-NP, i.e. it always gives the appearance of exclusively taking wide scope (206):

(206) Jedes Kind freundete sich mit **diesem Referendar** an. (Er heißt Martin und kommt aus Stuttgart.)
‘Every kid made friends with **this student teacher**. (His name is Martin and he is from Stuttgart.)’
→ Direct reference: only one teacher, with respect to all possible worlds

(207) Jedes Kind freundet sich (typischerweise) mit **dem Referendar** an.
‘Every kid (typically) makes friends with **the student teacher**.’
→ Co-variation: possibly different teachers

(208) Jedes Kind freundet sich mit **einem Referendar** an.
‘Every kid makes friends with **a student teacher**.’
→ Co-variation: possibly different teachers for different children

Indefinite dieser behaves like an indexical in that it refers exactly to the one teacher which is rooted in the actual speaker-exclusive knowledge and to which the actual speaker intends to refer to in the actual world of utterance. Dieser Referendar ‘this student teacher’ only refers to one and the same teacher, with respect to all worlds in which that teacher exists and thus behaves very much like deictic dieser:

In contrast, the definite description dem Referendar in (207) allows for a reading which can be paraphrased by whoever is the teacher in world w, every kid makes friends with him. That is, co-varying readings are licensed as the definite
NP can refer to different teachers depending on the world of evaluation. The indefinite NP *einem Referend* in (208) also has a prominent quantificational reading, i.e. a reading in which there is no particular teacher at all.

Similarly, in the intensional contexts in (209) *dieser Koch* ‘this cook’ refers to the very cook which the actual speaker has speaker-knowledge about and which (s)he desires to refer to. This is why (209) is not combinable with a sentence, which forces a quantificational interpretation on the *dieser*-NP. In contrast, the definite article in (210) allows for co-variation in that it can denote various cooks, depending whoever is the cook in the respective world of utterance. The indefinite article in (211) also allows for a quantificational interpretation:

(209) Maria will *diesen Koch* loben. (#Sie hat aber noch keinen kennen gelernt.)
   ‘Mary wants to praise *this cook*. (#She hasn’t met one yet.)’
   $\rightarrow$ Direct reference: there is exactly one cook

(210) Maria will (meistens) *den Koch* loben.
   ‘Mary (most often) wants to praise the *cook*.’
   $\rightarrow$ Co-variation: possibly different cooks

(211) Maria will *einen Koch* loben. (Sie hat aber noch keinen kennen gelernt).
   ‘Mary wants to praise a *cook*. (She hasn’t met one yet.)’
   $\rightarrow$ Co-variation: possibly quantificational interpretation

According to this test, indefinite *dieser* clearly behaves like *dieser* in the basic deictic use. Indefinite *dieser* behaves like an indexical in the critical examples, where the definite and the indefinite article do not. Indefinite *dieser*, very similar to deictic *dieser*, does not allow for quantificational or narrow-scope readings (not allowing for co-varying interpretations).

Note that these tests do not securely prove that indefinite *dieser* truly is an inherently indexical expression. As opposed to the other derived uses (anaphoric use, recognitional use), we are dealing with *indefiniteness* now. Indefiniteness is defined based on the novelty condition (Kamp 1981 and Heim 1982), i.e. from a discourse-based take on (in)definiteness. Indefinites introduce novel referents into the discourse which are are hearer- and discourse new and do not “have the same referential index as any NP to their left“ (Heim 1982: 151). Therefore, we have to consider one further option: indefinite *dieser*, according to the tests, appears to behave like indexicals do behave. However, with respect to definiteness, this is not enough evidence to conclude that the respective expression actually is obligatorily indexical. This is because there is a certain class of indefinites, whose members sometimes behave like indexicals but which were shown not to be inherent indexicals. These are indefinites on so-called “referential readings”, as *ein* in (212).
4.4 Interim summary

(212) Maria hat einen Spanier geheiratet. Er heißt Pablo und ich habe ihn gestern kennen gelernt.
‘Maria has married a Spaniard. His name is Pablo and I met him yesterday.’

Here ein receives a referential reading, but it has been shown (Farkas 1981; Ruys 1992; Abusch 1994; Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997; Kratzer 1998; von Heusinger 2011a) to carry semantics different to indexicality. One argument is the observation that ein on its referential reading may still allow for intermediate scope interpretations. This discussion will be presented in detail in Chapter 5.

As a consequence, I have to show that indefinite dieser differs from indefinites on referential interpretations such as ein on the respective referential reading, as well. This will be done in the context of a more detailed investigation of the semantics and the pragmatics of indefinite dieser in Chapter 5 and 6.

Table 20: Main features of the indefinite use of dieser

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indefinite use</th>
<th>Examples / Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form</td>
<td>dieser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indexicality</td>
<td>Yes, but more tests in Chapter 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 1: Disquotation test</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 2: Scopal behavior test</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointing gesture required?</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domain where referent is to be found</td>
<td>Speaker knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnominal / pronominal?</td>
<td>Only adnominal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse status of referent</td>
<td>Introduction of new referent in discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking given or new information for hearer?</td>
<td>new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker-old but hearer- and discourse new</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific tests</td>
<td>1. No pointing gesture, no textual antecedent 2. Not interchangeable with definite article 3. Tag questions of the type remember? not possible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 Interim summary

In the previous sections I argued that almost all occurrences of dieser can be assigned to one of the four following uses: the basic deictic use, the anaphoric use,
the recognitional use or the indefinite use. Dieser was shown to be a demonstrative in all these uses, showing similarities to dieser in its basic deictic use and systematically differs from other non demonstrative expressions such as the definite article or personal pronouns — due to the standard exhibition of direct reference in all uses.

The “pointing” function postulated for demonstratives in the basic deictic use (directing / focusing the attention of the hearer towards an object which is part of the actual utterance situation; see Chapter 2) can now be generalized and appears to hold for demonstratives in the derived uses as well. This generalization to different domains was already put forward by Ehlich (1987: 285), who explains the function of deictic expressions across different “domains of reference” (Verweisräume):

Mit Hilfe eines deiktischen Ausdrucks nimmt der Sprecher eine Verweisung in einem Verweisraum vor. Die Verweisung ist einerseits Ausdruck einer Fokussiertheit, die der Sprecher auf Elemente des Verweisraums mental vorgenommen hat; sie ist andererseits eine Übertragung dieser Fokussierung auf den Hörer, der durch die deiktische Prozedur aufgefordert wird, dieselbe Fokussierung seinerseits zu vollziehen und so eine für ihn und den Sprecher gemeinsame Fokussierung im Verweisraum herzustellen.

‘Using a deictic expression, the speaker refers in a certain domain of reference. The demonstrative reference is on the one hand the expression of being mentally focused to elements in the reference domain, and on the other hand, a transfer of this focus to the hearer, who is asked via the deictic procedure to focus himself and to establish a common focus of speaker and hearer in the reference domain.’ (Author’s translation)

Thus, by using a demonstrative, across the different uses and their domains, the speaker always appears to direct the attention focus of the hearer to the referent (s)he intends to refer to: the derived uses are determined, depending on to which domain the attention focus of the hearer is directed.

4.5 Context / Origo shifts

The fact that additional processes of reference such as types of shifts as in (213) may interact with the uses of dieser, has led to the emergence of confusing typologies of uses, postulating a non-transparent multitude of demonstrative uses. In the following section I will address a general mechanism of reference such as deictic shifts, which are also labeled origo or context shifts (Bühler 1934), and show how an independent treatment of this process allows us to maintain the transparent classification of demonstrative uses presented in the previous sections.

(213) When you are in NYC next week, believe me, you’ll walk down 5th avenue, then, at 43rd street you will see THIS path (here) going off to your left (directing / signaling action with hands)…
This mechanism is seen as an additional, independent mechanism, which may, on a different level also apply to demonstratives but do not affect their classification in terms of the derived uses.

In this context, also consider the section on type-token shifts in Chapter 2, example (56). Type-token shift is another independent process. Demonstratives may generally undergo type-token shifts, but this should be treated separately from their classification with respect to usage.

One type of referential shift I want to address in this section is context shift (Recanati 2004, Schlenker 2004), which has also been labeled origo shift (Bühler 1934; Fillmore 1982; Fricke 2003; Diessel 1999). This shift is present, when the origo is, exceptionally, not defined by the actual coordinates of the speaker (i.e. dependent on the actual utterance context), but shifted to different coordinates which are not identical with the ones of the current speaker. Fillmore explains (1982: 38): “some prototypically deictic elements can be used with their deictic center ‘transferred’ to something other than the speaker of the current utterance.” These shifts can generally apply to indexical expressions such as hier ‘here’, morgen ‘tomorrow’, jetzt ‘now’ for example, and are not exclusive to demonstratives. The standard case (without shifts) is exemplified in (214), where the indexical expressions ich ‘I’, jetzt ‘now’ and hier ‘here’ are to be interpreted with respect to the actual time-space-coordinates of the speaker, in that ich refers to the person who is uttering the actual sentence, jetzt refers to the actual time of utterance and hier to the actual location of the current speaker:

(214) Ich bin jetzt hier.
‘I am here now.’

In contrast to that, in (215) a referential shift in form of an origo-shift is present in that hier ‘here’ does not refer to the actual place of utterance but to a different location, i.e. to a context other than the actual context of utterance. One would expect to find dort ‘there’ instead, however, being shifted, hier ‘here’ works as well:

‘Yesterday, I walked along the pebble path until a came to a small pond. I liked it here so much, so I did not want to leave.’

In (215) hier is a shifted indexical, in that its reference does not work as it is supposed to in the prototypical case. For hier the origo is shifted to the place described in the previous sentence, the area around the pond the speaker mentions in his / her narration. Hier refers to the salient area around the pond and not to the place in which the speaker finds herself at the very moment of utterance. A similar example for jetzt ‘now’ is given in (216):
4 A typology of (derived) uses of ‘dieser’

‘Michael finally arrived in Bergamo. Now nothing would stop his love to Eva. He was finally happy now.’

Bühler already (1934: 135) says, that the origo does not always need to be with the current speaker, i.e. related to the actual utterance situation and its parameters. He labels this phenomenon Deixis am Phantasma ‘deixis at phantasm’ and defines it as a shift of the origo, in that deictic expressions which are uttered are to be interpreted with respect to a different system of orientation and not with respect to the coordinates of the speaker in the actual utterance situation as the deictic center. A shift in time and space is made and the “kinaesthetic propioceptions” are transferred to this new system of orientation.

Man ist nach einem charakteristischen Erlebnisvorspiel oder unvermittelt und plötzlich hineinversetzt in der Vorstellung an den geographischen Ort des Vorgestellten, man hat das Vorgestellte vor dem geistigen Auge von einem bestimmten Aufnahmestandpunkt aus, den man angeben kann und an dem man selbst sich befindet in der Vorstellung. (Bühler 1934: 135)
‘After a characteristic play you are suddenly put into the imagination of the geographic place of the imagined, you see the imagined in your inner eye from a certain point of view, which one can determine and at which one finds himself in the imagination.’ (Author’s translation)

The mechanism of origo shift may, as in the examples for hier and jetzt above show, generally apply to indexical expressions. It is thus also present with respect to demonstratives. Note, that origo shifts, with respect to demonstratives, may only apply to demonstratives in their basic deictic use, since it is the only use in which the meaning of the demonstrative actually depends on the origo (i.e. the actual speaker’s coordinates in time and space). In the other uses, further domains such as the textual discourse or knowledge which are origo-independent are distinctive.

Himmelmann (1996: 222) also acknowledges the phenomenon of origo shift. He also relates it to Bühlers Deixis am Phantasma defining it as a use of deictic expressions which (at least in the context of narratives) pretend as if a referent was actually present in the actual utterance situation, whereas this is not the case in reality. An example with a demonstrative is given in (217):

(217) When you are in NYC next week, believe me, you’ll walk down 5th avenue, then, at 43rd street you will see THIS path (here) going off to your left (directing / signalling action with hands)…

In the example above the origo has been shifted from the speaker of (217) to an imaginary observer in the described world of NYC. Diessel (1999: 95), referring to Linde and Labov (1975) and Ullmer-Ehrich (1979) notes, that, when a
context shift is present with respect to demonstratives “the demonstrative is deictically anchored in the situation evoked by the ongoing discourse.”

The presence of context shifts for demonstratives has led to different classifications of demonstratives in examples like (217). Himmelmann (1997: 83) and (Diessel 1999: 95), for example, categorize them as members of the class of *demonstratives am Phantasma*, i.e. as a sub-class of the basic deictic use, since speakers relate to them “as if they were there”. In my view, there is no need to postulate a sub-class of the basic deictic use in order to explain examples like (217). I assume the mechanism of context or origo shift present in these critical examples to work on an independent level. Working “orthogonally” the mechanisms of origo shifts should not complicate the typology of demonstrative uses with the postulation of sub-classes — they should be treated separately. With respect to usage, *this* in (217) is to be classified as being used in the basic deictic use. Separately, we have to note that an origo shift is present, since reference is not, as usual, made to the actual situation of utterance, but to the situation evoked created via the narration.

The following two arguments support an independent treatment of origo shifts:

Firstly, these shifts are not exclusive to deictic demonstratives. They are more general and apply to other origo-dependent expressions such as pure indexicals as well (see examples above).

Secondly, these context or origo shifts are exceptional processes and in order to be licensed, special contexts have to be present which create the new or shifted situation as a point of reference. The following examples of referential shifts work only because the actual shift of the indexical is evoked via the context. Recanati (2004: 9) lists three possibilities of how a possible context shift can be evoked: (i) imaginary contexts, (ii) thought reports (often in combination with historical present), and (iii) recorded messages:

(i) **Imaginary contexts:**


‘Alright, *imagine* you walk along the river until you can’t go any further. Then you reach the end of the street. **THIS house** (“imaginary” pointing gesture to the right) on the right side you pass it and make a half-left over the bridge.’

⇒ **DIESES Haus** ‘THIS house’ does not refer to a building which is part of the actual utterance situation, but is a part of the imagined situation / imaginary context.
4 A typology of (derived) uses of ‘dieser’

‘I remember it exactly. I walked along the sandy pebble path daydreaming. Everything is quiet. **This place** always put me into a weird mood.’

→ **Dieser Ort** ‘this place’ does not refer to a location which is part of the actual utterance situation, but is a part of the imagined situation / imaginary context.

(ii) **Thought report or direct speech:**
(220) …and then John **said**，“I’m fed up with all **this**!” and he walked away.
(Recanati 2004: 10)
→ **I** and **this** do not refer to the actual speaker of the utterance situation but to the agent whose thought is reported

(iii) **Recorded message:**
(221) This day is beautiful. (Recorded a day before the message is heard)
→ **This day** does not refer to the day of utterance, but to a different day, i.e. the day of recording

The examples show that context or origo shifts depend on the presence of certain trigger-contexts which license the shift. Context or origo shifts need to be **induced**, i.e. they require certain contexts which help the hearer to accommodate that the context of evaluation is not the actual context of utterance any more, but that is has been shifted towards a different context of utterance which is (i) either created in the pre-context by the description of an imaginary situation as in (218) to (219), (ii) created by the announcement of a thought report / indirect speech, or created by the (iii) knowledge of listening to an old, recorded message as in (iii). If the crucial sentences are isolated and if we ignore the greater contexts in which they originally appeared (e.g. if we ignore that (218) is in an imaginary context, that (220) is a thought report and that (221) is a recorded message), the respective sentences look like standard examples of the basic deictic use, which have to be interpreted in relation to the actual utterance situation:

(222) **DIESES Haus** [pointing gesture to the right] lässt du rechts liegen und läufst dann halblinks über die Brücke.
‘**THIS house** [pointing gesture to the right] on the right side, you pass it and make a half-left over the bridge.’

(223) **Dieser Ort** brachte mich immer wieder in eine komische Stimmung
‘**This place** always put me into a weird mood.’
4.5 Context / Origo shifts

(224) *I’m fed up with all this!*

(225) **This day** is beautiful.

With respect to the classification of use, the examples including context or origo shift are to be classified as examples of the basic deictic use. Their meaning still depends on *situational* features (and not on the previous context or speaker / hearer knowledge). It just does not depend on the features of the actual utterance situation, as in the standard case, but on features of the new, shifted situation context. That is, the origo is shifted to a new evaluation situation, which, as such, has to be overtly created or announced.

I already noted above that origo shifts with respect to demonstratives may only apply to demonstratives in their basic deictic use, since it is the only use in which the meaning of the demonstrative actually depends on the origo. One could, however, turn the argument around and say that the examples containing *dieser* undergoing an origo shift are actually examples of the *indefinite use* of *dieser* (referring to a referent which is in the mind of the speaker and not physically perceptible). There are, however, some arguments which speak against this assumption and which speak for a clear separation of examples containing origo shifts and the indefinite use. First, I have shown that origo shifts generally may apply to all types of indexical expressions; hence they are expected to affect deictic demonstratives, as well. Secondly, the origo shift examples of *dieser* differ from examples containing indefinite *dieser* as (i) origo shifts require previous context, which evokes the shifted context (whereas indefinite *dieser* may appear totally out of the blue). Furthermore, shifted indexicals may (ii) also carry stress and may (iii) be accompanied by some form of imaginary speaker demonstration, as exemplified in (218). Finally (iv), *dieser* which underwent an origo shift may be interchanged by other deictic demonstratives such as *DER* (227). This is not the case for out-of-the-blue indefinite *dieser* (226), which may only be interchanged by the indefinite article:

(226) Ich bin gestern an *diesem / einem / *DEM Haus* vorbeigekommen. Es war so schön, dass ich es am liebsten sofort gekauft hätte.

‘*I passed this / a / *DEM house* yesterday. It was so beautiful, so I almost bought it on the spot.’


‘Imagine you walk along the river, until you reach the end of the road. *This / DAS / *a house* (‘imaginary’ pointing gesture to the right) on the right side you pass and make a half-left over the bridge.’
4 A typology of (derived) uses of ‘dieser’

Looking at the examples of referential shift, the fact that a referential shift in form of a context- or origo-shift is present definitely needs to be accounted for. Yet it should not interfere with our domain-based classification of demonstrative uses.

4.6 Summary

In this chapter I developed a typology of uses of demonstrative dieser, arguing for the inclusion of the indefinite use which has hardly received any attention in the literature so far. The indefinite use, at first glance, seems to stand out since dieser in this use, unlike in all other uses, is indefinite. The uses differ with respect to the domains in which their referents are located. However, dieser, across all uses, is still considered a demonstrative because it is used as a means of direct reference and fulfills the demonstrative-typical function of pointing out demonstrata which are represented in distinctive referential domains. Beneath all these parallels, we have to accept that demonstratives may or may not be definites, i.e. that the concepts of demonstrativity and (in)definiteness may show interaction.

The four uses and the respective domains of reference are summarized in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Discourse status of referent</th>
<th>Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic deictic use</td>
<td>Introduction of new referent in discourse</td>
<td>Perceptible in actual utterance situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaphoric use</td>
<td>Marking discourse old information</td>
<td>Previous discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognitional use</td>
<td>Introduction of new referent in discourse</td>
<td>Speaker and hearer knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite use</td>
<td>Introduction of new referent in discourse</td>
<td>Speaker-exclusive knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the categorization of uses of dieser, one can investigate if additional mechanisms of reference such as referential shifts, are present. However the presence of these additional mechanisms should not influence the classification of demonstrative uses, but be seen as a feature in a different dimension.

I want to investigate closely the semantics and pragmatics of t indefinite dieser in the following chapters. In doing so, I will provide further evidence suggesting that indefinite dieser actually is a demonstrative expression, behaving on a par with deictic dieser and behaving unlike the indefinite article ein, even on referential interpretations.
5 Sentence semantics: Referential properties of indefinite ‘dieser’

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to an in-depth investigation of the semantic (referential) properties of indefinite *dieser*, in order to provide confirming evidence for what has already been suggested in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 I concluded that indefinite *dieser* behaves very much like a directly referential expression in that it always gives the appearance of taking widest scope or of being scopally inert. The demonstrative-like behavior of indefinite *dieser* already establishes a clear link between deictic and indefinite *dieser* and separates both forms from other non-indexical expressions such as (i) definite descriptions, which generally allow for readings of co-variance with respect to possible worlds and (ii) indefinites, which allow for quantificational interpretations and thus cannot be considered means of demonstrative reference. Still, indefinite *dieser* was also shown to share features with indefinites (discourse-new) and the tests provided in Chapter 4 do not securely prove that indefinite *dieser* is an indexical expression. Indefinite *dieser* could also be analyzed by a different mechanism — as an indefinite article which is constantly on its referential interpretation. Indefinites on their referential interpretation are nowadays widely accepted not to be inherent means of direct (indexical) reference and subject to a lexical ambiguity (Farkas 1981; Ruys 1992; Abusch 1994; Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997; Kratzer 1998; von Heusinger 2011a). So, couldn’t indefinite *dieser* simply be an indefinite, which is constantly on its referential interpretation — being subject to a different mechanism of reference than direct referentiality? In this chapter I will develop the formal sentence semantics for indefinite *dieser* and show that this is not the case: indefinite *dieser* is not to be put on a par with the indefinite article on referential interpretations — it truly is a directly referential expression.

This sentence semantics of indefinite *dieser* will be formally accounted for in this chapter making use of the semantics of “referential indefinites” (Fodor and Sag 1982), which were originally suggested for a different phenomenon: the referential interpretations of the indefinite article. I claim that Fodor and Sag (1982) proposed the correct semantics for “referential indefinites”, albeit for the wrong morpheme. I will conclude that indefinite *dieser* (228) and the indefinite article on referential interpretations (229), two forms which may look quite similar at first glance, should not be put on a par but strictly differentiated.

(228) Referential indefinite *dieser*
Maria hat diesen Arzt kennen gelernt. Er ist Chirurg.
‘Mary got to know this doctor. He is a surgeon.’
5 Sentence semantics: Referential properties of indefinite ‘dieser’

(229) **Indefinite ein on referential interpretation**
Maria hat **einen Arzt** kennen gelernt. Er ist Chirurg.
‘Mary got to know a doctor. He is a surgeon.’

This chapter is structured as follows: I will first give an overview with respect to what has already been observed in the literature on the referential properties of indefinite demonstratives. Then I suggest an analysis of indefinite **dieser** as a referential indefinite per Fodor and Sag (1982).

In doing so I will first present Fodor and Sag’s original account of referential indefinites. In this context I will also present the arguments which were put forward in order to prove that Fodor and Sag’s (1982) semantics cannot be applied to referential readings of the simple indefinite article **ein** ‘a(n)’. In a third step I will show that those arguments do not pose a threat for indefinite **dieser**, i.e. that indefinite **dieser** can be well-analyzed as a directly referential expression via Fodor and Sag (1982) — whereas indefinites on referential interpretations cannot.

5.2 State of the art: Semantics of indefinite demonstratives

In this section, I will give an overview on existing research with respect to the phenomenon of English indefinite **this** and research on the semantics of German indefinite **dieser**. As there is hardly any literature on German indefinite **dieser**, the literature on the semantics of English indefinite **this** is a useful indicator pointing out crucial research directions for the research on indefinite **dieser**.

5.2.1 Research on indefinite **this**

A couple of researchers acknowledge the existence of English indefinite **this** (Pearlman 1969; Maclaran 1980; Prince 1981; Wald 1983; Wright and Givón 1987; Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989; Ionin 2006). These accounts treat the phenomenon of indefinite **this** from varying perspectives. Where, for example, Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989) and Wright and Givón (1987) concentrate on the discourse pragmatics of indefinite **dieser** and on data with respect to its discourse effects (see Chapter 6), Ionin (2006) focuses on a formal semantic-pragmatic account of indefinite **dieser**. Some of the researchers consider the phenomenon from a diachronic point of view (Wright and Givón 1987), being interested in the historical emergence of the use of indefinite **dieser**, whereas others work synchronically (Prince 1981; Ionin 2006). Some researchers relate the use of indefinite **this** to the basic deictic use of **this** (Maclaran 1980), whereas others are neutral with respect to that question (Prince 1981) or overtly neglect the assumption of a link between deictic and indefinite **dieser** (Ionin 2006), proposing a lexical ambiguity between deictic and indefinite **this**.

Note that I will not offer a special sub-section containing a full overview and a direct comparison with respect to these different accounts and their takes on the referential properties of English indefinite **this**. Nevertheless, all those works
listed above which inspire and influence the present account of indefinite *dieser* will be addressed and discussed in the remainder of this book. Ionin’s (2006) account, for example, contains important claims with respect to the referential behavior of indefinite *this*: she also assumes that the sentence semantics of indefinite *this* are the semantics of direct reference and that it can be represented as a “referential indefinite” in the original Fodor and Sag (1982) sense. However, Ionin (2006), in contrast to this dissertation, rejects the assumption of a link between the deictic use of *this* and the indefinite use of *this* and suggests a lexical ambiguity between the two forms. I agree with the sentence-semantic part of Ionin’s (2006) analysis, assuming the sentence semantics of referentiality for indefinite *dieser*.

### 5.2.2 Research on the sentence semantics of indefinite *dieser*

In a paper on V2-relative clauses and definiteness Endriss and Gärtner (2005) only briefly relate to the phenomenon of indefinite *dieser*. Still, they suggest that indefinite *dieser* carries sentence semantics which are very similar to the semantics of standard demonstratives. This approach is exactly the one pursued in the present account. Endriss and Gärtner (2005) clearly identify indefinite *dieser* as an expression similar to indefinites, as it passes the two classic tests for indefiniteness: it frequently occurs in existential contexts and it is generally replaceable with the indefinite article. Still, they assume demonstrative-like semantics of inherent referentiality for indefinite *dieser*. According to Endriss and Gärtner (2005), the crucial difference between standard demonstratives and indefinite *dieser* lies in the observation that deictic *dieser* relates to objects which are pointed out by pointing gestures, whereas indefinite *dieser* relates to objects of virtual pointing actions:

(230) Ich war neulich im Wald und, stell dir vor, da kam mir plötzlich **dieses Wildschwein** entgegen.

> ‘Recently, I was in the forest and, imagine, there was **this wild boar** which came up to me.’

(Endriss and Gärtner 2005: ex. 32)

Endriss and Gärtner (2005) already suggest, that this “demonstrativity” of indefinite *dieser* could be analyzed in a Fodor and Sag (1982) type of approach, which suggests the semantics of direct referentiality for the so-called referential indefinites, replacing “overt pointing” by “private ostension” (Fodor and Sag 1982: 384). What is pointed out in Endriss and Gärtner (2005) will become the foundation for the semantic analysis proposed in this work, in which I suggest Fodor and Sag’s (1982) semantics of referentiality for an account of indefinite *dieser*.

Apart from Endriss and Gärtner’s suggestion for the possible semantic analysis of indefinite *dieser*, there is one further account which at least
5 Sentence semantics: Referential properties of indefinite ‘dieser’

acknowledges the existence of the indefinite use of dieser: Lyons (1999: 176f.) claims that in German, too, the demonstrative dieser can be used as an indefinite determiner with similar effects as English indefinite this. Apart from scattered mentions of the phenomenon there is nothing more to report with respect to existing literature on indefinite dieser. (But see the work of Wespel 2006; von Heusinger 2011b; Deichsel and von Heusinger 2011 on indefinite dieser, which grew out of the research project this dissertation is a part of.)

5.3 Sentence semantics of indefinite ‘dieser’

In the following subsections I will show that indefinite dieser is an obligatory referential expression whose sentence semantics can be explained via Fodor and Sag’s (1982) Kaplan-inspired sentence semantics of direct referentiality.

5.3.1 Fodor and Sag (1982): Referential and quantificational indefinites

Fodor and Sag (1982) argue that English a-indefinites are ambiguous between a standard quantificational reading and a referential (i.e. indexical) reading. Fodor and Sag’s original proposal is based on the availability of long-distance scope readings (wide scope readings with respect to scope islands) of indefinites, exemplified for English a-indefinites and German ein-indefinites below. They illustrate their point by the interaction of indefinites with quantifiers. The classic approach to the contrast between referential and quantificational readings is by means of different scope-taking behavior.

I will now give a brief introduction to scope islands and the scope taking behavior of indefinites with respect to scope islands. This is important as we will investigate the referential behavior of indefinite dieser in examples containing scope islands in section 4.4. Scope islands are constructions which usually do not allow quantifiers to take scope out of them. Syntactic islands, i.e. those constructions which do not allow overt extraction (from them) (cf. Ross 1967) always are also scope islands (Endriss 2009: 8). Since if-clauses or that-clauses are known to be such syntactic islands, they are also scope islands.

(231) Peter will be happy if few movies are shown.
    if > few
    *few > if
    (Endriss 2009: 9)

(231) shows how the if-clause is a scope island, as the sentence can only receive the narrow scope interpretation for the quantifier. It can be paraphrased as: Peter will be happy if overall few movies (under discussion) are shown. It is impossible to interpret the sentence as saying that, for certain few movies, it holds that Peter will be happy if these movies are shown. That would be the wide scope reading” (Endriss 2009: 9). This impossibility for the quantifier to scope out of
the scope island can be labeled as an island-constraint on the side of the island, prohibiting for the quantifier to scope out of it.

Nevertheless, we know that some indefinites, such as a / some N are not bound to obey this island constraint, as they can take scope out of a scope island. Endriss (2009: 9) refers to this ability as the exceptional wide scope behavior of indefinites:

(232) Peter will be happy if a / some movie is shown.
if > ∃
∃ > if
(Endriss 2009: 9)

(232), in contrast to (231) above, allows for a wide scope reading of the involved quantifiers, as it can mean, for example, that there is a particular movie (e.g. Lord of the Rings part 1), such that if this movie is shown, Peter will be happy. Such a wide scope reading is impossible in the case of (231).

I have shown in the examples above that scope islands can be created by, for example, if- or that-clauses with lexical heads or conditionals, i.e. linguistic operators which give rise to the so-called islands constraint. This means that quantificational indefinites, in these contexts, cannot “leave the island”. In other words, in these contexts quantificational indefinites usually cannot scope out of the scope island. They must obey to the island constraint and thus cannot receive wide scope. This is exemplified once more in (233) below, where we can see that indefinite noun phrases with the indefinite article can get both exceptional wide or narrow scope with respect to the definite NP the rumor in a scope island, reflecting both the referential interpretation and the quantificational interpretation, respectively. However, the universal phrase each student in (234) cannot receive wide scope, obeying to the island constraint. Thus, the referential reading of a in (233) cannot be described by a wide scope existential quantifier. Fodor and Sag (1982) therefore propose a lexical ambiguity of the indefinite article, claiming that the indefinite article is either interpreted as a referring expression (an indexical) or as an existential quantifier. The referring expression is assumed to be scopeless, like an indexical. That is, it only behaves as if it always has widest scope, as in (233b). The quantificational interpretation, as in (233a), must obey island constraints like other quantifiers and accounts here for the non-specific reading.

(233) John overheard the rumor that a student of mine had been called before the dean.
John hörte das Gerücht, dass einer meiner Studenten zum Dekan gerufen wurde.

a. the rumor > a student
b. a student > the rumor
(Fodor & Sag 1982: 495)
John overheard the rumor that each student of mine had been called before the dean.

John hörte das Gerücht, dass jeder meiner Studenten zum Dekan gerufen wurde.

a. the rumor > each student
b. *each student > the rumor

(Fodor & Sag 1982: 495)

Fodor and Sag’s (1982) theory clearly predicts that an indefinite is to be interpreted either as a referential expression which always gives the appearance of widest scope (i.e. is scopally inert), or as an existential quantifier, which has to obey scope island constraints. This prediction can be tested using examples with two quantifiers (see below). According to Fodor and Sag’s (1982) theory, one would only find a narrow scope reading for the existential interpretation and a wide scope reading for the referential interpretation, but no intermediate reading. However, criticizing their account, von Heusinger (2002b: 126) observes: “while judgments on intermediate readings are quite intricate in general, Farkas (1981) observed for certain examples that intermediate readings are often very natural.”

I will further elaborate on the arguments provided against Fodor and Sag (1982) in Section 5.3.3. Being aware of the fact that Fodor and Sag’s (1982) account is subject to critique (if applied to the indefinite article), I am, at this point, rather interested in the suggested sentence semantics for the referential indefinites by Fodor and Sag in (315) below, than in their original motivation for this semantics.

The lexical entries for the two readings suggested by Fodor and Sag (1982) (i.e. the traditional quantificational reading and the new referential reading) are given below in (235a) and (235b), in a two-dimensional semantics with a context set $c$ and an evaluation point $i$ (following Heim 2011):

(235) a. $[[a_{quant} N]] = \lambda Q. \exists x. [N(x) \text{ and } Q(x)]$

b. $[[a_{ref} α]]^{c,i} = \text{is defined only if there is a unique individual that the speaker of } c \text{ has in mind in } c, \text{ and this individual is in } [[α]]^{c,c}; \text{ where defined, } [[a_{ref} α]]^{c,i} = \text{this individual.}$

(Heim 2011: ex. 56)

As an illustration consider the pair of sentences in (236). In (236a) the speaker most likely has a particular referent in mind when she utters a man. This is suggested by the observation that the speaker is clearly aware of the identity of the man who proposed to her, and in fact wants to hide his identity from the hearer. The man’s identity is relevant from the speaker’s point of view. In contrast, the speaker has no particular referent in mind in (236b), where she is concerned simply with the presence of some man or other in the women’s bathroom. For
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Fodor and Sag (1982) (236a) contains a so-called “referential indefinite” while (236b) contains a quantificational indefinite.

(236) a. A man just proposed to me in the orangery (though I’m much too embarrassed to tell you who it was).
   b. A man is in the women’s bathroom (but I haven’t dared to go in there to see who it is).
   (Fodor and Sag 1982: 359)

Crucially, considering Fodor and Sag’s (1982) semantics of referentiality in (235b), the extension of a referential indefinite is defined if and only if the speaker intends to refer to the unique individual in the actual world w which is denoted by the indefinite. Since this semantics mirrors Kaplan’s semantics for demonstratives, the referential indefinite was originally claimed to be an indexical or a demonstrative. Demonstratives, according to Kaplan, are defined as expressions which require an associated demonstration. They refer to that very object that the demonstration points out in the actual utterance situation — the demonstratum, as Kaplan calls it.

This indexical behavior is mirrored in Fodor and Sag’s (1982) semantics for referential indefinites, as their extension is defined if and only if the speaker intends to refer to the unique individual in the actual world w which is denoted by the indefinite. The demonstration required for deictic demonstratives is replaced then by what is labeled “private ostension” (as it is not overt) (Fodor and Sag 1982: 384) for referential indefinites. The important feature that the denotation rules for (deictic) demonstratives and referential indefinite phrases share is that the denotation depends only on the context of the utterance and not on the sentential context in which the phrase appears. Like I, you, here, that and so on, these phrases are thus immune to the usual effects of scoped elements in the sentence.

Fodor and Sag (1982) themselves relate their referential indefinites to the Kaplan-semantics of demonstratives, saying that the pointing gesture required for deictic demonstratives is replaced by “private ostension” (Fodor and Sag 1982: 384):

In fact, the closest analogue to a referential indefinite is a demonstrative phrase accompanied by a pointing gesture which is not visible to the hearer, a ‘private’ pointing gesture within the mind of the speaker. (Fodor and Sag 1982: 381)

A demonstrative phrase carries the presupposition that its descriptive content and its associated ostension are compatible (see Kaplan (ms), on pointing to a man and saying that flower), and that the two together pick out a unique referent. Likewise, a referential indefinite carries the presupposition that its descriptive content is compatible with the speaker’s ‘private ostension’. Its denotation will be the individual the speaker ‘has in mind’, as long as the
5 Sentence semantics: Referential properties of indefinite ‘dieser’

descriptive content is true of that individual. Thus a referential indefinite can be regarded as an indexical phrase. (Fodor and Sag 1982: 384)

What we have argued is that a referential indefinite resembles a demonstrative without the associated overt pointing or other public identification of the referent. […] Its denotation will be the individual ‘the speaker has in mind’, as long as the descriptive content is true of that individual. […] …we will set about the task of giving a formal semantics for referential indefinites by adapting Kaplan’s formal treatment of demonstratives. (Fodor and Sag 1982: 384)

5.3.2 Indefinite dieser: A referential indefinite per Fodor and Sag (1982)?

Fodor and Sag (1982) assumed the indefinite article to be subject to a true lexical ambiguity, sharing the semantics with indexicals on the “referential” reading, since “a referential indefinite is more like a demonstrative than like a definite description” (1982: 381). The application of the semantics Fodor and Sag (1982) originally suggested for their so-called referential indefinite article to indefinite dieser would account for the fact that indefinite dieser always gives the appearance of taking widest scope over linguistic operators (cf. Chapter 4): if it is analyzed as a referential indefinite per Fodor and Sag (1982) it works like an indexical in that it is scopeless, what gives rise to what looks like wide-scope interpretations only.

At this point, there seems to be strong evidence that the referential properties of indefinite dieser can be accounted for using Fodor and Sag’s (1982) semantics of direct referentiality.

Hypothesis (after Fodor and Sag 1982 and Heim 2011: ex. 56)

(237) \([[[\text{dieser}_{\text{ind.}}. \alpha}]_{c,i}^{ci} = \text{is defined only if there is a unique individual that the speaker of } c \text{ has in mind in } c, \text{ and this individual is in } [[\alpha]]_{c,c}^{c,c}; \text{ where defined, } [[\text{dieser}_{\text{ind.}}. \alpha}]_{c,i}^{ci} = \text{this individual.} \)

Still, it needs to be checked if the arguments which were used to show that Fodor and Sag’s semantics for referential interpretations of the indefinite article \(a(n)\) are not adequate also hold for indefinite dieser. If they don’t, nothing speaks against a Fodor and Sag-style analysis of indefinite dieser — i.e. an analysis of indefinite dieser as an indexical, a demonstrative, which is thus clearly linked to deictic dieser.

5.3.3 Arguments against Fodor and Sag (1982)

Fodor and Sag’s ambiguity account is, nowadays, widely accepted not to hold in the form suggested (Farkas 1981; Ruys 1992; Abusch 1994; Reinhart 1997;
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Winter 1997; von Heusinger 2011a⁴⁰) for the indefinite article on so-called “referential readings” such as the indefinite article *a(n) / ein*. The main argument is the availability of intermediate-scope readings for long-distance indefinites such as *ein* (238a) which are not predicted on Fodor and Sag’s (1982) account for referential indefinites: they claim that either an indefinite is quantificational, then allowing for intermediate-scope readings (but obeying to island constraints) or that it is referential — but then it should never allow for intermediate scope readings:

(238) a. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das *ein Professor* empfohlen hatte.
   ‘Every student read every book, which a professor has recommended.’
   b. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das *dieser Professor* [pointing gesture] empfohlen hatte.
   ‘Every student read every book, which this professor [pointing gesture] has recommended.’

(238a) has an intermediate reading on which the sentence is true as long as for every student *y*, there exists one professor *x* such that *y* read every book that *x* had recommended, i.e. as long as the value of the student co-varies with the value of the professor. The sentence is true if, for example, Annie read every book which had been recommended by Prof. Kuhn, Sarah read every book that had been recommended by Prof. Kunz, and Peter read every book that had been recommended by Prof. Müller. These types of intermediate readings (in which there is a different professor for each student, who read every book on the respective professor’s list) are also labeled pair-list interpretations.

In addition, a so-called functional reading⁴¹ (Endriss 2009) is allowed in (238a), too, on which the professors also co-vary with the students (but not unsystematically, as in the pair-list reading above). Their relation is defined via a functional relation, as it is for example the case if we continue (238a) with his favorite professor, where the functional relation between students and professors is defined as “the respective favorite teacher”:

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⁴⁰ All these accounts agree that the original Fodor and Sag (1982) ambiguity between a referential and a quantificational for the indefinite article does not hold in the form suggested. The various accounts vary in that they suggest different mechanisms for the indefinite article on the respective readings (see discussion on the next page).

⁴¹ Note that intermediate scope (pair-list) and functional readings are clearly to be distinguished. According to (Endriss 2009), functional readings are not to be put on a par with intermediate readings.
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(239) a. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das ein Professor empfohlen hatte. Und zwar der jeweilige Lieblingsprofessor.
   ‘Every student read every book, which a professor has recommended: the respective favorite teacher.’

b. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das Dieser Professor [pointing gesture] empfohlen hatte. #Und zwar der jeweilige Lieblingsprofessor.
   ‘Every student read every book, which THIS professor [pointing gesture] has recommended: # the respective favorite teacher.’

The functional readings of co-variation cannot be received for deictic dieser (239b), a prima facie indexical expression. The intermediate and the functional readings are not expected if one assumes ein to be a referential indefinite in the original Fodor and Sag (1982) sense carrying semantics of indexicality, as these semantics should never allow for readings of co-variance, if in a scope-island. This explains why intermediate and functional readings cannot be received for deictic dieser in (239b).

Fodor and Sag (1982) made a clear prediction saying that a long distance indefinite (a referential indefinite) can never give the appearance of being in the scope of another quantifier. They claim that an indefinite is either quantificational, and therefore subject to island constraints (i.e. it is no longer a long-distance indefinite), or, it is referential and therefore gives the appearance of always taking widest scope. I have exemplified above, however, what has been pointed out in many accounts arguing against the semantics proposed by Fodor and Sag (1982) for indefinites (Ruys 1992; Abusch 1994; Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997): intermediate scope readings for ein in these scope-island contexts do exist. Thus, the original Fodor and Sag (1982) approach of an ambiguity between a referential, demonstrative-like reading and a quantificational reading is not defendable any more for the indefinite article ein on the respective reading and for various other exceptional-scope indefinites such as the indefinites bestimmt or gewiss (Ebert, Ebert and Hinterwimmer 2012).

More recent analyses (Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997; Kratzer 1998; von Heusinger 2002a) of indefinites that have accounted for these intermediate scope readings make use of choice function analyses in order to explain these “referential interpretations” of ein.

Above I have shown how Fodor and Sag’s (1982) original semantics cannot be used in order to account for the referential interpretations of the indefinite article ein, even though it may, on these readings, mirror the behavior of indexicals at first glance. In the next subsection I will argue that the semantics proposed by Fodor and Sag (1982) can still account for the use of indefinite dieser.
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5.3.4 Arguments against Fodor and Sag (1982): No threat for indefinite 
\textit{dieser}

In this section I will show that the argument used in order to prove Fodor and 
Sag’s (1982) account for the indefinite article wrong does not affect the suggested 
analysis of indefinite \textit{dieser}.

My argument is based on the observation that indefinite \textit{dieser}, very much 
like deictic \textit{DIESER} cannot be found to exhibit intermediate scope and functional 
readings. I will point out differences between the so-called “referential” 
interpretation of the indefinite article and indefinite \textit{dieser}. This supports the 
assumption that both are to be related to two different mechanisms of reference. 
The examples below show that intermediate scope readings can be received for 
\textit{ein}, in that there are different teachers which are paired with different students, 
and for each teacher holds that every student read every book they recommended:

(240) a. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das \textbf{ein Professor} empfohlen 
hatte. Prof Kunz hat Mark ein Buch empfohlen, Professor Hinz hat 
Martina ein (anderes) empfohlen und Prof. Müller hat Carl eines 
empfohlen, etc.
‘Every student has read every book which was recommended by a 
(possibly different) professor, i.e. Prof. Kunz recommended a book 
for Mark, Professor Hinz recommended another book for Martina, 
and Prof. Müller recommended another book for Carl, etc.’
\rightarrow Intermediate reading and functional reading possible: possibly 
different teachers

In (240a) the so-called pair-list reading, i.e. a reading in which the relation 
of unsystematic co-variation between students and professors exists, can be 
received for \textit{ein}. Other than for \textit{ein}, one \textit{cannot} receive the intermediate scope 
reading (the pair list interpretation) for indefinite \textit{dieser} (240b) (and also not for 
deictic \textit{dieser}, as exemplified in (240c)):

(240) b. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, dass \textbf{dieser Professor} 
empfohlen hatte. #Prof Kunz hat Mark ein Buch empfohlen, 
Professor Hinz hat Martina ein (anderes) empfohlen und Prof. Müller 
hat Carl eines empfohlen, etc.
‘Every student has read every book which was recommended by this 
professor. #I.e. Prof. Kunz recommended a book for Mark, 
Professor Hinz recommended another book for Martina, and Prof. 
Müller recommended another book for Carl, etc.’
\rightarrow Only possible reading: apparent wide-scope reading — one 
professor only, in the world of the actual speaker
c. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das **Dieser Professor** [pointing gesture] empfohlen hatte. # Prof Kunz hat Mark ein Buch empfohlen, Professor Hinz hat Martina ein (anderes) empfohlen und Prof. Müller hat Carl eines empfohlen, etc.

‘Every student has read every book which was recommended by ***This professor*** [pointing gesture]. #I.e. Prof. Kunz recommended a book for Mark, Professor Hinz recommended another book for Martina, and Prof. Müller recommended another book for Carl, etc.’

→ Only possible reading: apparent wide-scope reading — one professor only, in the world of the actual speaker

Furthermore, other than for **ein** in (241a) one cannot receive the functional (systematic) reading for indefinite **dieser** (241b) (and for deictic **Dieser**, as exemplified in (241c) below), either.

(241) a. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das **ein Professor** empfohlen hatte: Und zwar der jeweilige Lieblingsprofessor.

‘Every student read every book which a **professor** had recommended: his favourite professor.’

Functional reading → Possibly different professors, but systematic order

b. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das **dieser Professor** empfohlen hatte: #Der jeweilige Lieblingsprofessor.

‘Every student read every book which **this professor** had recommended: **#his** favourite professor.’

→ apparent wide-scope reading only

c. Jeder Student hat jedes Buch gelesen, das **Dieser Professor** [pointing gesture] empfohlen hatte: #Der jeweilige Lieblingsprofessor.

‘Every student read every book which **This professor** [pointing gesture] had recommended: **#his** favourite professor.’

→ apparent wide-scope reading only

Remember that we have to distinguish between two different readings, (i) the intermediate reading in which there is an unsystematic relation between students and professors (Schwarz 2001; Endriss 2009) (the pair-list reading in (240a)) and (ii) a functional in which a systematic functional relation holds between students and professors. Endriss (2009) shows that both readings have to be clearly distinguished and that the functional reading is not a genuine intermediate reading. What is of greater interest here is not how the intermediate and the functional reading differ, but the observation that indefinite (and deictic) **dieser** appear to never allow for any reading of co-variation, be it the intermediate scope reading or the functional reading.
5.3 Sentence semantics of indefinite ‘dieser’

In a very similar fashion, the following examples (based on Farkas 1981) show that intermediate scope readings can be received quite naturally for the indefinite article on long distance readings. This, however, is not the case for indefinite and deictic dieser. (242) (with ein) clearly has a reading, amongst others, according to which for each student there is one (probably different) condition such that the student comes up with three arguments against the condition. This intermediate reading cannot be received for deictic dieser (243) and indefinite dieser (244):

(242) Jeder Student musste sich 3 Argumente überlegen, die zeigen, dass eine Bedingung die von Chomsky vorgeschlagen wurde, falsch ist.

‘Each student had to come up with three arguments that show that some condition proposed by Chomsky is wrong.’

→ intermediate scope reading possible

(243) Jeder Student musste sich 3 Argumente überlegen, die zeigen, dass DIESE Bedingung [pointing to a condition on the blackboard] die von Chomsky vorgeschlagen wurde, falsch ist.

‘Each student had to come up with three arguments that show that THIS condition [pointing to a condition on the blackboard], proposed by Chomsky is wrong.’

→ apparent wide-scope reading only

(244) Jeder Student musste sich 3 Argumente überlegen, die zeigen, dass diese Bedingung die von Chomsky vorgeschlagen wurde, falsch ist.

‘Each student had to come up with three arguments that show that this condition proposed by Chomsky is wrong.’

→ apparent wide-scope reading only

The observation that there are examples in which ein may take intermediate scope led to the assumption that Fodor and Sag’s account in its original form is not suitable for ein. It has further led to the postulation of other mechanisms than inherent referentiality for ein on these so-called “referential” uses. For indefinite dieser, however, very much like for deictic dieser, things look different. The observation that indefinite dieser, very much like deictic dieser, does not allow for any type of reading of co-variation i.e. is not affected by the main argument which was used against the assumption of Fodor and Sag’s theory for referential readings of indefinite ein, leaves indefinite dieser “back in the game”. The referential behavior of indefinite dieser appears to be as rigid as one expects it to be, assuming that it carries sentence semantics of indexicality. Thus, nothing speaks against an analysis of indefinite dieser with the semantics of referentiality proposed by Fodor and Sag (1982).
5.3.5 Formal sentence semantics for indefinite *dieser*

The hypothesis in (237) has been confirmed. The sentence semantics I propose for true, inherently referential indefinites such as indefinite *dieser* in German is Fodor and Sag’s (1982) semantics of referentiality, as discussed above. The indexical or referential meaning of an indefinite *dieser* only depends on the utterance context, as it is the case for regular indexical expressions such as deictic *dieser*:

\[(dieser_{ind} \alpha)^{c,i} \text{ is defined only if there is a unique individual that the speaker of } c \text{ has in mind in } c, \text{ and this individual is in } [(\alpha)]^{c,e}; \text{ where defined, } ([dieser_{ind} \alpha])^{c,i} = \text{this individual}\]

(after Fodor and Sag 1982 and Heim 2011: ex. 56)

The lexical entry in (245) ensures that referential indefinites obligatorily appear to take scope above intensional verbs and modals (as they are in fact scopeless demonstratives): since the speaker intends to refer to a particular individual in the world of utterance, this individual must exist in the world of utterance. This is a correct prediction, since we have seen (in Chapter 4 and in this chapter) that indefinites do never take scope under intensional or modal operators.

5.4 Apparent counter examples: Indefinite ‘dieser’ showing scopal interaction?

This section deals with apparent counter-examples which might be brought up in order to argue against the analysis of indefinite *dieser* as a scopally inert demonstrative. I have shown above that indefinite *dieser* does not allow for narrow scope, intermediate scope, and functional readings. This is why it was argued to be a scopally inert (scopeless) expression and as such an indexical. It exhibits rigid reference and never allows for any reading of co-variation but, in contrast, always establishes reference to the very referent the speaker intends to refer to in the actual utterance situation. Thus, indefinite *dieser* was argued to mirror the referential behavior of deictic *dieser* and to be a demonstrative.

5.4.1 Presentation of critical examples

The following examples may be considered as counter examples to the semantic account developed for indefinite *dieser* in this chapter, as they, at least at first glance, give rise to the impression that indefinite *dieser* is not scopally inert but sometimes appears to show scopal activity. Indefinite *dieser* appears to allow for readings of co-variation as it: firstly appears to scope under propositional attitude verbs as in (246), (248) and (249) and in dream reports as in (247), and as it secondly appears to allow for further readings of co-variance in sentences including a quantifier as in (250) and (251) or for functional readings in sentences including a quantifier as in (252). The goal of this subsection is to show that these
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examples do not pose a threat to the present account of indefinite dieser as a referential indefinite per Fodor and Sag (1982) as they only look like problematic examples at first glance.

i. Embedding — Negation of existence

(246) Sarah said she found this unicorn in her garden. Unicorns don’t exist so she’s either lying or crazy.
   ‘Sarah hat gesagt, dass sie dieses Einhorn in ihrem Garten gefunden hat. Es gibt aber gar keine Einhörner, daher lügt sie entweder, oder sie ist verrückt.’
   (Ionin 2006: fn. 9)

(247) John dreamt that he was in this Eskimo restaurant. But Eskimo restaurants do not exist.
   ‘John hat geträumt, dass er in diesem Eskimorestaurant war. Es gibt aber keine Eskimorestaurants.’
   (Prince 1981: 241)

(248) Maria glaubt fest daran, irgendwann diesen Märchenprinzen zu heiraten, der auf einem weißen Ross daherggeritten kommt. Märchenprinzen gibt es aber gar nicht.
   ‘Maria still believes, that she will marry this fairytale prince who comes on a white horse, at one point. But fairytale princes do not exist.’

(249) Jenny denkt immer noch, dass irgendwann dieser gutaussehende Virtuose vorbei kommt, der 100 Instrumente beherrscht und in ihrer Band spielt. Den gibt es aber gar nicht.
   ‘Jenny still thinks that, at one point, this good-looking virtuoso comes across, who knows 100 instruments and who wants to play in her band. Such a virtuoso does not exist.’

ii. Scope taking under existential quantifier:

(250) Im Leben jeder Frau gibt es diesen attraktiven Kollegen, mit dem sie ab und zu mal Essen geht.
   ‘In every woman’s life there’s that attractive colleague who she goes out with for a meal every now and then.’

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42 Note that in the English translation we can already see that dieser is not used in its indefinite use. If we forced this instead of that into the English translation, the rigidity of this would not be in question and the sentence would describe the unlikely scenario that there is exactly one man x for who holds that every women goes for a meal with him every now and then.
5 Sentence semantics: Referential properties of indefinite ‘dieser’

(251) Jeder kennt doch diesen Händler, der einem seine Ware völlig überteuert anbietet.
‘Everybody knows that trader, who offers totally overpriced products.’

iii. Functional scope-taking under existential quantifier

(252) Jeder Mann vergisst dieses Datum: den Geburtstag seiner Frau.
‘Every man forgets this date: his wife’s birthday.’

5.4.2 Analysis of critical examples

Let us start with Ionin’s (2006) and Prince’s (1981) examples in (246) and (247), repeated as (253) and (254) below:

(253) Sarah said she found this unicorn in her garden. Unicorns don’t exist so she’s either lying or crazy.
‘Sarah hat gesagt, dass sie dieses Einhorn in ihrem Garten gefunden hat. Es gibt aber gar keine Einhörner, daher lügt sie entweder, oder sie ist verrückt.’

(254) John dreamt that he was in this Eskimo restaurant. But Eskimo restaurants do not exist.
‘John hat geträumt, dass er in diesem Eskimorestaurant war. Es gibt aber keine Eskimorestaurants.’

Embedded under propositional attitude verbs or in dream reports indefinite dieser appears to rather reflect the state of mind of the referent of the subject of the matrix clause (Sarah, John), rather than that of the speaker. Remember that, according to Fodor and Sag (1982) the use of indefinite dieser is dependent on the state of mind of the actual speaker. In (253) and (254) the speaker, however, does not refer to a particular unicorn or Eskimo restaurant which exists in the actual world of utterance. In contrast, the speakers of (253) and (254) even spell out that they do not believe that the respective objects exist. In (253) and (254) the belief that the unicorn or the Eskimo restaurant exists is only on the part of the speaker of the matrix clause — the actual speaker’s belief’s are not reflected at all. This behavior is clearly unexpected in the account proposed above and longs for an explanation. According to Ionin (2006: 189), in (253) “the belief that unicorns exist, and the intent to refer to a particular unicorn is all on the part of Sarah”. This becomes obvious if we consider (255), which does not contain any embedding: the speaker commits himself to a particular unicorn by stating that Sarah found it in her garden. Therefore, it leads to incoherence if the speaker negates his / her previous statement:

43 See footnote 42.
5.4 Apparent counter examples: Indefinite ‘dieser’ showing scopal interaction?

(255) Sarah found this unicorn in her garden. # But unicorns don’t exist.
   ‘Sarah hat dieses Einhorn in ihrem Garten gefunden. # Es gibt aber gar keine Einhörner.’
   (Ionin 2006: 189)

Similarly, in the example with the Eskimo restaurant in (254) the use of indefinite this does not mirror the state of mind of the actual speaker either, but that of somebody else: the actual speaker clearly does not intend to talk about any Eskimo restaurant that exists in the world of utterance, it does not even entail that the speaker believes that Eskimo restaurants do exist. If we consider (256) (even without the dream report) below, according to Ionin (2006: 189), the belief in the existence of a particular Eskimo restaurant is, similarly, on the part of John rather than the speaker:

(256) Poor old delusional John wanted to eat in this Eskimo restaurant. But Eskimo restaurants do not exist.
   ‘Der arme, alte, verwirrte John wollte in diesem Eskimorestaurant essen. Es gibt aber keine Eskimorestaurants.’

Ionin (2006: 189) observes that “while (256) does not have embedding under a propositional attitude verb, it may be understood as implicit embedding: the meaning expressed by (256) is, roughly Poor old delusional John said that he wanted to eat in this Eskimo restaurant.” These examples are apparent counter examples to the proposal made in this chapter. If indefinite dieser is an indexical expression, as proposed in this work, it should always refer to individuals in the actual world and it should never be affected by embedding. Nevertheless, we find dieser in these critical examples and so we have to account for its occurrence in these examples.

What stands out, considering the first two apparent counter examples from the list above is the type of the respective “referents” of indefinite dieser: a unicorn and an Eskimo restaurant. The apparent non-indexical use of indefinite dieser in (253) and (254) only appears to work with fictional objects, which somebody believes to exist but whose existence can be denied by the speaker. An explanation for these types of examples which allow indefinite dieser to scope under attitude verbs — with fictional objects — is found in Ionin (2006: fn. 8) who refers to Heim (p.c.), claiming that it is possible to use indefinite this as a referential indefinite with fictional objects. Ionin suggests that in the Eskimo restaurant example “the matrix speaker is directly referring to the fictional restaurant of John’s dream” (2006: 190), with the following, demonstrative-like, truth conditions:
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“(257) “John dreamt that he was in this Eskimo restaurant” expresses a proposition only in those utterance contexts $c$ where the following felicity condition is fulfilled: the speaker intends to refer to exactly one individual $x_c$ in $c$, [...] and $x_c$ is a (fictional) Eskimo restaurant in $c$. When this condition holds, “John dreamt he was in this Eskimo restaurant” is true, iff John in $w_c$ at $t_c$ dreamt that he was in $x_c$. (Ionin 2006: 190)

In an analogue fashion, in the unicorn example “the matrix speaker is directly referring to the fictional unicorn of Sarah’s imagination.” Ionin (2006) further explains, that this fictional-object-proposal can be transferred to other cases, as well. Therefore, I use it in order to explain the fairytale-prince and the virtuoso example in (248) and (251) as well: these types of reports can be explained if the subject of the matrix clause has established a fictional object, i.e. a fictional fairy tale prince or a virtuoso (which the matrix speaker imagines to exist) which the actual speaker does not believe to exist.

For the sake of completeness, I will mention another theory which could also be used in order to explain the above examples containing embedding under propositional attitude verbs (following Ionin 2006: 189, fn 8). As Ionin (2006) points out, “one possible solution to the above facts is to treat this-indefinites in the framework of Schlenker (2003a, 2003b)”, as Schlenker generally allows shifts in reference for all indexicals via his so called double index account. Schlenker proposes that propositional attitude verbs such as say or think, due to a general principle, do manipulate the context variable, as shown in (258). In his proposal, the sentence Sarah said that she found this unicorn in her garden. Unicorns don’t exist, so she is either lying or crazy! has the truth-conditions in (259) below. This proposal can also account for the sentence Poor old delusional John wanted to eat in this Eskimo restaurant. (if we assume implicit embedding), but it cannot be used, at least without modifications, in order to explain the dream-report-case, as dream-reports are to be distinguished from propositional-attitude-reports.

(258) $\text{John says}_{ci} \text{ that } p$ is true$_c$ iff every context $c$ compatible with John’s claim is such that $p$ is true$_{ci} \downarrow c$ when uttered in $c$.
(Schlenker 2003a: ex. 28)

(259) $\text{Sarah said}_{ci} \text{ that she found this unicorn in her garden}$ expresses a proposition when the following condition is met: in every context $c$ compatible with Sarah’s claim, the speaker of $c$ (namely, Sarah) intends to refer to exactly one individual $x_c$ in $c$ and $x_c$ is a unicorn in $c$. When this condition holds, $\text{Sarah said}_{ci} \text{ that she found this unicorn in her garden}$ is true$_c$ iff every context $c$ compatible with Sarah’s claim is such that Sarah in $w_c$ at $t_c$ found $x_c$ in her garden.
(modeled after Ionin 2006: 189, fn 8)
5.4 Apparent counter examples: Indefinite ‘dieser’ showing scopal interaction?

The fact that Schlenker’s analysis cannot account for the dream-case makes me prefer Ionin’s view on these examples with fictional objects. Nevertheless, a formal analysis of those examples is lacking in Ionin (2006) and I leave that question open for further research.

Let me move on with the examples (250) and (251), repeated below as (260) and (261). Here we are not dealing with fictional objects and embedding under propositional attitude verbs, but have quite a classic case which creates the appearance that indefinite dieser scopes under the existential quantifier jeder. Both examples give rise to a reading in which there is more than one specific colleague / trader. That is, the examples below create the appearance that dieser allows for a reading of co-variance, which is not expected in the above account of referentiality for indefinite dieser:

(260) Im Leben jeder Frau gibt es diesen attraktiven Kollegen, mit dem sie ab und zu mal Essen geht.
‘In every woman’s life there’s that attractive colleague with who she’s going out to dinner every now and then.’

(261) Jeder kennt diesen Händler, der einem seine Ware völlig überteuert anbietet.
‘Everybody knows that trader who offers totally overpriced products.’

These two examples, however, are not a threat for the theory developed above either, for two reasons: firstly, they actually (i) do not contain dieser in its indefinite use but dieser in its recognitional use. This is so for two reasons again: Firstly, dieser, as we can see in (262) and (263) is replaceable by the definite article:

(262) Im Leben jeder Frau gibt es diesen / den attraktiven Kollegen, mit dem sie ab und zu mal Essen geht.
‘In every woman’s life there’s that / the attractive colleague with who she’s going out to dinner every now and then.’

(263) Jeder kennt diesen /den Händler, der einem seine Ware völlig überteuert anbietet.
‘Everybody knows that / the trader who offers totally overpriced products.’

A second indicator that dieser is used in the recognitional use in these examples is the fact that the translation to English only works with the distal demonstrative that. Note that, if we insert the proximate demonstrative this in the English example we only receive the classic indefinite this-reading, giving rise to one possible (and very odd) interpretation only, namely that there is exactly one colleague or trader who the actual speaker intends to refer to in the actual world:
In every woman’s life there’s this attractive colleague with who she’s going out with to dinner every now and then.  
→ Only possible reading: one particular colleague for all women

‘Everybody knows this trader, who sells totally overpriced products.’  
→ Only possible reading: one particular trader for everybody.

The (ii) second reason why these examples do not pose a threat to a theory of direct reference for demonstratives (such as indefinite, and also, importantly, recognitional dieser) is the observation that, in fact, no co-variation reading is present. In contrast, direct reference is made to a type-referent, as the respective examples contain type-token shifts. In the examples the hearer is clearly expected to be familiar with this type-referent, as the second sentence in (265) even contains the phrase everybody knows. These examples of dieser in the recognitional use exhibit a type-token shift (Hole and Klumpp 2000) and can still be claimed to exhibit direct reference to a given type. They exhibit reference to a certain type of colleague or a certain type of trader (the attractive type of colleague who is present in every office and the greedy type of trader who we all know, for example) — and thus reference can still be claimed to be rigid.

Hole and Klumpp (2000) state that the semantic distinction in the domain of argument expressions between the reference to types or tokens is very important. They note that the lexicon of German and other languages provides a number of expressions to make clear that what is referred to by an argument expression is not a certain individual mass or item, but rather a type:

Diese Art / Diese Sorte / Dieser Typ Rotwein / Pullover ist besonders teuer.  
‘This kind / This sort / This type of red wine / jumper is particularly expensive.’

Dieser, in the critical examples in (260) and (261) can be very naturally combined with those type-expressions. This proves that type-reference is actually present in those examples:

Im Leben jeder Frau gibt es diesen Typ von attraktivem Kollegen, mit dem sie ab und zu mal Essen geht.  
‘In every woman’s life there’s that type of attractive colleague with who she’s going out to dinner every now and then.’

Jeder kennt diesen Typ Händler, der einem seine Ware völlig überteuert anbietet.  
‘Everybody knows that type of trader who offers totally overpriced products.’
5.4 Apparent counter examples: Indefinite ‘dieser’ showing scopal interaction?

Thus, _dieser_ is used recognitionally in those critical examples and exhibits reference to a familiar type and not to different, co-varying individuals. Remember that I showed in Chapter 4 already that _dieser_, quite naturally, may allow for type references and that they do not pose a problem to a direct reference theory of demonstratives. Even deictic _dieser_ may exhibit type-token shifts (269), still directly referring to one particular type of jacket (represented by one token of that type), i.e. the type of which a representative token is pointed out by the actual speaker in the actual utterance situation:

(269) Jedes Kind in meiner Klasse hat **DIESE Jacke** [pointing gesture to a jacket in a shop window].

‘Every kid in my class has **THIS jacket** [pointing gesture to a jacket in a shop window].’

Finally, consider the critical example (252), repeated as (270) below: it looks like a classic functional-scope reading in that _dieser_ scopes under the quantifier _jeder Mann_ and that the related co-variation of reference with respect to dates and men is defined via a function (marriage):

(270) Jeder Mann vergisst **dieses Datum**: den Geburtstag seiner Frau.

‘Every man forgets **this date**: his wife’s birthday.’

This example, however, does not pose a threat to the theory developed for indefinite _dieser_ either. It does not represent _dieser_ in its indefinite use: it is not unstressed. _Dieser_, in (270), is used in its cataphoric use. The cataphoric use is a sub-use of the anaphoric use (cf. Chapter 4). Demonstrative reference may work cataphorically, in that the demonstrative NPs are mentioned first and the “antecedent” is delivered later, in the upcoming discourse:

(271) Listen to this₁: {Eva is coming to the U.S.A.!}₁

Von Heusinger’s (2012: 27, fn. 11) defines the cataphoric use in that it is only well-formed if “missing information” is delivered in the very same or the next sentence. The example in (271) would be incomplete if Eva is coming to the U.S.A. wasn’t delivered after using cataphoric **this**. In the case of cataphora, the demonstrative is generally stressed, as **dies** in (272) and **diese** in (273):

(272) Von ihr erfuhr Lisa **DIES**: Ihr Vater lebte in Osnabrück.

‘From her Lisa learned **THIS**: her father lived in Osnabrück.’

(273) **DIESE** Personen werden nicht kommen: Müller, Meier, Zimmermann.

‘**THESE** persons won’t come: Müller, Meier, Zimmermann.’

One main indicator for the cataphoric use is stress. (272) and (273) only work when \textit{dieser} is stressed, whereas with indefinite \textit{dieser} (always unstressed) the functional reading cannot be received. More on the cataphoric use in von Heusinger (2012).

To summarize, the examples in (246) to (252) which at first glance looked like examples in which indefinite \textit{dieser} allows for co-variation readings do not pose a thread to the present account as they could either still be analyzed as referential expressions via Ionin’s (2006) fictional-object analysis, or they did not even represent examples of the indefinite use of \textit{dieser}, referring either recognitionally to a known \textit{type} of referent, or were examples of the cataphoric use of \textit{dieser}.

\subsection*{5.5 Summary}

In this chapter I have shown that indefinite \textit{dieser} can be analyzed using the original Fodor and Sag (1982) semantics for referential indefinites. Thus, indefinite \textit{dieser} is assumed to share the central feature of indexicality with standard demonstratives. This is a direct argument supporting the proposal made in this book: the use of indefinite \textit{dieser} is a derived use of the basic deictic use, very much like the anaphoric and the recognitional use of \textit{dieser}. This being so, indefinite \textit{dieser} is to be considered a demonstrative. Carrying this sentence semantics it should be generally distinguished from indefinite expressions, which have a prominent quantificational reading, and also from indefinites on their so-called “referential” readings, which are nowadays widely acknowledged to be analyzed via choice function approaches — not being subject to a lexical ambiguity and not carrying the semantics of direct referentiality. With respect to the present analysis of indefinite \textit{dieser} as a referential indefinite, I agree with Ionin (2006) who also assumes the semantics of direct referentiality for indefinite \textit{this}. In the following chapter I will, amongst others, provide data highlighting the differences between indefinite \textit{dieser} and indefinites on their referential interpretation.
6 The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

6.1 Introduction

The present chapter aims to experimentally account for the discourse structuring effects across sentence boundaries in the subsequent discourse of indefinite dieser. This investigation aims to describe the discourse structuring behavior of indefinite dieser and of the indefinite article ein on its referential interpretation via experimentally measurable parameters. Thus, this chapter will experimentally support the observation that the referents of indefinite dieser, unlike the ones of the indefinite article ein (on referential interpretations), exhibit Discourse Prominence in the subsequent discourse after their introduction in that they show a high degree of Discourse Structuring Potential (Chiriacescu 2011; Chiriacescu and von Heusinger 2011). Both key concepts (Discourse Prominence and Discourse Structuring Potential) will be defined Section 6.2.

The analysis of the discourse pragmatics of indefinite dieser supports and extends the systematic and theoretical investigations pursued in the previous chapters. Chapter 5 led to the conclusion that indefinite dieser shares the sentence semantics with demonstrative expressions and can be assigned the formal semantics of referential indefinites per Fodor and Sag (1982). I showed that those sentence semantics of indefinite dieser differ from the sentence semantics of indefinites on referential interpretations. Indefinite dieser was shown to express a speaker intention to refer, which can account for its scopal behavior, i.e. its scopal inertness. Note that the linking factor between the sentence semantics and the discourse pragmatics of indefinite dieser — the speaker intention to refer — will be the subject of the final Chapter 7.

This chapter brings out (i) a new approach to a definition of the type of Discourse Prominence of indefinite dieser (only related to the forward looking discourse), an (ii) experimental account of the discourse behavior of indefinite dieser giving evidence that indefinite dieser exhibits discourse prominence compared to the indefinite article on its referential interpretation and thus (iii) supporting evidence underlining the distinction between indefinite dieser and the indefinite article on its referential interpretation pursued from a formal-semantic perspective in Chapter 5.

This chapter is structured in two parts:

Theoretical background (Sections 6.2 – 6.5)

In this part I will first provide relevant definitions (Section 6.2) and suggestive corpus data on the discourse effects of indefinite dieser (Section 6.3). Then I will give background information related to the discourse effects of the analogue English phenomenon of indefinite this (Perlman 1969; Prince 1981; Ionin 2006) and on potential ways to measure Discourse Prominence (Givón 1981, 1983; Wright and Givón 1987; Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989; Chiriacescu 2011) in
Section 6.4. This will enable me to come up with an advanced method to measure experimentally the Discourse Structuring Potential of indefinite *dieser* in Section 6.5).

**Experimental study** (Section 6.6)
This part will report and analyze the findings of the experimental study, measuring the Discourse Structuring Potential of indefinite *dieser*, in comparison with the one of *ein* on its referential reading.

### 6.2 Relevant definitions

#### 6.2.1 Discourse Prominence

The type of Discourse Prominence on which this dissertation focuses, deals exclusively, and unlike in the scales discussed below, with prominence related to the forward-looking discourse structure in a discourse model.

*Discourse Prominence* (or discourse salience, cf. Krasavina and Chiarcos 2007) relates to a quite general observation which has been made in different accounts (Givón 1981, 1983; Kehler et al. 2008; Choi 1996; Artstein 1998) and from quite different perspectives: the underlying assumption is that there are referents which are more prominent or salient in a discourse than others. This prominence can relate to various independent areas as to, for example, the discourse structuring status of a referent in terms of frequency of mention of that referent in a discourse. This semantic-pragmatic notion is exactly the one followed in this book. It can, however, also be related to other factors including the type of referential expression, animacy or how a referent is morpho-syntactically rendered. Thus, Discourse Prominence is a broad concept, which can be approached from several directions. This can be done from the formal side (e.g. morphology) or from the semantic-pragmatic side, dealing with Discourse Prominence in a discourse model.

The observation that Discourse Prominence is a broad concept which can be approached from a wide range of different points of views becomes obvious if we briefly consider some prominence scales (Gundel et al. 1993; Choi 1996; Artstein 1998; Ariel 2001; Arnold 2010). Note that the sub-type of Discourse Prominence I am interested in is listed under (274d) in (ii) only. Of the four scales listed below, only Givón’s (1981, 1983) work focuses (at least partly) on forward-looking effects and at discourse structuring devices with respect to the upcoming discourse.
6.2 Relevant definitions

(274) Prominence scales

a. prominence scale by thematic role (Choi 1996)
   Agent > Beneficiary > Experiencer / Goal > Instrument > Patient / Theme > Locative

b. prominence scale by grammatical function (Artstein 1998)
   Subject > Object

c. prominence scale by accessibility / activation status (Ariel 1988, Gundel et al. 1993)
   Assuming that lexically reduced forms like pronouns refer back to more prominent referents

d. prominence scale by topic continuity in discourse (Givón 1981, 1983)
   Assuming that more prominent referents tend to be (i) more anaphorically accessible and (ii) more cataphorically persistent

The type of Discourse Prominence on which this dissertation focuses, deals exclusively (and unlike in the scales (274a) – (274c)), with prominence related to the discourse structure in a discourse model. It assumes that it is an inherent property of expressions to give structure to the upcoming discourse. Thus, only the subtype of Discourse Prominence which captures the Discourse Structuring Potential of an expression (in terms of frequency effects in the subsequent discourse after their introduction) is of relevance in this work. A separate treatment of this sub-type of Discourse Prominence has already been put forward in the accounts of Kehler et al. (2008) and Chiriacescu and von Heusinger (2010), who argue in favor of a postulation of a sub-type of Discourse Prominence which only deals with the cross-sentential discourse structure in the upcoming discourse after an expression’s introduction. They argue that it should be separated from the related, but still independent, types of prominence. In the following I will briefly respond to these accessibility / activation accounts and explain why they will not be of further relevance for this dissertation.

6.2.2 Discourse Structuring Potential

The concept of Discourse Structuring Potential (Chiriacescu 2011) was originally coined in order to offer clear means to experimentally measure at least one type of Discourse Prominence of indefinites. It focuses on the subsequent discourse only, as indefinites usually do not have any history in discourse, typically being first-mention entities. Originally, the concept of Discourse Structuring Potential was developed in order to account for the discourse behavior of pe- versus non-pe-marked indefinite direct objects in Romanian by Chiriacescu (2011), who identified the Discourse Structuring Potential as one type of forward looking Discourse Prominence. Only focusing on prominence effects in the upcoming discourse, the concept of Discourse Structuring Potential is very likely to be used
in order to investigate the behavior in discourse of indefinites, as they do not have any “history” in the existing discourse, being newly introduced items. However, nothing keeps the concept of Discourse Structuring Potential from being applied to definites as well, as it is done, for example, by Chiriaescu and von Heusinger (2010).

In this work, the general concept of Discourse Structuring Potential is taken over from Chiriaescu (2011) but presented in a slightly advanced version as it is defined in this book via three textual, measurable parameters: (i) referential persistence, (ii) topic shift potential and a new parameter, which has not been investigated in Chiriaescu’s work and (iii) topic continuity. The Discourse Structuring Potential reflects one manifestation of the broader concept of Discourse Prominence.

6.2.3 Interrelation between Discourse Prominence and Discourse Structuring Potential

With respect to the interrelation between the two concepts it has to be acknowledged that the Discourse Structuring Potential can be seen as one subtype of Discourse Prominence. The relation between the two concepts is unidirectional: if an expression is found to have a high value of Discourse Structuring Potential it is considered an expression exhibiting high Discourse Prominence. This, however, does not hold vice versa: A high degree of Discourse Prominence does not necessarily correlate with a high Discourse Structuring Potential, as the Discourse Structuring Potential only focuses on the upcoming discourse, i.e. it analyzes the prominence of a referring expression from a forward-looking perspective only.

(275) Der Mann lief auf der Strasse. Ich war aber ganz abgelenkt und dachte an Peter.

‘The man was walking on the street. I, however, was totally distracted and thought of Peter.’

44 Note that in its original version (Chiriaescu 2011) the Discourse Structuring Potential is only defined via two parameters (i) referential persistence and (ii) topic shift potential, i.e. my first two parameters. Chiriaescu and von Heusinger (2010) though investigate a further parameter, (iii) the anaphoric type of referring expression used to take up the critical referents in the subsequent discourse, which they then find not to be relevant for an account of the Discourse Structuring Potential of an expression. This parameter works well in order to measure an expression’s accessibility (one parameter of the more global concept of Discourse Prominence). Their observations result in the claim that the concepts of accessibility and Discourse Structuring Potential are, even if both are subtypes of Discourse Prominence, clearly to be seen as separate concepts (see above). Accessibility, in Chiriaescu and von Heusinger (2010) is defined as the “activation status [of a referent] that interacts with other competing concepts” which should not be confused with referential devices used to structure the subsequent discourse.

45 The term topic continuity can be interchanged with the term topic persistence.
6.3 Suggestive corpus data

High Discourse Prominence of Der Mann (due to its subject-status (Artsein 1998), but no high Discourse Structuring Potential.

Marie hatte einen Mann kennen gelernt. Er war gut aussehend, außerdem war er groß. Und schlank war er.
‘Mary met a man. He was good-looking and he was tall. And he was skinny.’

High Discourse Prominence of einen Mann in terms of high Discourse Structuring Potential (Chiriacescu 2011), as the referent is re-mentioned three times in the subsequent discourse after its introduction.

The following discussion of previous accounts on the discourse effects of indefinite this and more general literature on Discourse Prominence is vital to the present account of the discourse pragmatics of indefinite dieser. Based on the “ingredients” offered by previous accounts I will develop a new approach defining Discourse Prominence via an advanced version of Discourse Structuring Potential (Chiriacescu 2011).

6.3 Suggestive corpus data

The discourse features of indefinite dieser, compared to the indefinite article on the referential interpretation, will be, in a rather simplified way, illustrated via suggestive corpus date in this section. First data from the Cosmas Corpus of written German46 (mostly newspaper articles, but also prose texts) below give suggestive evidence with respect to how indefinite dieser appears to exhibit a higher Discourse Prominence (with respect to the subsequent discourse) than ein. Still, I will argue in this section that corpus studies are not ideal dealing with the matter of investigating the discourse effects of indefinite dieser, as (i) the form of indefinite dieser is extremely hard to elicit from corpus data (how do we know that the referent is truly hearer- and discourse-new?), (ii) entirely parallel minimal pair contexts containing sentences with indefinite dieser and ein cannot be found in a corpus and as (iii) indefinite dieser is generally very infrequent in written corpora, as it rather occurs in spoken, informal language. Since the corpora of spoken German are too small, the results for indefinite dieser are not satisfying either.

In order to ensure that the results of this first study only contain occurrences of indefinite dieser (and not deictic, anaphoric or recognitional dieser), I searched for entries for the phrases da war dieser ‘there was this’ (and for da war ein ‘there was a’, respectively, in order to receive comparable results). These searches led to a total of indefinite dieser-constructions in these existential contexts of 135 and to a total number of ein in the construction da war ein ‘there was a’ of 1239. This

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proportion shows how indefinite *dieser* is much less frequent than the indefinite article in comparable contexts.

I compared the same proportions (ca. 30 %) of the corpus sentences found for *dieser* and *ein* in context (random listing), i.e. 38 sentences of the total of 135 for indefinite *dieser* and 350 sentences out of the total of 1239 for *ein*. I investigated if the respective *dieser*- or *ein*-referents were re-mentioned (at all) in the subsequent discourse. The results of this comparison may not be satisfyingly representative, nevertheless they do point towards a clear direction: the referents of indefinite *dieser* appear to be more prominent in the subsequent discourse, as the referents were re-mentioned in all cases (100%) at some point in the following discourse (the subsequent 5 sentences), whereas only 99 out of 350 sentences (28%) showed this effect in the *ein*-cases:

Table 22: Discourse Prominence in the corpus of indefinite *dieser* and *ein*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indefinite <em>dieser</em> 38 sentences (28% of total (135))</th>
<th>Indefinite article <em>ein</em> 350 sentences (28% of total (1239))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-mentioned anaphorically at least once after introduction</td>
<td>100% (38 out of 38)</td>
<td>28% (99 out of 350)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples of the *dieser*- and *ein*-sentences (with and without direct anaphoric re-mentions) are given below.

(277) *Dieser* with re-mention:
Da war *dieser Regenwurm*₁, *der*₁ immer nach oben geschaut habe. Es sei zum Streit gekommen, und Adam habe *ihn*₁ gefressen. So konnte er leider nie erfahren, warum *der Wurm*₁ immer nach oben schaute.
‘There was this earthworm which always looked up. There was an argument, and Adam had eaten him. Thus, he unfortunately could never find out why the worm always looked up.’
(Cosmas Corpus)

(278) *Dieser* without re-mention:
n.a. in the small sample investigated

(279) *Ein* with re-mention:
Da war *ein Ritter*₁, *der*₁ am Ufer des Seeweihers die Seeburg bewohnte. *Er*₁ zog ins Heilige Land, wurde gefangen genommen und erhielt im Traum Hoffnung auf eine glückliche Heimkehr.
‘There was a knight, who lived at the shore of the lake pond and lived in the lake castle. He went to the Holy Land, was imprisoned and received hope for a happy return home in a dream.’
6.3 Suggestive corpus data

(Cosmas Corpus)

(280) *Ein* without re-mention:
Meine erste Erfahrung habe ich mit 17 Jahren gemacht, da war ein **Amerikaner** bei uns, was sich auf meine Englisch-Matura recht positiv ausgewirkt hat. Später folgten ein Jugendlicher aus China und einer aus Australien....
‘My first experimence I made with 17 years, there was an American with us, what had positive effects on my English A-Level. Later a youth from China and one from Australia followed….’
(Cosmas Corpus)

These first results are biased in a way, as I only considered existential contexts. As stated previously, this mechanism was used in order to be able to clearly identify the uses of indefinite *dieser*. Without that search mechanism, it would be extremely difficult to sort out occurrences of indefinite *dieser* from the multitude of other uses of *dieser*.

Finding examples of indefinite *dieser* in a corpus of written language is particularly difficult, as it is mainly a phenomenon of spoken and rather informal language. The corpora of spoken German to which I have access to are too small and do not allow for representative results. In the DGD2 corpus (Database for spoken German of the IDS Mannheim[^47]) I received only 15 hits overall in the search for *da war diese/r/s* ‘there was this’, whereas the search for *da war ein* ‘there was a’ resulted in 755 hits overall. Of the 15 hits for (supposedly) indefinite *dieser* at least two examples are examples of the recognitional use, one is an example of the cataphoric use (cf. Chapter 5) of *dieser* and one represents the anaphoric use, thus only 11 examples can be considered as true occurrences of indefinite *dieser*. This reflects how little actual data of spoken German is accessible in corpora — still facing the problem of a profound elicitation of actual occurrences of indefinite *dieser*, which was so far done by only searching for existential construction. One example of the corpus of spoken German for indefinite *dieser* and one for indefinite *ein* is given below, as these examples nevertheless clearly reflect how prominent the *dieser*-referent is in the upcoming discourse, being re-mentioned 6 times (281) whereas the *ein*-referent is only re-mentioned once. This mirrors the high Discourse Prominence of *dieser* in contrast to the lower one of *ein*. Remember that I do not claim that the indefinite article *ein* shows no discourse effects at all. The referents of *ein may* well be re-mentioned (282), however, this is assumed to happen with a much lower frequency compared to the referents of indefinite *dieser*:

6 The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

(281) Na und da kamen ja immer Beschwerden über das Essen und in der Zwischenzeit da war dieser Unteroffizier, der mich nun immer zum Nachexerzieren nahm, der war in der Zwischenzeit Küchenunteroffizier geworden, weil er immer handgreiflich wurde, auch nicht bloß bei mir, bei anderen auch also. Und damit er nun schließlich keine Dummheiten mehr machen sollte, kam er in die Küche und da machte er erst recht welche. Da verkaufte er das Fleisch und wir mußten immer treu zusehen.

‘Well and there always were complaints with respect to the food and in the meantime, there was this corporal who always called me for post-exercise, who had become kitchen corporal in the meantime, as he was always violent, but not with me, but with others. In order to keep him from doing stupid things he was sent to the kitchen, but there he did even more stupid things.


‘There was an old supervisor used to visit cigar factories. The factory workers all used to come out and started at the car. There was the grandad who came and said: I told you: It is already written in the Bible: if the chariots roll without horses, then the end of the world has arrived.’

In addition to the problems with corpus research in relation to the phenomenon of indefinite ‘dieser’, a corpus with natural language data does not enable us to find parallel minimal pairs of discourses including indefinite ‘dieser’ and referential interpretations ‘ein’ — the ultimate requirement for an optimal and direct comparison of the discourse effects of the two terms, as we aim for a high level of comparability.

6.4 Previous accounts on the discourse effects of indefinite ‘this’

In this section I will give an overview on influential accounts which try to account for the discourse-structuring function of the English indefinite ‘this’.

The observation that indefinite ‘dieser/this’ marks referents that are prominent in the subsequent discourse, has, however, not only been made with respect to the indefinite use. Himmelmann (1996: 229), for example, notes that the anaphoric use of demonstratives can be shown to preferably occur after the first mention of a “thematically prominent referent that persists in the subsequent discourse”. This strategy of the anaphoric use is widely used across languages. As an example Himmelmann suggests that it is more natural to re-mention the king in (i) with this king than with the king, if the referent is “thematically prominent” in the subsequent discourse:

(i) Once upon a time there was a king. This / the king had…

48 The observation that indefinite ‘dieser/this’ marks referents that are prominent in the subsequent discourse, has, however, not only been made with respect to the indefinite use. Himmelmann (1996: 229), for example, notes that the anaphoric use of demonstratives can be shown to preferably occur after the first mention of a “thematically prominent referent that persists in the subsequent discourse”. This strategy of the anaphoric use is widely used across languages. As an example Himmelmann suggests that it is more natural to re-mention the king in (i) with this king than with the king, if the referent is “thematically prominent” in the subsequent discourse:
6.4 Previous accounts on the discourse effects of indefinite ‘this’

I will first summarize the accounts of Perlman (1969), Prince (1981) and Ionin (2006) in turn. Their main ideas should serve as the starting point for the investigation of the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser* and nurture the predictions made in the actual experimental study on the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser*.

After that I will discuss more general accounts discussing the concept of Discourse Prominence (Givón 1981, 1983; Chiriacescu 2011) and literature including experimental methods (Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1969; Chiriacescu 2011).

Most accounts, quite similarly, accounts describe indefinite *this* as either a signal for “more information coming” (Perlman 1969), or as an expression introducing a referent which is “more likely to be talked about again” (Prince 1981), or as the marker of a “noteworthy” referent, whose noteworthy property will be subsequently revealed (Ionin 2006). Prince (1981) and Ionin (2006) both give first empirical data from corpus studies and Ionin (2006) offers a semantic analysis of indefinite this based on her data and previous findings (Maclaran 1982 and Prince 1981). Wright and Givón (1987: 28) conclude (originally being interested in the renovation cycle of indefinite articles) that the referents of indefinite *this* are more “important” in the following discourse after their introduction (based on Givón 1981, 1983). In addition to these accounts, there are other accounts stating observations which lead to the same direction. Maclaran (1982), for example, states that the referents of indefinite *this* are “of some greater importance in the following discourse”.

6.4.1 Perlman (1969): Indefinite *this* — “A signal for additional upcoming information”

Perlman (1969: 77) notes, investigating the discourse function of indefinite *this* and contrasting it with the discourse effects of the simple indefinite article *a(n)* in English, that indefinite *this* “serves to bring subsequent information about the noun head which is introduced for the first time into the discourse“ (1969: 77). He gives the examples in (283) and (284) below and notes: “in [283] the two clauses are felt more distinctly to be two separate pieces of information, while in [284] the speaker implies that he does not have just any book, but rather one that was drawn into the utterance for some special reason, such reason being given in the second clause.” (Perlman 1969: 77)

(283) I have got a book, and I think you ought to read it.

Himmelmann’s observation underlines how the class of demonstratives appears to be generally linked to discourse phenomena and further motivates the present investigation of the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser*.
Perlman concludes that the close linking of the referent of indefinite *this* with the subsequent information about it is one of the functions going along with indefinite *this*. He supports this assumption with examples containing indefinite *this* without subsequent information. He states: “Compare the following answers to the question “what did you do last night?” (Perlman 1969: 78):

(285) a. I saw a play.
b. I saw this play.
c. I saw a play, had a drink and went home.
d. I saw this play, had a drink and went home.
e. I saw a play and it dealt with alcoholism among linguists.
f. I saw this play and it dealt with alcoholism among linguists.
g. I saw a play (that dealt) (dealing) with alcoholism among linguists.

Starting with the assumption that indefinite *this* serves to “tie additional information about the head noun more closely to it” (1969: 78), the above examples show, according to Perlman, that indefinite *this* also appears to serve as a “signal for additional upcoming information” (1969: 78). In (285b), for example, most likely the hearer would respond saying *How did you like it?* anticipating that the speaker reveals more information about the play. Perlman notes that for (285a), in contrast, the most natural response would be *Then what did you do?* The same as for (285b) is said to hold for (285d), where indefinite *this* “leads the listener to expect to hear about the play itself” (Perlman 1969: 78). Perlman labels examples like (285a) unmarked, as they imply “no further information forthcoming” (or at least not necessarily), whereas cases like (285b) are labeled “marked” for the opposite reason. Thus, he comes to the final conclusion that indefinite *this* has “introductory and information-signaling functions” (1969: 80). Perlman’s observations, intuitively, also relate to the German phenomenon of indefinite *dieser*.

6.4.2 Prince (1981): Indefinite *this* — “Introducing something to be talked about”

Prince (1981) offers an account of indefinite-*this* noun phrases, including remarks about their semantics (for a discussion of the semantic part of Prince (1981) see Chapter 5) and discourse pragmatics. She makes several interesting observations, but does not come to a final conclusion with respect to the analysis of indefinite *this* in the end. She admits that she sees her work rather as a starting point for future research which then can lead to “several different directions” (1981: 246). She delivers first data with respect to the discourse effect of indefinite *this* and makes some theoretical claims: indefinite *this* is indefinite, specific (in terms of
6.4 Previous accounts on the discourse effects of indefinite ‘this’

existential presupposition) and presuppositional. Still, she leaves a semantic-pragmatic analysis of indefinite this open for future research. Her theoretical and experimental work strongly influenced future accounts on the topic, such as Ionin’s (2006) analysis of indefinite this, which links Prince’s (1981) theoretical observations with her own data and Fodor and Sag’s (1982) account of referential indefinites, cf. Chapter 5.

Prince (1981: 235) is the first to do quantitative work with respect to the discourse effects of indefinite this, in the form of a brief corpus study. Still, she only briefly alludes to the discourse function of the indefinite this, saying that “one must look […] at what follows”, as indefinite this appears to introduce “something that is going to be talked about”. This matches Perlman’s (1969) and, as I will show in the next section, Ionin’s (2006) approach. Prince (1981) reports from a small corpus study in which she investigates occurrences of indefinite this and checked if the referents introduced with indefinite this were mentioned again in the subsequent discourse after their introduction. She does not, though, compare her findings with, for example, the behavior of the indefinite article in discourse. Still, her results are suggestive as they confirm the intuition that the indefinite this introduces referents which are frequently mentioned again in the subsequent discourse, for example as new topics. Prince reports: “In 209 out of 243 cases (86%), the referent introduced (evoked) by indefinite this is referred to again within a few clauses. In 141 instances (58% of all occurrences), it is referred to explicitly (e.g. [286]), and, in 68 cases (28% of all occurrences), it is referred to implicitly (e.g. [287]):”

(286) Explicit:

“This fellow I work with — I wouldn’t call him militant, but he’s perhaps a little more forward than I am — he wouldn’t respond if you called him boy. He’d promptly tell ‘em…”

(Washroom attendant; Terkel, 1974, p. 156) (Prince 1981: 235)

(287) Implicit:

“I been on this one case now about eight months. The problem [in this case] is bad management, not theft…”

(Industrial investigator; Terkel, 1974, p. 208) (Prince 1981: 235)

From these data Prince (1981: 235) concludes that indefinite this introduces new discourse topics which are “very likely to be talked about” in the subsequent discourse, nurturing similar intuitions for the phenomenon of German indefinite dieser. Unfortunately, Prince (1981) does not compare the results of her small study with other indefinites such as the indefinite article on comparable referential interpretations and also, unfortunately, she doesn’t properly specify what she means by her “explicit” vs. “implicit” distinction. To me, “implicit” continuation appears to be quite a vague concept — what does it mean to implicitly refer to a referent? Ill-defined concepts like this justify the attempt of the present thesis to
develop clear-cut parameters, comprehensively defining the discourse effects present for indefinite ‘dieser’ and making them measurable by means of clear measurement criteria.

6.4.3 Ionin (2006): Indefinite this — Expression of noteworthiness

Ionin (2006) also offers data from a small corpus study. Furthermore, she creates a new semantic analysis of indefinite ‘this’ as a referential indefinite with demonstrative-like semantics in the original Fodor and Sag (1982) sense. Ionin’s analysis highly influences my semantic analysis of indefinite ‘dieser’ (cf. Chapter 5).

With respect to the discourse function of indefinite ‘this’, Ionin (2006) also notes that there is a difference between indefinite ‘this’ and the simple indefinite article ‘a(n)’. She quotes Maclaran (1982: 90), who, like Perlman (1969) and Prince (1981), notes that indefinite ‘this’ “draws attention to the fact that the speaker has a particular referent in mind, about which further information may be given.” Then Ionin (2006: 180) discusses one of Maclaran’s examples (288), noting that the use of indefinite ‘this’ is infelicitous in (288a), where the identity of the 31 cent stamp is completely irrelevant, and where nothing further is said about this stamp. In contrast, the use of indefinite ‘this’ is felicitous in the b.-version, where the identity of the stamp is important, and where the stamp is talked about again:

(288) a. He put on a / *this 31 cent stamp on the envelope, so he must want it to go to airmail.
   b. He put on a / this 31 cent stamp on the envelope, and only realized later it was worth a fortune because it was unperforated.
   (Maclaran 1982: 88)

Ionin (2006: 181) adds one of her own examples to strengthen this point:

(289) a. Becky wrote some thank-you note using a / *this purple pen; then she mailed the notes to her friends.
   b. Becky wrote some thank-you notes using a / this purple pen, which suddenly exploded spilling purple ink all over Becky’s clothes and furniture.

Ionin (2006: 181) labels this property of indefinite ‘this’ “noteworthiness”, which is supposed to be a semantic property leading to the respective discourse effects. She states that the use of indefinite ‘this’ “requires the statement of something noteworthy about the individual denoted by the indefinite”. Ionin’s idea is quite similar to the one of Perlman and Prince as she also claims that indefinite ‘this’ requires more information about that referent. That is, the speaker has to say more about the referent, (s)he has to reveal a noteworthy property of
the referent, which can be, pretty much anything, according to Ionin (2006). There simply must be “something noteworthy” (Ionin 2006) about the referent.

Ionin (2006: 184, fn. 4) reports data from a brief, informal corpus study using a portion of the Saarbrücken Corpus of Spoken English. She examined the first 40 pages of the corpus of oral stories for occurrences of *a / an* and of *this / these* in its indefinite use. She found 19 uses of indefinite *this* and 92 uses of the indefinite article. Of the 19 instances of indefinite this 17 (89%) denoted a referent which was referred to again in a few clauses wither explicitly (12 cases) or implicitly (5 cases). Of the 92 uses of *a*-indefinites only 34 were directly comparable to indefinite *this* by (i) occurring in argument position and (ii) not scoping under any intensional / modal operators. Of these 34, 24 (71%) were subject to follow-up mention either explicitly (20 cases) or implicitly (4 cases). Ionin admits that this is just a brief search but that it is still suggestive. Unfortunately, she does not give any examples of her corpus data.

Ionin (2006) notes that it is most likely that the noteworthiness (which is a semantic concept) is *expressed* in a subsequent statement either explicitly or implicitly. Implicit expression of noteworthiness is understood as an indirect continuation of the noteworthy referent in the subsequent discourse in that it will not be explicitly re-mentioned (via clear anaphoric reference) when the noteworthy property is revealed. With implicit expression of noteworthiness the noteworthy property is revealed without making direct reference to the referent:

(290) Implicit:

“I been on this one case now about eight months. The problem [in this case] is bad management, not theft…”

(Industrial investigator; Terkel 1974, p. 208) (Prince 1981: 235)

Discussing Prince’s account above, I already expressed my critical view towards the explicit-implicit distinction, as this implicit noteworthiness appears to be a concept too vague. It is extremely difficult to pin down precisely and unfitting as a parameter in an experimental study.

Note that Ionin (2006) considers noteworthiness to be a purely semantic characteristic of the indefinite *this*-referents. She considers it, firstly, as a property of a sentence and roots it in form of a noteworthiness-condition in the lexical entry of indefinite *this*. But the *expression* of noteworthiness (in the subsequent discourse, i.e. the actual discourse effects) is explained via standard pragmatic principles of informativeness. Ionin (2006: 194) refers back to Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quantity, saying that the use of indefinite *this* without a continuation of the referent in the subsequent discourse is too informative, as we do not use a term indicating noteworthiness of a referent (in the sentence semantics) if there is nothing noteworthy to say about the particular referent. Thus, Ionin accounts for the discourse effects of indefinite *this* in that she roots the noteworthiness condition in the lexical entry and, in addition, refers back to Gricean (1975) principles in order to account for the *effects* (in the subsequent discourse) of this
The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

noteworthiness condition. I, in contrast, argue for the effect of Discourse Structuring Potential as a purely pragmatic phenomenon, which does not need to be anchored in form of a noteworthiness condition in the sentence semantics but which can be exclusively and naturally explained due to standard pragmatic mechanisms being triggered from the presence of the speaker intention to refer of indefinite *dieser* alone. Chapter 7 is dedicated to my account of the relation between sentence semantics and discourse pragmatics.

The following three accounts which will be presented depict experimental approaches to discourse prominence.

6.4.4 Givón’s (1983) Topic Continuity (experimentally applied in Wright and Givón 1987)

Givón (1983) investigates topics (topics, on Givóns terminology relate to discourse referents) in discourse and notes that high continuity in discourse correlates with easier processing of a referent (1983: 12). In a nicely applicable fashion (an example of the application is given below, discussing an experiment of Wright and Givón 1987), Givón postulates three means of measurement in order to determine a topic’s continuity in discourse. In the following I want to discuss the main points, most importantly the three parameters he suggests in order to quantify over Discourse Prominence (topic continuity) and the application, respectively. This will bring helpful and inspiring insights for the present approach which tries to develop measurements in discourse in order to determine the forward-looking prominence of the referents of indefinite *dieser* in discourse.

Givón (1983) extensively discusses the graded concept of ‘topic continuity’, relating to the observation that some topics may stay topics over several clauses, whereas others do not, with respect to the behavior of discourse referents across more than one sentence. Assuming that more important referents tend to be more anaphorically accessible, crucially, more persistent in the upcoming discourse, Givón (1983) proposes three parameters as a method of how to empirically measure topic continuity, correlating with the form and the type of referring expression used:

(291) Three factors of topic continuity (Givón 1983: 13ff.)

(i) referential distance (look back)
(ii) potential interference / ambiguity / competition
(iii) persistence / look forward

The first factor, (i) referential distance, is thought to determine how recently an entity has been mentioned in the previous discourse, i.e. by looking at the sentences on the left side of the respective referent. Givón (1983) shows that the smaller the distance between antecedent and anaphor, the more important or prominent the referent of the anaphor is. The second factor, (ii) potential
interference, describes the interaction of the descriptive content of the expression with the descriptive contents of similar referring expressions. The observed tendency is that the more descriptive material is given, the fewer are the competitors for a referent. The third factor, (iii) persistence measures how long an entity will remain in the subsequent discourse after it was introduced for the first time. This parameter is generally less intensely investigated since most theories focus on the fashion in which referents are represented in the previous discourse (e.g. Ariel 1988), and since it is quite difficult to establish the appropriate factors that could influence it.

According to Givón (1981), all three factors together determine the activation status of a referent. For the experimental study in this dissertation, however, the third factor is of utmost interest, as it is most suitable for the study of indefinites, which, if at all, show discourse effects in the subsequent discourse after their introduction. They do not have any history in the previous discourse and thus the parameter (i) referential distance / look back, for example, is not applicable. Later, Wright and Givón (1987: 17) apply the third measurement “topic persistence” in a study investigating the topic continuity of indefinite this vs. the simple indefinite article a(n) in English (originally being interested in the renovation cycle of the indefinite article). They claim that the use of indefinite this has been informally noted before, however they do note that studies which quantify over the intuition that indefinite dieser expresses prominence in the subsequent discourse are lacking. Then they (1987: 16) refer to a quantified, text-based study by Shroyer (1985), who found the following: “When the unstressed ‘this’ — rather than ‘a(n)’ — is used as an indefinite article in informal spoken English, introducing an new referent into the discourse, that referent is likely to be thematically important; it is thus likely to be more frequent in the subsequent discourse. In contrast, referents introduced by ‘a(n)’ will be less important, thus less frequent in the subsequent discourse.” Wright and Givón (1987) test that hypothesis by means of an experimental study themselves, applying the topic continuity measurement developed by Givón (1981, 1983). They had six naïve participants (native speakers of American English between 8 and 10 years old), who were asked to tell narratives to each other (Wright and Givon 1987: 17ff.). These stories were recorded and then transcribed. The whole body consisted of 800 clauses, containing 107 occurrences of indefinite noun phrases marked with a(n) and 43 occurrences of indefinite noun phrases marked with indefinite this. Then, each category was further sub-divided into SUBJECT and NON-SUBJECT NPs, examples of these categories are given below:

(292) a. this / a(n)-SUBJECT:…there’s these two guys / and there was a fly to third base.
   b. this / a(n)-NON-SUBJECT … he saw this great big bear… / he saw this monkey holding a candy bar.
   (Wright and Givón 1987: 17)
Then, the topic continuity measurement which was developed by Givón (1981, 1983) was applied to all the texts transcribed. Wright and Givón (1987: 17) sum up:

[T]his method measures the number of times within the next 10 clauses that a referent NP persists as an argument of the clause, following the point in which it is first introduced. The values that are assigned are thus from 0 to 10 (very rarely the count is 10+, if the argument appears in a clause more than once). The topic persistence (TP) measure thus assesses, indirectly, the referent’s importance in the subsequent discourse. In this count, non-referential indefinites [such as non referential objects: he was looking for a place to sleep or attributive predicates as in they were a real dream], were automatically assigned the value of 0. (Wright and Givón 1987: 17)

Their measurement method is depicted in the example below:

(293) a. ya know this kid ya know [he] was waking in the forest,
    b. [he] was waking in the forest,
    c. an’ [he] saw this great big bear,
    d. and [[it] was, [it]] was taking bites out of a tree;
    e. [he] was scared, and then, and then,
    f. and then [he] came to [[the bear]] and,
    g. [he] tapped [[him]] on the, little bottom,
    h. and [he] says,
    i. (…) growl,
    j. and [he] says,
    k. who’s behind [me]?
    l. uh uh, [I] am, uh uh, [I]’m just a little boy, yeah,
    m. [I] wish [[you]] lived with [me]
    n. [I]’m a nice bear.

(Wright and Givón 1987: 18)

Wright and Givón (1987: 18) conclude: “The five indefinite NPs in (293) above fare as follows: The first character, ‘this boy’, is introduced in clause (293a) above. Within the next 10 clauses — (293b) through (293k) — it recurs 8 times. The second character, ‘this great big bear’, is introduced in clause (293c). In the next 10 clauses — (293d) through (293m) — it recurs five times. The REF-indefinite ‘a tree’ is introduced in clause (293d) and never recurs again. It is thus assigned the TP value of 0. And the NON-REF-indefinites ‘a little boy’ and ‘a nice bear’ appear in clause (293l) and (293n), and are assigned the TP value of 0 by definition.

As a result, Wright and Givón receive persistence-distribution patterns (1987: 21) which clearly show that the referents of indefinite this are much more persistent, and thus, in their terminology, “more important” in the respective discourses, as summarized in Table 23 and Table 24, where:
6.4 Previous accounts on the discourse effects of indefinite ‘this’

the mean TP values for the four sub-categories: ‘this’-SUBJECT, ‘this’-NON-SUBJECT, ‘a’-SUBJECT and ‘a’-NON-SUBJECT were calculated. As one can see, there is a rather striking difference between the two categories, a difference that recapitulates itself in all their four texts. The average TP value for this-marked NPs, either subjects or objects, is consistently much higher than that of a-marked NPs. This difference is even more pronounced when the SUBJECT vs. NON-SUBJECT distribution of the two categories is taken into account. This distribution is expressed in table [23], below. Fully 65% of the this-marked NPs appear as subjects, with the average TP value of 6.95 clauses. In contrast, 88% of the a-marked NPs appear as objects, with the average TP value of 0.56 clauses — i.e. virtually no persistence at all beyond the initial introduction into the discourse. (Wright and Givón 1987: 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT</th>
<th>‘THIS’</th>
<th>‘A’</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUBJ</td>
<td>NON-SUBJ</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>SUBJ</td>
<td>NON-SUBJ</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>SUBJ</td>
<td>NON-SUBJ</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>15 2.53</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>36 0.65</td>
<td>39 0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 6.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>24 0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>14 5.20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>29 0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>8 6.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>15 0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>43 5.32</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>107 0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJ</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TP</th>
<th>NON-SUBJ</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TP</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘this’</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘a(n)’</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, Wright and Givón (1987) give stable results showing that the referents of indefinite this are “more important” in the subsequent discourse after their introduction, as they show significantly higher values for the parameter of topic persistence, developed by Givón (1981, 1983). Wright and Givón (1987) use this result in order to contribute to the discussion about the renovation cycle of the indefinite article: they claim that indefinite this is, semantically, a referential indefinite and that it is also, and more importantly, a marker of pragmatically-referential indefinites. Pragmatically referential indefinites are those indefinites, which are more important in the discourse. Thus they conclude that indefinite this “seems to enter the grammar of colloquial English at the very same point in the paradigm as does the numeral one” (Wright and Givón 1987: 28), assuming a
three-stage-renovation cycle of indefinites, in which pragmatic “importance” leads to semantic referentiality:

(294) Three-stage-renovation cycle of indefinites (Wright and Givón 1987: 28)
Stage I: All indefinites are marked similarly (by zero or by some invariant article)
Stage II: The new marker codes only pragmatically important — thus primarily semantically referential — indefinites
Stage III: The new marker gradually expands its scope to mark all indefinites, it thus becomes de-marked, bringing the system back to its point of origin.

I, however, will pursue a different, and non-diachronic argumentation in Chapter 7, in that I assume the semantics to be prior and that the correlating pragmatic discourse effects are to be derived from the semantics, respectively (cf. von Heusinger 2011b).

Wright and Givón’s experiment shows, independently of how they interpret the results, how Givón’s (1983) parameter of topic persistence can be practically applied in order to analyze the discourse behavior of indefinites in the upcoming discourse. In my study, I take over this parameter from Givón and re-label it as referential persistence (as my definition of topic differs from Givón’s). In addition, I will use two further parameters which are also suitable to measure the discourse effects of indefinites in the upcoming discourse. Wright and Givón (1987) exemplarily show how the postulation of a clear parameter enables us to experimentally quantify over the discourse effects of indefinite this. I go one step further, applying several improvements to their technique as I (i) will use three parameters overall. This allows us to give a wider and more systematic description of the discourse effects under investigation (including the information structural notion of topic, for example, and not only measuring effects of persistence but also quantify over quality effects, such as topic shift). I (ii) use data from a perception-production experiment in which the trigger items are minimal pairs varying only with respect to the parameter of indefinite dieser vs. indefinite ein — allowing for a more straight forward comparison of the two terms. Note that later studies, like Gernsbacher and Shroyer’s (1989) below already made use of minimal pairs and served as a model for the present account.

6.4.5 Gernsbacher and Shroyer’s (1989) measurements of accessibility in discourse

Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989) present the findings of an experimental study investigating the forward-looking (“cataphoric” (1989: 536), in their terminology) discourse effects of indefinite this in English spoken discourses. As a result, they show that the referents of indefinite this, in comparison to the indefinite article a(n), are mentioned more frequently in the subsequent discourse, with a higher
immediacy of reference and with lower referential explicitness. The methodology used in Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989) was (roughly) used as a model for the experimental study presented in this dissertation. I will thus summarize the experiment performed by Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989) in the following.

In the experiment, Gernsbacher and Shroyer auditorily presented several informal narratives to their subjects, informing them that the narrator would stop talking at one point in the narrative. When this happened the subjects were told to continue telling the narrative. The narratives were constructed in a way such that the last clause of each narrative contained noun phrases either introducing a referent with indefinite this or with the simple indefinite article a(n). One example of such a narrative with the critical noun phrase in the final sentence is given below:

(295) I went to the coast last weekend with Sally. We’d checked the tide schedule ‘n we planned to arrive at low tide — ‘cuz I just love beachcombin’. Right off, I found 3 whole sand dollars. So then I started look’ for agates, but I couldn’t find any. Sally was pretty busy too. She found this / an egg...
(Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989: 537)

The continuations provided by the participants were then analyzed in terms of what Gernsbacher & Shroyer (1989) label forward-looking discourse accessibility.

Before summarizing their measurement methods, let me summarize Gernsbacher and Shroyer’s proposal (1989: 536): “as speakers speak, listeners build mental representations of the ongoing discourse. Both parties benefit if these representations are efficiently constructed. One characteristic of an efficient mental representation is that key concepts are easily accessible,” and the accessibility of indefinites is, in Gernsbacher and Shroyer’s view, reflected in the discourse effects of the respective expressions in the subsequent discourse after their introduction. Thus, they propose that speakers use certain devices in order to mark key concepts, in particular, concepts that might play a role in the subsequent discourse after their introduction. They also propose that these concepts marked with these devices have a privileged status in listener’s mental representations — in particular, they are more accessible (defining accessibility as cognitive accessibility). Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989: 537) strive to measure the cataphoric discourse effects of the referents investigated via three parameters, which they describe as manifestations in the upcoming discourse after the introduction of the referent of interest. Their parameters are: (i) frequency of reference, (ii) immediacy of reference and (iii) referential explicitness.

These three parameters Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989) make use of enable them to measure a quantified degree of “referential accessibility” of the referring expressions investigated. With (i) frequency of reference they relate to how often reference is made to the critical referents in the subsequent discourse. They
assume that the more accessible a concept is in a speaker’s mental representation, the more frequently he or she will refer to it. With (ii) immediacy of reference they mean how likely an expression would be immediately re-mentioned. They assume that the more accessible a concept is in a speaker’s representation the more quickly he or she can refer to it. They support the postulation of this parameter via various studies all predicting that accessibility strongly predicts initial mention (Bock 1982, 1986; Gernsbacher and Hargreaves 1988). By (iii) referential explicitness they relate to how likely it is that referents would be re-mentioned with more explicit forms of anaphor, such as noun phrases, as opposed to less explicit forms such as pronouns. They propose that accessibility is manifested in referential explicitness because referential explicitness is inversely related to focus, foregrounding and topicality, Thus they predict that speakers use less explicit anaphors, such as pronouns, to refer to more focused, foregrounded or topical concepts. (Remember that I consider the parameter of referential explicitness to pertain to a different type of Discourse Prominence.)

45 undergraduates, all native American English speakers, were used as subjects for the experiment. The materials consisted of 20 experimental narratives and 8 filler narratives which were all composed in a rather informal style. All 28 narratives were recorded, whereas half of the narratives was recorded using indefinite this to introduce the critical referents, and the other half was recorded using the indefinite article. The subjects would then listen to the stories and orally continue telling it for 20 seconds. The continuations were then transcribed and judged by naïve transcriptors.

The findings for the first parameter, frequency of reference, fulfill the expectations, as “the subjects did indeed refer to the critical noun more frequently when the critical nouns were introduced with this, the subjects referred to them with an average of 4.05 times per continuation; in contrast, when the critical nouns were introduced with a, the subjects referred to them only 2.76 times per continuation. This difference was statistically reliable” (Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989: 538). Further on, Gernsbacher and Shroyer note that it was not the case that the subjects did simply produce more clauses when the critical nouns were introduced with this rather than with a, as in both conditions the same average number of clauses (17.8) per continuation was produced. It was rather the case, that the subjects simply used up a greater proportion of their clauses in order to refer to the critical nouns, when they were introduced with this. I find this observation particularly interesting, as it shows how the use of indefinite this blocks reference to other referents. In my study, the parameter of referential persistence relates to Gernsbacher and Shroyer’s parameter of frequency of reference, measuring the same effect.

With respect to the second parameter, immediacy of reference, the predictions were fulfilled as well, as “the subjects were indeed more likely to refer to the critical nouns in their very first clauses when the nouns were introduced with this” (Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989: 539). The subjects were found to refer to the critical nouns in 47% of their first clauses when they were continuing
narratives that introduced nouns with *this*, whereas in contrast they referred to the
critical noun only in 34% of their first clauses when they were continuing
narratives of the a-version — this finding also being statistically reliable. In my
experiment, the “immediacy of reference” is measured as well but not considered
to be an independent parameter, as the measuring method applied accounting for
referential persistence (counting how often a referent is re-mentioned
anaphorically in the subsequent discourse) automatically accounts for immediacy
of reference: it counts how often and where (in which continuation clause) the
critical referent is re-mentioned again. Thus, in my account, I do not consider
immediacy of reference an independent parameter but will discuss the results
related to immediacy of reference as an additional result discussing the results for
referential persistence.

With respect to the third parameter, referential explicitness, Gernsbacher
and Shroyer’s predictions were fulfilled, as well, as the subjects “were indeed
more likely to use less explicit anaphors to refer to the critical nouns when the
noun had been introduced with this” (1989: 539). The parameter of referential
explicitness was not taken into account in my study, as it relates to a different type
of Discourse Prominence on my understanding (following Chiriacescu and von
Heusinger 2010), i.e. to the accessibility of a referent in the discourse. The type of
Discourse Prominence (Discourse Structuring Potential) investigated in this work
deals with discourse patterns (in terms of frequency effects pertaining to the
discourse structure) across (multiple) sentence boundaries only.

Gernsbacher and Shroyer’s (1989) study strongly inspired the study
conducted in this dissertation, especially as their methodology, using a story-
continuation task, i.e. a perception-production experiment, appears to be a good fit
with respect to the investigation of the discourse behavior of indefinites. It allows
us to compare minimal pairs containing indefinite *dieser* and *ein*. Furthermore,
their operational definition of the cataphoric discourse effects via three
measurable parameters builds a clear base for a quantitative text-based study, as it
is transparent and comprehensible. In this work, I will take over Gernsbacher and
Shroyer’s methodology and (at least) one of their parameters suggested: the
frequency of reference (which is, on my view, directly related to immediacy of
reference.)

### 6.4.6 Chiriacescu’s (2011) Discourse Structuring Potential

Being originally interested in the different discourse behavior of *pe*-marked
indefinite objects (differential object marking) and non-*pe*-marked indefinite
objects in Romanian, Chiriacescu (2011) coins the concept of Discourse
Structuring Potential. It is a sub-type of Discourse Prominence which originally
focuses, via two clear, measurable parameters, on the discourse behavior of

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49 In fact, suggesting the parameter of frequency of mention, Gernsbacher and Shroyer are inspired
by Givón (1983).
expressions in the subsequent discourse after their introduction (Chiriacescu 2011). Chiriacescu shows that pe-marked indefinite object in Romanian exhibit a significantly higher Discourse Structuring Potential compared to their non-pe-marked counterparts. The postulation of Chiriacescu’s Discourse Structuring Potential is central to this dissertation, as I will put forward an advanced version of her concept in order to experimentally account for the discourse effects of indefinite dieser. Before doing that, however, I want to summarize Chiriacescu’s account of Discourse Structuring Potential, as my advanced version still strongly relates to what Chiriacescu (2011) originally proposed.

The underlying assumption of Chiriacescu’s approach is that different types of noun phrases do not equally contribute to the Discourse Structuring Potential of their referents. The Discourse Structuring Potential is assumed to be a continuum, allowing for low / high values. Chiriacescu and von Heusinger (2011: 153) define the Discourse Structuring Potential as follows: it “is understood as the property of an expression that introduces a discourse referent to provide information about the discourse status of the referent in the subsequent discourse”. A concept like the Discourse Structuring Potential, which exclusively focuses on the subsequent discourse after an expression’s introduction in the discourse appears to be very useful with respect to the investigation of the discourse effects of indefinite dieser. Chiriacescu (2011) operationally defines Discourse Structuring Potential using two textual parameters, i.e. (i) referential persistence and (ii) topic shift potential, in order to quantify over the discourse effects of a referent, as both metrics pertain to the subsequent discourse. In doing so, she adopts a forward-looking perspective, testing the production-driven biases licensed by pe-versus non-pe marked referents conducting a story continuation experiment, very similar to the one performed by Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989). She also had subjects produce story continuations (written) and then analyzed the discourses produced with respect to the two underlying metrics. The two textual parameters are defined, according to Chiriacescu (2011), in detail as follows: Her first parameter, (i) referential persistence, goes back to Givón (1983) and Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989), as it indicates the likelihood with which a particular referent will be picked up in the following discourse. Thus, in the story continuations received she counted how often a referent was anaphorically re-mentioned in the discourses produced by the subjects. The second parameter, (ii) topic shift potential, is defined “in terms of the likelihood that a non-subject referent will be mentioned in grammatical subject position in the subsequent discourse” (Chiriacescu and von Heusinger 2011: 145). This notion is, as well, inspired by Givón’s (1983) account of topic continuity in discourse. For reasons of simplicity, Chiriacescu (2011), however, equalizes the topic-status of an expression with the grammatical subject position, which makes the analysis of the continuations received more practicable, since topicality is not very easy to determine, as there are varying definitions and approaches to topicality. Chiriacescu and von Heusinger (2010) justify this simplification by relating to previous studies which have shown that topicality can be associated with the grammatical subject position, as those studies (e.g. Crawley
and Stevenson 1990) have shown that referents mentioned in syntactic subject position are often mentioned in topic position as well. The same referents are found to be more salient in a given discourse than referents mentioned in other syntactic positions (i.e as direct or indirect objects). Thus, Chiriacescu and von Heusinger (2011: 153) say: “The first instance in which an object referent becomes the grammatical subject in a matrix clause is treated as an instance of topic shift.”.

To summarize, Chiriacescu (2011) has developed the concept of Discourse Structuring Potential which is especially tailored to measure the Discourse Prominence of an expression with respect to the subsequent discourse after its introduction (see also Chiriacescu and von Heusinger 2010; Chiriacescu and von Heusinger 2011). In order to measure the (potential) forward-looking discourse effects of indefinite dieser in German, the concept of Discourse Structuring Potential appears to be a suitable concept.

6.4.7 Interim summary

So far, I have first discussed three accounts investigating the discourse pragmatics of English indefinite this (Perlman 1969; Prince 1981; Ionin 2006), including first suggestive data on this topic. I further reviewed and discussed three accounts which deal with the more general phenomenon of Discourse Prominence (Givón 1983; Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989; Chiriacescu 2011) and which all offer quite practical means in order to measure Discourse Prominence. All three accounts defined Discourse Prominence via practically applicable means in form of several clearly measureable parameters that enable us to quantify over Discourse Prominence. Those three accounts shed light on the phenomenon of Discourse Prominence from quite similar perspectives. This is due to the fact that Gernsbacher and Shroyer’s (1989) study is inspired by Givón’s earlier work (1983) and Chiriacescu’s (2011) study is inspired by, amongst others, the work of both Givón (1983) and Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989). The study conducted in this thesis can be seen as a continuation of that research development, profiting from the insights of all three accounts. Using those elements of the three accounts, which appeared most suitable for the experimental investigation of indefinite demonstrative dieser and re-pooling them together, we are now well-equipped for the experimental investigation of indefinite dieser in German.

In the following section will propose my definition of Discourse Structuring Potential by suggesting two advancements (compared to Chiriaceacu’s 2011 version): First, I suggest a third parameter underlying the Discourse Structuring Potential: topic continuity. Secondly, I aim for a more profound definition of the concept of topicality, distancing myself from simply equating topics and grammatical subjects and furthermore applying professional means of data annotation and inter-annotator agreement.
6.5 Discourse Structuring Potential — Advanced

Postulating the parameters underlying the Discourse Structuring Potential enables us to reformulate our observations as clear experimental hypotheses with respect to the discourse behavior of indefinite *dieser* (compared to the indefinite article *ein*). The advanced version developed in this thesis includes an additional parameter, (iii) topic continuity. Thus, I extend Chiriacescu’s (2011) notion of Discourse Structuring Potential and make it more comprehensive.

6.5.1 Three parameters

Discourse Structuring Potential is understood as the property of an expression that introduces a discourse referent to provide information about the discourse status of that referent in the subsequent discourse. The operational definition of Discourse Structuring Potential employed in this dissertation extends the one developed Chiriacescu (2011). Discourse Structuring Potential is measured by means of the following three textual characteristics which all pertain to the following discourse: referential persistence, topic shift potential and, additionally, topic continuity.

The parameters of topic shift potential and the new parameter of topic continuity may appear quite similar at first glance, however does the first quantify over the questions of likelihood: does the critical referent become topic? And, if so, at which point in the subsequent discourse? whereas, in contrast, the second parameter, builds up on the first parameter and goes one step further, in that it quantifies over frequency values. It provides answers to the question of how often a newly-shifted topic is then mentioned again as a topic in the subsequent discourse.

The third parameter does not only measure the likelihood of a topic shift, but also quantifies over frequency- or continuation-effects: it deals with the new question of how long the referents, which are shifted to topics, continue as topics in the upcoming discourse. In measuring this further parameter, the long-reigning discourse effects related to topics (in terms of frequency effects across a multitude of sentences) are captured. Those effects are not captured by parameter topic shift potential. Therefore, it appears reasonable to apply this third parameter, as it provides a clear surplus.

1. **Referential persistence** measures the frequency with which a referent is anaphorically re-mentioned in the subsequent discourse (overall number), i.e. it measures how long the critical referents are generally being talked about (Givón 1983; Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989; Chiriacescu 2011).

2. **Topic shift potential** measures the probability with which a non-topical referent is mentioned again as a topic for the first time in the subsequent discourse (at some point) after its introduction. It counts the
6.5 Discourse Structuring Potential — Advanced

...shift only and measures the likelihood of a potential shift (modeled after Givón’s topic continuity, Chiriacescu 2011).

3. **Topic continuity** measures the frequency with which a referent is anaphorically re-mentioned as a topic again, i.e. it measures how long the referent is being talked about in the subsequent discourse remaining its status as a topic (overall number, including the topic shifts) (Givón 1983).

Let us consider the three parameters in relation to an example, in order to see how the measurement procedure actually works. In example (296) below, there is an introductory sentence introducing a referent with indefinite *dieser* as *dieser Fremde* ‘this stranger’. Being interested in the discourse effects of the *dieser*-noun phrase in the subsequent discourse, we then analyze the subsequent discourse (sentence 1 – 4) with respect to the three parameters above. This is done as follows:

(296) Introductory sentence:
Gestern war ich in einer Kneipe, da hat mich einfach so *dieser Fremde*1 angesprochen.
‘Yesterday I was in a pub where *this stranger*1 started talking to me.’

Table 25:
Coding example of referential persistence, topic shift potential and topic continuity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence continuations to (...)</th>
<th>Referential persistence</th>
<th>Topic shift potential</th>
<th>Topic continuity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1: <em>Er</em>1Topic sah sehr gut aus und trug eine große Brille. “<em>He</em>1Topic was very good looking and wearing big glasses.”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2: Ich war total verblüfft, dass <em>er</em>1 mich einfach so ansprach. “I was totally baffled because <em>he</em>1 just chatted me up.”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3: Aber <em>er</em>1Topic war ganz charmant und lud mich auf einen Drink ein. “But <em>he</em>1Topic was really charming and bought me a drink.”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4: Ich habe mich total in <em>ihn</em>1 verliebt. “I have really fallen in love with <em>him</em>1.”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUM</td>
<td>4 overall</td>
<td></td>
<td>shift in S1 2 overall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to the first metric, referential persistence, each anaphoric remention of the *dieser*-referent in (296) is counted, i.e. *Er* in S1, *er* in S2, *er* in S3 and *ihn* in S4, resulting in an overall number for referential persistence of
6 The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

indefinite dieser in the discourse above of 4. The second metric, topic shift potential, measures if and when the non-topical dieser referent from (296) becomes a topic in the subsequent discourse for the first time. In the table above, there is a topic shift and it happens already at S1. This is all we need to know in order to measure the topic shift potential. The third metric, topic continuity, goes one step further and measures the overall number of re-mentions of the critical referent as topics. In the example this happens twice, in S1 and S3. The value for topic continuity is always a subset of the value for referential persistence.

Being clear about the three parameters, which operationally define the version of Discourse Structuring Potential advanced in this dissertation, the next section deals with the understanding of topicality pursued in this work, as it is central with respect to the parameters topic shift potential and topic continuity, both investigating the upcoming discourse structure by checking the likelihood of (potential) topic shifts and the behavior of the shifted topics in the upcoming discourse (i.e. if they survive as topics).

6.5.2 Definition of topicality and topic-identification

Topics, in this book, are understood as sentence topics in the aboutness sense (Reinhart 1981; Jacobs 2001; Hocket 1958; Roberts 2011). I assume that “the terms topic and comment suggest the most general characteristic of predicative constrictions for their ICs” (Jacobs 2001: 645), in that the speaker announces a topic and then says something about it. Roberts (2011), arguing in the same vein explains aboutness topics stating that “a speaker in some way brings our attention to an entity that is relevant at that point in the discussion, in order to tell us something about it.” Reinhart (1981) has integrated this notion of topic into a theory of communication that makes use of the notion of common ground. According to her new information is not just added to the common ground content in the form of unstructured propositions, but is rather associated with entities, just like information in a file card system is associated with file cards that bear a particular heading. Where (297a) and (297b) express the same proposition, they structure it differently with respect to information structure insofar as (297a) should be stored as information about Aristotle Onassis, whereas (297b) should be stored as information about Jacqueline Kennedy.


To grasp the intuitive content of the aboutness-topic-concept consider further examples examples in (298) and (299):

(298) Maria, die ist eine begabte Sängerin

    ‘Maria, she is a talented singer.’
6.6 The experimental study

(299) Peter, den hab ich lange nicht mehr gesehen
‘Peter, I haven’t seen him in a while.’
(Endriss and Hinterwimmer 2007: 84)

The sentences above both exemplify so-called left-dislocation, where an XP in fronted position is associated with a resumptive pronoun in the specifier position of CP. I follow Frey (2004) in assuming that German left-dislocated phrases which are not understood contrastively are necessarily interpreted as topics. Accordingly, left-dislocation can be used as a topic-test. Intuitively, both sentences in (298) and (299) are felt to mainly convey information about Maria and Peter, respectively: they are both fine as answers to questions like What about Maria / Peter? or commands like Tell me something about Maria / Peter, while they are odd as answers to questions like Who is a very talented singer? or Who haven’t you seen for a long time?

According to Endriss and Hinterwimmer (2007: 84) it is “because of the prevalence of examples with proper names, definite descriptions and pronouns in the literature on topics, that many linguists subscribe to the view that familiarity is a necessary property of topics (cf. Hockett 1958; Kuno 1972; Gundel 1998)”. I will, however, follow Reinhart (1981) (see also Molnár 1993; Frey 2000, 2004; Endriss and Hinterwimmer 2007) in assuming that familiarity is not a defining property of topics. This claim is based on the observation that not only individual denoting DPs can be sentence topics in the aboutness sense, but also unmodified wide-scope indefinite DPs, exemplified in (300):

(300) Einen Linguisten, den kennt jeder.
‘One linguist, everybody knows.’
(Hinterwimmer and Endriss 2007: 87)

So, defining topics in the aboutness sense and not restricting the concept of topic to familiarity and givenness of the respective referents, we still lack clear tests and clear characteristics of aboutness topics. In the appendix, I summarize topicality tests and characteristic properties of topics, which will facilitate the topic determination in context. Listing these features, I quote extensively from the annotation guidelines, which two independent annotators used for the annotation of the actual experiment. They are based on the Potsdam Annotation Guidelines for Information Structure (Information Structure in Cross-Linguistic Corpora: Annotation Guidelines for Phonology, Morphology, Syntax, Semantics and Information Structure; Götze, Dipper and Skopeteas 2007). Those guidelines offer clear characteristics and tests for aboutness topics which facilitate the identification of aboutness topics and thus enable us to experimentally quantify over the two parameters of topic shift potential and topic continuity of indefinite dieser in German.
6 The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

6.6 The experimental study

Thus far, we have collected all the elements required for an experimental investigation of indefinite ‘dieser’. I came up with means to quantify over forward-looking Discourse Prominence in form of an advanced version of Chiriacescu’s (2011) Discourse Structural Potential and defined it via three parameters. I furthermore postulated clear characteristics of and practical tests for the notion of topicality and discussed the experimental method of story continuation tasks, which appears to be the perfect fit in order to account for the forward-looking discourse effects of expressions. Based on previous accounts on the English phenomenon of indefinite ‘this’ and first examples on the German phenomenon, we are able to formulate clear hypotheses with respect to the discourse effects of indefinite ‘this’, which are to be tested via the use of a story continuation experiment.

The Discourse Prominence of indefinite ‘dieser’ measured in the experiment will be compared with the one of indefinite article ‘ein’ on referential interpretations. Remember that I argued in Chapter 5 that only at first glance indefinite ‘dieser’ may be put on a par with the indefinite article on its referential interpretation. In the chapter on the semantics of indefinite ‘dieser’ (Chapter 4) I argued that indefinite ‘dieser’ is to be ascribed the semantics of demonstratives / of direct referentiality (per Fodor and Sag 1982). In contrast, indefinite articles, even on their so-called referential interpretations are to be clearly distinguished from indefinite ‘dieser’. They are argued to be explained via mechanisms other than direct referentiality (such as choice function approaches von Heusinger 2002a; Kratzer 1998). One argument was the availability of intermediate scope readings for the referential indefinite article (see Chapter 5). Thus, assuming two different underlying (semantic) mechanisms between the two indefinites and based on the observations and intuitions with respect to the discourse structure nurtured in this chapter, we may also expect differences with respect to the discourse behavior of indefinite ‘dieser’ and the indefinite article ‘ein’, even on forced referential readings, assuming discourse effects to correlate with the respective semantics. Thus, we can come up with the following hypothesis:

(H) Indefinite ‘dieser’ exhibits a higher degree of Discourse Prominence (in terms of Discourse Structuring Potential) compared to the indefinite article ‘ein’ on referential interpretations.

This hypothesis leads to the following implications with for the three parameters:

(i) Indefinite ‘dieser’ exhibits a higher degree of referential persistence compared to the indefinite article ‘ein’ on referential readings.

(ii) Indefinite ‘dieser’ exhibits a higher degree of topic shift potential compared to the indefinite article ‘ein’ on referential readings.
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(iii) Indefinite *dieser* exhibits a higher degree of topic continuity compared to the indefinite article *ein* on referential readings.

In the remainder of this chapter, the story continuation study conducted to test the hypothesis postulated in H will be presented. I consider story continuation tasks the most suitable method to investigate the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser*, as we have seen that corpus studies are problematic. Gathering data via perception-production experiments in form of story continuation experiments appears more reasonable, as it enables us (i) to have clear minimal pairs as test items, only varying with respect to the critical items indefinite *dieser* vs. indefinite *ein* and also as it (ii) allows us to clearly force referential interpretations on the referents of *ein*, guaranteeing the comparability (see section on materials in this chapter).

6.6.1 Objections

The experimental study presented in the following sections investigates the production-driven biases licensed by *dieser*- versus *ein*-marked (forced on its referential reading) indefinite noun phrases in the form of a story continuation experiment: the participants saw the beginnings of little mini-discourses (the test items) which contained referents marked either with indefinite *dieser* or with *ein* on the referential interpretation, introducing discourse- and hearer-new referents. They were then asked to write a continuation story of 6 coherent continuation sentences to the respective mini-discourses received. These continuations made up the data which was then analyzed in order to measure the respective Discourse Prominence of indefinite *dieser* and *ein* on its referential interpretation. It was counted (and compared) how often the *dieser* and *ein* referents were re-mentioned (and shifted to topics, etc.) in those continuation stories provided. According to the hypothesis developed above, it was expected that the values of Discourse Prominence received for indefinite *dieser* (in terms of Discourse Structuring Potential) would be significantly higher compared to the respective values in the *ein*-versions. Remember that the Discourse Structuring Potential of the indefinite noun phrases is defined via the three textual characteristics pertaining to the subsequent discourse after the introduction of the respective noun phrases, i.e. (i) the referential persistence (ii) the topic shift potential and (iii) the topic continuity.

6.6.2 Participants

The participants (n=24) were volunteers and all undergraduate students of linguistics at the University of Stuttgart (attending the course “introduction to linguistics” when asked to participate) and all native German speakers. None of the participants were younger than 16 and none older than 50.
6.6.3 Methodology and design

The experimental study was conducted as a written story continuation task (written version of Gernsbacher and Shroyer 1989, in line with experiments conducted by Chiriacescu and von Heusinger 2010; Chiriacescu 2011) with 10 test items. The participants were asked to read 10 different test items each (i.e. the mini-discourses containing sentences including indefinite noun phrases either marked with indefinite dieser or the indefinite article on the referential reading) and to add 6 coherent, natural-sounding continuation sentences to each test item. Inter subject variation was applied in that each of the twenty-four participants saw the same 10 test items: 5 test items which contained indefinite dieser-NP in the critical sentence (dieser-condition) and 5 test items which contained an ein-NP (forced on its referential reading) in the critical sentence (ein-condition).

Two lists were created. Each participant saw their 10 test-items in a pseudo-random order, seeing each test item either in the dieser or in the ein condition, i.e. never seeing the same condition (dieser or ein) twice with respect to one test item consecutively.

120 is the total number of discourses produced per condition: 12 discourses à 6 sentences produced per condition, in 10 Test Items. The overall number of continuation sentences produced per condition is thus 720.

The independent variables, i.e. the form of the noun phrases introducing the critical referents in the critical sentences were manipulated, which resulted in two conditions: condition one, in which the critical referent is marked by indefinite dieser, as in (301), and condition two, in which the critical referent is marked by the indefinite article ein on its referential interpretation as in (302). The test items were constructed in a parallel fashion and only varied with respect to the dieser- or the ein-condition. The continuations provided by the participants were then analyzed with respect to the three Discourse Structuring Potential-defining parameters.

Due to the length of the task, there were no filler items. After the experiment all participants were asked if they had an idea with respect to what the experiment was about. This question was denied by 100% of the participants, which justifies the omitting of filler items.

6.6.4 Materials

Below, in (301) and (302) I have provided example test items in the two conditions, i.e. the dieser-condition and the ein-condition. Please note that the test items were presented all in plain — bold and italics are only used in this work in order to emphasize the structure of the example, a full list of the test items and also of the continuations provided by all participants is provided in the appendix.
6.6 The experimental study

(301) Sample test items for the *dieser*-condition:

1. Laura will **diesen Kommilitonen** mit auf die Party bringen. Sie hat **ihn** im Englischkurs kennen gelernt.
   ‘Laura wants to bring **this fellow student** to the party. She met **him** in the English class.’

2. Achim will jetzt **diese Sekretärin** einstellen. Er hat **sie** gestern bei einer Jobbörse getroffen.
   ‘Achim now wants to hire **this secretary**. He met **her** yesterday at a job fair.’

(302) Sample test items for the *ein*-condition:

1. Laura will **einen Kommilitonen** mit auf die Party bringen. Sie hat **ihn** im Englischkurs kennen gelernt.
   ‘Laura wants to bring a **fellow student** to the party. She met **him** in the English class.’

2. Achim will jetzt **eine Sekretärin** einstellen. Er hat **sie** gestern bei einer Jobbörse getroffen.
   ‘Achim now wants to hire a **secretary**. He met **her** yesterday at a job fair.’

Each test item introduces a topical subject referent as a proper name (e.g. *Laura* or *Achim*, see tests for topicality in the appendix) and then the critical indefinites as non-topical direct objects (**diesen** / **einen Kommilitonen**, **diese** / **eine Sekretärin**). Since the critical referents are presented as non-topical objects, they are assigned a rather non-prominent position in the trigger clauses in the first place. Then, in a second sentence, the critical referents are re-mentioned once more in the same non-prominent position: as non-topical direct objects again. In doing so, the subject referents (*Laura* or *Achim*, for example) were clearly established topics (on the prominent subject position) in the discourse, whereas the critical referents are mentioned twice on a non-prominent position. Considering the fact that they were made extra non-prominent in the test items, it will be interesting to see if (and why) those rather non-prominent critical referents in the trigger sentences **still** become prominent in the subsequent discourse (and if they maybe even outrank the subject referents) in the *dieser*-version. These second sentences in the test items (*Sie hat ihn im Englischkurs kennen gelernt* ‘She met him in the English class’ or *Er hat sie gestern bei einer Jobbörse getroffen* ‘He met her yesterday at a job fair’) in which the critical referents are re-mentioned once more via a direct anaphor in form of a pronoun (in both conditions, to guarantee parallelism) were inserted for a very important reason: These additional sentences were used in order to force the desired referential interpretation on the indefinite article in the *ein*-versions. This was desired in order to guarantee the comparability between *ein* and *dieser* in the experiment. Remember that I argued in Chapter 5, investigating the semantics of indefinite *dieser*, that different semantic mechanisms should be assumed for
indefinite *dieser* (demonstrative-like semantics per Fodor and Sag 1982) and for *ein* on referential interpretations (other mechanism, most likely one of the choice function approaches von Heusinger 2002a; Kratzer 1998). I argued that indefinite *dieser* and *ein* on referential readings should *not* be put on a par. This being so, it is beyond question to put indefinite *dieser* and non-referential readings of *ein* on a par, which is why in the experiment as well we compare indefinite *dieser* with the indefinite article *ein* on forced referential interpretations. Finding differences with respect to the discourse behavior of those two forms would then exactly match the differences suggested with respect to semantics in Chapter 5. In contrast, finding — probably even more — differences in the discourse behaviors of indefinite *dieser* and *ein* which is not on forced referential interpretations (thus ambiguous between referential and non-referential interpretations) — would *not* be an argument for the demonstrative semantics of *dieser*. One could explain the differences found between indefinite *dieser* and *ein* (ambiguous) by suggesting that indefinite *dieser* is an indefinite on referential interpretation whereas *ein* is preferably interpreted as non-referential. This line of argumentation, however, is not what this thesis aims for. Thus, a forced referential interpretation of the critical referents was guaranteed by direct anaphoric reference (realized by an object pronoun) to the critical referent in a subsequent sentence after its introduction (Karttunen 1969/1976). In order to guarantee parallelism between the test items in the two conditions (*dieser* and *ein*) these additional sentences also had to appear in the *dieser* version.

Note that the presence of the second sentence may create the appearance, at first, that it weakens the validity of the test. One might think that it incites the participants to talk more about the *dieser*-referents (thus supporting the hypothesis), as they are already re-mentioned once more these second sentences. However, the contrary is the case: the presence of the second sentence makes the test even more stringent: the anaphoric re-mentioning of the critical referent in the *ein*-version, which forces the referential interpretation on *ein* can as well be seen as an incentive for the participants to talk about the *ein*-referent more often in the subsequent discourse (which is clearly against the hypothesis). If the second sentence were not present (in both versions), the participants would be very likely to receive the non-referential interpretation of *ein* and would probably be less likely to talk about the referent. By the insertion of the second sentence, this is avoided. To summarize, forcing the referential interpretation on *ein* decreases the difference between indefinite *dieser* and *ein* to a minimum and makes the test performed even more strict (as it rules out non-referential interpretations of *ein*).

Note furthermore that, with respect to the interpretation of the *dieser*-sentence in the test items several measures had to be applied in order to avoid a deictic or a recognitional interpretation of the demonstrative on the side of the participant. The instruction sheet of the experiment included a statement saying

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50 Please refer to Chapter 1 for definitions of “referential interpretations of indefinites” and “referential indefinites”.
6.6 The experimental study

that the participants are asked to imagine that the stories they are completing are
told to an interlocutor on the phone. This makes it very unlikely to interpret *dieser*
in the test item in its basic deictic use, as the imaginary interlocutors are not,
physically, in the same context situation. In order to avoid that the participants,
while processing *dieser* in the test item, receive the recognitional reading, the
instructions said that the participants are to imagine talking to very distant friends
which they have not spoken for a very long time. This instruction aimed to reduce
the imaginary common ground between the speaker and the imaginary
interlocutor to a minimum. The additional sentence in the test items, which was
used in order to force a referential interpretation on *ein*, also contributes to an
indefinite interpretation of *dieser* in the *dieser*-conditions, as it delivers basic,
general information about the critical referents. If *dieser* were used
recognitionally, one would rather expect a follow-up question like “do you know
who I mean?” and not basic, introductory information about the respective
referent.

6.6.5 Procedure and data analysis

The test items were presented on paper to the subjects in the classroom, the
instructions were given orally and were repeated on an instruction sheet as well.
The participants were asked to complete the task within a time frame of 60
minutes, i.e. they fulfilled a classical pen-and-paper-task under controlled
conditions.

The six continuation sentences per test item (including any associated
subordinate clause(s)) provided by the participants were coded and analyzed with
respect to the three defining parameters of the Discourse Structuring Potential.
Overall, 12 continuation stories per test item / condition were received, i.e. 12 for
the *dieser*-condition and 12 for the *ein*-condition respectively (per test item). In
(303) and (304) I have provided some example-continuations to test items in the
*dieser*- and the *ein*-version and in Table 26 the data analysis of one of the
continuations provided is explained in detail.

(303) Laura will *diesen Komilitonen* mit auf die Party bringen. Sie hat ihn im
Englischkurs kennen gelernt....
‘Laura wants to bring this fellow student to the party. She met him in the
English course…’

P13
S1: Sie hat mir vorhin von *ihm* erzählt.
‘She just told me about him.’
S2: Er soll ganz süß sein.
‘He’s supposed to be quite cute.’
S3: Er hat sie mit *seinem* Wissen über Englische Romantik beeindruckt.
‘He impressed her with his knowledge about English Romanticism.’
6 The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

S4: Sie hat ihn jetzt zu der Party eingeladen. ‘Now she invited him to the party.’
S5: Wollen wir mal sehen, ob er kommt. ‘Let’s see if he’ll come.’
S6: Er ist ja ziemlich beliebt. ‘He is pretty popular.’

P14
S1: Er heisst Peter und ist erst vor kurzem nach Deutschland gezogen. ‘He is called Peter and just moved to Germany.’
S2: Eigentlich lebt er in Schweden. ‘Actually, he lives in Sweden.’
S3: Für ein Semester ist er jetzt jedoch hier. ‘But now he’s here for one semester.’
S4: Ich finde ihn ehrlich gesagt etwas komisch. ‘Honestly, I find him a bit weird.’
S5: Er hat so seltsame Ticks und lustig ist er auch nicht. ‘He has those weird ticks and he isn’t funny at all.’
S6: Wenigstens ist er nett anzusehen. ‘At least he is nice to look at.’

(304) Laura will einen Kommilitonen mit auf die Party bringen. Sie hat ihn im Englischkurs kennen gelernt....
‘Laura wants to bring a fellow student to the party. She met him in the English course...’

P2
S1: Sie meinte, er ist wohl sehr nett. ‘She said that he is quite nice.’
S2: Sie haben schon öfter zusammen Hausaufgaben gemacht. ‘They did their homework together a couple of times.’
S3: Ich bin ja mal gespannt, ob da mehr zwischen den beiden läuft. ‘I am anxious to see if something will develop between the two.’
S4: Mit ihrem letzten Freund hatte Laura ja nicht viel Glück. ‘With her last boyfriend Laura wasn’t very happy.’
S5: Es wird Zeit, dass sie jemand Neues kennen lernt. ‘It is time that she meets somebody new.’
S6: Ich bin schon gespannt auf den Typen. ‘I am thrilled to meet the guy.’

P3
S1: Sie fand ihn auf Anhieb sympathisch. ‘She liked him from the beginning on.’
S2: Sie hat sich Hals über Kopf verliebt. ‘She fell in love head over heels.’
S3: Auf der Party will sie jetzt dann den ersten Schritt machen. ‘At the party she wants to make a move.’
6.6 The experimental study

S4: Ich denke, sie hat gute Chancen.
   ‘I think her chances are quite good.’
S5: Es wäre super für sie, wenn sie ihn für sich gewinnen könnte.
   ‘It would be great for her if she could win his heart.’
S6: Er sieht schon ganz gut aus.
   ‘He is actually quite good looking.’

While analyzing the continuations provided, not only the discourse effects of *dieser* and *ein* were measured. In order to receive a comprehensive picture of the effects of indefinite *dieser* on the subsequent discourse, the Discourse Structuring Potential of the critical referents (as depicted in Table 25 above) was measured. In addition, we also accounted for the Discourse Structuring Potential (in terms all three parameters) of further referents in the continuations received. That is, we measured the a) topic shift potential and b) the topic continuity with respect to the (i) (old) subject referents which were introduced the test items (i.e. *Achim, Laura*), (ii) the speaker referents (which were only sometimes introduced by the participants) and also (iii) all other referents which were mentioned as topics by the participants. The label “(old) subject” was used in order to refer to the subject of the critical sentence in the test item (i.e. *Laura* in (303)), the label “*dieser*-referent” or “*ein*-referent” in order to refer to the critical referents, “speaker” was used in order to make reference to a speaker (as the participants had no restrictions with respect to their continuations, they sometimes introduced a speaker referent in their continuations), and all other newly introduced referents by the participants are labeled as “other” (see Table 26 below). I measured the c) referential persistence of the (i) (old) subject and (ii) speaker referents, respectively, but did not account for the referential persistence of all “other” referents, as there were too many “other” referents in the texts. The findings with respect to the Discourse Structuring Potential of these further referents will be discussed in the section on secondary results in the appendix. The discourse behavior of the critical referents, i.e. indefinite *dieser* vs. *ein* on the referential reading, is in the main focus of attention and will make up the main result of this study. Table 26 depicts the coding methods using an example answer from the experimental study.
Table 26:
Coding method for the critical referent in the *dieser*-version. The rightmost column serves to foreshadow that the same method was applied to other referents (old subject, speaker, and other referents) with respect to the other parameters, too:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Referential persistence of critical referent (cumulative)</th>
<th>Topic?</th>
<th>Topic shift potential of critical referent</th>
<th>Topic continuity of critical referent (cumulative)</th>
<th>Referential persistence of old subject&lt;sup&gt;51&lt;/sup&gt; (cumulative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **TI:** Peter will nächste Woche *diese Spanierin<sub>1</sub>* besuchen. Er hat *sie<sub>1</sub>* letztes Jahr in Barcelona kennen gelernt.  
*Peter wants to visit this Spanish girl<sub>1</sub> next week. He met her<sub>1</sub> in Barcelona last year.* |       |        |                                            |                                                 |                                                            |
| **S1:** Er<sub>TOP</sub> traf *sie<sub>1</sub>*, als er in einer Schlange stand.  
*He<sub>TOP</sub> met her<sub>1</sub>, while he was lining up.* | 1      | Old subject | n.a | 0 | 1 |
| **S2:** *Sie<sub>TOP</sub>* war genervt vom Warten und fing ein Gespräch an.  
*She<sub>TOP</sub> was tired of waiting and started a conversation.* | 2      | Critical referent | 1 Shift ✓ | 1 | - |
| **S3:** *Sie<sub>TOP</sub>* hatte viele Gemeinsamkeiten mit ihm.  
*She<sub>TOP</sub> had lots of things in common with him.* | 3      | Critical referent | n.a | 2 | 2 |
| **S4:** *Ich<sub>TOP</sub>* finde das total süß.  
*I think that’s so cute.* | - | Speaker | n.a | - | - |
| **S5:** *Mein Bruder<sub>TOP</sub>* denkt genau so.  
*And my brother thinks so as well.* | - | Other | n.a | - | - |
| **S6:** … | … | … | … | … | … |
| **Sum** | 3 | Shift in S2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

The first aspect under investigation was *referential persistence*. It was counted how often the critical referents were picked up anaphorically in the main and subordinate clauses of the subsequent discourse. The number of times that the critical referents were mentioned in the continuations was added up to a sum representing the referential persistence of that referent at a particular stage in the discourse (i.e. a cumulative value in S6). For example, in the sentences provided

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<sup>51</sup> The column depicting the measurements for the referential persistence of the old subject is thought to serve as an indication of how the values were received for the other referents. Imagine an extension to table one’s right side with the columns of “Topic Continuity of (old) subject”, likewise, and a further extension with the respective columns for the speaker referents as well.
as continuations in, the referent introduced by indefinite *dieser* (the fellow student) is mentioned in S1 through S5, in sum, three times. Then, this value was also determined for the old-subjects, as depicted in the rightmost column in the table, the (old) subject *Peter* receives the value 2 for referential persistence. The referential persistence of potential speaker referents was measured, as well. This is, due to space limitations, not exemplified in Table 26.

The second aspect under investigation was *topic shift potential*. It represents the first instance in which the non-topical critical referent was mentioned again as a topic in a following matrix clause. The topic shift potential does not take into consideration whether this shift was maintained in the following discourse or not, as this is done by the third parameter (topic continuity). This is indicated by a tick (✓) in Table 26. The topic shift of the critical referent occurred in S2 — that is all we need to know in order to measure the topic shift potential. Note that I considered topic shifts that occurred in *matrix clauses* alone, since different studies have shown that referents mentioned as subjects in subordinate clauses do not make good topics (Emonds 1970, among others). The topic shift potential was also determined for the old subjects, potential speaker referents and also all other referents (this is, due to space limitations not depicted in Table 26).

The last parameter of investigation was the *topic continuity*. It measures how often a referent is mentioned again as a topic in the subsequent discourse after its introduction, i.e. it indicates the overall number of anaphoric re-mentions of a referent as a topic, including the initial topic shift measured by the topic shift potential. The critical referent in Table 26 is re-mentioned twice as a topic, which gives us the overall value 2 for topic continuity in Table 26. The topic continuity was also determined for the old subjects, potential speaker referents and all other referents (this is, due to space limitations not depicted in Table 26).

Two trained, independent annotators coded the data received from all participants with respect to the three parameters, relating to strict annotation guidelines based on the *Potsdam Annotation Guidelines for Information Structure* (Information Structure in Cross-Linguistic Corpora: Annotation Guidelines for Phonology, Morphology, Syntax, Semantics and Information Structure; Götze, Dipper and Skopeteas 2007). After a first round of data annotation the inter-coder-agreement was determined: the annotated data points (with respect to all three parameters and all referents (critical referents, old-subjects, speaker-referents and other referents) were compared manually, that is, the deviating cases (<10%) were discussed and decided upon with a third person. Out of 7198 data points compared, there were only 489 cases of disagreement between the two annotators. As a statistical measure of the reliability of the annotators Cohen’s Kappa (Greve and Wentura 1997) was calculated: \( \kappa = 0.846 \). According to these authors, this value is far beyond the threshold of \( \kappa = 0.75 \) indicating good to excellent inter coder agreement. Thus, I employed means for a sound and reliable data annotation, which is of utmost importance annotating information structural concepts such as topicality.
6 The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

6.6.6 Results

24 participants provided 6 continuation sentences for each of the 10 initial trigger-discourses. The results from the three parameters defining the Discourse Structuring Potential, referential persistence, topic shift potential and topic continuity indicate the preferential discourse status of the \textit{dieser}-referents, compared to the \textit{ein}-referents (referential reading).

In the following, I present the findings with respect to the three textual characteristics in detail. Firstly, I present the main results, i.e. the findings concerning hypothesis (H), i.e. the general comparison of the Discourse Structuring Potential of the critical \textit{ein}- and \textit{dieser} referents with respect to the three parameters. In the appendix I present further results (secondary results). Those are the findings including the values for the discourse behavior of the other referents (old subject, speaker, and all other referents) in comparison with the \textit{dieser}- and the \textit{ein}-referents, i.e. the results concerning a comparison of the fine-grained referent-distribution in the \textit{dieser}- and \textit{ein}- contexts.

Main results

I found a highly significant difference of Discourse Structuring Potential as a result of the Wilcoxon two sample rank sum test (Wilcoxon 1945: 80ff.) between the \textit{dieser}-marked and the \textit{ein}-marked noun phrases with respect to all three parameters, i.e. the referential persistence (p<0.0001), the topic shift potential (p<0.0001) and the topic continuity (p<0.0001).

That is, for the \textit{dieser}-condition, we notice (i) a significantly higher likelihood for the referents to be picked up more frequently in the subsequent discourse (i.e. 596 times in total, vs. 152), (ii) to be shifted to topics more frequently (119 times in total, vs. 33) and (iii) to be re-mentioned / continued more frequently as topics again at whichever point in the continuing discourse (i.e. 315 times in total, vs. 34). This result is visualized using the total numbers of all participants in all test items in Figure 4 below:
6.6 The experimental study

Figure 4:
Discourse Structuring Potential of critical referents total values of 10 TI with 6 continuation sentences delivered, 12 discourses produced / condition (dieser / ein-condition)

![Graph showing discourse structuring potential](image)

Figure 4 displays the total values for referential persistence, topic shift potential and topic continuity of the critical referents in all test items (TII-10). For a better orientation the values for the total number of stories produced per condition in the experiment (120 (12 discourses a 6 sentences produced per condition, in 10 Test Items)) and the overall number of continuation sentences produced per condition (720 (12 discourses a 6 sentences produced per condition, 10 test items / participant) is depicted in the figure as well.) Note that, assuming maximally one topic shift per continuation-story, we can determine the overall maximum number of topic shifts of maximally 120 topic shifts per condition, (10 TI x 12 continuation-stories produced). This can serve as a point of reference: In almost all continuation stories delivered (119 out of 120), *dieser* underwent a topic shift at one point in one of the six continuation sentences. In contrast to the results for *dieser*, in the *ein*-condition the referents are (i) mentioned less often in the subsequent discourse (i.e. 152 times in total), (ii) are less likely to be shifted to topics (i.e. 33 times in total) and (iii) are less frequently re-mentioned as topics (only 34 times in total, that is only once more a referent was mentioned again, after it underwent the topic shift).

Now, let us focus on the *distribution* of the total values depicted in Figure 4 with respect to the six sentences produced. This leads to further interesting
observations regarding the referential persistence, the topic continuity and the topic shift potential of the critical referents, as we will see that the *dieser*-marked referents, unlike the *ein*-marked referents, show particular and systematic latency-effects with respect to all parameters.

**Referential persistence**

This means for the referential persistence (Figure 5) of indefinite *dieser* that the values (of the overall higher values) in S1 (76) are the lowest, steadily increasing and reaching a peak in S4. Thus, most *dieser*-referents which were anaphorically re-mentioned were found rather late, in S4, whereas for the *ein*-referents the values for referential persistence are, as low as they generally are, highest in S1 (40) immediately and then remain low for the rest of all continuation clauses produced.

![Referential Persistence Chart](chart.png)

Figure 5: Referential persistence of critical referents in 10 TI per sentence, total values of 12 discourses produced / condition

**Topic continuity**

A very similar pattern results if we consider the topic continuity of the critical referents and look at the distribution of the total values depicted in Figure 6 via the six continuation sentences produced. The (overall higher) values for the *dieser*-referents are lowest in S1 (28, or 30% of all re-mentioned referents were topics) and then steadily increase until they reach a peak in S4 (70, or 60% of all re-mentioned referents were topics). Thus, most critical referents, which were anaphorically re-mentioned as topics, were found rather late, in S4, whereas the values for topic continuity for *ein*, as low as they generally are, are highest in S1 (10) and then stay constantly low.

![Topic Continuity Chart](chart.png)
Figure 6: Topic continuity of critical referents in 10 TI per sentence, total values

**Topic shift potential**

The *dieser*-referents, unlike the *ein*-referents, also show a particular latency with respect to their topic shift potential. This means that the *dieser*-referents are most likely to be shifted to topics later, i.e. after continuation sentence 2 and before sentence continuation 3. Remember that the topic shift potential only accounts for the actual shift and does not take into account topic continuity, which was discussed above. This effect cannot be found for the *ein*-referents, for which the likelihood to be re-mentioned as topics is, as low as it generally is, highest in S1 immediately and decreases from this point on.

These more fine-grained results nicely underline the inherent differences between the two parameters topic continuity and topic shift potential. We see in Figure 6 how the parameter of topic continuity is about the *continuity* of the respective referents in the discourse, as it actually cumulates how long the referents “survive” in the six continuation sentences. Thus, topic continuity informs us about the (potential) continuation of the referents in discourse Figure 6 shows that the critical referents in the *ein*-version were quite frequently re-mentioned as topics even in the last sentence, S6. Topic shift potential in Figure 7, in contrast, does not cumulate topics in a discourse as it only measures the punctual effect of the actual shift, i.e. the first re-mention of the respective referents as topics. In doing so, it informs us about a different feature of topic-marking: the critical referents of indefinite *dieser* are most likely to be shifted to topics in S2. Thus, the two parameters cover two facets of the phenomenon of topicality: the actual *act* of promoting a topic and the question about the continuation in the developing discourse of these shifted topics.
6 The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

Figure 7:
Topic shift potential of critical referents in 10 TI per sentence, total values

The results with respect to the three parameters referential persistence, topic shift potential, and topic continuity confirm the predictions regarding the Discourse Structuring Potential of ‘dieser’-marked indefinites, as their referents display significantly higher values with respect to all Discourse Structuring Potential-defining parameters, in comparison to the ‘ein’-marked indefinites. Thus, as a main result, I can conclude that the hypothesis in (H) is fulfilled: with respect to Discourse Prominence, there is a significant difference between indefinite ‘dieser’ and the indefinite article ‘ein’ (on referential readings), as indefinite ‘dieser’ shows a significantly higher Discourse Prominence in terms of Discourse Structuring Potential than the indefinite article ‘ein’ on referential readings. In addition, particular latency effects were found for ‘dieser’, considering the distribution of the Discourse Structuring Potential values over the six continuation sentences provided: the values for the ‘dieser’ referents, with all three parameters, were lowest in S1 and reached peaks later on in the discourse, whereas the generally low values for the ‘ein’-referents were always highest in S1. This underlines the systematically long-reigning effects of indefinite ‘dieser’, which systematically exceed several clause boundaries.

6.6.7 Interpretation of experimental results

The hypothesis put forward with respect to the Discourse Structuring Potential of indefinite ‘dieser’ in contrast to indefinite ‘ein’ on its referential reading was shown to be correct, as it was experimentally shown that indefinite ‘dieser’ functions as a signal for additional upcoming information / introducing referents which are more likely to be talked about. All these intuitions can be accounted for using the concept of forward-looking Discourse Prominence. Indefinite ‘dieser’ could be
shown to be an expression which marks referents exhibiting a relatively high forward-looking Discourse Prominence in terms of Discourse Structuring Potential in the upcoming discourse, in comparison to the indefinite article *ein* on its referential interpretation.

In Chapter 5 I argued, based on different behavior with respect to sentence semantics of indefinite *dieser* and *ein* on its referential reading, for a semantic distinction of indefinite *dieser* and *ein* on the respective reading. The difference found with respect to their discourse behavior strengthens this point: the significant difference with respect to the discourse behavior of indefinite *dieser* and the simple indefinite article *ein* on referential interpretations strongly supports the assumption that indefinite *dieser* should *not* be put on a par with indefinites on referential interpretations but that it needs to be assigned a different mechanism: direct reference. So, indefinite *dieser*, showing significantly higher values with respect to the Discourse Structuring Potential compared to the indefinite article *ein* on referential interpretations, can be argued to be a demonstrative exhibiting direct reference and high Discourse Prominence with respect to the subsequent discourse which exhibits indefinite reference. These findings suggest, that different expressions exhibiting indefinite reference (with different underlying mechanisms of reference) vary with respect to the degree of Discourse Prominence they exhibit, as the indefinite article *ein* (even on referential interpretations) correlates with significantly lower values for Discourse Prominence in terms of Discourse Structuring Potential, whereas indefinite *dieser* correlates with a significantly higher Discourse Structuring Potential. Non-referential *ein*, on this account, is, as a consequence assumed to show even lower values for the Discourse Structuring Potential than *ein* on (forced) referential interpretations. The link between referential and discourse properties will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. These findings are summarized in the following table:
The difference between indefinite *dieser* and *ein* on referential interpretations with respect to sentence semantics discussed in Chapter 5 (availability of intermediate scope and functional readings of referential interpretations of *ein* and the unavailability of these readings for indefinite *dieser*) suggests that both expressions are to be accounted for via different mechanisms of reference. This is mirrored in their differing discourse behavior. For indefinite *dieser* I suggested the semantics of indefinite direct referentiality (based on Fodor and Sag’s 1982 approach). I did not commit myself to a specific semantic analysis of referential readings of *ein*. It is most likely to be explained via one of the (various) choice function approaches (Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997; Kratzer 1998; von Heusinger 2002a; Jäger 2007). What matters in this book is the difference with respect to the semantics between indefinite *dieser* and *ein* and the significant difference in discourse behavior just investigated, which strengthens the present analysis of indefinite *dieser* as a demonstrative linking indefinite *dieser* it to *dieser* in its basic deictic use and breaking up the strict differentiation between indefiniteness and demonstrativity. These two concepts do not appear to be mutually exclusive in light of the findings of this dissertation, in which indefinite *dieser* is clearly assigned characteristics of both indefinites and demonstratives: it is found to exhibit indefinite reference from a discourse-based perspective on (in)definiteness, as it introduces hearer-new discourse referents, fulfilling the novelty-condition. But it can also be assigned the semantics of demonstrativity and it can thus be analyzed as a derived demonstrative. In light of these findings, it would be unreasonable to argue that indefinite *this* shares the semantics with the indefinite article on the respective referential readings, as such an account would have problems explaining the systematic differences found with respect to both semantics and discourse pragmatics.

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**Table 27:**
Semantic and discourse pragmatics of expressions with indefinite reference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
<th>Discourse Pragmatics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite <em>dieser</em></td>
<td>Directly referential indefinite per Fodor and Sag (1982)</td>
<td>High Discourse Structuring Potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite <em>ein</em> on (forced) referential interpretations</td>
<td>For example: different choice function approaches (von Heusinger 2002a; Kratzer 1998)</td>
<td>Low Discourse Structuring Potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite <em>ein</em>, not on forced referential interpretations</td>
<td>Indefinites as quantifiers or choice function approaches</td>
<td>Probably even lower Discourse Structuring Potential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

52 This, however, is still to be proved experimentally.
6.7 Summary

The presentation and interpretation of the secondary results can be found in the appendix. They do not necessarily contribute or support the present semantic analysis of indefinite *dieser*, but they still contribute to the more detailed description of the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser*.

6.7 Summary

The present chapter dealt with the discourse pragmatics of indefinite *dieser*. The first part (Section 6.2 – 2.5) provided theoretical background information with respect to the concepts of discourse prominence and Discourse Structuring Potential. Based on the findings from previous research I provided an advanced version of the concept of Discourse Structuring Potential. Givón (1983), Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989) and Chiriacescu (2011) all offer quite practical means in order to measure Discourse Prominence. All three accounts define Discourse Prominence via practically applicable means in form of several clearly measurable parameters that enable us to quantify over Discourse Prominence. Those three accounts shed light on the phenomenon of Discourse Prominence from quite similar perspectives. The study conducted in this thesis can be seen as a continuation of that research development, profiting from the insights of all three accounts. Using those elements of the three accounts, which appeared most suitable for the experimental investigation of indefinite demonstrative *dieser* and re-pooling them together set all parameters for the experimental investigation of indefinite *dieser* in German.

The second part (Section 6.6) offered an experimental account for the intuition that the referents introduced with indefinite *dieser* are somehow “more important” in the upcoming discourse after their introduction, compared to the indefinite article.

As a main result, I showed that indefinite *dieser* exhibits a significantly higher Discourse Prominence in terms of Discourse Structuring Potential compared to the indefinite article *ein* (on referential interpretations) with respect to three parameters (referential persistence, topic shift potential and topic continuity).

This chapter gave experimental evidence showing that the referents of indefinite *dieser* exhibit Discourse Prominence. The presentation of this evidence should satisfy descriptive accounts, on one hand, as this study is, to my knowledge, the only experimental work on the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser*. This evidence, on the other hand, allows several implications with respect to the analysis of indefinite *dieser* and its placement in a typology of German determiners, as it, from a discourse-based perspective, supports the sentence semantic distinction proposed (in Chapter 5) between indefinite *dieser* and the indefinite article on its referential interpretation. Both forms were claimed to carry different sentence semantics and were now shown to differ with respect to their discourse behavior, as well.
6 The discourse pragmatics of indefinite ‘dieser’

In the following chapter I will discuss in greater detail the connection between the semantics suggested for indefinite *dieser* and the discourse effects found.
7 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

In this final chapter I aim to (i) establish a hypothesis in order to link the findings from the chapters on the sentence semantics (Chapter 5) and the discourse pragmatics (Chapter 6) of indefinite *dieser* and to (ii) provide a concluding summary of my account of indefinite *dieser*. The first part of this chapter will provide an approach for a comprehensive and holistic semantic-pragmatic account of indefinite *dieser*. I suggest that the link between the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* can be established via the special mode of “pointing” employed by the use of indefinite *dieser*: private ostension (Fodor and Sag 1982) (cf. Section 5.3.1.). It can be seen as the connecting piece between semantics and pragmatics as it is reflected in the semantics of direct referentiality Fodor and Sag (1982) (cf. Chapter 5). Additionally, it can account for the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser*, as I argue in this chapter for a general correlation between private ostension and discourse prominence, due to pragmatic principles (informativeness) only.

In the second part of this chapter I (ii) provide a concluding summary of my account of indefinite *dieser*. Describing its semantics and pragmatics, I showed that it is a demonstrative expression (Kaplan 1989a, 1989b) which exhibits indefinite reference (introducing new referents into the discourse) and which goes along with a high Discourse Structuring Potential. Claiming that indefinite *dieser* is a demonstrative expression which exhibits indefinite reference and thus indicating that the concepts of demonstrativity and indefiniteness may interact, I provided arguments against accounts which claim that indefinite demonstratives are (specific) indefinite articles and should not be associated with the class of demonstratives (Ionin 2006).

7.2 Private ostension

Linking the semantics and the discourse pragmatics of indefinite *dieser*

In this section I first provide a brief summary of the semantics (as thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5) and the discourse pragmatics (as thoroughly discussed in Chapter 6) of indefinite *dieser*. On one hand it was vital to discuss both concepts in separate chapters, as I claim the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser* to be explained via a standard pragmatic principle only. They do not need to be anchored by an additional discourse condition in the lexical entry of indefinite *dieser*. On the other hand, however, the findings of this thesis ask about the link between the semantics of directly referential expressions exhibiting indefinite reference (i.e. indefinite *dieser*) and the respective discourse effects we found (high Discourse Structuring Potential).
7 Conclusion

7.2.1 Semantics

With respect to the semantic analysis of indefinite *dieser* I showed in Chapter 5 that we can assign the semantics of directly referential indefinites (as originally developed by Fodor and Sag 1982), i.e. the core semantics of demonstratives (direct reference, Kaplan 1989a, 1989b) to indefinite *dieser*. The suggested lexical entry, based on Fodor and Sag 1982 (modified by Heim 2011) is repeated in (390) below. Remember that I showed in Chapter 5 that Fodor and Sag (1982) suggested the correct semantics albeit for the wrong morpheme, as it turns out that their semantics cannot be used to account for the indefinite article *ein* on the respective “referential” reading.

\[
[[dieser_{ind} \alpha]]^{ci} = \text{defined only if there is a unique individual that the speaker of c has in mind in c, and this individual is in } [[\alpha]]^{cc} \text{ ; where defined, } [[dieser_{ind} \alpha]]^{ci} = \text{this individual.}
\]

(Fodor and Sag 1982, Heim 2011: ex. 56)

The semantics postulated for indefinite *dieser* reflects the rigidity of reference which is widely acknowledged for *dieser* in its basic deictic use. This parallelism between indefinite and deictic *dieser* was one argument for the claim that the indefinite use of *dieser* is, as well, a derived use from the basic deictic use and that thus indefinite *dieser* is a demonstrative with the semantics of direct referentiality. The physical pointing gesture, which was shown to be obligatory for *dieser* in its deictic use (cf. Chapter 2), was claimed to be replaced by “private ostension” (Fodor and Sag 1982) in the indefinite use in Chapter 5. The private ostension-condition is mirrored in the lexical entry for indefinite *dieser* in the phrase the speaker has a certain individual in mind which is not known by the hearer. Private ostension can be described as the performance of a mentally / privately performed pointing gesture or mental pointing (exclusively) in the mind of the speaker. It is assumed to be directed to the discourse- and hearer-new referent the speaker intends to refer to using indefinite *dieser* (cf. Chapter 5).

7.2.2 Pragmatics

In Chapter 6 (on the discourse pragmatics of indefinite *dieser*) I presented the findings of a psycholinguistic experiment which showed that indefinite *dieser* goes along with a certain discourse behavior. Its referents were found to exhibit discourse prominence in the subsequent discourse after their introduction (in terms of Discourse Structuring Potential). These findings could be used in order to underline the similarity the similarity between indefinite *dieser* and demonstratives, or, vice versa, the difference between indefinite *dieser* and the indefinite article. Compared to the indefinite article *ein* on referential interpretations, the referents of indefinite *dieser* were found to exhibit a significantly higher Discourse Structuring Potential. The Discourse Structuring
7.2 Private ostension

Potential was defined via three parameters which pertain to the subsequent discourse: (i) referential persistence, (ii) topic shift potential and (iii) topic continuity. The experimental results were, beneath their descriptive value, used as an additional argument underlining the differences between indefinite *dieser* and *ein* on referential interpretations.

### 7.2.3 Linking semantics and pragmatics

Providing evidence for the hypothesis that indefinite *dieser* is a demonstrative which marks discourse prominent referents, there is still no answer to the question of where these discourse effects of indefinite *dieser* come from, as the lexical entry suggested for indefinite *dieser* does not specify any condition on the discourse at all. In the present account there is no overt discourse condition (in its semantics) that forces the speaker to make the referent discourse prominent – and the indefinite article *ein* can (almost) always replace indefinite *dieser*, respectively. Moreover, it may, as well, occur in examples in which the referents are highly discourse prominent. Indefinite *dieser* is optional and used if speakers intend to perform private ostension:

(306) Gestern in der Kneipe da war **ein** / **dieser** Fremde(r). Er hat mich einfach so angesprochen. Er war total nett.

‘Last night in the pub, there was a / this stranger. He just talked to me. He was very nice.’

As nothing in the semantics of indefinite *dieser* forces its choice (over *ein*) on the speakers, and as indefinite *dieser* can generally be substituted by indefinite *ein* in the respective contexts, we have to ask ourselves the following questions: what determines the choice of indefinite *dieser over ein*? And: on the basis of which mechanisms do we account for the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser*?

Another way of formulating the same question is: why is the use indefinite *dieser* extremely odd without the respective behavior in discourse, as exemplified in (307)? (Note that (307) is not ungrammatical, which supports my claim that the discourse condition is not to be anchored in the semantics of indefinite *dieser* and becomes subject to the truth-conditions, but rather is to be explained via communicative principles only.)

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53 Remember that the lexical entry in Ionin’s (2006) account does spell out a condition on the discourse in the sentence semantics for indefinite *this* (in terms of the felicity condition of noteworthiness). I, in contrast, claim that this is not necessary and that the discourse effects can be derived via standard communicative principles.

54 I showed in Section 5.4.4 that Ionin (2006) gives some exceptional examples (which actually do not hold for German indefinite *dieser*) in which indefinite *this* cannot be replaced by the simple indefinite article due to pragmatic reasons.

55 Actually, nothing in the lexical entry forces indefinite *dieser* to be indefinite. Indefinite *dieser* cannot be replaced by the definite article, this is due to the Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim 1991).
I argue (in line with Maclaran 1982; Ionin 2006) that the answer to these questions lies in Grice’s (1975: 45) Maxim of Quantity: in order to be a cooperative speaker, “make your contribution as informative as required. Don’t make your contribution more informative than required”. That is, in the pragmatic principle of informativeness. Ionin (2006: 197), in contrast to the present account, traces this back to the noteworthiness-condition in the semantics of indefinite this, as the speaker, in order to satisfy Grice’s Maxim, has to reveal what the noteworthy property is / as the hearer expects more information about why the referents are noteworthy. The Maxim of Quantity, in my account, however, is argued to derive directly from the fact that private ostension is employed using indefinite dieser, i.e. that the referents are not given, and that the hearer has to accommodate the fact that private ostension is employed. 56 Ionin’s (2006) summarizing quote below still holds for my account as well:

[W]hether too much or not enough information is the problem, the situation with this_not [indefinite dieser sic!] is analogous to a speaker saying “I have something to tell you”, and then leaving the room. This can be viewed as not enough information (the speaker does not say what it is (s)he has to tell), or too much information (why bother making the statement at all, if (s)he is going to leave the room afterwards?). Either way, the speaker is being uncooperative. (Ionin 2006: 197)

Even though my account does not make use of an extra discourse condition in the semantics of indefinite dieser, it is similar to Ionin’s (2006), as I similarly claim that using indefinite dieser without mentioning the discourse referent again in the subsequent discourse (i.e. without exhibiting discourse prominence) is not cooperative and violates Grice’s Maxim of Quantity. In contrast to her’s, however, my account of indefinite dieser does fine without the noteworthiness-condition in its semantics. Thus, I conclude that a separate statement of a noteworthiness condition in the lexical entry is redundant and not necessary.

In what follows I explain in more detail my understanding of how the use of indefinite dieser (going along with the presence of private ostension) causes discourse prominence. This is supposed to happen in 3 steps: Firstly, using indefinite dieser the speaker makes use of private ostension. By hearing a sentence containing indefinite dieser the hearer notes that the referent cannot be identified as it is not “given” in one of the three accessible domains (perception, previous discourse, shared knowledge). Therefore, (s)he has to accommodate that

56 More on the differences between Ionin’s (2006) noteworthiness and the present account of private ostension can be found in Chapter 6.
private ostension is used and realize that the speaker uses private ostension, i.e. that the speaker points something out which is exclusively speaker-known and not “given”. This, **secondly** creates a certain expectancy on the part of the hearer in that (s)he expects to learn more about that referent and therefore urges the speaker to be more informative due to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity, which asks to be satisfied. Not delivering further information would be uncommunicative. Therefore, **thirdly**, the speaker will deliver more information about the referent. Thus, indefinite *dieser* can be analyzed as a signal of additional upcoming information.

This three-step-scenario appears vital if we realize why we, generally with gestures or mentally / privately, make use of ostension. Usually, this is the case if we intend to draw the attention of the hearer towards the individuals we intend to point out. This is done in order to shift the focus of the hearer to a new referent and establish joint reference to that referent, in whichever domain it may be (Ehlich 1987: 285). And why do we aim to draw the attention of the hearer to an individual? This is so because speakers want hearers to identify the referents they point out. Otherwise, from the speaker’s perspective, we probably would not bother to point them out at all. If speakers make use of private ostension, however, they already indicate that the respective referents are not “given” or cannot be identified (in the perceptive part of the utterance situation, the discourse or shared knowledge) and will thus be mentioned again in the subsequent discourse. If the hearer realizes that the speaker is “mentally pointing” to something which is only known to the speaker, s(he) expects more information about that referent in the subsequent discourse. Thus, Grice’s Maxim urges speakers to justify why the respective mode of reference, private ostension, was used.

To summarize, Grice’s Maxim of Quantity explains why in the standard case the speaker gives more information about the referent, which is reflected in the high values of Discourse Structuring Potential of indefinite *dieser*. From the speaker’s perspective it would not be cooperative either to make them accommodate that private ostension is used, to draw the attention towards a referent which is exclusively in his / her mind, and then not revealing why. Alternatively, one can argue that use of indefinite *dieser* without a re-mention of the referent in the subsequent discourse means not providing enough information. The speaker conveys that there is a new referent which is worth to be pointed out and to be drawn the attention to. If s(he) then does not explain why this is so, s(he) leaves the hearer wondering.

The indefinite article *ein* on its referential interpretation on the other hand is assumed not to be subject to private ostension and is most likely analyzed via choice function approaches. This difference with respect to the underlying mechanisms of reference between *ein* on referential interpretations and indefinite *dieser* explains the weaker values of Discourse Structuring Potential for referential *ein*. It may be but is not necessarily expected to be re-mentioned in the subsequent discourse, as it does not go along with “private ostension” which triggers the respective effects of a high Discourse Structuring Potential in the
subsequent discourse. I expect higher values of Discourse Structuring Potential for *ein* on referential readings compared to non-referential *ein*, assuming that each mechanism of reference correlates with a certain degree of Discourse Structuring Potential: establishing a referential interpretation of *ein* probably correlates with a higher Discourse Structuring Potential than not establishing a referential relation at all. Thus, I assume that speakers are more likely to continue talking about referents they introduce as indefinite on referential readings. However, they do not necessarily have to re-mention the respective referents (as it is the case for indefinite *dieser* due to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity). I conclude that the referential strength of expressions exhibiting indefinite reference correlates with the respective degree of Discourse Structuring Potential. Indefinite *dieser* being the strongest referential expression (exhibiting direct reference via private ostension) thus correlates with a relatively very high Discourse Structuring Potential, requiring that the respective referents are re-mentioned at one point in the subsequent discourse.

The scenario for deictic *dieser* is different, as its referents are physically perceptible. The referents of deictic *dieser* are discourse-new as well but the pointing gesture (ostension), which directly leads to identification via mere physical perception on the part of the hearer, does not necessarily require the use of the demonstrative. Ostension, in the case of deictic *dieser*, directly leads to identification of the referent but does not necessarily fulfill a further function (unlike private ostension which does not lead immediately to the identification of the referent.) Thus the Maxim of Quantity is automatically satisfied so that the speaker does not necessarily need to provide more information about the referent / that the hearer does not necessarily expect more information, accordingly.

To summarize, a link between the discourse and the referential properties of expressions can be established, by arguing that the discourse properties are derived from the underlying mode of reference. In the case of indefinite *dieser* this mode of reference is private ostension which correlates with a relatively high Discourse Structuring Potential. The fact that the referents of indefinite *dieser* are not “given” (in that it is not physically perceptible, not given in the previous discourse or not in the common ground of speaker and hearer) makes the hearer accommodate the fact a new discourse item is introduced via a (mental) demonstration (private ostension). This makes hearers long for a follow-up explanation of why it has been introduced in the respective way. Thus, indefinite *dieser* is claimed to correlate with high discourse prominence, whereas we expect lower values of discourse prominence from referentially weaker expressions with indefinite reference such as the indefinite article on referential interpretations and even weaker values of discourse prominence from the indefinite article on non-referential interpretations. These findings are summarized in Table 28.
7.3 Summary and concluding remarks

This dissertation dealt with the poorly-investigated indefinite use of *dieser* in German and offered:

1. An account of the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* as a genuine use of the demonstrative *dieser*, arguing that it fits in well into the semantic field of demonstratives.
2. A typological account of indefinite *dieser*, including its linguistic classification as an indefinite demonstrative, i.e. an expression which shares features of both demonstratives and indefinites.
3. Evidence suggesting that the concepts of demonstrativity and indefiniteness are not mutually exclusive.

Analyzing the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* I showed that it carries features of both demonstrative and indefinite NPs, which are reflected in its discourse semantic, sentence semantic and discourse pragmatic characteristics.

(i) **discourse semantics** in terms of dependencies to the previous discourse: discourse new

(ii) **sentence semantics** in terms of referential properties: truly referential

(iii) **discourse pragmatics** with respect to the upcoming discourse in terms of discourse prominence: high Discourse Structuring Potential

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Table 28 (table 27 repeated): Indefinites and their behavior in discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indefinite</th>
<th>Directly referential indefinite per Fodor and Sag (1982)</th>
<th>High Discourse Structuring Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>dieser</em></td>
<td>For example: different choice function approaches (von Heusinger 2002a; Kratzer 1998)</td>
<td>Low Discourse Structuring Potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ein</em> on (forced) referential interpretations</td>
<td>Indefinites as quantifiers or choice function approaches</td>
<td>Probably even lower Discourse Structuring Potential than indefinite <em>ein</em> on (forced) referential interpretations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ein</em>, not on forced referential interpretations (ambiguous)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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57 This, however, is still to be proved experimentally.
7 Conclusion

The underlying question was: How do we categorize an expression which is a) directly referential and therefore generally categorized together with other definite expressions, including definite descriptions, and b) indefinite at the same time, in that it introduces discourse new items? As a solution, I proposed that the two concepts (indefiniteness and demonstrativity for individuals) are not mutually exclusive. I suggested that indefinite *dieser* NPs carry the core semantics of deictic demonstratives for individuals (in terms of direct reference after Kaplan 1989a, 1989b) and that they exhibit indefiniteness from a discourse-based perspective on indefiniteness, as they introduce hearer-new discourse referents.

This fact does not appear as paradox any more, if we conceptualize the general characteristics of determiners in a model consisting of at least three layers ((i) to (iii) above), which allows for an interaction of indefiniteness and direct referentiality. This allows for a new classification of determiners based on combinations of the values of these three parameters:

Determiners may, amongst other features, (i) either be directly referential or not, (ii) either be linked with respect to the previous discourse or not, i.e. be definite or not, and (iii) either may exhibit high values of discourse prominence or not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deictic <em>dieser</em></th>
<th>Indefinite <em>dieser</em></th>
<th>Definite article <em>der</em></th>
<th>Wide scope indefinite article <em>ein</em></th>
<th>Narrow scope indefinite article <em>ein</em> (quantifier)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse semantics: Dependencies to previous discourse (definiteness)</td>
<td>(+) (no dependency in the previous discourse, but given in the situation)</td>
<td>– (cf. Chap. 1)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence semantics: Direct reference</td>
<td>+ (cf. Chap. 5)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse pragmatics: Discourse prominence</td>
<td>+ (cf. Chap. 6)</td>
<td>+/- (less then <em>dieser</em>, more than <em>ein</em>)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58 Both wide-scope *ein* and narrow-scope *ein* are not directly referential expressions with low discourse prominence. They are subject to two different underlying mechanisms of reference. Another layer would be necessary in order to distinguish between these two expressions. However, this difference is not relevant with respect to the present account.
7.3 Summary and concluding remarks

Based on the categories of this three-layer model, this work analyzed the semantics and pragmatics of indefinite *dieser* NPs.

Dealing with these three main points this work contributed to research in various fields of linguistics, such as semantics (of indefinites and demonstratives – arguing that demonstrativity (with respect to individuals) and indefiniteness are not mutually exclusive categories), discourse pragmatics (of indefinites and demonstratives) and the semantics-pragmatics interface. The phenomenon of indefinite *dieser* is a linguistic expression which has contact points with all these areas, as it is a) argued to be a demonstrative which b) also is an indefinite from a discourse-based take on indefiniteness and, in addition, it c) exhibits extremely interesting discourse effects in the subsequent discourse which are explained to be a “product” of the semantics-pragmatics interplay. These multi-faceted characteristics of indefinite *dieser* enable it to fulfill quite diverse functions, which only at first glance may appear conflictive, such as its demonstrative reference (to individuals) and its indefinite reference.

The overall result provided in this book is that indefinite *dieser* is a demonstrative expression which exhibits an interplay between demonstrativity and indefiniteness. It should not be put on a par with indefinite noun phrases with the indefinite article, even though it exhibits indefinite reference. I showed that its demonstrative semantics match the semantics of deictic *dieser* and not the semantics of indefinites, not even on referential interpretations. This semantic difference is also mirrored in the discourse effects indefinite *dieser* exhibits, compared to the discourse effects of indefinites (on referential interpretations).

The major claims of this dissertation are summarized in more detail in the key messages below:

- I discussed the concept of demonstrativity and explained how reference fixing works for the basic deictic use of demonstratives (Chapter 2).
- I argued that in German only the forms *dieser* and stressed *DER/DIE/DAS* can be considered to be demonstratives for individuals (Chapter 3).
- I presented a typology of uses of *dieser* and showed that there is (beneath the well-acknowledged deictic, anaphoric and recognitional use) a further use of demonstrative *dieser*: the indefinite use. It suitably extends the typology of uses of *dieser* (Chapter 4).
- In the indefinite use, *dieser* was shown to be a directly referential expression, very much like *dieser* in the other uses (Chapter 4 and 5) with the respective semantics provided by Fodor and Sag (1982) (where noting in its semantics specifies indefiniteness).
- Still, indefinite *dieser* was found to share characteristics with indefinites (from a discourse-based perspective on indefiniteness) (Chapter 5). Thus, indefiniteness and demonstrativity / indexicality were claimed not to be
conflicting concepts, but rather orthogonal concepts which may show interaction.

- Yet, indefinite *dieser* was argued *not* to be confused with indefinites on referential interpretations (which are nowadays mostly analyzed via choice function approaches).

- The two findings below underline the difference between indefinite *dieser* and the indefinite article on its referential interpretation – and emphasize the similarities between indefinite *dieser* and true demonstratives like deictic *diese*.
  
a. The semantics of indefinite *dieser* are the semantics of indexicality (per Fodor and Sag 1982). This clearly links indefinite *dieser* to the basic deictic use of *dieser* and dissociates it from indefinites.

  b. The experimental investigation of the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser* showed a significant difference with respect to the discourse effects (in terms of Discourse Structuring Potential) of indefinite *dieser* in comparison to the indefinite article *ein*, even on referential interpretations. This argument additionally supports the semantic argument made in a.: indefinite *dieser* is not to be put on a par with indefinites, not even on referential interpretations (Chapter 6) but a demonstrative.

- The discourse effects found for indefinite *dieser* were explained as a natural derivation of its semantics, due to standard conversational principles related to informativeness (Chapter 7).
Appendices

A: Topicality: Tests and properties

The definition of topicality and tests for topics presented below is entirely based on the *Potsdam Annotation Guidelines for Information Structure* (Information Structure in Cross-Linguistic Corpora: Annotation Guidelines for Phonology, Morphology, Syntax, Semantics and Information Structure; Götze, Dipper and Skopeteas 2007).

- The aboutness topic is the entity about which the sentence under discussion makes a predication.
- The only expressions that can denote aboutness topics are:
  i. referential NPs (i.e. definite descriptions and proper names),
  ii. indefinite NPs with specific and generic interpretations, and indefinites in adverbially quantified sentences that show Quantificational Variability Effects,
  iii. bare plurals with generic interpretations, and bare plurals in adverbially quantified sentences that show Quantificational Variability Effects, and
  iv. finite clauses denoting concrete facts about which the subsequent clause predicates (see below).

Note 1 (Specificity)
Specificity can be tested as follows: If the respective indefinite can be preceded by “a certain …” without forcing a different interpretation, it gets interpreted as a specific indefinite (Götze, Dipper and Skopeteas 2007: 164).

Note 2 (Genericity)
Genericity (in terms of kind readings (Krifka et al. 1995) can be tested as follows: If a sentence containing an indefinite or a bare plural is roughly equivalent to a universal quantification over the set of individuals that satisfy the respective NP-predicate, it is a generic sentence. Examples: (1a) below is roughly equivalent to (1b) and (2a) is roughly equivalent to (2b).

(1) a. *A dog* is smart.
    b. *All dogs* are smart.

(2) a. *Cats* are snooty.
    b. *All cats* are snooty.
Appendices

Note 3 (Quantificational Variability Effects)
Quantificational Variability Effects can be defined as follows: An adverbially quantified sentence that contains an indefinite NP or a bare plural is roughly equivalent to a sentence where the combination Q_{adverb} + indefinite NP / bare plural has been replaced by a quantificational NP with corresponding quantificational force. Examples: (3a) is roughly equivalent to (4b), and (3a) is roughly equivalent to (4b).

(3) a. A dog is often smart.
   b. Many dogs are smart.

(4) a. Cats are usually snooty.
   b. Most cats are snooty.

   • Quantificational NPs other than indefinites and other kinds of XPs can never be aboutness topics. In general, NPs marked as given or accessible on the information status layer are often aboutness topics.
   • For reasons of simplicity, we assume only one aboutness topic per sentence.
   • There are also sentences which do not have a topic at all. These topicless sentences are thetic, all-new or event sentences:

(5) [The informant is shown a picture of a burning house, and is asked: What happens?]
    A house is on fire.

(6) Die Polizei kommt.
‘The police are coming’

   • I assume that aboutness topics only occur in matrix clauses.
   • Generally, topics tend to be fronted (7) (taken form Frey 2000), i.e. they tend to be the very first element in the clause. However, this does not necessarily have to be the case, as (8) shows:

(7) Peter_{Topic/Subject} forderte Maria zum Tanzen auf.
   ‘Peter_{Topic/Subject} asked Mary for a dance’

(8) Von unserer lieben Maria_{Topic} hat Peter_{Subject} die Jacke bekommen.
   ‘From our beloved Mary_{Topic} Peter received the jacket’

   • Topics tend to be grammatical subjects. However, this does not necessarily have to be the case (see (8)).
Questions are also very likely to have an aboutness topic. Just apply the standard tests given below and check whether the question (with a potential topic) could be a good follow up question to the test-questions.

Whether an NP (with the exception of specifically interpreted indefinites) should be marked as the aboutness topic of a sentence can be tested in the following way (tests below).

Tests for aboutness topics (examples below):

- An NP $X$ is the aboutness topic of a sentence $S$ containing $X$ if $S$ would be a natural continuation to the announcement *Let me tell you something about $X*$
- Or if $S$ would be a good answer to the question *What about $X*$?
- Or if $S$ could be naturally transformed into the sentence *Concerning $X$, $S'$* or into the sentence *Concerning $X$, $S'$*, where $S'$ differs from $S$ only insofar as $X$ has been replaced by a suitable pronoun. Note that in the case of generic sentences and adverbially quantified sentences that contain singular indefinites, the first occurrence of $X$ in the tests above must be replaced by a corresponding bare plural.
- A specific indefinite $X$ is the aboutness topic of a sentence $S$ containing $X$ if the following transformation of $S$ sounds natural: Within $S$, replace the indefinite article in $X$ by *this* or *that* or transform the resulting sentence $S'$ into *Concerning $X$, $S'$*.

Let us consider some examples:

(9) [The informant is shown a picture of a burning house, and is asked: What about the house?]
The house is on fire.

(10) [Yesterday I met Peter and Anne in London.]
Peter was wearing red socks.
Transforming $S$ into “Concerning Peter, he is wearing red socks” or testing the sentence in the context “Let me tell you something about Peter” sounds natural.

(11) A dog is often smart.
Transforming $S$ into “Concerning dogs, a dog is often smart” or preposing “Let me tell you something about dogs” sounds natural.

(12) Cats are snooty.
Transforming $S$ into “Concerning cats, cats are snooty” or preposing “Let me tell you something about cats” sounds natural.
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(13) Einen Hund mag Peter wirklich.
Specificity: “A dog” can be replaced by “A certain dog”.
(Aboutness-)Topicality: S can be transformed into “Concerning a certain
dog, Peter really likes that dog”.

These clear characteristics and tests for aboutness topics facilitate the
identification of aboutness topics and thus enable us to experimentally quantify
over the two parameters of topic shift potential and topic continuity of indefinite
dieser in German.

B: Further results (secondary results)

Not only did I account for the Discourse Structuring Potential of the critical
dieser- and ein-referents, I also measured the Discourse Structuring Potential (all
three parameters) with respect to the (old)-subject referents from the test items
and the speaker referents as well. With respect to the parameters of topic shift
potential and topic continuity, we even measured the values for all other referents
(“other”) from the discourses produced by the participants. This enables us to
exploratorily investigate more global discourse effects of indefinite dieser
(compared to ein) and to investigate the distribution of (almost) all referents used
in the subsequent discourses, after the introduction of dieser- and the ein-
referents, respectively. In the following, I will (i) first present a comparison of the
Discourse Structuring Potential of the critical referents (“object”) and the subject
referents (“old subject”) from the dieser-version and the Discourse Structuring
Potential of the critical referents (“object”) and the subject referent (“old subject”)
from the ein-version respectively (Figures A, B) thus investigating the distribution
of the “old subject” and “object” referents in the subsequent discourses for the
dieser- and ein-versions. Then, in a further step, I will (ii) display the even greater
picture and present a comparison of the Discourse Structuring Potential of the
critical referent (“object”), the subject referent (“old subject”), the speaker
referent (“speaker”) and all other referents (“other”) (“other” at least for the
parameters of topic shift potential and topic continuity), i.e. investigate the
reference distribution with respect to the three parameters in the dieser- and ein-
versions.

(i) (Old) Subject - object comparisons
a) Referential persistence
If we look at Figure A (dieser-version), we see that there is a higher value for
referential persistence (89) of the subject referent (compared to the critical dieser-
referents, the “objects” (76)) in S1 only. From S2 on, the values for referential
persistence are higher for the object-referents in all further continuation sentences
S2 through S6. Thus, only in S1 did the participants re-mention the subjects rather
than the objects. In S2 already, the value of the object referent outranks the value
for the subject referents. Also, the overall number of referential persistence of the object-referents (in the *dieser* version) is higher (596) than the total values of referential persistence for the old-subject referent (449).

Figure H: Referential persistence of subject vs. object (critical referent) in *dieser* version, non-cumulative, but total values per sentence

A very different pattern can be found in Figure B (*ein*-version), in which the respective values for the *ein*-contexts are given. In all continuation sentences from S1 through S6, the values (referential persistence) for the old-subject referents are higher than the values for the critical *ein*-referents. Also, the overall number of referential persistence of the object-referents (in the *ein* version) is lower (125) than the total values of referential persistence for the old-subject referent (553).

Figure I: Referential persistence of subject vs. object (critical referent) in *ein*-version, non-cumulative, but total values per sentence
b) **Topic continuity**

With respect to topic continuity (*dieser*-version), the patterns look quite similar. I found a higher value for topic continuity (49) of the subject referent (compared to the critical *dieser*-referents (28) in S1 only. From S2 on, the values for topic continuity are higher for the object-referents in all further continuation sentences S2 through S6. Thus, in S1 only the participants re-mentioned the old subjects as topics rather than the objects. In S2 already, the value of the object referent *outranks* the value for the subject referents. Also, the overall number of topic continuity of the object-referents (in the *dieser*-version) is higher (315) than the total values of topic continuity for the old-subject referent (157). A very different pattern was found with respect to the values for the *ein*-contexts. In all continuation sentences from S1 through S6, the values (topic continuity) for the old-subject referents are higher than the values for the critical *ein*-referents.

c) **Topic shift potential**

With respect to topic shift potential, we receive again a very similar pattern. With respect to the *dieser*-version, I found a higher value for topic shift potential (49) of the subject referent (compared to the critical (*dieser*)-referents (28) in S1 only. From S2 on, the values for topic continuity are higher for the object-referents (*dieser*-version) in all further continuation sentences S2 through S6. Thus, in S1 only did the participants shift more old subjects to topics rather than the objects. In S2 already, the value of the object referent *outranks* the value for the subject referents. Also, the total numbers for topic shift potential of the object-referents (in the *dieser*-version) is higher (119) than the total values of topic continuity for the old-subject referent (102). A very different pattern can be found with respect to the values for the *ein*-contexts. In all continuation sentences from S1 through S6, the values (topic continuity) for the old-subject referents are higher than the values for the critical *ein*-referents. Also, the overall number of topic continuity of the object-referents (in the *ein*-versions) is lower (33) than the total values of topic continuity for the old-subject referent (112).

d) **Summary: Old subject-object comparisons**

The analysis of the data with respect to the old subject-object comparison has shown that, with respect to all three parameters, the values for the critical *dieser*-referents outrank the values for the subject referents from continuation sentence S2 on. That is, from that point on, in the *dieser* versions, the people a) re-mentioned the critical referents more often than the old-subject-referents, they b) re-mentioned them more often as topics as well from S2 on, and c) more critical- than old-subject referents underwent a topic shift from S2 on, as well. All this was not found to be the case in the *ein*-versions, in which, constantly, the old-subject referent received higher values for all three parameters. Thus, the presence of the *dieser*-referent (in contrast to the presence of the *ein*-referent) appears to *prevent* the old-subject-referents from receiving higher values with respect to the three parameters.
B: Further results (secondary results)

(ii) Comparisons including speaker and other referents
In the following, I will display the even greater picture and present a comparison of the Discourse Structuring Potential of the critical referent (“object”), the subject referent (“old subject”), the speaker referent (“speaker”) and all other referents (“other”) (“other” referents at least for the parameters of topic shift potential and topic continuity). That is, I will investigate the reference distribution with respect to the three parameters in the dieser- and ein-versions.

a) Referential persistence
Figure C depicts the values received for referential persistence of the critical referents, the old subject referents and the speaker referents in the dieser-condition, whereas figure 8b depicts the values for the respective referents in the ein-condition (note that, for the sake of simplicity, we did not measure the referential persistence of the other-referents, see above).

Figure J: Referential persistence of critical referents, subject referents and speaker referents (in 120 stories (10TI x 12 continuation stories produced / condition), total values per sentence in the dieser contexts)

Comparing the values in Figure C and D, two main observations can be made. First, in accordance with the main result (see Section 5.5.1), the referents of indefinite dieser, expectedly, show an overall higher value with respect to referential persistence, compared to their ein-marked counterparts throughout all continuation sentences S1 to S6. Secondly, the high referential persistence of the dieser-marked indefinites appears to decrease / suppress the referential persistence of the subject and the speaker referents, i.e. the referential persistence of indefinite dieser can be claimed to work “at the cost of” on the referential persistence of other referents: the participants used more of their continuation sentences to make reference to the critical referents which were marked with dieser in the test items.
Appendices

Figure K: Referential persistence of critical referents, subject referents and speaker referents (in 120 stories (10TI x 10TI x 12 continuation stories produced) / condition, total values in the ein contexts)

b) Topic continuity
A similar effect can be found when comparing the topic continuity of the critical referents, the (old)-subject referents, the speaker referents and also of other referents in the discourses in the *dieser-* and the *ein-*version, respectively. Figure E depicts the values received for topic continuity of the critical referents, the old subject referents, the speaker and other referents in the *dieser-*condition, whereas Figure F depicts the values for the respective referents in the *ein-*condition.

Figure L: Topic continuity of all referents in 120 stories in the *dieser-*condition (10TI x 10TI x 12 continuations produced / condition), total values
**B: Further results (secondary results)**

The high topic continuity of the critical referents in the *dieser*-version decreases / suppresses the topic continuity of the subject referents, the speaker referents and other referents. Additionally, it decreases the number of topicless sentences. The maximal topic number per sentence (S1-S6) is 120 (assuming maximally 1 topic per sentence in the total of 120 stories (10TIx12 participants / per condition), the difference to 120 being the number of topicless sentences). Knowing the maximal topic number per sentence (120) enables us to calculate the number of topicless sentences, which is the difference to 120 for each continuation sentence in S1 to S6. The number of topicless sentences is lower in the *dieser*-version. That is, the high topic continuity of a referent marked with indefinite *dieser* works at the cost of all other referents in the discourse, which all receive higher values in the *ein*-version.

Furthermore, we find an overall higher number of topics in the *dieser*-condition (in S1 to S6 always over 100 topical referents overall), compared to the *ein*-condition (in S1 to S6 always under 100 topical referents overall). The total amount of topics, in all sentences, is higher in the *dieser*-condition than in the *ein*-condition. That is, not only does indefinite *dieser* change the proportions of topic distribution in the discourse (marking topics at the cost of other referents), it also, additionally, increases the maximal number of topics / topical referents.

c) **Topic shift potential**

A similar effect can be found when comparing the topic shift potential of the critical referents, the (old)-subject referents, the speaker referents and also of other referents in the *dieser*- and in the *ein*-versions. Figure G depicts the values received for topic continuity of the critical referents, the old subject referents, the

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**Figure M:** Topic continuity of all referents in 120 stories in the *ein*-condition (10TI x 12 cotinuation stories produced / condition), total values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continuation Sentences</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Subject Referents</th>
<th>Critical Referents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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speaker and other referents in the *dieser*-condition, whereas Figure H depicts the values for the respective referents in the *ein*-condition.

Figure N: Topic shift potential of all referents in 120 stories in the *dieser*-condition (10TI x 10TI x 12 continuations produced / condition), total values

Figure O: Topic shift potential of all referents in 120 stories in the *ein*-condition (10TI x 10TI x 12 continuations produced / condition), total values

A comparison of both Figures G and H shows, very similar compared to the two previous comparisons, that the high topic shift potential of the critical referents (especially in S1 and S2) in the *dieser*-version decreases / suppresses the
B: Further results (secondary results)

topic shift potential of the subject referents, the speaker referents and other referents. That is, the high topic continuity of a referent marked with indefinite *dieser* works at the cost of all other referents in the discourse.

Furthermore, we find an overall higher number of topic-shifts in the *dieser*-condition compared to the *ein*-condition. The total amount of topic-shifts, in all sentences and for all referents, is higher in the *dieser*-condition (313) than in the *ein*-condition (274). That is, not only does indefinite *dieser* change the proportions of topic-shift distribution in the discourse (marking shifted topics at the cost of other referents), but it also increases the overall number of topic-shifts.

**Interpretation of secondary results**

In addition to the main result, which is significant with respect to the analysis of indefinite *dieser* as a so-called indefinite demonstrative, further, secondary results were presented. They do not necessarily contribute or support the present semantic analysis of indefinite *dieser*, but they still contribute to the more detailed description of the discourse effects of indefinite *dieser*. According to the data presented in Section 5.5.2, indefinite *dieser* (unlike *ein* on its referential interpretation) appears to

(i) mark new topics or referents at the cost of other referents

and, additionally, it even appears to

(ii) trigger a general overall increase of referents or topics in the continuations provided by the participants

Finding (ii) contrasts with what Gernsbacher and Shroyer (1989: 538) found in their very similar study (which served as a model for the present study methodologically) on English indefinite *this* vs. *a(n)*. They say that: “the subjects did not, however, simply produce more clauses when the critical nouns were introduced with *this* rather than *a(n)*: [...] Rather, the subjects simply used more of their clauses to refer to the critical nouns when the critical nouns had been introduced with *this*.” In the present experiment, the participants did not produce more clauses (this was impossible as they were told to give exactly 6 more clauses in both conditions), but they still did produce a greater overall number of referents (or topics) in the *dieser*-version. To put it the other way round, they produced more topicless sentences (i.e. for example more thetic sentences as exemplified in (14):

(14) Laura will *einen Kommilitonen* mit auf die Party bringen. Sie hat ihn im Englischkurs kennen gelernt....
    ‘Laura wants to bring a *fellow student* to the party. She met him in the English course.’
Appendices

(P7)

S1: Laura verliebt sich immer schnell und vermutlich steht sie auf ihren Kommilitonen.
‘Laura always falls in love quickly and probably fancies her fellow student.’
S2: Sie hat ihn einfach gefragt.
‘She simply asked him.’
S3: Vermutlich findet er sie auch ganz interessant.
‘Probably he finds her interesting, too.’
S4: Die Party soll anscheinend ziemlich wild sein und viele Leute sind eingeladen.
‘The party is supposed to be quite crazy and many people are invited.’
S5: Wahrscheinlich wird es dann schwer, die beiden zu beobachten.
‘It might become hard to observe the two.’
S6: Aber im nächsten Englischkurs wird man dann ja sehen, ob daraus was geworden ist. (Topicless sentence)
‘But in the next English class one will see if the two became an item.’

(P12)

S1: Sie saßen nebeneinander.
‘They sat next to each other.’
S2: Er hat ihr aber auch bei vielen Aufgaben geholfen.
‘He helped her with many exercises.’
S3: Dadurch hat sie es besser verstanden.
‘This made her understand it better.’
S4: Dann hat sie eine bessere Note bekommen.
‘Then she received a better grade.’
S5: Deswegen kam dann auch die Einladung von ihr. (topicless sentence)
‘This explains her invitation.’
S6: Bin mal gespannt, was auf der Party passiert. (Topicless sentence)
‘It will be exciting to find out what will happen at the party.’

It is difficult to pin down a theoretical correlate to this overall topic-increasing effect of indefinite dieser in linguistic theory. One might analyze this as a “vividness” effect of indefinite dieser, even though the notion of vividness appears a concept too vague.
C: Test items of experimental study

Full list of the test items of experimental study in Chapter 6

TI1: Laura will diesen / einen Kommilitonen mit auf die Party bringen. Sie hat ihn im Englischkurs kennen gelernt.
   ‘Laura wants to bring this / a fellow student to the party. She met him in her English class.’

TI2: Peter will nächste Woche diese / eine Spanierin besuchen. Er hat sie letztes Jahr in Barcelona kennen gelernt.
   ‘Peter wants to visit this / a Spanish girl next week. He got to know her last year in Barcelona.’

TI3: Achim will jetzt diese / eine Sekretärin einstellen. Er hat sie gestern bei einer Jobbörse getroffen.
   ‘Achim wants to hire this secretary now. He met her yesterday at the job fair.’

TI4: Jenny will diesen / einen Tänzer auf der Party auftreten lassen. Sie hat ihn gestern im Stuttgarter Ballett gesehen.
   ‘Jenny wants this / a dancer to perform at her party. She saw him yesterday in the Stuttgart ballet.’

TI5: Petra will unbedingt diesen / einen Barkeeper näher kennen lernen. Sie hat ihn gestern in ihrer Heimatstadt zum ersten mal gesehen.
   ‘Petra desperately wants to become friends with this / a barkeeper. She saw him yesterday for the first time in her hometown.’

TI6: Martin will jetzt diese / eine Nanny einstellen. Er hat sie gestern über einen Annonce in der Zeitung gefunden.
   ‘Martin wants to hire this / a nanny now. He found her yesterday via an ad in the newspaper.’

TI7: Julia will diesen / einen Schuldenberater um Hilfe fragen. Sie hat ihn gestern von Bekannten empfohlen bekommen.
   ‘Julia wants to ask this / a debt adviser for help. Friends recommended him to her yesterday.’

TI8: Paul will jetzt diese / eine Austauschstudentin bei sich aufnehmen. Er hat sie gerade von der Uni vorgeschlagen bekommen.
   ‘Paul now wants to host this / an exchange student. The university just recommended her to him.’

TI9: Michael will diese / eine Neuseeländerin heiraten. Er hat sie letztens beim Reisen kennen gelernt.
   ‘Michael wants to marry this / a New Zealand girl. He got her to know while he was travelling lately.’

TI10: Tina will jetzt einen Sänger in der Band aufnehmen. Sie hat ihn heute übers Internet entdeckt.
   ‘Tina now wants to hire a singer for her band. She found him today on the internet.’
Appendices

Full list of the test items in the *dieser*- and *ein*-version, respectively, and the continuations provided by the participants:

**Test Item 1 DIESER**

P13 (B1)
S1: Sie hat mir vorhin von ihm erzählt.
S2: Er soll ganz süß sein.
S3: Er hat sie mit seinem Wissen über Englische Romantik beeindruckt.
S4: Sie hat ihn jetzt zu der Party eingeladen.
S5: Wollen wir mal sehen, ob er kommt.
S6: Er ist ja ziemlich beliebt.

P14 (B2)
S1: Er heißt Peter und ist erst vor kurzem nach Deutschland gezogen.
S2: Eigentlich lebt er in Schweden.
S3: Für ein Semester ist er jetzt jedoch hier.
S4: Ich finde ihn ehrlich gesagt etwas komisch.
S5: Er hat so seltsame Ticks und lustig ist er auch nicht.
S6: Wenigstens ist er nett anzusehen.

P15 (B3)
S1: Ich glaube, sie fährt voll auf ihn ab.
S2: Ich bin ja mal gespannt, wie er so ist.
S3: Weiβt du, wer noch so da sein wird?
S4: Vielleicht bringt der Typ ja noch ein paar süße Kumpels mit.
S5: Er sieht richtig gut aus.
S6: Ich freue mich jedenfalls auf die Party.

P16 (B4)
S1: Sie findet ihn toll.
S2: Ich glaube, sie will mehr von ihm als nur Freundschaft.
S3: Also ich kann den ja gar nicht leiden.
S4: Der ist mir irgendwie zu arrogant.
S5: Er tut immer so, als ob er sonst wer wäre.
S6: Aber über Geschmack lässt sich leider streiten.

P17 (B5)
S1: Ich weiss nicht, ob dies so eine gute Idee ist.
S2: Sie hat sich ja erst vor 2 Wochen von Tom getrennt.
S3: Er hat sich ihr aber auch voll aufgedrängt.
S4: Er kennt doch gar niemanden auf der Party.
S5: Der ist doch dann voll das fünfte Rad am Wagen.
S6: Hoffentlich überlegt er es sich noch mal.

P18 (B6)
S1: Er saß durch Zufall neben ihr, als sie gestern ihre erste Vorlesung hatte.
S2: Dann ist sie mit ihm direkt ins Gespräch gekommen.
S3: Er hat wohl die gleichen Interessen wie sie und wohnt in selben Stadtteil.
S4: Ich glaube, sie ist da ein bisschen blauäugig.
S5: Der Typ ist schon 35 und hat 2 Kinder.
S6: Ich bin ja mal gespannt, ob sie ihn wirklich mitbringt.
C: Test items of experimental study

P19 (D1)
S1: Ich denke, sie steht auf den Typ.
S2: Ich bin mal gespannt, wie der so ist.
S3: Er soll aus Portugal kommen.
S4: Dann kann er bestimmt gut Englisch.
S5: Er kann uns dann sicher was von seinem Land erzählen.
S6: Vielleicht können wir ihn da sogar mal besuchen.

P20 (D2)
S1: Er scheint ein netter Typ zu sein.
S2: Hoffentlich säuft der mir nicht das gute Zeug weg.
S3: Martina aber meint, er wäre ne totale Pfeife.
S4: Er soll einen auf wichtig machen.
S5: Ich mach mir aber lieber mein eigenes Bild.
S6: Wir werden dann ja am Samstag sehen wie er so ist.

P21 (D3)
S1: Laura findet ihn sehr attraktiv.
S2: Er sieht so gut aus, deshalb will sie ihn im Freundeskreis einführen.
S3: Sie will ihn auf der Party besser kennen lernen.
S4: Sie hofft, dass er ihr einen Drink ausgeben wird.
S5: Er ist neu zugezogen und deshalb hat er noch nicht so viele Kontakte.
S6: Sie will ihm auf der Party gestehen, dass sie eine Beziehung mit ihm will.

P22 (D4)
S1: Er war sehr eingeschüchtert und oft alleine zu sehen.
S2: Deswegen hatte Laura ihn angesprochen und gefragt, ob er nicht Lust hätte mizukommen.
S3: Ich denke, dass er sich gefreut hat.
S4: Er kann durch Laura viele neue Leute kennenlernen.
S5: Ich würde mich freuen, wenn er sich nicht mehr so alleine fühlt.
S6: Er sieht ja auch ganz gut aus.

P23 (D5)
S1: Ich frage mich, wie alt er wohl ist.
S2: Ob er wohl gut aussieht?
S3: Ihr Freund wird sicher eifersüchtig sein.
S4: Hoffentlich ist er kein Langweiler.
S5: Naja, wir können uns auf jeden Fall auf der Party betrinken.
S6: Er soll uns dann in die Disco fahren.

P24 (D6)
S1: Er war ihr sofort sympathisch.
S2: Sie kam dann auch sehr schnell mit ihm ins Gespräch.
S3: Er lernt jetzt auch regelmäßig mit ihr.
S4: Morgen ist ihr erstes Date.
S5: Vielleicht kriegt sie ihn direkt rum.
S6: Wir sehen es dann ja, wenn er auf der Party aufschlägt.

Test Item 1 EIN

P1 (A1)
S1: Sie findet ihn ziemlich nett.
S2: Es ist lustig, wie sie sich kennengelernt haben.
S3: Sie kam eines Morgens zu früh, und er war schon da.
S4: Sie dachte, sie wäre alleine und hat erst einmal ein Selbstgespräch geführt.
S5: Als er sich räusperte, erschrak sie furchtbar.
S6: Dann haben die beiden sich totgelacht.

P2 (A2)
S1: Sie meinte, er ist wohl sehr nett.
S2: Sie haben schon öfter zusammen Hausaufgaben gemacht.
S3: Ich bin ja mal gespannt, ob da mehr zwischen den beiden läuft.
S4: Mit ihrem letzten Freund hatte Laura ja nicht viel Glück.
S5: Es wird Zeit, dass sie jemand Neues kennen lernt.
S6: Ich bin schon gespannt auf den Typen.

P3 (A3)
S1: Sie fand ihn auf Anhieb sympathisch.
S2: Sie hat sich Hals über Kopf verliebt.
S3: Auf der Party will sie jetzt dann den ersten Schritt machen.
S4: Ich denke, sie hat gute Chancen.
S5: Es wäre super für sie, wenn sie ihn für sich gewinnen könnte.
S6: Er sieht schon ganz gut aus.

P4 (A4)
S1: Aber ich weiss nicht, ob es eine gute Idee ist.
S2: Ich hab gehört, dass er oft Frauen verarschen soll.
S3: Naja, du kennst ja Laura.
S4: Wenn sie sich für jemanden begeistert, verrennt sie sich schnell.
S5: Und dabei ist sie so sensibel und beobachtet ihre Umwelt.
S6: Sie ist einfach zu naive.

P5 (A5)
S1: Sie saßen nebeneinander.
S2: Er starnte sie die ganze Zeit von der Seite an.
S3: Daraufhin fragte sie was los sei.
S4: Sie war super verunsichert.
S5: Trotzdem kamen sie ins Gespräch.
S6: Sie verstanden sich so gut, dass sie ihn einlud.

P6 (A6)
S1: Er ist der Weiberheld des Jahrgangs.
S2: Aber diese Tatsache nimmt sie nicht so wahr.
S3: Ich bin mal gespannt, wie er so ist.
S4: Ich kenne ihn noch nicht selbst.
S5: Was hältst du davon?
S6: Warten wir mal ab, wie die Sache endet.

P7 (C1)
S1: Laura verliebt sich immer schnell und vermutlich steht sie auf ihren Kommilitonen.
S2: Sie hat ihn einfach gefragt.
S3: Vermutlich findet er sie auch ganz interessant.
S4: Die Party soll anscheinend ziemlich wild sein und viele Leute sind eingeladen.
S5: Wahrscheinlich wird es dann schwer, die beiden zu beobachten.
S6: Aber im nächsten Englischkurs wird man dann ja sehen, ob aus den beiden was geworden ist.
C: Test items of experimental study

P8 (C2)
S1: Sie hatten sich wohl schon öfters gesehen.
S2: Sie meinte, dass er Peter heisst und ein Jahr jünger ist.
S3: Sie haben beide davor Maschinenbau studiert.
S4: Und jetzt wollen sie ihre Englischkenntnisse in diesem Kurs auffrischen.
S5: Laura ist völlig hin und weg.
S6: Ihr Bruder studiert übrigens auch Maschinenbau.

P9 (C3)
S1: Er sieht offenbar richtig gut aus.
S2: Sie ist ganz aufgeregt und weiss nicht, was sie anziehen soll.
S3: Die beiden kennen sich ja gar nicht richtig.
S4: Sie stand schon gestern ewig vor dem Spiegel.
S5: Fest steht, dass sie gut aussehen will, um ihn zu beeindrucken.
S6: Jedenfalls wird die Party unterhaltsam werden, ob es nun was wird oder nicht.

P10 (C4)
S1: Jetzt will die schon wieder einfach jemanden mitbringen.
S2: Sie schlept doch immer nur Idioten an.
S3: Im Englischkurs sind sie in Kontakt getreten.
S4: Sie meinte, er lächle sie immer so hübsch an.
S5: Das sagt aber komischerweise jede Frau.
S6: Ich werde auf der Party die Geschehnisse mal genau beobachten.

P11 (C5)
S1: Sie kennen sich erst seit 3 Wochen.
S2: Aber sie will ihn trotzdem schon mitbringen.
S3: Sie meinte, sie wäre verliebt.
S4: Na, wenn sie ihn mitbringt, werden wir ja sehen.
S5: Ach ja, mir fällt noch etwas ein, wegen der Party.
S6: Du musst Bier mitbringen.

P12 (C6)
S1: Sie saßen nebeneinander.
S2: Er hat ihr aber auch bei vielen Aufgaben geholfen.
S3: Dadurch hat sie es besser verstanden.
S4: Dann hat sie eine bessere Note bekommen.
S5: Deswegen kam dann auch die Einladung von ihr.
S6: Bin mal gespannt, was auf der Party passiert.

Test Item 2 DIESER

P1 (A1)
S1: Er war dort im Urlaub.
S2: Sie will ihm jetzt die Stadt ein bisschen besser zeigen.
S3: Er hat sich sehr über ihre Einladung gefreut.
S4: Sie ist auch total nett und offen.
S5: Die meint das auch nur so total Freundschaftlich.
S6: Für ihn ist das auch absolut in Ordnung.

P2 (A2)
S1: Es war wohl liebe auf den ersten Blick.
S2: Ich hoffe mal, er verrennt sich da nicht in was.
S3: Sie ist für ihn aber echt mehr als nur ein Urlaubsflirt.
S4: Und sie scheint die Sache ähnlich zu sehen.
S5: Er hat mir ein Foto von ihr gezeigt.
S6: Sie ist sehr hübsch.

P3 (A3)
S1: Er bildet sich ein, sie wieder sehen zu müssen.
S2: Sie hat sich ein Jahr lang nicht gemeldet.
S3: Vor einem Monat haben sie dann telefoniert.
S4: Sie hat angerufen und ihn eingeladen.
S5: Was will sie denn von ihm?
S6: Sie ruft und er springt ihr hinterher – typisch.

P4 (A4)
S1: Er hat schon eine neue Badehose gekauft.
S2: Er will ihr richtig imponieren.
S3: Vielleicht kommt sie ihn bald mal in Deutschland besuchen.
S4: Sie soll eine hervorragende Köchin sein.
S5: Hoffentlich gibt sie mir dann ein paar Tipps.
S6: Ich bin sehr gespannt auf sie.

P5 (A5)
S1: Er traf sie, während er in einer Schlange stand.
S2: Sie war total genervt vom Warten und fing ein Gespräch an.
S3: Sie hatte viele Gemeinsamkeiten mit ihm.
S4: Auch ihr kleiner Sohn war Peter auf Anhieb sympathisch.
S5: Mit ihr verbrachte Peter die folgenden Urlaubstage.
S6: Bald will er zu ihr nach Barcelona ziehen.

P6 (A6)
S1: Sie arbeitet in einer Marketingagentur.
S2: Peter kommt in einer Woche wieder.
S3: Ich bin mal gespannt, was er von ihr erzählt.
S4: Er war auf jeden Fall hin und weg von ihr.
S5: Sie sieht aber auch atemberaubend aus.
S6: Vielleicht kommt sie uns ja hier mal besuchen.

P7 (C1)
S1: Damals war er wohl schwer verliebt in sie.
S2: Aber Spanierinnen haben sowieso diesen exotischen Charme.
S3: Hoffentlich ist sie heute noch genauso schön wie letztes Jahr.
S4: Sie soll zu ihm nach Deutschland ziehen.
S5: Das würde großes Aufsehen erregen.
S6: Sie hat nämlich kein Geld und nutzt ihn womöglich nur aus.

P8 (C2)
S1: Es passierte in der Sagrada Familia.
S2: Sie ist zufällig mit ihm zusammengestoßen.
S3: Peter hat dann gleich ein Gespräch angefangen.
S4: Sie heisst Juanita.
S5: Juanita studiert Sprachwissenschaften in Barcelona.
S6: Peter macht ja zufälligerweise genau dasselbe.
P9 (C3)
S1: Barcelona war für ihn ein super Trip.
S2: Er will sie näher kennen lernen.
S3: Sie sieht typisch spanisch, also so richtig gut aus.
S4: Sie wird bestimmt seine neue Freundin.
S5: Seine letzte Trennung war echt hart.
S6: Aber er freut sich jetzt auf sie.

P10 (C4)
S1: Dieser Peter ist echt ein Schlingel.
S2: Sie ist seine Traumfrau, meint er.
S3: Sie hat den Flug für ihn bezahlt.
S4: Nächsten Monat geht es los.
S5: Dabei war er doch letzten Monat noch in Rom bei Giulia!
S6: Aber jetzt geht er zu Carla nach Spanien.

P11 (C5)
S1: Sie hat ihm schon ganz viele Briefe geschrieben.
S2: Und das im Zeitalter von Email und Telefon.
S3: Sie sagt aber, dass sie das romantisch findet.
S4: Naja, fliegen wird er sowieso.
S5: Sie hat ihn regelrecht bedrängt.
S6: Hoffentlich ist sie keine Stalkerin!

P12 (C6)
S1: Er hat sogar schon den Flug gebucht.
S2: Er will jetzt ne ganze Weile bei ihr bleiben.
S3: Sie wohnt da total zentral.
S4: Außerdem hat sie super viele Connections in der Künstlerszene.
S5: Die kann er echt gut als Absprungbrett nutzen.
S6: Vielleicht wird dann ja doch noch was aus seiner Karriere.

Test Item 2 EIN

P13 (B1)
S1: Der Peter hat auch in jeder Stadt ne Frau.
S2: Vor ein paar Wochen war er noch in Frankreich.
S3: Krass, wie der es schafft mit allen Kontakt zu halten.
S4: Und dann lädt er sich einfach immer selbst ein.
S5: Jetzt ist es jedenfalls Barcelona.
S6: Ich bin schon echt gespannt, was er so berichten wird.

P14 (B2)
S1: Sie sind sich da immer mal wieder über den Weg gelaufen.
S2: Letzten Endes hat er sich mit Freunden besoffen und sie angesprochen.
S3: Peter ist total peinlich, wenn er getrunken hat.
S4: Er ist dann immer so laut und draufgängerisch.
S5: Aber offenbar hat er einen bleibenden Eindruck hinterlassen.
S6: Jetzt ist er schon ziemlich aufgeregt.

P15 (B3)
S1: So eine Fernbeziehung ist ja nicht ganz einfach.
S2: Er sollte auf jeden Fall aufpassen und sich nicht verletzen lassen.
Appendices

S3: Aber ansonsten....warum nicht?
S4: Auf dem Foto, das er mir gezeigt hat, sah sieh sehr nett aus.
S5: Und wenn er das durchziehen will, dann wünsche ich ihm, dass es klappt.
S6: Vielleicht zieht er ja für immer nach Spanien?

P16 (B4)
S1: Das war ja auf einer Konferenz oder so.
S2: Jedenfalls hat er sie im Hotel kennen gelernt.
S3: Ich hab keine Ahnung, wie die sich verständigen.
S4: Peter spricht kein Spanisch und kein Englisch...
S5: Aber die Sprache der Liebe ist ja universell...
S6: Ich bin schon gespannt, was er so erzählt.

P17 (B5)
S1: Es ist kaum zu glauben, dass sie immer noch Kontakt haben.
S2: Ich finde das sehr bemerkenswert.
S3: Schließlich liegen schon einige Kilometer zwischen den beiden.
S4: Ich frage mich nur, was er damit bezwecken will.
S5: Eine Beziehung über so eine Distanz ist ja kaum realistisch.
S6: Ich bin sehr gespannt, wie das weitergeht.

P18 (B6)
S1: Dort war er auf einer Sprachreise.
S2: Er traf sie in einem Restaurant.
S3: Allerdings kann er kaum Spanisch.
S4: Vielleicht läuft die Kommunikation ja mittlerweile besser.
S5: Außerdem kann er so auch sein Spanisch aufbessern.
S6: Er will ja auch bald ein Auslandssemester in Barcelona machen.

P19 (D1)
S1: Es muss ziemlich gefunkt haben zwischen den beiden.
S2: Aber sie waren ja auch aber ein Jahr getrennt.
S3: Mal sehen, was davon noch übrig ist.
S4: Nach Barcelona würd’ ich auch mal gern fliegen.
S5: Er hat echt Glück gehabt.
S6: Wenn sie sich gut verstehen, zieht er irgendwann vielleicht sogar nach Spanien.

P20 (D2)
S1: Jetzt muss er nur noch einen Sprachkurs machen.
S2: Sonst wird das wieder nur ein Treffen mit Zeichensprache.
S3: Sein gebrochenes Englisch ist auch nicht gerade hilfreich.
S4: Der Peter macht einen auf Globetrotter.
S5: Er denkt, er kann mit seinem Schulenglisch die Welt erobern.
S6: Dabei hat er erst letztes Jahr einen Spanischkurs nach nur Stunden abgebrochen.

P21 (D3)
S1: Peter sucht sich immer Frauen, die weit weg wohnen.
S2: Für ihn sind diese Long Distance Sachen perfekt.
S3: Er hat hier seine Freiheiten und kann machen was er will.
S4: Dann kann er ab und zu mal schön in den Urlaub fliegen.
S5: Ich weiss nicht, ob sie da mitmacht.
S6: Spanierinnen sind ja oft so Besitz ergreifend.
C: Test items of experimental study

P22 (D4)
S1: Beim Einkaufen sollen sie sich begegnet sein.
S2: Beide hätten beim Shoppen nach der gleichen Sporthose gegriffen.
S3: Diese Sporthose hätte es nur ein mal gegeben.
S4: Peter hat dann die Hose gekauft.
S5: Doch im Nachhinein soll er zurück gerannt sein und ihr die Hose geschenkt haben.
S6: Beide hätten dann darüber gelacht.

P23 (D5)
S1: Die haben sich schon so lange nicht mehr gesehen.
S2: Hat er denn keine Angst, so weit weg zu fahren?
S3: Wo nimmt der bloß das Geld her?
S4: Ich frag mich auch, was seine Eltern dazu sagen.
S5: Offenbar wollen sie jetzt heiraten, und das nach 2 Monaten Beziehung.
S6: Sie hat sich sicherlich verändert.

P24 (D6)
S1: Er sagt, dass sie sehr hübsch ist.
S2: Er ist aber 2 Jahre älter.
S3: Scheinbar haben sie sich im Urlaub in einer Disco kennen gelernt.
S4: Peter ist total hin und weg von ihr.
S5: Er freut sich schon sehr auf den Besuch.
S6: Vielleicht verspricht er sich zu viel davon.

Test Item 3 DIESER

Achim will jetzt diese Sekretärin einstellen. Er hat sie gestern bei einer Jobbörse getroffen...

P1 (A1)
S1: Sie standen beide am Buffet.
S2: Sie hatte offenbar schon eine ganze Weile nicht mehr gearbeitet.
S3: Aber ihm ist das egal.
S4: Vermutlich ist er ein bisschen verliebt in sie.
S5: Das würde erklären, warum er so handelt.
S6: Sie hat ihm nicht mal ein Zeugnis vorlegen müssen.

P2 (A2)
S1: Er war sofort begeistert von ihr.
S2: Sie hat wohl sehr gute Referenzen und wirkt sehr kompetent.
S3: Es wird ja auch Zeit, dass Achim Hilfe bekommt.
S4: Und die Neue macht das sicher super.
S5: Sie war auf einer internationalen Sekretärinnenschule.
S6: Achim bräuchte echt mal wieder Urlaub.

P3 (A3)
S1: Sie hat ihn total zugequatscht.
S2: Sie hat geredet und geredet und geredet.
S3: Sie hat erzählt, was sie schon alles an Erfahrung hätte.
S4: Im Ausland war sie auch schon und 5 Sprachen spricht sie.
S5: Da war er sofort begeistert.
S6: Nächsten Montag fängt sie an.
Appendices

P4 (A4)
S1: Ich glaube seiner Frau wird das gar nicht gefallen.
S2: Sie wird super eifersüchtig auf die neue Sekretärin sein.
S3: Die soll aber auch ein heißes Schnittchen sein.
S4: Aber Achim sieht ja auch super aus.
S5: Vielleicht fängt er eine Affäre mit ihr an.
S6: Seine Frau wird ihn bestimmt im Auge behalten.

P5 (A5)
S1: Ich glaube nicht, dass sie ihn nur durch Kompetenz überzeugt hat.
S2: Er wird es wild mit ihr treiben.
S3: Deshalb stellt er auch alle paar Monate eine neue ein.
S4: Die Neue sieht schon echt pornomäßig aus.
S5: Vielleicht sollte jemand mal Achims Frau Bescheid sagen.
S6: Die hat nämlich keine Ahnung.

P6 (A6)
S1: Ich finde es ja etwas überstürzt.
S2: Allerdings ist er von ihren Fähigkeiten überzeugt.
S3: Sie wird sicher ewig brauchen, um sich einzuarbeiten.
S4: Die ist doch total unqualifiziert!
S5: Morgen kommt sie vorbei und arbeitet Probe.
S6: Ich erzähle dir wie es war.

P7 (C1)
S1: Heute hat er schon alle Vorbereitungen getroffen, damit sie möglichst schnell bei ihm anfangen kann.
S2: Er sollte auch noch mal sein Büro putzen.
S3: Diese Sekretärin soll nun Achims Arbeitsalltag erleichtern.
S4: Sie sollte besser kompetent sein, und was drauf haben.
S5: Ansonsten schafft sie das nicht.
S6: Aber sie scheint Achim ja echt von sich überzeugt zu haben auf der Börse.

P8 (C2)
S1: Er ist total begeistert von ihr gewesen.
S2: Sie heißt Anna.
S3: Anna hatte davor bei einem Edel-Anwaltsbüro gearbeitet.
S4: Achim ist daher echt froh, dass er sie hat.
S5: Er wird sie morgen den anderen vorstellen.
S6: Achim ist schon auf die Reaktionen gespannt.

P9 (C3)
S1: Ihre Referenzen seien gut und sie sei bestens für diesen Job geeignet.
S2: Außerdem sieht sie gut aus.
S3: So unwichtig ist der äußere Schein ja nun auch nicht.
S4: Sie lässt sich so einen Job bestimmt nicht entgehen.
S5: Achim ist schließlich freundlich und zahlt gut.
S6: Das war bestimmt eine gute Entscheidung.

P10 (C4)
S1: Mensch, die hat einen Hintern wie ein Scheunentor.
S2: Aber dafür ist sie eine richtig flinke Tippse.
S3: Für mich wäre die zwar nichts, aber gut.
S4: Achim meint, sie wäre toll.
S5: Ich glaube, dass seine Frau ihm diese Sekretärin verschafft hat.
S6: Ganz blöd ist die nämlich nicht.

P11 (C5)
S1: Ich glaube, er hat einen Fehler gemacht.
S2: Er hat sie einmal gesehen und gleich eingestellt.
S3: Mit der wird sein Unternehmen den Bach runtergehen.
S4: Sie ist so was von unorganisiert.
S5: Außerdem ist sie faul.
S6: Und sie stinkt nach Schweiß!

P12 (C6)
S1: Er war sofort begeistert von ihren Fähigkeiten.
S2: Sie hat ihm alles über sich erzählt.
S3: Dann hat sie ihm von ihren vorherigen Jobs erzählt.
S4: Sie scheint sehr gut ausgebildet zu sein.
S5: Achim ist sich sehr sicher.
S6: Er wird gut mit ihr zusammenarbeiten können.

Test Item 3 EIN

P13 (B1)
S1: Er braucht sie aber auch ganz dringend.
S2: So wie es bei dem im Büro aussieht.
S3: Das ist ja fast schlimmer als bei Messis.
S4: Eigentlich bräuchte er eher mal eine Entrümpelungsfirma.
S5: Ich bin mal gespannt, wie sich die Neue da durchkämpft.
S6: Ich könnte das nicht.

P14 (B2)
S1: Er hatte ja schon immer ein Händchen für dümmlche Frauen.
S2: Was er erzählt hat, spricht für sich.
S3: Erstmal erzählte er, wie gut qualifiziert sie doch sei.
S4: Das hat mich dann ehrlich gesagt auch schon beeindruckt.
S5: Dann meinte er, dass ihm jede Hilfe von ihr recht wäre.
S6: Dann hat er plötzlich losgeheult. (Voll krass ey.)

P15 (B3)
S1: Ich frag mich, ob die überhaupt gut qualifiziert ist.
S2: Man weiss ja nie, was bei solchen Jobmessen alles rumläuft.
S3: Da kann ja jeder hinkommen.
S4: Ich weiss sowieso nicht, wozu er unbedingt eine Sekretärin braucht.
S5: Sein Betrieb ist ja nicht so groß.
S6: Aber er muss wissen, warum er sie eingestellt hat.

P16 (B4)
S1: Und jetzt will er sie einfach so einstellen.
S2: Er hat ja schon verzweifelt gesucht und jetzt hat er sie endlich gefunden.
S3: Ich glaube aber nicht, dass er nur nach fachlichen Kriterien geht.
S4: Blonde Haare sind ihm extrem wichtig.
S5: Die hatte auch seine Exfrau.
S6: War die nicht auch mal seine Sekretärin?
Appendices

P17 (B5)
S1: Wollen wir mal sehen, was seine Frau zu ihr sagt.
S2: Sie hat bestimmt ein Problem damit.
S3: Schließlich gibt es nicht umsonst solche Klischees.
S4: Auf der anderen Seite braucht er auch dringend Unterstützung.
S5: Er ist ja so was von gefordert in seinem Job.
S6: Jemand der ihm unter die Arme greift, wäre ihm schon zu wünschen.

P18 (B6)
S1: Bei der Börse gab es allerlei Jobsuchende.
S2: Ich wage zu bezweifeln, dass es dort qualifizierte Fachkräfte gab.
S3: Ich habe gehört, dass sie erst 20 ist und eigentlich Model werden will.
S4: Die ist doch mal so was von naiv!
S5: Vielleicht sollten wir Achim mal darauf hinweisen.
S6: Ich hoffe nur, dass er das nicht falsch versteht.

P19 (D1)
S1: Ich weiss gar nicht, ob er überhaupt eine Sekretärin braucht.
S2: Bisher ist er ja auch immer gut alleine zurecht gekommen.
S3: Und ob er sich das leisten kann, ist auch fraglich.
S4: Hoffentlich hilft sie ihm auch wirklich und sitzt nicht nur dumm rum.
S5: Hoffentlich ruiniert er sich damit nicht.
S6: Aber vielleicht ist es ja auch alles gut so.

P20 (D2)
S1: Ich weiss echt nicht, warum er sie braucht.
S2: Er selbst schafft ja auch nichts.
S3: Jetzt hat er sie eingestellt, um beim Faulenzen nicht allein zu sein.
S4: Das ist mir unverständlich.
S5: Er sollte sich lieber um ein paar Aufträge bemühen.
S6: Aber das habe ich ihm schon hundert Mal gesagt.

P21 (D3)
S1: Er denkt, dass der erste Eindruck sehr viel ausmacht.
S2: Er sagte, dass die Sekretärin sehr gut geeignet ist.
S3: Ihm ist ein gepflegtes Äußeres sehr wichtig.
S4: Weiterhin legt er auch Wert auf Pünktlichkeit.
S5: Mal sehen, ob sie hält was sie verspricht.
S6: Ich bin bei so was ja immer erstmal misstrauisch.

P22 (D4)
S1: Er meinte, dass es eine Kurzschlussreaktion war.
S2: Er hat gar nicht nachgedacht und einfach „ja“ zu ihr gesagt.
S3: So etwas passiere ihm sonst nie.
S4: Er meinte aber, dass er total von ihrer Schönheit geblendet war.
S5: Jetzt ist es zu spät.
S6: Der Vertrag ist schon unterschrieben.

P23 (D5)
S1: Das ist einfach so fies.
S2: Meine Bewerbung liegt schon seit Wochen bei ihm auf dem Tisch.
S3: Er hat einfach nie darauf reagiert.
S4: Und dann geht er auf die Jobbörse und stellt diese Tussi ein!
C: Test items of experimental study

S5: Ich werde ihm mal schön die Meinung geigen.
S6: Kollegialität und Solidarität spielen für ihn wohl keine große Rolle!

P24 (D6)
S1: Sie waren sofort auf einer Wellenlänge.
S2: Er war auf der Suche, und sie auch.
S3: Achim hinkt ja total hinterher mit seiner Arbeit.
S4: Da passte ihm das ganz gut rein.
S5: Das ganze Organisatorische wurde ihm langsam zu viel.
S6: Hoffentlich hat er jetzt etwas Entlastung.

Test Item 4 EIN

P1 (A1)
S1: Sie war total begeistert.
S2: Sie hat ihn vom Fleck weg engagiert.
S3: Das war die Vorstellung, in der sie mit mir und Annika gegangen ist.
S4: Sie hatte doch die Tickets gewonnen.
S5: Sie war so was von angetan von ihm, das war fast schon übertrieben.
S6: Sie hat die halbe Zeit geheult.

P2 (A2)
S1: Sie hat total von ihm geschwärmt.
S2: Ich kenne mich ja nicht so aus mit Ballett.
S3: Ich bin mir aber nicht so sicher, ob Ballett so gut auf die Party passt.
S4: Aber das ist einfach typisch Jenny.
S5: Sie braucht immer etwas Ausgefallenes.
S6: So wie damals, als der Feuerspucker fast ihre Wohnung in Brand gesetzt hat.

P3 (A3)
S1: Ist ein Balletttänzer nicht unangebracht auf einer U30 Party?
S2: Aber sie macht ja eh was sie will.
S3: Der ist bestimmt sehr teuer.
S4: Aber sie war so begeistert von seinem athletischen Körper.
S5: Ich finde die Idee so was von blöd.
S6: Wir werden sehen, was passiert.

P4 (A4)
S1: Sie hat mir richtig begeistert von der Aufführung erzählt.
S2: Sie war in Schwanensee.
S3: Wie sie sich das leisten kann, ist mir schleierhaft.
S4: Aber genau deshalb sind Jennys Partys auch immer die besten.
S5: Ich habe extra ein neues Kleid gekauft.
S6: Vielleicht gibt’s ja noch mehr Überraschungen als den schwulen Tänzer?

P5 (A5)
S1: Erst hat sie sich über den Tänzer lustig gemacht.
S2: Männer und Ballett passen für sie nicht zusammen.
S3: Doch mit jeder Minute wurde sie begeisterter.
S4: Und nach der Show traf sie ihn und war total begeistert.
S5: Sie haben dann direkt einen Vertrag ausgehandelt.
S6: Sie hat ja genug Geld.
Appendices

P6 (A6)
S1: Er hat genial getanzt.
S2: Sie ist dann gleich danach hinter die Bühne gegangen und hat alles gemanaged.
S3: Jennys Party wird echt was Größeres.
S4: Sie hat ja auch eine Band.
S5: Und professionelle Cocktail-Mixer.
S6: Die Party wird soo geil.

P7 (C1)
S1: Im Ballett sehen sowieso alle Tänzer immer toll aus.
S2: Vermutlich sind sie auch eine hohe Gage gewöhnt.
S3: Ich habe Jenny gefragt, ob sie denn genug Geld hat.
S4: Sie meinte aber, dass er gar nicht so viel koste.
S5: Ich bezweifle das.
S6: Ich bin schon echt gespannt auf die Party.

P8 (C2)
S1: Sie weiss, dass ihre Freunde erstaunt sein werden.
S2: Jeder weiss, dass Jenny ein absoluter Ballett-Fan ist.
S3: Aber dass sie gleich einen professionellen Tänzer einlädt, ist schon ungewöhnlich.
S4: Obwohl, sie hat ja schon immer so verrückte Ideen gehabt.
S5: Jenny hat mit ihm ausgemacht, dass er einen kurzen Überblick über sein Repertoire gibt.
S6: Das wird bestimmt super komisch.

P9 (C3)
S1: Ballett ist sowieso ihr größtes Hobby.
S2: Jenny kennt sich da gut aus, obwohl sie nicht professionell ist.
S3: Sie trainiert oft und ist immer auf dem neuesten Stand was die News im Ballett angeht.
S4: Der Tänzer ist bestimmt durchtrainiert und genau ihr Typ.
S5: Nervös wird sie auf der Party aber sicher nicht sein.
S6: Sie ist so was gewohnt.

P10 (C4)
S1: Die ist echt strange drauf.
S2: Sowas kann doch keiner ernst nehmen.
S3: Wenn da auf der Party jemand zwischen den Gästen schwul herumtippelt....
S4: Naja, lustig wird’s schon werden.
S6: Wir sollten dem Typ ein pinkes Tütü kaufen.

P11 (C5)
S1: Und das will was heissen.
S2: Er war der Star des Abends.
S3: Es gab Standing Ovations.
S4. Ich komm auf jeden Fall auf die Party.
S5: Das kann ich mir nicht entgehen lassen.
S6: Vielleicht kann ich ja was mit ihm anfangen.

P12 (C6)
S1: Jetzt ist sie sich aber total unsicher, ob das eine gute Idee war.
S2: Ballett-Einlagen sind in der Regel nicht so die Partykracher.
S3: Und teuer ist er halt auch voll.
S4: Sie meinte, dass sie ihn aber auch nicht wieder ausladen kann.
S5: Nun ja, jetzt gibt es halt Ballett auf der Party.
S6: Hoffentlich dauert das nicht so lange.

Test Item 4 DIESER

P13 (B1)
S1: Sie war total begeistert von ihm.
S2: Sie ist nach der Vorstellung direkt hin und wollte ein Autogramm.
S3: Er war dann recht interessiert an ihr.
S4: Der hat ihr dann vorgeschlagen, ihr Privatstunden zu geben.
S5: Sie hat ihn dann aber gefragt, ob er nicht einfach auf ihrer Party tanzen will.
S6: Jetzt kommt er am Wochenende zu ihr.

P14 (B2)
S1: Sie war hin und weg von seinem Können und seinem Körper.
S2: Jenny meinte, dass dieser Tänzer genau das Richtige für die Party sei.
S3: Ich konnte mir das irgendwie nicht vorstellen.
S4: Wird er dann eine riesen Show hinlegen?
S5: Vielleicht kommt er ja auch gar nicht.
S6: Sie sollte lieber jemand freakigen einstellen.

P15 (B3)
S1: Der konnte sich bewegen, sag ich dir!
S2: Und er hatte ein hautenges Kostüm an.
S3: Da blieb nicht mehr viel Platz für Phantasien.
S4: Wenn sie den für die Party anheuern könnte, wäre das ja so genial.
S5: Aber er meinte, dass er 100 Euro pro Stunde koste.
S6: Hoffentlich kann Jenny noch handeln.

P16 (B4)
S1: Sie hat sich sofort in seinen ausdrucksstarken Tanz verliebt.
S2: Er soll genau das sein, was sie immer gesucht hat.
S3: Du weißt ja, wie ihre Partys so sind.
S4: Der passt da super rein.
S5: Nach der letzten Party hab ich 2 Tage gebraucht, um mich zu erholen.
S6: Vielleicht ist der Tänzer ja auch noch nett.

P17 (B5)
S1: Sie war sofort hin und weg von ihm.
S2: Ich persönlich halte das ja auch für eine gute Idee.
S3: Der Typ wird das Highlight des Abends.
S4: Es ist sicher sein Traum, auf dem Mädelsabend aufzutreten.
S5: Er kommt aus Russland.
S6: Vielleicht kann er ja mit uns Vodka trinken.

P18 (B6)
S1: Vielleicht ist dieser Tänzer ja auch ganz schnuckelig.
S2: Aber für so eine Party ist der doch nicht das richtige.
S3: Der gehört auf eine große Bühne und nicht ins Jugendhaus!
S4: Jenny will mit ihm ihren Ex eifersüchtig machen.
S5: Sie will so tun, als sei er ihr Neuer.
S6: Der Tänzer hat schon zugesagt, dass er mitspielt.
Appendices

P19 (D1)
S1: Das wird sicher teuer.
S2: Der tanzt im Ballett und wird sicher nicht mal nur so kurz vorbeikommen.
S3: Auf der anderen Seite liefert der dann auch bestimmt ne gute Show.
S4: Eigentlich braucht Jenny den doch gar nicht.
S5: Da soll sie lieber mehr zu Essen kaufen.
S6: Der Tänzer ist doch reine Geldverschwendung.

P20 (D2)
S1: Ballett, dass ich nicht lache.
S2: Der ist doch bestimmt Stripper.
S3: Jenny weiss doch gar nicht, was Ballett ist.
S4: Ich wette, der ist ein 1A Stripper.
S5: Wenn der Typ dann merkt, auf was er sich da eingelassen hat...
S6: Das wird bestimmt ein lustiger Abend.

P21 (D3)
S1: Weil dieser Tänzer hoch begabt sein soll, muss er unbedingt auftreten.
S2: Sie ist der Meinung, dass er die Musik voll auslebt.
S3: Offenbar hat er eine super Choreographie drauf.
S4: Er muss unbedingt auftreten, weil er seine Moves so dermaßen rockt.
S5: Auserdem sei er total kreativ beim Tanzen.
S6: Kein Move gleicht dem anderen.

P22 (D4)
S1: Du weißt ja, dass für Jenny diese Competition sehr wichtig ist.
S2: Wenn der Tänzer, den sie coachen wird, erster wird, dann gewinnt sie ein Stipendium in Paris.
S3: Deshalb kommt er jetzt auf die Party.
S4: Sie lässt keine Chance aus, ihn auftreten zu lassen.
S5: Er ist schon total genervt davon.
S6: Er ist ein richtiges Nervenbündel.

P23 (D5)
S1: Hoffentlich kann er auch wirklich gut tanzen.
S2: Ob die Partygäste begeistert sein werden?
S3: Ballett ist doch eher was für ältere Leute.
S4: Wenn er gut aussieht, könnte er den Leuten gefallen.
S5: Ich hoffe, dass die Party ein Erfolg wird.
S6: Der hat offenbar eine Special Show mit Spasseffekt geplant.

P24 (D6)
S1: Sie war total hin und weg von seiner Performance.
S2: Nach der Vorstellung ging sie hinter die Bühne.
S3: Dort fragte sie den Tänzer, wie das denn aussehe mit Privatvorstellungen.
S4: Er reagierte echt gut und ihm gefiel die Idee.
S5: Er meinte, er habe sowieso genug Zeit.
S6: Nun stellt er ein Programm auf.

Test Item 5 DIESER

P1 (A1)
S1: Sie war eigentlich schon so oft in dieser Bar.
S2: Sie fand ihn direkt sympathisch.
S3: Jetzt hat sie sich überlegt, wie sie das am besten anstellt.
S4: Sie ist ja ziemlich schüchtern.
S5: Aber der Mann hat sie sehr beeindruckt.
S6: Er ist Mexikaner.

P2 (A2)
S1: Sie meinte, dass er extrem gut aussieht.
S2: Er ist auch sehr charmant.
S3: Aber das ist ja schließlich auch sein Job.
S4: Der ist zu allen Kundinnen charmant.
S5: Aber Jenny ist da leicht zu beeindrucken.
S6: Morgen erzählt sie mir dann wahrscheinlich schon von dem nächsten netten Kerl.

P3 (A3)
S1: Da fährt sie einmal im Jahr nach Hause und trifft dann so jemanden.
S2: Er hat ihr ihren persönlichen Drink kreiert.
S3: Aber er wohnt soo weit weg.
S4: Er ist ein ganz netter.
S5: Aber mehr als eine einmalige Geschichte wird daraus eh nicht.
S6: Er ist einfach nicht ihr Typ.

P4 (A4)
S1: Ich habe ihr gesagt, dass sie ihn einfach zum Kaffe einladen soll.
S2: Aber sie traut sich nicht.
S3: Außerdem fährt sie nächste Woche nach Tübingen.
S4: Und er hat gar keine Ahnung von seinem Glück.
S5: Ewig wird er auch nicht auf sie warten.
S6: Aber ihr Psychologiestudium ist da natürlich wieder wichtiger.

P5 (A5)
S1: Sie war total frustriert in der Bar und bestellte sich einen Drink nach dem anderen.
S2: Irgendwann begann der Barkeeper sich mit ihr zu unterhalten.
S3: Sie blühte dadurch richtig auf.
S4: Er hat auch total rumgeschleimt.
S5: Sie wollte sich mit ihm verabreden, aber verlor seine Nummer.
S6: Sie will ihn unbedingt wieder sehen.

P6 (A6)
S1: Sie war mit ihm im Cafe.
S2: Allerdings haben sie kaum miteinander gesprochen.
S3: Immerhin hat sie Blicke mit ihm ausgetauscht.
S4: Er ist wohl auch schüchtern, genau wie sie.
S5: Sie weiss auch nicht, wo er wohnt.
S6: Aber er wird sich schon wieder bei ihr melden.

P7 (C1)
S1: Von der Idee halte ich nicht viel.
S2: Im betrunkenen Zustand findet man doch alle Männer toll.
S3: Bestimmt stand sie gestern auch die ganze Zeit bei dem Barkeeper und hat getrunken.
S4: Vermutlich hat der eh noch andere Frauen.
S5: Aber sie wären schon ein lustiges Pärchen.
S6: Petra mit ihrem Alkoholproblem und er mit seinem Job.
Appendices

P8 (C2)
S1: Sie glaubt ja an Liebe auf den ersten Blick.
S2: Der Barkeeper hatte sich ihr vorgestellt.
S3: Zuvor hatte er ihr 2 leckere Cocktails gemischt.
S4: Das ist sehr wichtig für Petra.
S5: Cocktails sind ja ihre Leidenschaft.
S6: Damit hat er sich direkt in ihr Herz geschossen.

P9 (C3)
S1: In Düsseldorf gibt es tolle Männer.
S2: Der Barkeeper war total sexy.
S3: Er ist bestimmt ein Aufreißer.
S4: Sie steht jetzt aber jedenfalls auf ihn.
S5: Den lässt sie nicht weglauen.
S6: Ob das mal gut geht...

P10 (C4)
S1: Der war neu in ihrer Stammbar.
S2: Ich konnte sie nicht mehr halten.
S3: Sie wurde rasend bei seinem Anblick.
S4: Ich glaube, sie kennt ihn von früher.
S5: Er war noch etwas unerfahren, aber sie fand das süß.
S6: Ich glaube, dass er mit Absicht einen Drink über sie geschüttet hat.

P11 (C5)
S1: Jetzt will sie ihn unbedingt wieder treffen.
S2: Naja, er sieht schon gut aus.
S3: Er hat sie voll mit seinem Charme eingewickelt.
S4: Meinen Rat will sie nicht hören.
S5: Er hat sie überredet in seinem Club zu bleiben bis seine Schicht zu Ende ist.
S6: Besonders einfühlsam scheint er nicht zu sein.

P12 (C6)
S1: Sie hat sich gleich in ihn verschossen.
S2: Ich glaube, es war nur Einbildung.
S3: Aber sie meint, dass er total mit ihr geflirtet hat.
S4: Sie will nächste Woche wieder zu ihm.
S5: Da hat er sicher schon ne andere.
S6: Barkeeper sind doch immer solche Draufgänger.

Test Item 5 EIN

P13 (B1)
S1: Wer will schon was mit nem Barkeeper anfangen?
S2: Die sind doch alle untreu.
S3: Aber Petra hat ihren festen Plan.
S4: Ich habs versucht ihr auszureden.
S5: Aber sie meinte, dass sie ihn will oder keinen.
S6: Vermutlich wird sie da noch zur Alkoholikerin.

P14 (B2)
S1: Er ist wohl ein richtiger Womanizer.
S2: So sind sie doch alle.
S3: Ich weiss nicht, in was sich Petra da wieder verrennt.
S4: Sie verliebt sich immer in Typen, die unerreichbar für sie sind.
S5: Und Barkeeper verdienen doch auch nichts und sind abends immer beschäftigt.
S6: Mein Fall wäre das gar nicht.

P15 (B3)
S1: Solche Typen flirtent doch jeden Abend rum.
S2: Außerdem zieht Petra doch bald ziemlich weit weg von dort.
S3: Dann sind es fast 3 Stunden Fahrt in ihre Heimatstadt.
S4: Sie sollte lieber mal dort jemanden suchen, anstatt sich hier an einen ranzuschmeißen.
S5: Aber ich glaube, dass sie seit der Trennung von ihrem Ex so verzweifelt ist und krampfhaft sucht.
S6: Hoffentlich wird sie wieder glücklich.

P16 (B4)
S1: Sie hat ja ihre Eltern besucht.
S2: Jedenfalls war ihr langweilig und sie ging in diese Bar.
S3: Und dann waren nur sie und er da.
S4: Da ergibt sich ja zwangsläufig ein Gespräch.
S5: Sie sagt, sie haben stundenlang geredet.
S6: Jetzt wollen sie heute Abend ins Kino.

P17 (B5)
S1: Ich weiss ja nicht, was ich davon halten soll.
S2: Barkeeper – das klingt doch total nach Womanizer.
S3: Bei solchen Typen stehen die Frauen doch Schlange.
S4: Ich fände es schade für Petra, wenn sie auf so einen reinfällt.
S5: Sie meinte ja, dass er supernett wäre.
S6: Aber sie lässt sich einfach viel zu leicht blenden.

P18 (B6)
S1: Sie meinte, dass er neu in der Stadt ist.
S2: Deshalb will Petra da heute Abend wieder hin.
S3: Ich würde ja mitgehen, aber ich bin wahrscheinlich schnell uninteressant für sie.
S4: Auf der anderen Seite ist sie eh viel zu schüchtern.
S5: Wahrscheinlich sitzt sie nur den ganzen Abend da und hofft, dass was passiert.
S6: Ich denke, ich sollte mitgehen und sie ermutigen.

P19 (D1)
S1: Sie stürzt sich wieder in irgendein Abenteuer wenn das so weiter geht.
S2: Barkeeper machen doch jeder Frau schöne Augen, damit sie viel kaufen.
S3: Der Typ kann sich wahrscheinlich gar nicht an sie erinnern.
S4: Hoffentlich ist sie nicht enttäuscht, wenn es nichts wird.
S5: Sie muss ja immer so waghalsige Aktionen veranstalten.
S6: Da ist das keine Ausnahme.

P20 (D2)
S1: Ist ja klar, dass sie schon wieder am Flirten ist.
S2: Aber gut, dann sind die Drinks auf der nächsten Party gesichert.
S3: Wowohnt Petra überhaupt?
S4: Ich sollte sie mal fragen.
S5: Ist ja eigentlich schon merkwürdig.
S6: Ich kenne sie doch schon seit Jahren.
Appendices

P21 (D3)
S1: Sie meint, dass er vom Aussehen her der richtige sei.
S2: Aber das Aussehen ist ja wohl nicht alles.
S3: Man muss auch was im Köpchen haben.
S4: Und Barkeeper haben sicher keinen Doktortitel.
S5: Den erwartet aber Petras Vater.
S6: Der ist so ein Spießer.

P22 (D4)
S1: Du weißt, wie Petra ist.
S2: Sie muss jeden neuen Typen kriegen.
S3: Das ist doch gestört.
S4: Sie sollte sich mal ein bisschen raffen.
S5: Fast jede Woche hat sie einen neuen.
S6: Und immer sucht sie sich Männer nach den Berufen aus.

P23 (D5)
S1: Wie sie das wohl anstellen will?
S2: Sie ist doch so schüchtern.
S3: Hoffentlich muss ich ihr nicht helfen.
S4: Barkeeper flirten doch ständig mit allen.
S5: Und Petra ist jetzt nicht gerade die Ausgeburt der Schönheit.
S6: Vielleicht schnapp ich ihn mir!

P24 (D5)
S1: Sie war bei ihren Eltern zu Besuch.
S2: Abends war sie mit Schulfreunden weg.
S3: In ihrer Stammbar hat sie ihn dann gesehen.
S4: Sie haben dann geflirtet was das Zeug hielt.
S5: Am nächsten Tag haben sie telefoniert.
S6: Und jetzt will sie ihn eben unbedingt wiedersehen.

Test Item 6 DIESER

P1 (A1)
S1: Er fand sie direkt passend für den Job.
S2: Also rief er sie an und machte ihr ein Angebot.
S3: Sie hatten direkt danach ein Vorstellungsgespräch.
S4: Sie hat viele gute Zeugnisse vorzuweisen.
S5: Er macht sich auch keine Gedanken darüber, sie nicht zu kennen.
S6: Er hätte gerne, dass sie Montag beginnt.

P2 (A2)
S1: Er hat ja schon lange nach einem Kindermädchen gesucht.
S2: Als alleinerziehender Vater hat er’s schon nicht leicht.
S3: Aber die Neue wird ihn sicher entlasten.
S4: Sie kann ihm vielleicht auch bei der Frauen suche helfen.
S5: Die Kinder sind sicher auch glücklich über sie.
S6: Vielleicht ist diese Nanny ja auch was für ihn.

P3 (A3)
S1: Er sollte aufhören Zeitung zu lesen.
S2: Sie soll ihn „entlasten“.
C: Test items of experimental study

S3: Es ist doch pure Geldverschwendung, diese Frau zu bezahlen.
S4: Also so viel hat er in seinem Job auch nicht zu tun.
S5: Sie wird seine Familie zerstören und nur Unruhe hineinbringen.
S6: So sind Nannys doch nun einmal.

P4 (A4)
S1: Er will nur das Beste für die Kleinen.
S2: Die Nanny hat schon fürs Fernsehen gearbeitet.
S3: Sie ist die Super-Nanny bei RTL.
S4: Da wurde sie jetzt ja aber rausgeschmissen und hat deswegen inseriert.
S5: Ich bin ja mal gespannt, wie sie sich so mit Martins Kindern macht.
S6: Die tanzen ihr sicher total auf der Nase herum.

P5 (A5)
S1: Ich bin gespannt, wie sie sich so mit den Kindern schlägt.
S2: Sie ist die 7. Nanny für die Kleinen.
S3: Seit Martins Frau gestorben ist, kriegt die Kinder niemand unter Kontrolle.
S4: Hoffentlich bring die neue Nanny die Wende.
S5: Sie muss die Kinder irgendwie dazu bringen, sich wieder normal zu verhalten.
S6: Sie müssen ja ab Herbst wieder in die Schule.

P6 (A6)
S1: Eigentlich ist das ja keine schlechte Idee, da Hilde ja jetzt wieder arbeitet.
S2: Hoffentlich ist sie auch die Richtige.
S3: Die Kinder müssen sich sicher erst einmal an sie gewöhnen.
S4: Sie kennt sie ja nicht.
S5: Ich finde es immer besser, jemand aus dem Bekanntenkreis als Nanny zu nehmen.
S6: Aber Martin hat jetzt diese Vollblut-Pädagogin angeheuert.

P7 (C1)
S1: Die Nanny hat schon zugesagt.
S2: Martin ist echt froh, dass er sie hat.
S3: Die Kinder mögen die Nanny bestimmt.
S4: Die Nanny kommt jetzt, weil die Kinder jetzt in einem schwierigen Alter sind.
S5: Die Kinder haben eigentlich eine gute Erziehung.
S6: Aber die Nanny soll’s noch besser machen.

P8 (C2)
S1: Die Nanny soll ihm jetzt zur Seite stehen.
S2: Nach seiner Trennung ist bei ihm das Chaos ausgebrochen.
S3: Er hat 4 Kinder in der Pubertät.
S4: Die Nanny wird ihre helle Freude daran haben.
S5: Aber sie ist ja schließlich dafür ausgebildet worden.
S6: Sie soll am Anfang erst mal nur am Wochenende vorbeikommen, damit sich die Kinder an sie gewöhnen können.

P9 (C3)
S1: Das ist eine schwierige Angelegenheit, wenn man bedenkt dass man sie kaum kennt.
S2: Die Frau ist aus Spanien.
S3: Hoffentlich klappt das gut.
S4: Die Kinder brauchen jetzt einfach jemanden, der sich um sie kümmert.
S5: Vielleicht kann sie auch Spanisch mit den Kindern reden.
S6: Ich würde nicht eine fremde Frau an meine Kinder lassen.

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P10 (C4)
S1: Du kennst sie ja noch nicht.
S2: Aber ich hab sie in ihrer Annonce gesehen.
S3: Sie schien sehr kompetent.
S4: Ich hätte sie auch eingestellt.
S5: Sie unterstützt ihn und er hat dann wieder mehr Zeit mit mir mal ein Bierchen trinken zu gehen.
S6: Außerdem ist sie auch noch hübsch.

P11 (C5)
S1: Das war auch nötig.
S2: Er und seine Frau müssen dringend wieder unter Leute.
S3: Sie passt auf und die beiden können sich vergnügen.
S4: Sie muss sich dann mit Hannes und Björn rumschlagen.
S5: Ich bin ja mal gespannt, wie sie das findet.
S6: Aber das ist ja ihr Job.

P12 (C6)
S1: Er ist alleine sehr überfordert.
S2: Die Nanny soll eine ältere Dame sein.
S3: Sie hat offenbar bereits viel Erfahrung beim Babysitten.
S4: Außerdem soll sie billig sein.
S5: Ihr macht der Job einfach so viel Spass.
S6: Geld ist für sie sekundär.

Test Item 6 EIN

P13 (B1)
S1: Für was braucht der denn eine Nanny?
S2: Er ist arbeitslos und seine Frau auch.
S3: Die sitzen doch eh nur den ganzen Tag zu Hause mit den Kindern rum.
S4: Und wie die das bezahlen wollen?
S5: Die beiden sind echt so bescheuert.
S6: Arbeitslos und faul noch dazu sind die.

P14 (B2)
S1: Hört sich alles super an, was in der Annonce steht.
S2: Martin will jetzt mal sehen, wie die Kinder mit ihr zurecht kommen.
S3: Wichtig ist ihm, dass die Kinder zufrieden sind.
S4: Er verfolgt ja das Waldorf-Konzept.
S5: Es ist ihm wichtig, dass die Kinder viel in der Natur sind.
S6: Außerdem sollen sie mindestens 3 Mal am Tag ihren Namen tanzen.

P15 (B3)
S1: Mir wär ja nicht so ganz wohl dabei, wenn eine Fremde auf meine Kinder aufpasst.
S2: Aber ich glaube, dass er in der ersten Zeit auch öfter noch dabei sein will.
S3: Trotzdem kann man ja nie wissen.
S4: Sie kennen sich ja nur aus der Annonce.
S5: Wer weiss, was alles passieren wird.
S6: Vielleicht stellt er auch versteckte Kameras auf.

P16 (B4)
S1: Er und Sonja halten sie für perfekt geeignet.
C: Test items of experimental study

S2: Wozu auch immer die bei 2 Kindern ne Nanny brauchen.
S3: Sonja arbeitet ja nur halbtags.
S4: Die letzte Nanny war ziemlich schlecht.
S5: Sie soll ne richtige Schreckschraube sein.
S6: Aber man wird sehen, wie es läuft.

P17 (B5)
S1: Da musste ich spontan an die Beckham-Geschichte denken.
S2: Heutzutage betrügt doch jeder seine Frau mit dem unschuldigen Kindermädchen.
S3: Wäre ich seine Frau, würde ich darauf achten, dass sie nicht zu attraktiv ist.
S4: So ein junges hübsches Ding würde ich mir nicht ins Haus holen.
S5: Ich werde bei der nächsten Gelegenheit versuchen, einen Blick auf sie zu erhaschen.
S6: Dann wissen wir mehr.

P18 (B6)
S1: Langsam wird es ihm auch zu viel mit den Kindern und dem Job.
S2: Dabei hat er schon mit Susannes Tod genug zu kämpfen.
S3: Dem Armen sollte wirklich jemand unter die Arme greifen.
S4: Und die Kinder freuen sich bestimmt, wenn wieder jemand da ist, der Zeit für sie hat.
S5: Martin hätte in seinem Job kürzer treten sollen, aber das wollte er ja nicht.
S6: Hoffen wir mal, dass die Nanny seriös und zuverlässig ist.

P19 (D1)
S1: Das ist auch besser für die Kinder denke ich.
S2: Schließlich ist er so oft arbeiten und seine Frau ist auch dauernd im Stress.
S3: Wenn eine Nanny da ein bisschen Arbeit abnimmt, tut das der Familie nur gut.
S4: Die Kinder müssen endlich mal lernen, sich zu benehmen.
S5: Ich mache der Mutter keinen Vorwurf, schließlich hat sie auch kaum Zeit.
S6: Aber genau deswegen wäre eine Nanny ja auch so hilfreich.

P20 (D2)
S1: Also dann lass uns mal schauen, was sie für eine ist.
S2: Ich würde ja meine Kinder nicht in fremde Hände geben.
S3: Dafür liebe ich sie viel zu sehr.
S4: Sie sind einfach meine kleinen Engel.
S5: Naja, vielleicht hat er ja wirklich keine Zeit.
S6: Sein Job ist schon extrem stressig.

P21 (D3)
S1: Eine Nanny sei jetzt einfach nötig, sagte er.
S2: Er kommt einfach nicht mehr mit der Situation zurecht.
S3: Ihm wächst alles über den Kopf.
S4: Erst verlässt ihn seine Frau und dann muss er auch noch umziehen.
S5: Der ist am Rande des Nervenzusammenbruchs.
S6: Mal sehen, ob sich die Situation jetzt verbessert.

P22 (D4)
S1: Er meint, dass sie die Richtige sein soll für seinen Sohn.
S2: Er ist dieses Mal fest davon überzeugt.
S3: Du weißt ja, wie Martins Sohn ist.
S4: Einmal war ich bei ihm zum Babysitten.
S5: Es ging so ziemlich alles schief, was schief gehen konnte.
S6: Um Gottes Willen, das mach ich nie wieder.
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P23 (D5)
S1: Hoffentlich kommen unsere Kinder mit ihr zurecht.
S2: Ich hab keine Ahnung, ob 7 Euro die Stunde reichen.
S3: Aber mehr ist bei uns einfach nicht drin.
S4: Die Kinder brauchen einfach gerade jemanden.
S5: Sie hören nicht mehr auf uns.
S6: Das ist echt krass.

P24 (D6)
S1: Ihre bisherigen Erfahrungen sind überzeugend.
S2: Seit Martin sich von seiner Frau getrennt hat, hat er mit den Kindern nur Ärger.
S3: Ein Teenager und ein Kleinkind sind nicht einfach.
S4: Er hofft, dass er jetzt endlich jemand gefunden hat, der ihm hilft.
S5: Dann hätte er wenigstens wieder etwas Zeit für sich.
S6: Der Arme lebt ja nur noch für seine Arbeit und seine Kinder.

Test Item 7 DIESER

P13 (B1)
S1: Sie sitzt echt in der Klemme.
S2: Aber der Schuldenberater, den sie jetzt angerufen hat, ist wohl echt super.
S3: Er meinte, dass er ihr helfen kann.
S4: Sie muss aber alles machen, was er sagt.
S5: Er hat ihr schon einen Terminvorschlag gemacht.
S6: Er verlangt aber ganz schön viel Geld.

P14 (B2)
S1: Die Bekannten sind sehr zufrieden mit dem Schuldenberater und haben nun ein angenehmeres Leben.
S2: Er hat sie aus dem Ruin gerettet, indem er einen genauen Plan aufgestellt hat.
S3: Julia ist aber ehrlich gesagt selber schuld, dass sie so hohe Schulden hat.
S4: Würde sie nicht wöchentlich shoppen gehen, wäre sie besser dran.
S5: Eigentlich sollte sie mal einen Therapeuten aufsuchen.
S6: Aber jetzt wird der Schuldenberater ja hoffentlich für alles sorgen.

P15 (B3)
S1: Es ist auf jeden Fall gut, dass sie sich von ihm beraten lässt.
S2: Sonst könnte sie richtig abstürzen und in der Schuldenfalle landen.
S3: Er hat anscheinend die Bekannten auch schon mal beraten.
S4: Also er soll wohl ganz zuverlässig sein.
S5: Hoffentlich hilft er ihr dabei, die Gläubiger wieder loszuwerden.
S6: Dass dieser Mike sie aber auch verlassen musste...

P16 (B4)
S1: Ich weiss nicht, warum sie den braucht.
S2: Der wird sie doch nur abzocken!
S3: Ich wusste auch gar nicht, dass sie Schulden hat.
S3: Obwohl, sie hat sich ja ein neues Auto gekauft.
S4: Naja, jetzt muss wohl dieser Typ ran und ihr helfen.
S5: Eigentlich dachte ich, dass sie gut verdient.
S6: Vielleicht kann sie auch nur nicht richtig mit Geld umgehen.
C: Test items of experimental study

P17 (B5)
S1: Die Arme steckt ganz schön in der Krise.
S2: Seit ihre Firma den Bach runter ist, häufen sich die Schulden.
S3: Hoffentlich kann der Berater da einen Weg hinaus finden.
S4: Aber eigentlich ist das ja sein Job.
S5: Der macht ja den ganzen Tag nichts anderes.
S6: Deshalb bin ich schon optimistisch.

P18 (B6)
S1: Es wurde auch langsam Zeit, dass sie sich darum kümmert.
S2: Ihre Bekannten haben ihr schon monatelang von ihm erzählt.
S3: Und er hat ihr ein Freundschaftspreisangebot gemacht.
S4: Aber sie war zu stolz ihn anzurufen.
S5: Erst als sie wirklich so dick im Minus war, hat sie ihn dann mal angerufen.
S6: Er meinte, sein Angebot stehe noch.

P19 (D1)
S1: Das wird auch langsam Zeit.
S2: Die mit ihrem Einkaufswahn.
S3: Der Typ wird ihr echt helfen.
S4: Auf uns alle hat sie ja nicht gehört.
S5: Aber dieser Berater hat so etwas an sich, dem muss man einfach vertrauen.
S6: Der wird ihr als aller erstes ihre Shoppingtouren streichen.

P20 (D2)
S1: Ich wusste gar nicht, dass Julia Schuldenprobleme hat.
S2: Sie könnte doch jederzeit zu mir kommen.
S3: Aber nein, sie ruft den Typen an und wirft ihm noch mehr Geld in den Rachen.
S4: Der wird sie ausnehmen, wie eine Weihnachtsgans.
S5: Erst baut er Vertrauen auf, dann zockt er sie ab.
S6: So läuft es doch immer.

P21 (D3)
S1: Er ist wohl recht freundlich.
S2: Er hat auf sie auch nen positiven Eindruck gemacht.
S3: Und er kennt sich mit allem sehr gut aus.
S4: Intelligent ist er auch.
S5: Eigentlich klingt das nach nem Mann zum heiraten.
S6: Vielleicht verliebt sie sich ja in ihn.

P22 (D4)
S1: Sie ist wirklich total verschuldet.
S2: Sie muss ja aber auch immer die neuesten Schuhe haben.
S3: Aber ob der Schuldenberater ihr da helfen kann, ist fraglich.
S4: Der wird ihr ihre Schulden mal vorrechnen und das wars.
S5: Sie bräuchte eher ne Therapie.
S6: Schauen wir mal, was er ihr rät.

P23 (D5)
S1: Sie hat doch gar keine Schulden.
S2: Was ist wohl der Grund dafür, dass sie ihn sehen will?
S3: Sie hat sich sicherlich in ihn verliebt.
S4: Das ist doch ne dumme Idee.
Appendices

S5: Er ist doch viel zu alt.
S6: Und er wird sich sicher nicht auf Kunden einlassen.

P24 (D6)
S1: Sie hatte damals ziemliche Probleme gehabt.
S2: Sie ist gerade so richtig am Ende.
S3: Ob der Berater ihr da tatsächlich helfen kann?
S4: Was er wohl raten?
S5: Er kann doch auch nicht plötzlich Geld aus dem Nichts hervorzaubern.
S6: Ich würde es ihr wünschen.

Test Item 7 EIN

P1 (A1)
S1: Die Bekannten haben selbst gute Erfahrungen mit ihm gemacht.
S2: Dass ihr Exmann sie auf den ganzen Schulden hat sitzen lassen, ist auch wirklich die Höhe!
S3: Da kann man verstehen, dass sie so verzweifelt ist.
S4: Hoffentlich kommt sie da bald wieder raus.
S5: Schulden sind echt ernst zu nehmende Probleme.
S6: Ich würde den Exmann verklagen.

P2 (A2)
S1: Gott sei Dank nimmt sie die Sache endlich mal in die Hand.
S2: Sie jammert mir schon seit Wochen was vor, weil sie immer pleite ist.
S3: Aber sie muss ja auch ständig Geld ausgeben, dass sie nicht hat.
S4: Sie lebt halt total über ihre Verhältnisse.
S5: Dabei ist sie doch noch Studentin.
S6: Sie sollte lieber mal einen ordentlichen Abschluss machen.

P3 (A3)
S1: Der kommt immer im Fernsehen auf RTL.
S2: Sie würde dann eine eigene Sendung bekommen.
S3: Dafür kassiert sie mächtig Geld.
S4: Die Sache mit den Schulden wäre dann auch erledigt.
S5: Sie ist ein schlaues Mädchen.
S6: Wenn das ausgestrahlt wird, muss ich es auf jeden Fall anschauen.

P4 (A4)
S1: Endlich hat sie ihr Problem erkannt.
S2: Mir war es schon lange klar, dass sie Hilfe braucht.
S3: Aber wenn ich etwas gesagt habe, hat sie nie was gesagt.
S4: Vielleicht hat ihr neuer Freund ihr die Augen geöffnet.
S5: Wer immer nur unnützes Zeug bestellt, kann nicht normal sein.
S6: Ich konnte ihr ja auch nicht helfen mit meiner wenigen Freizeit.

P5 (A5)
S1: Sie bestellt seit Jahren in zig Versandhäusern.
S2: Die Rechnungen bezahlt sie natürlich nicht.
S3: Es haben sich horrende Mahngebühren angesammelt.
S4: Julia wächst alles über den Kopf.
S5: Sie wirft die Briefe ungeöffnet in die Schublade.
S6: Ich hoffe, dass sie sich nun wirklich helfen lässt.
C: Test items of experimental study

P6 (A6)
S1: Sie sitzt echt ziemlich in der Klemme.
S2: Ohne Hilfe wird das auch nicht besser werden.
S3: Sie meinte, dass der Berater echt kompetent ist.
S4: Ich würde es mir für Julia wünschen, dass sie einen Weg da raus findet.
S5: Sie klang echt richtig verzweifelt am Telefon.
S6: Aber was kann man solchen Leuten noch raten?

P7 (C1)
S1: Zum Glück hat sie einen gefunden.
S2: Shoppingsucht sollte man nicht auf die leichte Schulter nehmen.
S3: Morgen haben sie ihr erstes treffen.
S4: Julias Bekannte waren sich sicher, dass ihr der Berater helfen kann.
S5: Sie sollte aber in Zukunft wirklich sparsamer sein.
S6: Sonst wird das nix mit dem Traum vom Eigenheim.

P8 (C2)
S1: Sie steckt ja schon lange in der Klemme.
S2: Jetzt jemanden zu konsultieren war ein schwieriger Schritt für sie.
S3: Es ist aber die einzige Möglichkeit.
S4: Sie lässt sich ja von jedem Angebot ködern.
S5: Wenn sie das erste Gespräch hinter sich hat, wird es ihr besser gehen.
S6: Er will ja solchen Leuten helfen.

P9 (C3)
S1: Das hat sie noch nie nötig gehabt.
S2: Aber jetzt steckt sie in der Schuldenfalle.
S3: Ihr kann wirklich nur noch der Berater helfen.
S4: Es ist echt besser so.
S5: Hoffentlich wird sie dadurch nicht noch ärmer.
S6: Sie hat ja ohnehin zu wenig Geld

P10 (C4)
S1: Ich frage mich, wozu sie den braucht.
S2: Ich kann ihr auch sagen, wo ihr Problem liegt.
S3: Vielleicht sollte sie einfach mal weniger shoppen gehen.
S4: Zweimal die Woche geht sie, und kauft immer bei Prada und Gucci ein.
S5: Kein Wunder ist man da pleite.
S6: Da muss man ja arm werden.

P11 (C5)
S1: Wobei ich Bekannte die einem Schuldenberater empfehlen schon komisch finde.
S2: Naja, er muss wohl echt gut sein.
S3: Sie kann es brauchen, so wie ihr Geschäft gerade läuft.
S4: Man hat nicht leicht, wenn sich jemand mit der Kasse davon macht.
S5: Und dann kam der Wucherkredit, von dem ich dir erzählt hab.
S6: Jetzt lass uns mal schauen, wie sich das entwickelt.

P12 (C6)
S1: Sie hat wirklich viel Geld verloren.
S2: Sie hat sich durch ihre Spielsucht aber auch selbst in diese Situation gebracht.
S3: Jetzt kann sie nur noch durch professionelle Hilfe da rauskommen.
S4: Eine Therapie wird sie auch machen.
Appendices

S5: Das sind schon ernst zu nehmende Probleme.
S6: Jetzt schauen wir mal, ob der Berater ihr helfen kann.

Test Item 8 DIESER

P13 (B1)
S1: Sie kommt aus Italien.
S2: Er wollte unbedingt jemand aufnehmen, und die Uni regelt das dann.
S3: Man hat keinen Einfluss darauf, wen man bekommt.
S4: Paul hat aber richtig Glück gehabt.
S5: Sie sieht verdammt gut aus.
S6: Und fliessend Deutsch kann sie auch sprechen.

P14 (B2)
S1: Ich finde, das passt sehr gut zu ihm.
S2: Er wird sich rührend um sie kümmern.
S3: Nächsten Monat wird die Austauschstudentin dann kommen.
S4: Er hat schon einen richtigen Plan für sie gemacht.
S5: Paul will ihr auf jeden Fall so viele Sehenswürdigkeiten zeigen, wie möglich.
S6: Als erstes wird’s zu nem Schloss gehen.

P15 (B3)
S1: Sie kommt aus Kalifornien.
S2: Das ist bestimmt total interessant, wenn er sie aufnimmt, und macht Spaß.
S3: Naturlich bleibt abzuwarten, ob sie auch nett ist.
S4: Wäre ja eine totale Katastrophe, wenn sie voll die doofe Nuß ist.
S5: Aber ich fänd es toll, wenn ers macht.
S6: Wird bestimmt ne coole Zeit.

P16 (B4)
S1: Er hat sich da ja vor Monaten beworben.
S2: Ich glaub, sie kommt aus Chile.
S3: Ich mein, er spricht ja Spanisch, das passt.
S4: Aber wo soll sie bitte schlafen?
S5: Er wird für sie wohl sein Wohnzimmer räumen müssen.
S6: Dann wird die Wohnung ja noch enger.

P17 (B5)
S1: Es war ja klar, dass er sich eine Studentin ausgesucht hat und keinen Student.
S2: Die Arme weiss hoffentlich, auf was sie sich da eingelassen hat.
S3: Ich jedenfalls würde nicht freiwillig bei Paul wohnen.
S4: Weißt du eigentlich, wie unordentlich der ist?
S5: Das hält die nicht länger als eine Woche aus.
S6: Jede Wette, nächsten Monat ist sie wieder weg.

P18 (B6)
S1: Das ist eine super Idee, um Kontakte zu knüpfen.
S2: Sie kommt aus Schweden.
S3: Pauls Freundin macht da sicherlich nicht mit.
S4: Die Austauschstudentin soll nämlich echt gut aussehen.
S5: Das gefällt Pauls Freundin sicherlich nicht.
S6: Das ist schade für Paul, weil er sich mit der Schwedin sicher gut versteht.
C: Test items of experimental study

P19 (D1)
S1: Ich weiß ja nicht, was ich davon halten soll.
S2: Also eigentlich ist das ja ne tolle Chance, um Menschen kennen zu lernen, aber man kann auch Pech haben.
S3: Sie könnte zum Beispiel Drogen nehmen.
S4: Sie könnte auch ein völliger Psycho sein.
S5: Aber ich mach mir sicher zu viele Gedanken.
S6: Bestimmt ist sie nett und sie haben eine super Zeit.

P20 (D2)
S1: Sie scheint schon nächstes Semester zu kommen.
S2: Vielleicht wird er sich in sie verlieben.
S3: Aber bei seinem Glück wird sie sicher eine schwer umgängliche Braut sein.
S4: Vielleicht ist sie ja aber doch ganz nett.
S5: Schauen wir mal, was aus der Sache wird.
S6: Immerhin hat er so mal Kontakt zu Frauen.

P21 (D3)
S1: Er hofft, dass die Studentin hübsch ist.
S2: Er wünscht sich, dass sich etwas mit ihr entwickeln wird.
S3: Er würde alles für sie tun, sagt er.
S4: Total gastfreundlich ist er ja auch.
S5: Vielleicht nimmt sie ihn danach ja dann auch bei sich auf.
S6: Paul ist jedenfalls für alles offen und hofft auf eine Affäre mit ihr.

P22 (D4)
S1: Als er ein Foto von ihr gesehen hat, dachte er sich, dass sich vielleicht was zwischen ihm und ihr entwickeln könnte.
S2: Sie sah nämlich wunderhübsch aus.
S3: Die Austauschstudentin ist aus Australien.
S4: Dort wollte Paul auch schon immer mal hin.
S5: Durch sie denkt er sich, dass er da dann auch mal hin kann.
S6: Paul sagt, dass sie sogar sehr intelligent ist.

P23 (D5)
S1: Er ist schon gespannt, wie sie aussieht.
S2: Ob er sich wohl mit ihr verständig kann?
S3: Ob sie wohl gut aussieht?
S4: Vielleicht verliebt sie sich in ihn!
S5: Aber bestimmt ist sie enttäuscht, wenn er immer nur mit seinen Jungs rumhängt.
S6: Das könnte auch ein Drama geben.

P24 (D6)
S1: Er kann ja aus finanziellen Gründen nicht selbst verreisen.
S2: Aber er würde gerne Erfahrungen mit Amerikanern machen.
S3: Die Austauschstudentin kennen zu lernen, stellt er sich sehr interessant vor.
S4: Er kann womöglich viel lernen.
S5: Sie kommt aus Missouri.
S6: Sie hat nicht die Mittel, alleine zu wohnen.
Test Item 8 EIN

P1 (A1)
S1: Sie kommt aus Amerika und kann kaum Deutsch.
S2: Aber Paul macht das nicht viel aus.
S3: Er hatte Englisch in der Schule und spricht es sehr gut.
S4: Vielleicht geht er danach ja auch ins Ausland.
S5: Aber Amerika reizt ihn nicht.
S6: Er will lieber nach England.

P2 (A2)
S1: Bin ja mal gespannt, was für eine da dann ankommt.
S2: Die können einem ja jeden schicken.
S3: Eigentlich wollte Paul ja gerne jemand aus Italien, damit er sein Italienisch verbessern kann.
S4: Aber dieses Jahr gibt es wohl keine Austauschstudenten aus Italien.
S5: Naja, dann muss Paul sich überraschen lassen.
S6: Und er wird dann wohl irgend ne andere Sprache lernen müssen.

P3 (A3)
S1: Sie kommt aus Neuseeland.
S2: Paul wollte schon immer mal nach Neuseeland.
S3: Vielleicht kann er schon nächstes Jahr dorthin, wenn er sie jetzt aufnimmt.
S4: So einfach hat er sich die Erfüllung seines Traumes nicht vorgestellt.
S5: Er freut sich schon riesig und hat große Pläne.
S6: Er hat gemeint, dass sie in 5 Monaten kommt.

P4 (A4)
S1: Ich kann mich noch an meinen ersten Austausch erinnern.
S2: Es war wirklich eine tolle Zeit.
S3: Und so lernt man auch die Sprache am besten.
S4: Ich finde, er tut das Richtige.
S5: Schließlich brauchen Austauschstudenten auch ein Zuhause.
S6: Und genügend Platz hat er ja bei seinen Eltern.

P5 (A5)
S1: Sie kommt aus Schweden.
S2: Er hat die Wahl nur aufgrund des Fotos getroffen.
S3: Das passt ja mal wieder zu ihm.
S4: Er ist echt immer nur auf der Suche nach neuen Flirtobjekten.
S5: Aber immerhin scheint sie auch was auf dem Kasten zu haben.
S6: Paul sollte besser die Finger von ihr lassen.

P6 (A6)
S1: Bei dem Bewerbungsverfahren konnte man unterschiedliche Kriterien angeben.
S2: Paul wollte eine Frau, und am besten noch aus Lateinamerika.
S3: Körbchengrößen durfte man sich da natürlich nicht wünschen, aber auf dem Foto sah sie schon gut aus.
S4: Jetzt kann Paul seinen ganzen Charme spielen lassen.
S5: Er wird ihr erst den liebevollen Freund und Helfer vorspielen, und dann zugreifen.
S6: Ich kenne ihn nur zu gut....

P7 (C1)
S1: Ich weiss, dass er das ziemlich aufregend findet.
C: Test items of experimental study

S2: Hoffentlich ist er sich bewusst, dass das vor allem ziemlich viel Arbeit bedeutet.
S3: Aber ich denke, die Hauptsache ist, dass er dabei viel lernt.
S4: Der Sinn eines Austauschs ist schließlich, seine Sprachfähigkeiten zu verbessern.
S5: Auf jeden Fall will ich die Austauschstudentin dann mal sehen.
S6: Vielleicht kann ich auch davon profitieren.

P8 (C2)
S1: Sie kommt aus Spanien.
S2: Paul interessiert sich für die spanische Sprache.
S3: Er hat sich daher um einen Austausch mit Spanien beworben.
S4: Paul hat schon einige Ideen, was er mit ihr machen will.
S5: Er will zum Beispiel über Stierkampf diskutieren.
S6: Er ist ein großer Gegner des Stierkampfes.

P9 (C3)
S1: Jetzt ist er ein bisschen nervös.
S2: Sein Englisch ist ja nicht wirklich gut.
S3: Paul ist sich total unsicher, wie er sie begrüßen soll, denn er ist ein bisschen schüchtern.
S4: Weil er so zurückhaltend ist, lebt er alleine und traut sich nicht in eine Beziehung.
S5: Er überlegt sich, ob die Austauschstudentin eine Freundschaft mit ihm eingehen würde.
S6: Er sollte einfach mal etwas lockerer werden.

P10 (C4)
S1: Er war dieses Jahr in Spanien im Urlaub.
S2: Seit dem redet er von nichts anderem mehr, als von Spanierinnen.
S3: Und nun hat er auch noch eine spanische Austauschstudentin.
S4: Ich bin gespannt, wie das wird.
S5: Womöglich will er sie mit seiner schwäbischen Kochkunst verzücken.
S6: Ich sollte ihm davon abraten.

P11 (C5)
S1: Bisher hat er aber noch keine Ahnung, wo er sie unterbringen soll.
S2: Ich finde, das hätte er sich vorher überlegen sollen.
S3: Ich meine, er hat ja selbst nur ein Schlafzimmer und eine Küche.
S4: Aber er war schon immer sehr spontan.
S5: Vermutlich wird wie immer alles gut gehen.
S6: Vielleicht werden die beiden ja auch ein Paar.

P12 (C6)
S1: Er war erst nicht so begeistert.
S2: Doch dann hatte er noch eine Weitere zur Auswahl.
S3: Die war dann sympathischer als die Erste.
S4: Das ist halt immer das Risiko.
S5: Es können einem auch komische Leute vermittelt werden.
S6: Aber es wird ja niemand gezwungen, da mitzumachen.

**Test Item 9 DIESER**

P13 (B1)
S1: Er war in Neuseeland und hat sie da am Strand kennen gelernt.
S2: Er hat sich sofort in sie verliebt.
S3: Und sie sich auch in ihn.
S4: Sie ist echt total nett, lieb, hübsch, intelligent...
S5: Er musste ihr einfach einen Antrag machen.
S6: Sie hat auch gleich übergliücklich „ja“ gesagt.

P14 (B2)
S1: Das ist gerade mal 3 Monate her.
S2: Sonst hätte Michael immer Panik, sich zu binden.
S3: Aber jetzt hat er sich in sie verliebt und will sie heiraten.
S4: Die Neuseeländerin muss es echt in sich haben.
S5: Ihr Talent hätte ich auch gern.
S6: Ich hoffe, dass das alles gut endet.

B15 (B3)
S1: Stell dir das mal vor!
S2: Er kennt sie gerade mal 2 Monate.
S3: Und jetzt will er sie heiraten.
S4: Sie ist schon ne tolle Frau.
S5: Bei manchen Leuten klappt so was ja, aber...also ich weiss nicht.
S6: Ich finde, er sollte sich da mal noch etwas Zeit nehmen.

B16 (B4)
S1: Er hat sie nicht in Neuseeland kennen gelernt.
S2: Er traf sie in Spanien, bei einer Trekking Tour.
S3: Ich hab keine Ahnung, wie alt sie ist.
S4: Sie will bestimmt, dass er zu ihr nach Neuseeland zieht.
S5: Ich glaube aber nicht, dass Michael das macht.
S6: Als was soll er denn da arbeiten?

B17 (B5)
S1: Ich finde das ja wahnsonig romantisch.
S2: Sie ruft ihn jeden Tag an und die beiden halten es auch kaum aus vor Sehnsucht.
S3: Deshalb zieht er jetzt auch zu ihr und heiratet sie.
S4: Sie kommt aber aus einer komplett anderen Welt.
S5: Hoffentlich geht das gut.
S6: Wenn er erst mal bei ihr lebt und dann merkt, dass es nicht passt, ist es zu spät.

B18 (B6)
S1: Das ist schon etwas peinlich, finde ich.
S2: Sie ist 25 Jahre jünger als er.
S3: Und Deutsch kann sie auch nicht.
S4: Die hat wohl mitbekommen, wie reich Michael ist.
S5: Und er ist ja auch nicht mehr der jüngste.
S6: Sie ist sicher eine Heiratsschwindlerin!

B19 (D1)
S1: Kaum einen Monat zusammen, und schon wird geheiratet.
S2: Aber gut aussehen tut sie ja.
S3: Aber vielleicht liebt er sie ja wirklich.
S4: Sie scheint es schon Ernst zu meinen.
S5: Und in Neuseeland zu leben muss auch nicht schlecht sein.
S6: Da gibt’s Sonne satt und Skifahren kann man auch.

B20 (D2)
S1: Ich finde, dass passiert recht früh.
C: Test items of experimental study

S2: Ich mein, er hat sie einmal getroffen.
S3: Sie war im Urlaub in Deutschland.
S4: Er weiss gar nicht, ob sie zu ihm passt.
S5: Er sollte lieber mal etwas Zeit mit ihr verbringen.
S6: Sie wäre bereit, alles für ihn aufzugeben.

B21 (D3)
S1: Sie ist seine absolute Traumfrau.
S2: Er sagt, sie wird die Mutter seiner Kinder werden.
S3: Er will mit ihr den Rest seines Lebens verbringen.
S4: Sie sei seine andere Hälfte, die schönste Frau auf Erden und sein Herz.
S5: Er ist so was von verliebt in sie.
S6: Ich hoffe mal, dass das gut geht!

B22 (D4)
S1: Ich weiss nicht, ob das richtig ist.
S2: Ich meine, er hat sie während der Reisezeit kennen gelernt.
S3: Ist sie wohl die Richtige für ihn?
S4: Sie muss schon was können, um den Michi glücklich zu machen.
S5: Mit mir hat es ja nicht geklappt.
S6: Aber die Neuseeländerin macht ihn jetzt dann hoffentlich glücklich.

B23 (D5)
S1: Wo die beiden wohl leben werden?
S2: Da prallen doch 2 völlig unterschiedliche Welten zusammen.
S3: Sie kann überhaupt kein Deutsch.
S4: Und an die deutsche Kultur ist sie auch nicht gewöhnt.
S5: Sie muss Michael wohl sehr lieben, da sie ja alles für ihn aufgibt.
S6: Ob ich wohl zur Hochzeit eingeladen bin?

B24 (D6)
S1: Sie ist seine große Liebe.
S2: Das ist totaler Wahnsinn, wenn du mich fragst.
S3: Er kennt sie erst seit 3 Wochen.
S4: Aber er sagt, dass er sie für immer lieben wird.
S5: Sie nutzt ihn aber nur aus!
S6: Sie will nur in Deutschland leben und heiratet ihn deshalb.

Test Item 9 EIN

P1 (A1)
S1: Er hat sich direkt in sie verliebt.
S2: Erst wollte er nach Neuseeland ziehen.
S3: Aber er kann kein Englisch.
S4: Deshalb haben sie sich jetzt doch geeinigt, dass sie nach Deutschland kommt.
S5: Im Dezember ist schon der Termin für die Hochzeit.
S6: Dann wird es ernst.

P2 (A2)
S1: Er ist völlig begeistert von ihr.
S2: Sie reisen beide super gern, und haben sich auch so kennen gelernt.
S3: Überhaupt haben die beiden sehr viel gemeinsam.
S4: Zur Hochzeit kann ich leider nicht kommen, die findet nämlich in Neuseeland statt.
Appendices

S5: Schade, aber das ist dann doch ein bisschen weit weg.
S6: Hoffentlich wird er glücklich.

P3 (A3)
S1: Das passierte bei seinem Rucksack-Trip durch Indien.
S2: Da war er auf der Suche nach sich selbst und hat dann Mary getroffen.
S3: Er sollte sich das noch mal durch den Kopf gehen lassen.
S4: Vielleicht sollten sie erstmal schauen, ob sie im Alltag klarkommen, und dann noch mal überlegen.
S5: Unter diesen spirituellen Umständen in Indien ist man eh nicht bei der Sache.
S6: Aber Michael ist alt genug, das muss er wissen.

P4 (A4)
S1: Ich war wirklich schockiert.
S2: Er kennt sie noch gar nicht lange.
S3: Später bereut er sicher seine Entscheidung.
S4: Man kann ja nie wissen, wie sich jemand noch entwickelt.
S5: Er sollte erst mal schauen, wie die Beziehung so läuft, bevor er heiratet.
S6: Eine Scheidung gibt’s schließlich auch nicht umsonst.

P5 (A5)
S1: Er ist ja ein Jahr lang um die Welt gereist.
S2: Er hat sie in Chicago kennen gelernt, wo sie jetzt arbeitet.
S3: Er war jetzt schon 2 mal dort.
S4: In die Stadt hat er sich auch verliebt.
S5: Er hat sich dort bereits um einen Job beworben.
S6: Wahrscheinlich zieht er Ende des Jahres dort hin.

P6 (A6)
S1: Er kennt sie aber kaum.
S2: Hoffentlich weiss er, was er da tut.
S3: Manchmal ist Michael echt ein Windbeutel.
S4: Die beiden haben sich auf einer Kreuzfahrt kennen gelernt.
S5: Er spricht nicht mal Englisch.
S6: Echt ne komische Sache.

P7 (C1)
S1: Für die Hochzeit hat er schon alles vorbereitet.
S2: Die Frau wird zu ihm nach Deutschland ziehen.
S3: Seine Eltern hat er auch endlich mal informiert.
S4: Sein Vater ist so spendabel, das er einen Teil der Hochzeit finanzieren will.
S5: Die Einladungen werden morgen endlich verschickt.
S6: So ne Hochzeit vorzubereiten ist schon echt stressig.

P8 (C2)
S1: Es passierte in Australien.
S2: Michael war auf Sommerurlaub.
S3: Als er in Sydney war, hat er sie getroffen.
S4: Sie waren beide im gleichen Konzert in der Oper.
S5: Beide lieben Verdi.
S6: Deshalb wird bei der Hochzeit auch Verdi gespielt.
C: Test items of experimental study

P9 (C3)
S1: Neuseeland ist sehr weit weg.
S2: Ob das eine gute Entscheidung war, ist unklar.
S3: Er spricht kein Englisch.
S4: Das wird ein Problem sein.
S5: Aber Michael ist bereit, alles zu geben.
S6: Die Hochzeit wird sicher schön, am Strand und so...

P10 (C4)
S1: Er wird jetzt echt nächste Woche heiraten.
S2: Er hat diese Neuseeländerin doch erst vor Kurzem kennen gelernt.
S3: Wenn der so weitermacht, dann hat er bald Ex-Frauen.
S4: So wie ich.
S5: Ich geb ihm 6 Monate, dann wärs das wieder.
S6: Aber ich kann ja gerade laut sein...

P11 (C5)
S1: Sie sind wahnsinnig verknallt.
S2: Jaja, so ist das: wo die Liebe hinfällt.
S3: Die Hochzeit wird auf jeden Fall der Hammer.
S4: Schade nur, dass er dann zu ihr nach Neuseeland ziehen wird.
S5: Aber egal, dann hab ich ne Ausrede um dorthin zu fliegen.
S6: Man muss seinen besten Freund ja besuchen.

P12 (C6)
S1: Aber seine Eltern sind dagegen.
S2: Sie kennen sich ja auch noch nicht lange.
S3: Er ist aber davon überzeugt, dass sie die Richtige ist.
S4: Er will seine Meinung auch nicht ändern.
S5: Obwohl das wohl sinnvoller wäre.
S6: Aber manchmal muss man einfach seinem Herz folgen.

Test Item 10 DIESER

P1 (A1)
S1: Als sie seine Videos sah, war sie begeistert.
S2: Sie hat ihn direkt angeschrieben.
S3: Er kann zwar heute nicht mehr, aber sie ist sicher, dass er der Richtige ist.
S4: Notfalls nimmt sie ihn auch ohne Treffen.
S5: Er hat früher bei ihrer Lieblingsband gespielt.
S6: Sie würde ausrasten vor Freude, wenn es klappt.

P2 (A2)
S1: Sie hat ja schon ewig einen gesucht.
S2: Und bald geht die Tour los, da brauch sie unbedingt einen neuen Sänger.
S3: Er hat wohl eine extrem geniale Stimme.
S4: Er hat auch schon vorher in verschiedenen Bands gesungen.
S5: Morgen darf ich mal zur Probe kommen.
S6: Dann werde ich ihn auch sehen.

P3 (A3)
S1: Er hat einen Blog.
S2: Da schreibt er immer über sich und seine Projekte.
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S3: Das hat ihr gleich gefallen.
S4: Als sie ihn dann singen gehört hat, war sie sich sicher, dass er super zur Band passt.
S5: Jetzt muss sie ihn nur noch fragen, ob er mitmachen will.
S6: Morgen ruft sie ihn an.

P4 (A4)
S1: Er kommt morgen zum Vorsingen.
S2: Hinterher stimmen wir dann über ihn ab.
S3: Ich weiss, wie lange sie schon nach guten Sängern gesucht hat.
S4: Ich hoffe, dass er hält was er verspricht.
S5: Er soll aber eine super weiche Stimme haben.
S6: So einen können wir gut gebrauchen.

P5 (A5)
S1: Sie hat sich sofort in seine Stimme verliebt.
S2: Allerdings kam er ihr am Telefon etwas abgehoben vor.
S3: Er prahlte die ganze Zeit mit seinem Erfolg bei einer Castingshow.
S4: Aber er war nur unter den letzten 30.
S5: Trotzdem möchte sie ihn aufnehmen, da seine Stimme wirklich gut ist.
S6: Außerdem brauchen sie dringend einen Sänger.

P6 (A6)
S1: Er hatte einige Videos hochgeladen.
S2: Seine Stimme ist sehr vielseitig.
S3: Außerdem kann er sich gut auf der Bühne bewegen.
S4: Er würde perfekt in die Band passen.
S5: Sie weiss nur nicht, ob er Interesse hat.
S6: Er ist nämlich schon in einer Band.

P7 (C1)
S1: Auf den Bildern im Internet sah er ja auch sehr gut aus.
S2: Aber meiner Meinung nach ist es schwer, über das Internet solche Qualitäten zu testen.
S3: Das ist wirklich eine unsichere Methode.
S4: Vermutlich entpuppt er sich als Niete.
S5: Wenn er morgen zur Probe erscheint, wird Tina ja merken, ob er gut ist.
S6: Schließlich ist der Sänger das Aushängeschild einer Band.

P8 (C2)
S1: Tina hat ja schon ewig nach einem weiteren Sänger gesucht.
S2: So ist es auch nicht verwunderlich, dass er übers Internet entdeckt wurde.
S3: Leider ist er momentan erkältet.
S4: Tina muss noch ein paar Tage auf seinen ersten Auftritt warten.
S5: Dieser Sänger hat schon viele Auftritte hinter sich.
S6: Tina ist wirklich froh, dass sie ihn jetzt gefunden hat.

P9 (C3)
S1: Er macht gute Musik.
S2: Singen kann er wunderbar.
S3: Zudem sieht er echt gut aus.
S4: Sie meinte, er habe lange Haare.
S5: Das gefiel ihr schon immer.
S6: Er wird gut in die Band passen.
C: Test items of experimental study

P10 (C4)
S1: Mal schauen, ob sie mit ihm auch so vertraut ist, wie mit dem Vorigen...
S2: Womöglich hat sie schon ihre Erfahrungen mit ihm gemacht.
S3: Wenn sie mit dem was anfängt, dann geht die Band bald auseinander.
S4: Ich bin eh längst auf der Suche nach einer anderen Band.
S5: Wenn sie mit ihm was anfängt, bin ich weg.
S6: Aber derzeit brauch irgendwie niemand anderes einen Drummer.

P11 (C5)
S1: Und oh Wunder, er sieht gut aus.
S2: Das wars dann aber auch schon.
S3: Er hat keinen Schulabschluss, keine Ausbildung und auch kein Geld.
S4: Er ist eben ein typischer Musiker.
S5: Seine Facebookseite war sehr aufschlussreich.
S6: Ich bin gespannt, wie das mit ihm endet.

P12 (C6)
S1: Er hat ein Video von sich hochgeladen.
S2: Er singt dort nur und spielt Gitarre.
S3: Sie war gleich begeistert von ihm.
S4: Er hat angeblich eine super Stimme.
S5: Mit ihm wird die Band mehr Erfolg haben.
S6: Er hat auch was drauf was Management, PR und Publicity angeht.

Test Item 10 EIN

P13 (B1)
S1: Sie braucht jetzt auch mal wirklich einen Sänger.
S2: Bisher hatte sie ja nur Instrumental-Stücke.
S3: Ist ja klar, dass man mit diesem Herumgedümpel kein Geld macht.
S4: Ein Sänger muss her, das war klar.
S5: Hoffentlich wird dann auch der gesamte Stil der Band anders.
S6: Ich fand das ja nicht so toll, diese Schlaftablettenmusik.

P14 (B2)
S1: Er heisst Carlos und kommt eigentlich aus Kolumbien.
S2: Übers Internet war das offenbar gar kein Problem.
S3: Da gibt es spezielle Foren, wo man alles findet, was man sucht.
S4: Sie hat inseriert, dass sie einen Kuschelrock Sänger sucht.
S5: Offenbar haben sich auch viele komische Leute gefunden.
S6: Aber am Ende hat es dann ja doch geklappt.

P15 (B3)
S1: Seine Stimme war echt der Hammer.
S2: Sie hat mir gleich das Video gezeigt.
S3: Aber vielleicht ist an der Stimme ja auch was bearbeitet?
S4: Naja, soll sie halt mal schauen.
S5: Sie kann ja ein Casting machen.
S6: Gut aussehen tut er schon.

P16 (B4)
S1: Würde mich ja mal interessieren, was das für ne Seite gewesen sein soll.
S2: Wahrscheinlich eher etwas anrüchiges, wo es gar nicht ums Singen geht.
S3: Allerdings kann es mit der Band ja nur bergauf gehen, denn die ist jetzt nicht sooo gut.
S4: Vielleicht ist es aber auch einfach nur nicht so mein Musikgeschmack, ich steh nicht so auf Rock.
S5: Aber auf den Sänger bin ich schon irgendwie gespannt.
S6: Würde mich freuen für Tina, wenn es gut läuft.

P17 (B5)
S1: Das bringt doch nur Ärger!
S2: 4 Mädels und ein Typ, das ist doch keine gute Kombination!
S3: Bisher hat das reine Mädchenteam doch super harmoniert.
S4: Es wäre schade, wenn ein Mann dies ändern würde.
S5: Und ich bin mir sicher, dass das passiert.
S6: Männer und Frauen können nie problemfrei miteinander.

P18 (B6)
S1: Sie nimmt das sehr ernst mit der Musikkarriere.
S2: Am Anfang hab ich das ja nicht so ernst genommen.
S3: Aber letztens hab ich sie spielen hören, das klang echt toll.
S4: Das Talent hat sie bestimmt von ihrer Mutter geerbt.
S5: Und mit einem weiteren Sänger wird die Band sicher noch besser.
S6: Deswegen besuche ich auch noch mal ein Konzert.

P19 (D1)
S1: Das ging echt schnell, dafür dass sie den noch nie gehört hat.
S2: Sie sollte lieber erstmal ein Casting oder so machen.
S3: Allerdings kann die Band eine gute Stimme gebrauchen.
S4: Bisher waren sie ja nicht so erfolgreich.
S5: Trotzdem ist es nicht gut, den Erstbesten zu nehmen.
S6: Das kann eigentlich nur schief gehen.

P20 (D2)
S1: Sie meinte, dass er Talent hat.
S2: Einige Vorbands haben ihm Referenzen gegeben, deshalb werde ich mir das mal anschauen.
S3: Da die letzten Songs der Band nicht sehr textlastig waren, wird das schon klappen.
S4: Wie sieht’s aus, sollen wir heute Abend zusammen zur Probe schauen?
S5: Ich hätte schon Lust.
S6: Danach können wir auch noch Party machen gehen.

P21 (D3)
S1: „Band“ kann man das ja eigentlich nicht nennen.
S2: Sie klopft doch nur ein bisschen auf ihrer Klampfe rum.
S3: Aber sie sieht sich halt echt als das neue Sternchen am Musikhimmel.
S4: Vielleicht sollten wir ihr mal Bescheid sagen?
S5: Die Videos, die sie auf ihrer Webseite hat, sind auch oberpeinlich.
S6: Und dann fängt sie an, da noch andere Leute mit reinzuziehen.

P22 (D4)
S1: Sie ist sich aber noch unsicher.
S2: Tina weiß kaum was über ihn.
S3: Ihr ist es immer wichtig, mit was für Leuten sie in ihrer Band singt.
S4: Die Stimme wäre schon gut, aber sie weiß nicht, ob er auch Deutsch kann.
S5: Naja, schauen wir mal, für wen sie sich entscheiden wird.
S6: Vielleicht war es auch keine so gute Idee, jemand übers Internet zu suchen.
C: Test items of experimental study

P23 (D5)
S1: Nachher ist das Ganze noch ein Fake und er kann gar nicht singen.
S2: Sich im Internet zu entdecken ist doch unseriös.
S3: Hoffentlich kommen die anderen Bandmitglieder auch gut mit ihm klar.
S4: Es muss ja alles stilistisch, gesanglich und optisch zusammenpassen.
S5: Ich hoffe, dass er mit dem Gehalt einverstanden ist.
S6: Ob er wohl so kurzfristig mit uns auftreten kann?

P24 (D6)
S1: Seine Anzeige fand sie total interessant.
S2: Seine Erfahrungen hörten sich überzeugend an.
S3: Sie hat dann sofort telefonischen Kontakt hergestellt.
S4: Die zwei haben für nächste Woche ein Treffen ausgemacht.
S5: Tina will, dass er mit der Band zusammen probt.
S6: So wird sie feststellen, ob sie vom Stil her zusammenpassen.
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