Europeans´ attitudes towards levels and distributions of pensions and unemployment benefits: Origins and effects on policies

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Abbreviations

aR²	adjusted R-square
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
ch.	chapter
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists Group
EEC	European Economic Community
EGP	European Green Party
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union
EL	European Left
ELDR	European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party
EPP	European People´s Party
EU	European Union
ES	Euro Stipendium
ESS	European Social Survey
EVS	European Values Study
FDI	Foreign direct investment
Fig.	Figure
FYC	former Yugoslavian countries
GDP	Gross domestic product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISEA	International Survey of Economic Attitudes
ISG	European Commission´s Indicator Sub-Group (ISG) of the Social Protection Committee
ISJP	International Social Justice Project
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
KOF	Swiss Economic Institute
LIS	Luxembourg Income Study
MPP	Mapping Policy Preferences
NSD	Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services
P	pensions
PES	Party of European Socialists
PM	Prime minister
PPP	purchasing power parity
s.e.	standard error
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UE	Unemployment/Unemployed
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children´s Fund
VIF	Variance inflation factor

Country abbreviations

AT: Austria | AU: Australia | BE: Belgium | BG: Bulgaria | CD: Canada | CH: Switzerland | CY: Cyprus| CZ: Czech Republic | DE: Germany | De: Germany (east) | DK: Denmark | Dw: Germany (west) | FR: France | DK: Denmark | EE: Estonia | ES: Spain | FI: Finland | GB/UK: United Kingdom | GR: Greece | HR: Croatia | HU: Hungary | IE: Ireland | IL: Israel | IT: Italy | JP: Japan | LT: Lithuania | LV: Latvia | NL: Netherlands | NO: Norway| NZ: New Zealand | PH: Philippines | PL: Poland | PT: Portugal | RO: Romania | RU: Russia | SE: Sweden | SI: Slovenia | SK: Slovakia | TR: Turkey| UE: Ukraine | US: United States of America

Zusammenfassung

Neben Dienstleistungen bieten Wohlfahrtsstaaten Barleistungen an. Unter jenen nehmen Renten und Zahlungen an Erwerbslose in Bezug auf die Gesamtausgabenhöhe sowie die Anzahl betroffener Personen eine hervorgehobene Stellung ein. In den meisten europäischen Ländern hängen Leistungen vom vorherigen Einkommen (und den Sozialbeiträgen) ab. Die einzige Ausnahme hier sind Zahlungen an Langzeiterwerbslose. Sowohl Höhe als auch Verteilung der Barleistungen beeinflussen relative Armut und Einkommensungleichheit, als auch andere Faktoren wie Arbeitskräfteangebot und Steuer- und Abgabenbelastung.

Die meisten Erklärungen wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Entwicklung beruhen auf Annahmen, welche die Einstellungen der Bürger als Bindeglied zwischen gesellschaftlichen und ökonomischen Entwicklungen und wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik benötigen (Kapitel 2). In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, welche Faktoren auf der Makro- und die Mikroebene die Einstellungen der Bürger zur Höhe und Verteilung von Barleistungen beeinflussen, und wie diese Einstellungen über den demokratischen Prozess Politikinhalte beeinflussen.

In Kapitel 3 werden wohlfahrtsstaatliche Entwicklungen kurz dargestellt. In Bezug auf Renten werden gegenwärtige und zukünftige Finanzierungsprobleme umlagefinanzierter Systeme gezeigt sowie drei Lösungen, die nicht gleichzeitig erreicht werden können. Zudem werden Gründe für Arbeitslosigkeit und der Wandel der Arbeitslosigkeit in postindustriellen Gesellschaften dargestellt. Höhe und Verteilung von Renten als auch Arbeitslosengeld beeinflussen das Arbeitskräfteangebot sowie Lohnhöhen.

Die idealtypischen Verteilungsprinzipien von Wohlfahrtsstaaten und die Programme 30 europäischer Länder in Bezug auf Höhe und Einkommensabhängigkeit werden in Kapitel 4 dargestellt. Einerseits, weil Makrokennziffern die Komplexität von Programmen nur teilweise erfassen können. Zum anderen wird davon ausgegangen, dass Entwicklungen in jüngerer Vergangenheit und sie begleitende Diskurse die Einstellungen der Bürger beeinflussen. Ein Aspekt dieser Entwicklungen sind Theorien der Pfadabhängigkeit. Teilweise gründen sie auf der Annahme, dass wohlfahrtstaatliche Politik die Einstellungen der Bürger beeinflusst, bzw. dass im umgekehrten Fall die Stabilität und politische Relevanz der Einstellungen institutionellen Wandel blockiert. Damit zusammenhängend beeinflussen regimespezifische Krisenreaktionen Einkommensungleichheit bzw. relative Armut, fiskalische Belastungen sowie Erwerbs- und Erwerbslosenquoten, die wiederum die Einstellungen der Bürger beeinflussen (Kapitel 7.1).

Kapital 5 zeigt die Relevanz dieser Einstellungen für die Politikgestaltung und politische Unterstützung. Einstellungsunterschiede auf der Individualebene sowie regionalen Ebene führen notwendigerweise zu Unzufriedenheit; dies trifft im Falle europäischer Wohlfahrtspolitik auch auf Unterschiede zwischen Ländern zu.

Der empirische Teil beginnt in Kapitel 6, in dem die Frage aufgeworfen wird, ob Fragen nach der Staatsverantwortung als Fragen grundsätzlicher Zuständigkeit oder als Fragen nach präferierten Leistungserhöhungen- oder Senkungen verstanden werden.

Kapitel 7.1 zeigt, welche Makrofaktoren die Einstellungen der Bevölkerung beeinflussen. Dazu gehören wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik und, teilweise davon beeinflusst, makroökonomische Faktoren. Für manche der Makrofaktoren kann die Verbindung auf der Mikroebene in Kapitel 7.2 gezeigt werden. Hier wird gezeigt, dass Vorstellungen über gerechte Einkommensverteilungen, abhängige Gruppen sowie Auswirkungen wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik relevante Mikrofaktoren sind. Sie werden zwar von Eigeninteresse beeinflusst, sind aber einstellungsrelevanter. Darüber hinaus wird die Einflussstärke und somit Interessengegensätze unterschiedlicher Gruppen nicht in erwarteter Richtung von regimespezifischen Politikinhalten beeinflusst.

Für Effekte von wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik auf Einstellungen kann gesagt werden: Die Einschätzung, Rentner seien finanziell gut situiert, führt zwar zu Ablehnung von Staatsverantwortung für diese Gruppe, wird ihrerseits aber nicht von der Rentenhöhe beeinflusst (dementsprechend hängen Rentenhöhe und Unterstützung für hohe Renten positiv zusammen). Ebenso führen hohe Einschätzungen des Lebensstandards von Arbeitslosen zur Ablehnung von Staatsverantwortung, aber diese Einschätzungen resultieren aus der Höhe von Langzeitarbeitslosengeld. Dies erklärt auch, warum die Unterstützung von Arbeitslosengeld durch die Höhe von Kurzzeitarbeitslosengeld nicht beeinflusst wird, wohingegen die Höhe des Langzeitarbeitslosengeldes starke negative Effekte auf diese Unterstützung hat. Die meisten Zahlen zeigen, dass die Bürger einkommensabhängige Renten in Ländern befürworten, wo diese einkommensabhängig sind, was noch mehr auf Arbeitslosengeld zutrifft. Mit hohen Leistungen an Langzeitarbeitslose sind gerade diejenigen Politikinhalte selbstzerstörend, die mit am stärksten die relative Armut verringern.

Kapitel 8 zeigt Länder- und Regionenmittelwerte. Erstere korrelieren stark mit Ergebnissen aus den 1990ern, d.h. auf Aggregatebene sind die Einstellungen stabil. Staatsverantwortung für Alte wird stark unterstützt, für Arbeitslose etwas weniger. Unterschiede zwischen EU-Ländern sind gering. Die Bürger präferieren höhere Leistungen an Rentner mit höheren vorherigen Einkommen. Dies trifft auch für Arbeitslose zu, jedoch liegt

hier der Ländermitte näher an der Einkommensneutralität. In Bezug auf die Einkommensabhängigkeit sind die Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern groß; in manchen Ländern wird positive Einkommensabhängigkeit stark unterstützt, andere liegen leicht auf der negativen Seite. Europäische Wohlfahrtspolitik würde nicht in Bezug auf die Höhe, jedoch in Bezug auf die Verteilung der Auszahlungen (und Beiträge) die Bürger mancher Länder unzufrieden stellen. Zudem gibt es in manchen Ländern starke regionale Unterschiede, so dass Staatenregierungen notwendigerweise in manchen Regionen Unzufriedenheit schüren müssen. Zuletzt kann gesehen werden, dass trotz gemeinsamer Geschichte die Bürger Mittel- und Osteuropas (MOE) stark unterschiedliche Präferenzen für Staatsverantwortung haben.

Kapitel 9 zeigt die erste von zweien Verbindungen zwischen den Einstellungen der Bürger und wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik. In konservativen, sozialdemokratischen und liberalen Wohlfahrtsstaaten Westeuropas unterscheiden sich die Unterstützer von Parteien wie es von der Regimetheorie zu erwarten wäre. Dies ist in Südeuropa nur teilweise, in MOE nicht so. Das liegt teilweise daran, dass hier die Unterschiede von Parteien unterschiedlicher ideologischer Ausrichtungen geringer sind, was wieder teilweise mit niedrigeren Wohlfahrtsausgaben erklärt werden kann (das Muster besteht auch außerhalb MOEs).

Aggregiert und teilweise verzerrt durch Wahlrecht und Koalitionsbildungen bestimmt das Wahlverhalten die Kabinettszusammensetzung. Kapitel 10 zeigt, wie die Kabinettsstärke von drei politischen Ideologien die Höhe und Verteilung von Renten und Arbeitslosengeld beeinflusst. Innerhalb der Länder ist die Dominanz einzelner Ideologien zwischen den Zeiträumen 1945-1974, 1975-1990 und 1991-2008 sehr stabil, so dass nicht gesagt werden kann welcher Zeitraum für heutige Politik entscheidend ist. Darum können pfadabhängige Verläufe von Programmen nach ihrer Einführung nicht gezeigt werden, jedoch können sich in erwähnter Stabilität Mechanismen der Pfadabhängigkeit widerspiegeln.

Vor allem für Westeuropa kann gezeigt werden, dass ökonomisch linke Parteien höhere Lohnersatzquoten, christdemokratische/religiöse Parteien etwas niedrigere und liberale/säkular-konservative wesentlich geringer veranlassen. Christdemokratische/religiöse Parteien führen einkommensabhängige Barleistungen (und Beiträge) ein, die beiden anderen Parteiengruppen präferieren eher gleiche Bezüge (auf unterschiedlicher Höhe).

Abstract

Welfare states provide services and cash benefits. Concerning the latter, main programmes in terms of expenditure levels and number of dependents are retirement and unemployment benefits. In most European countries, individual benefit levels depend on prior earnings (and, accordingly, contributions). The sole exception is benefits for the long-term unemployed. Benefit levels and distributions affect relative poverty and income inequality, as well as other factors such as labour supply and tax/contribution burdens.

Several approaches explaining the emergence and development of welfare states co-exist, most of them rely on citizens´ preferences linking societal and economic developments and welfare policies (chapter 2). This work will show which factors on the macro and micro level affect citizens´ preferences for levels and distributions of cash benefits, and how these preferences are turned into policies via the democratic process.

Welfare programmes are shortly depicted in chapter 3. For pensions, current and projected financing problems inherent to pay-as-you-go schemes under unfavourable demographic conditions are discussed, a well as three main goals unattainable simultaneously. For unemployment benefits, causes and the changing nature of unemployment in post-industrial societies are shown. Levels and distributions of pensions as well as unemployment benefits affect labour supply and wage-setting.

Chapter 4 shows welfare regimes´ ideal-typical entitlement principles and 30 European countries´ programmes in terms of benefit levels and earnings-relatedness. This is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, quantitative macro data can catch programmes´ complexity only partially. Further, recent developments and accompanying discourses are believed to affect citizens´ attitudes. One aspect of these developments are theories of path dependence, partially being based on the assumption that citizens´ attitudes are shaped by welfare policies and vice versa, in the latter case causing institutional inertia due to attitude stability and attitude relevance for policies. Related to this, regime-specific reactions to crisis symptoms affect income inequality/relative poverty, fiscal burdens, and employment and unemployment rates, all of which affect citizens´ attitudes towards the welfare state (shown in chapter 7.1).

Chapter 5 shows why these attitudes are believed to be relevant for policy design and political support. Besides the argument that intra-country attitude differences on the micro level or regional level necessarily leave citizens dissatisfied, it is argued that European welfare policies require roughly coherent welfare attitudes within EU countries.

The empirical part starts in chapter 6, asking if survey question concerning government responsibility are understood as concerning basic responsibility, or if answer at least partially reflect preferences for higher or lower benefits.

Chapter 7.1 shows which macro factors affect citizens´ attitudes. Amongst these factors are welfare policies and macroeconomic factors, the latter partially being affected by the former. For some, links on the micro level can be shown in chapter 7.2. This chapter shows that beliefs about just income distributions, views about dependent groups as well as about welfare policies´ effects are relevant. These factors are not independent of self-interest in a narrow sense, but far more relevant for citizens´ attitudes. Further, regime-specific relevance of micro variables and therefore different interests of different groups is not affected by regime configurations in expected directions.

Regarding effects from policies to attitudes, the following can be stated: Estimates of high standards of living of pensioners lead to low support for government responsibility, but these estimates are virtually unrelated to pension levels (accordingly, pension levels and citizens support for high generosity are positively related). Estimates of high standards of living of the unemployed also lead to low support for government responsibility, but these estimates primarily result from levels of long-term unemployment benefits. This also explains why support for unemployment benefits are unaffected by short-term benefit levels, whereas long-term benefit level has strongest negative effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed. According to most figures, higher pensions for higher earners are supported primarily where pensions are positively earnings-related. This applies even stronger to unemployment benefits. With generous benefits for the long-term unemployed, welfare policies strongly reducing relative poverty are self-destructing.

Country and region mean values are shown in chapter 8. Country values are strongly correlated with results from the 1990s, so that on aggregate level attitudes are stable. Support for government responsibility for the old is on the strong positive side, to a lesser degree this also applies to the unemployed. Considering answer scale ranges, intra-EU differences are small in both cases. In the mean, citizens prefer higher benefits for higher earners. This also applies more to pensions, whereas mean values for the unemployed are closer to earnings neutrality. Here, differences between countries are strong, with some countries´ citizens showing strong preferences for positive earnings-relatedness, and others being on the negative side. This implies that EU welfare policies would necessarily dissatisfy some countries´ citizens not due to the level, but the distribution of benefits (and contribution burdens). Further, some countries display strong regional differences, forcing national governments to

dissatisfy regions due to welfare policies on the national level. Lastly, it can be seen that despite a common history, citizens´ of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) vastly differ in their preferences for government responsibility.

Chapter 9 shows the first out of two links from citizens´ attitudes to welfare policies. In conservative, social democratic and liberal welfare states of Western Europe, party supporters differ in their attitudes as might be expected from welfare regime theory. In Southern Europe this is only partially the case, in most CEE countries not. Part of the explanation is that differences between supporters of parties belonging to different ideologies are smaller in CEE countries. This is partially caused by welfare outlays being lower there (this pattern also holds within non-CEE countries).

Aggregated and partially distorted due to electoral rules and coalition making, voting decisions determine cabinet compositions. Chapter 10 shows how cabinet strength of three different ideologies in different time periods since 1945 affects levels and distributions of pensions and unemployment benefits. Within countries, cabinet predominance of certain ideologies is very stable between periods 1945-1974, 1975-1990 and 1991-2008, so that it cannot be ascertained which period is relevant for today´s policies. Therefore, path dependency of programmes after initial set-up cannot be shown, but this stability may reflect path dependence mechanisms.

Primarily for Western Europe it can be shown that economically left parties spend more, Christian democratic/religious parties slightly less and liberal/secular conservative markedly less on welfare. Christian democratic/religious parties introduce earnings-related benefits (and contributions), whereas both other party groups are more in favour of equal benefits (albeit on different levels). In Western Europe, citizens´ attitudes matter for policies.

1.   Introduction, outline

1.1 Introduction

Welfare states try to achieve socio-economic security and equality (Flora et al 1977: 723, Kumlin 2002b: 44, Roller 1992: 10). They consist of various programmes (Goodin 1992: 3). In terms of costs they induce and number of people they affect, pension programmes, health care and unemployment benefits[1] are the most important welfare programmes (Esping-Andersen 1990: 49), depending on country-specific situations. Here, the focus is on pensions and unemployment benefits, both offering cash benefits and not services.

According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 24ff.), there are three 'Worlds of Welfare Capitalism' with their respective rules of benefit entitlement.

Dependents may either receive low benefits, and solely if they can prove that they need these benefits to maintain a minimum standard of living. This pattern is prevalent in liberal welfare states, where material well-being is hugely determined by market outcomes.

Conversely, benefits can be generous, allowing recipients to enter dependency without severe losses of income. In this case, entitlements are based on citizenship or long-term residency (Edlund 2007: 38). Ideally, social-democratic welfare states distribute benefits in this way. Here, market outcomes are significantly altered by state intervention.

Lastly, benefits can be dependent upon previous earnings.[2] The justification lies in the principle of 'merit'[3], because in corporatist/conservative or Catholic (Castles 1994: 22ff.) welfare states benefits tend to be financed via contributions, of which higher earners pay more and lower earners less (Esping-Andersen 1990: 24ff.). In these countries, the family is given higher importance for the provision of welfare than in the two other regimes.

Crucially, Esping-Andersen (2003: 64) rejected a unidimensional understanding of welfare policies and depicted the worlds of welfare capitalism by incorporating (earnings-related, status-preserving) Corporatism. This results in an ideal-typical triangle (next page):

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[1]   Pension and health outlays are far higher than unemployment benefit outlays and on the same low level as spending for the disabled (for European countries see Petrášová 2008: 5 and Schmid 2008: 720).
[2]   In actual policies, if benefits are earnings-related, previous income and benefit levels are positively correlated. Theoretically it is also possible that they are negatively correlated, since low earners had fewer opportunities to save up money than higher earners had. In the survey on which this analysis is based (European Social Survey 4), respondents had the opportunity to support the idea that those with lower previous earnings receive higher benefits. Though, it is hard to ascribe this attitude to a certain welfare state type, since this principle is virtually non-existent in reality. Due to its equality-enhancing effects, this attitude could be considered social-democratic or socialist.
[3]   Consisting of ability and effort (Lewin-Epstein 2003: 5).

Figure 1.1: Welfare state ideal types

Benefits	Earnings-related	Earning-unrelated
High	Conservative/ Corporatist/ Catholic	Universalist (Social democratic)
Low		Residualist (Liberal)

Source: Own presentation

Due to a lack of survey items referring to earnings-relatedness previous analyses had to examine if there is a fit between welfare attitudes and worlds of welfare capitalism by comparing a line (items concerning more or less government responsibility) to a triangle (the three 'Worlds of Welfare Capitalism'). Therefore, in previous surveys respondents were able to answer in a social-democratic (high responsibility/spending) or liberal (low responsibility/spending) fashion. At the same time, there was no opportunity to express preferences for conservative earnings-relatedness and status preservation. New survey data contain appropriate items. Survey data are the backbone of this study.

This study analyses the origins and policy effects of Europeans´ attitudes towards government responsibility for the old and the unemployed and benefits´ earnings-relatedness. In a first step, it will be shown how these attitudes come about; in a second step these attitudes will be shown. Following this, effects on voting behaviour and of cabinet composition, which is aggregated voting behaviour, on welfare policies will be depicted.

Figure 1.2: Causal model

Numbers: Chapters.

1.2 Outline

Chapter 2 shortly depicts welfare states´ basic characteristics and their emergence and development. The reasons for these developments are crucial since welfare state development can, but not has to result from citizens´ demands. Chapter 2.2.2 shows post-WW II developments. This is important since these developments marked the expansion of governments´ welfare activities, i.e. the beginning of strong effects on people´s lives. For Western countries the post-WW II period can be subdivided into the expansion roughly until the mid-1970s and stagnation or retrenchment afterwards. These policy developments could and should have attitudinal effects.

In chapter 3, for both policy fields ideal-typical configurations and effects on relative poverty and labour supply are shown. Both refer to policies´ outcomes, i.e. the outputs´ consequences.

Chapter 4 shows the ideal-typical principles of entitlements in the three 'old' welfare regimes (4.1). Subchapter 4.2. deals with Esping-Andersen´s classification and replications. All of these macro phenomena may result from citizens´ attitudes or vice versa. 4.3 summarises pensions and unemployment policies in 30 European countries and recent developments, which is crucial for interpretations of empirical results. Here, the 'Three Worlds' get supplemented with southern European welfare states and Central and Eastern European (CEE) welfare states. Further, since effects from policies on attitudes and vice versa are time-lagged, understanding attitudes in 2008/2009 presupposes knowledge of recent developments. Additionally, this chapter gives insights in programmes chacteristics not to be found in comparative date. Subchapters 4.4 and 4.5 show overall reform trends, chapter 4.6 depicts path dependent and path-independent developments. This is crucial for three reasons: Firstly, path dependent arguments are partially based on the idea that policies affect attitudes. Secondly, path dependent arguments suggest attitude stability. Thirdly, the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy' as path dependent change affects macro factors having remarkable effects on attitudes. This also applies to welfare state crisis symptoms.

In chapter 5, attitudes towards the welfare state are defined. Their relevance is shown, along with the question if individual attitudes, if aggregated, constitute 'culture'. Chapter 5.2 deals with the large-n comparisons and European comparisons, the EU effects on welfare states and the relevance of European attitude homogeneity or heterogeneity for EU welfare policies.

Chapter 6 shortly depicts used survey data and deals with the question if survey questions about government responsibility tap the ostensibly dichotomous 'range' dimension measuring basic responsibility independent of the status quo or partially the 'degree' dimension concerning preferences for higher or lower spending.

Chapter 7 shows macro (7.1) and micro (7.2) effects on welfare attitudes.

Europeans´ attitudes are displayed in chapter 8. Four maps show mean values for countries, four additional maps for regions. Regional maps are relevant firstly due to diffusion reasons. Further, intra-country differences imply that national welfare policies necessarily have to leave some regions dissatisfied.

In order to be politically relevant, attitudes have to bear some relation to actions. Chapter 9 shows that at least western European party supporters differ in their welfare attitudes in expected directions. For CEE countries this cannot be supported. One possible reason, as will be empirically shown, are fuzzy party profiles due to low welfare expenses.

The relationship between attitudes and voting for the 'correct' parties is insufficient for the link between attitudes and policies. Parties have to enact policies in line with their supposed ideology. Chapter 10 shows that 'parties do matter', i.e. cabinet strength of parties of different ideological directions results in welfare policies in line with what one would expect from Esping-Andersen´s naming of the 'Three Worlds'.

Chapter 11 summarises the results and concludes that welfare policies affect attitudes which, in turn, affect welfare policies. All with frictional losses and other relevant factors at each step. The discussion will also refer to policies´ consequences.

2 Welfare states

2.1 Basic characteristics

The welfare state´s goals are equality and security (Flora et al. 1977: 723, Kumlin 2002b: 44) in the socio-economic sense (Roller 1992: 10). In a narrower definition it is "government protected minimum standards" (Wilensky 1975: 1) in various areas or simply "to relieve distress" (Goodin 1992: 10). In this view, equality is merely a by-product of security.

To achieve its goals, the welfare state provides goods and services or supports dependents financially so that they can purchase goods and services (Hasenfeld et al. 1987: 389). Among welfare states´ main components are payments to the elderly and the unemployed and the provision of services (treatment) and goods (pharmaceuticals) to the sick. In this sense, the welfare state embodies solidarity between the healthy and the sick, those in working age and those too old to work, and the employed and the unemployed (Gelissen 2002: 94). In contrast to the sick, who receive services and goods for free or below market prices, the old and unemployed receive cash benefits. Therefore, one may expect that in these areas citizens know better how much they get for what they pay in than in health services where beneficiaries mostly do not know the cost of what they receive.

2.2 The emergence and development of welfare states

2.2.1 Reasons for the emergence of welfare states

Re-telling the emergence and development of welfare states at length is redundant because "entire libraries have been filled" (Ferrera 2003: 620) with these narrations.

Before the 19th century, guilds provided social insurance systems for their members. Employers protected their workers in feudal times, until the French Revolution. Additionally, public poor relief came into being in the beginning of the 19th century. Before, poor relief has been offered predominantly by churches and monasteries (Alber 1982: 24f., for medieval social security see also Overbye´s 1994: 156 short enumeration of responsible institutions).

Several different explanations for the emergence of modern welfare states from the 19th century onwards coexist. The main thesis of this work is that citizens´ attitudes shape welfare policies via citizens´ voting decisions. Some of the factors below are not merely relevant for the emergence of welfare states, but also for later and current developments.

Religion

Protestantism can be subdivided into Lutheran state churches and protestant sects. Manow´s (2002: 206ff.) thesis is that welfare state differences between protestant countries may be explained by the predominance of protestant sects and Calvinism on the one side, as in the UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland (and, outside of Europe, the US, Australia and New Zealand), and protestant state churches, as in Sweden and Germany on the other side. Further, Manow (2002: 208ff.) suggests that Protestantism has affected welfare state development in Europe: Protestant sects emphasising collective self-help and asceticism should have delayed welfare state development. In contrast, Scandinavia´s undisputed Lutheran state churches did not claim to be superior to secular rulers and therefore did not obstruct governmental responsibility in social issues. In Germany the dominant Lutheran state church has been confronted with a strong Catholic minority, resulting in a different dynamic. Manow (2002: 210) points out that in Southern Europe workers interpreted their struggle for social rights also as fight against the Catholic Church, and that liberal parties pushed through welfare policies against resistance from the Catholic Church. Only later Christian democratic parties began to use the welfare state for clientelistic ends and to make political Catholicism independent from the Catholic Church. Manow (2002: 210ff.) considers religion and denomination a very important determinant of welfare state development.

An important argument in chapters 7.2, 9 and 10 is that Christian democracy´s preference for traditional male breadwinner models implies that Christian democrats and Christian democratic parties prefer (high) earnings-related benefits since under the male breadwinner ideal type the loss of income due to unemployment or retirement cannot be compensated with the second (female) income.

Logic of industrialism

Schmid (2003: 235f., see also Overbye 1994: 155f., King 1987: 846, Hicks 1999: 16f.) points to functionalistic approaches stressing welfare state necessities inherent to industrialisation: Changing family structures, urbanisation, new production techniques may have led inevitably to the emergence of welfare states, with a low significance of political factors.

Before industrialisation old people unable to self-reliantly support themselves were supported by charity or their children (Briggs 2006: 17). But households became less able to provide security (Roller 1992: 9, 1995: 167). Contrastingly, unemployment "as a social

contingency" (Briggs 2006: 17) is a product of industrialisation; according to Briggs, it has been the most important factor for the "shape and timing of modern welfare legislation". Following the 'logic of industrialism' perspective, the destruction of traditional institutions and therefore their safety function led to the development of the welfare state (Huber/Stephens 2001a: 15).

Besides increasing necessity resulting from weakened traditional institutions, increasing wealth due to industrialisation made social benefits affordable (Quadagno 1987: 112, see below for the wealth argument from Adolph Wagner). A similar view is supported by Wilensky (1975: XIII), who saw causality starting from economic growth, leading to demographic and bureaucratic changes, resulting in the emergence of the welfare state (for bureaucracy, see below).

In contrast, Quadagno (1987: 113) cites results from Collier and Messick (1975), who found only weak support for the industrialisation thesis: Analysing 59 countries, Collier and Messick found out that although social security programs were adopted early in most developed countries, the later a country adopted social security programs the less developed it has been at this stage, which contradicts functionalist arguments, since these lead to the assumption that the level of industrialisation is similar when countries introduce social security programs (see Ross/Homer 1976: 7.).

There has been huge variance of industrialisation between countries at the time they introduced their first accident insurance, ranging from 11 percent in Finland to 54 percent in England. On the other hand, most countries introduced these insurances between 1880 and World War I, while still early industrialised countries introduced these programmes earlier (Alber 1982: 122f.). Although this suggests that industrialisation mattered for the introduction, but even more so diffusion or imitation processes (Alber 1982: 134, see also Overbye 1994: 164f.), these factors seem to be less important than internal developments like worker mobilisation. Diffusion processes seem to have gained importance not prior to WW I (Alber 1982: 137). Albeit for example the introduction of unemployment insurance in several European countries prior to WW I could suggest otherwise, not until after WW II diffusion of unemployment programs accelerated (Dixon 2001: 407).

The same as for industrialisation applies to urbanisation, which rose due to the former. Significant differences between countries in their level of urbanisation at the time when they introduced accident insurances suggest that urbanisation has not been a main determinant of social insurance introduction (Alber 1982: 123).

Overbye (1994: 165) states that the logic of industrialism may be rescued if it merely claims to explain convergence in the long run, degrading timing to a side issue and therefore immunising the theory against falsification.

Further, Hage and Hanneman point out that new vulnerabilities in themselves do not automatically lead to increased welfare expenditures (cited in Quadagno 1987: 113). In this view, there is no direct causal link between economy and the welfare state without intervening policy variables. As Quadagno notes, 'logic of industrialism' approaches tend to neglect political factors (see below for democracy as crucial factor).

Esping-Andersen (1990: 13) doubts the 'logic of industrialism', since there is a huge time lag between the destruction of traditional community safety nets and the emergence of the welfare state. In contrast, Iversen and Cusack (2000: 313ff.) continue the argument of economic determinism and see effects from de-industrialisation to growing welfare demands and welfare expenses. There are two effects: (1) From de-industrialisation to rising transfer payment generosity, possibly due to rising demands for generosity fuelled by higher risks of becoming unemployed, and (2) from de-industrialisation to surplus labour, so that unemployment rises, which leads to higher government transfers. This effect is conditioned by other variables, such as wage compression (Iversen/Cusack 2000: 336). Chapter 7.1 shows effects of various factors affected by de-industrialisation on welfare attitudes, amongst them, unemployment rate, long-term unemployment and income inequality.

A related argument, since also based on economic factors, is based on Adolph Wagner stating that government share of GDP increases with rising GDP per capita, since citizens´ demands and willingness to pay are income-elastic (Cameron 1978: 1245). Though, as Cameron (1978: 1245) notes, several authors found a ceiling effect, so that above a certain level of economic development further increases do not raise governments´ share of GDP. Based on data from 22 countries, it can be shown that GDP per capita and taxes as percentage of GDP (both 2008) are positively related (Pearson´s r= .48, significant at the 5 percent-level), with Ireland, Switzerland and Norway as outliers on one side (taxes lower than GDP per capita would suggest) and Hungary as outlier on the other side. The ceiling effect could not be confirmed. Among the 18 'normal cases' near the regression line, those with the highest GDP per capita (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium) have the highest tax/GDP values. Chapter 7.1 shows effects of GDP per capita on support for benefit generosity. Incorporating citizens´ willingness to pay points to another factor, democratisation.

Democratisation

Following Roller (1992: 9f.) summarising accounts which trace the emergence of welfare states back to modernisation, besides industrialisation also democratisation fostered the emergence of welfare states. Yet democracy is not a necessary precondition. On the one hand, Marshall describes three kinds of citizenship rights: Civil rights, established in the 18th century, political rights, established in the 19th century, and social rights, established in the 20th century (see also Hasenfeld et al. 1987: 389). Civil rights include rights to freedom and justice, political rights include political participation and social rights include rights to welfare (Marshall 2000: 30ff.). It is possible that political rights open the door for social rights, if the poor use their equal votes in the political sphere to reduce inequalities in the economic sphere.[4] Political rights preceded social ones in the UK, to which Marshall refers.

Welfare policies provide states with legitimation (Borre/Goldsmith 1995: 2), yet not only democratic ones. As Roller (1992: 9) notes, the sequence of the introduction of rights may be different than in the UK, since in Germany social rights have been introduced before universal suffrage (and, by definition, democracy). Supportive evidence is provided by Berg-Schlosser and Quenter (1996: 106ff.). Analysing 12 European countries, they could find effects from left party share to the percentage of the workforce covered by social insurance only if they included Germany in their analysis, which scored very high on both dimensions. Further, socialist CEE countries had social rights, but not democracy. Thus, with reference to policies by Napoleon III, Bismarck and Taaffe, Esping-Andersen (1990: 15) doubts the thesis that democracy fostered competition between parties outbidding each other in their welfare promises and policies.

Related to democratisation is the type of democratic system. Swank (2001: 220) analysed effects in 15 OECD countries between 1965 and 1995 and found out that social corporatism and inclusive electoral institutions positively affect welfare effort, while for decentralisation of political power the opposite applies.

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[4] King and Waldron (1988: 420ff), in contrast, point out the seemingly reverse causality by stating that welfare policies are important for citizenship rights. For example, participation in public life requires a minimum of economic well-being (King/Waldron 1988: 426). Considering that voting requires no basic social standards, it could be at the beginning of the causal nexus, leading to the implementation of welfare programmes, which, in turn, enable citizens to other forms of political participation which require basic social standards.

The neo-Marxist approach

According to the neo-Marxist approach capitalist systems stabilise themselves via the welfare state, mitigating the system inherent conflict between labour and capital (Schmid 2003: 236, Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003: 3. Mau 1997: 67 sees industrialisation as a source of new conflicts and the welfare state as a reaction to mitigate them.). Offe (1982: 9), for example, considers Bismarck´s social policies as an effort to weaken the working class (see also Overbye 1994: 158). As Alber (1988: 182f.) notes, Marxists see the welfare state as a logical result of capitalism´s desire to calm down its inherent conflicts and at the same time the possibility that the welfare state undermines the functioning of the economic system it is supposed to stabilise. A somewhat related argument is provided by Obinger and Schmitt (2011: 246ff.). They hypothesise that after World War II rivalry for output legitimacy between both economic systems was a driving force of welfare expansion in both blocs (Obinger/Schmitt 2011: 247). Analysing welfare spending in 16 western European countries and five CEE countries between 1961 and 1989, they find strong effects of one bloc´s annual changes in welfare spending on another bloc´s changes the year after (but not in the 1960s and more in the 1970s than in the 1980s). Geographical proximity did not matter and the question if bigger countries exerted stronger influence could not be answered unambiguously (Obinger/Schmitt 2011: 262). Further, also diffusion effects within blocs could be detected.

Bureaucracy

Cameron (1978: 1248) notes that according to some authors bureaucracies´ internal logic of "self-aggrandizement and expansion" raises welfare spending. Downs (1960: 555, footnote) ascribes to bureaucrats the willingness to expand their power by expanding their departments and budgets. Similarly, Niskanen (1968: 293f.) attributes to bureaucrats the willingness to maximise their budgets, since the bureaucrat´s utility is positively affected by larger budgets. These raise the "salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, ease of managing the bureau, and ease of making changes" (Niskanen 1968: 293f.). Further, also bureaucrats´ eagerness to serve the public interest should foster their endeavours to raise their budgets (Niskanen 1968: 294). Yet that bureaucrats want to increase their budgets does not necessarily mean that they can. Niskanen (1971: 30) assumes that although the transaction between government and bureaucracy is monopolistic on both sides, the bureaucrats´ informational and motivational advantages will increase budgets according to their

preferences. Breton and Wintrobe (1975: 198) object that Niskanen´s assumption that politicians are passively accepting bureaucrats´ demands is unrealistic, since politicians can exploit their monopolistic power, too, and are motivated to do so since they want to be re-elected and therefore will try to avoid purchasing more bureaucratic output than citizens prefer. Further, if increased budgets result from an increased number of employees, this in turn lowers a bureau manager´s capability to exert control over his department (Breton/Wintrobe 1975: 198). The bureau manager may see a critical staff number above which further recruitment´s costs offset the benefits. Another counterargument here is that finance bureaucrats have conservative policy orientations (Huber/Stephens 2001: 21); whereas this does not necessarily imply that they prefer small budgets also in the case of their own budget. Another counterargument is that structural conditions, amongst them government partisanship, limit bureaucrats´ influence (Huber/Stephens 2001: 21).

While Niskanen states that information asymmetries to the favour of Bureaucrats lead to higher spending, Downs (1960: 545ff) also allows for incorrect information to incur budgets smaller than they otherwise would have been. On the other hand, taxation concealment leads to higher budgets (Downs 1960: 559) and is fostered by indirect taxation (e.g., sales taxes; cf. Downs 1960: 552), so that indirect taxation leads to larger government by hiding its real costs. Besides indirect taxation, employers´ contributions to social insurance conceal the welfare state´s costs (Cameron 1978: 1246). Chapter 7.1 will show effects of taxes, direct taxes and contributions on welfare attitudes which, in turn, affect policies.

2.2.2 Post-WW II developments

'Golden Age'

The emergence of the welfare state prior to the World Wars and its reasons has to be distinguished from its expansion (King 1987: 846). The period after WW II was marked by high economic growth and this expansion (Korpi 1985: 112). The underlying growth rates made this feasible without significant cutbacks in other government expenditures or private consumption (Castles 2004: 45). Governments could implement neo- Keynesian policies to keep unemployment down (yet not debt). Families were - at least more than today - structured in a way that allowed the provision of care for the young and the elderly (Taylor-Gooby 2004a: 1). In this period, "the welfare state became an integral part of all advanced industrial democracies" (Pierson 1994: 1).

After the 'Golden Age'

The mid-1970s are often considered a turning point. Kitschelt et al. (2003: 3) see the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the first oil shock[5] of 1973 as watersheds, after which economic growth rates declined (for the US, additional financial pressures resulted from the Vietnam War, cf. Quadagno 1987: 113). Hasenfeld et al. (1987: 411) terminate the beginning of retrenchment with lower benefit levels, stricter rules or short entitlement periods (Green-Pedersen 2007: 17) at the year 1975. Technological changes negatively affected employment in the manufacturing sector. Globalisation has spurred the need for labour market flexibility. Changing family structures and employment patterns lowered families´ capabilities to care for their young and old (Taylor-Gooby 2001a: 2). From this period onwards, weak economic performance caused financing problems and lower support for the Keynesian belief that public expenses can spur economic growth (Pierson 1994: 3; see also Taylor-Gooby 2001a: 12). Since demand-side economic management raises taxes and charges, leeway for Keynesian policies is narrower against the backdrop of high and increasing capital mobility (Taylor-Gooby 2001a: 6). Trade-offs between welfare expenditures and other government expenditures or private consumption became more necessary since the 1970s (Castles 2004: 45). Since this period, a crisis and retrenchment[6] of the welfare state have often been stated. From today´s viewpoint, the golden age of the welfare state is over (Lessenich 2006: 181).

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[5]   Analysing 16 OECD countries between 1961 and 1995, Goerke and Madsen (2003: 49ff.) show that increases in oil prices have remarkable effects on unemployment.

[6]   There are two ways of measuring welfare effort. One the one hand, net replacement rates tell to which degree an individual can maintain the living standard prior to dependency. The replacement rate partially expresses the degree of de-commodification (for definitions of the latter see chapter 4.1). Roughly put, it is the ratio between unemployment or pension benefits and previous earnings (Martin 1996: 108). On the other hand, welfare expenditures may be measured as a percentage of GDP. The weak spot of this measurement is that the number of dependents is not taken into account.

When analysing if welfare retrenchment took place after the mid-1970s, the use of welfare expenditures as a percentage of GDP is misleading. The reason is that a rise in the number of dependents, possibly via demographic factors which lead to higher pension and health costs or via higher unemployment, distorts the view on generosity at the individual level. In this sense, retrenchment and rising welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP may co-occur, if retrenchment is defined as a worsening of the situation of individual dependents. As Adelantado and Calderón (2006: 374) note, several factors may cause retrenchment: Globalisation, politicians who think voters will not accept higher costs to sustain the welfare state, the dominance of neoliberal thinking in economic policy, and, lastly, contradictory pressures, stemming from growing needs on the one hand and pressures from economic libertarianism and globalisation on the other.

3 Policy fields

3.1 Old age pensions

Originally a special form of disability insurance since retirement began when working is no longer possible (Overbye 1994: 157), old-age pension programmes were introduced in all developed countries between the late 19th and the mid-20th century (Fenge et al. 2003: 7).

Figure 3.1: Relationship between pension replacement rates and poverty risk of the elderly

Figures from Eurostat

Generous pension entitlements prevent poverty among the old. Pension replacement rates[7] and at poverty risks of the elderly are strongly negatively correlated (Pearson´s r .70, highest significance level; Fig. 3.1). Partially, this very high correlation, not to be found when using other indicators, results from Eurostat´s operationalisation. Replacement rates are defined as the ratio of median gross pensions for those between 65 and 74 and median gross earnings of those between 50 and 59, in both cases not counting other welfare benefits. Poverty among the elderly is calculated as the "share of population aged 65 or over with an equalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 percent of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers" (Eurostat).

Old-age poverty could be higher if earnings of people 65 or older would be compared to the whole adult population (if younger people have higher earnings). On the other hand, this operationalisation largely holds constant poverty effects of being old and emphasises

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[7]   Replacement rates are "[…] an indicator of the insurance role of the pension system. It shows to what extent pension systems aim to preserve the previous, personal standard of living of a worker moving from employment into retirement." (Whitehouse 2007: 27).

poverty effects of being above the official retirement age and therefore probably pensioner. The neglect of other benefits should underestimate the income of those between 50 and 59, since they could be entitled to unemployment benefits and, more often than pensioners, child allowances. This leads to an underestimation of elderly poverty rates.

The OECD countries' old-age systems belong to two different categories (Siegel 2001: 78, Fenge et al. 2003: 7). These should not be considered as binary, but rather as a continuum. One the one extreme, pensions are modelled after an insurance principle and therefore benefits are rigorously related to previous income. This ideal type is termed 'Bismarckian' after the German chancellor who may be considered the driving force behind the introduction of a public insurance scheme for the old and invalid. In its ideal form, a Bismarckian scheme does not redistribute between income groups (Kolmar 2007: 650):

> "Intra-generational […] redistribution when the replacement rate decreases as income increases, which is the case in some countries such as the UK and the Netherlands which have flat-rate pensions […] in countries such as France or Germany, the link between contributions and benefits is tight; they are labelled *Bismarckian* and are much less redistributive" (Cremer/Pestieau 2000: 976, emphasis in original).

On the other extreme, the scheme ensures basic income in old age, irrespective of previous income. This is called 'Beveridgean' after the British politician Lord Beveridge, who proposed such a scheme in 1942. Prototypes are the Danish 'Folkepension', introduced in 1891 (Fenge et al. 2003: 7ff., Overbye 1994: 150), or the Swedish pension, introduced in 1913 (Alber 1982: 45. Overbye 1994: 152 states that the Nordic countries adopted the Danish model). In the latter, basic transfer payments were low and had to be supplemented with payments dependent on the level of previous contributions (Alber 1982: 214).

As criticised by Fenge et al. (2003: 10), sometimes this dichotomy is enlarged to include a third type, which is the 'Nordic' or 'Scandinavian' type, which may cover more people and offer higher benefits (in the mean) than both schemes described above. Fenge et al. criticise the introduction of a third type for two reasons: Firstly, it is historically dubious. Secondly, it incorporates a confusion of ideal and real types. This criticism rests on the common understanding of the distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean, which is based on earnings-relatedness. This distinction does not incorporate schemes´ generosity. Actually, inferring from the goals of the Beveridge report to eliminate poverty and misery, Beveridge schemes´ ideally flat-rate benefits do not necessarily have to be low. In a unidimensional

pension world, merely these two ideal types may exist. The introduction of the second criterion of generosity or mean benefit level or replacement rates introduces a second axis and allows for the introduction of a third ideal type. Esping-Andersen´s typology is built upon the introduction of this second axis. He (1990: 85ff.) describes three "pension regimes":

1. In the "Corporative state-dominated insurance systems" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 85) or 'Bismarckian' systems benefits are status-related. This pattern is prevalent in conservative welfare states. In these countries, pensions are financed from contributions deducted from earnings and benefit levels are earnings-related. Average pension payments are high.

The second and third systems are subtypes of the Beveridgean system:

2. In the residualist systems, income in old age depends largely on the market. Benefits are low, so that citizens should not rely on government for their old age. Market-provided pensions are more important, and citizens have financial leeway to privately invest, since they are not burdened by high taxes and contributions for current pensioners´ high benefits. The only European country Esping-Andersen categorises here is Switzerland. It is possible that this regime has been enlarged since 1980, possibly by the UK and Ireland. The UK has been described as 'mixed' by Esping-Andersen.

3.In "universalistic state-dominated systems […] social rights eradicated both status privilege and markets" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 87). These systems were to be found in Scandinavia and the Netherlands.

Therefore, focusing on governmental activities, there is no contradiction between Siegel´s or Fenge at al.´s two worlds and Esping-Andersen´s three worlds. Siegel´s distinctive feature is earnings-relatedness; Esping-Andersen subdivides ideally earnings-unrelated systems into residualist systems with low benefits (at least from government) and universalist systems with high benefits. In the former, private savings or pensions and therefore market performance determine material well-being in old-age while in the latter this is not the case. Since in the conservative system benefits depend on prior contributions and therefore earnings, the familiar pattern occurs:

Figure 3.2: Ideal-typical pension schemes

Benefits	Earnings-related	Earning-unrelated
High	Conservative/ Corporatist/ Catholic	Universalist (Social democratic)
Low		Residualist (Liberal)

Source: Own presentation

In corporatist schemes, benefit levels do not merely differ on the individual level out of different previous earnings, work histories and entitlement rules. Corporatist schemes may offer generally high or low benefits. So, strictly speaking there are four ideal types, but the ideal type of the ungenerous corporatist pension scheme is problematic: While generosity may exist without earnings-relatedness (the universal type), the opposite does not hold true. With high generosity, corporatist schemes may offer high earnings-relatedness. With low generosity, corporatist schemes approximate residualist schemes, since this scheme will crowd out the state and lead to higher reliance on private pensions. Following, only the more or less generous corporatist schemes may be considered corporatist, while earnings-relatedness becomes less relevant with declining generosity.

In the last decades, in corporatist systems benefits were generally high, since nearly all pensioners were previously gainfully employed or married to somebody who was. In the meantime, due to spreading long-term unemployment and early retirement, both of which lower benefits, it may be expected that some pensioners receive benefits as low as in residualist systems. Further, the spread of low-pay service jobs may lead to a growing number of retirees whose previous incomes (and, therefore, contributions) does not allow for high benefits. In the long run, due to the spread of private pensions in corporatist countries, a residualisation of corporatist pension schemes is probable.

Cutbacks have different effects in Beveridgean and Bismarckian schemes. In the former, inequality rises with cutbacks, because the flat-rate scheme is inherently redistributive (the Beverdige scheme has a high, the Bismarck scheme a low transfer intensity, cf. Schmid 2008: 715). In Bismarckian schemes, cutbacks will also increase inequality, if these schemes redistribute towards low-income groups (Cigno 2008: 76). Yet this may not be directly concluded from replacement rates, since higher income groups´ higher life expectancy lowers redistributive effects towards the poor and could even lead to net redistribution towards higher income groups. If Bismarckian schemes are actuarially fair and nobody is credit rationed, cutbacks have neutral effects (Cigno 2008: 76).

Possibly citizens consider contribution-based pension benefits as more legitimate, since they may be considered as earned and based on merit (Alber 1988: 191, see also Castles 2004: 130). Employment-related benefits are individualised, meaning that

> "each individual has his or her own contract with the government with specific benefits attached to their specific work history, years of contribution, and earnings history […] such programmes […] become invested with quasi-property rights in the same way as life insurance or equities" (Myles/Pierson 2001: 321).

Contrastingly, tax financed pension benefits are distributed according to need and not merit, so that recipients may be considered as less entitled than in the case of merit-based schemes. If tax-financed benefits are not based on need but on citizenship, they may be considered as more legitimate than if they were if provided only for the needy. Contributions-based benefits may lose legitimacy if contributions are not sufficient and have to be supplemented with fiscal revenues. In this case, it is possible that taxpayers perceive conservative countries´ generous retirement benefits as not completely earned and therefore illegimately burdening workers and taxpayers. In a certain manner they may see a past underinvestment of current pensioners in financial or human capital. The same may apply to early retirement, meaning that taxpayers and contributors feel they have to bear the burden while employees and employers benefit.

3.1.1   Dependency ratios

> "The financial soundness of old age pensions financed from payroll taxes depends on high wage growth, high fertility, and high rates of labour force participation (Myles/Pierson 2001: 310)".

Since all three preconditions for unproblematic financing of high earnings-related pensions cannot be found in conservative welfare states, pension place high burdens on labour costs and possibly also government budgets.

Figure 3.3 shows that the share of old people and old-age spending are correlated on a medium strong level. Demographics determine pension burdens, but there is political leeway. Social democratic countries are below the line; they spend less than the age of their populations implies. Contrastingly, conservative countries tend to spend more.

Dependency ratios not just determine pension spending, but also citizens´ views on their country´s future pension affordability. Table A2.5 (all tables and figures beginning with 'A' are to be found in the appendix) shows current and projected old-age dependency ratios in European countries. Higher ratios imply a higher number of older perople in relation to

Figure 3.3: Relationship between demographic structure and pension outlays

Pearson´s r .52, significant at 5 percent-level. Data from Whiteford/Whitehouse 2006: 80. Denmark and Finland have the same figures.

younger people. Although this does not directly translate into the level of social security contributions in pay-as-you-go schemes, old-age dependency ratios are a major determinant of pension schemes´ problems. These ratios will rise in coming decades, and Europeans seem to recognise to which degree their country is affected. Respondents in the fourth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS4) were asked if, ten years from now, their country will not be able to afford the current pension level, to sustain it or even to increase it. Given that the old-age dependency ratio is not the sole factor affecting pension affordability, the strength of the correlations is impressive. Without Bulgarians, who are very optimistic about their pension scheme´s future, correlations are stronger.

Table 3.1: Relationship between old-age dependency ratios and subjective pension affordability

Subjective pension affordability	Old-age dependency ratios (Eurostat)				
	2008	2020	2030	2040	2050
	-.30 (26)	-.30 (24)	-.39 (24)	-.34 (24)	-.02 (24)
without Bulgaria	-.42*	-.42*	-.48*	-.44*	-.16*

*: $p < .05$ **: $p < .01$; ***: $p < .001$. In brackets: Number of countries. No projections for Croatia and Turkey.

Financing rising pension costs

If pensions are financed through contributions deducted from incomes, as in conservative countries, pensions costs are burdensome especially if real wages rise slowly, which is often the case (Myles/Pierson 2001: 310). If in pay-as-you-go schemes rising contributions are problematic for competitive reasons (since labour costs rise), two solutions are available:

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Either, financing can be shifted to capital investment or general taxes or both. Or, benefit levels could be cut (Myles/Pierson 2001: 311), whereas rising official retirement ages are benefit cuts in some respects. Transitions to funded designs imply that intergenerational transfers of financial resources get replaced by pension benefits workers have saved up for themselves, either publicly or privately. This leads to a double pension burden (Myles/Pierson 2001: 313), since current schemes need contributions to cover expenses.

3.1.2 Early retirement

Early retirement does not worsen dependency ratios, because these ratios take merely the populations´ age distribution into account. But early retirement worsens pension schemes´ financial situation. With reference to EU countries, Holzmann (2006: 227) states that

> "the effective retirement age is typically low as a result of disincentives to work longer in current public (pension, *author*) schemes, special options for early retirement, and past labor market policy that deliberately attempted to keep the unemployment rate low by allowing older workers to exit prematurely"

The spread of early retirement in Western Europe has already been observed by Esping-Andersen in 1990 (148), especially in conservative welfare states which supported it (1990: 180; 1996a: 18, see also Ebbinghaus 2000: 513). Table 4.8 confirms this. In every country employment rates of those over 54 are lower than of those below 55. Another striking point is that according to the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy' especially conservative welfare states encourage their workers to retire early. This can be confirmed here. With a mean ratio of 1.6 between total and elderly employment rate they are above the four other regimes.

There are three types of early retirement: In the first type, every year or month a beneficiary retires prematurely lowers benefits. In the second type, benefits are not cut if the beneficiary paid into the pension fund long enough. In the third type, the benefit level is set below the normal level. In this case, early retirement serves as a substitute for expired unemployment benefit entitlements and as a bridge to normal retirement (Blöndal/Pearson 1995: 149f.).

Formerly considered a solution to the problem of redundancies in the workforce, early retirement is now considered a problem leading to insufficient use of manpower and rising numbers of pensioners (Ebbinghaus 2000: 511, Fisher/Keuschnigg 2011: 1). There would be no additional financial problems for pension funds if payments to early retirees would be

reduced in degrees that keep the ratio between payments-in and benefits constant, i.e. at the same level as with 'normal' retirees. Yet this is not the case: "Adjustment is often less than the actual fair level" (Cremer et al. 2009: 174, see also Fisher/Keuschnigg 2011: 2). Combined with high levels of benefits, widespread early retirement is one cause of high pension costs in conservative countries (Myles/Pierson 2001: 308). Further, using a highly stylised model Fisher and Keuschnigg (2011: 4ff.) show that early retirement fosters unemployment amongst the young (evidence that the lump-of-labor fallacy, the idea that early retirement creates job opportunities for the young, is indeed a fallacy, is also presented by Börsch-Supan and Schnabel 2010: 147ff. and for Belgium by Jousten et al. 2010: 55ff.).

All else equal, stronger earnings-relatedness rewards postponed retirement, since later retirement raises income during retirement, which is not the case in flat-rate schemes (Fisher/Keuschnigg 2011: 21). The latter discourage labour, because labour merely affects take-home pay but not pension entitlements (Cigno 2008: 72ff.). Yet replacement rates are generally higher in earnings-related systems (Siegel 2001: 85), so that early retirement is more attractive in conservative welfare states. Besides formal retirement, disability pensions may allow for early retirement (Börsch-Supan 2006: 24f.; Holzmann 2006: 238). Early retirement via disability pensions is widespread and rising. In 19 out of 20 OECD countries, disability costs are higher than unemployment costs. Further, an OECD report from 2003 states that about one third of disability benefit recipients in ten EU countries are not disabled. In Europe, among non-employed men in working age, merely one third is unemployed, and among women merely one sixth. There is no medical explanation for the steep rise of invalidity among working-age persons. Unemployment and invalidity benefit generosity seem to account for the rise (Marin 2006: 285).

Esping-Andersen (1990: 150f.) suggests that early retirement is encouraged by the risk of unemployment among older workers and the provision of benefits (see also Stephens 1996: 37, Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2002: 78). In some cases employees may opt for unemployment to "bridge" the time between work and retirement (Ebbinghaus 2000: 518).

In a more detailed manner, individual estimates of further life expectancy should matter. Considering that contributions lead to entitlements per month and not for the whole retirement phase, those expecting a high number of pension months could be encouraged to work longer since their additional contributions are lower than these contributions´ positive effects per retirement month multiplied by number of retirement months. In contrast, those

expecting to have a merely short retirement phase should retire as early as possible, since additional contributions do not pay off due the low number of retirement months.

3.1.3 Pensions´ other effects on labour supply

If pension benefits are strongly earnings-related, as in Bismarckian countries, higher pension income should reduce unemployment (because the lower effective tax rate encourages job search, whereas for Beveridgean flat-rate pension this does not apply Fisher/Keuschnigg 2011: 5ff., Cigno 2008: 72).

Another point is that for contributors effective interest rates in pay-as-you-go schemes are lower than in the capital market. Since this is a tax on labour (a suboptimal investment contributors are forced into because they work), work incentives are diminished in pay-as-you-go schemes (Demmel/Keuschnigg 2000: 22ff., Cigno 2008: 68f.). This would not be the case if the system is actuarially fair and agents are not credit rationed (Cigno 2008: 75), which could allow them to borrow money while they are forced to lend money until retirement.

If workers perceive retirement benefits as net assets, the expectation of these benefits after retirement should reduce work effort prior to retirement (Danziger et al. 1981: 983). This effect is negatively related to benefits´ earnings-relatedness. On the flat-rate side, work effort should be discouraged most strongly, since retirees receive these benefits unconditionally. On the strong earnings-related side, there should be no work discouraging effects, since all benefits depend on previous earnings and therefore work. This applies if interest rates are at the same level as they would be in the capital market. If they are lower, as stated above, also strong earnings-related schemes should discourage work, depending on the interest loss and the degree to which employees consider employer contributions as part of their wage. If employees consider employer contributions as some kind of forced gift from employers without negative effects on gross wages the same amount as their contributions are, this could even foster positive effects on labour supply from earnings-related schemes.

On first sight lower employers´ contributions to social security (either pension or unemployment insurance) should reduce the unemployment rate, since labour becomes cheaper for employers. Yet, lower employer contributions could lead to higher gross wages due to higher demands by workers to compensate for missing contributions, offsetting the diminishing effects on labour costs on the companies´ side (Corneo/Marquardt 2000: 300).

3.2 Unemployment benefits

3.2.1   Causes of unemployment

Most western European unemployment insurances were created under labour market conditions which were markedly different than today. In the post-war period, rising unemployment was caused by economic cycles, such as short term breaks and reversals of the long periods with high growth rates. In following boom periods, unemployment numbers dwindled, and unemployment has been diminished to a minor matter for the time being. On the individual level, redundancy has been a short interruption of a full working career. The income provided to the unemployed served both, a social rationale to alleviate economic hardship, and an economic rationale, the Keynesian attempt to stabilise consumption during economic slumps (Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 194). In the meantime, economies got more service- and less manufacturing-based, and unemployment and especially long-term unemployment rose. Averaging the unemployment rates of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Korpi (2003: 595) found out that between 1955 and 2000 the rate rose from three to seven percent. A rise from two percent to nine percent took place between 1975 and 1985. Against the backdrop that full employment has been an important goal in western European welfare states, Korpi (2003: 591ff.) considers rising unemployment a sign of welfare state retrenchment.

Now, unemployment is largely long-term[8] and structural (Bison/Esping-Andersen 2000: 70, Goul Andersen/Halvorsen 2002: 7). Further, the probability of becoming unemployed is now more strongly affected by education level (Taylor-Gooby 2001a: 4), leaving some groups permanently at high risk and others not.

Unemployment is undesirable for various reasons (see, for example, Lee 1997: 37ff.) and results from mismatching supply and demand of labour, both of which are partially internal to the political system. Reasons for these mismatches may be categorised into three groups:

1. Reasons which prevent wages from adjusting to demand, i.e. wages above their market clearing prices due to wage agreements, minimum wages, etc. Unemployment caused by economic cycles may belong to this category, since at least theoretically wages should

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[8]   The same unemployment rate may be caused by (a) many people being short-term unemployed or (b) a few people being long-term unemployed. For example, (a) everybody in the workforce may be unemployed for one month in a year, resulting in an unemployment rate of 8.3 percent, or (b) 8.3 percent of the workforce are always unemployed, while the others are always employed. (a) is less severe, since consumption inequalities are lower (Pencavel 1994: 625). The same can be said about other, possibly psychological, effects of unemployment.

drop fast enough to catch on with declining demand, so that a new market clearing equilibrium emerges.

2. Wrong incentives, such as too high benefits which discourage work, or employment protection laws which discourage employees to hire workers if they fear not to get rid of them when necessary. Here, Goul Andersen and Jensen (2002: 23ff.) disagree. According to them, employment protection does not affect the unemployment rate, but rather the division between labour market insiders and outsiders and increase the share of long-term unemployed. Benefits determine the reservation wage,[9] which in turn are effective minimum wages. Unemployment benefits could also belong to category 1. High unemployment benefit replacement rates increases reservation wages (e.g., van der Horst 2003: 19).

3. Mismatches caused by low labour mobility or too low or wrong qualifications (for the three categories see Armingeon 2003: 160). Low labour mobility can be caused by generous benefits, so that this category is not clearly distinguished from categories 1 and 2.

Based on OECD data from the 1990s, Armingeon (2003: 160ff.) concludes that these factors are merely weak predictors for cross-national differences in unemployment levels. For example, Goul Andersen and Jensen (2002: 22) mention US studies rejecting the idea that US minimum wages raise unemployment (this view is supported by Bassanini and Duval 2006: 27f. and, for 21 OECD countries and low-skilled workers, by Oesch 2010: 45ff.).

Unemployment rates depend also on the supply of labour. Factors affecting this supply are early retirement, disincentives for spouses of working people, child care facilities allowing parents to work, immigration, etc. (Armingeon 2003: 163; yet this belief is based on the widely rejected 'lump of labour fallacy' depicted above). Further explanations for unemployment include:

1. Social integration. Yet Armingeon could not find any correlations between social capital and unemployment.

2. Governmental partisanship and labour union strength (the idea is that left governments prioritise the goal of full employment, while right governments put emphasis on low inflation, if actually there is a trade-off, which will be discussed below when the Philips curve is discussed). Though, left and labour strength is not significantly correlated with unemployment rate.

3. Form of government. However, already in Lijphart´s (1999: 266ff.) analysis the allegedly unemployment-raising effects of consensus democracies could be rejected.

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[9] "The lowest wages unemployed people are willing to accept if they are to take a job" (Goul Andersen/Halvorsen 2002: 8, see also Kenworthy 2003: 1181).

4. Corporatism, trade unions. Trade unions could reduce unemployment if they are big enough so that their size disallows them to externalise unemployment´s costs. This should make them reluctant to demand employment-damaging wage settlements. This could not be empirically validated.

5. Interactions between various factors, as explained by Iversen and Scharpf (Armingeon 2003: 164ff.).

Governments have instruments in fiscal and monetary policy at their disposal, which in turn affect economic development and unemployment. Also regulations on immigration can affect unemployment levels, as well as early retirement schemes (Armingeon 2003: 152f.). Another case in point is governmental activities in the field of education, to guarantee a highly skilled workforce and to regulate training so that supply and demand of workers in different sectors meet. Lastly, there is governments´ function as employer. On the one hand government can raise labour demand, on the other hand necessary financial resources may worsen the underlying conditions for private-market employers so that the net effect could be negative.

3.2.2 Unemployment benefits

As Vroman (2007: 7) points out and will be seen below, most countries have two programmes, unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, with the former offering higher benefits than the latter (for remarks on methodological problems resulting from this, see Vroman 2007: 7).

Unemployment benefits are not necessarily the sole source of government-provided income for the unemployed, since housing allowances may eliminate or lower housing costs. Examples are housing allowances in Northern European countries (Aaberge et al. 2000: 86) or the Netherlands (de Vos/Kapteyn 2001: 241). OECD replacement rates included housing benefits (Martin 1996: 108). Unemployment benefits are believed to reduce relative poverty (e.g., Brady et al. 2009: 283ff.). Various measures of benefit generosity are negatively correlated with poverty risk. Figure 3.3 shows one of the most impressive correlations.

Figure 3.4: Relationship between earnings of the long-term unemployed and post-tax/post-transfer poverty

Pearson´s r -.63, significant at 1 percent- level. Data: Earnings: OECD. Poverty: Eurostat

Like pensions, unemployment benefits may be subdivided: Either benefits are earnings-related, or they serve to cover basic needs. In the latter case, they may be means-tested (Alber 1982: 166). Accordingly, unemployment benefits may be categorised in the same three worlds as pension benefits mentioned above, because countries with flat-rate benefits can be subdivided into two groups, depending on their generosity.

3.2.2.1 Effects on unemployment levels: Generosity

It is argued that benefit generosity affects the unemployment rate. Generosity is not just the level of benefits, but also eligibility criteria, the length of payments until they stop or drop, and work availability requirements (Blöndal/Pearson 1995: 139).

The various assumptions which support this hypothesis are summarised by Blöndal and Pearson (1995: 137f.). Firstly, under generous benefits joblessness is less painful, wage expectations are higher and the need for geographical relocation is less pressing, so that the search for the new job will take longer (see also Ederveer/de Mooij 2003: 22) or benefits are used to substitute for pensions (Cremer et al. 2009: 174).

Supporting evidence

In Mortensen´s results (cited in Holmlund 1998: 116ff.), on first sight higher benefits do not lead to longer unemployment spells for all unemployed. Yet this applies primarily to those not eligible. For those who are eligible higher benefit levels have a prolonging effect on

unemployment spells. Analysing 17 OECD countries in the period between 1960 and 1999, Belot and van Ours (2004: 631ff.) came to the result that higher replacement rates are related to higher unemployment rates. Yet this effect becomes insignificant when controlled for country fixed effects. This does not necessarily imply that replacement rates do not affect unemployment levels. But it is possible that both variables are not directly related, but affected by the same third variable. As Belot and van Ours point out, the assumption that higher benefits foster unemployment is supported by Elmeskov et al.´s (1998), analysis of 18 OECD countries in the period between 1983 and 1995. Discussing the results of their panel data analysis, Belot and van Ours (2004: 639) conclude that "replacement rates and tax rates reinforce each other in deteriorating the situation on the labor market".

Bassanini and Duval (2006: 9) cite several studies showing that both benefit level and duration foster unemployment. In their own analysis, benefit generosity (an index combining replacement rates of various earnings levels, family situations and unemployment durations) has positive effects on unemployment rates in 20 countries (15 European) between 1982 and 2003 (here, interaction effects show that negative effects of generosity cuts on unemployment levels would be stronger in low-union density countries, Bassanini/Duval 2006: 23ff.). Since in their analysis replacement rates and labour taxes are correlated (.39), labour taxes have strong effects on unemployment levels, and since labour taxes´ purpose is partially to finance benefits, the latter´s real impact on unemployment could be higher than in Bassanini and Duval´s estimations. The general view that generous schemes foster unemployment is supported by Venn (2012: 7) with reference to the 2006 OECD Employment Outlook.

Further, wage-setting may be affected by benefit levels, since unions expect higher wages to reduce employment and derive their utility from employment and incomes from wages and benefits (Blöndal/Pearson 1995: 137). If the latter are generous, unions will be less reluctant to lose their members´ jobs. Further, employers could be less reluctant to lay off workers if they know that their financial losses are kept within limits. Lastly, long job search could result in skill loss and, consequently, lower employability and even longer unemployment.

Mixed evidence

Goul Andersen and Jensen (2002: 22) refer to several studies showing that not the level of benefits, but benefit duration has adverse effects. These empirical findings square with the

model presented by Pisauro (2002: 739ff., see also Nickell and Nunziata 2002: 4), in which benefit duration and disqualification rules are crucial for search efforts. Higher unemployment levels in continental Europe than in the US and UK are partially explained with longer benefit duration in continental Europe. Additionally, Atkinson and Micklewright (1991: 1711ff.) summarise evidence for the US from various authors, showing that around benefit exhaustion there is a spike in the outflow from unemployment, while replacement rates matter less (Venn 2012: 8ff. criticises the use of replacement rates as proxy for generosity since eligibility criteria and take-up-rates are neglected and offers a detailed description and quantification of eligibility criteria in more than 30 countries).

Kenworthy (2003: 1187ff.) notes that generous and long-lasting benefits reduce incentives to find employment on the one hand, but on the other hand make employees and their organisations more willing to accept weak employment protection with positive effects on flexibility. Kenworthy (2003: 1189) could find no bivariate relationship between employment growth between 1979 and 1997 and replacement rates between 1980 and 1997 in 18 OECD countries (the very weak negative relationship does not allow for a general assessment).

Results for effects from unemployment benefit generosity on employment growth are weak and inconclusive, yet long periods of eligibility have adverse effects on employment (Kenworthy 2003: 1198ff.).

Disproving evidence

In Baccaro and Rei´s (2007: 541ff.) analysis of 18 OECD countries between 1960 and 1998, replacement rates in the first year of unemployment had no significant effects on unemployment. Rather, real interest rates and monetary policies matter.[10] This squares with Danziger et al.´s (1981: 975ff.) summary of US studies showing merely weak effects of benefit generosity and duration on unemployment duration. For 21 OECD countries between 1991 and 2006, also Oesch (2010: 45f.) could detect no effects of one-year or five-year replacement rates on low-skilled unemployment. For Sweden, Furåker (2002: 123ff.) sees no

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[10] An increase in unemployment compensation raises wages which in turn lowers employment. The counter-argument is that higher benefits reduce search efforts primarily of low productivity (or low-skilled) workers, since workers´ reservation wages depend on their skills and following, rising benefits push some low-skilled workers into the area of non-effort. Given that firms are partially ignorant concerning a particular applicant´s qualifications (they will not offer higher wages), the higher skill levels will lead to increasing demand and therefore lower unemployment due to higher unemployment benefits (Atkinson/Micklewright 1991: 1704). Possibly this applies only to flat-rate benefits, since rising earnings-related benefits should reduce search effort across skill levels proportionally.

"principal impact" of benefits on unemployment levels, but of economic factors and world market developments.

Further, generous unemployment benefits may inflate unemployment figures, if people who are at high risk of becoming unemployed enter the labour market because they prefer unemployment benefits to other non-employment benefits. These other, less attractive benefits may be disability benefits (Blöndal/Pearson 1995: 139), early retirement benefits or tax breaks resulting from spouses´ labour market passivity.

Additionally, it is argued that financial incentives are not the sole factor motivating people to find a new job quickly. Rather, one important motivational factor could be the rising self-esteem a new job brings along, or new social contacts attached to a new job. Further, external pressure to find a new job is said to come more from societal stigmatisation than lack of money (Butterwegge 2005: 83). The last view is supported by Blöndal and Pearson´s (1995: 147) reference to studies showing that social stigma burdens the unemployed.

The 'matching effect' of generous and long-lasting benefits

The reservation wage may decline as the date of benefit expiration comes closer (Holmlund 1998: 116). Lengthy and generous benefits may allow for longer job searches. Resulting better matches decrease frictional unemployment (Furåker 2002: 138) which is a result of labour market flexibility and rises when employees change jobs often. With the 'efficiency argument', Tzannatos and Roddis (1998: 4f.) mention a related argument: Lengthy and generous benefits allow workers to wait for well-paid jobs, bringing along a better allocation of resources (labour). Yet, they point out that this was a justification for (generous) unemployment benefits during post-war full-employment periods, and may not apply to current surplus labour conditions.

Changing legislation in Slovenia offers quasi-experimental data. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006: 3ff.) found no effects from shorter benefit duration on post-unemployment job quality. Neither the rate of fixed-term contracts rose, nor did the duration of new jobs decrease. Since there were no negative effects accompanying the positive effect of shorter unemployment spells, the authors (2006: 5) see the examined policy change as a solution to benefits´ inherent moral hazard problems. Yet the results of previous analyses presented by the authors suggest that evidence concerning this question is mixed. In some analyses, higher replacement rates led to higher post-unemployment wages, in some there is no significant

relationship. In one analysis, benefit generosity positively affects durations of post-unemployment jobs (see van Ours/Vodopivec 2006: 3f. for a comprehensive listing of previous analyses and Tatsiramos 2006: 2ff., whose analysis of eight European countries came to the conclusion that benefit generosity raises unemployment duration as well as subsequent employment duration; "matching effect", Tatsiramos 2006: 23).

3.2.2.2   Effects on unemployment levels: Earnings-relatedness

Benefits financed by workers are expected to have neutral effects on economic growth, whereas employers´ contributions are expected to positively affect economic growth: Higher employee contributions lower their net wage and, in turn, savings, while the unemployed´s savings rise by the same amount. Higher employer contributions, in contrast, reduce employees´ gross wage not as much as unemployment benefits rise for the young cohort, so that positive effects on economic growth may be expected. This applies to pay-as-you-go schemes, because otherwise there are no effects from the unemployment insurance on the young or the old´s aggregate net income (Corneo/Marquardt 2000: 301).

Higher benefits should encourage risk-taking in terms of job insecurity (Hey/Mavromaras 1981: 318). Hey and Mavromaras (1981: 318ff.) base their model on earnings-related unemployment benefits and two job characteristics, wage level and job security, and jobseekers demand higher wages in exchange for lower security (leaving aside cases in which jobseekers may demand higher wages to compensate for a lower layoff probability or are indifferent concerning this probability, which in the model may not be affected by employees). Lower wages than the wage preceding unemployment are accepted as long as the new wage is higher than benefits, but since this leads to lower benefits when re-entering unemployment, high job security is demanded (Hey/Mavromaras 1981: 326). The advantage of accepting the job is the product of job security and higher income due to exit from unemployment, so following this model higher benefits should decrease the income advantage of unemployment exit, necessitating higher job security in order to make re-employment attractive or, holding job security constant, lowering re-employment´s advantages.

Goerke and Madsen (2003: 41ff.) show that switching from flat-rate to earnings-related benefits can lead to lower wages and less unemployment, given that unions try to maximise employees´ advantages from unionisation and given that the mean benefit level remains

unchanged.[11] This is based on the idea that employees´ advantage increases with rising wages under circumstances of constant benefits. With flat-rate benefits, the whole amount of wage increases is added to the differential between unemployment and employment. With earnings-related benefits, a part of this increasing differential is eaten up due to higher unemployment benefits coming with increasing wages. Therefore, with earnings-related benefits unions trying to maximise their employees´ advantage in comparison to unemployment will be less interested in wages rises than they would be with flat-rate benefits, while lower wages in turn decrease unemployment. In contrast to this rent-maximising union, utilitarian unions, considering all members whether employed or unemployed, gain from higher wages due to higher benefits in an earnings-related scheme.

This difference results from differing assumptions concerning unions´ goals. On the one hand, unions may try to maximise the utility of employed members (earnings) and unemployed members (benefits) or the median member´s utility, i.e. all members are important for unions. This is Vijlbrief and van de Wijngaert´s (1995: 237) assumption: With fixed benefit levels and balanced government budgets, higher unemployment leads to higher taxes and contributions, so that wage increases[12] are less attractive to unions (wage increases benefit merely those union members still employed after the increase, not previously unemployed or newly unemployed union members). In contrast, linking benefits to the wage rate raises benefits with rising wages, so that the marginal costs in terms of higher unemployment become smaller; higher unemployment is less deterring for unions which results in high incentives to increase wages (Vijlbrief/van de Wijngaert 1995: 242).

Alternatively, unions could care merely for employed members and their relative payoff resulting from the difference between employment income and foregone alternative income, i.e. benefits and other advantages resulting from unemployment or income in other labour markets, whereas unions directly merely can affect benefits (Goerke/Madsen 2003: 46; seemingly referring to the fact that union bargaining indirectly affects wages in other labour markets). The second alternative leads to the conclusion that stronger earnings-relatedness of benefits diminishes unemployment, as noted above.

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[11] Similarly, Beissinger and Büsse (2001: 87ff.) state that in closed economies unemployment rates are more sensitive to labour market shocks or unemployment benefit reform if benefits are earnings-related. The cause is that labour market shocks like rising wages also bring about rising benefits in earnings-related schemes, while falling wages lower benefit levels. Modelling this for two countries, shortly put, amongst the four scenarios (flat rate/earnings-related benefits in two countries), country B is only affected by country A´s rising unemployment if country B has flat-rate benefits, independent of country A´s unemployment benefit scheme.

[12] A single centralised union cares more for tax/contribution effects, since it may not externalise these additional costs or gains. Smaller decentralised unions should care less for these effects, since these effects feedback only partially to a small unions´ members (Vijlbrief/van de Wijngaert 1995: 240f.).

Additionally, assuming that unemployment benefits are financed via taxes and contributions proportional to income (as in earnings-related schemes) and that labour demand elasticity (rising labour demand due to lower labour costs) is high relative to the unemployment rate, positive effects on government budget will result, because high elasticity means strong positive effects on employment levels and therefore the tax/contributions base. The relation to unemployment levels is important since high levels in relation to labour demand elasticity lead to a relatively weak broadening of the tax/contributions base (weak elasticity), lower contributions and low unemployment-reducing effects relative to the unemployment level. In this case, negative effects on government budgets might occur (Goerke/Madsen 2003: 48f., see also Vijlbrief/de Wijngaert 1995: 240 arguing with the opposing direction, i.e. rising wages leading to higher unemployment and therefore higher expenses, possibly being lower or higher than extra revenues from higher taxes and contributions from those still employed).

To prove this, Goerke and Madsen (2003: 49ff.) analyse 16 OECD countries between 1961 and 1995. Calculating earnings-relatedness as the relation between gross replacement rates of average production workers and those with 67 percent of the average production worker´s income across three family types, their results are: Firstly, unemployment slows down wage growth. Second, indirect labour costs raise total labour costs only weakly: "It follows that workers are willing to trade increases in direct labour costs for indirect labour costs" (Goerke/Madsen 2003: 55), which is plausible given that indirect labour costs are partially paid in for the individual employee. Third, higher replacement rates lead to higher unemployment. Coming to the main thesis, wages and earnings-relatedness are negatively related, suggesting wage-diminishing effects of earnings-related benefits (Goerke/Madsen 2003: 55f.), i.e rising employment. Lastly, earnings-relatedness lowers unemployment. Both latter results apply for the analysed countries regardless their mechanisms of wage-setting: "The negative correlation between the earnings relationship of benefits and wages or unemployment has general validity for the OECD countries" (Goerke/Madsen 2003: 56).

Goerke and Madsen´s (2003: 41ff.) analysis is based on the assumption that collective wage bargaining is an important factor in wage determinantion. Although union membership rates vary strongly between OECD countries, they (2003: 45f.) point out that in many OECD countries bargaining coverage reached 80 or 90 percent: "Collective wage determination is a pervasive and important feature especially in Europe" (2003: 46). Figures are from the mid-1990s, i.e. meanwhile the power of the argument could have been weakened due to the relative growth of low-skilled service employment not covered by union wage agreements.

The view of unemployment-reducing effects of earnings-related benefits is also supported by Heer and Morgenstern (2000: 1ff.) in three out of four of their equilibrium models. Additionally, besides the net wage the advantage of working is the acquisition of the right to more generous unemployment benefits, so that the supply of labour rises (Friedman 1977: 458). This applies only to earnings-related benefits. Contrastingly, the model presented by Schluter (1997: 489ff.) entails a critical tax/contribution point. Below, both schemes have the same effect on unemployment. Above, earnings-related benefits increase unemployment compared to flat-rate benefits.

Bräuninger´s (2000: 1ff.) formal model subdivides the labour force into skilled and unskilled members and is more realistic. Underlying assumptions are unemployment rates depending on replacement rates and in flat-rate schemes benefits being linked to wages of unskilled workers. One result is that in earnings-related schemes increased replacement rates raise unemployment in both skill groups proportionally, while in flat-rate schemes unskilled unemployment rises stronger. In the short run, this is caused by a stronger rise in the wages of the unskilled. In the medium run, lower rates of return for firms in the unskilled sectors drives capital from there towards the skilled sector, raising unemployment in the unskilled sector (the model explicitly precludes the skilling of the unskilled). But wage bargaining should reverse this mechanism because higher unskilled unemployment weakens unskilled unions´ positions with wages of the unskilled falling relative to skilled wages (Bräuninger 2000: 1ff.).

Unemployment benefits can also affect the labour supply of other family/household members. Payments on an individual basis affect other household member´s labour market behaviour as wage income does. If other members´ incomes are regarded, as in means-tested schemes, effects are different, since benefits may be reduced due to other family members´ income (Atkinson/Micklewright 1991: 1720). On the one hand, effects on others´ labour supply should be stronger if the unemployed person receives means-tested benefits, since generally they are lower. On the other hand, benefits based on prior contributions are not affected by other family member´s income, i.e. other family member´s additional income due to endeavours to compensate for the individual´s loss of income are not 'taxed' via lower benefits. See below (in the chapter 'female employment') for Bentolila and Ichino (2001: 14ff.) showing that predominantly in Southern countries income losses due to men´s unemployment are compensated due to their wives starting to work or working longer hours.

4   Welfare regimes

4.1 Entitlement principles and de-commodification

If government is responsible for dependents, benefits may be distributed according to two mutually exclusive principles. One the one hand there is the insurance principle, prevalent in countries with a Bismarckian tradition (Clasen 2005: 21). Benefits are financed via contributions. Contributions and benefits are earnings-related. Therefore, inequal wages bring about inequal benefits (Alber 1982: 44f.).

In Beveridgean schemes, benefits consist of a lump sum or at least have a low ceiling (Clasen 2005: 21). In contrast to Bismarckian schemes, payments are not meant to secure standards of living, but to enable recipients to cover basic needs (Alber 1982: 45).

According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 29), welfare states differ in their "quality of social rights, social stratification, and the relationship between state, market and family". The welfare world is not to be understood as a unidimensional matter of a bigger or smaller scope of government, but as a triangular shape "like three separate "o"s" (Esping-Andersen 2003: 64), representing different regime clusters: Liberal, conservative/corporatist and social democratic. The expansion of the distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean welfare states to three worlds is a subdivision of the Beveridgean category. Each regime type´s policy is characterised by its own underlying principle: Need in the case of liberal welfare states, desert or merit in conservatives ones and citizenship in social democratic ones (Peillon 1996: 180; Taylor-Gooby 2001: 137; Gelissen 2002: 100. In the face of low intercorrelations of generosity scores, Scruggs and Allan 2006a: 68f. doubt that there are clusters).

These principles underlie the rules of eligibility to social services and welfare benefits. Together with levels of income replacement and the range of entitlements they affect the level of de-commodification (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47), which may be defined as the

> "degree to which they (social rights, *author*) permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces. It is in this sense that social rights diminish citizens´ status as 'commodities'" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 3, see also Jæger 2006b: 164).

That is, de-commodification allows citizens "to freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23). De-commodification expresses individuals´ or families´

capability to live in market-independence (Esping-Andersen 1990: 37) and, at least partially, lowers the high importance of wage labour initially caused by industrialisation (Esping-Andersen 1990: 38). Three factors determine the level of de-commodification.

Firstly, the importance of previous employment and earnings or the necessity for the applicant to prove current need. This refers to "entry" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47), meaning the conditions under which applicants may receive benefits. In the case of pensions, a certain employment history and/or a certain age may be necessary to qualify for full benefits. On the other side, "exit" or the durations of benefits affects the level of de-commodification. The sooner eligibility expires, the lower the degree of de-commodification. At first sight merely unemployment benefits might expire, since pensions are paid until death. Yet, life expectancy[13] at the age of retirement is a part of de-commodification, since it determines the length of time passing until benefits expire (partially entitlements are transferred to widows).

Secondly, benefit levels matter. The more welfare grants lie below "normal earnings of the standard of living considered adequate and acceptable in the society" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47), the lower the degree of de-commodification.

Lastly the range of areas covered by welfare policies determines the level of de-commodification (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47). As mentioned, besides sickness and disability, unemployment and old age are risks covered in all countries analysed here, so concerning the range of entitlements there is no inter-country variance.

4.1.1 Conservative welfare states

Conservative (or Corporatist or Catholic) welfare states preserve status differences (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). The level of entitlements depends on prior work and income (Esping-Andersen 1990: 48, Castles 1994: 34). This insurance-like system links payments-out to previous payments-in. The underlying principle is merit (Peillon 1996: 180).

Since benefits depend on previous contributions and the latter on market forces to which manpower has been sold, the extent of de-commodification is moderate (Esping-Andersen 1990: 52; Wintermann 2005:72) and inversely related to performance-relatedness. Goodin (2001: 13) summarises Conservative welfare states´ core characteristics (next page):

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[13]   Remaining life expectancies may be underestimated for political reasons, possibly due to calculations based on cross-section life expectancies instead of cohort life expectancies (Holzmann 2006: 244). If higher earners have a longer life expectancy at the age of 65 than lower earners and receive higher pension payments, calculations based on cross-section life expectancies lead to an underestimation of pension costs and therefore to inflated pension levels.

"a family´s welfare entitlements are based on workplace contributions that the (typically male) breadwinner and his employer have made to the social insurance scheme throughout his working life".

One key assumption is that welfare state development in these countries has been affected by religious beliefs, to varying degrees. Effects from religious beliefs to welfare policies should be similar to effects from other kinds of attitudes:

"Religious beliefs may influence policy because individuals with such beliefs behave differently from those without them, because interest groups and parties may be formed to promote such beliefs, because the views of those who are influential in policy-making may be shaped by such beliefs, or even, in quasi-corporatist mode, because the state delegates to the church the public regulation of certain spheres of social relations. Channels may involve the aggregation of individual decisions, the drafting of laws and the shaping of institutional forms – these latter, possibly, with very long-term effects, so that the impact of the religious cleavage is an historically mediated rather than a contemporary phenomenon" (Castles 1994: 20)

Resulting from Catholic and Christian democratic influences, the principle of subsidiarity demands that material support should be addressed at the right level by the right institution, possibly a low level (Taylor-Gooby 2001: 137). Families as the basic units of society are the first source of material well-being, followed by the employer and the state (Taylor-Gooby 2001: 137, Castles 1994: 22). When the families´ capacities expire and before the state steps in, churches, voluntary or social organisations could provide help. At least in theory, the state is supposed to help only if the family cannot do so sufficiently (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Due to the male-breadwinner model, female labour participation is low (also table 4.8).

Therefore, for example in the case of unemployment benefits the long duration of (high) earnings-related benefits, or generous pensions are based on the assumption that there is no second wage to rely on (for earnings-related widow pensions in conservative countries in contrast to Northern countries and divorce-induced risks for those without own pension entitlements see Holzmann 2006: 231ff.).

4.1.2   Social democratic welfare states

Here, entitlements are attached to citizenship or long-term residence (Peillon 1996: 180; Taylor-Gooby 2001: 137; 2004: 13). Ideally, everybody has the same rights, no matter the social class (Esping-Andersen 1990: 25), previous labour market position or proven need. This idea is rooted in the Beveridgean principle of universalism (Esping-Andersen 1990: 48) and leads to high de-commodification (Orloff 1993: 311, Stephens 1996: 36), since current as

well as prior labour market participation bears low influence on material well-being. Citizens are nevertheless responsible to try to be as productive as possible (Goodin 2001: 14) and government offer them opportunities to do this. This is done for example by raising women´s labour force participation by providing support for people trying to combine parenthood and paid employment (Orloff 1993: 312) or by providing jobs in the public sector. High labour force participation is crucial, since social democratic states have to keep their social problems low and their revenues high in order to finance their generosity. If the ratio between working people and dependents is high, this system can be sustained (Esping-Andersen 1990: 28).

This model´s prioritises equality (Goodin 2001: 16, Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). However, both Esping-Andersen (1990: 18) and Fritzell (1991: 21) point to some limited earnings-relatedness in the level of social benefits, which is not part of the ideal type but an empirical finding (see chapter 4.1.4 below).

4.1.3 Liberal welfare states

In these countries, "means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance plans predominate" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26) and de-commodification is low. Work is far more important than welfare (Goodin 2001: 13), so that dependents are expected to work themselves self-reliantly out of need, and government help is the last resort. Originating in the poor-law tradition, 'need' is the underlying principle and has to be proven in order to receive assistance (Esping-Andersen 1990:48, Peillon 1996: 180). The scope of government is limited. The market prevails (Taylor-Gooby 2004b: 221) since it is thought to enhance efficiency which, in turn, is highly prioritised (Goodin 2001: 16). Accordingly, poverty as well as inequality is high (Castles 2004: 178, see also figure 4.8).

4.1.4 Welfare regimes: Ideal types or empirical categories?

Concerning welfare regimes, it has to be settled if welfare regimes are

> "ideal types in the Weberian sense or […] empirical categories? While the whole idea of a neat package of institutions, actors, and distributive outcomes surely looks more like an ideal type than like a description of a complex reality, both Esping-Andersen and most of his later critics treat them rather as empirical categorizations, where the 'lack of fit' between regime type characteristics and existing welfare states becomes a troublesome issue" (Svallfors 1997: 285f.).

As understood by Arts and Gelissen (2002: 138f.), Esping-Andersen´s categories are ideal types, and in his empirical work he tries to examine whether there are countries coming close to the ideal types. Following them, Esping-Andersen´s ideal types are holistic in the Weberian sense, simplifying reality and ignoring details to depict essential characteristics. Therefore, they expect the real world to contain hybrid forms (see also Shalev 2007b: 290f.) and no pure cases, since every country is a mix of different ideal types. Also Esping-Andersen (1990: 28) states that pure cases do not exist in reality. What follows is that his selection of the countries USA, Germany and Sweden as prime examples of the three regime types represents merely a selection of vivid examples and not ideal types in the empirical sense. Therefore, Borchert (1998: 138) is on the one hand right in stating that Germany is not the most conservative case in Esping-Andersen´s study,[14] but these countries serve solely the purpose of explaining "essential features" (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 139), and for this Germany´s Bismarckian tradition makes this country a better example. This may be so because Bismarck shaped the German system, which served as a role model, even if Austria and Italy are more Bismarckian. Lastly, labelling countries as belonging to one regime type merely means a predominance of certain regime characteristics. Deviations may have two causes:

Firstly, although it is to be expected that underlying principles affect several programmes, it is possible that a country belonging to a certain regime type has an arrangement in a field of social policy which resembles a different regime. For example, in Esping-Andersen´s (1990: 50) table conservative Germany has in its pension system a degree of de-commodification lower than the liberal welfare states Japan and Switzerland and the same as the UK, although conservative welfare states´ degree of de-commodification is thought to be moderate (Esping-Andersen 1990: 52; Wintermann 2005: 72) and therefore above that of liberal states. Generosity in one policy field and the opposite in another may coexist. It will be seen if there is a strong correlation between both policy fields.

Secondly, even within systems mixes of different regime characteristics are possible. Unemployment benefits can be earnings-related and very generous at the beginning of unemployment, which is a conservative trait, but drop down to a low lump sum after a certain time span has passed, which is a liberal trait.

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[14]   According to Borchert (1998: 138), Austria is the most conservative country in Esping-Andersen´s (1990: 74) table. If one takes (in Esping-Andersen´s table; 1990: 74) the value of the regime characteristic of the regime a particular country belongs to (in the case of Austria, the conservative regime) and subtracts the values of the other characteristics (liberalism and socialism), Austria and Italy are indeed the most conservative countries (value 2), followed by Belgium (0), and France and Germany (both -2).

4.2 The classification of countries

It cannot be taken for granted that in 2008 welfare states had the same characteristics and therefore belonged to the same regimes as in 1980. The purpose of classifying countries to certain welfare regimes is on the one hand to detect effects from membership in a certain regime to welfare attitudes, although regime dummies are reductionist (Jæger 2006b: 158 also states that the use of regime dummies in previous literature is the reason for difficulties to detect regime specific attitudes). Another purpose is to bring order into the high number of countries and to interpret findings against the backdrop of an enlarged common categorisation. Differences are not clear cut enough, and too many cases populate border regions in order to expect clear effects from regime belongings on attitudes. The idea of welfare regimes has to be based on the application of overarching principles to various policy fields. Yet the correlation between benefits levels of generosity figures is weak. Here, characteristics of the 30 countries will be shown in order to analyse if there are systematic relationships between policies and attitudes. Further, against the backdrop of countries´ welfare policies and more detailed descriptions of some recent changes of their policies, empirical results will be interpreted. The classification of countries will be based on other authors´ assessments.

Esping-Andersen has classified merely 18 countries (13 of them European). Several suggestions have been brought forward to expand this classification to include countries left out or to correct alleged misclassifications. New categories have been introduced since then, e.g. an Antipodean type of "wage-earner welfare states" (Castles 1985: 102ff.; Huber/Stephens 2001b: 108), or an "East Asian welfare model" (Goodman et al. 1998: 4 are reluctant to introduce this type). Due to the limitation to European countries here, far more important is a possible "Southern cluster" (Ferrera 1996: 19, see also Castles 2004: 77) and the question, if and how the former socialist CEE countries can be classified.

Though "typologising […] is the lowest form of intellectual endeavour" and the "preserve […] of the bean counter and bookkeeper", it is "necessary perhaps, a precondition no doubt for loftier and more sophisticated pursuits" (Baldwin 1996: 29). Here, countries have to be categorised for the sake of clarity and interpretative reasons. The categorisation in five clusters comes close to the one by Palier (2006: 105); albeit with different regime names (Palier neither describes the respective models´ characteristics nor which countries belong to which regime). This categorisation is a useful compromise between the oversimplification of a lower number of regimes and the confusion resulting from a higher number.

Classifications of welfare states are necessarily to some degree arbitrary and contradicting between authors (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 140). Our classification will look roughly similar to that of Fenger (2007: 22ff.), whose classification is based on a cluster analysis and covers 23 out of the 30 countries to be analysed here (missing countries are Cyprus, Ireland, Israel, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey).

4.2.1 Replication of Esping-Andersen´s results for 11 European countries

Scruggs and Allan (2006a: 61ff.) replicated the calculation of Esping-Andersen´s de-commodification scores by using data from the same year. The de-commodification scores result from the scores from unemployment, pension and sickness benefits. The latter are not relevant here. Therefore, in contrast to Esping-Andersen´s and Scruggs and Allan´s calculations, table 4.1 will leave them out.

Table 4.1: De-commodification and benefit generosity in 1980

Esping-Andersen De-commodification					Scruggs / Allan								
					De-commodification				Benefit generosity				
Total 3 scores	2 scores (P,UE)	UE	P	Total		UE	P	Total		UE	P	Total
SE	NO	9.4	14.9	24.3	SE	9.4	17.0	26.4	SE	9.4	15.0	24.4
NO	SW	7.1	17.0	24.1	BE	10.2	13.3	23.5	BE	10.2	14.0	24.2
DK	BE	8.6	15.0	23.6	NO	9.4	13.9	23.3	NL	10.6	11.5	22.1
NL	DK	8.1	15.0	23.1	DK	8.6	13.7	22.3	CH	9.2	12.0	21.2
BE	NL	11.1	10.8	21.9	NL	10.6	11.5	22.1	NO	8.5	11.9	20.4
AT	FI	5.2	14.0	19.2	CH	9.2	12.0	21.2	DK	8.6	11.8	20.4
CH	AT	6.7	11.9	18.6	FI	4.9	14.0	18.9	US	7.4	11.3	18.7
FI	FR	6.3	12.0	18.3	CD	7.2	11.4	18.6	CD	7.2	11.4	18.6
DE	CH	8.8	9.0	17.8	FR	6.3	12.0	18.3	FR	6.3	12.0	18.3
FR	DE	7.9	8.5	16.4	NZ	5.0	13.3	18.3	NZ	5.0	13.3	18.3
JP	CD	8.0	7.7	15.7	AT	6.9	11.2	18.1	AT	6.9	11.2	18.1
IT	JP	5.0	10.5	15.5	IE	8.3	8.0	16.3	FI	4.9	13.0	17.9
UK	UK	7.2	8.5	15.7	DE	7.5	8.7	16.2	DE	7.5	8.7	16.2
IE	IE	8.3	6.7	15	UK	7.2	8.5	15.7	UK	7.2	8.5	15.7
CD	IT	5.1	9.6	14.7	IT	4.6	10.0	14.6	IE	6.9	8.3	15.2
NZ	US	7.2	7.0	14.2	US	7.4	7.0	14.4	AU	5.0	10.1	15.1
US	NZ	4.0	9.1	13.1	JP	4.5	9.4	13.9	JP	4.5	9.4	13.9
AU	AU	4.0	5.0	9.0	AU	5.0	6.0	11.0	IT	3.2	7.3	10.5

Source: (Scruggs/Allan 2006a: 61; 68). De-commodification scores for each country and programme from Scruggs/Allan 2006a: 61. Total scores (resulting from adding unemployment and pension): own calculation. Colours show welfare regimes countries are supposed to belong to in this work.

Comparing the columns, different results are apparent: Firstly, if one excludes sickness de-commodification from Esping-Andersen´s analysis, the ranking of countries changes slightly.

Secondly, the countries whose classification by Esping-Andersen is criticised by Scruggs and Allan (2006a: 61f.) are Japan, Italy, Canada and New Zealand and therefore countries not participating in ESS4.

Further, as an alternative to Esping-Andersen´s de-commodification index, Scruggs and Allan (2006a: 62ff.) offer an

> "'benefit generosity index', based on what we believe are the most accurate values for programme characteristics […] we believe that our alternative 'benefit generosity index' comes closest to estimating accurately these key welfare programme features".

For some countries and their programmes, the authors corrected what they considered shortcomings in Esping-Andersen´s analysis (in case of the ESS4- countries, the pension scores of the Scandinavian countries plus Finland, Belgium and Switzerland). In the benefit generosity index, the group with the highest scores remains the same with Scandinavia and Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The presumable liberal countries United States, Canada and New Zealand seem to be more generous than the corporatist-conservative countries as well as the UK and Ireland.

Further, Scruggs and Allan (2006b: 31) replicated and updated Esping-Andersen´s Benefit Equality Index[15], which displays "the average of the ratio of standard to maximum (post-tax) benefits for unemployment, sickness and pension insurance" (Scruggs/Allan 2006b: 18). This index displays the earnings-unrelatedness of benefits Table 4.2.[16]

Scruggs and Allan (2006a: 68f.) doubt if it is sensible to speak of clusters, since the intercorrelations between the generosity scores in the three policy fields are low (between .3 and .45). Comparing welfare spending as percentages of GDP in 23 countries and four policy fields, Castles (2009: 49ff.) comes to a similar result. Jordan (2010: 866) summarises:"Though a state´s regime type may define its overarching strategy, states often employ a variety of different approaches across the many policy areas […]".

Equality in pensions and unemployment benefits have been calculated for the years 1980/1981 and 2002. Basically, it may be expected that social democratic as well as liberal

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[15]   In addition, the authors updated Esping-Andersen´s Conservative, Liberal and Socialist Stratification Indexes. However, their Liberal Stratification Index is based on private health spending (Scruggs/Allan 2006b: 15). Since, as the authors (2006a: 68f.) mention, the intercorrelations between the three programs are low, no conclusion may be drawn from health care to the two policy programmes relevant here.

[16]   In their publication, Scruggs and Allan (2006b: 31) show the values of the three programmes merely combined, but thankfully Lyle Scruggs provided me data for each programme separately.

Table 4.2: Benefit Equality in 1980/81 and 2002

Esping-Andersen		Calculations based on data provided by Scruggs							
UE / P / SICK		UE equality				P equality			
1980		1980/81		2002		1980/81		2002	
AU	1.00	AU	1.00	AU	1.00	AU	1.00	AU	1.00
NZ	1.00	NZ	1.00	NZ	1.00	NZ	1.00	NZ	1.00
DK	0.99	DK	1.00	DK	1.00	DK	1.00	DK	1.00
SE	0.82	SE	1.00	SE	1.00	NL	1.00	NL	1.00
BE	0.79	BE	1.00	BE	1.00	IE	1.00	IE	1.00
IE	0.77	FI	1.00	IE	1.00	CD	1.00	CD	0.94
FI	0.72	UK	1.00	UK	1.00	UK	0.96	CH	0.91
NO	0.69	CD	1.00	US	1.00	US	0.88	UK	0.81
UK	0.64	IT	1.00	CD	1.00	CH	0.88	AT	0.77
NL	0.57	US	1.00	NO	0.95	FR	0.87	SE	0.75
DE	0.56	AT	0.90	JP	0.94	BE	0.86	US	0.74
FR	0.55	NL	0.85	IT	0.79	DE	0.76	DE	0.72
AT	0.52	IE	0.81	NL	0.76	JP	0.68	NO	0.66
IT	0.52	CH	0.80	AT	0.71	AT	0.67	FR	0.66
CD	0.48	JP	0.76	DE	0.67	SE	0.66	JP	0.65
CH	0.48	DE	0.71	CH	0.63	NO	0.63	BE	n.a.
JP	0.32	NO	0.63	FR	0.24	FI	infinite	FI	infinite
US	0.22	FR	0.33	FI	infinite	IT	infinite	IT	infinite

Calculations based on data provided by Scruggs.
Ratio of standard to maximum benefit for unemployment, sickness and pension insurance (Scruggs/Allan 2006b: 18): The higher the score, the more equal and the less earnings-related are the payments.
Left column: Ireland has a medium score on conservatism and low scores on liberalism and socialism The UK has medium scores on liberalism and socialism and a low score on conservatism (Esping-Andersen 1990: 74).

countries display high equality (on a high and low level), while in conservative countries benefits are unequal.

Before the position of the countries will be discussed, several relevant findings should be noted. Intercorrelations between policy fields are low here, too. In 1980, equality in pensions and in unemployment benefits correlated with .33, in 2002 with .35, both times insignificant. In contrast, in the longitudinal comparison equality in unemployment benefits in 1980 and 2002 correlate with .77 and in the case of pensions with .82, in both cases highly significant. Therefore, at least based on this data the assumption that underlying principles get applied across several fields of welfare polices cannot be sustained. Though, the assumption of path dependence can be supported. Further, in 1980 the correlation between Esping-Andersen´s numbers for all three fields and those for unemployment and pension benefits based on Scruggs´ data is at .38 and not significant, whereas in 2002 it is at .49 and significant at least at the 10 percent - level. Therefore, with calculations based on Scruggs´ data Esping-

Andersen´s classification can be criticised more in 1980 than in 2002. This result reminds of Borcherts´s classification (chapter 4.6), which is coherent with Esping-Andersen´s classification not so much in 1980 but more so decades later.

The classification of countries into various regimes in Table 4.2 follows the categorisation below. Regarding the 12 countries included in both, Esping-Andersen´s analysis and ESS4, several findings for 2002 are apparent:

In the case of pensions, regime patterns can be detected, too. The conservative countries Germany and France are in the bottom half of the table. A social democratic outlier is Norway, whose earnings-relatedness is on conservative levels. As with unemployment compensation, Finland cannot be interpreted since there is no ceiling, but decreasing returns. Taken together, the distinction between the earnings-related conservative regime and the other two regimes is not as clear-cut as in the case of unemployment benefits, but clearly visible.

Belgium is the only conservative country with high unemployment benefit equality. The most conservative countries in Esping-Andersen´s analysis, Austria and Germany, as well as conservative France display high inequality and therefore earnings-relatedness. Finland´s value cannot be interpreted (no ceiling but decreasing returns). The Netherlands´ earnings-relatedness in unemployment benefits has been rather on conservative levels already in 1980 and still in 2002. Developments between 1980 and 2002 confirm Esping-Andersen´s classification: The bottom group consisting of Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands remains in 2002. The same can be said about the top group (Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Ireland). The mean values (Table 4.3) reveal that conservative countries´ unemployment benefits are indeed the most unequal (and therefore earnings-related):

Table 4.3: Benefit Equality in Pensions, 2002 (regime means)

Regime Type	Countries	Mean
Liberal	Ireland, UK	0.91
Social Democratic	Sweden, Norway, Denmark (Finland not included because infinite)	0.80
Conservative	Germany, France	0.69

Based on Table 4.2

Table 4.4: Benefit Equality in Unemployment Benefits, 2002 (regime means)

Regime Type	Countries	Mean
Liberal	Ireland, UK	1.00
Social Democratic	Denmark, Norway, Sweden (Finland not included because infinite)	0.98
Conservative	Belgium, Germany, France	0.64

Based on Table 4.2

Since looking at earnings-relatedness merely offers a crucial distinction between conservative countries and those belonging to other regimes, to depict the difference between social democratic and liberal countries, overall generosity has to be taken into account. Table 4.5 shows that in social democratic countries replacement rates are not higher than in conservative countries, but European liberal countries offer low rates.

Table 4.5: Social insurance replacement rates in 2002

	Unemployment Insurance	Old-age pension (minimum)	Old-age pension (standard)
Italy	52	40	86
Austria	61	53	76
Belgium	63	38	72
Sweden	76	38	59
Norway	69	55	63
Canada	68	49	61
Germany	66	20	62
United States	57	39	71
Finland	62	39	63
France	70	54	55
Netherlands	73	52	52
Switzerland	77	31	48
Denmark	63	51	58
Japan	61	32	60
United Kingdom	37	37	57
Ireland	44	40	46
Australia	48	39	39
New Zealand	42	49	27

Source: Scruggs 2006:354. Countries in descending order according to unemployment insurance and standard pension total values.

Several findings are apparent (Table 4.6, next page): Conservative countries offer generous standard pensions[17] (calculated for a person who had a full working career), but not so in their minimum pensions. This clearly reflects their high earnings-relatedness. Further, liberal countries are the least generous.

Scruggs and Allan (2006a: 68f.) doubt the sensefulness of the term 'regimes', in the face of low correlations between policy fields. Here, using a larger number of countries and data more up to date, it will be re-tested if generosity and earnings-relatedness are underlying principles getting applied in various policy fields, or if different rules apply.

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[17]   Standard pension replacement rates are based on full working careers.

Table 4.6: Social insurance replacement rates (regime means)

Unemployment Insurance		
Social Democratic	Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden	68
Conservative	Belgium, Germany, France	66
Liberal	Ireland, UK	41
Old-age pension (minimum)		
Social Democratic	Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden	46
Conservative	Belgium, Germany, France	37
Liberal	Ireland, UK	39
Old-age pension (standard)		
Social Democratic	Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden	61
Conservative	Belgium, Germany, France	63
Liberal	Ireland, UK, Switzerland	52

Calculations based on (Scruggs 2006:354)

4.2.2 Quantifications of welfare policies

For empirical analyses in chapters 7.1 (macro effects on attitudes) and 10 (effects of cabinet ideology on welfare policies) macro data provided by various sources will be used (see also appendix A2). These sources are the European Commission´s Indicator Sub-Group (ISG) of the Social Protection Committee, Eurostat, the OECD or authors like Whitehouse (or the World Bank), Scruggs and Allan or Esping-Andersen. Whitehouse, for example, shows net pension levels as percentage of average net earnings. As he (2007: 27) notes:

> "The relative pension level is best seen as an indicator of pension adequacy since it shows what benefit level a pensioner will receive in relation to the average[18] wage earner in the respective country"

Welfare policy data have shortcomings. For example, the ISG´s pension figures are partially based on a 40-year working career (age 25 to 65), so that "the replacement rate results are sensitive to the career-length assumption" (ISG 2009a: 5). In Belgium for a full pension 45 working years are needed, so the assumption of 40 working years reduces the shown

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[18]   It is not clear if Whitehouse refers to the mean or the median wage earner, yet it seems that the former is meant. In this case, very high wages could distort the picture, since they boost the mean value and would have had only minor effects on the median value. Therefore, the use of the mean may make pensions look lower than they were if the median, the common measure of household income, would have been used.

replacement rate below the replacement rate that applies for Belgians who worked for 45 years as assumed by the system (ISG 2009a: 6f.). The assumption of a long and uninterrupted working career becomes increasingly unrealistic even in the case of men, since in young age entry into the labour market is more difficult and in higher age early retirement cuts years off the working career. Further, more employment is part-time and unemployment occurs more often (Grimshaw/Rubery1997: 292). A similar problem is to be found in unemployment replacement rates. If "the worker receiving the benefit is assumed to be 40 years old, with 20 years of social insurance contributions" (Scruggs 2007a: 143), replacement rates calculated for countries with a high share of unemployed not fulfilling these criteria get overestimated.

The use of such kinds of data is contestable. For the vase of the OECD, de Deken and Kittel (2007: 73) state:

> "[…] the statistical department itself admits that some aspects are simply too complex to be represented in a consistent accounting edifice. It may well be true that the Social Expenditure Database is the best we can hope to obtain. But are the best data available good enough for drawing conclusions about the direction and size of welfare state change, or – more modestly – about the direction and size of social expenditures in general and old-age pensions in particular? After scrutinizing the Social Expenditure Database and comparing it to the European System of integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS), a database published by the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), we tend toward the conclusion that this question has to be answered to the negative".

De Deken and Kittel (2007: 74ff.) cite several sources of error: Quality of data and differences between various operationalisations, e.g. resulting from the definition of the *public* programmes and spending: "The two methods (Eurostat´s and the OECD´s, *author*) of calculating seem to result in quite different assessments of cross-national social expenditure efforts." (2007: 74, see also Caminada/Goudswaard 2009: 8 and Martin 1996: 107ff.). Further, de Deken and Kittel (2007: 75) refer to private social expenditures, which are not directly controlled by the state but also not sold at market prices. From a different angle, Green-Pedersen (2007: 19) asks how "benefits levels, eligibility rules and benefit duration" can be summarised. Siegel (2007: 56) states that in multivariate models analysing determinants of expenditures, changes in benefits conditionality are left unregarded, since for the latter there are no comparable figures.

In sum, macro welfare policy data are mere approximations to what welfare states do.

Earnings-relatedness increases replacement rates

Korpi and Palme (1998: 661ff.) argue that there is a trade-off between redistribution per monetary unit spent and budget size. The reason is that citizens are more in favour of high spending if they consider accumulated payments as personal savings which the get back when they retire, rather than a public budget spent equally. This is plausible since also entitlements in pay-as-you-go-schemes are substitutes for private savings (Danziger et al. 1981: 999).

Korpi and Palme (1998: 672) state that "*final redistribution* is a function of degree of *low-income targeting* x *redistributive budget* size […] we can expect a trade-off between the degree of low-income targeting and the size of the redistributive budget" (emphases in original). Though flat-rate pensions are not the same as targeted pensions, since in the former everybody above a certain age receives a lump sum and not merely those whose other income source are insufficient, a similar logic applies: Higher-income groups may be unwilling to pay high taxes (or contributions) in order to finance a pension system with flat-rate benefits, and be more willing to pay into earnings-related schemes. Therefore, a trade-off exists: Flat-rate schemes will have low benefit levels, since significant parts of the electorate are unwilling to pay for them. This is reinforced by the fact that due to different turnout levels in different social strata, the median voter is more affluent than the median adult.

There is a strong relationship between earnings-relatedness (ratio between pensions for high earners and for lower earners or replacement rates of high and low earners) and replacement rates (mean of various income levels in the case of pensions, figures 4.1 and 4.2).

Figure 4.1: Relationship between earnings-relatedness and pension level

Pearson´s r .6, significant at the 5 percent-level. Figures from Whitehouse 2007: 57ff., ratio: Own calculation

Figure 4.2: Relationship between unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness and replacement rate

Pearson´s r .38, significant at 10 percent-level. United Kingdom and Ireland have the same values on both dimensions. Replacement rates: 3 wage levels, 6 family types, initial and long-term unemployment. Earnings-relatedness: Replacement rates 150 percent / 67 percent of average earnings

4.2.3 Overarching principles applied to both policy fields

Figure 4.3: Relationship between pension and unemployment benefit replacement rates

Pearson´s r .09. Data sources: Pension replacement rate: Eurostat. Unemployment replacement rate: OECD (mean of 3 wage levels, 6 family types, initial and long-term).

Figure 4.4: Relationship between pension and unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness

Analogous to the results from Scruggs (above), data here does not support the view that overarching principles of generosity and earnings-relatedness correlate between both cash benefits policy fields (Fig. 4.3 and 4.4). This can be one reasons why it is partially hard to classify countries, since this strongly depends on the perspective.

4.3 Welfare policies and developments in 30 countries

Countries and their pension and unemployment schemes will be depicted. The order of countries is determined by the welfare regimes they are supposed to belong to.

For reasons depicted above, replacement rate levels and ratios cannot catch programmes´ complexity. In many instances, besides the current state of affairs also recent developments, sometimes decade-long, will be shown, if significant changes occurred. Policies´ effects on attitudes are time-lagged, so that explanations based on current states of affairs or the immediate past are incomplete (Rueschemeyer/Stephens 1997: 57):[19]

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[19]   For "asymmetrical forms of causation" Lieberson (1985: 63) states that the assumption that a certain X value (say, 20) will have the same effect on Y regardless of its prior value (10 or 30) may be wrong. In this case, if X moves from 20 to 30 and back, it will have the same effect on Y as before. In contrast to this symmetrical form of causation, in the asymmetrical form reversibility is not given. There are various forms of irreversibility: Firstly, if a move of X from 20 to 30 causes Y to move from 20 to 30, a drop of X to 20 again may leave Y at 30. This is pure irreversibility. Further, there are two cases of partial irreversibility. X may drop to 25, or even to 10. We can give welfare state examples here: If welfare spending rises, people may get accustomed to their higher benefits and consider them normatively desirable. If their benefits drop back to their original level, they may still maintain their high expectations. This may happen possibly due to a psychological mechanism under which people (1) adjust their expectations to reality but (2) are completely unwilling to lower expectations, since this may be considered a step backwards, or losses. The second case, a drop of Y to 25, may happen under partial unwillingness to lower expectations, but some influence from real circumstances. While both cases result form too weak reactions to the second change of circumstances, the last case, a drop to 10, could result from the

> "What we advocate […] aims for an understanding of the case/country as a whole in order to facilitate detecting how social and historical factors combine in contingent ways to shape a given outcome" (Rueschemeyer/Stephens 1997: 57).

Here, this outcome is attitudes.

4.3.1 Conservative welfare states

According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 74), conservative welfare states are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. The same countries (and Luxembourg) are termed "Continental" by Jehoul-Gijsbers and Vrooman (2008: 13). In Maître et al.´s (2005: 158) and Borchert´s (1998: 166f.) categorisations, France is missing, yet the categorisation of mentioned countries as conservative is supported. While Arts and Gelissen (2001: 290) restrict this type to the "pure" cases France and Germany and categorise Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands as social-democratic hybrids, primarily the Dutch case is problematic and will be found among the uncategorised countries. Besides the same countries as Esping-Andersen, Taylor-Gooby (2004: 137) also includes Switzerland, since it contains Bismarckian elements (2004: 215), which will be left uncategorised here. Further, Taylor-Gooby includes Spain, here categorised as 'Southern'. A more extensive conservative group is presented by Iversen and Stephens (2008: 616), also incorporating Switzerland and the Netherlands.

Pensions

Ideally, benefits are highly earnings-related (for Germany see Bean/Papadakis 1998: 216), which results in higher expenses than in countries with flat-rate or means-tested benefits (see Fig. 4.1 and 4.2 above; these higher expenses [see also Ederveer/de Mooij 2003: 25] bring along corporatist states´ fiscal problems [Castles 2004: 138] because taxes have to fill in contribution gaps). According to Esping-Andersen (1996a: 18) conservative or continental European welfare states´ social security expenditures are „inordinately biased towards pensions", which also applies to Southern welfare states (Ederveer/de Mooij 2003: 25). This cannot be supported with Fig. 4.3.

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opposite. A rise of benefits (X) to 30 could result in higher expectations (Y) of 30. The downsizing to 20 under the justification that generous welfare benefits are harmful for economic development and that in the long run absolute poverty would be lower with welfare benefits at a lower level could send signals to the population that retrenchment´s negative effects on absolute poverty are linear, so that an X value of 10 may be preferred to an X value of 20. As Ebbinghaus (2005b: 139) points out, asymmetrical causation comes close to a path dependent argumentation.

In conservative countries in the late 1990s private pensions accounted for only a negligible part, in contrast to liberal countries and the Netherlands (Miles/Timmermann 1999: 256). In order to reduce the number of job-seeking people conservative countries enable their workers to retire early to (Schwartz 2001: 26), which is also an argument of the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy'.

In Belgium, pensions are earnings-related, whereas the replacement rate has been at about 75 percent after a full working life (de Callatay/Turtelboom 1996: 5ff.), yet this is applies to households; single persons´ replacement rate is at 60 percent (Desmet et al. 2007: 46). Though lifetime earnings are taken into account, for periods of unemployment earnings before unemployment are the calculation basis of entitlements (Fisher and Keuschnigg 2011: 3ff. state that pension entitlements for unemployment periods prolong job search and raise unemployment). Additional income can be derived from private- non-compulsory pension schemes, yet this pillar is still unimportant (Desmet et al. 2007: 46). Those with insufficient entitlements receive means-tested old-age income (Pestieau/Stijns 1999: 46f.). Compared to other OECD countries, the level of minimum assistance is high (Whiteford/Whitehouse 2006: 86). Taken together, the system is generous, so that at least in 1999 Pestieau and Stijns (1999: 64) could state that pensioners are well-off, even compared to other age groups. Newer reforms social-democratised the scheme by strengthening redistribution and weakening earnings-relatedness (Natali 2004: 356f.).

Besides the 'normal' demographic developments, the German system has been additionaly burdened by reunification, partially because eastern German women had high entitlements due to their high labour market participation rate in the GDR and post-transition employment levels were low (Schludi 2005: 135, see also Haverland 2001: 318 and Schmähl 2003: 11), so that contributions were insufficient (Haverland 2001: 318, see also Schmähl 2003: 11).

Eastern German pensions were raised strongly from 1990 until 1995. A possible solution to financing problems would have been not to extend the Western German system to Eastern Germany, but to reform and retrench the system (Wiesenthal 2003: 48).

Benefits are earnings-related; after a full working life a worker has a replacement rate of about 60 percent (Schludi 2005: 129). The system is strongly Bismarckian (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 102), redistribution between income classes is small (Börsch-Supan 2001: 162). Benefits are ceiled, so that the maximum is twice as high as the minimum benefit (Opielka 2004: 10). Several reforms have helped to contain costs, and financial incentives for

savings in private pensions have been introduced. Notwithstanding, the German scheme covers about a quarter from the federal budget (Bundesregierung 2011). This share has developed in a U-shaped manner, with a low point of 17 percent in the early 1990s and high points in the late 1950s and today (Veil 2004: 61, Deutsche Rentenversicherung 2011).

The reforms of the early 1990s left the replacement rate of the 'fictitious standard pensioner' at 70 percent; in the late 1990s the introduction of the 'demographic factor' lowered it to 64 percent (Schludi 2005: 132ff.). The reform of 2001 offset the 'demographic factor', so that the standard level has been at 67 percent, yet introduced other cuts which should curtail the rise of contributions (Schludi 2005: 156). A 'revenue oriented expenditure policy' has been introduced, so that the contribution rate should determine pension levels rather than vice versa (Schmähl 2003: 12). Therefore, the replacement rate should decline to 64 percent in 2030 (Bonoli 2003: 405), whereas this includes private pensions, whose replacement rates are dependent on rates of return (Veil 2004: 71). Due to the 2004 reform, the average level will drop from nearly 50 percent in 2005 to 40 percent of *gross* wages in 2040; a gap supposed to be filled with private pensions, subsidised by government. These subsidies consist of direct subsidies, advantaging lower income groups: "The reverse is the case for the tax-deductible special allowances, due to the progressive tax system", resulting in a"U-shaped relation between subsidies and income" (Börsch-Supan/Wilke 2005: 252f.). Changes in replacement rates will be slow and affect mainly those who will retire in the far future. Private pensions are not compulsory, supporting Tálos´s (2004: 220ff.) assessment of these developments as shift away from the principle of income maintenance. In this respect, the system has been liberalised (see also Stoy 2013, forthcoming, summarising five major reforms since 1989. Main goals were contribution rate stability and cost containment).

French pensions are earnings-related and supplemented by means-tested elements for those whose earnings were not high or long enough (the number of pensioners who have to rely on these benefits declines due to higher benefits from other systems and a higher female labour market participation rate, cf. Legendre/Pelé 2001: 142). The replacement rate for an average worker is at about 70 percent, although the rate may be lower if the pay-as-you-go system´s revenues are too low (Schludi 2005: 191f.). Due to considerable rises in previous decades, pensions are generous so that the gap in the standard of living between the retired and active labour markets participants narrowed (Legendre/Pelé 2001: 151).

The link between contributions/earnings and benefits is stronger since reforms in the 1990s. For example, the average salary of the best 25 instead of the best 10 years will be the

basis of benefit calculation, the number of years for full eligibility has been raised from 37.5 to 40 years, and indexation has been switched from gross wages to prices, which will reduce benefits (Bonoli 2001: 257, Blanchet 2005: 245ff.). Replacement rates of private sector workers will gradually decline from 68 percent (blue collar) and 59 percent (white collar) in 1996 to 51 percent (blue collar) and 38 percent (white collar) in 2040 (Schludi 2005: 205). Reforms after 2003 under PM Raffarin also lowered pensions of public employees (Schludi 2005: 218). Nevertheless, France´s system underwent comparatively minor reform, so that contributions had to rise, since costs contributed to government deficit and endangered the achievement of the Maastricht goals (Schludi 2005: 194ff.). The French scheme has to cover a significant part (20 percent) of its expenses from the general government budget. In contrast to Germany, such subsidies are a new development (Veil 2004: 59ff.).

Unemployment benefits

Ideally, conservative welfare states reduced unemployment by diminishing the number of people available for the labour market (Iversen and Wren 1998: 514; cf. Pierson 2001: 86). Unemployment benefits are earnings-related, though after a certain time of unemployment they may drop to lower flat-rate and partly means-tested benefits.

Belgian replacement rates were at 60 percent of previous gross earnings, cohabitants without dependants got 55 percent (Schömann et al. 2000, appendix). This had to be taxed (Schmid 1995: 64). Remarkably, these benefits´ duration was unlimited, yet could be regressive or even stopped being paid out after long duration for cohabitants without dependents (Schömann et al. 2000, appendix).

As with pensions, in Germany the western system has been transferred to the former GDR. Wiesenthal (2003: 49) criticises that the higher replacement rates were a product of the early 1970s, when most families had only one earner, whose unemployment had to be compensated by high replacement rates. Resulting from socialist employment policies, in the 1990s Eastern Germany had not the male breadwinner model (and also in the western part female labour market participation rates had risen markedly since the early 1970s), which led to overtly high generosity and situations in which in families high benefits were added to a normal salary. Yet, because high unemployment benefits were important to numerous eastern Germans, vote-seeking political actors avoided cuts (Wiesenthal 2003: 49). Additionally, different

majorities in both parliamentary chambers prior to the 1998 election blocked reform (Schmidt 2002: 183). According to Clasen et al. (2001: 218), benefits are highly conditional upon previous contributions and became more so during the early 1980s.

With a replacement rate of 68 percent of previous net wage (the reference to the net wage is a German peculiarity) and a high ceiling (Schmid 1995: 64, see also Opielka 2004: 14), German unemployment compensation has been generous. This scheme covers all employees except public officials, since they are irredeemable (Opielka 2004: 13). Replacement rates for those receiving earnings-related benefits were left unchanged in the last few decades (Clasen/Clegg 2006a: 538). Those not eligible to contributory benefits received flat-rate benefits (Schmid 1995: 70), which was combined into one means-tested scheme for all. The new dualism divides between about one half getting earnings-related and the other half the means-tested benefits (Clasen/Clegg 2006a: 538); the share of unemployed receiving means-tested benefits rose (Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 202).

In sum, in Germany (and in France) compensation follows insurance principles with contributions determining benefits (Schmid 1995: 70), yet due to reforms means-tested benefits begin sooner than in the past, which is a move towards the liberal 'need' principle (Clasen/van Oorschoot 2002: 103f.).

Lastly, Germany defined (and probably still defines) itself as 'work society', basing its affluence on skill and diligence (Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2002: 75, 80). Following, increasing blame has been laid on the unemployed from the political arena in the 1980s and even more so the 1990s (Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2002: 87). This could lead to low support for government responsibility for the unemployment in Germany.

French benefits are strongly earnings-related due to the highest ceilings in Europe (Clasen/Clegg 2006a: 536). Ughetto and Bouget (2002: 104) state that French social policies reflect several doctrines, but in the unemployment scheme (as well as the public pension scheme) the Bismarckian doctrine prevails.

In order to raise work incentives, benefits were reduced in the 1980s and 1990s (Ughetto/Bouget 2002: 95). In 2000, unemployed got 44 percent of their previous wage plus a lump sum or 57.4 percent of their wage (Schömann et al. 2000, appendix).

Eastern and Western Germany in attitude studies

Since western institutions were imposed on the east after reunification (Svallfors 2010: 121), Eastern Germany has not been depicted separately above. Besides the fact that unemployment

has been after reunification and still is considerably more widespread in the former GDR (for a short depiction of the reasons and reference to more detailed literature, see Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2002: 84), Eastern Germany´s socialist legacy may still have attitudinal consequences. Svallfors (2010: 121) describes Eastern Germany´s development as an interesting natural experiment:

> "Take a country, invade it, split it into two parts, impose foreign political institutions with completely new rules in one part of the country (the East), but leave a substantial institutional continuity in the other (the West). Let things take their course for several decades, then suddenly reunite the two parts, with existing institutions in the West now imposed in the East. Check how things differ between the East and the West immediately after reunification, and follow what happens as time passes".

Svallfors (2010: 124) summarises previous comparisons between both parts and states that they found mainly similarities "in basic conception of social justice", but more egalitarian views in Eastern Germany when it comes to redistribution. Svallfors (2010: 125ff.) analysed ISSP data (1990-2006) by using an index containing various variables. In 1990, Eastern Germans so strongly supported government responsibility that their attitudes differed markedly from Western Germans´ attitudes. This supports what Gabriel (2000: 23) stated for Eastern Germans´ experience with democracy: Although they received information about Western Germany from personal contacts and western TV (and GDR media), this kind of information cannot substitute for direct experiences (in our case, with market economy).

In 2006, due to declining support for government responsibility in the former GDR, both parts of Germany were closer. In 2006, differences between both parts were to be found mainly in the cohort of those born before 1975. Those eastern Germans born from 1975 onwards differed only slightly from their Western contemporaries in their support for government responsibility. Although also those eastern Germans born before 1950 became less supportive of governmental responsibility, the main cause of eastern Germans´ westernisation lies in generational replacement (Svallfors 2010: 128f.). Contrastingly, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007: 1508) estimate that about one third of the move towards convergence is caused by generational replacement, and two thirds by intra-person changes. Though, also in their (2007: 1512) analysis based on the German Socioeconomic Panel from the years 1997 and 2002 Eastern Germans show declining support for generous welfare policies. In contrast to Eastern Germans´ attitudes, Western Germans display neither inter-cohort nor inter-time changes (Svallfors 2010: 129). Svallfors (2010: 131) considers the 'normative adjustment' argument supported by his results.

4.3.2 Social democratic welfare states

According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 74), social democratic welfare states are Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The categorisation of the Scandinavian countries and Finland as social-democratic is unambiguous (Jehoul-Gijsbers/Vrooman 2008: 13; Maître et al. 2005: 158; Castles 2004: 77; Bonoli 1997: 361; Arts/Gelissen 2001: 290). On the other hand, Borchert (1998: 166f.) sees the end of the social democratic path, since developments there could not be understood as mere adaptations to new circumstances (for Sweden, see also Jochem 2010: 243). Rather, with weakening labour power Denmark and Sweden merge into a lib-lab model, while Norway, separate because of non-EU-membership and oil revenues, also changes. The opposite stance is taken by Heikkilä et al. (1999: 266f.) claiming that universalism and equality, basic social-democratic features, are still characteristic of these countries, since cuts were small. Yet, unemployment schemes were stronger affected by changes.

With the exception of Norway, Nordic welfare states became less generous in the 1990s. Although the basic structure has been left unchanged, remarkable changes took place in Denmark, Sweden and Finland (Kuhnle 2000: 116). This may be due to increasing crisis symptoms hitting Northern countries in the early 1990s (Wintermann 2005: 82, Stephens 1996: 32), especially Finland with its high dependency on Soviet trade which rapidly declined during this period (Stephens 1996: 53, see also Ollus/Simola 2006: 16). For Sweden, Denmark and Finland, Clasen and van Oorschot (2002: 109) conclude that Bismarckian elements have been strengthened in both policy fields.

Pensions

Though social democratic countries had flat-rate pension benefits in the post-war decades, elements of earnings-relatedness were introduced. Therefore, their pensions systems are Beveridgean/Bismarckian hybrids (Castles 2004: 130).

In Denmark, a shift from universalism to individual responsibility took place. Cox (2001: 463ff.) terms Denmark (and the Netherlands) "model cases of welfare reform in Western Europe", for Denmark Goul Andersen (2002: 156) states that "significant (although most incremental) path breaking was possible". Further, income inequality rose strongly between 1981 and 1994 (Caminada/Goudswaars 2009: 6).

From the early 1980s onward the unemployment scheme has undergone cutbacks which Green-Pedersen (2001: 971f.) estimates to amount to about one third of the previous level. The same applies to the early retirement scheme, but not to the regular one. These findings do not square with other evaluations of the Danish welfare state. For example, Jochem (2004: 241) cites Green-Pedersen stating that between 1982 and 1993 right governments expanded and social-democratised the Danish welfare state.

Denmark introduced universal pensions in the post-war period, which became unsatisfying to higher income groups. In contrast to Sweden, until 1980 in Denmark no noteworthy earnings-related elements were introduced (Green-Pedersen/Lindbom 2006: 248ff.); partially because flat-rate benefits were higher and possibly therefore even more 'social-democratic' (Goul Andersen/Larsen 2002: 8f.). After long debates during the 1980s involving Denmark´s powerful unions, in the end earnings-related occupational pensions were introduced which now cover nearly all Danish wage earners (Green-Pedersen/Lindbom 2006: 254). Since Bismarckian elements gained ground in the last decades (Ebbinghaus/Schulze 2007: 276), Denmark combines Bismarckian with Beveridgean elements (Werding 2003: 12), and basic pensions will play a more limited role in the future (Goul Andersen/Larsen 2002: 15). Therefore, pensions have become more earnings-related, but as in Switzerland and the Netherlands, the earnings-related part is placed in the market (Myles/Pierson 2001: 317).

The Finnish system consists of the national pension and employment-related pensions. The national part is a substitute if entitlements to employment-and earnings-related pensions are insufficient. A growing number of Finns are receiving full retirement benefits from the employment pension: The higher the benefits from the earnings-related part, the lower the national pension supplement, up to the point where benefits stem fully from the former. Earnings-related pensions have no upper ceiling (Hinrichs/Kangas 2003: 582ff.), so that Korpi and Palme place Finland among the countries with the highest maximum pensions, alongside the conservative or Southern countries Germany, Austria and Italy. Already Esping-Andersen saw a "possible inclusion" (1990: 86) of Finland to these countries with their Bismarckian schemes (see also Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 108). Hinrichs and Kangas (2003: 582) conclude Finnish pensions are largely based on prior work: In 2000, less than one fifth of retirement benefits came from national pensions (down from two thirds in 1960/1965), and this number is expected to decline further.

Due to oil revenues, Norway could shift from a pay-as-you-go system to a funded system without double-burdening its wage earners. By doing so oil revenues could be used without boosting and overheating the economy, since payments from the oil fund to the pension fund were not available to the population (Green-Pedersen/Lindbom 2006: 255).

Earnings-related pensions were introduced in 1966 (Ervik 2001: 5). Replacement rates are high, on average at about two thirds of previous income for an industrial worker; yet the replacement rate is inversely related to previous income. Earnings-relatedness has been further weakened by new legislation (Ervik 2001: 46). Additionally, minimum pensions have been increased in 1998 (Ervik 2001: 16), a rise stronger than that of industrial worker wage (Ervik 2001: 46). The Norwegian system may still be considered social democratic, although private pensions play an increasing role (Ervik 2001: 52).

Sweden´s public pension scheme will be transformed from "a defined benefit to a defined contribution scheme" (Schludi 2005: 91, see also Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 108).

Already in 1960, earnings-related elements have been introduced. Before the reform of 1998, Swedish pensions rested on a flat-rate pillar to prevent old age poverty and supplementary earnings-related occupation-based benefits (Sundén 2006: 134f.). The average replacement rate was "quite generous" (Sundén 2006: 135) compared to the OECD average. From 1980 until 1998, replacement rates remained high (Lindbom 2001: 177).

The late 1990s saw benefit cuts and increased earnings-relatedness (Schludi 2005: 93ff.). Now, lifetime income determines benefit levels (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 8), though basic security for low earners is still provided (Schludi 2005: 97, Jochem 2010: 239). Congruently, Schludi (2005: 99), terms the Swedish system "Bismarckian", Werding (2003: 13) states it is even more Bismarckian than the German scheme.

Profound restructuring legislation became effective in 2001. Now the individual pension level is calculated on the basis of life time contributions (instead of the best 15 years; yet) and the projected life expectancy of one´s birth cohort (Hort 2004: 182ff.). Further, indexation switched from earnings growth to (lower) economic growth (Jochem 2004: 248, 2010: 239). The basic pension is supplemented by an additional compulsory earnings-related pension. As in other countries, there are tax incentives to invest in the private part; though, this pillar is relatively irrelevant in Sweden (Hort 2004: 171ff.). The new regulation applies only to those born from 1954 onwards. For those born before, a combination of the old and new regulation applies (Hort 2004: 184). Also by taking lifetime earnings into account instead of the best 15 years (Whiteford/Whitehouse 2006: 91), the system became more earnings-

related and less generous (Sundén 2006: 144), while the latter statement, as Sundén notes, is a vague projection, since this depends on contributions and the interest they gain.

In sum, the Swedish system became less de-commodifying, less redistributive (Lindbom/Rothstein 2004: 19f.) and more Bismarckian (see also Natali 2004: 369).

Summarising, except Norway all social democratic countries underwent pension Bismarckisation. Combining developments shown here and figures above, one may doubt that in the case of pensions there still is any significant difference between social democratic and conservative countries. Yet, since attitudes may be time-lagged, past policies may still leave their marks on current attitudes.

Unemployment benefits

All four Northern countries have earnings-related schemes, whereas replacement rates have been rather high in Denmark, Finland and, especially, Sweden (Clasen et al. 2001: 207, Norway discussed). In all countries, benefits are ceiled, so that replacement rates are lower for higher earners; this applies especially to Sweden (Aaberge et al. 2000: 85). In all countries, replacement rates have slightly declined between 1995 and 2000 (Abrahamson 2003: 37).

Aaberge et al. (2000: 85) indicate that among the four Northern countries Denmark is the most generous in terms of unemployment benefits, with a replacement rate for low earners of 90 percent (this view is supported by Hammer 1999: 125). Though this contradicts the statement below that Sweden has the highest replacement rate, it seems that Denmark and Sweden are the most generous. Denmark cut replacement rates and tightened eligibility criteria in the 1990s, reacting to high unemployment (Stephens 1996: 54, Goul Andersen 2002: 143, 159). Nevertheless, the scheme is still highly generous (Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 200, for cuts in eligibility duration with ongoing high replacement rates for those still eligible see also Kenworthy 2003: 1201). Combined with employment protection roughly as weak as in the UK (Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 42), Denmark allows its workers to be laid off easily while protecting them during unemployment and raising their chances to find new employment, since barriers to becoming a labour market insider again are as low as becoming an outsider in the first place ('flexicurity', cf. Goul Andersen 2002: 143). Adjustments to changing demand and supply of labour are fast. Many Danish workers experience short-term unemployment at some time (Goul Andersen 2002: 146ff.).

Finland has the North´s least generous unemployment scheme. Mean replacement rates are at about 50 percent. In contrast to pensions, unemployment benefits are ceiled (Aaberge et al. 2000: 85; but Ervasti 2002: 187 states that there is no upper limit). Most insurance funds are run by unions (Ervasti 2002: 187). Union membership fees cover only a very small part of unemployment benefit costs. The rest is paid for by government and mandatory insurance contributions (Böckerman/Uusitalo 2006: 6f.). A new scheme provides earnings-related benefits without union membership. Earnings-relatedness is stronger than in Sweden and Denmark (Ervasti 2002: 187). Those not covered by earnings-related benefits receive lower flat-rate benefits (Böckerman/Uusitalo 2006: 2ff.). Summarising developments in the three core welfare programmes, Abrahamson (2003: 13) concludes that Finland became less Scandinavian and more Continental.

The finding that Finland is the least generous Northern country is also supported by Kvist´s (1999: 243) fuzzy set calculations. Three factors related to unemployment are used: Accessibility to and generosity of benefits, and quality of employment policies. In 1996/1997, the latest year available, in all three cases Finland scores lowest, partially due to replacement rate cuts and the tightening of eligibility conditions as reactions to economic crisis and soaring unemployment in the early 1990s (Stephens 1996: 53, for an overview of changes in the 1990s see also Ervasti 2002: 187ff. seeing strong cuts). Therefore Finland has the lowest value (.54) of 'Nordishness' (Norway .64 is the second most 'unnordic' country, while Sweden .69 and Denmark .74 fit better into the Nordic ideal type).

In Norway, the replacement rate is at 65 percent, but here it is also lower for higher earners. Norway´s replacement rate is the second lowest in the North (Aaberge et al. 2000: 85). According to another source (Hammer 1999: 125), the replacement rate is at 60 percent and at the same level as Finland's. In the 1990s, since there was no economic necessity, the system has been tightened marginally, and, as Halvorsen (2002a: 14, 2002c: 171) notes, less than in Denmark and Finland.

Sweden´s scheme is highly generous (Furåker 2002: 136, see also Schmid 1995: 69). The replacement rate has been cut from 90 percent to 80 percent in the 1990s (Jochem 2004: 248; Lindbom 2001: 178), but a higher percentage of the unemployed received benefits in 1998 (80 percent) than in 1980 (62 percent, cf. Lindbom 2001: 182). Lindbom (2001: 178) mentions "formal replacement rates" of 90 percent and 80 percent, Furåker (2002: 136f.) mentions a decline from 90 percent in 1988 to 80 percent in 1998.

The (ostensibly informal) replacement rate has risen from 64 percent in 1980 to 77 percent in 1990 and then fell to 71 percent in 1998. In this sense, replacement rates fell in the 1990s (Lindbom 2001: 178). Every Northern country has ceiled benefits, so that earnings-relatedness is weak, particularly in Sweden (Aaberge et al. 2000: 85, see also Schmid 1995: 63), but has grown stronger, partially due to union influence (Lindbom/Rothstein 2004: 18). The same may apply to contributions (Schmid 1995: 69 for Sweden and Denmark).

4.3.3 Liberal welfare states

According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 74), countries scoring high on liberalism are Switzerland and some non-European countries (Japan, United States, Canada, and Australia). Here, Switzerland will not be categorised as liberal.

In the 1950s the socio-economic conditions for the development of a comprehensive Irish welfare state were not given. The country was poor with a rural economy, low industrialisation and therefore no working class party. Further, a dominant Catholic church laid emphasis on traditional safety nets, and emigration served as a substitute for innovation. Although there were contributions-based elements, flat-rate benefits were dominant (Aust/Leitner 2004: 301f.). From the mid-1980s onward the welfare state has been cut back and focused on liberal basic minimum incomes (Aust/Leitner 2004: 298). Although Ireland´s past poverty and its lack of left parties have been used as an explanation of its rudimentary welfare state, neither growing prosperity nor government participation of left parties in the late 1990s led to more generous policies (Aust/Leitner 2004: 318f.).

In Esping-Andersen´s analysis, the UK had a medium degree of liberalism, but a low score on conservatism and a medium score on socialism (and a low de-commodification score, 1990: 52). The medium degree of liberalism may be due to the use of data from 1980.[20] After 1980 and Prime Minister Thatcher´s and her successors´ welfare policies, the UK became more liberal (Borchert 1998: 166f., Schmid 2008: 716). Referring to the mid-1980´s, Taylor-Gooby (1989: 639f.) stated that no crucial policy changes took place under PM Thatcher, but changes on the level of ideas (see also Schmidt 2002: 174ff. and 2010: 13 on discursive institutionalisms´ explanations of ideational change in the UK). Accordingly, Schmidt (2008: 32) states that PM Thatcher´s reforms were accepted due to the communicative discourse she

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[20] This is not caused by the inclusion of sickness benefits. Despite the universalist NHS, the UK scores not high on sickness de-commodification (Esping-Andersen 1990: 50).

initiated to gain support for her reforms. By 1989, crucial policy changes had followed suit (Taylor-Gooby 1989: 641). Taylor-Gooby´s analysis shows that policy changes may result from ideological changes rather than from factual constraint, since in the UK pressures to transform the pension system due to dependency ratios were lower than in other countries. On the other hand, the UK´s turn to liberalism fell short of PM Thatcher´s rhetoric (Clayton/Pontusson 1998: 69). Aggregate spending on social security and government outlay slightly increased between 1980 and 1990 (Pierson 1996: 158; though, aggregate spending should be put in relation to the number of dependents), but wage inequality increased dramatically (Clayton/Pontusson 1998: 72f., Esping-Andersen 2007a: 641). After Labour´s victory in 1997 the UK stood at a critical juncture, since policy changes were more probable than before, which is fostered by the low number of significant veto players. Though, welfare policies remained liberal, possibly because examples of successful employment policies could be found in the US rather than in continental Europe (Daguerre/Taylor-Gooby 2004: 27ff.). PM Blair completed PM Thatcher´s welfare policies (Schmidt 2002: 176).

Meanwhile, this country may be described as "weak" liberal case or a border case between liberal and social-democratic (Edlund 1999: 109), as Europe´s most prominent liberal country (Taylor-Gooby 2004b: 219) due to a radical shift (Esping-Andersen 1990: 49) in the 1980s, or just as liberal (Pierson 2001: 81; Böhnke 2002: 33).

Accordingly, in most classifications the UK and Ireland are treated separately from other European countries. Bonoli (1997: 361) labels them "British" due to low social expenditures, financed by taxes. Jehoul-Gijsbers and Vrooman (2008: 13) and Taylor-Gooby (2001: 137) label them "Anglo-Saxon" with low social security and a low extent of collective pensions. Ederveer and de Mooij (2003: 7), Maître et al. (2005: 158) and Scruggs (2006: 353) simply call them "liberal", Arts and Gelissen (2001: 290) term them "Liberal: Hybrid types". In contrast to pensions and unemployment benefits, the UK´s health system is highly de-commodified (Bambra 2005: 36, see also Hacker 2011: 73), which is the cause for some authors (e.g., Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 107) to be reluctant to consider the UK 'liberal'.

Pensions

According to Castles (2004: 139), due to their age structures and generosity levels all English-speaking nations are low spenders; in Ireland and the UK government budgets are only marginally affected by pension costs (see also Pierson 2001: 100). As percentage of GDP,

both countries spend about half as much on pensions as other EU-27 countries (figures here from 2003). This puts them in league with English-speaking overseas countries USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the eastern Asian countries Japan and the Republic of Korea. This difference is only partially attributable to different age structures (Holzmann 2006: 226).

Among the 23 mostly Western countries Disney (2000: F8) examined, Ireland is the sole one whose population is not expected to age further until 2030. Its old-age dependency ratio will not rise. Holzmann et al. (2003: 4, 34) differ in this view. They see a rise from 19 percent to 30 percent from 2000 until 2030 (Holzmann 2003: 4) and therefore state that the ratio will rise weakly (2003: 34). Yet, in their calculation not the working population is considered, but the working age population (2003: 4). For this to cause the difference to the projection offered by Disney, a different ratio between working age population and working population has to come into being. Since the calculation using working age population comes to the conclusion that the old age dependency ratio will rise, which the calculation based on the working population does not, the difference is only plausible if more people in working age will actually work. Given the low Irish unemployment figures at the time of these calculations (Walsh 2003: 5f.), this is possible only if employment among the currently non-active will rise further. Though female labour market participation rose strongly between 1988 and 2002 (Walsh 2003: 5), but is not yet on Scandinavian levels. Further, male labour market participation could rise and less people in working age could retire early. Additionally, young people could leave educational institutions sooner. If there is no rise in the mean age, this does not necessarily mean that there is no rise in the dependency ratio. If the age structure is U-shaped and the birth rate or immigration of young people is high, as time passes a strong cohort will retire and raise the ratio, although the mean age does not rise or even fall.

Ireland has a modest flat-rate pension; many workers are covered privately (Myles/Pierson 2001: 317). The basic pension amounts to about one third of average gross income and as in the UK, expenditures are very low (Holzmann et al. 2003: 34ff.).

In the UK, earnings-related benefits were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s (earnings-related pensions in 1975, cf. Overbye 1994: 153), but merely weakly, modestly and restrictively (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 105. This applies to unemployment benefits as well). Then a massive shift from public (earnings-related; cf. Myles/Pierson 2001: 313) to private pensions took place from the 1980s onward (Myles/Pierson 2001: 314; Taylor-Gooby/Larsen 2004: 59;

Evans/Cerny 2004: 224). The reform has been possible because the UK´s pension scheme has not been mature so that precommitments were low (Pierson 2004: 161).

In the mid-1980s, the UK´s government reduced the importance of the public earnings-related pension scheme in favour of a public basic pension; earnings-relatedness has been left largely to private funds (Creedy/Disney 1988: 57). Employees can choose between public and private schemes. The latter were made attractive due to fiscal incentives and subsidies (Barrientos 1998: 429f.; Natali 2004: 360). In the year 1998 Barrientos (1998: 434f.) reported that nearly two thirds of his sample were covered by private pensions; Disney (2005: 259) reports in the late 1990s this applied to almost three quarters of the workforce.

After peaking in 1980, replacement rates in the basic state pension will continue to fall for the coming decades (Disney 2005: 258); the 1986 reform has been a shift towards a liberal model (Bonoli 2001: 242ff., also stating that the UK´s political system with single party majorities and a very weak second chamber is conductive to swift policy change).

In sum, system is Beveridgean (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 106) with a low flat-rate pension (Budd/Campbell 1998: 99f.): In 1996/1997, this amounted to 15 percent of average full-time male earnings (Budd/Campbell 1998: 101). Risk of poverty and old-age poverty is high in the UK (Becker 2000: 229; Ederveer/de Mooij 2003: 17, Taylor-Gooby/Larsen 2004: 59, Clasen 2002: 66), a result of huge wage disparities and low replacement rates.

Due to above developments in pension policies (and, far less crucial, demographic factors), Budd and Campbell (1998: 99f.) state that the UK will have modest public pension expenditures. They will account for only five percent of GDP in the coming decades (Bonoli 2003: 403, Holzmann 2006: 227). In the EU-15, the UK will be the only country with lower public pension spending in 2040 than in 2000 (Disney 2005: 260).

Concluding, both countries have Beveridgean (flat-rate) pension schemes (Werding 2003: 12), with low benefits. Both countries have some similar traits (Fenge et al. 2003: 17).

Unemployment benefits

For decades, Irish unemployment triggered emigration primarily to the UK, keeping unemployment lower than it would have been otherwise. Both countries´ unemployment rates have been linked; until the late 1980s they were never far apart (Walsh 2003: 3ff.).[21]

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[21] This squares with Beissinger and Büsse´s (2001: 78ff.) model showing effects from country A´s unemployment rate on country B´s unemployment rate if country B offers flat-rate unemployment benefits. A similar mechanism may develop or have developed between European countries. Yet, it is less (but also

Unemployment declined steeply from the mid-1980s until 2000 (Walsh 2003: 2). In 2002, compensation has been the lowest in the EU (alongside the UK´s and Portugal´s), and amounted to less than 30 percent of GDP per capita (Aust/Leitner 2004: 315). This is confirmed by Gallie and Paugam (2002a: 10), placing Ireland alongside the UK to the liberal regime because of its low unemployment benefits. Also Schömann et al.´s (2000: 8ff) results support this: Benefits are low, while coverage is high. Further, earnings-related elements in the Irish unemployment scheme were abolished in 1995 (and in the same year the replacement rate has been cut to 32 percent; Schömann et al. 2000: 37). Schmid (1995: 70f.) places Ireland alongside the UK and Sweden as a country with weak or absent earnings-relatedness in unemployment benefits. In sum, both low benefits and high coverage are attributed to the UK and to Ireland. This could lead to the same average level of expenses per unemployed person as in countries with strongly earnings-related benefits (Schmid/Reissert 1996: 254).

In the UK, a modest earnings-related scheme has been abolished in 1982; benefits were cut and are low (Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 203, see also Schmid 1995: 63, 69 and Beissinger/Büsse 2001: 79, Boeri et al. 2000: 17). Clasen (2002: 67) states that the Conservative government wanted to decrease to reservation wage. The introduction of 'Jobseekers´ Allowance' in 1996 partly cut entitlement durations and benefits levels (Clasen/van Oorschoot 2002: 106). Since these policies were not removed after Labour came into power in 1997, only a small minority of the British unemployed were in contributions-based programmes in 2000, and earnings-related programmes become unimportant (Clasen/Clegg 2006a: 539f.): In 1979/1980, nearly half of the unemployed received contributory benefits, already in 1994/1995 their share has been under ten percent (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 106, Clasen 2002: 62). Further, compulsion to work was increased since the mid-1980s (Tonge 1999: 218). Welfare-to-work elements and benefit conditionality were introduced, primarily by the Blair government after 1997 (Boeri et al. 2000: 17; Tonge 1999: 218ff.).

migration between European countries that may link nation´s unemployment rates. Countries in economic crisis – or high unemployment – may decrease their imports (via lower demand for some goods and services). This leads to rising unemployment in countries with strong trade links (Korpi 2003: 603). As Korpi points out, especially small economies could be affected. At the same time, similar to the development between Ireland and the UK in the past decades, EU work law could trigger migration of unemployed people between EU countries.

4.3.4 Southern welfare states

Of the southern European countries, Esping- Andersen (1990: 74) solely included Italy in his analysis and categorised it as conservative. Italy did not take part in ESS4 and will therefore not be included in the analysis; this country will be left out in the further discussion.

Other authors, like Leibfried (1993: 142; 153), suggested a southern European cluster or "Latin Rim", composed of rudimentary welfare states with strongly earnings-related benefits (Ferrera 1996: 20ff.), a sharp division between labour market insiders and outsiders (Ferrera et al. 2001: 157), high reliance on intra-family social solidarity, low importance of welfare benefits for household incomes, low targeting on the poor, and, related to this, a relatively low share of the poor receiving benefits but a comparable high share of the non-poor. Lastly, Southern welfare states reduce poverty only marginally (Maître et al. 2005: 158ff; this can also be seen in Fig. 4.8). Moreno (2008: 2) sees further southern similarities: Authoritarian or dictatorial rule in the past, late industrialisation, and the strong role of the churches in social protection.

A third view is held by Fenger (2007: 22f.), whose cluster analysis generated no distinct Southern cluster, but a Southern subcluster of the conservative type.

Table 4.7: Southern Europe as own cluster or conservative subcluster

Source	Countries
Leibfried (1992)	Greece, Portugal, Spain, France
Ferrera (1996: 19)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Katrougalos (1996: 43)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Bonoli (1997: 361)	Greece, Portugal Spain, Switzerland
Arts and Gelissen (2001: 290)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Ederveer/de Mooij (2003: 1ff.)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Castles (2004: 77)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Aassve et al. (2005: 286f.)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Maître et al. (2005: 161)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Fenger (2007: 21)	Greece, Spain (Portugal not in the analysis)
Jehoul-Gijsbers/Vrooman (2008: 13) (Pensions)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Eikemo et al. (2008: 2283)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Karamessini (2008: 43)	Greece, Portugal, Spain
Schmid (2008: 718ff.)	Greece, Portugal, Spain, possibly Cyprus
Gal (2010: 283ff.	Greece, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Israel, Turkey
Hacker (2011: 69)	Greece, Portugal, Spain

Only ESS4- countries

The introduction of a southern model is debatable. On the one hand, there are remarkable differences between southern and conservative countries (here, e.g. Rhodes 1996: 315f.

disagrees, Jæger 2006b: 159 is ambivalent). Distinct southern features are particularism, corruption and clientelism (Ferrera 1996: 25, for Greece´s clientelism see Esping-Andersen/van Kersbergen 1992: 203). Katrougalos (1996: 41f.) notes that due to their low spending Greece, Portugal and Spain are welfare "laggards". Further, minimum old age and invalidity pensions are far lower than in other European countries and there is or has been no minimal social provision (Katrougalos 1996: 41). Elderly care is primarily the family´s responsibility; while in conservative countries the burden is divided between family and state (Jehoul-Gijsbers/Vrooman 2008: 12). Poverty is high (Katrougalos 1996: 55f.) and the black economy is extensive (Ferrera et al. 2001: 157; Karamessini 2008: 46). Economically, in these countries (except Spain, cf. Karamessini 2008: 46) agriculture is far more important than in the conservative countries (Katrougalos 1996: 43, related to this, they are weakly industrialised, cf. Schmid 2008: 717), and self-employment is higher (Karamessini 2008: 46).

Yet a fourth regime type presupposes a fourth source of welfare beyond state, market and family. Further, Esping-Andersen drew attention from levels of entitlement to underlying principles. Besides the principle of need, citizenship, or merit, southern countries should have a distinguishing principle. With highly earnings-releaded benefits, high protection of the core worker to the labour markets outsiders´ disadvantage (Ferrera 1996: 19), high reliance on the male breadwinner (low female labour market participation), the importance of the principle of subsidiarity and religion´s strong influence, southern countries take conservative principles to the extreme, but display none of their own (cf. Katrougalos 1996: 40).

Additionally, differences between Southern Europe and other EU-15 countries narrow (Katrougalos 1996: 43, Ederveer/de Mooij 2003: 40) or have narrowed (Gal draft: 6). In the 1980s, southern countries had the biggest per-head growth in welfare expenditures among all EU countries (Katrougalos 1996: 51). The view of narrowing differences is also supported by Moreno (2008: 1) who shows that in 1990, southern countries´ (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) social expenditures averaged at 18 percent of their GDPs, while the four northern countries spent 28 percent and the continental countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands) spent 29 percent. While expenditure levels of both latter regimes were in 2005 still at the same levels, the southern countries raised theirs to 24 percent.

Differences between the southern and their northern neighbours persist (Gal draft: 7), despite marked changes in the last two decades (Karamessini 2008: 44). In 2003 Greece´s and Portugal´s social protection benefits as percentage of GDP were only slightly below those of the EU-15, a far way from remarkable gaps in 1993 (in Spain, the gap to the EU average has widened). Further, women´s labour market participation has risen sharply: Portugal´s is still

above, and Spain´s and Greece´s slightly below EU average. Accordingly, the share of male-breadwinner-households has fallen, but the southern countries (except Portugal) still have markedly higher figures than the conservative countries (Karamessini 2008 57ff.; Spain´s are lower). Summarising changes, Karamessini (2008: 66) states that southern countries developed in a path dependent manner with lasting high "labour market segmentation and reliance on the family for welfare".

Consequently, Katrougalos (1996: 43) describes these countries as an underdeveloped version of the conservative type. Also Ferrera (1996: 18f.) is ambivalent. On the one hand he mentions "south European, Latin or Mediterranean welfare states". On the other hand he notes "[…] extreme versions of the 'transfer centered' model of social protection typical of continental Europe. As in *other* 'Bismarckian' and 'corporatist' countries […]" (1996: 19; emphasis added). Scientists do not agree on the question whether Southern countries are a distinct 'world of welfare' or merely a conservative subtype (Karamessini 2008: 44).

Figure 4.5 shows the location of Southern countries in the ideal-typical welfare state classification.

Figure 4.5: Theoretical location of Southern Welfare States

Benefits	strong earnings-related weak		earnings-unrelated
High	**Southern** CY/ES/GR/PT/TR	**Conservative** BE/DE/FR	**Social democratic** DK/FI/NO/SE
Low			**Liberal** IE/UK

Mixed: Netherlands, Switzerland, and Israel. Not included: CEE countries. Own presentation

Pensions

Based on data from 1993, Ferrera (1996: 20) has shown that in Greece, Portugal and Spain pension payments are strongly earnings-related. Contributory pensions for a worker after a full labour career as a percentage of average net earnings of manual workers by far exceed those of other western European countries (especially in Greece). Minimum benefits (for those without sufficient contribution records) were far lower (also especially in Greece). This view is supported by Natali (2004: 352) stating that Southern Europe followed the German model in pensions. In total, among the EU-15 countries, these countries had the highest gross replacement rates in 2002 (Hering 2006: 8, see also figure 4.1).

Guillén (2007 :118f.) notes that Spain is conservative in respect to income maintenance, social democratic in health and education policies and liberal in social services and family policies. In this sense, Spain is conservative in the case of old-age pensions and unemployment benefits. Eligibility is mainly based on labour market participation; the Spanish welfare state is considered as having Bismarckian roots (Guillén 2007: 120). Moreno (2008: 2), while agreeing in general, sees the development since the early 1990s as a movement away from Bismarckian income maintenance.

Old Spaniards may receive pensions either from a contributory program, in which entitlements result from occupation, or means-tested benefits or income from private insurance (Vidal-Meliá/Domínguez-Fabián 2006: 612). The first pillar is earnings-related with upper and lower caps. This pillar consists of various programmes; the general system for employees, the other for the self-employed, for fisheries workers, miners etc. The number of contribution years is taken into account very strongly (Vidal-Meliá/Domínguez-Fabián 2006: 613). With 35 years the reposition rate is at 95 percent, with 15 contributions years at 48 percent (Marco 2001: 5). Private schemes are unimportant (Argimón et al. 2007: 6ff.).

In Greece, pension payments account for a larger share of welfare spending than in the EU-15 or EU-25. Since the early 1990s, expenses (nominally and as share of GDP) have risen rapidly in Greece, partially this can be explained with fast population aging (Papatheodorou 2007: 293). Among 30 developed nations, only Japan had a higher share of people aged 65 or older in 2001 (Whiteford/Whitehouse 2006: 80, see also Table A2.5). The high expenses also result from a gross replacement rate exceeding 100 percent (in 2002), which only Greece has among the EU-15 countries. Nevertheless, due to coverage gaps, parts of the Greek population have insufficient retirement income (Hering 2006: 8ff.). Those who entered the labour market after 1993 have a replacement rate of two percent for each year worked up to 35 years (70 percent) with additional three percent for each of two years working after 65, so the maximum is at 76 percent. This high emphasis on the number of years worked resembled the Spanish and the Portuguese system. The consideration of the whole working career instead of some years is a highly earnings-related feature.

The Portuguese social security system is generally Bismarckian (Albuquerque et al. 2009: 4), which also applies to the pension system in particular (Pereirinha et al. 2007: 488f., see also Whitehouse/Queisser 2007: 130f.). The main part is the insurance-based subsystem which is supposed to protect against loss or reduction of income for many reasons, among them,

unemployment and old age. Here, benefits are earnings-related. This component of pensions requires at least 15 years of insurance, whereas both, length of contributions and income, are taken into account. Pensions may not be lower than 30 percent or higher than 80 percent of the reference income; 80 percent get paid if the beneficiary worked for 40 years (Albuquerque et al. 2009: 4ff.). In this sense, the system resembles the Spanish one. Those not eligible for earnings-related pensions are entitled to flat-rate, tax-financed and means-tested payments, which are lower than the minimum pension of the general scheme. Public officials could receive full pensions after 36 years, this will be raised to 40 years (Pereirinha et al. 2007: 490). Still, the system is more generous towards public officials than to other employees. Further, the average pension is merely 1.16 times as high as the minimum wage, partially because beneficiaries worked not long enough (Pereirinha et al. 2007: 498). The private pillar is not important (Albuquerque 2006: 6f.).

Unemployment benefits

With the exception of Portugal, the same as for pensions also applies to unemployment benefits: Referring to the early 1990s, Ferrera (1996: 22) states that those with insufficient contribution record (in this case the young) received no benefits, while in Portugal and in Spain benefits for those who have already participated in the labour market were higher than in most western European countries.

In 2004, Spain spent twice as much as the EU-15 or EU-25 average, although its unemployment rate was only slightly higher (Gil-Escoin/Vázquez 2007: 173; 178). This has changed since then: As table A2.1 reveals, in 2008 Spain´s unemployment rate was at 11 percent, while EU average was markedly lower. To qualify for unemployment compensation, one has to have worked for at least 12 months in the last six years; the level of benefits depends on previous contributions. When eligibility expires, dependents receive 75 percent of their occupation´s minimum wage if they are single or 125 percent for others. Only two thirds of Spanish unemployed receive benefits (Gil-Escoin/Vázquez 2007: 178ff.).

The Greek system is highly conditional upon social insurance contributions and therefore previous work and income, so that those with long and uninterrupted careers are far better off. Further, the average replacement rate is among the lowest in the EU-15 and mostly under 50 percent (Papadopoulos 2006: 229f.). Additionally, coverage is low and duration of eligibility

is short (Papatheodorou 2007: 294). Therefore, in 2004 Greece spent a lower share of social expenditures on unemployment compensation than the EU-15 or EU-25 (Papatheodorou 2007: 292), although unemployment is higher (Papatheodorou 2007: 294).

In Portugal, payments come either from the insurance-based system or the allowance system. In the former, beneficiaries receive 65 percent of their previous income, yet the minimum level is at the minimum wage and the upper level thrice the minimum wage. In the allowance system, means-tested benefits are at 80 percent of the minimum wage or at the level of the minimum wage if the dependent person has a family. (Pereirinha et al. 2007: 490ff., Albuquerque et al. 2009: 7f.). Pereirinha et al. (2007: 492) state that in 2004 the average benefit was at 68 percent of minimum wage. Yet it is not clear how this is possible, if insurance-based benefits are at minimum wage level or above and means-tested benefits are at 80 percent of minimum wage or at minimum wage level. Possibly this calculation also includes those unemployed not eligible for any benefits.

The extended southern model

Since analyses of southern welfare states are mostly restricted to Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, it has to be answered if the ESS4- countries Cyprus, Turkey and Israel just share with them their geographical location or also their welfare state characteristics.

In Cyprus and Israel, a lower share of social protection is funded through contributions than in Spain, Greece and Portugal (though the latter is merely slightly above Israel). Therefore, Gal (draft: 12f.) argues that Cyprus and Israel are more Beveridgean and less Bismarckian than other Southern countries; a fact possibly resulting from British colonial rule (draft: 12). Further, Cyprus´, Israel´s and Turkey´s social expenditures as share of GDP are even lower than these of the other southern countries, which in turn spend less than conservative countries, making them extreme cases of the southern cluster, albeit this may be caused by low old-age dependency ratios (for Cyprus and Turkey see table A2.5). Female labour market participation is as low as in other Southern countries (in Cyprus and Portugal it is higher than in other Southern countries). Poverty risk is even higher in Israel and Turkey. Here again, the countries examined are extreme cases of the Southern regime, since poverty risk is lower in conservative and social-democratic countries. Lastly, inequality is on high Southern levels (Gal draft 12ff.), whereas inequality is correlated to relative poverty. From these figures Gal

(draft: 18) concludes that a Southern model exists. Gal supports the inclusion of Cyprus, Israel and Turkey in the Mediterranean welfare regime, which is characterised by

> "less resources, relatively low levels of social expenditure, weak state support for the poor, a major role for the family and religious organizations in the provision of welfare, relatively low levels of labor market participation (particularly among women), and overall limited success in alleviating poverty and overcoming social and economic gaps" (Gal draft: 32f.)

It will be argued that Cyprus and Turkey are parts of the Southern model, Israel not.

Cyprus

Not only welfare researchers pay low attention to Cyprus´ social policy, but Cypriots themselves too, since attention is focused on the island´s divide (Ioannou et al. 2007: 89). In 1960, when Cyprus gained independence from British rule, the country´s economy was underdeveloped and mainly agricultural (Ioannou et al. 2007: 90). In the coming decades, the shift to industry and (tourism) services created wealth (with double-digit growth rates in the 1970s) and new needs, which were met by new social policies financeable by the new wealth (2007: 92, 104), albeit late and on a low level. According to Ioannou et al. (2007: 104), the British Beveridge tradition was the basis for the later independent Cyprus´ welfare model. Today Cyprus´ GDP per capita is on a southern European level, below Spain and Greece and above Portugal and all CEE countries except Slovenia. Therefore, in 2004 Cyprus belonged to the "advanced" EU accession countries, together with the Visegrád countries and Slovenia (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 32). The country´s EU accession led to a "National Action Plan for Social Inclusion" (Ioannou et al. 2007: 94), which on the one hand contains goals like the reduction of poverty risk and the stabilisation of social protection expenditures, but on the other hand a distinct southern feature by emphasising the family´s role (Republic of Cyprus 2004 National Action Plan for Social Inclusion, cited from Ioannou et al. 2007: 95f.). Another crucial provider of welfare is the Church (Ioannou 2007: 97).

Pensions

Benefits are contribution- and government- funded (Pashardes 2003: 42; Ioannou et al. 2007: 101) and expenditures are very low (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 118). Half of the insured work on after they are 63 and are entitled to benefits, since it is possible to get pensions and

carry on working (Pashardes 2003: 42, 26). Though, retirees derive less than two percent of their income from salaries (Pashardes 2003: 35). Social insurance was implemented under British rule, but the pension scheme developed in Bismarckian manners (Natali 2004: 362). The public system has two pillars: One is means-tested and tax-financed, the other is contributions-financed, earnings-related and unconditional on retirement (Natali 2004: 362).

Unemployment benefits

Benefits depend on previous earnings (Ioannou 2007: 98). Payments last for 156 days and amount to 60 percent of previous years´ earnings (2007: 102) and are higher if the unemployed has dependent family members (Pashardes 2003: 25ff.).

Southern conservative elements and Beveridge elements from British heritage were supplemented by late endeavours to provide universal benefits (from 1980 on the principle of citizenship gained more, and merit less importance cf. Pashardes 2003: 28). According to Ioannou et al. (2007: 106), the Cypriot welfare state is still lagging behind. With 18 percent of GDP social spending is low compared to the EU-25´s 27 percent (Ioannou et al. 2007: 92), but markedly higher than the ten percent in 1985 (Ioannou et al. 2007: 105). According to Vaughan-Whitehead (2003: 117), Cyprus´ social spending as percentage of GDP is the lowest in the (old) EU, but the number of dependents (unemployed or old, Pashardes 2003: 28; 57) is also low. Risk of relative poverty is only marginally higher than in the EU-25 (Ioannou et al. 2007: 106). Though Beller and Hout (2006: 358) categorise Cyprus in the Conservative regime (their classification with four regimes does not contain a Southern type), Cyprus´ high earnings-relatedness, low expenditures and its high reliance on family ties are Southern traits.

Turkey

Turkey´s welfare regime is strongly in motion (Buğra/Keyder 2006: 212). It is not quite clear in which direction the Turkish welfare state is heading: Buğra and Keyder (2006: 226f.) mention a conservative-liberal tendency, which may sharpen Turkey´s southern profile. At the same time, there are universalistic and egalitarian tendencies (2006: 227) to include those previously excluded. In Turkey, both GDP per capita and social expenditures as percentage of GDP are very low (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 117), yet welfare outlays as percentage of

GDP more than tripled between 1980 and 2001 (Tsarouhas/Bolukbasi 2007: 13). As in Cyprus, low expenditures are also caused by demographic characteristics.

Pensions

Turkey´s population is the youngest of the countries analysed here (Grütjen 2007: 63). Nevertheless, due to a low retirement age and low labour force participation (in 2006, 44 percent while 63 percent in the EU, cf. Buğra/Keyder 2006: 218, see also Table 4.8), the number of pensioners in relation to contributors is high (Buğra/Keyder 2006: 214f.). Therefore, the favourable demographic situation´s positive effects are to be found rather in health than in pension expenditures. Retirement benefits are dependent on previous income and, due to the new regulation from 1999, amount to 54 percent after a full job career of 7000 days of contribution and 40 percent in the case of 4500 days (Grütjen 2007: 49). Men´s official retirement age is at 65 and women´s at 58 (Grütjen 2007: 48). Men can enter early retirement at the age of 60. White-collar state employees receive higher payments, at least 75 percent of their last income (Grütjen 2007: 50). Those ineligible for contributory pensions get very low flat rate benefits. To be eligible, a person has not just to be without income, but also without close relatives who have sufficient income to help (Grütjen 2007: 52). This reflects the family´s important role in the provision of welfare. The system is highly polarised, displaying high inequality. The maximum replacement rate is 125 percent and therefore highest in the OECD (Grütjen 2007: 70). In comparison with other countries (Ferrera 1996: 20), Turkey´s pension system bears southern European characteristics:

> "With regards to polarization and peaks of generosity, which are reflected in a very unequal distribution between pre- and post-retirement income, very high replacement rates and low minimum benefits, Turkey clearly shares the characteristics of Southern European countries." (Grütjen 2007: 70)

Private pensions are virtually non-existent (Grütjen 2007: 62).

Unemployment benefits

Since 2000, workers have compulsory unemployment insurance. To qualify, they have had to contribute for 600 days within three years. Benefits amount to 50 percent of previous earnings, but may not exceed the minimum wage (Grütjen 2007: 53). With this capped

earnings-relatedness, Turkey deviates from other southern countries, since their unemployment benefits can be very generous (Ferrera 1996: 20).

In the welfare triangle between state, market and family, the latter is clearly predominant in Turkey. Turkish families are large (Grütjen 2007: 63), which makes intra-family provision of assistance easier.

As in other southern countries, the employment market is highly segmented between protected insiders and precarious outsiders (Dinç 2009: 107). Notwithstanding reforms in the year 2008, Turkish social policies are still highly status-preserving for insured core workers (Dinç 2009: 199f.). Also as in other southern countries, it is an extreme case of corporatism (Dinç 2009: 200). In some respects, Turkey is an extreme case of southern European countries: High informal employment, high corruption and a significant share of the labour force in agriculture (Buğra/Keyder 2006: 212ff.). This is a southern characteristic (Grütjen 2007: 72). Due to its high earnings-relatedness, the Turkish welfare state employs the Matthew principle of giving those who already have (Buğra/Keyder 2006: 219). Further southern features Turkey displays are the protection of core workers and its familialism mentioned above (Grütjen 2007: 80). Grütjen (2007: 80) argues that Turkey bears important southern characteristics. Buğra and Keyder (2006: 212) state that the system is highly fragmented, hierarchical, status-preserving and reliant upon help within families. In contrast, Tsarouhas and Bolukbasi (2007: 1) are ambivalent concerning Turkey´s 'Southernness'.

To sum up, the Turkish system resembles the southern European model not in background characteristics like GDP per capita, or population aging, but in the underlying principles of welfare distribution and the relative importance of state, market and family.

4.3.5 Central and Eastern European (CEE) welfare states

Socialist legacies

CEE welfare states developed not gradually but were marked by two fundamental systemic changes: Firstly, their economic systems were transformed from capitalism to communism after the Second World War or, in the case of Russia and Ukraine, in the early 1920s. The reverse transformation took place around 1990 (Keune 2009: 62).

Leaving aside Yugoslavia, all CEE countries´ welfare policies were roughly similar. Food, housing, public transport, health and education were subsidised; employment was guaranteed by government, so there was no open unemployment (Cerami 2008: 5, see also Vodopivec et al. 2003: 13) and wage differentials were small (Boeri 1997: 126; Deacon 2000:

147). Baxandall (2004: 15) states that the non-existence of (open) unemployment has been a crucial source of legitimacy of communist regimes (see also Esping-Andersen 1996a: 9).

Social expenditures´ share of GDP was higher than in OECD countries (yet, socialist-era data is rather unreliable). Albeit socialist states tried to cater for their citizens´ basic needs, provision of services was inadequate. Inefficient health services contributed to low life expectancies, economic inefficiencies resulted in equality in poverty (Deacon 2000: 148). Notwithstanding, Vaughan-Whitehead (2003: 114f.) assumes that CEE citizens were satisfied with social protection and mourned its loss after transition to market economy.

Possibly CEE countries´ welfare policies under socialism can be categorised in Esping-Andersen´s classification:

> "that (former) *communist* countries were pure cases of the social-democratic regime-type that Esping-Andersen did not expect to find amongst capitalist welfare states […] i.e. they were more or less free of liberal and conservative elements […] de-commodification was perfect" (Andreß and Heien 2001: 342, emphasis in original).

Combining both statements, pure social democracy not to be found in the West and high satisfaction with social policies, one may conclude that in 1990 CEE citizens held social democratic attitudes, if policies and attitudes were coherent. Haggard and Kaufmann (2009: 69) support this view, stating that CEE citizens´ attitudes were shaped by their old welfare schemes. Though, whichever the character of CEE welfare policies before regime change and CEE citizens´ attitudes at the time of transition, the question now is in which direction both have developed. The need for welfare policies stems from economic development. The same applies to the resources needed for welfare policies´ financing.

CEE: Economic development and reform

Though there were similar developments in former socialist countries, differences are to be found in the pace of economic reform. As Deacon (2000: 150) with reference to the UN Development Programme notes, CEE countries may be classified in five categories according to their degrees of liberal reform. Comparably, the World Bank´s classification is based on reforms concerning pensions, transfer payments, banking and the government´s role and results in four groups which are similar to the UN Development Programme (Deacon 2000: 150). In both classifications, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the fastest transforming countries. Concerning other nations´ assessment there are contradicting findings.

During the recession in the first transitional phase, from 1990 to 1995, "working and social conditions" worsened (Bohle/Greskovits 2006: 10; 22). However, huge differences exist between the former USSR countries which lost about one third of their GDP and the Visegrád countries, whose economies shrank less or, in the case of Poland, even grew (Kangas 1999: 6, but real wages shrank stronger in Poland than in Hungary and the Czech Republic, cf. Vanhuysse 2007: 500). These countries, as well as Slovenia, successfully attracted foreign capital (Bohle/Greskovits 2006: 11). From 1995 to 1999, the trend continued and the Visegrád countries as well as Slovenia regained their pre-transition-levels and their real wages rose after 1993 (Vanhuysse 2007: 500). The recovery, roughly from 1996 to 2002, took place earlier in Visegrád countries and Slovenia and later in the Baltics and Bulgaria and Romania (Bohle/Greskovits 2006: 11), though the latter two as well as post-Soviet countries (except the Baltics) still had low GDP levels. This new intra-CEE differences and growing convergence of some CEE countries with Western countries (Bohle/Greskovits 2006: 22) make distinctions between Eastern and Western Europe harder and support claims to subdivide CEE countries (see below). Leaving aside Russia and Ukraine, Bohle and Greskovits (2006: 22) distinguish between the successful export economies of the Visegrád countries and Slovenia on the one hand and the Baltics and south-eastern Europe on the other.

CEE: Reforming the welfare state

The power of constituencies strongly shaped generosity (Myant and Drahokoupil 2010, Ch. 10). Institutions´ existence was also conditional upon state capacity to implement social policies, maintain administrative control over welfare infrastructure, and its ability to raise revenues. Effective systems of social protection were thus introduced where the social interests were represented in the political system, as was the case particularly in Slovenia. In authoritarian regimes, the outcomes were variable. One factor, as argued by Cook (2007), may be the strength of bureaucratic-statist interests in relation to the presidential power (Drahokoupil/Myant 2010: 276).

CEE subcategories

Necessarily left out by Esping-Andersen, the 13 CEE countries analysed here have to be categorised from scratch. Each of Esping-Andersen´s three regimes is based on a distinctive principle of distribution. Based on the analyses of the principles underlying the CEE

countries, two questions emerge: Firstly, are they distinct from Western Europe and secondly, are they homogeneous enough to pose one new regime type or are there more regimes?

After 1990, CEE countries passed through the dual transformation of the political and the economic systems (Roller 1994: 105) and therefore, since it combines both, also their welfare state architectures. During the transition phase in the early 1990s governments introduced previously non-existent and unnecessary unemployment benefits, removed subsidies for basic goods, partially privatised the health sector and social insurance, and hoped that philanthropy will help (Deacon 2000: 149). An oversimplified but clear picture is drawn by Vaughan-Whitehead (2003:123) with reference to the late 1990s: Insurance (or merit) principles gave way to means-tested (or need) principles. In this sense, CEE countries have developed in the liberal direction (see also Esping-Andersen 1994: 54, 1996a: 20).

After 2000, UNICEF reported steeply rising poverty and inequality and declining employment rates (Manning 2004: 215), which were high under socialism due to the absence of open unemployment and women´s high labour force participation (Europe´s socialist countries maximised employment in order to keep expenses for the non-employed down, cf. Esping-Andersen 1996a: 9). After transition, inequalities resulted now less from positions in the state bureaucracy and more from market mechanisms (Deacon 2000: 146, Keune 2009: 64). Since the first successful entrepreneurs after the transition were often members of the old nomenclature (Deacon 2000: 158), some inequalities may result from both.

Early on, Deacon (1993: 192) suggested that CEE countries are and will be closest to the liberal regime type since commodification, inequality and market reliance are high. This is supported by Williamson (1993: 1329) considering CEE countries the strongest adherents of the Washington Consensus. Amsden et al. (1994: 2) explain this trend with these countries´ rejection of their socialist past and their movement from one extreme to the other. In their view, CEE countries incorporated capitalist laissez-faire policies. The Russian crisis of 1998 and the East Asian crisis of 1997 affected CEE economies negatively. These crises further strengthened internal and external forces that were in favour of liberalisation and retrenchment of the welfare state (Haggard/Kaufman 2009: 68). Therefore, in retrospect Aidukaite (2009: 33ff.) notes that due to the mix of social assurance and assistance and privatisation of welfare, studies in the post-transition years classified CEE countries as liberal.

Later, Deacon (2000: 156ff.) saw more conservative elements: Albeit the 1990s´ reforms were strongly influenced by liberal ideas proposed by IMF and World Bank (see also Saxonberg/Sirovátka 2009: 187), in EU accession countries these ideas were counterbalanced

by social democratic and Christian democratic role models in old EU countries. Primarily in CEE countries earnings-relatedness should not be overestimated, since there low ceilings push earnings-related benefits in the residual or liberal direction (Drahokoupil/Myant 2010: 279).

The introduction of Christian democratic or conservative elements is a re-introduction: Before socialism, CEE countries had a Bismarckian tradition (Keune 2009: 63, Obinger/Schmitt 2011: 251; for the Czech Republic see also Saxonberg/Sirovátka 2009: 189ff. Overbye 1994: 151 points to a large influence of the German social security model in the Austro-Hungarian empire). Further, numerous welfare entitlements in socialist countries were employment-related (Manning 2004: 214; Haggard/Kaufman 2009: 67). According to Alber and Standing (2000: 109), Deacon´s expectation that developments will lead to conservative-type welfare states was based on two pillars:

Firstly, path dependencies would sustain socialism-style employment-relatedness. The absence of unemployment or remarkable wage differentials resulted in an equality of benefits which should not be misinterpreted as a low value placed on work; rather the opposite applies. Cerami (2008: 10f.), for example, states that the high value of work in Communist countries resulted in the stigmatisation of those unable to be good communist workers.

Secondly, political actors would try to satisfy emerging middle classes with performance-related social policies.

Though CEE countries´ politicians tried to introduce insurance-based social policies, international financial agencies urged these countries to liberalise their schemes (Alber/Standing (2000: 113). Orenstein and Haas (2002: 3) expect that the former´s liberal influences are mediated by closeness to a trading bloc highly emphasising welfare entitlements, i.e. Western Europe. This "Europe effect" (2002: 5) could apply more to (then prospective) EU members, and less to former Soviet countries (except the Baltics).

This division is similar to Deacon´s, who subdivided these countries into one group developing systems similar to Western Europe´s (see also Alber/Standing 2000: 110). Countries belonging to this group are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Baltic or former Yugoslavian countries. In the other group, consisting of Bulgaria, Romania and non-Baltic former Soviet countries, he saw the possibility of residualist developments caused by budget restraints. As will be seen, this subdivision of the CEE countries seems more appropriate than that resulting from Fenger´s (2007: 21ff.) cluster analysis.

Countries in the "European" category emulated EU countries´ policies. Though, convergence of spending levels may not be expected soon (Careja/Emmenegger 2009: 167ff.). On the other hand, considering that European integration brings along market liberalisation

(Bohle/Greskovits 2006: 9), it is questionable if CEE countries' EU accession will pull them towards social democratic or conservative models. Possibly EU accession moves Europe towards the liberal direction, if the EU's eastern enlargement is part of a neoliberal transformation of Europe, as suspected by Bohle and Greskovits (2006: 10).

A supposed approximation to EU countries or liberal ones leads to the question if CEE welfare states constitute a regime of their own or if they belong to those already existing. According to Stuchlík (2008: 220), their classification in pre-existing categories is problematic, since their levels of de-commodification are on social democratic levels, but in certain areas, especially in the pensions systems in Poland, Hungary and the Baltics bear Anglo-Saxon characteristics. As Stuchlík (2008: 220) shows with reference to Eurostat data from the year 2004, these countries differ hugely in terms of income equality (see also Table A2.4). Although Stuchlík (2008: 221), despite internal differences pointed out by him, considers the CEE countries belonging to a distinct regime type, it is not clear if they are just a unique mixture of pre-existing regimes or if there are unique post-socialist elements. According to Stuchlík (2008: 221), current reforms are liberal.

Also McMenamin (2004: 263) separates CEE countries from existing regimes. He cluster-analysed the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and 19 western countries according to multiple variables belonging to the three categories 'Polity' (Lijphart's 'patterns of democracy'- variables), 'Social Welfare' and 'Economy'. Even allowing for eight clusters, in McMenamin's (2004: 268) dendrogram the three countries are in the same cluster and merge with other countries only after many steps. These countries are Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, suggesting a proximity to Southern Europe; similarities lie partially in widespread unpaid female care work and strong agricultural and weak service sectors. McMenamin (2004: 271) regards the three former socialist countries examined by him as more or less representative of this region's other new EU countries. In our context, the downside of this analysis is the inclusion of variables which do not characterise welfare policies.

The claim to distinguish CEE welfare states from already existing ones is supported by above-mentioned Fenger's (2007: 21ff.) cluster analysis. Comparable to McMenamin, he combines various variables from three areas: 'Governmental programmes' (among others, government expenditures, total and in various policy fields, and government revenues and their sources), 'social situation variables' (e.g., inequality, female labour force participation, unemployment) and 'political participation variables'. Since the selection of variables determines results (Peters 1998: 76), it is possible that the inclusion of variables not constituting genuine welfare state characteristics contributes to empirical findings meeting

theoretical expectations. Among these variables are income inequality, low in northern countries and high in eastern countries, and female labour force participation (vice versa).

In Fenger´s analysis of 30 countries, two large groups emerge: post-communist countries and others (among non-CEE countries, Esping-Andersen´s classification gets confirmed). If one, as Fenger does, allows for six clusters, the post-socialist group may be distinguished in 'former-USSR type' (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics), 'post-communist European type' (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the 'developing welfare states type' (Georgia, Romania and Moldova). The post-communist European type had a better economic development in recent years (Fenger 2007: 25), higher social well-being and more equality, compared to the former-USSR type. Among the developing welfare states, only Romania took part in ESS4. However, Fenger´s (2007: 22ff.) distinction between former socialist countries deviates from his cluster analysis. For example, the Baltics merge with the 'post-communist European type' before they merge with Russia and Belarus. Further, Russia merges with the 'developing' welfare states Moldova and Romania and then with European style countries. If one tries to categorise these countries according to the cluster analysis and leaves aside both Belarus and Georgia because they are not ESS4 countries and allows for two CEE clusters, it is Moldova, Romania and Russia in one cluster and all other countries in the other. Shortly put, the cluster analysis does not allow a simple distinction based on former USSR membership, but between post-socialist and not. Summarising Fenger´s (2007: 22ff.) description and table containing the six clusters, one may conclude: CEE spending on social protection (as percentage of GDP) and public employment is low, so are taxes. Inequality is high (but not in the European-style countries which are the group closest to the social democratic regime), so is unemployment. Further, economic development differed markedly between some pre-EU-accession countries and post-Soviet countries like Russia, with effects on poverty, inequality and unemployment (Manning 2004: 217). Like Fenger, Manning (2004: 220) sees significant differences in public spending between most former Soviet countries and EU accession countries. While the former´s spending is less than 25 percent of GDP, the latter spend EU-like 40-45 percent. Bearing in mind intra-region diversities, Alber and Standing (2000: 112) see several clusters with marked intra-cluster differences.

In contrast to Fenger, in his 5-type classification Palier (2006: 105) subsumes CEE countries in one group. Conversely, Schubert et al. (2007: 27) see huge intra-regime differences and consider a subdivision into a post-Soviet and a central European regime insufficient, since the Visegrád countries display huge intra-regime differences, too. These

authors try to prove their view by citing Brusius (1999: 80f.) seeing differences in the constellation of relevant groups, but describes all four Visegrád countries as hybrids between liberal and conservative welfare states. If categorisations are based on welfare arrangements, Brusius supports rather than rejects the subsumption of the Visegrád countries in one regime.

The easiest solution to both problems, the question if CEE countries may be categorised into Esping-Andersen´s classification and if this is the case, to which regime they belong, is the introduction of a new regime type. This solution is gaining ground (Aidukaite 2009: 35) and more promising. Though Aidukaite has to admit that this regime has liberal and conservative features and remarkable intra-regime diversity, she (2009: 34f.) justifies a new regime type with distinct phenomena. Among these phenomena are a high number of welfare state dependents and low benefit levels, the prominence of insurance schemes due to employment-related past welfare policies, high reliance on the family and the market and the "identification of the social policy system with the Soviet past" (Aidukaite 2009: 34).

Though, post-communism is not an underlying principle of welfare distribution. Therefore, while the four other regime types mentioned above have three corresponding ideal types, post-socialism refers merely to past policies. The past is peripheral in categorising welfare states according to their current policies, since at least in principle welfare policies can change from one extreme to the other in short time (as seen in some CEE countries). In the case of attitudes, though, the past is more relevant. The socialist past may be relevant in explaining CEE citizens´ attitudes. It leads to two diametrically opposed assumptions.

On the one hand, CEE´s limited welfare states may either result from citizen attitudes or affect these attitudes. Therefore, CEE citizens may be strongly opposed to social welfare policies. Possibly CEE citizens saw collectivism´s worst excesses and negative sides and strife for the opposite.

On the other hand, most CEE citizens were primary socialised under socialism. Respondents too young to have first-handedly experienced it may nevertheless be influenced by the socialist past, via retrospective reports from parents, media coverage or history lessons. Therefore, possibly pro-welfare values were transmitted to them. This is the more conventional line of socialism´s attitudinal consequences (see also Rose/Makkai 1995: 205).

Before transition, entitlements to benefits were employment-related (Manning 2004: 214, Deacon 2000: 147), although through high employment rates this criterion caused no differences between CEE citizens. If policies affect attitudes or vice versa, one may expect

CEE citizens´ to support benefits´ employment-relatedness, if socialisation under socialism continues to have effects. This may be one reason why Deacon expects path dependence in this case (see Alber/Standing 2000: 109). Though, while employment-relatedness could have been a peripheral aspect in societies without open unemployment, in CEE countries with high unemployed, nowadays this principle may affect the unemployed or pensioners. Though, employment-relatedness is not the same as earnings-relatedness: Citizens may demand that someone has worked for at least a certain time before he is eligible to receive benefits and at the same time reject earnings-relatedness. Even assuming that employment-relatedness is based on the principle of merit as earnings-relatedness is and that people supporting employment-relatedness support earnings-relatedness, this does not necessarily imply that CEE citizens demand benefits to be earnings-related. If, as Andreß and Heien (2001: 342) state, socialist countries approximated Esping-Andersen´s social democratic ideal type, CEE citizens grew up under systems stressing equality (Miller 1995: 96). On first sight, this is incompatible with positive earnings-relatedness.

Macro support for rewarded work and for equality

Although there is disagreement concerning CEE countries´ homogeneity or heterogeneity, it is largely consensual that they are different from the countries Esping-Andersen analysed. One reason for the impossibility to incorporate them into Esping-Andersen´s regime types may be this regime concept´s applicability. Referring to Israel, Shalev (2007a: 194) states that the regime concept is not transferable to all countries. In the CEE case, this view is supported by Miller (1995: 96ff), stating that CEE citizens think differently of welfare issues. In his view, CEE citizens´ attitudes towards equality and need are incompatible in Western terms. They support rewards for work and productivity and at the same time limited market competition, high equality and government provided minimum standards: "These attitudes partly reflect practice when the Communist system was in place, but partly also they reflect the egalitarian ideology of Communism itself" (Miller 1995: 96). Miller´s analysis is based on data from the early 1990s. Going further, Schubert et al. (2007: 29) argue against not just the validity of the classifications of CEE welfare states, but against the concept of welfare regimes in itself. Though, their evidence is based on factors not relevant in this analysis, like differences in the strength of unions between countries.

Summarising, CEE countries cannot be categorised into existing regime types and it is not clear how many new regime types are appropriate. Further, the socialist past may bear some influence upon CEE citizens´ attitudes, especially those whose primary socialisation took place before transition. Lastly, since nearly two decades passed between transition and ESS4, welfare policies during this period may be expected to bear some relation to citizens´ attitudes, corresponding to these attitudes or not. Below, CEE policies in both policy fields will be shortly depicted, to be followed by descriptions of single countries´ policies.

Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that on the macro level preferences for material equality and positive earnings-relatedness in the pension scheme are positively correlated over all countries, but less so without CEE countries[22] (and even less without Southern countries except Turkey). On the micro level, bivariate correlations between support for positive pension earnings-relatedness and preference for material equality are negative in all countries except Portugal; there is a very weak positive correlation (Pearson´s r .01).

Figure 4.6: Relationship between support for positive pension earnings-relatedness and preferences for material equality (all ESS4 countries)

Data source: ESS4 (2008/2009). Pearson´s r .31.

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[22]   Comparisons of correlation coeffecients across different samples are problemantic, i.e. stronger coefficients do not necessarily express stronger relationships between the two variables (Achen 1977: 807ff.).

Figure 4.7: Relationship between support for positive pension earnings-relatedness and preferences for material equality (without CEE countries)

Data source: ESS4 (2008/2009). Pearson´s r .24

Pensions

During the socialist period, pension entitlements were based on employment; due to virtually non-existent unemployment the whole population has been covered. Pension policies´ main goal was equality (Natali 2004: 354). In 1990, the average retirement age in CEE countries was about two years below the OECD average and the number of retirees in relation to workers was high (Fultz/Ruck 2000: 6f.).

In the first years after transition, pension benefits were related to minimum wages and therefore very low (Esping-Andersen 1994: 55f.). During the "trial and error" (Boeri 1997: 127) phase of transition, CEE countries began to raise their low retirement ages of mostly 55 years for women and 60 years for men (Deacon 2000: 153; Fultz/Ruck 2000: 3, Cerami 2008: 4) to 55-60 years for women and 60-65 years for men (Fultz/Ruck 2000: 13).

Additionally, the length of active employment is taken into consideration more strongly, resulting in disadvantages for (especially younger) women (Fultz/Ruck 2000: 20; Lipsmeyer 2000: 1200). Mostly pay-as-you-go schemes were introduced, burdening employers and employees, partly to be complemented by private insurances. The World Bank advised these countries to introduce flat-rate pensions while preparing the switch from pay-as-you-go systems to funded schemes, resulting in double burdens placed on employees (see also Demmel/Keuschnigg 2000: 23), slightly softened by the region´s good demographic conditions compared to the OECD average (Boeri 1997: 136). The World Bank´s three pillar model has been introduced in most CEE countries (Cerami 2008: 6). In some countries, due to

tax subsidies to contribution- financed pension benefits financed from the general budget, the burden to be carried by some cohorts are triple (contributions, taxes, and private pensions). In 2000, Hinrichs (2000: 89) suggested that the very young employees and those not yet in working age may carry a lighter burden, if their funded pension schemes´ rates of return are higher than those of pay-as-you-go systems.

At the same time, more pensioners had to be paid for by less workers, since early retirement became a comfortable and expensive way out of unemployment for older job-seekers (Fultz/Ruck 2000: 6ff., Cerami 2008: 6). New pension systems displayed a shift from universalism to earnings-relatedness and, in some countries, private pension spread (Kangas 2000: 11). Pensions payments are no longer paid for from state budgets, but from separate pension budgets (Kangas 2000: 12). In sum, the World Bank multipillar scheme has been introduced with corresponding low government responsibility and low means-tested benefits for those insufficiently covered (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 147). In contrast, Natali (2004: 354) sees weakened World Bank influence due to socialist heritage and EU effects. A similar view is held by Haggard and Kaufman (2009: 71), stating that moves towards liberalisation were watered down by compromises between pro-liberalisation forces and politicians representing various groups. Partially, the conflict was between retirees and older workers on the status-quo side and younger workers on the liberalisation side.

Unemployment benefits

Socialist regimes gave a job to everyone[23] (e.g. Lipsmeyer 2000: 1196), so that unemployment regulations had to be created instead of merely altered (Boeri 1997: 127). To ease the effects of economic shock therapy, initially transformation countries implemented generous benefits (Cerami 2008: 11). Due to fiscal problems created by high unemployment, generosity had to be abandoned; partly in favour of means-testing (Esping-Andersen 1994: 55), partly replacement rates were cut and entitlement durations shortened (Boeri 1997: 130; Deacon 2000: 154). Unemployment benefits were linked to the minimum wage and amounted to about a quarter of the average wage (Esping-Andersen 1994: 55f.).

Since regulations incorporated insurance as well as assistance principles (Boeri 1997: 129), they contain conservative and liberal elements, albeit Boeri (1997: 129) emphasises

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[23]   Possibly with attitudinal consequences. Asked if it should be government´s responsibility to "ensure a job for everyone who wants one" (0='not at all', 10= 'entirely'), CEE citizens had a mean value of 7.52 (n=14 with Eastern Germany, each country equally weighted), whereas southern Europeans had a mean value of 7.40 (n=5). Other countries had a mean value of 6.04 (n=12).

earnings-related and therefore conservative elements (Cerami 2008: 8 terms CEE unemployment schemes "German-style"). Initial high minimum benefits were reduced not nominally, but in real terms due to lacking built-in inflation-compensation mechanisms, which is especially relevant with inflation rates in three-digit areas (Kurth 2002: 9). Though, since many unemployed were either female or under 25 years old or both, in many cases unemployment did not affect a family´s main breadwinner (Boeri 1997: 136f.).

Countries: Visegrád and former Yugoslavian countries (FYC)

The Visegrád countries´ Bismarckian tradition stems from their geographical proximity to Germany and Austria and dates back to the interwar period. At the beginning of socialism after World War II this path was abandoned partially, since basic features, like the merit- and earnings- dependent entitlements and privileges for certain occupation groups were maintained. Only from the 1970s onwards this system made way for universalism (Tomka 2006: 8ff), leading to the coexistence of communist, social democratic and conservative elements (Tomka 2006: 10 referring solely to pensions and health care).

The Polish as well as the Czech social policy reforms after 1990 were swift and severe (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 116), and Hungary´s 'Bokros package' of 1995 (named after the finance minister) had the same direction of impact by advantaging capital, investment and exports (Greskovits 2006: 180, see also Drahokoupil/Myant 2010: 276 stating that political factors were far more important than economic ones). In contrast, Slovenia envisaged shock therapy but did not adopt it (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 128). This country´s social expenditures are the CEE´s highest and are slightly below EU average (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 117). With reference to Soede, Jehoul-Gijsbers and Vrooman (2008: 13) mention an 'Eastern European group', consisting of the Visegrád countries. In this group, social security as well as pensions are lower than in Western Europe.

Taken together, according to Tomka (2006: 13ff.), the Visegrád countries developed in similar ways and cannot be categorised into Esping-Andersen´s regime types. Rather, their new systems combine elements from all three regimes with a predominance of conservative and social democratic elements, supplemented with liberal ones (Tomka 2006: 16, primarily the Czech Republic has liberal elements, cf. Alber/Standing 2000: 112, see also Saxonberg/Sirovátka 2009: 187ff.). Tomka (2006: 15) suggests that due to EU accession these

countries´ systems will develop even further towards social democratic and conservative regime types, yet on the other hand sees power structures advantaging the liberal path. More detailed, Slovenian welfare policy is very 'European' (high spending. Further, earnings inequality is as low as in Sweden, cf. Schmid 2008: 733), whereas Slovakia liberalised after 2000 (Drahokoupil/Myant 2010: 276ff. state that this was the "most dramatic welfare retrenchment", caused by political factors and not economic ones, and opposition was strong). According to Drahokoupil and Myant (2010: 279), alongside the Baltics and south-eastern Europe, Slovakia belongs to the 'minimal welfare state' model, i.e. it markedly deviates from its neighbours. On the other side, besides Slovenia the Czech Republic and Hungary have more redistributive welfare schemes (Drahokoupil/Myant 2010: 279).

In contrast to Slovenia, which was only marginally involved in the Yugoslavian Civil War, Croatia was in war until 1995 and territorially fully integrated not until in 1998 (Bošnjak et al. 2002: 2). In the first analysis of inequality in Croatia, which was conducted in 2000, with a Gini coefficient of .35 Croatian income inequality was far higher than in most CEE countries and nearly as high as in Russia (Bošnjak et al. 2002: 4). As Table A2.4 shows, in 2008 incomes in Croatia were relatively equal compared to other CEE countries.

Pensions

In all Visegrád countries, the initially low retirement age was raised in the 1990s, with transition periods. Gender differences in retirement ages stemming from the socialist era were maintained. Early retirement regulations were generous until the early 2000s (Brown 2007: 1468). Schemes in these countries are pay-as-you-go-financed and supplemented with private elements, although in the 1990s private elements played a marginal role (Lodahl/Schrooten 1998: 2ff.). At least the "front-runners" (Stanovnik 2009: 54) Hungary and Poland have followed the World Bank´s 'three pillar' model of pension privatisation (Aidukaite 2004: 31).

In contrast to Poland (see below), the Czech Republic could resist World Bank reform suggestions because it was not in deep financial trouble and therefore less dependent on loans (Potůček 2007: 140f.). Further, unlike Poland, the Czech Republic did not introduce a mandatory second pillar, but encouraged voluntary savings (Barr/Diamond 2010: 158). Legislation from 1995 prescribes a fix amount paid to all and a variable amount, depending on number of years worked and on earnings. The system is markedly redistributive (Potůček 2007: 141). The public pillar is highly important; it offers flat rate benefits for all retirees and

earnings-related benefits for those eligible. Private pensions are expected to play a larger role in the future; amongst other things because of the public scheme´s replacement rate, which is low on continental standards (Natali 2004: 366).

In Hungary, due to spreading early retirement the number of pensioners rose by 20 percent from 1990 to 1995. In the same period, the number of employees shrank, so that the dependency ratio rose strongly, worsending the financial situation. Then, levels were cut and the retirment age was raised. In 1998, a radical reform came into being that should eliminate all redistributive elements from the first (governmental) pillar bit by bit and introduce a second, obligatory (for people entering the labour force after 1998) private pillar. Among internal reasons for this reform, also external actors like the World Bank and the EU proposed a less redistributive and more private system (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 94ff.).

After 40 years of contributions, the pension level is at 66 percent of the reference income, after 20 years it is at 33 percent (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 98, see also Barr/Diamond 2010. 159). The authors conclude that until 1998 the Hungarian pension scheme was markedly Bismarckian, whereas the current scheme is mixed with strong liberal traits. In their assessment, the 1998 reform constitutes a path change (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 99).

Until 1998, Poland´s scheme was Bismarckian. The replacement rate was at about 70 percent, the average retirement age was low (Góra 2005: 263f.), costs were high (Lodahl/Schrooten 1998: 3). In 1998, the system has been radically transformed: Those born before 1949 remained in the old system. Those who were born later and entered the labour market prior to 1999 receive benefits based on what they would have received under the old scheme, but merely for contribution years. This implies that the scheme is individualised and not redistributive (Góra 2005: 265f.). A minimum pension is paid from the state budget. In sum, the Polish scheme strongly links earnings to benefits, and reduced average pensions due to their high costs and the belief that current generations should not benefit by shifting costs on future generations, and that the protection of workers´ incomes is as important as the protection of retirees´ incomes (Góra 2005: 263ff.). The downside of the reform is pointed out by Wóycicka and Grabowski (2007: 108), who state that replacement rates will be below levels considered adequate. The system is a faithful implementation of the World Bank´s proposal (Natali 2004: 364, see also Piątek 2001: 215f.); it is a Bismarckian/liberal hybrid. Remarkably, Barr and Diamond (2010: 158) state that the scheme is similar to the Swedish

and the Latvian scheme, squaring with Natali´s (2004: 363) statement that the pension schemes of Latvia and Sweden are similar.

Until 2005, Slovakia had a pay-as-you-go scheme troubled by low contributions. The new three-pillar model has the goals "to secure a stable flow of high pensions to the beneficiaries, and sustainability and overall stability of the system" (Kilianová et al. 2006: 2). The retirement age has been increased, and indexation switched from wage growth to a mix of wage growth and inflation, so that under expected real wage growth pension rise will be flatter (Kilianová et al. 2006: 4). In other words, replacement rates will decline, which could be compensated with the new funded second pillar. The first as well as the second pillar should offer a replacement rate of 25 percent, so that the total replacement rate is at 50 percent; the number of contribution years and earnings levels are strongly taken into account (Melicherčík/Ungvarský 2004: 7). The new scheme "largely destroyed the solidarity and cross-subsidization of the previous scheme" (Svoreňová 2006: 102, whereas she 2006: 101 also states that a survey among Slovakians few years before showed that they were willing to be more responsible for their old age income and favoured contribution-benefit-links).

In the communist era, Slovenian replacement rates were high, in the final stages at 76 percent in 1990. The scheme was Bismarckian and benefit calculation was based on earnings in the ten best years.

Slovenia deviated from the region´s pattern of World Bank- influenced pension reform by introducing a voluntary instead of a mandatory second pillar (Stanovnik 2009: 54f., see also Barr/Diamond 2010: 158). With a replacement rate exceeding 60 percent, Slovenia has – besides Hungary – one of the region´s most generous pension schemes (Stanovnik 2009: 60).

The civil war delayed Croatia´s development, although Stubbs and Zrinščak (2006: 4) do not consider Croatia a 'war state', since large parts of Croatia were not directly affected by the war. With reference to the sociologist Josip Županov, the authors (2006: 4) note that the war raised social solidarity.

As in other CEE countries, in Croatia in the mid-to-late 1990s early retirement was used to combat unemployment. This caused financial problems and, consequently, reforms in the pension scheme in the late 1990s (Stubbs/Zrinščak 2007: 89; 2006: 7). The ratio between workers and pensioners dropped from 3:1 in 1990 to 1.8:1 in 1999. As a result, pension expenditures accounted for 14 percent of GDP (Stubbs/Zrinščak 2009: 19). The reform was

influenced by the World Bank. The European Union was less involved than in other CEE countries (Stubbs/Zrinščak 2006: 10). On the whole, Croatia´s 'Europeanisation' (and EU membership) was later than that of other CEE countries (Stubbs/Zrinščak 2009: 14).

Stubbs and Zrinščak (2009: 10ff.) subdivide Croatian social policy after independence in 1991 into two main periods. The dividing line is the death of former president Franjo Tudjman in December 1999 and the subsequent election of a reform oriented government in January 2000. The pension reform was introduced before Tudjman´s death.

The reform of 1999 strengthened the link between earnings and benefits by changing the relevant period for the calculation of the benefit level from the ten best years to the whole working career. Further, the pension age was raised. These reforms had positive effects on the financial soundness of the system. Besides the reform of the first pillar, private pensions were introduced (Stubbs/Zrinščak 2006: 6ff.). The second pillar is mandatory for those below 40 years of age and voluntary for those between 40 and 50. The third pillar is private and voluntary. The reform resulted in very low pensions with a replacement rate of less than 40 percent in 2007 (Guardiancich 2008: 192ff.).

Unemployment benefits

From the early to the late 1990s, Czech unemployed received 60 percent of their previous income in the first six months of unemployment and 50 percent in the next six months. Since the late 1990s, benefits are lower and shorter: 50 percent of previous income in the first three months and 45 percent in the next three months. Benefits are ceiled at the low level of 58 percent of national average income. After these six months, for those younger than 50 years of age eligibility expires, those older than 50 receive benefits for nine months, those above 55 for 12 months (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 142ff., see also Bednárik/Škorpík 2007: 9f.). Baum-Ceisig et al. (2008: 144f.) conclude that in principle the Czech system is comparable to western European ones, yet with markedly lower benefits. Further, eligibility expires as fast as in the UK. The development since 1990 is characterised by gradually declining benefit levels (Saxonberg/Sirovátka 2009: 191ff.).

In 1991, as first CEE country Hungary introduced an unemployment scheme comparable to Western Europe. In the first three months of unemployment, benefits are at 60 percent of previous earnings, with a lower and upper ceiling. After this time, everybody gets a lump sum (60 percent of the minimum wage). The duration of entitlement depends on length of previous

employment. After expiration, unemployment assistance with a lower lump sum (40 percent of the minimum wage) gets paid (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 107ff.). The authors (2008: 112) conclude that with 60 percent of previous earnings unemployment benefits are very low in Hungary and not sufficient to allow for status preservation, although this is an explicit goal of the scheme. Further, benefits levels drop fast to incentivise search efforts.

Since 1990, Poland had one of the highest unemployment rates in the region (Brown 2007: 1470) and a low employment level (Wóycicka/Grabowski 2007: 100). In contrast to Hungary´s and the Czech Republic´s successful endeavours to bring unemployed citizens back into work, Poland´s unemployment policies are passive (Brown 2007: 1472). Unemployment insurance provided 70 percent of previous earnings, unemployment benefit was unconditional on previous work and not temporally limited, which provided only weak financial incentives to end individual unemployment (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 76, yet writing in 2003 Vodopevic et al: 19 stated that Poland had earnings-unrelated benefits).

In 1994, benefits were cut and the system transformed into an insurance system. Eligibility is dependent on previous earnings at least at minimum wage level. The basic benefit is slightly higher or lower if the beneficiary worked for more than 20 years or less than five. The duration of eligibility depends on the regional unemployment level and is between six and 18 months. The higher the level, the later eligibility expires. Many long-term unemployed are not covered, Baum-Ceisig et al. (2008: 80) state that in 2004 only about 15 percent of the unemployed received benefits and that the scheme is only a short-term and insufficient protection. While Forma and Kangas (1999: 181) characterise Poland as "corporatist", Brown (2007: 1474) points out that Polish unemployment policies is neither liberal nor conservative or social democratic.

In sum, in the Czech Republic, Brown (2007: 1482) sees social democratic elements from the Czechoslovak period and a commitment to full employment; welfare provision is higher there. Hungary may be seen as in between Poland´s passive and the Czech Republic´s active policies. In all three countries, according to Brown (2007: 1482) initially implemented unemployment policies after 1990 remained stable in the following years.

In Slovakia, generosity stepwise declined since the implementation of unemployment insurance. Since 2004, in order to be eligible to insurance benefits one has to have worked for

three out of the last four years. Benefits amount to 50 percent of previous income, are ceiled at thrice the average income and last for six months (Bednárik/Škorpík 2007: 9f.).

In contrast to other CEE countries, Yugoslavia experienced unemployment before 1990. After economic reforms in the 1960s, unemployment rose. The opening of borders led to emigration of workers (Pickering/Baskin 2008: 522).

Slovenian benefits are earnings-related and their duration depends on previous work record. After entitlement to earnings-related benefits expires, means-tested benefits step in. In 1998, the duration of benefits has been shortened. Before 1998, workers with five to ten years of work received insurance benefits for nine months, those who worked for ten to fifteen years for 12 months. Since 1998, for both groups duration has been cut to six months (van Ours/Vodopivec 2006: 5f.). Writing in 2002, Ignjatović et al. (2002: 203) state that insurance benefits amount to 70 percent of the previous wage in the first three months of unemployment and then to 60 percent, with a lower limit at the minimum income and an upper limit thrice this figure. When these benefits run out (depending on employment record, not sooner than after three months and not later than after two years), unemployed receive unemployment assistance of 80 percent of minimum income. Generally, eligibility conditions have been tightened (Ignjatović et al. 2002: 205). The authors (2002: 211) conclude that the Slovenian scheme became less earnings-related and less generous, i.e. more liberal.

The Croatian unemployment rate was at high 22 percent in 2000 and dropped afterwards. Entitlement durations have been shortened, so that only about a fifth of the unemployed receive benefits, while the others receive social assistance (Stubbs/Zrinščak 2009: 17f.). According to Behar (2009: 80), Croatian benefits offer a benefit ratio of 100 percent; in his table Croatia is the only country which offers full replacement. Yet, with a duration of nine months it belongs to the countries with benefits expiring early. Still, in a figure combining both characteristics, Croatia ranks as the second most generous country after Denmark, whereas most CEE countries belong to the most ungenerous. Possibly this result neglects the low coverage rate.

Countries: Post-Soviet I: The Baltics

The Baltic countries are a homogenous group (Aidukaite 2006: 259), yet they are not homogenous inside. In Estonia and Latvia, more than a quarter of the population are ethnic

Russians. Most of them are not Baltic citizens (Rajevska 2004: 42ff.). Therefore, they are entitled to welfare benefits (Aidukaite 2004: 27; 2006: 260), but not eligible to vote. However, more ethnic Russians may be expected to gain citizenship (Aidukaite 2004: 28).

In terms of social security expenditures as share of GDP, with about 13 percent the Baltics are at the lower end of the EU-25 (28 percent, cf. Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 192).

Pensions

> "The Baltic states favour the young, the educated, and the middle classes rather than the elderly" (Bohle/Greskovits 2009: 53).

All Baltic states have raised their retirement ages (Aidukaite 2006: 261). Estonia and Latvia have equalised them between men and women. For example, in the 12 years from 1996 to 2008 Latvia has raised women´s retirement age from 56 to 62 years. The Baltics followed the World Bank´s 'three pillar' privatisation model (Aidukaite 2004: 31), containing earnings-related as well as basic payments and voluntary private pensions. Therefore, these countries´ systems come closest to the basic security model (Aidukaite 2004: 41) which provides flat-rate benefits (Korpi/Palme 1998: 666) and elements of other models, primarily earnings-related ones. Liberal flat-rate pensions coexist with conservative earnings-related elements with lower and upper ceilings (Aidukaite 2004: 42, 2006: 262).

Due to its low replacement rates, the Estonian pension scheme has been described as liberal (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 188), but yet at the same time Bismarckian (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 194f.). Between 1998 and 2005, Estonian pensions averaged at 105 percent of the minimum wage or 55 percent of the average wage (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 200).

Latvia´s pension scheme was reformed in 1995. The reform included above mentioned three-pillar model. The first pillar is an obligatory, largely unredistributive defined-contribution pay-as-you-go scheme. The second pillar contains obligatory pension funds and is (also) earnings-related. The third pillar is voluntary. With this scheme, Latvia has introduced a rather liberal pension scheme (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 157ff.). In Estonia, private pensions are more widespread and the Latvian scheme is close to the Swedish model.

Natali (2004: 362ff.) points out that the Lithuanian pension system is more Bismarckian.

Unemployment benefits

The unemployment rate among the Russian minority is markedly higher than that of native Estonians and Latvians, primarily due to lower qualifications and poor language skills. Further, in contrast to the EU-15, in all Baltic countries men´s unemployment rate is higher than women´s (Paas et al. 2004: 182ff.).

Baltic benefits are modest, have a short duration and are financed through contributions by employers and employees (Aidukaite 2006: 263, see also Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 198). Those who have not qualified through work receive means-tested benefits. While in Lithuania people can qualify not merely through work, but also through child raising, in other respects this country has the strictest conditions: The work record demanded for eligibility is the longest; benefits are the lowest and the shortest of all Baltic countries. The Baltics´ low benefits, tight rules and possible stigma associated with dependence lead to low sign-up rates: About half of unemployed Estonians and merely one in eight unemployed Lithuanians receives benefits (Aidukaite 2006: 267f.).

In comparison to the EU-25 (6.3 percent), Estonia (1.6 percent) spends an extraordinarily low share of its social security expenditures on the unemployed. This can not be explained with unemployment rates slightly below the EU-25 average. As with pensions, Estonia´s unemployment scheme is considered liberal or Bismarckian (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 188ff.). Between 1998 and 2005, benefits amounted to merely 23 percent of the minimum wage and to about 10 percent of the average wage (see also Vodopevic et al. 2003: 19). Estonia´s system has the lowest replacement rate in the EU (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 200). Taken together with the rates for pensions, these figures explain why Estonia is on European levels in terms of pension spending, yet far under the European average in unemployment spending.

The Latvian scheme is staggered in two dimensions. Firstly, the number of years worked is taken into account: Those who have worked for 30 years or more receive 65 percent of previous earnings (20 years: 60 percent, ten years: 55 percent, less than ten years: 50 percent. In contrast to Southern countries like Spain, the number of working years is less important in determining benefit levels). Secondly, with longer unemployment spells benefits decrease: In the first three months, the rates above get paid, in the next three months, only 75 percent of these rates, and in the subsequent three months only 50 percent (Baum-Ceisig 2008: 169). As with Hungary, Baum-Ceisig et al. (2008: 170) conclude that the scheme is not sufficiently

status-preserving, since benefit levels are low and drop fast. Given a short work history, after six months of unemployment benefits drop to 25 percent of previous income (50 percent of 50 percent). Therefore, Baum-Ceisig et al. ask if this offers sufficient financial security.

Taken together, Estonia´s and Latvia´s social security system are mixes of corporatist and basic security models, while Lithuania´s is the most liberal one with basic targeted and basic security ones (Aidukaite 2006: 267f.).

Countries: South-eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Romania

Reform endeavours in the early 1990s were desultory and became better, yet not good, in subsequent years (Faggio and Konings 2001: 2). As Sotiropoulos (2004: 117) with reference to Deacon´s classification of these countries as belonging to the "post-communist conservative corporatism" group notes, during post-1990 transition these countries neither on the level of ideas nor on the level of policies wholeheartedly rejected socialism.

Economic developments after 1990 have been worse than in other CEE countries. GDPs per capita still lag behind the relatively wealthy Visegrád group and the mediocre Baltics and are the lowest in the EU. From even this lower basis a lower share gets spent on social security (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003:117, Sotiropoulos 2004: 119). With 13 (Bulgaria) and 11 (Romania) percent of GDP, social expenditures are very low, only Cyprus´ and Turkey´s expenditures are lower (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 117). This results in "deep poverty" (Sotiropoulos 2004: 116): Bulgaria is the EU country with the highest share of households suffering from material scarcity (Nicaise 2005: 3).

Pensions

In the late 1990s, Bulgaria as well as Romania changed their pension schemes and introduced the World-Bank proposed three-pillar model (Sotiropoulos/Pop 2007: 62).

In 2000 Bulgaria decided to introduce a three-pillar pension scheme. The first pillar is public, the second private but mandatory (not for those born before 1960) and the third private and voluntary. This happened not just under World Bank influence, but also due to domestic actors considering the previous system no longer legitimate. Its financial problems were too grave because the ratio between payers and recipients was too low, partially due to

demographic circumstances, partially due to a low retirement age. Further, old-age poverty was widespread because benefits were too low (Asenova/McKinnon 2007: 390f.).

The new system is still underfunded and will be cross-financed by revenues from privatisation, which will be insufficient. Originally, the target was a replacement rate of 60 percent of the recipient´s last salary. Yet, with a combined replacement rate of merely 44.4 percent benefits falls short of this goal (Asenova/McKinnon 2007: 392). The average pension is at about a quarter of the average wage, so that poverty among retired Bulgarians is widespread (Asenova/McKinnon 2007: 393).

After the Romanian revolution of 1989, the system has been left unchanged for the time being. A low number of working years required for full eligibility (men: 30 years, women: 25 years) and the possibility to retire five years before the low official retirement age led to a huge increase in the number of pensioners in 1990/1991. Baum-Ceisig et al. (2008: 183) trace this development back to interest-led policies designed for special societal groups. As in other CEE countries, the increase in the number of pensioners was accompanied by a decrease in the number of contributors. The Romanian scheme has been reformed in 2000, which squares with the general assessment of Bulgaria and Romania as reform laggards. The point of orientation has been the World Bank´s three pillar model: The first (redistributive, obligatory) pillar will be supplemented by a second, private and funded pillar. The third pillar should be a voluntary private component for high-income groups. Yet, only the first pillar works smoothly. Baum-Ceisig et al. (2008: 186) conclude that due to the reform of 2000, in principle Romania´s scheme is comparable to schemes of other EU member states, while economic hardship still causes practical problems.

With around 40 percent both countries´ replacement rates are lower than those of the Visegrád countries or the former Yugoslavian countries (Stanovnik 2009: 60.)

Unemployment benefits

After transition, unemployment has been high in Bulgaria (Sotiropoulos et al. 2003: 668, Vodopivec et al. 2003: 8f.). The initially generous scheme has been cut back during the 1990s (Sotiropoulos et al. 2003: 668, Vodopivec et al. 2003: 16). From 1998 on, benefits were at least at 85 and ceiled at 140 percent of the minimum wage. Among the ten CEE countries shown by Vodopivec et al. (2003: 16ff.), Bulgaria and Latvia have by far the lowest ceiling,

i.e. weak earnings-relatedness, yet in the late 1990s a replacement rate of 60 percent, which is slightly above the CEE average.

In 1991, Romania introduced an unemployment scheme. Until 2002, unemployed received 75 percent of their previous income. To prevent unemployed from receiving benefits higher than the national minimum wage, reforms in 2002 and 2005 established benefits at 75 percent of the national minimum wage (in 2008 this has been 26 percent of the average wage). Those who worked for 20 years or longer receive slightly higher benefits, up to 85 percent of the national minimum wage. For those who worked for less than five years, eligibility expires after six months, for others who worked for more than five years, after nine months. After that, unemployed receive flat-rate benefits (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 206ff.). In comparison to other European countries in Romania unemployment is a minor problem. The real problems are unproductive industries, economic gaps between rural and urban regions and a widespread informal and subsistence economy (Baum-Ceisig 2008: 210).

Countries: Post-Soviet II: Russia and Ukraine

In contrast to Visegrád and Baltic countries, the initial reforms in the former Soviet countries proved far less successful. Both countries displayed the worst economic performance of all CEE countries: After transition Russia´s GDP dropped by 45 percent and Ukraine´s even by 65 percent (Svejnar 2001: 10); both countries´ recessions lasted for more than a decade (Svejnar 2001: 30; again, comparisons with pre-transition figures are difficult). Further, these countries had the highest levels of inflation, partially exceeding 2000 percent (Svejnar 2001: 5ff.) and the highest inequality with Gini coefficients of .30 in Ukraine and .40 in Russia (Standing 1996: 235, for more recent figures see also Table A2.4), probably even higher in reality (Svejnar 2001: 26), reaching .50 in Russia. While central Europe´s low Gini coefficients result from successful social policies, the Russian welfare state even raises inequality (Svejnar 2001: 26). The reasons may be found in bad targeting: "The poorest 10 percent of the population receive *less* than 10 percent of social assistance spending" (Barr 2002: 39, emphasis in original). This does not necessarily imply that money is being transferred from the poor to the rich, since the latter pay a larger share of social expenditures.

Russia´s absolute poverty rate is high (Barr 2002: 28). Poverty statistics rely on official wages, but in both countries real poverty is higher due to the non-payment or delays of wage payments (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 54) or even of welfare payments like

retirement benefits (Kornai 1997: 1184). Further, in Russia poverty and unemployment differed strongly between regions (Manning 2004: 217).

Pensions

From the mid-1990s until 2001, the Ukrainian pension scheme offered average replacement rates of 30 to 40 percent (Noel et al. 2006: 30) or of 55 percent (Rohozynsky 2006: 28).

In 2003, parliament introduced a new three-pillar scheme: The first pillar provides a replacement rate of one percent of pensionable wage per working year. Contributions and benefits are ceiled at seven times of average earnings, the time span on which benefits levels are calculated has been lengthened. Therefore, the new first pillar is strongly earnings-related. In 2004, the minimum pension was raised from previously 43 percent of minimum wage to 120 percent or 49 percent of average wage (which increased pension spending as a share of GDP from ten percent to 14 to 16 percent, see also Rohozynsky 2006: 33). As a result, nearly nine out of ten pensioners received the minimum pension in 2004, eliminating the earnings-related elements strengthened the year before. Rohozynsky (2006: 30) states that rising social expenditures were caused by two major parties with approximately the same shares of votes trying to surpass each other in popularity. For the same reasons, taxes and contributions could not be raised. Rohozynsky (2006: 31) points out that in 2005 the pension fund had an extraordinarily huge deficit of five to six percent of GDP.

The second pillar is mandatory for younger and middle-aged workers and consists of personal accounts. The third pillar consists of voluntary private pensions. In 2005, the average Ukrainian pension has been at about 40 percent of average wages (Noel et al. 2006: 23ff.)

In sum, the Ukrainian pension scheme has only weak earnings-related elements, and low to medium generosity. It resembles the Russian scheme.

In the 1990s Russian government did not succeed in their attempts to keep average pensions above the subsistence level. In 1999 the average pensioner received about 60 or 70 percent of the subsistence minimum (Williamson et al. 2006: 166ff.).

In 2002, Russia introduced a World Bank-like three-pillar scheme (Hauner 2008: 3, Williamson et al. 166ff.). This was "[…] in part a response to the nation´s fiscal need for neo-liberal structural adjustments […]" (Williamson et al. 2006: 168).

The first pillar is redistributive and offers a flat-rate pension intended to ensure a basic standard of living.

The second pillar is earnings-related. Individual contributions determine the level of benefits. The third pillar is mandatory for young workers and voluntary for others. Contributors chose a fund, if not, the default fund is chosen (Hauner 2008: 3f.). The last point resembles the Swedish scheme. The first pillar consumes most of the contributions so that not much financial capital is directed to the earnings-related part. On the other hand, Williamson et al. (2006: 172) state that the new system strengthens the ties between contributions and benefits (see also Góra/Rohozynsky 2008: 7). The limited financial means and the resulting relative strength of the first pillar are due to the low contribution rate.

Williamson et al. (2006: 171f.) conclude that with the new scheme Russians will reduce elderly poverty, yet has negative implications for women, low earners, the informally employed[24] and the frequently unemployed.

The replacement rate is the lowest in the OECD and at 40 percent (Hauner 2008: 5, see also Kapstein 2002: 219) and will decline. Since the average pension is at the subsistence level, due to differing individual levels some pensioners receive less than considered necessary (Hauner 2008: 6). Those pensioners cannot rely on pensions alone and have to look for other sources of income (Williamson et al. 2006: 172).

In sum, due to actual weak earnings-relatedness and low benefits, the Ukrainian and even more so the Russian pension scheme resemble the liberal type.

Unemployment benefits

In Russia as well as Ukraine, post-transition official unemployment was lower than in other CEE countries merely due to statistical reasons (Standing 1996: 235). Benefits were low from the outset, declined further and were not always paid (Svejnar 2001: 8).

The Ukrainian scheme came into being in 1991 and resembled the liberal type in eligibility criteria and benefits levels (Kupets 2006: 231) until the new system came into effect in 2001. With 25 to 28 percent of the official average wage or 50 to 70 percent of the national minimum wage, benefits are still low (Kupets 2006: 231). Further, coverage is below 70 percent of registered unemployed, and less than half of those unemployed after ILO definitions (see Kupets 2006: 232 for these definitions) register as unemployed, which implies that only about a third of the actual unemployed receives benefits. In a study conducted by

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[24] With the shadow economy reaching roughly half of the GDP (Góra/Rohozynsky 2008: 5), the informal sector is important.

Kupets, less than five percent of the unemployed reported that unemployment benefits were their main source of income, while help from other household members was the most important source of material well-being (Kupets 2006: 231ff.). Pointing out the low benefit level in comparison to other CEE countries, Kupets (2006: 231) states that the Ukrainian scheme incentives the unemployed to search for employment stronger than other CEE schemes, but, correspondingly, neglects the unemployed´s material well-being.

The Russian system provides high coverage and low benefits. In 2009, the net replacement rate was at 26 percent, after one year of unemployment benefits amount to five percent of previous income (OECD 2011:39): "Income security is an underdeveloped feature of the Russian labour market" (OECD 2011: 39).

CEE welfare regimes

In terms of welfare spending and economic performance, there are notable differences between CEE countries. On one side there are the Visegrád countries and two former Yugoslavian countries, which seem to be closest to Western Europe on both accounts. Other CEE countries´ economic output is lower, and a lower share is spent on social security.

Various attempts to divide CEE countries into smaller subcategories depicted above show that there is consensus concerning the impossibility to categorise these countries into existing regime types and the appropriateness of a new regime type. Yet, there is disagreement concerning intra-regime differences and the classification of countries. The easiest solution, the introduction of numerous regime types to reduce intra-regime differences, should be avoided for the sake of clarity.

Concluding from the necessarily superficial analysis of CEE countries´ cash benefits, it seems that economically more successful countries spend far more as percentage of GDP than countries with lower GDPs. This is coherent to what Busch (1998: 148ff.) found out for Western Europe.

From this point of view, intra-regime differences are too large to subsume CEE countries into one regime. On the other hand, there is the question of how to categorise the Baltics and the south-eastern European countries Bulgaria and Romania. They may be considered different from the Visegrád countries (Bohle and Greskovits 2006: 22). There are four different possible CEE categorisations:

1. Visegrád and FYC / Baltics; Bulgaria and Romania; Russia and Ukraine

In contrast, Deacon classifies the Baltics to the same category as the Visegrád countries, which he expects to approach the "Western European welfare model".

2. Visegrád and FYC; Baltics / Bulgaria and Romania; Russia and Ukraine

On the other hand, the "Europe effect" which may lead to the implication of western European standards applies to (prospective) EU members (Orenstein/ Haas 2002: 3):

3. Visegrád and FYC; Baltics; Bulgaria and Romania / Russia and Ukraine

In this case, a sensible division would be between Russia and Ukraine on the one side and all other countries on the one side on the other. Lastly, there is Palier´s (2006: 105) suggestion:

4. one CEE regime

The initial reason for classifications here was the assumption that in distinct welfare regimes corresponding attitudes are to be found. This leads to the decision for merely one CEE regime: If socialist countries shaped their citizens´ attitudes, these were roughly similar across CEE countries before 1990. Assuming that welfare attitudes result – at least partially – from basic conceptions of justice, which in turn are relatively resilient to change, it is possible that CEE countries form a coherent attitude cluster different from other countries. Therefore, and for the sake of analytical parsimony, CEE countries will be subsumed into one regime. On the other hand, it is possible that nearly two decades of distinct national paths have brought along diversity between CEE citizens´ attitudes. Lastly, it is possible that CEE citizens differed markedly in their attitudes already in 1990.

4.3.6   Uncategorised welfare states

Switzerland

From the mid-1980s onwards, Switzerland´s social spending as share of GDP rose rapidly. This is not due to higher generosity, but to low economic growth, higher unemployment and population aging (Bonoli 2004: 159). Coverage has not risen since 1980, the year Esping-

Andersen´s data stem from. Nevertheless, with a rise of 18.6 percent Switzerland ranks highest in gains in corrected social security spending as a percentage of GDP, which takes demographic and other factors into account (Jochem 2004: 232f.).

The Swiss welfare state has not changed significantly (Bonoli 2004: 162). Scruggs (2006: 353, see also Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 29) notes that Switzerland is mostly regarded as a liberal welfare state and Trampusch (2008: 50) terms it "post-liberal". Yet Switzerland´s de-commodification score is rather high in Esping-Andersen´s (1990: 52) analysis and Scruggs and Allan´s replication. In their figures for 2002, benefit equality is low for unemployment, which is a conservative trait, but high in pensions, on liberal levels. Other data for pensions and unemployment benefits do also not support the categorisation of Switzerland as liberal, since replacement rates are far too high. In some cases, Switzerland is on (low) liberal levels. Given the similarity of the UK and Ireland in most cases, Switzerland cannot be added to the liberal group and will be left uncategorised.

Pensions

In Switzerland, a public pillar is supplemented by an occupational pillar. On average, the public basic pension replaces merely 35 percent of previous income (Bonoli 2003: 408). This is "modest" (Queisser/Vittas 2000: 4). Redistribution is high, since contributions are not capped (but nevertheless low) and the ratio between the highest and the lowest benefits is two to one (40 to 20 percent of average earnings). The second pillar is compulsory for all employees with incomes exceeding a minimum level (Queisser/Vittas 2000: 5ff.). Although this pillar is compulsory, regulations leave much space for variations in various characteristics (Queisser/Vittas 2000: 28). Nevertheless, legal rules determine that the second-pillar pension will correspond to about 35 percent, so that combined with the first pillar the second pillar will lead to a replacement rate of 60 to 70 percent for a worker with average earnings (Queisser/Vittas 2000: 28). Both pillars are earnings-related, but the occupational pillar is more so. The earnings-related part is placed more in the market, so that government is not directly responsible for it (Myles/Pierson 2001: 317, see also Bonoli 2004: 162).

Unemployment benefits

The unemployment rate was very low until the early 1990s and remained low compared to other European countries (Bonoli 2004: 159). Swiss unemployed receive benefits either from

unemployment insurance, which is not means-tested; its regulations are made by the national government (Hotz-Hart et al. 2006: 651). Contributions are paid by employees and employers; the level of benefits is earnings-related (for details see Hotz-Hart et al. 2006: 674, Straubhaar/Werner 2003: 67, Schömann et al. 2000: appendix, and Bonoli 2001: 255).

Since 2003, this payment may last for 400 days, if the beneficiary proves that he actively tries to find a job. Regulations put unemployed people under strong pressure to find a job (Straubhaar/Werner 2003: 67). Those not eligible receive means-tested benefits, with regulations being made by the Cantons (Hotz-Hart et al. 2006: 651ff.).

The Netherlands

Originally the Dutch welfare state has been typically Corporatist with family-centred benefits (Schmidt 2002: 179f.). Later, a shift from universalism to individual responsibility took place. Besides Denmark, Cox (2001: 463ff.) terms the Netherlands a model case of welfare reform; Caminada and Goudswaars (2009: 1ff.) show that this is a main reason for increasing income inequality in the Netherlands,

In Table 4.2, the Netherlands´ benefit equality is between social democratic and conservative countries, depending on policy field. Some authors (Bonoli 1997: 361; Huber/Stephens 2001b: 110ff. Castles 2004: 77, Schmid 2008: 718ff.) label the Netherlands as conservative or Christian democratic; the same result emerges from Fenger´s (2007: 21) cluster analysis. Borchert (1998: 166f.) states that the Netherlands are no longer a conservative welfare state. Maître et al. (2005: 158) categorise this country in the social-democratic cluster, along with northern Europe. It is worthwhile to examine this case closer. In the 1970s, the Netherlands were economically weak. Unemployment was high and public budgets were strained (Jochem 2004: 237). As a reaction, under PM Lubbers, beginning in 1982 the Dutch unemployment and pension schemes have undergone massive cutbacks (Green-Pedersen 2001: 971f., Schmidt 2002: 180). This country is the only one which lowered its social security spending as percentage of GDP between 1980 and 1995 (half a percentage point) and later (Siegel 2005: 60; Jochem 2004: 232f.; Cox 2001: 465). Concerning corrected spending (i.e. regarding the number of dependents), with -14.8 percent the Netherlands had the largest drop (Jochem 2004: 233), albeit the strong Dutch GDP per capita growth has to be taken into account.

Despite these changes in the liberal direction, Becker (2000: 220ff.) describes the Dutch welfare system as still overtly generous in a worldwide perspective. Since many

benefits are financed by contributions and are earnings-related (Becker 2000: 226), there are some conservative elements in the Dutch welfare state.

Summarising that some authors categorise the Netherlands as conservative, some as social-democratic, that benefits´ income-relatedness is comparably high and significant liberalisations have taken place, the Dutch case is a mixed one. This is analogous to Borchert's (1998: 164) description of the Netherlands as a mixed model containing conservative and social-democratic elements which is supplemented by liberal elements, or Pennings´ (2005: 335) statement that categorising the Netherlands as conservative is outdated and that this country does not belong to any regime type.

Pensions

Virtually everyone aged 65 or older gets the same basic payments. According to de Vos and Kapteyn (2001: 241, see also Myles/Pierson 2001: 317 and Natali 2004: 361), there is no government-provided earnings-related pension, but additional occupational pensions. Since 1994, the basic pension amounts to only 50 percent of the minimum wage (Vos/Kapteyn: 2001: 236ff.). In other words, the scheme is largely private, since the public part has a replacement rate of merely 40 percent (Bonoli 2003: 400, 408) and people in retirement age on average derived merely half of their income from it in 1993/1994 (de Vos/Kapteyn 2001: 253). In the late 1990s its was only 45 percent (Haverland 2001: 311), a number which may should fallen further since then. Contributions to occupational (earnings-related) pensions are calculated so that they, together with the basic pension, provide a replacement rate of 70 percent (Haverland 2001: 312). So the Dutch pension system is as generous as the German pension system (Haverland 2001: 312f.), but with less government responsibility.

Unemployment benefits

In the 1990s the replacement rate has been reduced from 80 percent to 70 percent of previous earnings (Gorter 2000: 192, 206, Schmid 1995: 66, Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 99). Still, in 1994 the OECD stated that the Dutch unemployment scheme offers very generous replacement rates (cited in Gorter 2000: 192). Table A2.6 shows that this still holds true. Those not eligible because they were never entitled or have expired entitlements receive flat-rate benefits (Schmid 1995: 67). In 2000, this unemployment assistance has been at 70 percent of minimum wage (Schömann et al. 2000, appendix). After the tightening of work

requirements (duration of employment) in 1995 wage-related benefits enabling unemployed recipients to preserve their previous standard of living became less frequent, so that to some degree conservative elements gave way to liberal elements (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 100, van Oorschot 2002b: 114 states that about half of the workforce would get earnings-related benefits if they would be laid off): Benefits are lower and shorter (van Oorschot 2002b: 114).

In general, the country is the one with the most impressive rise in employment in recent decades, even considering the low level from where it started, the 'Dutch disease' - politics of inactivity (Goul Andersen/Halvorsen 2002: 7). This was accompanied with a decline in unemployment, indicating that PM Lubbers´ policies (Schmidt 2002: 181) and the continuance by successive PM Kok worked. Yet, Kenworthy (2003: 1202, see also Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 29ff., van Oorschot 2002b: 108f. and 117) notes that the rise in employment has been mainly boosted by a strong rise in part-time employment, which is not too grave considering that most Dutch working part-time do so voluntarily. Further, the decline in unemployment is not as impressive as it seems on first sight, since it is partially due to a very generous definition of disability.

Israel

As in Cyprus, in Israel foreign policy issues drew more attention than welfare policies. Further, foreign policy also draws financial resources. Wilensky (2003: 368) assumed that Israel would spend more on social security if military spending were lower. Although this statement is from 1981, it may still apply. Another distinct feature is Israel´s huge immigration in the 1990s from the former Soviet Union which, according to Rosenhek (1999: 490f.), contributed to higher unemployment, the expansion of the high-tech industry and increasing wage disparities.

In the decades after state foundation the Israeli welfare state moved away from a British-influenced Beveridge system and developed into a "comprehensive social protection system" that covers the entire population. Means- tested benefits have been replaced by universalism (Room 2000: 93f.). In Doron´s (2000: 101) view, in this period Israel followed the European model. This development has been reversed in the 1990s; being low in the past, inequality rose to high levels (Room 2000: 94).

Apparently contrasting retrenchment developments, Barak-Erez (2003: 106) sees numerous new social rights, supported by people´s undiminished support for the welfare state: According to Shalev (2007a: 193), support for social welfare policy and redistribution is high.

In 1996, actual inequality as well as support for redistribution were higher than in most western countries. Among the countries with support for redistribution comparable to Israel were the southern countries Italy, Portugal and Spain and the post-communist countries Hungary, Eastern Germany, Slovenia, Poland and Russia (cf. Shalev 2007a: 195).

On the other hand, Room (2000: 94f.) assumes that Israel´s swift economic growth has led to declining importance and approval among the population of its welfare system, even among its dependents. However, citizens seem to be ambivalent between their welfare demands and their ambitions to be competitive in the face of globalised markets (Barak-Erez 2003: 106ff.). Barak-Erez´ (2003: 107f.) enumeration of new social rights enjoyed by Israelis shows that there is no contradiction between Rosenhek´s description of retrenchment and hers of the welfare states´ expansion. The latter took place mainly in the fields of education, health, elderly care and public housing. Following Barak-Erez (2003: 112), formal entitlement rules should not be taken at face value, since bureaucrats use their leeway to limit welfare payments with support or silent approval of their superiors. These restrictions seem to apply mainly to the fields mentioned above and not to unemployment assistance or retirement payments. Since Barak-Erez (2003: 122) mentions merely one example of bureaucratic arbitrariness in the area of unemployment compensation, it is not clear if these practices are widespread.

Israel´s GDP per capita is on a southern European level and its spending on social security is low (Doron 2000: 103). So Israel has some features in common with other southern countries. Consequently, in their typology consisting of corporatist, liberal, social-democratic and post-socialist welfare states, Beller and Hout (2006: 357) classify Israel as conservative because of its high emphasis on religion and family ties. On the other hand, summarising social protection, pension and health expenditures, Kondratowitz (2003: 34) states that data does not support this classification. This is plausible against the background of Israel´s low pension expenditures (Kondratowitz 2003: 34; cf. Weihl 1998: 5, albeit, again, the number of dependents has to be taken into account).

The case of Israel shows that the concept of welfare regimes is partially inapplicable in non-western countries (Shalev 2007a: 194). Gal (draft: 8) remarks that Israel has sometimes been described as conservative and sometimes as social-democratic and very seldomly as Mediterranean and concludes that it is uncertain if existing classifications apply. Possibly the best description is that of a "'*mixed model*, with liberal, conservative and social democratic features" (Lowenstein/Ogg 2003: 3, emphasis in original, see also Kondratowitz 2003: 53).

Pensions

Israel´s life expectancy has risen and its birth rate declined, resulting in a growing share of elderly among the population (Doron 2000: 102), but in a European comparison Israel´s fertility rate is still high (even higher than Turkey´s; cf. Gal draft: 9). Therefore, the elderly dependency ratio is favourable and pension expenditures are low (Kondratowitz 2003: 33ff.). Since the elderly dependency ratio is calculated on the basis of the share of population aged over 60 and in Israel the labour force participation of those over 65 is very high (Kondratowitz 2003: 41), the difference between Israel and European countries in the real elderly dependency ratio is even higher.

Originally, the level of retirement payments depends on contributions and therefore labour market participation (Ajzenstadt/Gal 2001: 310), so that pensions are earnings-related (Weihl 1998: 4). This is a conservative or southern feature. According to Gamliel-Yehoshua and Vanhuysse (2010: 723), Israel social spending moved from the rather not elderly-oriented side in 1975-1995 to the medium elderly-oriented side in 2005 (their calculations regard number of elderly and children and payments to them).

Unemployment benefits

After the 1970s benefit levels were cut, eligibility rules were tightened, means-tested elements introduced and government expenditures reduced (Rosenhek 2003: 86f.): Retrenchment has been the major trend in the 1980s (Doron 2000: 101). Doron sees a departure from the European model and Israel´s approximation to the American model with a high reliance on the market. Further, successes in the reduction of relative poverty are meagre. Relative poverty has risen in the past decades (Room 2000: 94), which is a logical consequence of growing income disparities. In these respects, Israel displays liberal features.

To qualify for unemployment assistance, between six and nine months of employment are necessary, with exceptions for former soldiers and newly arriving immigrants. Discharged soldiers and Jewish immigrants are privileged in their first year after discharge or arrival. This reflects the important role of the welfare state for nation-building (Rosenhek 2003: 93f.).

In order not to lose their entitlements, beneficiaries have to take on 'suitable' work, which is defined as similar to former work. In the 1990s, this definition was widened for the young unemployed, and the distance unemployed persons may be expected to travel to their new workplace was extended. Since the late 1990s, financial punishments for refusals to

accept suitable work are more severe (Rosenhek 2003: 94f.). The maximum duration of benefits has been reduced. Notwithstanding these changes, the average unemployment benefit as percentage of the average wage did not decline from 1980 to 1999 (Rosenhek 2003: 99), but due to reforms in 2002/2003 (Gamliel-Yehoshua/Vanhuysse 2010: 717).

Further, due to a change in the nature of unemployment, that is, the increasing share of long-term unemployed, these changes did not result in the hoped-for lower number of unemployment assistance recipients (Rosenhek 2003: 95).

4.4 Pension reform

Myles and Pierson (2001: 308) see the strongest pension crisis symptoms in continental Europe, since there spending is highest due to generous systems and widespread early retirement. All pay-as-you-go systems became problematic, because basic parameters like rising wage rates, high employment rates and high birth rates, have changed (Myles/Pierson 2001: 310f.). The resulting problem is: If wages do not rise (and labour costs should not, for competitive reasons), it is not possible to channel a higher proportion into pension schemes without causing falling disposable incomes. Higher contributions or taxes would be necessary to counterbalance rising dependency ratios. Otherwise, replacement rates for the elderly would have to drop or dependency ratios have to improve due to later retirement or higher employment rates among those below legal retirement age. Analogous to the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy' (see below), there is a 'Trilemma of Pension Schemes': There are three goals: Sensible wages (sustainable for employers, not too low net earnings for employees), high replacement rates, and not too high retirement ages. Only two of them can be fulfilled to the cost of the neglect of the third:

1. Low and therefore competitive wage costs and low retirement ages can be upheld; replacement rates would be depressed.
2. High replacement rates and low retirement ages can be upheld. Rising contributions would necessitate either dropping real wages or higher labour costs. Alternatively, rising contributions could fill the gap, although the effect of rising employee taxes to purchasing power is similar as that of falling wages, and the effect of rising corporate taxes is similar to the effect of rising labour costs. High indirect taxes lead to lower real wages.

3. Wages and replacement rates could be kept constant, if retirement ages would be higher, so that dependency ratios would improve. Alternatively, employment rates among the younger could rise.

Pedersen and Finseraas (2009: 192) imply the same trilemma when discussing the EU´s objectives of pension 'sustainability' and 'adequacy'. They point out that the former implies cuts (possibly against the backdrop that they consider option 2 infeasible), while the latter implies the continuance of present levels. They see a way to avoid trading one goal for another in later retirement, which is option 3 above: It would reduce the number of dependents and at the same time raise the number of contributors (Pedersen/Finseraas 2009: 192, see also, e.g., Blekesaune/Solem 2005: 4).

As Myles and Pierson (2001: 311) note, rising unemployment in the 1990s created an environment in which rising associate employer outlays, which could further spur unemployment, were considered a bad idea. The other part of option 2 would be to lower net wages via higher contributions and taxes. As will be seen, the preferred solutions were higher retirement ages and lower replacement rates.

Myles and Pierson (2001: 305ff.) state that due to their high fiscal impact, pension schemes have been considered problematic for three decades, which led to major reforms in almost all OECD countries. Notwithstanding, they expect expenditures to rise, since increasing outlays created by the number of dependents will outweigh any cuts.

Pensions are a prime example of path dependencies (Myles/Pierson 2001: 306), because past decisions constrain future choices for a long time. Decisions lead to effects with considerable time-lags (Hinrichs 2000: 356). This is especially the case in contributions-financed systems, where the feeling of entitlement to a certain benefit level may be stronger than in tax-based systems. Further, contributors have inalienable legal rights to benefits. Therefore, Myles and Pierson (2001: 312ff.) expect diversity to continue due to the pre-structuring of available options and differences in affected groups´ political strength. Shifts away from pay-as-you-go systems to funded designs are hard because due to precommitments workers have to pay double (see also Pierson 2004: 161). This problem, which is added to already existing problems, "is likely to present an insurmountable barrier to privatization or the capitalization of existing public schemes" (Myles/Pierson 2001: 313). The authors categorise the countries into two groups:

The first group consists of "latecomers", which had no or modest earnings-related pay-as-you-go-schemes in 1980: Ireland, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the Antipodes (see also, confirming, Natali 2004: 368 and Holzmann 2006: 247). The UK had an extensive earnings-related programme; yet in the early 1980s this was merely recently implemented. Except Switzerland, which also had Bismarckian elements, all these countries had Beveridgean systems (Myles/Pierson 2001: 316). The latecomer group could easily shift due to low earnings-related liabilities.

The second group consists of 'mature systems' and is composed of the remaining countries. For these countries, the World Bank´s reform suggestions, which stress privatisation (Myles/Pierson 2001: 305), are "largely irrelevant to the practical problems facing policy makers" (Myles/Pierson 2001: 318). Yet, Pedersen and Finseraas (2009: 191) argue that "although few, if any, countries followed the Bank´s radical solution", it had strong agenda-setting effects.

Capital cover and privatisation have been introduced (see also Matos 2009; the text has no page numbers), albeit to small degrees. Reductions of government responsibility for earnings-related benefits in favour of privatisation and market-reliance take place slowly, since people need time to adjust and save up money to compensate. Basically, entitlements to earnings-related benefits cause costs to finance present retirees´ benefits, which have to be financed via earnings-related contributions of the economically active. These contributions, in turn, lead to entitlements. Therefore, sudden changes would cause severe disruptions and are not feasible. Either present retirees´ benefits would have to be cut to basic levels, earnings-related (high) contributions without promising corresponding benefits would have to be collected or funding gaps could be subsidised via taxes. Each solution would bring about a large group of losers, which is politically not feasible:

> "The emergent model among the 'latecomers' is a novel 'welfare state for the elderly' for which there is precious little historical precedent […] this novel form is simply not available as a serious political option in many nations. A principle corollary of this general argument is that attempts to design an optimal system and then insist governments to adopt it, as the World Bank has done, is unhelpful at best and a distracting form of utopianism at worst" (Myles/Pierson 2001: 330).

Myles and Pierson (2001: 330) conclude that the latecomer countries have created systems approximating World Bank suggestions, where low basic pensions as safety net of last resort are provided by government and earnings-related elements are provided by markets. The second group, consisting of most continental and northern countries, has implemented

reforms cutting benefits (Myles/Pierson 2001: 331). Lastly, privatisation means lower government responsibility, higher earnings-relatedness and less redistribution.

Since factors leading to pension problems, like declining birth rates and increasing longevity (and, partly, spreading early retirement) affect all affluent countries to comparable degrees, Hinrichs (2000: 79) asks if this leads to international convergence. This, in turn, would contradict Esping-Andersen assumption of welfare clusters´ consistent distinctiveness. Using the common distinction between earnings-related Bismarckian systems and flat-rate Beveridge systems, Hinrichs (2000: 81) depicts two developments: In Bismarckian systems (Germany, France and Belgium), earnings-relatedness has been supplemented by minimum pensions for pensioners with insufficient entitlements. Natali (2004: 355) sees this as first step towards hybridisation and step towards the Anglo-Saxon model, since the underlying distribution principle is need, the goal is the alleviation of poverty and it is tax-financed.

Likewise, Beveridge countries supplemented their basic pensions with earnings-related benefits to the satisfaction of their rising white-collar middle classes. Some countries did this earlier via a public pillar, like Sweden, Finland and Norway around and shortly after 1960, which is a shift towards Bismarckian schemes (Natali 2004: 358). Other countries supplemented basic pensions later with an occupational and private earnings-related second pillar (Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, which are "latecomer" countries, cf. Myles/Pierson 2001: 313). In the UK, public earnings-related pensions were introduced in 1978 and partly abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s in favour of public subsidised private pensions. Summarising, in all Beveridge countries mentioned here, emphasis has to a certain extent shifted from governmental responsibility for sufficient and satisfying retirement benefits to personal responsibility (Hinrichs 2000: 82f.). The only Beveridgean country relevant here whose pension system remained largely Beveridgean is Ireland, since occupational pensions are not widespread and offer a low coverage rate. As a consequence of these developments, in all three old regime clusters, earnings-related pension schemes can be found, yet, as noted above, in latecomer countries earnings-relatedness is market-provided.

The main distinction now between the countries mentioned above is that the latecomer countries (Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK) need lower taxes or contributions from their citizens than social insurance countries, since the latecomers´ systems are more "private and funded" (Hinrichs 2000: 83).[25]

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[25] The distinction between public and private pension schemes leads to a methodological problem inherent in the ESS4- questionnaire. The question concerning government responsibility for the old refers to *government* responsibility. The question concerning pensions´ earnings-relatedness leaves open who should distribute

In case of the social insurance countries (Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Norway), there have been some common developments since the mid-1980s. Redistribution has been diminished due to longer reference periods, so that benefit levels stronger reflect life earnings and contributions than before, when only some (the best or the last) years were considered. Further, retirement ages have been raised, which also raises the age when early retirement is possible or lowers the benefits holding actual retirement ages constant. Another feature is increased tax financing in order to reduce pressures to raise contributions, which would raise the costs of labour and therefore weaken international competitiveness (Hinrichs 2000: 85ff.)

Summarising these developments, Hinrichs (2000: 90) concludes that concerning the dual structure of pension schemes, that is minimum benefits to prevent poverty in old age plus earnings-relatedness to maintain accustomed standards of living, a development towards convergence has taken place. Therefore, he (2000: 91; 96) doubts that the regime concept is still appropriate in relation to pension schemes, because social democratic elements were eliminated (by social democratic parties and without resistance in the populations). In his view, "substantial path changes […] have occurred".

Testing the hypothesis of increasing convergence, analysing 14 western European countries Pedersen and Finseraas (2009: 199ff.) found out that gross replacement rates in the first pillar in 2004 and changes in these replacement rates from 2004 until 2050 are negatively correlated. Further, these changes in replacement rates are mostly negative. More generous systems cut benefits to higher degrees than less generous systems, which is a move towards convergence. The results apply to the 'representative' as well as the low-wage worker. Likewise, rising (merely Ireland will have a declining replacement rate) replacement rates in the second pillar until 2050 are negatively correlated to replacement rates in 2004. That means that there is upward convergence in the second pillar (due to lack of data this prediction is based on only eight countries). Though, in terms of replacement rate differences between low-wage and average earners, Pedersen and Finseraas (2009: 207) see a path dependent pattern: In their analysis of 13 western European countries, only Finland, and, primarily, Sweden, will strongly change ratios: Their overcompensation of low-wage workers will be strongly reduced, while Denmark will continue to do so. These calculations are based on data collected by the Social Protection Committee of the EU as part of the 'Open Method of Coordination'

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pension benefits. Therefore, it is not clear if respondents stating that they prefer earnings-relatedness refer to benefits pensioners receive from government or from private pension schemes. Though, since most of the preceding questions refer to governmental action, probably respondents had government in mind when answering the question.

(Pedersen/Finseraas 2009: 190), which, in contrast to earlier EU approaches tries to consider member countries´ different social policy legacies (Kolmar 2007: 651).

A similar stance for the case of Sweden is taken by Esping-Andersen (1994: 48) depicting the shift away from non-consideration of work history towards an insurance-like scheme. Further, he (1994: 48f.) sees signs of the economically better-offs´ exit towards private pensions. Korpi and Palme (1998: 680, see also Gelissen 2002: 175) show that maximum public pension benefits and citizens´ switch towards private pensions are negatively related, so that these exit movements would have been bigger without shifts in Swedish retirement policies. Wiß (2011: 12ff.) shows that the scope of additional supplementary pensions and pension funds is higher in Liberal Market Economies because of lower public pension replacement rates than in Coordinated Market Economies and even more so than in Mediterranean Market Economies with their high public replacement rates. Consequently, developments towards a Bismarckian pension system can decelerate the development towards private pension funds.

Also Overbye (1994) expressed that schemes will converge: Governments will provide minimum protection, and government or markets will provide earnings-related benefits (see also Pedersen/Finseraas 2009: 194). This implies the end of equality in generosity in favour of inequality through earnings-relatedness. If provided by government, benefit ceilings still contain redistributive effects, if provided by markets, benefits would be closely earnings-related (leaving aside distortions caused by superior or inferior investment choices), since markets cannot provide pensions redistributing between classes.

In sum, Hinrichs´ analysis lays doubts upon Myles and Pierson´s expectation that diversity will continue. On the other hand, these authors´ attribution of high stability to contributions-based systems has proved correct: Changes in Bismarckian systems did not alter earnings-related elements, but merely supplemented them with benefits for those whose contributions are insufficient (the question is if actually there were not some sorts of minimal safety nets for pensioners without entitlements before). In Beveridgean systems, earnings-related elements were introduced, yet sometimes market-provided.

4.5 Unemployment benefit reform

Clasen and Clegg (2006b: 196ff.) depict two programmatic and one institutional main reform orientations. The first programmatic orientation refers to eligibility and entitlement and emphasises the "*de-differentiation* of benefit rights" (Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 197; emphasis in

original). The idea is that long status-preserving benefits reduce workers´ motivation to adapt to changing environments, in terms of skills and earnings expectations. Benefits may be equally high or low.

The second programmatic orientation is *activation*, including training or benefits conditional upon proven attempts to find work. The choice between the 'high-road' and the 'low-road' (Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 198) is open to ideological preferences. Emphasis may be placed on training and re-training, or activation may include a widening of the definition of 'suitable' work, or continuing eligibility may be conditional upon proven endeavours to find new employment. Both programmatic orientations are at least partially based on the idea that the unemployed´s endeavours to find a new job are contingent upon schemes´ characteristics.

Lastly, these programmatic orientations are often linked to ideas to reform the institutional structure. For example, the *de-differentiation* of benefit rights brings along the idea to combine three separate programmes for the unemployed (depending on length of unemployment) into one programme for all (Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 198).

4.6 Path dependence and change

Path dependence assumptions of welfare state developments are partially based on attitudinal stability and the convergence of citizens´ preferences into policies.

Path dependence may be understood as a succession of small developments, each one based on the previous one, with significant implications in the long run (Hacker 2002: 58). A vivid description is provided by Pierson (2002: 253) with reference to a Polya urn process. It is described here it not with just two, but three balls: From an urn filled with red (social democratic), blue (conservative) and yellow (liberal) balls, a ball gets drawn and replaced by two balls of the same colour. This procedure gets repeated infinitely. The colour getting a head start by chance has a higher probability to get drawn; an imbalance emerges in its favour and reinforces itself. Eventually, one colour is dominant; the two others are numerical minorities of different sizes. Events were accidental but did not cancel each other out, since they affect later ones (i.e. are non-ergodic or history-dependent, cf. David 2001: 19). Therefore, early events matter more than later ones (Pierson 2000: 253). This order of events may be termed "the 'deterministic' path theorem" (Ebbinghaus 2005a: 7ff): Lock-in resulting from "internal feedback" (Ebbinghaus 2005a: 11) can be unlocked solely by exogenous factors not included in the model (Ebbinghaus 2005a: 7ff.).

As criticised by Schubert et al. (2007: 29f.), Esping-Andersen´s (1990: 50; 70) analysis and classification are based on data collected in 1980. Yet institutional change is possible (Gelissen 2002: 212), especially when welfare states clash with their environment (March/Olsen 1989: 167). Changes may have happened partially due to retrenchment taking place after welfare states´ 'golden age', a process which began roughly in the middle of the 1970s (Hasenfeld et al. 1987: 411). Therefore, it is possible that welfare states belonging to one regime cluster in Esping-Andersen´s analysis belong to another nearly three decades later. Bearing this possibility in mind, recent developments have to be taken into account. This course of action is recommended by Esping-Andersen (1999: 73) himself, since typologies are snapshots becoming obsolete as the world changes.

Path Dependence and the Continuance of the 'Three Worlds' validity

On the other hand, the assumption of path dependence suggests that

> "[…] once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high […] the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice" (Levi 1997: 28).

At the same time, there is less deterministic path dependence:

> "perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow" (Levi 1997: 28).

Chosen paths are probable to keep followed because exit costs are high (Pierson 2000: 252). This consideration rests on increasing returns arguments. The idea is that the currently dominant way of doing things entails set-up costs that generate pay-offs if used further and costs if abandoned. The same applies to organisations and institutions. In politics, institutions help to overcome collective action problems, like the generation of public goods. Through set-up costs and "learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations" (Pierson 2000: 259, see also 2004: 24) institutions are self-reinforcing, since actions and expectations are built around them, exit costs are high and attitudes may be shaped by the status quo (Pierson 2000: 260). In contrast to economic institutions, political institutions are seldomly confronted by competing institutions forcing them to adapt in order to survive (Pierson 2000: 261, 2004: 127f.). Therefore, pressures to adapt to changing parameters are smaller. Political institutions´

higher "status quo bias" (Pierson 2000: 262, see also 2004: 30) results from more aspects: Firstly, successors are bound to policies implemented by their predecessors. This also applies to economic institutions, yet decisive power is more concentrated there; economic organisations are less democratic. Secondly, political actors have to bind themselves (Pierson 2000: 262). Thirdly, time horizons are shorter in politics (Pierson 2004: 30), lessening the attractiveness of long-term benefits coming with short-term costs.

Importantly, increasing returns arguments contradict functionalist assumptions suggesting that changing circumstances lead to adjustments and convergence. Due to globalisation, functionalist assumptions would predict convergence (for reasons for pension convergence see Overbye 1994: 147ff.), since different countries face similar developments, which would lead to similar (best practice) solutions.

Increasing returns arguments are compatible with ongoing differences. Institutions are not just bound to their past, but also to their environment, which has developed over a long time span (Pierson 2000: 264, 2004: 27). The better institutions fit into their environment, the more efficiently they work: "Social actors need to coordinate their activities and they must invest resources in line with the incentive structures of their existing environment" (Pierson 2002: 374). Accordingly, changing institutions significantly reduces their compatibility with their environment and therefore their effectiveness, which in turn causes costs to be avoided. For all these reasons, Pierson (2000: 264) expects national economic systems to be path dependent even in the face of massive exogenous shocks such as globalisation (Pierson 2000: 264; contrastingly and possibly more long-term, March and Olsen 1989: 168 expect that in the face of changing environments, institutional stability endangers regime stability). More focused on political coalition building, Esping-Andersen (1996b: 265ff) expects political forces to maintain the current state of welfare states, so that the welfare state landscape is 'frozen' (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 24).

Nations are expected to adapt regime-specifically to new challenges (see below), resulting in continuing national differences. The reasons are "institutional legacies, inherited system characteristics, and the vested interests that these cultivate" (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 6).

A similar static view is hold by Gelissen (2002: 212), not ruling out change categorically, but considering welfare states to be rather change resistant. Gelissen refers to van Kersbergen distinguishing between two main factors supporting persistence. Firstly, citizens´ expectations are built around the status quo and political actors want to avoid disappointing these expectations. Secondly, mechanisms strengthening the status quo obstruct

change (Gelissen 2002: 212) and foster "institutional inertia" (Gelissen 2002: 53), leading to path dependence and lock-in (the latter may be defined as "a process by which institutions are constrained into particular patterns of development and behaviour by the impact of past actions and commitments; cf. Moran 2006: 146 with reference to North 1991:7). Gelissen attributes policymakers´ electoral calculus to the second factor, so that both factors are not clearly distinguishable, because this is related to citizens´ expectations in the first factor. A clearer distinction is provided by Pfau-Effinger´s (2005: 15) subdivision of path dependence into two dimensions, cultural and institutional.

The cultural dimension comes close to van Kersbergen´s first factor and includes political actors´ anticipation of citizens´ expectations (see also Zaller 1992: 270). Electoral incentives provide a rationale for policymakers to avoid cutting popular programmes (Pierson 2002: 370). Voters support welfare policies for various reasons: Firstly, welfare state expansion raised the number of people either receiving benefits and consuming welfare services or providing and administrating them. Further, those not benefitting currently may expect to benefit later or live in the same household as current or designated receivers. Besides the number of people preferring the current welfare arrangements, also the intensity of their support matters. It may be enhanced by retrenchment´s diffuse advantages and clearly visible disadvantages. Further, due to a "negativity bias", voters may react stronger to potential losses than to potential gains. Therefore, voters are likely to vote against politicians advancing unpopular changes (Pierson 2002: 371).

The structural dimension or "institutional 'stickiness'" results from "formal and informal institutional 'veto points'" (Pierson 2002: 372, this stickiness could be built into institutions intentionally, cf. Pierson 2004: 43). Formal veto points[26] are federalism, a second parliamentary chamber, constitutional courts, requirements of high majorities and coalition governments (Pierson 2002: 372). Besides formal rules, individuals and organisations tend to adapt to the status quo and therefore consider reversal unattractive (Pierson 2002: 372). Learning and coordination effects and adaptive expectations lead to increasing returns from path loyalty and costs associated with path abandonment, both rising as time passes.

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[26]   Since veto points slow down or even inhibit change (Huber/Stephens 2001a: 22f.), it may seem that welfare provision in countries with numerous veto points is more secure than in countries with less veto points. Yet, the presence of high institutional hurdles also slows down or even inhibits an appropriate reaction to new and previously uncovered risks (Hacker 2006: 402), so that under emgering new risks or worsening older ones, adversaries of the welfare state can reach their goals by non-action (Hacker 2004: 246).

Path cessation: New categorisations or the end of diversity

Borchert (1998: 137) criticises this static view of path dependence. In his view, Esping-Andersen describes welfare states as being caught in an endless loop comparable to 'Groundhog Day', declaring fundamental change impossible. Though Borchert (1998: 144) admits that Esping-Andersen (1987: 7) stated the contrary by leaving open the possibility that "each nation […] as society historically evolves […] will pass through distinct regime changes and institutional realignments", Borchert criticises that Esping-Andersen gives no clear answer to the question concerning the reasons behind this. Further, 'distinct regime changes' suggests that countries belonging to the same regime will pass through similar changes, resulting in continuing diversity (which will be depicted below in the chapter discussing the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy'). According to Borchert (1998: 145ff.), Esping-Andersen describes welfare states as being extremely path dependent after initial configuration.

Borchert (1998: 164) asks if there are deviant developments, which should be impossible following Esping-Andersen´s path-dependent regime model, and finds the most impressive example in the Netherlands, evolving from a conservative/social democratic mixed model to one incorporating liberal elements. The other obvious example would be the UK. Esping-Andersen (1996a: 15) himself admits that the UK underwent 'a radical regime shift'. In the case of Sweden, Borchert (1998: 164) dismisses Esping-Andersen´s claim that this country is social-democratic and traces the alleged misclassification back to the reference period. Later, parts of Sweden´s policies have changed remarkably.

In Borchert´s (1998: 165) view, the claim that welfare states react to new challenges in regime-specific manners is empirically false. Further, according to him (1998: 165), Esping-Andersen underestimates the scale of changes. Besides Esping-Andersen, according to Borchert (1998: 165) also Pierson and Schmidt support the continuity thesis and err. According to Borchert´s (1998: 165f.) argumentation, their error is to focus on degrees of spending and programme continuity rather than on the ideological, institutional and material bases of the welfare state, which erode in all Western countries. On the other hand, Borchert (1998: 166f.) does not fully agree with the convergence thesis, since systematic differences between welfare states and processes of restructuring remain. According to him, three models are left:

- The Christian democratic conservative model is the most solid one. Except the Netherlands, all countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Austria) remain in this model, but become more liberal (France is not included in the classification).

- The liberal model includes the English-speaking countries. The only European one is the UK, which entered the model due to PM Thatcher´s policies (Ireland is not included in the classification).

- The social democratic model vanishes. Sweden and Denmark transform into a Scandinavian lib-lab model with weakened labour power. Norway follows suit, despite having oil revenues and therefore at least theoretically the financial means to keep spending at higher levels (Finland is not included in the classification).

This classification results from the second phase transition (Borchert 1998: 169). As Borchert (1998: 168) notes, the classification fits Esping-Andersen´s model – strangely, since the latter is built upon data from 1980 and could not incorporate welfare states´ restructuring. The northern countries are no longer termed social-democratic, but still in the same cluster. With Belgium, Germany, the UK and the Scandinavian countries Borchert's classification contains only six out of the 30 countries analysed here.

As seen above, in Borchert´s view Esping-Andersen sees just one Big Bang at the beginning, to be followed by events as predictable as Groundhog Day: "The historical legacies of conservative, liberal, and socialist principles in their early construction became institutionalized and perpetuated, often over an entire century" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 69). That is, in the beginning there is a Big Bang or crucial phase of transition.

For example, Esping-Andersen (1990: 59) traces the origins of conservative welfare statism back to Bismarck´s aim to limit workers´ discontent and disaffection. Corporatism as a "major conservative alternative to etatism" (1990: 60) is believed to be strong in Europe due to late industrialisation, and, following from this, the long preservation of guild-traditions and therefore status distinctions. Lastly the strong influence stemming from the Catholic Church is supposed to be crucial.

Likewise, social democratic regimes are traced back to certain social circumstances. In these countries, socio-economic modernisation led to a decreasing share of "little people" and a rising share of middle class white-collar workers who could become unsatisfied with flat-rate benefits (see also Lupu/Pontusson 2011: 317 for strategical positions of various societal groups). Therefore, their escape into private insurance schemes could be avoided with a mix of universalism and earnings-relatedness (Esping-Andersen 1990: 69), e.g. the tighter links

between contributions (and, therefore, earnings) and benefits in Sweden (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 13f.). One may consider this a regime-specific development. At the same time, it may be interpreted as the Bismarckisation of the social democratic regime (see also Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 107).

While endogen causes rather lead to path-dependence, from exogenous ones convergence between different countries and regimes may be expected:

On the structural level, path dependence suggests that internal mechanisms would result in ongoing divergence (Borchert 1998: 148), while arguments for convergence stress external developments like modernisation and globalisation.

On the actor level, continuing divergence can be expected based on the power resources approach, since powerful groups partially result from welfare state arrangements. Therefore, Borchert (1998: 149) sees similarities to path dependence explanations. Change and convergence on the actor level may result from external factors like learning and diffusion processes.

Europeanisation may shift countries towards convergence on both counts. On the structural level, pressures from the Maastricht treaty and other EU regulations have, if at all, only effects towards convergence and not divergence. On the actor level, it may be expected that due to Europeanisation actors will more often emulate successful nations´ solutions, albeit with country-specific modifications.

Crisis fostering path departure and path cessation

In contrast to the first interpretation of path dependence (the Polya urn process or scenario 1 below), due to the second interpretation there are "branching pathways of sequential junctures at which collective actors decide which of the available alternative pathways they will follow" (Ebbinghaus 2005a: 14f.). These critical junctures are "crucial phases of transition" (Hacker 2002: 59). This interpretation is not deterministic, but probabilistic: Since this is a merely attenuated interpretation of path dependence and not path independence, alternatives are pre-structured by earlier decisions (Ebbinghaus 2005a: 15). At critical junctures, which occur often in critical phases (Borchert 1998: 150), three scenarios are possible (Ebbinghaus 2005a: 17, italics in original):

1. "path *stabilization*: marginal adaption to environmental changes without changing core principles." Path stabilisation follows from 'lock-in' and from successful path-dependent adaption to changes in the environment.

2. "path *departure*: gradual adaption through partial renewal of institutional arrangements and limited redirection of core principles." This scenario is more probable if environmental changes are more significant and comes closest to the idea of future paths not determined, but made more probable by previous paths. Path departures may be gradual but remarkable in the long run. Other possibilities are *functional transformations* in which institutions serve other purposes than originally intended and the addition of new institutions for different purposes.

3. "path *cessation or switching*: intervention that ends the self-reinforcement of an established institution and may give way to a new institution in its place". Since this scenario is the least compatible with the idea of path dependence, it is least likely to occur.

Scenarios 2 and 3 may only happen if initial welfare state development and the setting of underlying principles was not a unique moment, so that Borchert (1998: 147) asks if there is only one setting of directions or more.

If more, the question is when this happens. Borchert (1998: 151) lists three stages of welfare state development, of which he doubts that Esping-Andersen´s theory and its supposed path-determinism can explain appropriately. Assuming that Esping-Andersen´s classification has been valid for 1980 (which Borchert doubts), solely the third phase is relevant, because it – at least partially – took place after 1980: The phase of alteration and downsizing of the welfare state. Crucial now is if welfare state changes took place, and if so, in which manner. According to the first interpretation of path dependence (the urn) and the first scenario of the second one (path stabilisation with marginal adaptions), Esping-Andersen´s classification still holds true today. The second (path departures) and the third (path cessation or switching) scenario of the second interpretation would lead to the question how the 'Worlds of Welfare' look today. Following this, one has to ask under which conditions trodden paths are likely to get left. The answer is, that in times of crises path departures or path cessations are more likely, since in times of crises systems´ structure can be debated (Offe 1984: 36) so that path changes are possible (Borchert 1998: 157).

There are fundamentally three possible results of welfare state crisis: Firstly, developments towards convergence and retrenchment. Secondly, different regime clusters

may persist, but individual countries drift from one cluster to a different one. Thirdly, welfare states deal with problems in a regime- specific manner, which brings along the preservation of existing regime types. The last interpretation is favoured by Esping-Andersen (1996: 10ff.).

If welfare state crisis is a precondition for path changes, it is crucial to figure out if welfare states are or have been in crisis.

Summary

Path dependence and change may be considered two endpoints of a continuum ranging from extreme rigidity to rapid change. While path dependence supports the idea of the continuing validity of Esping-Andersen´s categorisation (possibly under regime-specific change), rapid change does not necessarily imply the opposite. Change, possibly fostered by external factors like globalisation or crisis symptoms caused by internal factors, may lead to:

1. levelled differences between countries, possibly due to the adaption of generally considered 'best solutions', like a 'race to the bottom' or the overall strengthening of earnings-related components (which, taken to the extreme, is in its effects similar to insurances in private markets).
2. ongoing differences, yet with countries travelling to different regimes, or even the creation of new regimes.
3. the validity of Esping-Andersen´s categorisation, under the assumption that this categorisation has been wrong in the first place. This is what Borchert suggests.

4.6.1   Crisis and regime-specific reactions

4.6.1.1   Crisis

Four varieties of crises may be distinguished:

> "A crisis caused by an external shock, the end of the long boom; a crisis caused by the way welfare services were gnawing at the vitality of capitalist economies; a fiscal crisis; and crisis of administrative capacity and effectiveness" (Moran 1988: 405).

Since the mid-1970s, welfare states are believed to be in crisis (Roller 1992: 1). Weak economic growth led to declining resources and at the same time, due to growing unemployment, to higher financial needs. Dependency ratios further worsened by

demographic factors, like low birth rates and higher life expectancy (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 7f.). These factors are only partially external.

Endogenous problems may be, firstly, discrepancies between demands and existing programmes (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 7ff.). Welfare states and their goals of universalism and equality were created against the backdrop of working class homogeneity. 'Post-industrial' society has more heterogeneous working lives, risks, needs and expectations (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 9).

Secondly, there are discrepancies between financial requirements to satisfy demands and taxpayers´ willingness to provide them, so that "the crisis of resources may be at heart a crisis of legitimacy" (Moran 1988: 408).

Besides possibly public discontent, another crisis symptom is that despite rising taxes budgets are often unbalanced so that debts are rising (Pierson 2001: 80). These debts inevitably lead to higher taxation or lower spending at a later point, or higher inflation. All three scenarios breed discontent.

Several causes of crisis have been brought forward and partially denied. Since demographic problems result from higher life expectancies and declining birth rates and merely the latter may be changed, causes of birth rate declines have been sought. The main suspect, female labour force participation, could not be proven to cause cross-national differences in birth rates (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 7f.). Another possibility lies in the welfare states themselves. Pensions and care for the elderly reduce the economic value of children for parents. In this case, declining birth rates would be partially endogenous. Possibly the same can be said if low birth rates partially result from insufficient child care facilities: Depending on the definition of 'welfare state', this factor is either endogenous or exogenous.

Among the economic problems, unemployment is the most severe. On the one hand, benefits´ disincentive effects may be part of the problem, so that unemployment should be endogenous. One the other hand, unemployment results from the shift from manufacturing to services. Baumol´s (1967: 416) basic distinction between manufactured goods and services is that in the former "labor is primarily an instrument" while in the latter "labor is itself the end product". The shift from manufacturing to services is a shift from fast to slow productivity growth (Baumol 1967: 415f.). Since wages in both sectors tend to be linked (Baumol 1967: 417), especially if government provide jobs in the service sector or implements minimum wages, services will become too expensive. High labour costs, Esping-Andersen (1996a: 8) admits, may hinder job growth (the same applies to minimum wages; cf. Ederveer/de Mooij

2003: 29). Initially, the problems faced by welfare states since the mid-1970s looked similar, but adaptions may be regime-specific path-dependent (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 6).

An external cause of welfare state crisis may be globalisation: Bowles/Wagman (1997: 317) present four hypotheses of globalisation´s effects on welfare state development: "Downward Harmonization", "Upward Convergence", "Convergence Clubs" and "Globalization Irrelevance". Merely "Downward Harmonization" (or 'Race to the Bottom') may be considered a development which can be defined as "crisis". The assumption is that capital mobility weakens national governments´ leeway. Governments have to compete for capital and markets and in doing so; governments have to reduce taxes and contributions and therefore their welfare outlays (Ghai 1994: 37, also pointing out the dilemma between employment and welfare statism).

Following this line of reasoning, welfare expenditures across countries should converge at a common low level (Bowles/Wagman 1997: 321, who could find no empirical support for this hypothesis, yet some evidence for convergence among corporatist countries).

In contrast, Pierson (2001: 81) sees the main flaw in attempts to discover effects from globalisation to welfare policies in the confusion of correlation in timing and causality. Though both, increasing trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) on the one hand and pressures on the welfare state on the other hand, have developed in the last three decades and accelerated in the mid-1970s, they are not necessarily causally related. Rather, slower productivity growth due to the rise of the service sector may have resulted in slower economic growth, which strains governments´ (and citizens´) financial resources. This slower growth cannot be attributed to globalisation (the idea could be that manufacturing is easier to outsource to other countries, so that the share of services rises and therefore productivity rises at lower rates). To the contrary, free trade should foster productivity and wealth as shown by David Ricardo´s comparative cost benefits (1996: 93f.); free trade may accelerate the shift from manufacturing to services, but this should happen only if the latter´s productivity is higher. Further, rising costs due to demographic developments cannot be attributed to globalisation (Pierson 2001: 88f). In the health sector, population aging and Baumol´s disease of high labour costs contribute to high government expenses (whereas the free movement of labour also affects costs, as well as information technology-based service outsourcing). In addition, unemployment results partially from taxation of labour and disincentive effects, neither of which can be attributed to globalisation. Lastly, financial problems stem partially from debts, since interest payments pre-commit significant parts of government budgets.

Since welfare states differ in their institutional settings, circumstances and resources, there is not the welfare state crisis as such because there is not the welfare state as such (Moran 1988: 414). Nevertheless, it is expectable that welfare states belonging to the same regime cluster face similar problems (or problems they choose), while countries belonging to other regimes are confronted with different problems (Castles 2004: 178).

Summarising the effects of crisis debates, Pfau-Effinger (2005: 13) states that against the backdrop of crisis discourses, welfare policies are rearranged in numerous European countries.

4.6.1.2   The 'Trilemma of the Service Economy'

The 'Trilemma of the Service Economy' (Iversen/Wren 1998: 508) argument is that governments can achieve only two of these three goals simultaneously: Budgetary restraint, employment growth and income equality. According to Iversen and Wren (1998: 514; cf. Pierson 2001: 86), social democratic countries will forego fiscal discipline, liberal countries earnings equality and conservative countries employment growth. This done via high public employment, reliance on labour markets´ price-setting mechanism and reduced labour supply in the respective regimes (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 6ff.) and results in fiscal overload, earnings inequality and high unemployment (Pierson 2001: 100) or low employment rates. These factors can be shown to affect welfare attitudes (below).

The three responses are ideal types as welfare regimes are. Alternatively to the pure type responses, the attainment of one goal may be regarded as highly important while both others may be neglected. Or it may be tried to achieve all three goals simultaneously, yet every goal can be attained to merely a small degree (Iversen/Wren 1998: 515). Leaving aside the possibility of fiscal indiscipline, Esping-Andersen (1996a: 25) presented this trilemma as a dilemma between equality and employment (see also Goul Andersen/Halvorsen 2002: 8). Plausibly: Esping-Andersen (1996a: 13) states that the growing budget pressure resulting from the 'Northern' model can merely be financed by government if productivity or private investments rise. If this is not the case, as in Sweden, governments face financial problems and have to accept growing wage inequality and welfare state retrenchment (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 13): "Scandinavia appears now to accept that greater inequalities are unavoidable […]" (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 25).

If countries react to the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy' according to the welfare regime they belong to, this would be some evidence that the assumption of path dependence is correct. In the following, it will be examined if conservative countries neglect employment growth, liberal countries earnings equality and social democratic countries fiscal discipline.

Earnings equality and employment growth

Earnings equality and employment growth are incompatible (holding government expenses constant), since in the manufacturing sector with its high trade, trade pushes highly developed countries towards high-skilled, high-paid and nevertheless profitable work without employment reduction (Iversen 2005: 228). But in (nontrade) service sectors, where most new jobs are created (Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 24), higher wages lead to higher prices and reduced employment in the private service sector (Iversen 2005: 228). An important factor here is the price elasticity of demand. As Iversen notes, it may be low in high-skilled service sectors like medicine and consulting. In low-skilled sectors, demand is more price-elastic. The larger the share of wages of the price and the more price-elastic demands is, the more rising wages will lead to declining employment. Since rising wages in low-skilled service sectors mean higher earnings equality (because in these sectors wages are low), higher earnings equality comes with the cost of lower employment. Under free trade, wages in the low-skilled non-traded low-productivity sector are affected by wages in the export sector; productivity growth in the export sector raises wages in the low-skilled service sector, contributing to an overall rise in prices ('Balassa-Samuelson effect', cf. Iversen/Soskice 2010: 602).

Kenworthy (2003: 1181) notes that numerous researchers suggest that there is a trade-off between employment and equality,[27] with the US preferring the former and Europe the latter.

Kenworthy (2003: 1182, see also Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 22ff.) refers to several studies doubting a connection between pay equality and employment rates or unemployment rates. Further, he refers to studies showing that the employment gap between low-skilled and high-skilled workers is in the US not smaller than in most European countries. He (2003: 1183) admits that Iversen and Wren´s figures are impressive in showing the negative relationship between pay equality and employment in private-sector consumer services (first

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[27] Analysing 15 EU countries, Ederveer and de Mooij (2003: 18) show that employment rate and income inequality are negatively related. Though, the correlation is weak and possibly sensitive to outliers. Further, high employment and productivity are unrelated (2003: 21), so that high labor force participation has not to be 'bought' with low GDP per hour worked.

link) and admits that this kind of employment is positively correlated to total employment (second link) and that total employment is negatively related to wage equality (direct link). Iversen and Cusack (2000: 337) explain this causality: Productivity rises slower in services than in manufacturing, so that services will be expensive relative to manufactured goods. This depresses demand for low-skilled services and consequently job creation in this sector. Since centralised wage bargaining is located at the beginning of the causal nexus and compresses wages, they see this job-destruction effect primarily in northern Europe, where centralised wage bargaining is predominant.

Yet Kenworthy (2003: 1184) doubts the Iversen-Wren argument. One point he brings forward is against the second link and is based on OECD studies showing that only half of the employment gap between Europe and the US may be attributed to low-income employment, and that employment growth in the 1980s and 1990s has been caused by economy-wide factors (OECD factor 1) or one or a few sectors whose employment boom also fostered employment in other sectors (OECD factor 2), so that there is no such thing as a low-wage strategy leading to high employment. Kenworthy (2003: 1185) criticises that Iversen and Wren´s argument rules out economy-wide factors (1), since they restrict their argument to services and suggest that high wages have no such adverse effects in manufacturing because of manufacturing's higher productivity gains. Further, to affect employment growth, wage equality would have to spur employment in private consumer-related services (2), "but it would be necessary to show that job growth in private consumer services creates spill-over effects which generate job growth in other sectors" (Kenworthy 2003: 1185f.). Though, Kenworthy (2003: 1186) emphasises that he does not focus on this link. Summarising, in this link compatibility exists between the OECD statement and the basic idea of Iversen and Wren: "Spill-over" effects from high employment growth in the private consumer-related services due to wage inequality to other sectors result in economy-wide employment growth.

Kenworthy (2003: 1186) doubts the link between equal wages and private sector service sector employment growth partially because employers may prefer higher wages to motivate their employees. Further, high productivity in low-wage jobs, possibly caused by better skills, better work organisation and higher mechanisation may result in a high ratio between the 10th income percentile and the 50th, i.e. high wage equality in the bottom half of the income distribution. In this case, equal wages are no obstacle to employment growth (Kenworthy 2003: 1187). Kenworthy (2003: 1187) suspects that the negative effect of wage equality on employment growth in private consumer services may be spurious, since the analysis has not been conducted controlled for several factors affecting both. Amongst these

factors are replacement rates offered by unemployment benefits. In Kenworthy´s analysis incorporating 14 OECD countries´ employment performances between 1980 and 1997 in private sector consumer services and total employment as dependent variables, pay equality and unemployment benefits´ replacement rates have only significant negative effects when several control variables are left out. Amongst these control variables is public employment, which has the strongest negative effect on employment in private-sector consumer services and positive effects on total employment. Yet, Kenworthy (2003: 1196) allows for a possible underestimation of pay equality´s effects due to the inclusion of variables which affect pay equality. For example, "wage setting institutions and unionization" are strongly correlated with pay equality, so that they may be "soaking up part of the effect of pay equality on employment growth". Eliminating these variable makes pay equality reaching significance again: "Thus these results support the notion that there is a trade-off between pay equality and employment growth in private-sector consumer services", yet the effect is not stronger than effects from employment regulations and taxes (Kenworthy 2003: 1196). The statistical problem is depicted in short:

> "Collinearity with some of these variables almost certainly depresses the pay equality coefficient […] somewhat. Yet leaving those variables out of the model is not necessarily more informative, because the pay equality variable is then permitted to capture part or all of the effects of the omitted variables" (Kenworthy 2003: 1196).

Taking the mean value between both, the effect of pay equality with four and with 12 other independent variables, Kenworthy (2003: 1996f.) depicts wage equality´s limited effect by taking the most extreme case for equality – Sweden – and the second most extreme case for inequality (after Canada) – the US – between 1979 and 1995. In this period, US private-sector consumer services employment rose from 20 percent to 26 percent of working-age population, whereas in Sweden it declined from 14 percent to 13 percent. Of the difference of seven percentage points (US six up, Sweden one down), 1.7 percentage points may be considered caused by wage equality or inequality: "This seems relatively small – not trivial, to be sure, but certainly not overwhelming" (Kenworthy 2003: 1197). Lastly, Kenworthy states that results for total employment are similar. He (2003: 1198) rules out reverse causality, meaning that earnings become unequal because of a bad employment development and not vice versa. Since earnings equality remained remarkably constant in the 14 countries in the analysed period, and employment changes in the 1980s and 1990s cannot have caused earnings equality in 1979, reverse causality is rather unlikely, at least in this calculation. Lastly, earnings equality has a stronger negative effect on employment in low-productivity services

in English-speaking liberal countries than in continental and northern Europe. Summarising, the trade-off is existent but weak (Kenworthy 2003: 1200).

Though, since various factors affect employment levels, Kenworthy doubts Iversen´s and Esping-Andersen´s idea that merely lower wages at the bottom of the wage scale and higher public employment lead out of weak employment performance, and because the latter results in budget pressures, lower wages at the bottom are the sole solution. Kenworthy (2003: 1201) mentions several alternatives, most of which do not seem to circumvent the problem: Reduced employment regulations may be viable, since its side effect besides its assumed employment-spurring effects may be more transitions from employment to unemployment and vice versa, therefore inequality should even decline, since short periods out of work may be bridged with savings, while long periods out of work lead to poverty for those affected whereas long periods in work may lead to wealth for others (and short-term unemployment benefits are higher than long-term benefits). Consistently, Kenworthy (2003: 1201) points out the example Denmark, a country with high levels of turnover from work to (short-term) unemployment and back and between various employers. Kenworthy's (2003: 1201) other suggestions seem to have adverse effects on either earnings equality or government budgets: Reduced tax rates imply less public employment or unbalanced government budgets. The latter may be circumvented via shorter unemployment compensation, also suggested by Kenworthy. Yet if the unemployed find new jobs faster due to less strict employment protection regulations anyway, positive effects on budgets merely come into being for those few cases who do not find new work within the short eligibility period. Though, these savings come with higher inequality. Also "upgrading active labor market policy" (Kenworthy 2003: 1201) strains public budgets (see also Stephens 1996: 39), i.e. a different one of the three incompatible goals has to be neglected.

Though the Scandinavian countries have high employment rates (Stephens 1996: 32) and earnings equality, public employment – rapidly growing after the first oil crisis (Goul Andersen/Halvorsen 2002: 4) has spawned a high proportion of low-skilled and well-paid public employees. The three countries expanding government employment as the proportion of working-age persons between 1962 and 1993 in the double digits were the Scandinavian countries (Iversen/Cusack 2000: 315). More important, due to pressures to create public employment, combined with low productivity growth there and insufficient fiscal revenues, financial problems emerged (Esping-Andersen 1994: 47, 1996a: 10ff.). Iversen (2005: 247) notes that the response of the social democratic countries led to higher taxes.

Increasing wage flexibility to achieve a clearing of the labour market is the response chosen by English-speaking countries, among them the UK (Iversen 2005: 246), resulting in higher inequality and (child) poverty (Esping-Andersen 1994: 50f). Wage inequality presupposes wage flexibility, which in turn "means lower de facto minimum wages" (Goul Andersen/Halvorsen 2002: 9; "de facto" points to a low reservation wage), which in turn presupposes low social protection (Goul Andersen/Halvorsen 2002: 9).

In conservative countries, employment growth has been neglected, primarily among the young, the old and women (Iversen 2005: 247f.). Tax incentives discourage wives to work, and early retirement is encouraged (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 18). The young are kept out of labour markets due to long training periods and the system´s inherent characteristics: The high importance of the male breadwinner´s uninterrupted career on which sometimes two adults depend (and their retirement benefits) force political actors to protect the labour market insiders to the disadvantage of the outsiders (Esping-Andersen 1994: 52f). Though these countries should have more flexible labour markets, welfare systems are based on rigidities like job security, high wages and social contributions from labour market insiders (Esping-Andersen 1994: 54, 1996a: 20). In combination with late entry in and early exit out of labour markets, the active period should be as uninterrupted as possible. This is defended by voters and unions to the disadvantage of labour market outsiders (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 19).

Employment growth

There are many methods to keep people away from labour markets: Generous early retirement conditions, extending education periods (Gould Andersen/Jensen 2002: 44), conscription, tax benefits for working people whose spouse is not working, lack of child care facilities, or extended definitions of invalidity. Based on Eurostat data from 2008 it becomes clear that among the 'old' regimes conservative countries (74 percent) have the lowest total employment rate among the 15-64-year olds (social democratic countries at 80 percent, liberal countries at 76 percent, Southern countries 71 percent and CEE countries 69 percent).

Employment rates are not exact measures of the amount of paid work done in a given country, since the mean number of hours worked per year differs between countries, mainly due to part-time employment (Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 32ff.).

Employment rates of elderly workers

The fourth column of Table 4.8 shows the total employment rate of the 15-64- year olds plus the unemployment rate, since the unemployed are available for the labour market. The pure employment rate (third column) could be misleading, since it does not include people involuntarily out of work. A low pure employment rate could be misinterpreted as a sign of government neglecting employment growth, albeit it is affected by unemployment. So, on the one hand the employment rate distorts the results. But on the other hand, according the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy' lowering unemployment by expanding the public sector (social democratic) or allowing low wages to compensate for low productivity (liberal) are regime-specific reactions to job losses. Further, comparing unemployment rates cross-nationally is difficult. To correct for possible effects from the economic cycle on the employment rate, the unemployment rate (from Eurostat) will be added. In the following the "total employment rate" will be discussed, though the pattern is similar with the normal employment rate (for measurement problems arising from part-time work, especially in the Dutch case, see Iversen 2005: 265).

Concerning the elderly´s employment rate, the expected pattern emerges. The lowest ratio between the elderly´s and the total employment rate is to be found in social democratic (1.2) and liberal countries (1.25). By far the highest ratio is to be found in the conservative countries (for rising early retirement there in contrast to other countries see Schmid 1995: 70). Southern Europe does not take conservative features to the extreme. One reason is the neglect of Italy and Malta in the calculation. Their ratio is rather high. Lastly, in CEE the elderly work less than in most other regimes. This may be due to low official retirement ages and not be explained by spreading early retirement in the early 1990s, since these cohorts would have been in retirement by 2008 anyway. Though, in CEE there are huge intra-regime differences, with the Baltics´ ratio on the level of their social democratic neighbours, and other countries with higher ratios.

Female employment

Coming to the female employment rate, which can be relevant for gender-specific attitudes towards the welfare state (chapter 7.2), the difference between the male and the female employment rate has been calculated. The differences are lowest in the social-democratic

countries (five percentage points), which raise female employment by offering labour market opportunities to women by an expanded public sector and sufficient child care facilities (for female public sector employment opportunities due to restrictions of non-Nordic immigration, see Stephens 1996: 38). In the other regimes, differences are higher. This applies especially to southern countries, where the difference would exceed 18 percentage points even without Turkey. In southern welfare states solidarity within families is believed to be high. This view is supported by Bentolila and Ichino (2001: 14); yet they acknowledge that this impression is hard to prove with data. They can prove that at least in Spain and Italy, females more often start working in case of male unemployment than in northern Europe. Several factors may be relevant here: Intrafamilial solidarity, low unemployment benefits or, as Bentolila and Ichino (2001: 15) point out, the fact that in the South less women work than in the North and therefore more are able to *start* working when their husband loses his job (while in the North most of them can solely raise the number of hours worked). This may depress support for government responsibility for the unemployed in the South, since respondents may consider this way to compensate missing male earnings. Bentolila and Ichino (2001: 19) conclude that consumption losses caused by unemployment are more severe in the North than in the South, which they suspect to be a reason why high Southern unemployment did not spark social unrest. Considering low welfare state generosity and high intrafamilial solidarity in the South, the authors (2001: 20) ask if the latter caused the former or vice versa.

In contrast to the social democratic regime type, women´s participation in the paid labour force is not encouraged by government in conservative countries (Orloff 1993: 312), since gender-specific division of labour insides families also belong to Corporatist-Catholic welfare state conceptions (Castles 1194: 22). Therefore, female participation in paid work is discouraged by tax breaks for families with only one earner and a narrower range of child care offered to working parents, at least in comparison to social democratic states (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Esping-Andersen (2007a: 644) shows that in Germany earnings within couples are negatively correlated, evincing that wives of well-paid husbands work little.

Castles (1994: 30) offers a cultural explanation for this gender gap in Catholic countries: Catholicism as well as Protestantism emphasise traditional family values and traditional intra-family divisions of labour. Since secularisation proceeded faster in Protestant countries than in Catholic countries, the employment gender gap in the former is smaller.[28]

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[28] The correlation between the employment gap between men and women (calculated from Eurostat data) and aggregated self-ascribed degree of religiosity (calculated from ESS4 data) is strong (Pearson´s r .54 at 5 percent significance level, n=27). The result is sensible to outliers. Without Turkey and its high employment gap

Table 4.8: Employment rates (2008)

	55-64 years	15-64 years	Total (incl. UE rate)	15-64 years female	15-64 years male	Diff / male / female	Ratio 15-64 / 55-64
Conservative welfare states							
BE	34.5	62.4	69.7	56.2	68.6	12.4	1.8
DE	53.8	70.7	77.8	65.4	75.9	10.5	1.3
FR	38.3	65.2	73.2	60.4	69.6	9.2	1.7
Mean	**42**	**66**	**74**	**61**	**71**	**11**	**1.6**
Social democratic welfare states							
DK	57.0	78.1	81.5	74.3	81.9	7.6	1.4
FIN	56.5	71.1	77.6	69.0	73.1	4.1	1.3
NO	82.9	78.0	80.5	75.4	80.5	5.1	1.1
SE	70.1	74.3	80.6	71.8	76.7	4.9	1.1
Mean	**67**	**75**	**80**	**73**	**78**	**5**	**1.2**
Liberal welfare states							
IE	53.6	67.6	74.2	60.2	74.9	14.7	1.3
GB	58.0	71.5	77.5	65.8	77.3	11.5	1.2
Mean	**56**	**70**	**76**	**63**	**76**	**13**	**1.25**
Southern welfare states							
CY	54.8	70.9	74.5	62.9	79.2	16.3	1.3
ES	45.6	64.3	76.8	54.9	73.5	18.6	1.4
GR	42.8	61.9	69.5	48.7	75.0	26.3	1.4
PT	50.8	68.2	76.0	62.5	74.0	11.5	1.3
TR	29.5	45.9	55.8	24.3	67.7	43.4	1.6
Mean	**45**	**64**	**71**	**51**	**74**	**23**	**1.4**
CEE welfare states							
CZ	47.6	66.6	70.9	57.6	75.4	17.8	1.4
HU	31.4	56.7	64.6	50.6	63.0	12.4	1.8
PL	31.6	59.2	65.9	52.4	66.3	13.9	1.9
SK	39.2	62.3	71.3	54.6	70.0	15.4	1.6
SI	32.8	68.6	72.7	64.2	72.7	8.5	2.1
HR	36.6	57.8	60.0	50.7	65.0	14.3	1.6

and high religiosity, the correlation is far weaker, albeit still significant at the 5 percent-level. Without the Czech Republic and its very low religiosity and considerable employment gap, the correlation is far stronger with the highest significance.

Table 4.8: Employment rates (2008), continued

EE	62.4	69.8	76.7	66.3	73.6	7.3	1.1
LV	59.4	68.6	76.7	65.4	72.1	6.7	1.2
LT	53.1	64.3	70.9	61.8	67.1	5.3	1.2
BG	46.0	64.0	69.2	59.5	68.5	9.0	1.4
RO	43.1	59.0	64.8	52.5	65.7	13.2	1.4
Mean	**44**	**63**	**69**	**58**	**69**	**11**	**1.5**
Uncategorised welfare states							
NL	53.0	77.2	79.9	71.1	83.2	12.1	1.5
CH	68.4	79.5	-	73.5	85.4	11.9	1.2

Source: Columns 2,3,5,6,7 Eurostat,4,8: own calculation. In column 4 data for CH missing since unemployment rate has not been in the second source.

Possibly in Protestant countries women´s higher labour force participation led to demands on the political systems to expand public employment. For 1960 and 1985, Castles (1994: 31ff.) can show that Catholicism has stronger negative effects on female employment than on male employment (while overall Catholicism's negative effect on employment got stronger), probably due to both, lower motivation among women in Catholic countries to take up paid work after childbirth, and, due to lower public employment, a lower share of part-time jobs and less child care facilities, less possibilities to do so.

Additionally, Castles asks why Catholicism not merely negatively affects female employment but also male employment in 1985. Here, he (1994: 33f.) speculates that a group of Catholic nations reacted on crisis symptoms in the 1970s and 1980s by reducing their labour supply. As "primary instrument" he sees social insurance transfer expenditures:

> "The greater reduction of the male labour force and of male employment in these countries was largely a function of the utilization by their governments of a policy instrument […] much in tune with the dominant policy culture of the Catholic family of nations" (Castles 1994: 33f.)

Here, we come full circle to possible reasons for regime-specific reactions to the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy' depicted above.

Earnings equality and relative poverty

According to the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy', liberal welfare states neglect earnings equality in order to achieve high employment rates and low taxes/contribution burdens,

coming with the price of rising inequality in these countries (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 16, labelling the UK as liberal. Ireland is left aside in his article).

Related to earnings equality is relative poverty.[29] This does not take into account people´s objective circumstances, but their material well-being compared to their fellow citizens.[30] These poverty rates tell something about welfare states´ success in creating equality, yet tell nothing about material hardship. Absolute poverty rates give a clue about the share of people who are poor by any chosen international standard. Kenworthy (1999: 1126) analysed these rates in 15 countries. Defining absolute poverty as income below a certain share of the US median income, the Nordic countries and Switzerland had the lowest absolute poverty rates in the early 1990s. In contrast to relative poverty, absolute poverty is not just determined by the distribution of income, but also by a country´s wealth. In sum, absolute poverty is reduced by an extensive welfare state (Kenworthy 1999: 1131).

As can be seen in Figure 4.8, among the three 'traditional' welfare regimes, liberal countries display the highest degree of relative poverty and social democratic countries the lowest (the UK´s turn towards liberalism and Finland´s Bismarckisation resulted in the highest rises of inequality).

Several scholars have analysed welfare states´ effects on relative poverty. Korpi and Palme (1998: 674f.) have shown that in 1985, relative poverty (defined as disposable incomes below 50 percent of the national median) has been lowest in Sweden, Norway and Finland (and the Netherlands) and highest in the UK, with Germany, France and Switzerland in-between. They conclude that this expected regime pattern is caused by the welfare states´ differing expenditure levels. Brady (2005: 1329ff.) found positive effects of social security transfers on reduction of relative poverty between pre-tax/pre-transfer poverty and after-tax/after-transfer poverty in 18 Western democracies between 1967 and 1997. He analysed residents between 25 and 59 years of age. Effects of welfare state regimes on poverty become insignificant as soon as social security transfer and health spending are taken into account (but they are part of the regime concept). Similarly, analysing the same age group in 14 affluent countries between

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[29]   Measured as share of those below 40, 50 or 60 percent below the median income, for relative poverty the income distribution above the median is irrelevant. Given that the median income can be considered 'normal' and relative poverty refers to what is normal in society, this is straightforward.

[30]   "A consensus seems to have emerged in favour of taking a 'relative' view of poverty in the rich countries" (Sen 1983: 153). This could gain support from Adam Smith considering leather shoes as necessities if these shoes are the standard way to dress (Smith 1776, cited in Sen 1983: 159). Sen (1983: 159) points out that Smith considers leather shoes as indispensable to be not ashamed and not to be ashamed less than others. The empirical finding supports the view of absolute poverty as the more substantial concept of poverty. Across 30 countries, mean satisfaction with household income is strongly correlated with GDP per capita (Pearson´s r at .85 on the highest significance level, no relevant outliers).

1970 and 1997, Moller et al. (2003: 22ff.) detected significant effects of welfare state generosity on relative poverty reduction. Lastly, Brady et al. (2009: 271ff.) have shown welfare policies´ negative effects on relative poverty for the age group between 18 and 65 years in 18 Western countries.

Figure 4.8 and Table A2.4 show poverty risk rates before social security benefits and after. Before, conservative welfare states have the lowest mean poverty risk rates and liberal welfare states the highest. Social democratic welfare states strongly reduce relative poverty. Only 44 percent of pre-transfer poverty still exists after taxes and social security benefits, so that their rate is at 12 percent and at the lowest level. Figure 4.8 shows that all these countries are far under the line, which depicts this great reduction in poverty. Conservative welfare states also have low relative poverty. Since their reduction is lower than social democratic welfare states´, post-transfer poverty is higher. Starting from high poverty rates, the liberal welfare states, especially Ireland, reduce relative poverty to noticeable degrees and have medium post-transfer relative poverty. High poverty in liberal countries is not a new pattern. In Korpi and Palme´s (1998: 674) analysis of relative poverty in 11 countries in 1985, the UK displays the highest percentage of relative poverty among European nations. Measuring absolute poverty in 1991, Kenworthy (1999: 1126) comes to the same conclusion: The UK´s and Ireland´s poverty rates are the highest of the 14 countries analysed. Though, in the case of Ireland, the high absolute poverty rate results not just from liberal welfare policies but also from the country´s low GDP per capita back then.

Figure 4.8: Relationship between poverty risk pre-tax-and-transfer and post-tax-and-transfer

Data: Eurostat. Pearson´s r .41, significant at 5 percent-level

The lowest reduction of relative poverty is to be found in CEE, and, even more so, in Southern Europe. In the latter, four out of five people who are at relative poverty risk before taxes and transfers are so after transfers. In CEE countries, there are noticeable intra-regime differences. Very low post-transfer poverty levels are to be found in the *Visegrád-* countries and Slovenia. Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltics have higher relative poverty risk levels.

Fiscal discipline

The hypothesis is that social democratic welfare states forego the goal of fiscal discipline. As will be seen in chapter 7.1, tax/contribution burdens affect welfare attitudes.

Calculating from OECD 2008 data, taxes as a percentage of GDP are high in social democratic countries (45 percent), lower in conservative (41 percent) and CEE (35 percent) countries and even lower in liberal (32 percent) and southern (30 percent) countries. This squares with Pierson´s (2001: 100) statement that social democratic countries are burdened with fiscal overload. Using European Commission Services data from 2008, cyclically adjusted total tax and contribution burdens are highest in social democratic countries (45 percent), lower in conservative countries (41 percent), and roughly equally low in Southern (33 percent), liberal (32 percent) and CEE countries (30 percent; all figures in table A2.5).

Summary

As shown above, all three assumptions could be supported: Conservative (and, especially, Southern) countries forego high employment rates. Liberal countries accept earnings inequality or relative poverty. Social democratic countries have to buy their high employment rates and low earning inequalities with big government, which incurs high taxes.

In CEE countries, which were not included in Iversen and Wren´s depiction of regime-specific reactions to the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy', several findings are apparent. Government outlays (and debts) and employment are low, and inequality is high. In this sense, post-socialist countries deviate from the liberal ideal type merely by their low employment rates. From both other regime-specific responses they are farther away. They differ from the social democratic reaction by their low employment, low equality and low spending. From the conservative type they differ in their low equality and low spending. Again, there are remarkable differences between CEE countries.

In sum, the results square with Iversen´s (2005: 250ff.) analysis of six countries between 1970 and 1996. He found out that Denmark and Sweden have the most equal wages, rapidly rising public employment in the 1970s and the 1980s, and, following from the latter, rising public spending. The USA and the UK had strong rises in private employment and unequal wages, while public employment and government outlays remained virtually unchanged. In Germany and the Netherlands, both "countries where Christian democratic parties have been dominant" (Iversen 2005: 252, see also Table A5.5), private and public service sector employment stagnated as well as government outlays, and earnings remained on medium equality levels. The Netherlands, though, had significantly rising private employment in the 1990s (Iversen 2005: 252). Defining the "average annual hours worked per person in the working-age population" of the year 1990 as 100, the Christian democratic pattern in 1999 looked like this: Germany 98, Italy 95, France 96, Netherlands 105. Among 11 OECD countries, only New Zealand had a similar strong rise as the Netherlands. This could be interpreted as mere catch up, since the number of hours was very low in the Netherlands in 1990, compared to the three other Christian democratic countries (Iversen 2005: 264f.).

Summarising trends since the early 1970s, Esping-Andersen (1996a: 10) states that social democratic welfare states raised public employment, liberal countries (including the UK) deregulated wages and reduced welfare states expenses to some degree, and conservative countries reduced labour supply: "All three strategies were intimately related to the nature of their welfare states" (Esping-Andersen 1996a: 10). In general, adaptions were "rather successful" (Rhodes 1996: 306), since major programmes could be maintained.

4.6.1.3   The relevance of regime-specific responses

As noted above, the assumption that welfare states react in regime-specific manners to the Trilemma of the Service Economy holds largely true. This is relevant not merely to support the assumption of path dependence. Rather, regime-specific reactions affect national circumstances, which in turn may affect citizens´ attitudes:

Early retirement

Early retirement is a preferred tool of regimes neglecting high employment rates. As seen in Table 4.5, in social democratic and liberal welfare states employment rates of those between 15 and 64 differ only slightly from employment rates of the 55 to 64- years olds. In

conservative and southern countries, differences are higher. High early retirement may have contradictory effects on attitudes towards government responsibility for the old: On the one hand, the number of pensioners rises, and, likewise, the number of people having pensioners in their social surroundings. Further, the prospect of becoming pensioner in the near future begins earlier for the average person. On the other hand, rising expenditures due to generous early retirement programmes, and their impact on contributions and taxes, may lead younger people to reject government responsibility, since they consider these programmes as overly generous and on the other side disadvantageous to current workers and future generations.

Earnings equality

Material equality is one of welfare states´ goals, so that income distribution could matter for support for government responsibility. Further, equality matters for questions regarding earnings-relatedness of benefits. The more unequal earnings are, the more earnings-related benefits lead to inequal benefit levels. Supporting earnings-relatedness in a low-Gini country implies something different than in a high-Gini country. Also, the reduction of pre-tax/pre-transfer relative poverty shows to which degree government fosters equality, and, to some degree, security (if absolute poverty is also diminished). One could argue that welfare states which diminish relative poverty only marginally are less oriented towards the goal of equality (security could be guaranteed nevertheless, if the country is affluent and low earners are still not in absolute poverty). Rather, they redistribute hardly between different income strata, but rather within these strata. If citizens think that earnings-related benefits foster or diminish earnings equality, then the current state of earnings equality should affect attitudes concerning earnings-relatedness.

Fiscal discipline

The neglect of fiscal discipline in favour of other goals leads to high taxes and contributions. In this case, citizens may consider the tax/contributions burden to be too high. Yet, since the items concerning government responsibility refer to basic responsibility and not to higher or lower spending, it might not be argued that fiscal indiscipline leads to low support for government responsibility. It is not entirely clear that these items refer to extensity instead of intensity (see below). If citizens think that government responsibility brings along tax/contribution burdens, high burdens could diminish support for government responsibility.

5 Attitudes towards the welfare state

An attitude is "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour" (Eagly/Chaiken 1993: 1). As the authors (1993: 1) point out, people supporting a certain policy have a positive attitude, those opposing it a negative one. Therefore, citizens stating that government should be responsible for adequate living standards for the old or the unemployed hold a positive attitude towards welfare policies benefitting the respective groups, and people stating that higher earners should get higher benefits hold positive attitudes towards corresponding policies and, presumably, neutral[31] or negative attitudes towards policies disregarding previous income or even providing lower benefits to higher earners.

Responses expressing attitudes can be subdivided into three classes: Firstly, the *cognitive* type consists of "thoughts or ideas about the attitudes object" (Eagly/Chaiken 1993: 11) or beliefs about the object, meaning that it is holding certain attributes or not, which in turn may be positive, negative or neutral. For example, people may believe that welfare policies diminish work incentives, while work incentives are considered positive. Secondly, the "*affective* type consists of feelings, moods, emotions, and sympathetic nervous system activity that people experience in relation to attitude objects" (Eagly/Chaiken 1993: 11; emphasis added). People may feel hope or frustration when thinking about their government providing financial means to dependents or benefits´ earnings-relatedness. Lastly, the *conative* or behavioural type consists of actions (Eagly/Chaiken 1993: 12). Citizens may vote for a party for its welfare policies. Though, cognitive, affective and conative responses can mostly not be distinguished empirically (Eagly/Chaiken 1993: 13).

Further, attitudes may be categorised according to their type. Roller (1992: 48ff.) basically distinguishes between instrumental and moral attitudes. The former lead to preferences for policies maximising personal utility, while the moral orientation takes the whole population into account and strives for the realisation of justice, equality (results or chances) or the absence of poverty (Roller 1992: 52). Instrumental attitudes are believed to be rather unstable and subject to variation in the short term, as personal circumstances can be, the latter should be stable and rooted in basic predispositions acquired during primary socialisation. Although Sears et al. point out that moral conceptions may be based on self-interest, they consider both

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[31]   Although a neutral belief may be considered not evaluative, Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 11) consider it a evaluation being neither positive nor negative.

dimensions to be distinguishable (Roller 1992: 49; Kumlin 2002b: 294 for example states that self-interest also affects political ideology).

Coming to the attitude objects, based on Free and Cantril Roller (1992: 39) distinguishes between the 'operational' and the 'ideological' level. The former includes attitudes concerning government responsibility for dependent groups or specific programmes, while the latter is more abstract and contains attitudes about the proper role of government in general. Our items belong to the operational level.[32] Further, referring to Almond and Powell, Roller distinguished between three policy levels: Goals, outputs (or means), and outputs´ consequences, which are termed outcomes.

Goals refer to desirable conditions (Roller 1992) and outputs to the means to reach them. As noted above, the goals of welfare policies are socio-economic security and equality. The provision of a "reasonable standard of living" is a means to achieve socio-economic security (and equality).

On the level of outputs or means there are, among other things, transfer payments (Roller 1992: 42). Therefore, attitudes concerning the preferred earnings-relatedness of benefits for the old and the unemployed refer to the output dimension, because earnings-relatedness is not a goal in itself, but a means to achieve goals (like security, equality or justice). These outputs are linked to other outputs, like taxes or social insurance contributions (Roller 1992: 43). These combinations are termed "policy programs" (Almond/Powell 1978: 288, cited in Roller 1992: 43) which are either temporary or long-term. To the former belong employment-creation programmes, to the latter pension schemes (Roller 1992: 43) as well as unemployment compensation. Long-term programmes can be termed 'institutions'; institutions´ basic characteristic is their long-termedness. Pensions and unemployment insurance belong to the institutional core of the welfare state (Roller 1992: 43). Therefore, welfare regimes may be described as distinctive institutional settings. Institutions, in turn, are

> "formal arrangements for aggregating individuals and regulating their behaviour through the use of explicit rules and decision processes by an actor or a set of actors formally recognized as possessing such power" (Levi 1990: 405).

Following this, "welfare state programmes […] may be considered as institutions" (Edlund 1999: 343).

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[32]   Free and Cantril (1968: 37, cited in Feldman/Zaller 1992: 268).) found out that Americans were far more pro-welfare on the operational level than on the ideological level. This finding is supported by Feldman and Zaller´s (1992: 279ff.) analysis of 450 respondents´ answers to open-ended questions in a 1987 NES pilot study. Here, abstract remarks were anti-welfare, concrete remarks pro-welfare.

Lastly, outcomes are the outputs´ consequences and may be intended or not. If not intended, outcomes may be further subdivided into anticipated or not and in positive or negative (Roller 1992: 43f.). None of our dependent variables refer to outcomes, yet outcomes affect attitudes since they shape the state of affairs people live in and, if anticipated, citizens´ preferences for outputs.

5.1 Relevance

Besides the inadequate reason of being "interesting in itself" (Forma 1999: 88), for several relevant reasons attitudes have to be analysed. Attitudes could affect citizens´ actions (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 337, Miller 1995: 73). Citizens´ attitudes affect policies in a direct or indirect manner (Borre 1995: 368). Further, in democracies policies should be related somehow to the preferences of the majority. Lastly, welfare states are challenged partially due to objective reasons, partially due to beliefs to which extent socioeconomic developments demand political changes: "Public opinion does not determine policy but may have medium-term influence" (Taylor-Gooby 1995: 11ff.).

As will be shown below, there is a systematic relationship between welfare attitudes and voting decisions, and government composition (which is aggregated voting decisions) and welfare state policies. Although this causal nexus is rather indirect, it is the most direct way in representative democracy. Further, welfare attitudes affect decisions to join or support intermediate groups such as political parties or trade unions. These groups´ strength and assertiveness results from public support and these groups affect government decisions.

Another reason why citizens´ attitudes are relevant is that differences between citizens´ policy positions and actual or perceived policies may result in a loss of political support (Borre 1995: 344). Further, not just the political system as a whole may gain or lose legitimacy, but also the welfare state itself may be considered legitimate if it is supported by the public (Jæger 2006a: 321). If one considers the welfare state or parts of it an integral, essential and indispensable part of democratic systems, then to analyse public support as a crucial determinant for its preservation is to indirectly analyse support for democracy. Further, at least minimal approval to the welfare state is crucial to its functioning (Ullrich 2006: 200). On a more operational level, if practices are considered as legitimate, need for coercion in order to ascertain rule-abiding behaviour is lower (Olsen 2007: 11).

Not just mean values in countries are relevant, but also the distribution of attitudes in a particular country. Considering politics as preference pooling in which an average of

individual preferences and their relative weight according to the power of preference-holders results in collective decisions (March/Olsen 1989: 151), heterogeneity of preferences is positively related to the number of dissatisfied citizens. March and Olsen (1989: 151f.) point to negative effects on political equality, because citizens near the middle point have more power and those far from the middle point have less power, possibly resulting in the latter´s dissatisfaction.

Culture and structure

Following Almond and Verba´s (1989: 13) definition, "the political culture of a nation is the distribution of orientations toward political objects among the members of the nation." Accordingly, a nation´s welfare state culture is the distribution of orientations towards the welfare state among the members of a nation. And like political cultures, which may be congruent or incongruent with political structure (Almond/Verba 1989: 20), welfare state cultures may be congruent or not with the welfare policies of a nation. And like political systems (Almond/Verba 1989: 20), also welfare states change, and comparable to Almond and Verba´s (1989: 20) assumption that political culture and structure are in most cases incongruent, welfare policies and citizens´ attitudes may also diverge.

Summarising, like political culture, which connects the micro level with the macro level (Almond/Verba 1989: 32), welfare culture links citizens´ attitudes to welfare state policies. 'Welfare culture' may be described as consisting of various different value dimensions regarding the role of the welfare state, its redistributive function, effects on stratification, and more (Pfau-Effinger 2009: 6). Culture and structure may be congruent or not, and influence each other or not. If culture and structure affect each other, causality may run in both directions (Almond 1989: 29).

The conceptual problem is that there is no persuasive link explaining why data collected at the micro level should constitute a macro phenomenon (Fuchs 2007: 173). There are several problems Fuchs (2007: 173f.) addresses and discusses. Firstly, is it appropriate to give the same weight to each individual´s attitude? With reference to individualism´s rootedness in Western civilization, he states that at least in Western countries this is appropriate (in contrast to collectivistic Asian countries). Further, Fuchs addresses the question how many attitudes need to be aggregated to describe the political culture. Here, it must be stated that we do not analyse 'welfare state culture', but rather a partial aspect of it. Lastly, Fuchs (2007: 174) asks who belongs to the collective and points out that citizens of

the respective nation states belong to it; they elect their representatives. In our case, attitudes of non-citizen residents are also taken into account.[33] They are not allowed to vote the national legislature or the president, yet they may partake in other forms of political participation. Further, they may gain citizenship.

An important question is if adding up the parts validly characterises the whole. Lijphart (1989: 45f.), with reference to Scheuch, describes the individualistic fallacy as "the incorrect inference of the conditions of higher-order systems from observations on lower-level units".[34] Lijphart (1989: 46) rejects Scheuch´s criticism of *The Civic Culture* and points out that Almond and Verba (1989: 42) state that though individuals are the basic units of observation, their attitudes towards other individuals and their activities with other individuals are relevant research topics.

Still, culture is not in, but rather between individuals. Almond and Verba (1989: 41) acknowledge that respondents are primarily considered as individuals, whereas social scientists try to explore them as members of social systems, so that people are asked individually in order to research the collective. Almond and Verba´s statement leads to the conclusion that the inference from attitudes to culture is hampered by the neglect of social interactions. For example, social desirability effects are not believed to be the same in various types of interviews, let alone in interviews on the one hand and social interaction on the other: The basic reason behind the 'spiral of silence' lies in people´s fear of social isolation (Noelle-Neumann 1996: 20). Since the interviewer is not an important significant other for the interviewee, the latter might put low emphasis on the former´s esteem (yet there may be stronger effects due to other persons present during the interview). Therefore, social desirability effects may be stronger outside of the interview situation. To avoid negative reactions from the social surrounding, people thinking that they hold an unpopular minority opinion may either express support for what they believe to be the majority opinion, or remain in silence. The latter is attractive, since it will probably be understood as approval to majority opinion (Noelle-Neumann 1996: 20) without active betrayal of one´s views. In our case, people supporting low government responsibility may feel (or know) that most people support high government responsibility and express views different from their true ones. This may be even more so in public when confronted by people more relevant to the respondent than the

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[33]   Therefore, 'citizens' here means denizens. Likewise, nationalities refer to people living in this country (i.e. not Belgians in the citizenship sense, but denizens of Belgium).
[34]   On the other hand, structural data like GDP, unemployment rates etc. also result from the aggregation of individual data. Based on this Pickel (2009: 304) asks if the high standards demanded from survey data are met by structural data, which are often considered correct.

interviewer. Here, different effects are possible, dependent on actions´ public visibility. To avoid social isolation, one may refrain from partaking in public actions supporting what he perceives as the minority view. Publicly invisible actions, like the decision to vote for a certain party or candidate, may be less affected by this fear of isolation.

Another problem is that structurally macro data based on aggregated micro data (like opinion surveys) and 'real' macro data like welfare policies are different. This will be discussed in the chapter addressing aggregate data analyses.

5.2 Comparing 30 European nations

By comparing different countries, effects resulting from national circumstances (institutions, history, and culture) may be explored. People in similar socio-economic positions may hold different views, since they live in different welfare states. Further, it may be seen which groups are in conflict in which countries (Svallfors 1997: 291) and national findings are not mistaken for overall trends (Svallfors 1995: 117). Comparative attitude research should discover cross-national attitudinal similarities and differences and trace them back to institutions´ influences (Svallfors 1995: 118). Gelissen (2002: 8) posed crucial questions regarding inter-country differences in welfare attitudes, intra-country differences between individuals and country effects on intra-country differences.

Gelissen's unsatisfying answers were not solely caused, as admitted by him (2002: 216), by a small sample of countries. Another factor has been the unavailability of appropriate questions reflecting the expected attitudinal differences between inhabitants of the different welfare regimes. Questions regarding "support for extensiveness and intensiveness of welfare state interventions" (Gelissen 2002: 60) used in previous studies, that means questions about state responsibility for dependent groups or demands for more or less state spending are insufficient for post-Esping-Andersen analyses of welfare attitudes, since they may merely reflect a unidimensional world-view of more or less responsibility or spending and neglect the triangular relationship between the "Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" (Esping-Andersen 1990) assumed to be mirrored in citizens´ attitudes.

Large n- comparisons

A large number of cases brings along a merely superficial examination of every single case (cf. e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990: 2). In-depth knowledge about single cases is necessary to

determine why a particular country is an outlier, if this knowledge is not available, the quest for reasons may become "an academic fishing expedition" (Peters 1998: 59). On the other hand, descriptions of countries´ welfare policies are presented here, since these policies are merely one of many, albeit the most theoretically relevant, independent variable. Further, to study a country´s policies in great detail, knowledge of this country´s language is necessary (Berg-Schlosser/Quenter 1996: 104). Also the incorporation of comparative quantitative data cannot solve the problem of superficiality, given that programmes are too complex to be sufficiently characterised by a few figures. This is one reason why both, country descriptions and quantitative data, will be used to describe the current (and former) characteristics of pension and unemployment benefit programmes.

The high number of cases is not the result of "analytic greed" (Peters 1998: 58), but result of the high number of European (in a wider sense) countries. Further, a higher number of cases brings along more telling results on both levels of analysis. On the macro level, the high number brings along results less prone to effects caused by outliers, on the micro level generalisations from intra-country effects on attitudes are based on more observations.

5.2.1 Comparing European nations

The comparison of European nations is sensible for these nations´ basic similarities and enduring diversity (Mau 1997: 4) and the common welfare tradition (Leibfried 1993: 133) or at least common western European welfare tradition (Schulte 1998: 257). By extending the view to the whole of Europe, homogeneity decreases.

5.2.1.1 EU/EMU effects on welfare states

The EU´s Monetary Union (EMU) and fiscal regime limits governments´ leeway in budgetary affairs and therefore welfare state structures (Ferrera 2003: 612). Magnusson and Stråth (2004: 12) argue that the monetary union poses a threat to the welfare state. Jessop (1993: 32) states that the single market is based on neoliberal understandings of competitiveness. Hacker (2011: 66) argues that the European social model is on the way of negative integration because of a Europe-wide race to the bottom of taxes, social security benefits and welfare generosity (independent of objective pressure, cf. Hay/Rosamond 2002 :151ff.). Pedersen and Finseraas (2009: 191) see a double Maastricht effect: EMU criteria provided objective pressure to lower deficits (and therefore, pension spending), and served as an excuse to pull through unpopular cuts. Hering´s (2004) more radical argumentation is: Since the mid-1990s

the ministers of finance of European countries openly interfere in social policies, supported by the European Commission and the European Central Bank. They justify their interference with the argument that pension expenses, if uncorrected, overload government budgets and therefore endanger sound budgets and, following, the EMU: European finance ministers, the European Commission and the European Central Bank disliked governmental pension programmes since the start of the EMU (Hering 2004: 355). Following this argumentation, pension policies are no longer purely national matters, since national pension policies have, due to their fiscal impact on the one hand and the Monetary Union on the other, implications for other Euro countries. In the conflict between European finance ministers, who are equipped with hard convergence criteria, European social ministers are at a disadvantage with their 'open coordination method'[35] (Hering 2004: 352). Further, since the Stockholm summit the 'Stability Pact' has been extended to include a longer view. Member countries no longer have to report on their finances in the coming five years, but fifty years, and to explain how they plan to stabilise their budgets. Budget stabilisation is no longer understood as mere fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria, but to reduce taxes and charges and at the same time to raise expenses for education, science and infrastructure. Logically, this implies a reduction of welfare expenses (Hering 2004: 356f.).

Contrastingly, Pierson (2001: 92) is ambivalent concerning EMU effects on members´ capacity to sustain their welfare expenditure levels: Though the Monetary Union could foster austerity policies, government debts and rising interest liabilities have important effects on governments´ financial leeway and are not caused by the EMU.

If existent, effects on pension systems are believed to be stronger in continental countries like France and Germany with their expensive schemes and worse budgetary situations, or, more general, the conservative welfare states (Hering 2004: 359). This applies primarily to cases where the pension system is not independent from government budgets (because it covers all of its expenses via contributions), but burdens government budgets because revenues do not cover expenses. As will be seen in the respective chapter, this is the case primarily in Germany (Hering 2004: 352).

Further effects from the EU on pension schemes may result from the Luxembourg process. In contrast to the Maastricht treaty, member countries can not be sanctioned if their policies are considered insufficient; goals are not quantified. The Luxembourg process openly

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[35]   Meaning that "countries exchange information and encourage each other to pursue policies geared to their social objectives. The European Union does not itself play an active role in the way in which individual member states set about achieving those objectives" (Ederveer/de Mooij 2003: 1).

coordinates member countries´ policies.[36] It should coordinate employment strategies, including active labour market policies (Goul Andersen/Halvorsen 2002: 2), so that the goal of high employment rates, adopted in Amsterdam, can be attained. The most important goals were overall employment rates of 70 percent and of 50 percent amongst the elderly in 2010 (Ostheim/Zohlnhöfer 2004: 374ff.). High employment rates lead to high tax revenues, enabling governments to support those unable to work (Ederveer/de Mooij 2003: 4). These goals could spur efforts to curb early retirement, as well as to reduce unemployment.

Nation states can become more competitive by reducing welfare expenses, so that EU- wide coordination to prevent a race to the bottom could be necessary (Busch 1998: 147; this argument is only partially EU-related, since cost competition also exists with trade barriers, but less so). Further, according to Ferrera (2003: 632), European integration resulted in nation states losing control over their economic boundaries. As a free trade area, the European Union raises internal competition (Taylor-Gooby 2001a: 12). This competition could result in social dumping (Magnusson/Stråth 2004: 12, yet Ederveer and de Mooij 2003: 2 state that this did not happen). Actually, analysing the OECD countries, Jahn (2009b: 104ff.) could not find significant Europe effects on welfare spending: From 1980 to 1990, EEC membership had an insignificant positive effect on welfare spending as a percentage of GDP. After 1990, EEC/EU membership had significant negative effects on welfare spending which became stronger, so that between 1997 and 2003 the strongest negative EU effects could be detected.

5.2.1.2   A European welfare state

Out of the 30 countries analysed here, merely six are not EU member states (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Israel, Ukraine and Russia). If the EU will provide welfare services or at least a framework,[37] it would be helpful if citizens of different European countries displayed similar attitudes. If not, citizens of some countries will inevitably be dissatisfied with EU welfare policies, considering them too generous or the opposite or the underlying conditions of eligibility to be unjust. Since here no countries are examined which are not part of Europe

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[36]   One step towards pension coordination has been undertaken in Laeken in 2001, where common objectives under the headlines "adequacy, sustainability, and modernization" were agreed upon (Pedersen and Finseraas 2009: 191f.). Against the backdrop of the EU´s supposed liberalism, it is notable that Pedersen and Finseraas (2009: 192) come to a very positive evaluation of the EU pension ideas in contrast to the World Bank´s model incorporating more personal responsibility, lower expneditures and higher work incentives. Yet, they object that 'sustainability' implies benefit cuts and 'adequacy' the absence of cuts.

[37]   In a four-quadrant matrix consisting of positive and negative integration and path dependency or path cessations, a common European welfare model is most probable under circumstances of positive integration and path cessation (Hacker 2011: 75). Hacker (2011: 76) considers this to be far from reality.

in a wider sense, it will not be possible to ascertain if Europeans´ welfare attitudes differ markedly from those of other world regions. Some studies (e.g. Heien 2002: 113) have shown that Europeans have far higher expectations towards the welfare state than US citizens.

A possible EU-wide equalisation of welfare policies presupposes roughly coherent attitudes in EU and pre-accession countries. If a European social union is to be established, people´s consent is crucial; Casas (2005: 6) notes that different national understandings concerning minimum standards are one crucial reason for their non-existence at the EU level.

This insight derives from Almond and Verba´s congruence hypothesis, meaning that for structure to be stable, a congruent culture is necessary. This can be analysed by comparing citizens´ attitudes towards the welfare state (Heien 2002: 16), for, if there are remarkable differences between nations, the problem from the polarisation thesis emerges. Every given institutionalisation of a European welfare state inevitably brings along member states whose citizens are at odds with it. Conversely, if attitudes are relatively homogeneous, this implies that Europeans´ welfare attitudes pose no obstacle to a European welfare state. Attitudinal congruence between countries makes consensus-finding in the EU easier or possible. The total number of dissatisfied citizens results from differences between countries as well as within countries (distrust and scepticism towards the EU is another matter, cf. Heien 2002: 38).

EU- wide harmonisation is not merely a matter of more or less welfare spending, but also of conditions of eligibility.

Common European welfare policies

If the EU forces countries to reduce their welfare expenses, then the EU may be considered the place to look for remedies (Magnusson/Stråth 2004: 16ff.; see also Schulte 2001: 27 who sees nation states as no longer willing or capable of further fulfilling social functions to the previous degree). Basically, two different kinds of a "European welfare state" are possible.

(1) EU benefits

Given the budgetary significance of welfare expenditures and the necessary bureaucratic restructuring, it is improbable that member states are willing to transfer revenues and important areas of policy making to the EU. Further, regarding distribution conflicts already existing within countries it is doubtful that EU citizens are willing to pay for some other

country´s beneficiaries. In the next paragraph, the proposal by Schmitter and Bauer (2001) will be discussed in order to depict basic technical problems for EU benefits.

Schmitter and Bauer (2001: 56ff.) propose payments directly from the EU for those earning less than a third of the EU median income. The 'Euro Stipendium' (ES) would cost approximately as much as EU agrarian subsidies and regional/structural funds combined. The authors (2001: 57) suggest that "for symbolic reasons" the benefit levels should be equal across the EU. Therefore, the alleged benefit of the ES that it "would go to those individuals really in need, regardless of where they lived" (Schmitter/Bauer 2001: 57). One problem is that the authors (2001: 59f) regard purchasing power parity (PPP) when calculating who is eligible, but forego PPP in benefit levels, favouring a lump sum. This implies that somebody living in a rich (and expensive) country could receive benefits and somebody living in a poor (and cheap) country not, even if nominally their earnings are similar, but two dependents, one in a rich (expensive) and one in a poor (cheap) country get the same amount, despite different living costs. Another problem is that according to the authors´ view, member countries should tie their hands in advance "not to change existing policies in an opportunistic fashion" (2001: 58). The authors do not propose to shift responsibility, but just to add another source of coverage. Additionally, the authors (2001: 58) demand that national or subnational anti-poverty programmes should be disregarded in eligibility calculating. So it is possible that the payment of ES in a poor country elevates a non-working family´s income above the income of a family working, since the non-working family´s national unemployment benefits cannot be cut. The remedy would lie in a lowering of the ES sum. The result would be that in a rich country a poor family´s income would be elevated by merely a negligible amount. Another remedy would be a gradual adjustment of the EU countries´ and regions costs of living through faster economic growth in poorer regions, which is what the authors (2001: 64), with view on past developments, expect. Another problem is that most pre-accession countries are poor. Their accession would reduce the EU´s median income. It is obvious from both calculations by Schmitter and Bauer (2001: 60f.) that there would be people in the EU who would no longer get ES if poor countries join the EU (in the authors calculation, the enlargement from the EU-15 to the EU-27 takes away ES from about 2.5 million EU-15-citizens and 2.1 million citizens from the first wave entrants; 2001: 60ff.). The authors (2001: 61) propose to sustain the level of the ES if new countries enter the EU, but not the number of recipients in the old members. The impending significant reduction of the EU´s median income due to Turkey´s accession and the resulting loss of the ES for a huge number of EU citizens would render this country´s accession politically hardly achievable.

The most severe obstacle is the EU citizens´ national rather than European identity making a common social budget impossible (Busch 1998: 148). Schmitter and Bauer´s proposal for poverty alleviation poses the highest degree of European welfare statism. Doubtlessly, this proposal belongs to the ones who would require very high solidarity among the EU countries and citizens (Magnusson/Stråth 2004: 16).

(2) EU regulations

Besides direct payments, the EU may impose laws under which its member states have to provide their respective citizens basic welfare provision (Pieter/Nicklass in Casas 2005: 4f.).

In both cases, due to huge differences between EU countries in the GDPs per capita and costs of living, regulations would have to be relative to a country´s wealth and could not refer to absolute sums. On the other side, also maximum standards could be set (Casas 2005: 3). Although Casas sees this as rather improbable and contradictory to the goal of better social protection, saved money could be spent to raise minimum levels, which implies weakened earnings-relatedness, if this is preferred.

The EU could make its member states provide a sum relative to the country´s GDP per capita or median income. A more sophisticated idea considers the positive relationship between GDP per capita and the relative size of the welfare state. In Busch´s (1998: 149) suggestion, a regulation may force EU member states to spend a certain share of GDP on social security, while the percentage is positively related to GDP per capita. One of the main advantages would be that one would not have to choose between overburdening poorer countries´ budgets and lowering wealthier countries´ standards. On the other hand, it may be argued that this regulation favours dependents in rich countries, who are already advantaged in absolute terms if everybody would receive the same share of median income. Since, also taking into account price level differences, a given percentage of the national median income allows for a higher standard of living in a more affluent country, one might also argue that poorer countries should offer higher (in relative terms) benefits to their dependents. Though, possibly this would cause competitive disadvantages for poor countries and therefore a widening of the already considerable wealth gap in Europe. Lastly, regulations demanding a certain share of GDP to be spent on social security neglect the number of dependents. Since security and equality should be welfare states´ goals and not spending per se, the achievement of security for individual persons or equality between them should be relevant.

For example, Holzmann (2004: 9ff.) suggests a three-pillar pan-European pension system, which is a very weak form of regulation since it regulates merely the structure.

A mandatory defined-contribution first pillar, a voluntary second pillar with occupational and individual retirement plans, and a third pillar for those whose income in old age from the first two pillars is insufficient (Holzmann 2004: 13, 2006: 243f.). The idea of a pan-European pension system still enables countries to determine their own benefit and contribution levels (Holzmann 2004: 15). Holzmann (2006: 245f.) presents versions of pensions portability. Either a migrating worker´s accumulated savings (which actually are not savings but entitlements in pay-as-you-go schemes) get transferred from his old to his new country. Or savings remain in the old country, so that at retirement migrating workers receive pension payments from various countries. In both cases, similar attitudes across European countries are not important since there is no common benefit level; merely workers have to get along with their new/old country´s benefit/contribution levels. In contrast to the first and second pillar, the third pillar, which should ensure basic security, is more problematic because national differences could affect the incentive structure of the pan-European scheme (Holzmann 2006: 259). The more similar attitudes in different European countries concerning government responsibility for the old are, the more similar each country´s programme could be or the more likely a pan-European programme is to come about. If retirees with insufficient pension entitlements from the first and second pillar receive benefits from the country they live in, some countries could be disadvantaged if they are attractive to other countries´ retirees. If benefits are paid by their country of origin, retirees from poorer countries or from countries whose citizens support a low basic pension could be forced to migrate back to their country of origin when entering retirement, since otherwise benefits would be inadequate.

The two main advantages of Holzmann´s proposal are: (1) Higher pension portability across nation borders would lower barriers to labour mobility and therefore reduce unemployment in some regions and labour shortages in others. Further, labour supply could be raised, partially due to delayed retirement, against the backdrop of an aging population in general. (2) Euro countries could lower their deficits in order to meet the Maastricht criteria (see also Holzmann 2006: 239ff.).

Political feasibility

The EU´s member states are disinclined to transfer responsibility for social policy to the European level (Larsen/Taylor-Gooby 2004: 183, Holzmann 2006: 239). This responsibility is mainly seen as being located on the national level and the EU´s jurisdiction includes merely areas in which its members voluntarily forego their influence (Schulte 2001: 30. See also the 'blame avoidance/tied hands' argument). Further, as Ross (1995: 327) assumes, due to the EU´s foundation on liberal perceptions, among the multiple issues affected by the European integration, social policy or an European welfare state are peripheral (see also Heien 2002: 15). The EU has neither the financial or bureaucratic capacities nor the welfare legislation to provide welfare services to its citizens (Leibfried 1997: 3). Due to different traditions, priorities, economic possibilities among European nations and other reasons, neither a harmonisation of social policy nor the institutionalisation of a common system has been tried (Schulte 1998: 255f.). The regulative tendency of EU law has the advantage for the nation states that it implies lower costs than binding rules would. Further, in Beramendi´s (2003: 33f.) calculation an adjustment of social support levels in 13 EU-15 countries to the EU-average would significantly raise or lower poverty and inequality in some member states. Therefore, he concludes that his results support the view of those who doubt the feasibility of an EU- wide social policy. But, as Ferrera (2003: 643) notes, though positive integration faces higher obstacles than negative integration, the EU has begun to imply that EU-wide solidarity is possible by widening redistribution´s boundaries from national border to the EU´s outside[38] borders. Further, while core areas of social policy have been left to nation states, the EU has achieved some minor regulations concerning industrial law, gender relations and agricultural policies (Ross 1995: 329, see also Korpi 2003: 604). Since the Amsterdam treaty of 1999, social policy takes place on the national and European level (Schulte 2001: 36f.), albeit primarily on the first one.

Though in Article 34 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU

> "the Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as […] dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employment",

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[38] One could argue that the second development follows logically from the first, since the erosion of borders necessitates the erection of new ones, because solidarity needs a definition of the outside (Lessenich 2006: 182).

the implementation takes place "in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices". Doubtlessly, the latter are prevalent, since the EU´s competences in welfare issues are limited (Casas 2005: 6).

Taken together, on the one hand a European welfare solution seems so improbable that the question if it is desirable is very hypothetical (Ferrara 2003: 648). The EU´s movements towards social citizenship are sketchy (Bauer/Schmitter 2001: 55). On the other hand, cautious developments and ideas like a guaranteed minimum income may be recognised (Ferrera 2003: 648). In Magnusson and Stråth´s (2004: 14f.) assessment, the introduction of "hard law" is unrealistic; far more feasible is the "soft law" approach of open coordination like the European Employment Strategy, since regulations´ liability is inversely related to member states´ willingness to accept them.

This also applies to the latest proposal, which is a kind of unemployment insurance for countries proposed by the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy. Countries would pay in according to their economic growth, tax revenues and labour market conditions. Countries could get money from this insurance, if their numbers of short-term unemployed spike due to economic crisis. This is meant to prevent enduring cross-national transfers (Handelsblatt 7-9/12/2012). Yet citizens could be dissatisfied if their country lends money to other countries whose benefits are considered too high, or, reversed, if their benefits are low since other countries are reluctant to lend more.

A higher degree of coordination and further step towards a European welfare state consists of Brussels-enacted basic regulations. For this scenario to happen, some common views on welfare states´ responsibilities, rules of eligibility and appropriate generosity are fundamental. Among the six reasons Schmitter and Bauer (2001: 55) adduce for the absence of a European welfare state is that the members´ welfare states have, over the course of the last century, developed with considerable diversity, with their citizens showing strong preferences for their country´s status quo. In contrast, Moreno and Palier (2004: 6) argue that intra-European differences have diminished in the last thirty years, because from 1984 to 1997 the gap between the highest spending regime (Continental) and the lowest spending regime (Southern) has diminished. On the other hand, Alber (2006: 227) states that in some terms like the level of government and social expenditures the intra-European gaps have even widened. Another obstacle brought forward by the authors is an uneven spread of neoliberal thinking with its rejection of big government (Schmitter/Bauer 2001: 55). Attitude similarities and differences shown below shed light on this uneven spread of support for big government.

6 Data: European Social Survey 4 (ESS4)

Data from ESS4 will be used. The ESS is a biennial survey conducted in most European nations. Besides the core questionnaire used in every round there are two rotating modules covering various issues. In ESS4, the 50-item module 'Welfare attitudes in a changing Europe' has been included.[39] This module covers various welfare state topics, such as the four questions whose answers will be the empirical analyses´ dependent variables.[40] For exact phrasing see appendix A1.

Most independent variables result from the core questionnaire, but some also from the rotating module.

In most countries unemployment benefits decrease during unemployment (Cahuc/Lehmann 2000: 135f.). ESS4 does not contain questions if respondents prefer decreasing or stable unemployment benefits or even a maximum duration of benefits.

6.1 Scope of welfare policies: Range and degree

The two dependent variables concerning governmental responsibility for the old and the unemployed are supposed to measure the range of the scope of government.

In every country analysed here government provides help if citizens become unemployed or old, so that there is no variance between countries concerning range of government in these two areas. This applies to Esping-Andersen´s (1990: 47) understanding of the term 'range'. Following this, government can either have responsibility or not. This is congruent with Roller´s (1992: 42) understanding. Goals[41] are socio-economic security and equality, and government can be responsible or not (extensity) and if so, to which degree (intensity; the distinction between extensity and intensity dates back to Habermas 1973: 105; cf. Gelissen 2000: 287). Therefore, questions if government should ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old or the unemployed belong to the 'range'-dimension. Though, given that in every country analysed here government is responsible for both dependent groups and the assumption that attitudes are coherent to policies, in every country unanimous

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[39]   The rotating module was designed by Stefan Svallfors (Umeå University, Sweden), Wim van Oorschot (Tilburg University, the Netherlands), Peter Taylor-Gooby (University of Kent, UK), Christian Staerklé (University of Geneva, Switzerland), Jørgen Goul Andersen (Aalborg University, Denmark), John Hills (LSE, UK), Tom Sefton (LSE, UK) and Steffen Mau (University of Bremen, Germany).

[40]   The numerous models depicting the way people answer survey questions (for example to be found in Zaller 1992: 279, Kumlin 2002: 29, Saris 2004: 27, Choing 1996: 195ff.) will be left aside here.

[41]   Goals are one of the three object categories attitudes towards the welfare state can refer to. The others are means (outputs) and consequences (outcomes). Goals can be subdivided into extensiveness and intensiveness, means into institutions and programs, and consequences into intended and not intended (Roller 1992: 45ff.).

support should be expected.[42] Difficulties between this understanding and the assumption that there should be some correlation between citizens´ attitudes and actual policies become obvious if one considers that the question of extensity, i.e. of government responsibility is answered in the affirmative at least in the case of income maintenance (Roller 1992: 42).

Even taking into account that our items do not refer to governments´ responsibility for putting into practice the goals socio-economic security and equality in general, but to provide for the old and unemployed (which relates to specific areas, Roller 1992: 45), consensual attitudes may be expected, since, as noted by Esping-Andersen (1990: 47), in these areas virtually all advanced capitalist countries´ governments have assumed responsibility. The same may be concluded from Roller (1992: 42) who, referring to Germany, states that concerning income maintenance consensus can be expected. The items used here regarding provision for the old and unemployed refer to income maintenance. Further, taking as basis Roller´s understanding (1992: 42), only "yes or no" is plausible: Government is either responsible or not. The same is proposed by Gelissen (2000: 287), stating that respondents may be divided in two groups, those favouring governmental responsibility and those rejecting it. Congruently, Roller (1992: 47) presents as an indicator for the measurement of preferred extensiveness an item, in which respondents should state *if* government should be responsible for social security.[43] Borre and Goldsmith (1995a: 10) have a different understanding of range of government:

> "In comparing two countries with regard to medical care […] the scope of government is larger in one of them if the care programme covers (i) more people, (ii) more diseases and treatments, or (iii) the program incurs a larger share of public expenditure. The first two amount to more extended coverage (range), the last to more intensive coverage (degree)".

In this case, range is not dichotomous, but continuous, so that there are many nuances between responsibility and its absence. Further, here 'degree' seems to result directly from range, since the share of public expenditure a programme incurs is, in above example, the product of number of people and the scope of covered treatments. The same may be said about old age pensions or unemployment benefits. The more people are covered (range i), and the more of the needs of those covered are cared for (range ii), the higher public expenditures

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[42]   Responses to other items are also harder to compare cross-nationally than those to range items, e.g. questions about the means of the welfare state (institutions, programmes, actors; cf. Andreß/Heien 2001: 339).
[43]   On the other hand, Roller (1992: 92) uses data from a survey conducted in 1974 in which respondents could choose if government should have "absolute/important/partly/absolutely no" responsibility for the problem "welfare and help for old people" (my translations from the German questionnaire "Politische Ideologie I"; ZA 0757, page 6). In this case, 'range' is continuous and not dichotomous.

(degree) in this area are. Thus, while Roller (1992: 42) sees range of government responsibility as dichotomous – "yes or no", meaning that government is either responsible or not – Borre and Goldsmith consider it gradual, a matter of more or less. However, the ISSP 1990 items the book "The Scope of Government" (edited by Borre and Scarbrough) is partially based on the binary understanding of range of government: Respondents may state that it should definitely or probably be government´s responsibility to provide decent standards of living for the old and unemployed. Government may be responsible or not, and respondents are allowed to express uncertainty by stating "probably should" or "probably should not".

In contrast, in ESS4 respondents may state that it "should not be government´s responsibility at all" or "entirely government´s responsibility" or one of the numerous nuances in-between. The possible answers deviate in principle from those in previous surveys. While in the latter government could be responsible or not and respondents were allowed to express uncertainty, in ESS4 responsibility can be ascribed to government to a different extent. Therefore, the questions in ESS4 seem to put into practice the understanding about the range of government brought forward by Borre and Goldsmith (1995: 15):

> "*Responsibility items* […] responses are taken as indicators of beliefs about the range *rather* the degree of government intervention" (first emphasis in original, second added).

Being continuous, range items in ESS4 are partially similar to degree items. Though, since they relate to a basic understanding of governments´ responsibilities and not to matters of more or less spending against the background of a country´s status quo, attitudes concerning the scope of government are comparable across countries in a sensible way. In contrast, it is problematic to compare items concerning 'more' or 'less' (Svallfors 2010: 126), since more and less is favoured against the backdrop of the status quo. For example, if country A displays higher spending in one policy field than country B, and country B´s citizens are more in favour of higher spending in this policy field than country A´s, it is not possible to find out which country´s citizens favour higher spending, because actual spending levels and preferences for more or less spending cannot be combined into one figure. Nevertheless, attitudes regarding more or less spending can be compared cross-nationally, e.g. to compare satisfaction and dissatisfaction with actual policies or to forecast coming political developments.

7 Determinants of welfare attitudes

Several factors may determine citizens´ attitudes about government responsibility and earnings-relatedness. The theoretically most interesting factor are welfare policies. Other attitudinally relevant macro effects could be national wealth, inequality, the tax system etc. On the micro level age, income or political outlook and other factors may matter. About these effects it will be hypothesised in chapters 7.1 and 7.2.

Direction of causality

If citizens´ attitudes and actual policies fit, the question is how this comes about. Attitudes may be shaped by circumstances, but also shape them via activity. The latter option implies that attitudes are highly relevant (Miller 1995: 89).

In the following, various possible causal mechanisms will be shown. One dimension incorporates the question where welfare policies ultimately originate, in elites´ actions or in citizens preferences. The second dimension incorporates the question if the citizenry may control political elites before or after these elites create precedents. Chapter 9 will show this in more detail.

7.1 Macro level

Figure 7.1.: Causal model

Numbers: Chapters.

7.1.1 Effects from institutions and policies on attitudes: New Institutionalism

According to 'New Institutionalism', institutions shape people´s attitudes (Kumlin 2002b: 79). Treating preferences or interests as exogenous can lead to wrong predictions and misleading normative theories (March/Olsen 1989: 154f.). Given that acceptance is crucial and that preference heterogeneity fosters political inequality (March/Olsen 1989: 155), institutional effects on citizens´ preferences can be normatively desirable.

The term 'institution' is used with multiple meanings in the social sciences (Peters 2005: 29). Mayntz and Scharpf (1995: 47f.) distinguish between three kinds of institutions, amongst them institutions that give financial or juridical resources to certain groups or extract these resources from them. Unemployment and pension schemes grant rights to citizens and burden them with duties. Based on these rights citizens receive payments, via the duties financial resources get extracted from them.

The distinction between 'policies' and 'institutions' is peripheral in our context and arbitrary in numerous others. Political leaders create welfare institutions and largely determine what these institutions do. Since not all eventualities may be considered by lawmakers, on a lower level there is institutional leeway (or 'bureaucratic discretion', which in turn lowers citizens´ power, cf. Kumlin 2002b: 86f. partially referring to Lipsky´s 1980 work on 'street-level bureaucracy'). For example, unemployment insurances may decide individual cuts in benefits. In this case, individual members of the institution act as its representatives (Scharpf 2000: 111). But overall, the existence and actions of institutions result from political decisions. This is one interpretation, still distinguishing between policies and institutions. The alternative interpretation is offered by Pierson (2004: 165). Based on North´s (1990: 3) definition of institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or […] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction", he concludes that

> "[…] major public policies as important institutions […] the institutions that impinge on the modern citizen most directly and intensely as she goes about her daily life are in fact public policies, *not* the formal political institutions that have preoccupied political scientists" (emphasis in original. See also Jæger 2009: 726 terming welfare regimes "socially and culturally embedded institutions", and Kumlin 2002b: 43f. defining welfare state institutions as "a broad spectrum of public transfers and services […] ").

Therefore, in the following the distinction between policies and institutions does not matter.

'New Institutionalism' or 'Neoinstitutionalism' focuses on effects from institutions in society. In its early days, New Institutionalism has been partially fuelled by curiosity about persisting differences between countries in the face of a common and similar surrounding (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 5).

Hall and Taylor (1996: 936ff.) depict three kinds of 'New Institutionalisms' or Neoinstitutionalism: Historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism (see also Peters 2005: 199ff. for an enumeration of New Institutionalisms).

Historical Institutionalism

Here, the 'calculus approach' is focused on actors´ expectations and certainty about the behaviour of others. Historical Institutionalism emphasises path dependence, partially via institutional effect on identities and interests (Hall/Taylor 1996: 941). Society and politics affect preferences (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 8) so that "broad assumptions about 'self-interest behaviour' are empty" (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 9). In contrast, Rational Choice Institutionalism (below) assumes fixed preferences (Hall/Taylor 1996: 944f., Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 9).

Historical Institutionalism suggests path dependent attitudes and worldviews (Cox 2004: 207f. refers to the 'path-dependency of an idea', where ideas do not change the world, but actors´ perceptions of the world). In complex environments information inconsistent with "mental maps" (Pierson 2004: 38, 126 with reference to North) used to store information in a handy manner has a weaker attitudinal effects than consistent information (Pierson 2004: 38f.). Between individuals, interaction reinforces pre-existing behaviour and understandings. Pierson (2004: 39) with references to Wuthnow states that

> "emerging worldviews, once they reach a critical mass, can generate a set of culture-producing institutions, organizations, and specialized actors that greatly facilitate the spread and reproduction of that ideology"

This implies a parallel continuity of institutions and attitudes, yet institutional change may result in asynchronous causality not to be detected cross-sectionally (Pierson 2004: 45).

Hall and Taylor (1996: 950) criticise that Historical Institutionalism has only weakly explained how institutions are supposed to affect behaviour, while Rational Choice Institutionalism is based on too simple assumptions concerning people´s motivations. Sociological Institutionalism partially neglects conflicts and clashes of power (Hall/Taylor

1996: 954). In contrast, Historical Institutionalism pays attention to power advantages[44] for certain actors or groups resulting from institutions (Hall/Taylor 1996: 954), which is another factor contributing to path dependence.

In the case of Historical Institutionalism, political institutions not merely result from social forces (March/Olsen 1989: 18), but also affect values of political actors, identities, future events and the understandings of events (March/Olsen 1989: 40ff., 160).[45] In times of crisis, ideas incorporated in institutions are less taken for granted and scrutinised more closely; new ideas emerge and gain popularity (Sanders 2006: 41). Therefore, crisis symptoms may weaken effects of principles incorporated in existing institutions on attitudes. Rather, these ideas and assumptions may be rejected because they are the foundation of institutions which have proven to be prone to crises.

Rational Choice Institutionalism

Regarding institutions as external constraints, or rules of the game under which actors try to maximise their utility is but one version of Rational Choice Institutionalism. The other is regarding institutions not as exogenous rules, but as creations of the actors themselves, in order to maximise future utility. In this case, institutions are states of equilibrium, possible to be unbalanced if crucial actors are willing to change rules (Shepsle 2006: 24ff., see also Sanders 2006: 42). Classically, Rational Choice assumed exogenous basic preferences such as power and wealth, applying to all times and cultures. In New Institutionalism, Rational Choice deviates from this view and considers preferences as dependent on situations, so that interaction and institutions affect preferences (Katznelson/Weingast 2005: 7ff.). Examples are Social Security and Medicare. Since these programmes are financially important for US senior citizens, the latter pay high attention to policy proposals concerning both programmes and are interested in defending these programmes (see also Campbell 2002: 139 and 2003: 14ff. for effects from institutions not merely on preferences but also on political resources).

Full rationality has been partially replaced by 'bounded rationality', considering that acquiring information is costly and full information is mostly not available. 'Bounded rationality' accepts the notion that humans are not completely rational (Shepsle 2006: 33).

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[44]   Power and preferences may not be independent of each other, since citizens´ power depends on how preferences are distributed (March/Olsen 1989: 150).
[45]   March and Olsen (1989: 165f.) depict the Swedish welfare state as a counterexample, since the idea of the *folkehem* was to create a common political community, yet the subsequent introduction of specific programmes for numerous groups led to fragmentation: "Efforts to achieve universality through detailed justice (millimetre-justice) tended to fragment the political community into small constituencies […] " (1989: 166).

In contrast to Historical Institutionalism, which is based strongly on history and philosophy, Rational Choice Institutionalism draws heavily on mathematics and economics, with far shorter causal chains and less empirical support (Sanders 2006: 43). Pierson´s (2004) demand to place 'Politics in time' shows this shortcoming of Rational Choice Institutionalism when regarded from Historical Institutionalism´s perspective. Conversely, Rational Choice institutionalists consider Historical institutionalists´ explanations of history´s effects on preferences as "undertheorized and often inadequate" (Katznelson/Weingast 2005: 6).

Cultural or Sociological Institutionalism

The 'cultural approach' is focused on actors´ worldviews, preferences and self-images. Institutions are stable because they "are so 'conventional' or taken-for-granted that they escape direct scrutiny" (Hall/Taylor 1996: 940). Political actors try to conform to "cultural rules, norms, and expectations" (Miller/Banaszak-Holl 2005: 195) to gain legitimacy:

> "The institutional environment promotes homogeneity, in particular, because it consists of cognitive paradigms and normative frameworks that limit the range of alternatives that organizational decision makers are likely to perceive as legitimate and appropriate" (Miller/Banaszak-Holl 2005: 196).

Beyond adaptation to a society´s norms and values ('vertical isomorphism'), legitimacy may also be gained by adopting other countries´ policies ('horizontal isomorphism'), because these policies may be considered legitimate and worth emulating (Miller/Banaszak-Holl 2005: 197). Conversely, institutions also shape people´s worldviews:

Sociological Institutionalism comes close to the 'cultural approach' above by assuming that institutions provide "cognitive scripts", based on how the world is interpreted (Hall/Taylor 1996: 948), so that "institutions […] affect […] most basic preferences and very identity" (Hall/Taylor 1996: 948). Institutions "structure the field of vision" (Hall/Taylor 1996: 953) of those who wish to change institutions.

Bell (2011: 886) terms this kind of institutionalism "over-socialized".

Constructivist or Discursive Institutionalism

The fourth approach is not mentioned by Hall and Taylor. 'Constructivist Institutionalism' incorporates "ideational path dependence" (Hay 2006: 65), which limits institutional change due to their founding ideas, having independent path-stabilising effects. Hay (2006: 65) also

notes that actors´ perceptions are shaped by the institutional environment. Schmidt (2008: 303ff.) uses the term 'Discursive Institutionalism' and points out that by using the term 'Constructivist Institutionalism' Hay focuses "more on the ideas that are the substantive content of discourse than on the interactive process involved in discourse" (Schmidt 2008: 304). Here, 'discourse' incorporates the interactive process by which ideas are conveyed and the context of ideas and agency, meaning who is saying what to whom (Schmidt 2008: 305):

> "[…] the coordinative discourse consists of the individuals and groups at the center of policy construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas. These are the political actors − the civil servants, elected officials, experts, organized interests, and activists, among others − who seek to coordinate agreement among themselves on policy ideas […]" (Schmidt 2008: 310).

The communicative discourse takes place in front of the public and at least partially for the public (Schmidt 2008: 310). These discourses may affect citizens´ attitudes, whereas discourse not only reflects values and interests, but also changes them (Schmidt 2002: 173). The critique of this fourth kind of New Institutionalism of the three other is that they brought institutions too strongly back in, overestimating institutional stability and underestimating possible changes in agents´ preferences (Schmidt 2008: 313; Bell 2011: 883ff. states that Historical Institutionalism, slightly altered and incorporating "active and interpretive agents" can explain change). Here, institutions are not merely given, but also considered resulting from what actors do and say, so that action is not rational, path dependent or norm-following, but also institution-creating and institution-maintaining (Schmidt 2008: 314). The three old New Institutionalisms explain the expected, where institutions "frame the discourse" (Schmidt 2008: 314), whilst Discursive Institutionalism claims to explain the unexpected (Schmidt 2008: 314). Similarly, Discursive Institutionalism claims to explain change and how actors reconceptualise the world (possibly due to cross-border diffusion), whereas the other three New Institutionalisms explain continuity (Schmidt 2010: 1ff.).

Institutions-to-values

The basic question underlying the institutionalist 'institutions-to-values' causality is: "Does a regime, given enough time, imbue individuals with those values that underlie institutions?" (Rohrschneider 1999: 10). Rohrschneider (1999: 9f.) criticises that very infrequently micro-level models about how this may happen are presented.

Welfare attitudes may result from welfare policies, since the latter may breed their own supportive ideology (King 1987: 851) and beliefs about desirable policies are shaped by actual policies (Steinmo 1994: 128). This happens possibly via personal experiences (Kumlin 2002b: 81, whereas Kumlin 2002b: 84 also states that the welfare regime they live in is a merely poor proxy variable for citizens´ actual experiences with welfare state institutions). Citizens may learn about policies´ consequences, or accept the new status quo under the presumption that these policies would not have been implemented if they were not sensible (Page/Shapiro 1989: 307f.). This is in line with the assumption that "any stable state of affairs tends to become accepted eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives[46] to it no longer readily come to mind" (Kahneman et al. 1986: 730f.) and that

> "the rule of distributive justice is a statement of what ought to be, and what people say ought to be is determined in the long run and with some lag by what they find in fact to be the case" (Homans 1974: 249f.).

Further, welfare policies create groups dependent upon them or benefitting from them, who in turn support the status quo (Huber/Stephens 2001a: 22). Another mechanism from institutional design to individual attitudes is presented by Rohrschneider (1999: 15ff.). 'Institutional learning' describes "the idea that citizens are exposed to the values and norms underlying a nation´s institutional configuration" (Rohrschneider 1999: 16). Offe (1987: 511) describes this as "the mechanism of ideological accommodation", or, the 'taken-for-grantedness' of rules and perceptions (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 42 with reference to Berger/Luckmann. This comes close to Sociological Institutionalism). Institutions, following from this, are dependent as well as independent variables in the actor-centred approach (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 45): The institutional context as well as non-institutional factors affect actors. Actors affect interaction, due to a feedback loop the latter´s results affect the institutional context.

Institutions foster reciprocal reliability of expectations and enable citizens to act beyond personal relationships (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 47). In the case of the welfare state, institutions enable citizens to pay for people they do not know, knowing that if they were dependent, the reverse would happen. Based on this, people may act, take risks etc. Institutions define rules everybody is bound to follow and shape actors´ orientations and situations they are confronted with. This influence is limited due to the possibility to disregard

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[46] What is considered a viable alternative is at least partially constructed by institutions, e.g. administrative agencies. The same applies to the 'rules of the game', also precluding some alternatives (March/Olsen 1989: 163f.).

institutions and limits to institutions´ capabilities to determine the distribution of resources (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 49). One important aspect is the effect of normative expectations on internalised norms. These expectations are partially system-wide valid values; partially they apply merely to people occupying certain societal positions (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 56). Resulting from the former, members of certain societies may be expected to be affected by external normative expectations (e.g., solidarity): "Institutions define individual, group, and societal identities, what it means to belong to a specific collective" (March/Olsen 1989: 17).

Scharpf (2000: 79f.) states that institutions shape the perception, interpretation and evaluation of reality. Knowledge about institutional contexts implies far-reaching knowledge about actors, their options, their perceptions and their preferences (Scharpf 2000: 81). With reference to path dependence, Scharpf (2000: 82) concludes that empirical regularities are to be found sporadically and not universally, so that material theories based on institutional approaches are not always correct (Scharpf 2000: 83, based on Coleman).

Further, Scharpf (2000: 83) points out that effects from institutions to actors´ perceptions, preferences and lastly intentions can never be perfect. The reason is that in modern societies social surroundings and socialisation contexts are increasingly differentiated (Scharpf 2000: 83). One may see a continuum ranging from total institutional effects on one side to institutions´ ideational irrelevance on the other.

Supporting the idea of institutions´ normative relevance, Rothstein (1998: 139) states that "'the gender system', 'class consciousness,' or 'the national character'" do not constitute social norms but institutions do so. And they result from political decisions.

Effects from institutions on preferences may result in preference for solutions to be found in the own country (Forma/Kangas 1999: 166). This implies path-dependence by individuals relying on norm-stabilising institutions (Mau 2004: 60).

Rothstein (1998: 139) tries to answer the question of the causal mechanism between institutions and norms. Following Mansbridge´s question if it is possible to create institutions leading to 'good' attitudes, Rothstein (1998: 140f.) drifts to Levi´s analysis of factors leading to people´s consent and compliance. The crucial factors are: Citizens consider the programme fair, believe that free-riding is negligible, and that the programme emerged in a fair process and has been implemented by trustworthy actors. Ascribed fairness tells us under which conditions citizens support institutions, but not under which conditions institutions affect citizens´ norms. The points concerning free-riding and "procedural justice" (Levi 1993: 7) may influence people´s evaluation and support of social programmes, but it is hard to see in

which manner they should enhance or lower the institutions´ impact on social norms. This also applies to the fair emergence of the programme. A strongly earnings-related pension scheme may have been introduced undemocratically and with low regard for its effects on citizens´ well-being, but can nevertheless lead to the spread of a supportive ideology. Solely concerning the suspicion of free-riding the answer is satisfying: It may not just undermine support for specific welfare programmes, but also undermine support for these programmes´ underlying norms and principles.

The connection between institutional settings and citizens´ attitudes hinges on citizens´ awareness of these settings; therefore they have to experience institutional effects in their daily lives (Krömmelbein et al. 2007: 35) or via mass media. Personal welfare state experiences are a crucial link in the causal flow from welfare policies to citizens´ attitudes (Kumlin 2002a: 21). But since intra-regime variance in experiences with welfare institutions is considerable (Kumlin 2002a: 23), the welfare regime a person lives in is a rather vague measure for interactions with welfare institutions. Since citizens have to be accustomed to contextual factors (Gelissen 2002: 100), to unfold their norm-setting effects the latter have to be around for a while (Borre/Goldsmith 1995: 7), so that citizens can accumulate individual and collective experiences with institutional settings (Arts/Gelissen 2001: 287). Heien (2002: 45) ascribes special importance to citizens´ primary socialisation, since attitudes emerging during this period are believed to be especially stable.

During primary socialisation, individuals acquire notions of generalised others, identity, society and reality. During secondary socialisation individuals internalise institutional "sub-worlds", and related "special knowledge" from societal differentiation of labour, i.e. individuals acquire role-specific knowledge (Berger/Luckmann 2009: 148f.). This "sub-worlds" with their own normative, cognitive and affective parts are "partial realities" in contrast to the total reality of the "basic world" acquired during primary socialisation. Therefore, influences stemming from secondary socialisation may be weaker, since secondary socialisation takes place against the background of the self and the internalised world stemming from primary socialisation (Berger/Luckmann 2009: 150[47]).

Further, not just the length of existence, but also transmitted information plays a crucial role in the presumed influence from policies to attitudes (Pierson 1993: 619). This varies depending on factors unrelated to a program´s "true" importance or scope, as measured

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[47]   All terms in inverted commas: My translation from the German edition. Terms in the English-languaged original edition may differ.

in its costs. For example, Pierson (1993: 622) states that programmes benefiting concentrated groups are more visible than those distributing benefits widely across the population.

Perceiving programmes, citizens ascribe utility to them, either because they benefit personally or they perceive them as embodiments of social norms, or both:

> "There are segments of the citizenry whose utility function is unitary; they are purely income maximizers or purely moral. A large proportion, however, appear to have dual utilities. They wish to contribute to the social good, at least as long as they believe a social good is being produced. They also want to ensure that their individualistic interests are being satisfied as far as possible" (Levi 1991: 133)

Institutional structure matters for both utility functions. Firstly, it determines the number of beneficiaries and benefactors, the former supporting the current structure, the latter opposing it under self-interest assumptions (leaving aside that, given welfare programmes´ complexity and future´s uncertainty, at least parts of the citizenry may be expected to be uninformed if they are beneficiaries or benefactors; Rothstein 2001: 220 and Jordan 2010: 865, both state that this applies more to universal programmes). More important, concerning the second utility function, if citizens regard what they are exposed to as normatively desirable, they should support the status quo. Therefore, the more important the secondary utility function, the more institutions breed their own supportive ideology, whereas an emphasis on the first utility function comes with lower support, since the necessity of balanced budgets in the long long implies that the amount of money paid out roughly equals the amount of money paid in, resulting in a number of people not supporting the current institutional structure (this depending on the distribution of costs and benefits. One person paying for all others would be the supportive extreme, all paying for one the antagonistic one).

A more detailed view on feedback mechanisms is grounded on Esping-Andersen´s (1990: 58) statement that "each case will produce its own fabric of social solidarity". Factors affected by welfare arrangements are the views the public holds about welfare dependents (Larsen 2008: 148) and the sharpness of the division[48] between those better off and those

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[48] Differences in income and wealth mainly result from the market. Yet, the pre-tax/pre-transfer distribution of income cannot be equated with a situation that would exist without the welfare state or in a minimal state: "Taxes and transfers always shape the income distribution, and it may be impossible to truly simulate a pretax and pretransfer income distribution" (Brady 2005: 1136). Besides effects due to the anticipation of welfare state effects, for example government spending on education, which often disproportionately privileges persons who will later receive higher incomes, affects pre-tax/pre-transfer income distributions. Another factor is governmental activity on the labour market: Governments employ people and therefore raise demand for people with specific skills. In theory, it is possible that someone working in a private education or health institution receives a higher wage than under 'pure' market conditions, because his employer has to compete with government wages in the same sector or because government activity raises demand for labour and therefore the price of labour. Further, some workers would have to work for lower wages, because

worse off (Edlund 1999: 342). Both are partially determined by the institutionalisation of social solidarity. A different stance is taken by Taylor-Gooby (1983: 168), negating stabilising as well as destabilising attitudinal effects of policies:

> "The political system cannot itself guarantee to produce the values required to assure loyalty to its policies. Values derive from culture which is independent of the state, and the cultural system produces motives which may be at variance with what is required to justify the particular planning necessary to contain crisis-trends in the economy. Ultimately the possibility of a legitimation crisis stemming from the cultural level of society becomes more and more urgent".

7.1.2 Institutions and policies as intervening variable

Korpi and Palme (1998: 664) expect that welfare state institutions are intervening variables, being shaped by accumulated interests and shaping interests. This can be considered a feedback-loop, whereas "feedback is the process by which institutions adapt in the light of messages arising from their preceding activities, and interaction with their environment" (Moran 2006: 146). Such a feedback-loop is illustrated by Roller (1992: 23) with reference to Almond and Powell. The outputs emanating from the political system, e.g. taxes/contributions and benefits, are followed by the outputs´ consequences (Roller 1992: 18). Through the feedback-loop, these outcomes affect the political system´s input (support and demands), albeit effects from structure to culture, i.e. from policy to attitudes, will probably take a long time (Roller 1994: 10) and therefore be even more time-lagged than effects from attitudes to policies. Feedbacks from outcomes to political support are relevant in relation to system effectiveness and stability. More important, feedbacks to demands imply that welfare attitudes are – at least partially – determined by welfare policies. These demands may be converted by the political system into new outputs, being converted into outcomes:

> "What is normally considered the dependent variable (policy output) is also an independent variable (in an ongoing process in which everything becomes an intervening variable) […] policy builds on policy, either in moving forward what has been inherited, or amending it, or repudiating it" (Heclo 1974: 315, see also Kumlin 2002b: 34).

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demand for their labour is low and supply is high, yet low wages have to compete with welfare benefits, so that their wages are above their 'natural' market clearing level. Lastly, labor and capital anticipate tax/transfer effects, so that pretext/pretransfer distribution is already affected by tax and transfer mechanisms (Beramendi/Cusack 2009: 261). Progressive taxation, for example, negatively affects labor supply and female employment and makes investment in human capital less attractive (Ederveen/de Mooij 2003: 26f.), so that the pre-tax/pre-transfer in welfare states is not equal to the situation in a minimal state, albeit Moene and Wallerstein (2001: 869) state that government spending has merely marginal effects on pretax wages.

There are two main reasons for feedback effects (Edlund 1999: 343): Firstly, institutions "define […] what is desirable for groups to achieve". Secondly, "as institutions in certain respects are conceived as normative orders, they influence and structure world views and preferences among the public". Pierson (2000: 810) mentions two reasons for "positive feedback or path dependence" overlapping with Edlund´s: Institutions changing "the universe of actors in a particular setting" and actors adapt their policy preferences to circumstances: "Spoils" (Pierson 1993: 599) created from policies motivate those benefitting to resist change; these beneficiaries are the product of the welfare states themselves (Korpi/Palme 2003: 426). Therefore, interest groups shape policies and vice versa (Pierson 1993: 598). Like Heclo (above), Rothstein (1998: 135), includes, besides self-preserving mechanisms, self-destructing ones too. Attitudes affect policies and institutions and vice versa. In the latter case, this may strengthen or weaken institutions (the latter via 'countermobilizations', cf. Pierson 1993: 600). Both mechanisms happen due to institutions´ norm-setting function, influencing what actors believe to be right or wrong.

7.1.3 Effects from political decision makers on attitudes

Political actors create institutions and policies. It has been argued that these institutions may affect citizens' attitudes. In this case, what political actors do affects attitudes, so that these attitudes do not enter the political process as exogenous factors. Another factor is what political actors say. Political actors justify their actions and non-actions, so that ostensible effects from policies on attitudes may be spurious if the real effect runs from parallel justifications by political actors on citizens´ attitudes.

Besides the idea of democratic political leadership as aggregation and brokering of exogenous demands, a second kind of leadership includes preference manipulation (March/Olsen 1989: 163, Jacobs/Shapiro 1994: 12f.). Political elites or other relevant groups may have their own agenda and try to change attitudes in order to gain support for their political goals (Pfau-Effinger 2009: 12, Kumlin 2002b: 127f.; Page/Shapiro 1983: 85; it is also possible that citizens think whatever government does must be right, cf. Page/Shapiro 1983: 185). Since information is crucial in the process of opinion-forming (Forma 1999: 91), information-providers are important actors in the emergence and change of public opinion. Due to the asymmetrical distribution of information between the public and political actors, the latter can affect the former´s preferences by providing educative or manipulative (Page/Shapiro 1989: 307f.) information or something in between. Zaller (1992: 313 defines 'elite domination' "as a

situation in which *elites induce citizens to hold opinions that they would not hold if aware of the best available information and analysis*" (emphasis in original). One way to dominate for politicians´ and interest groups is to enumerate the advantages of polices they prefer (Page/Shapiro 1983: 187):

> "To a certain extent, the attitudes of people are often echoes of such public discourses and they tend to accept stereotyped opinions of the political elite expressed through the media" (Halvorsen 2002b: 7, referring to public images of the unemployed).

A 'counterfeit consensus', in which public opinion is "non-autonomous in nature" (Brooks 1985: 250) could emerge. Brooks (1990: 513) shows two sources: A 'phoney consensus' "where the majority of the public approves the policy only after it is announced" (Brooks 1987: 468) and the influence of

> "the dominant values of ruling business elites because of its influence over the modes of opinion formation and the socialization (legitimation) process […] a preordained consistency between opinion and policy" (Brooks 1990: 513, 1985: 250f.)

This view challenges public choice assumptions which are based on economic theory and suggest that politicians are vote-maximisers (Blomberg/Kroll 1999: 58) who follow public opinion and that citizens´ preferences are exogenous. This reduces public opinion, at least partially, to a merely intervening variable (Blomberg/Kroll 1999: 58) between elite goals and elite actions, so that political elites´ decisions are supported by the public, with little, if any, negative consequences for satisfaction, trust, or upcoming elections. Institutions try to show that their choice is clever,

> "[…] sensitive to the concerns of relevant people and that the right interests have been heard in the process […] and that the political system is controlled by its leadership, and appropriately so" (March/Olsen 1989: 50).

Political institutions and political actors try to show that what they do is correct in numerous respects. Combining strong and weak effects between public opinion and political leaders, Jacobs and Shapiro (1994: 14) present a fourfold schematic combining effect direction and effect strength. Under 'charismatic direction' leaders have strong influence on public opinion, but effects in the other direction are weak. This may be considered the extreme cases of what is discussed here. The opposite is 'democratic responsiveness' with strong effects of public

opinion on political leaders but only weak effects vice versa. 'Bureaucratic rule' entails weak effects in both directions, 'responsive leadership' strong ones in both directions.

Political actors can place political issues and their decisions in a certain context ('framing') or change the importance citizen ascribe to these issues ('priming') and present interpretations, so that attentive citizens´ evaluations can be manipulated (Kuklinski/Hurley 1996: 125ff., for priming see also Chong 1996: 197). Scope of media coverage affects citizens´ feeling of an issue´s importance (Page/Shapiro 1992: 366), and elites can affect the scope of media coverage. Media, in turn, can cause short-term opinion fluctuations (Page/Shapiro 1992: 386). Elites can also make the public see events from a certain viewpoint, or "how to think about an issue" (Sniderman/Theriault 2004: 135). Citizens´ interpretations affect their issue positions, yet the double interpretation weakens the link between elites and citizens (Kuklinski/Hurley 1996: 133f.). Resulting, the authors (1996: 139ff.) expect interpretations of interpretations to cause noise, which distorts macro values.

Nelson and Kindler (1996: 1058) point out that frames may provide "a recipe for preparing an opinion" and that elites are keen to set frames, because influence over the way of thinking secures victory in the battle for public opinion. Yet citizens are not merely passively accepting offered frames, they have their own idea about the right framing of an issue and further, political competition and public debate offer different frames to citizens, so citizens may choose their frame (Sniderman/Theriault 2004: 134ff). Sniderman and Theriault´s results support the idea that presenting issues in a certain frame – increasing opportunities for the poor versus raising taxes – affect people´s support for positions. Proving framing effects by experimentally providing messages from only one side overestimates elites´ manipulative power, since in reality messages from both sides are offered, which strengthens the effect of underlying principles on attitudes (Sniderman/Theriault 2004: 158, Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 347, see also Jacobs/Shapiro 1994: 12f.).

Nelson and Kindler (1996: 1058) also note that specific events change frames, like the Three Mile Island disaster changing the way nuclear energy has been framed. In the case of benefits for the old and the unemployed, there are only few specific events which may change frames. One of it is economic crisis, possibly shifting the way citizens think about unemployment from individual failure to system failure.

Opinions consist of information and predisposition (Zaller 1992: 6). Information is selective and comes with a frame of reference (Zaller 1992: 13). Consequently, elite discourse affects

public opinion (Zaller 1992: 14; Jakobsen 2011: 103 could not confirm that incumbent party position affects public opinion). In Zaller´s (1992: 14f.) example, around 1980 media coverage has affected US public opinion on defense spending. Schneider and Jacoby (2005: 368ff.) could show that in the mid-1990s negative and extensive US media coverage on welfare issues has been accompanied by declining support for welfare spending. Based on the idea that citizens with high levels of media exposure are politically more sophisticated and therefore more critical towards new information and those with low levels of media exposure get little or no information, Zaller (1992: 19) suggests (and shows) that those with medium levels of political awareness are most prone to influence – yet what Zaller has shown in the case of votes for House incumbents in the US may be different in other cases when awareness is not negatively correlated to resistance to attitude change (Zaller 1992: 21).

Zaller (1996: 18) maintains that media affects citizens´ attitudes strongly and steadily. Based on a plane crash, which got extremely high news coverage, and the resignation of a politician, which also got high coverage, yet with unspectacular visual presentation, Zaller (1996: 24ff.) shows not just that citizens with medium levels of news reception had the highest "reception gap" between both messages, meaning they received one message but not the other. Moreover, the political awareness measure is stronger correlated with the probability of having heard of the stories than both other measures. Furthermore, the reception gap between both stories is negatively related to both other measures of news reception, but inverted U-shaped related to the awareness measure. Changing two different stories for two sides of one story, this pattern occurs: Resulting, if one would use both other measures, citizens with lowest media consumption or lowest education would be most prone to media effects, since they would be probable of having heard one side and not the other (here, the anti-welfare state side). In the case of the awareness measure, an inverted U-shaped pattern emerges, so that those with medium levels political knowledge are most likely to be influenced by having heard just one side.

Figure 7.2 (next page) shows regression results´ effects strength (points) and confidence intervals (lines). Effect strengths are here, as in all other regression figures in this work, standardised beta coefficients, so that comparisons between countries are mere approximations. That means that regression results allow for what is of interest here, the general effect of certain independent variables, and not detailed comparisons of certain variables being more influential in one country than another.

Figure 7.2: Nonlinear news media effects

Government responsibility for the old (Estonia and Turkey) and government responsibility for the unemployed
(Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Portugal, Russia)
n: EE: 1163 | TR: 1446 | EE: 1283 | HR: 1058 | LV: 1509 | PT: 1397 | RU: 1639

Effects with confidence intervals not crossing the 0.0-line are statistically significant at the 5 percent-level (more on this type of presentation below). The graph shows countries and dependent variables with significant and non-linear media effects. Controlled for numerous other variables which are in the uniform regressions across all countries (see chapter 7.2) news media effects are nonlinear and statistically significant so that effects of low and high news media consumption are roughly similar, but effects from medium news media consumption deviate.

Effects are also dependent on the intensity of coverage of issues, or, in Zaller´s (1996: 29ff.) simulation, coverage of campaigns. Focusing of perception gaps, it becomes clear that with rising intensity of coverage this gap moves in the direction of the least aware. Therefore, we should expect that the more pensions and unemployment benefits are debated within a country, the more effects are focused on citizens with low awareness. Yet, since ESS event data is sketchy, it is not possible to measure intensity of coverage on these issues. Data shown in the graph above results from dividing all ESS4 respondents into three groups with roughly the same size, assuming that the level of media consumption matters regardless of the own country´s mean consumption.

Zaller (1996: 43) refers to his example with the 1984 US presidential primaries when stating that influence gaps result from both, the societal level of communications in both directions and individual-level attention gaps. It is plausible that this also applies to the dependent variables here.

One further point to consider is media effects´ dependence on citizens´ ideological predispositions. Between incoming information and individual preferences lie predispositions as intervening variables, resulting from personal experiences such as primary socialisation and direct experiences with the political systems such as paying taxes etc. (Zaller 1992: 23). Amongst the predispositions, political values are believed to be prominent in their role as intervening variables: "A person strongly attached to the value of economic individualism would, all else equal, be more likely to reject an argument for higher taxes to pay for social welfare spending than someone less attached to this value" (Zaller 1992: 23, 'Resistance Axiom', Zaller 1992: 44, see also Zaller 1992: 267). Considering values, citizens´ level of political awareness has to be taken into account (Zaller 1992: 24). There is a connection between citizens´ ideological orientation (Zaller 1992: 26), expressed as conservative or liberal in Zaller´s US case or left-right in the European context, and their value dimensions, such as support for economic individualism or not (Zaller 1992: 26). Both ideology (in our case, left-right position) and values, "are indicators of *predispositions* to accept or reject particular political communications" (Zaller 1992: 28, emphasis in original).

Substantive messages are messages about topics, in our case e.g. "unemployment benefits are harmful to the economy". Source messages are about direction and benefactors, like "this is a neoliberal argument", the former kind being more salient (cf. Zaller 1996: 51).

If all or most messages point in the same direction, as was the case in the US during the Persian Gulf crisis 1990, higher news consumption increases the likelihood of accepting what politics and media agreed upon, regardless of ideology (Zaller 1992: 52f., Chong 1996: 205). In this case, coverage leads to consensus, with those receiving more information being more likely to support the consensual opinion (Chong 1996: 205f.). Attitudinal effects of news media consumption will be shown in the empirical part.

More common are cases in which news media presents opposing messages to an issue, possibly both sides to roughly the same degree and for a considerable time period (Zaller 1996: 35; Page and Shapiro 1992: 373 point out that in domestic policies information are usually more competitive than in foreign policies). Effects on different ideological groups are expected to be different. Zaller (1996: 54) expects those with low attention to politics to receive no source messages, since "advocacy information rarely reaches the chronically inattentive" (1996: 54). Resulting from this, media consumption will push the inattentive in the direction of the messages they happen to pick up, regardless if these messages are congruent with their ideological position. In contrast, those highly aware of politics will pick

up substantive messages as well as source messages, so they reject messages coming from the opposite ideological directions and embrace those messages supporting the own ideology (similar results are presented by Sniderman/Theriault 2004: 142ff.; here, differences between hearing only the message of their own ideological position and hearing messages from both sides are modest). Media will strengthen their initial position. Those with medium levels of awareness lie in between, so that in sum media consumption makes people support positions congruent with their own ideological orientation (Zaller 1996: 54).

Switching from singular events like the Kuwait crisis to long-term issues like the Vietnam war, Zaller (1996: 55ff.) shows the following: Coverage switched from consensual pro-war messages in 1964 to balanced or even anti-war messages in 1970, or, in the case of leading news magazines, from pro-war messages in 1964 to higher pro-war and also higher anti-war messages in 1966. Resulting from this, for adherents of both ideological positions, awareness has been positively related to support for the war in 1964, while in 1966 or 1970 media effects on liberals were inverted U-shaped, so that highly aware liberals opposed the war more than medium-aware liberals in 1966 and more than both, medium aware and low aware liberals in 1970.

In sum, "political communications, if internalized […] become reasons for taking one side rather than another on a political issue. When asked their opinions in surveys, people respond on the on the basis of whatever considerations are most immediately salient in their minds" (Zaller 1992: 266, 'Response Axiom', Zaller 1992: 49, Zaller/Feldman 1992: 586). Attitude change is caused by incremental changes in the composition of available considerations (Zaller 1992: 30). Mass opinion is affected by media, stability of mass opinion results from stability in coverage (Zaller 1996: 58). Yet, this does not necessarily imply that public opinion is just a snapshot of what media happened to report previously. "Media inputs to opinion […] are more stable for most issues than they were for the issue of Vietnam" (Zaller 1996: 58, admitting that he offers no empirical support for this claim). This may result from stability in elite positions, but also from media endogeneity, if media tries to take popular positions.

Coming back to effects from welfare policies and their accompanying justifications, it is clear that a good deal of the messages citizens get from the political system originate in politicians and political institutions. Therefore it is straightforward that in the case of the Kuwait example, Zaller (1996: 52) mentions Congress members´ statement and media coverage as a proof of unanimity.

Lastly, one major methodological problem is that in order to ascertain effects from messages to attitudes data concerning exposure to various messages is needed (Zaller 1992: 20f.). Zaller (1992: 21) defines awareness as attention and understanding, "intellectual or cognitive engagement with public affairs as against emotional or affective engagement or no engagement at all" or "an individual's reception and comprehension of communications from the political environment". As he (1992: 21, 1996: 19) notes, different operationalisations of awareness have been used, including media exposure and education, while he suggests using factual information about politics in order not to underestimate media effects. The argument is that self-reported media use measures primarily exposure, with the error being as large as the gap between exposure and reception (Zaller 1992: 22). Knowledge questions are correlated with media use questions (Zaller 1996: 22). In the middle between, in Zaller´s (1992: 22f.) evaluation, is education, since it is correlated with media use and the likelihood of reception of news one is exposed to. Results from the comparison of the plane crash and the politician´s resignation seem to confirm this.

Zaller (1992: 21, 1996: 22) suggests questions such as which political party controls House; researching political knowledge Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993: 1204) use similar questions. Zaller (1992: 43) himself states that his measure of political awareness is a measure of political knowledge, so that "*general, chronic awareness*" (Zaller 1992: 43, emphasis in original) is measured and not attention to particular topics (Zaller 1992: 43); general awareness is used as a suboptimal proxy for attention to particular issues, since direct data for the latter is scarce (Zaller 1992: 43). The same problem occurs with ESS data, yet the solution cannot be the use of knowledge questions, but media exposure, a criticised but incircumventable proxy.

One difference between the topics Zaller uses and our dependent variables is that Zaller mainly focuses on singular events, like the Vietnam and Kuwait wars or presidential primaries with a specific constellation of candidates. In our case, welfare issues are abiding issues, sometimes getting more, sometimes less coverage and attention. Given that, with reference to Iyengar, Zaller (1992: 311) states that effects result from long and intense coverage, it may be assumed that in our case media effects are at least comparably probable to be found.

This indeed is the case. During the fieldwork period of ESS4 numerous European countries were hit by financial and economic crisis with implications for unemployment

levels and government budgets.[49] Further, in some European countries pay-as-you-go pension schemes face increasing financial problems due to demographic developments, with continuous news coverage on a lower level (most pension schemes are pay-as-you-go schemes, cf. Fenge et al. 2003: 9). Results of news media consumption on welfare attitudes can be proven. Controlled for numerous other variables, news media coverage affects welfare attitudes. There are weak signs of a common European trend. In Western Europe, news media consumption reduces support for government responsibility (for the old: BE, FI, GR, TR, for the unemployed: NO, SE, Western Germany and, counterintuitively, the opposite in Eastern Germany). In some countries, both kinds of preferred responsibility are negatively (LT, UA) or positively (SK, IL) affected.

7.1.4 Spurious correlation

Lastly, congruence between public attitudes and policies may be spurious, if both are influenced by third factors like "world events, elite leadership, interest group campaigns, technological change, or some other exogenous factor" (Page/Shapiro 1983: 175; 186). Though, the authors estimate third factors´ simultaneous influence on policies and public opinion to occur rarely. Rather, third factors affect public opinion, which in turn affects policies, since the time span between public opinion change and policy change tended to be rather long in their analysis. Third factors may also firstly influence policies and then public opinion.

7.1.5 Policy deviates from public opinion

Discrepancies between citizens´ attitudes and governmental actions may occur (for the *democratic frustration* school of thought see Brooks 1985: 251[50] and Jakobsen 2011: 105f.), since political decisions do not follow public opinion exclusively (Forma 1999: 88).

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[49] Data collection for ESS4 began on August 27, 2008 with the first country (Germany) starting fieldwork and many other countries only a few days later. At approximately the same time, financial and economic crisis hit Europe. It is highly plausible that attitudes towards the welfare state, especially government responsibility for the unemployed, are affected by economic events and citizens´ perceptions of these events (for perceptions of the economy and effects on welfare attitudes see, e.g. Heien [2002: 55f.] and Blekesaune [2007: 393ff.], the latter showing that falling employment rates and falling financial satisfaction are associated with higher support for welfare state policies). Further, fear of unemployment may rise, or, accordingly, the unemployed may be regarded as more deserving since they are considered to be less in control of their situation, if economic crisis leads to job losses. At the same time, unemployed people´s chances of finding work are lower. Also attitudes towards government responsibility for the old may change, if citizens see their government´s expenses to dampen crisis effects and think that government should spend less money elsewhere.

[50] Analysing the US, the UK and Canada, Brooks (1985: 256) came to the result that democratic frustration is higher in the case of redistributive than non-redistributive issues, wheras redistributive issues are not necessarily welfare issues, since they also include issues concerning political rights.

According to Kuran (1995: 295f.) these distortions stem not merely from circumstances inherent in the legislative process and disproportions caused by elections, but also from politicians´ own ambitions, leeway in interpreting public opinion and public opinion´s diffuse character (the distinction between vote-seeking and policy-seeking parties will be discussed below). Another factor is influence exerted by lobby groups (Iversen 2002: 57) and the political system´s imprecise conversion of actors´ motivations into policies (Offe 1984: 102).

This is why Downs´ (1960: 541) relativisation of the connection between the electorate´s preferences and the scope of government by the word "roughly" seems to be appropriate. Leaving aside unavoidable dissatisfaction resulting from factors depicted in the polarization thesis, people´s demands are not one-to-one converted into political outputs and, following, outcomes: Would that be the case, the extent of political dissatisfaction would be negligible (Becker et al. 1992: 17).

According to Gamson (1968: 178), dissatisfaction with policies may foster distrust of government. Welfare policies as outputs of the political system can raise specific support, if citizens´ expectations are met (Roller 1992: 24). Conversely, output failures can lower specific support. In both cases, diffuse support and system stability can be affected, too (Easton 1965: 232f., Roller 1992: 25), whereas the greater scope of government currently to be found in Western democracies compared to the past (Borre/Goldsmith 1995: 5) brings along welfare state´s greater significance for the support of the political systems.

According to Easton, output failure may be caused by a lack of internal or external resources or by cleavages. The latter refer to irreconcilable demands or preferences of various actors (Roller 1992: 24; Brittan 1975: 30, see also the 'polarization thesis'). Here, dissatisfaction with policies does not result from a lack of resources, but from different expectations within the populace regarding the appropriate welfare policies (Borre 1995: 362). There is a positive relationship between homogeneity of people´s attitudes and the number of people government can satisfy (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2003: 5). Further, a lack of internal resources may lead to unpopular outputs and outcomes. Internal resources are political actors´ skills, capabilities or their willingness to transform demands into viable political solutions. Pivotal external resources are financial resources determined by taxes and contributions or the possibility to raise government debt. The lack of external resource is thematised in the 'overload thesis'.

Brittan (1975: 129) stated that democracy threatens itself by the creation of excessive demands and the damaging effects of group interests. Excessive demands originate in democracy itself, while the disruptive effects result from the economy. Both place heavy burdens on "the 'sharing out' function of government", which means "the activities of the public authorities in influencing the allocation of resources" (Brittan 1975: 130). According to Brittan (1975: 139) voters lack budgetary constraint, meaning that in contrast to their private lives, in the political sphere they do not acknowledge the necessity of trade-offs. Therefore, their expectations and willingness to pay for are incompatible; a tendency reinforced by politicians´ exaggerated promises (Brittan 1975: 139f.) and these promises´ "claim-inflating" (Offe 1984: 76) effects. These effecte cannot be avoided, since politicians cannot be inhibited to make unrealistic promises in order to win elections (Taylor-Gooby 1985: 11). Therefore, in democracies politicians´ willingness to get into office and to stay there may bring along overtly generous legislation (Schumpeter 1961: 286).

Particular interests overburden the welfare state, too, because small groups benefitting from government expenditures have stronger interests in the issue at hand than the general public which has merely a diffuse interest in keeping taxes, inflation or debt down (Taylor-Gooby 1985: 11). For members of the small group it is worthwhile to fight for their own benefits. For every single person disadvantaged by taxes, inflation or debt the amount is too negligible to be motivated to try to prevent legislation which would benefit the small group at the public´s expenses, or they do not even know about demands from some groups and planned or already passed legislation. Conversely, government budgets can also be too small, if citizens do not know about government action´s advantages (Downs 1960: 546).

Overload can also be spurred by welfare states themselves. According to the idea of a 'demand spiral', by fulfilling citizens´ demands the welfare state poses itself in a vicious circle, since fulfilment of demands creates new ones, etc. (Borre 1995c: 371, Kumlin 2002b: 125). In an extreme scenario, citizens get accustomed to rising standards and want government to solve all problems imaginable (Borre/Goldsmith 1995: 3). As King (1975: 166) puts it: "Once upon a time, then, man looked to God to order the world. Then he looked to the market. Now he looks to government", which may be seen as "a sort of unlimited-liability insurance company, in the business of insuring all persons at all time against every conceivable risk" (King 1975: 164). Government is forced to choose between citizen disappointment due to low benefits or due to high taxes while at the same time trying to

explain the inevitability of these inconveniences against opposition parties doubting this inevitability. Governments can also avoid disappointment by raising national debts. The latter option is only of limited duration, since today´s debts are tomorrow´s taxes or welfare cuts.

Concerning debts, governments of EMU member countries have limited leeway due to Maastricht criteria. From 1993 until the end of the 1990s, the mean deficit of 14 EU member countries declined, and differences between countries declined sharply (Wagschal 2003: 311). Multivariate analyses detect a time-lagged deficit reducing Maastricht effect (Wagschal 2003: 314). Contrasting, Obinger and Kittel´s (2003: 374f.) analyses of the period from 1990 to 1997 found no significant Maastricht effect on countries´ welfare spending.

Government can reduce the real value of debts by raising inflation, i.e. by raising money supply. This is unpopular, too, since it may be considered a tax on those holding financial assets and those earning wages, if nominal wages do not rise fast or early enough to offset inflation. Due to independent central banks and the EMU, most governments do not have the possibility to unilaterally raise money supply.

An additional problem is that government debts are believed to be harmful to the functioning of the market economy (Castles 2004: 23). Though, Norway maintains apparently unnecessary debts: Oil fund assets exceed government debt. Nevertheless, debts are maintained to support the functioning of the financial system.

Debts not only have to be paid back someday, but interest payments burden budgets. Notwithstanding, political actors prefer soon advantages and time-lagged disadvantages (Pierson 1993: 622).

Besides problems inherent in democracy and the welfare state, overload may result from external factors, too. Among them are population aging and unemployment, the latter possibly resulting from globalisation and technological change (Gelissen 2002: 1). Both, unemployment and population aging worsen the ratio between financers and dependents, while population aging also contributes to rising health costs (for arguments that birth rates are partially endogenous see above).

7.1.6 Macro determinants in the analyses

7.1.6.1 Welfare policies

The main hypothesis is that welfare policies affect citizens´ attitudes. The positive argument is based on arguments elaborated above and may be subsumed as what Heien (2002: 84)

terms regime-specific socialisation. Further, correlations could result from reverse causality, i.e. not generous benefits cause pro-welfare attitudes but vice versa.

The negative argument is that our responsibility items are partially 'degree'- items. If citizens understand these items as question of more or less spending, higher generosity could provoke support for lower spending.

The same applies to benefit earnings-relatedness. On the one hand, earnings-related benefits could be supported due to regime-specific socialisation; on the other hand they foster inequality, resulting in lower support for positively earnings-related benefits.

7.1.6.2   GDP per capita

Expected effects of a country´s wealth on its citizens´ attitudes are contradictory.

Approaches suggesting a positive relationship between wealth and welfare support date back to Adolph Wagner. Firstly, he asserted that increasing wealth and societal modernisation would lead to a diminished role of family and church as welfare providers and therefore, combined with new social problems, to increasing demands on government.

Secondly, with increasing wealth fiscal revenues increase not just in absolute numbers but in relative ones, too, since with rising income citizens are prepared to pay more as a share of their income (Hasenfeld et al. 1987: 391). The more citizens are willing to pay, the more they may expect government to provide. The assumption is supported by Busch´s (1998: 148ff.) finding of a close relationship between GDP per capita and social expenditure ratio in the year 1993 in 11 western European countries. The correlation was at .81. In the case of old age pensions, the correlation was at .67. Though, there was no correlation between GDP per capita and spending on unemployment. Further, the correlation may have been caused by a heavy weight of affluent northern social democratic countries due to the low number of cases.

Using data from the 1999/2000 European Values Survey, van Oorschot (2006: 29ff.) analysed 23 European countries´ citizens to what extent they "feel concerned about the living conditions" of the elderly, the sick, the unemployed and immigrants. The author did not try to analyse effects on support for the welfare state, but on the "degree of conditionality" (2006: 29), that is, the differences in support for popular programmes (among them, for the old) and unpopular ones (among them, for the unemployed). One result was that conditionality is significantly negatively related to GDP per capita (2006: 33), so that GDP could be positively related to support for welfare policies. Though, possibly this emerges from the correlation between low GDP and low support for immigrants´ welfare. Therefore, it is open if a pattern

will emerge between GDP and the division between support for the (supposedly deserving) elderly and the (supposedly undeserving, see also Gerhardts 2005: 184f.) unemployed.

A contradictory finding is provided by Taylor-Gooby (1995: 19), who found that in poorer European countries support for welfare programmes is stronger than in richer ones. Possibly the wealthier a country is, the less its citizens need the welfare state to protect them from absolute poverty. From this point of view, returns diminish with growing national wealth, since the ascribed value of governmental protection from absolute poverty dwindles.

By examining 11 European countries, Inglehart (1990: 255f.) shows that in about 1980 a negative relationship existed between economic development and support for the statement "greater effort should be made to reduce income inequality". The term "greater" leads the respondent to take into consideration his country´s status quo and is therefore not completely comparable to the statement "it is the government's responsibility to reduce income differences", which concerns a basic principle. Further, the reduction of income inequality is not the same as providing for the old and the unemployed, although these policies mostly reduce inequalities.

Inglehart (1990: 254ff.) explains this negative relationship between GDP and support for further redistribution with above mentioned diminishing marginal utility, i.e. that gains coming with further welfare expansion are lower than attributed costs. But Inglehart´s explanation is not built around GDP, but on other factors determined by GDP. Firstly, he mentions Denmark´s extensive welfare state, making the Danes rejected further expansion. Secondly, in the example of Greece, Inglehart considers high inequality as resulting from low GDP per capita and as main cause of support for welfare state expansion. In both cases, it is not GDP per se. So while Inglehart´s (1990: 255f.) graphs suggest that high GDP per capita reduces support for further redistribution, his argumentation (1990: 252ff.) rather points to (1) higher GDP leading to higher social security and therefore less support for further redistribution and (2) lower GDP leading to higher inequality (1990: 251) and more support for redistribution.[51] The underlying confusion about preferences about basic responsibility one the one hand and more or less spending on the other gets more obvious if we consider Huseby´s (1995:94ff.) interpretation of data from the Political Action Study in 1974 and the ISSP surveys of 1985 and 1990. In both cases, huge majorities of European respondents favour government responsibility for the elderly and the sick and equalisation of wealth etc. Huseby (1995: 94) interprets these attitudes as "expansionist", but it is entirely plausible that

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[51]   Moller et al. (2003: 24) see "tentative" evidence that at high levels of development, inequality and GDP are positively related. The underlying reason may be the shift from the industrial to the service sector, the latter of which is characterised by higher income inequalities (2003: 25).

respondents see basic responsibilities and at the same time think that their government is fulfilling them to an adequate degree (or is even overdoing it). In short, questions about the range of government and questions regarding degree are confused. While Inglehart´s results are based on questions concerning the degree of welfare statism, Huseby´s analysis combines GDP per capita with questions concerning *range*, meaning governments´ responsibility. Alas, since variance in the dependent variable is low (only Germany is out of step with lower support for government responsibility), in her six-country comparison (1995: 100) besides merely some tendency in the expected negative direction no clear effect can be shown.

Based on ISSP 1996 data, Heien (2002) finds merely very weak and insignificant negative correlations between GDP per capita and support for the old and sick. The same applies to support for the unemployed (job for everyone, standard of living).

The claim that higher GDP per capita leads to lower support for redistribution is also supported by Roller´s (1995: 178ff.) analysis of six European countries with data from 1987´s ISSP, in which the citizens of the poorest country (Italy) display the highest support for redistribution.[52] However, using data from the Political Action study in the 1970s she (1995: 181) found no relationship between wealth and support for redistribution.

It is possible that with rising GDP inequality loses its relevance, since it is no longer inequality under poverty but inequality under wealth (Mau 1997: 7). Related to this is the argument by Borre and Goldsmith (1995c: 378), that with increasing wealth the number of dependents shrinks. This seems to be the underlying assumption of Castles´ (2004: 174) expectation that welfare states shrink with rising wealth. If need for the welfare state is inversely related to GDP per capita, support for it may be so, too.

7.1.6.3   Income inequality

Unemployment benefits have compressing effects on earnings inequality. Firstly, they raise the incomes of those without market incomes. Further, they raise reservation wages and therefore the wage floor and so compress inequality at the bottom of the income distribution. Lastly, taxes and contributions to finance unemployment benefits depress high incomes (Beramendi/Cusack 2009: 262).

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[52]   The items wording is: „The government should reduce the differences between people with high incomes and those with low incomes". It refers to the range dimension of welfare policies (Roller 1995: 169).

Inglehart (1990: 252) suspects that inequality is positively related to support for further redistribution. Inequality, in turn, is negatively affected by GDP per capita[53] (1990: 251). Therefore, a poor society is an unequal society is a society where many people benefit from redistribution (Inglehart 1990: 252). Inglehart (1990: 251) shows that income inequality is negatively related to GDP per capita, but based on data from 1978.

Using the Gini coefficients from the mid-to-late 2000s (CIA Fact Book) and GDP per capita in 2008 (UN data), Inglehart´s finding can be confirmed. Across 30 countries, income inequality is negatively related to wealth. The correlation is at -.42 (significant at the 5 percent-level). There are no relevant outliers.

Roller (1995: 180f.) analysed seven countries with the same Eurobarometer waves at around 1980 as Inglehart and also found out that inequality is positively related to demands for equality. As noted above, the Eurobarometer item refers to "*greater* efforts […] to reduce income inequality" (emphasis added) and is therefore not completely comparable to the ISSP´s question about governments basic responsibility, although support for range and degree (or extensiveness and intensiveness) tend to correlate positively (Gelissen 2002: 74). Contradictorily, in Gelissen´s (2002: 81ff.) analysis, income inequality is significantly negatively correlated to support for an extensive and, even more so, intensive welfare state: "There is no immediate explanation for this unexpected effect" (Gelissen 2002: 84). This is coherent to what Lane (1985: 266) with reference to Peltzman states.

Gelissen presumes that both, low income equality and low support for the welfare state, are not directly related but result both from low social solidarity.

Using pre-tax/pre-transfer and not post-tax/post-transfer income equality, Iversen and Soskice (2009: 400f.) come to a supportive finding they call the "Robin Hood paradox": In countries with more equal wages, redistribution via transfer payments is higher than in countries with rather unequal wages. Yet, the authors (2009: 442) point out that both are not directly related, but affected by the same factors: "The electoral system and the degree of economic coordination".

More detailed, Moene and Wallerstein (2001: 859ff.) distinguish between redistributive and insuring welfare benefits. Increasing pre-tax/pre-transfer inequality should raise the income distance between the median and mean, with the mean being lower than the median. Therefore, the median voter should support welfare benefits stronger under higher

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[53]   Here, a virtuos circle is possible. If equality lessens the demand for redistribution and redistribution inhibits economic growth, "then reduced inequality promotes growth" (Moene/Wallerstein 2001: 859, not supporting this idea).

inequality. In contrast, the insurance model implies that, given the risks covered are held constant under increasing inequality, with lower median voter earnings median voters´ demand for insurance should decline. Given that the redistribution model applies in cases in which beneficiaries of a welfare programme are predominantly employed and the insurance model applies when not (Moene/Wallerstein 2001: 861), for pensions and unemployment we should expect effects for redistribution models under increasing inequality, so that demand for welfare policies should rise with income inequality, albeit pre-tax/pre-transfer. Moene and Wallerstein´s (2001: 867ff.) analysis of 18 countries between 1980 and 1995 supports their hypothesis, since social insurance spending against unexpected income loss is lower when incomes are more unequal, whereas pension spending is left unregarded in the calculations because it covers expected income losses.

Transferred to our items, the question is if inequality is positively or negatively related to support for governmental responsibility for the old and the unemployed. Further, if inequality leads to more demands for an equal distribution of benefits or to negative earnings-relatedness.

Lastly, the use of Gini coefficients to measure inequality is common, yet problematic for several reasons. The main reason is that Gini coefficients disregard if the present income is a stable situation or an irrelevant snapshot (Esping-Andersen 2007a: 639). As Esping-Andersen (2007a: 639f.) further points out, most economic hardship lasts for a short time. This implies that often savings might last long enough to compensate for lower incomes. Besides the implication at the macro level, i.e. that 'real' inequality gets overestimated if incomes are highly volatile, on the micro level this means that current income as measured in ESS does not always give a correct impression of a household´s income situation.

7.1.6.4 Skewed income distribution

A more detailed view on income inequality and its effects on attitudes is presented by Lupu and Pontusson (2011: 316ff.). They introduce the variable *skew*, which is the income of the 90th percentile divided by the income of the 50th percentile, and then divided by the result of the division between the 50th percentile and the 10th percentile, so that a high *skew* means widely dispersed incomes between the median and the upper classes relative to the dispersion between the median and the lower classes.

Arguing that a high skew fosters solidarity between the middle classes and the lower classes (social affinity hypothesis), they propose and show that this in turn leads to redistribution,[54] because the middle classes are in a strategically crucial position, able to enter coalitions with both the lower and upper classes in a stylised society of three income groups. Proving the mechanism via the middle classes, Lupu and Pontusson show that income skew is positively related to middle income groups´ preference for redistribution, using ISSP and ESS data. Transferring this to our research question, a high *skew* should lead the middle income groups to feel solidary with the unemployed, since the latter are mostly poor (especially if they are long-term unemployed), so that the middle income group supports government responsibility for the unemployed. Since the middle group is relatively big, overall support for redistributive policies should be positively affected by the skewed incomes.

A diametrically opposite hypothesis is based on the work of Corneo and Grüner (2000: 1491ff.). They propose that individuals view redistribution in the light of its effects on their relative position in their income and consumption abilities in contrast to their social competitors. Therefore, the middle classes coalise with the upper classes in order to keep their distance to the lower classes. Corneo and Grüner (2000: 1500ff.) show that sixty percent of US respondents think their income would rise if incomes would become more equal, yet only forty percent support government responsibility for redistribution.[55] Based on 1992 ISSP data (US respondents), they show that support for redistribution is affected by income distribution: "They expected utility of the middles class increases with the consumption differential […] to the poor and decreases with the consumption differential […] to the rich" (Corneo/Grüner 2000: 1505).

7.1.6.5   Early retirement, pension age, old-age dependency ratio

For all three factors, hypotheses are similar. Spreading early retirement should foster the belief that pensioners quit working due to illegitimately too high generosity, so that support for government responsibility for the old should be depressed. A high legislated or actual

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[54]   Measured as changes from pre-tax/pre-transfer Gini to post-tax/post-transfer Gini for houshoulds headed by people between 25 and 59, since pensioners´ low (or absent) pre-tax/pre-transfer income would distort results (see also Brady 2005: 1336).

[55]   One problem with this "puzzling feature of political redistribution" (Corneo/Grüner 2000: 1501) the authors do not discuss lies in the fact that the item concerning government responsibility catches the *range* dimension, which does not refer to the status quo, while the question concerning expected effects on own income starts from the status quo. It is possible that US respondents are ambivalent concerning government responsibility for redistribution (about twenty percent state 'neither agree nor disagree') while expecting gains with higher redistribution because they consider government responsibility for redistribution to be more than what government is currently doing. Another point is that US citizens may prefer a more equal income distribution, but do not want government to implement this, but rather the market.

retirement age should have contrasting effects. A high old-age dependency ratio should make citizens consider the pension scheme too costly in present or future (Table 3.1) and therefore reduce support for government responsibility for the old.

7.1.6.6 Unemployment rate

Individuals may know or experience the national unemployment rate via two mechanisms: Firstly, the number of unemployed they see in their immediate social surroundings depends on the unemployment rate. This could be crucial for attitudes towards the unemployed (Halvorsen 2002b: 12). Secondly, the unemployment rate may be one of the key economic figures most individuals know (Kumlin 2002b: 28,), probably even more than growth rates or inflation. For the US, Popkin (1991: 23) pointed out that half of the electorate knows the unemployment rate within a small margin of error, which also applies to the inflation rate. Armingeon (2003: 157) characterises the unemployment rate as an important political figure, Kumlin (2002b: 28) terms unemployment rate, budget deficit and inflation "relatively informative and memorable", resulting in these figure´s effects on citizens´ attitudes (Kumlin 2002b: 28). Kumlin (2002b: 31) indicates that low-information individuals stronger infer unemployment rates from personal experience ('default source hypothesis').

Table 7.1: Relationship between unemployment rates and unemployment perceptions

	Est.p. UE (2)	UE rate (3)	UE rate (4)	UE rate (5)	UE rate (6)
Est.UE rate (1)	.71*** (30)	-.05 (19)	.55** (30)	.42 (14)	.60** (26)
Est.p. UE (2)		.58** (19)	.36 (30)	.41 (14)	.39* (26)
UE rate (3)			.19 (19)	.28 (10)	.01 (18)
UE rate (4)				.83*** (14)	.96*** (26)
UE rate (5)					.82** (12)

Figures: Pearson´s r *: p < .05 **: p < .01; ***: p < .001. In brackets: Number of countries.
(1) Estimated unemployment rate (2) Estimated likelihood of personal unemployment. Source: ESS4
Unemployment rates: (3): 2008, OECD (4) 2008, ILO Labour Force Survey (5) 2008, ILO Employment Office Records (6) September 2008, Eurostat.

In the first case, country levels of unemployment may be too highly aggregated, leading to an underestimation of effects on attitudes (Nonnenmacher 2007: 494). If citizens know their country´s unemployment rate from media, regional differences could be irrelevant, since citizens may bear in mind the national unemployment rate even if their region diverges (yet regional figures may also be known). If perceptions of unemployment result from personal

experience, then in countries with high internal differences national level unemployment may be merely weakly related to an individual´s perception.

Table 7.1 (preceding page) shows statistically significant correlations between estimated unemployment rate and two out of four unemployment figures.[56] Higher unemployment causes people to give higher estimates of the unemployment rate, leaving aside that generally unemployment rates were grossly overestimated in ESS4. Further, high estimated unemployment rates lead to a higher estimated probability of own unemployment (Pearson´s r .71).

Between levels of unemployment and support for welfare policies (especially, but not solely, unemployment benefits), mainly positive relationships are expected. Supportive evidence is provided by Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003: 420f.). Using data from 23 countries taking part in the ISSP´s Role of Government III –module (1996), they found a positive relationship between unemployment rate and support for the view that it is "government´s responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed". They conclude that national level unemployment has equal or even stronger effects on support for government responsibility than individual unemployment. Further, national level unemployment even fostered support for welfare policies for the old and the sick, possibly via a generally higher perception of economic vulnerability (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003: 421ff.). Likewise, using 2006 data from the International Social Justice Project (ISJP), Legewie (2008: 296ff.) found strong effects from the unemployment rate in the 97 administrative units of the German Federal Employment Agency on individuals´ attitudes: The unemployment rate in the respective unit was positively related to egalitarianism and negative to individualism and ascriptivism.

Also Heien (2002) shows positive effects of unemployment rates on welfare attitudes. This applies to support for government responsibility for the old and the sick, and strongly and significantly for support for the unemployed (job for everyone, standard of living).

Van Oorschot (2006: 26ff., see also Halvorsen 2002b: 5ff., Gallie/Paugam 2002: 8, Furnham 1982: 347, Csoba 2010: 102ff.) assumes that public perceptions of the unemployed´s deservingness are more positive when unemployment is high, since they are

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[56]   Unemployment figures are sensitive to methods of measurement. For example, 'discouraged workers' not looking for jobs or unemployed people in activation/education/maternity leave and underemployed people are not unemployed according to ILO criteria (Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 37ff.). Goul Andersen and Jensen solve this problem by comparing non-employment instead of unemployment. This is not feasible here. Firstly, survey questions refer to the unemployed. Second, unemployment is a different problem than non-employment. Unemployed people are defined as looking for a job, non-employed people not. Another possibility is to measure unemployment via survey data (as done by Vodopivec et al. 2003: 8).

seen as less responsible for their plight. In this case the unemployed´s deservingness (see also Larsen 2008: 157) is not considered far lower than that of the old or sick (van Oorschot 2006: 36). Further, more of those not unemployed can identify with the jobless (van Oorschot 2006: 26), possibly because the probability of having unemployed friends or relatives is higher (Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003: 418, Halvorsen 2002b: 4f.). Lastly, the own risk of getting unemployed is considered higher when unemployment is high (Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003: 418, see also Table 7.1). While on the micro level effects from the subjective risk of unemployment on support for government responsibility for the unemployed will be tested, on the macro level the effects of the unemployment rates will be.

Contrastingly, it is also possible that higher unemployment rates lead to declining support for governmental responsibility for the unemployed. If citizens fear that the high number of unemployed strains government budgets, which may lead to higher taxes, contributions, debts or cuts in other areas, then they might oppose financial support for the unemployed. In this case, low unemployment rates spread the belief that generous unemployment benefits are affordable (Lee 1997: 36f.). Another reason for diminished support not just for unemployment benefits but also for pension payments may be that higher unemployment conveys felt job insecurity. This insecurity may motivate citizens to accumulate wealth (Levi in Durlauf/Levi 2001: 267f.), which is easier if government cares less for dependent groups, because lower expenses imply lower taxes and contributions and higher net earnings. Though, given that people often support higher government spending in various policy areas while at the same time rejecting higher taxes, it seems that such 'priced thinking' is not commonplace (see also Lewis 1980: 284ff.). Consequently, if citizens do not to bear in mind higher taxes when supporting higher government spending, it seems probable that they also do not bear in mind lower taxes when supporting lower government spending.

7.1.6.7   Share of long-term unemployed among the unemployed

Also the composition of the unemployed could affect citizens´ attitudes (Halvorsen 2002b: 8). Plausibly, a higher share of long-term unemployed should foster the belief that the unemployed are not willing to take on work. Further, the consumption opportunities of the long-term unemployed markedly differ from those of the working majority, so that the latter group could consider 'the unemployed' as being basically different from the majority.

Contrastingly, with the share of long-term unemployed the share of poor unemployed rises. Considering the 'need' criterion to be fulfilled, citizens could demand higher support for the unemployed.

7.1.6.8   Taxes/contributions

Fiscal illusion, the "systematic misperception of the cost of government by taxpayers" (Misiolek/Elder 1988: 234, see also Wildavsky 1985: 245) has four sources: Firstly, a complicated tax structure may obscure how much citizens are paying. Secondly and related to this, some indirect taxes are believed to be less visible than direct ones. Therefore, the greater the share of indirect taxes, the stronger citizens underestimate their contribution to welfare funding. Thirdly, higher income elasticity in taxes leads to higher revenues without explicit tax increases. If tax rates depend on nominal incomes, which rise as well as prices rise, after some time the same amount of real income is taxed with a higher rate ('Cold Progression'). Lastly, fiscal centralisation is believed to be positively related to government size since voters´ influence is diminished (Misiolek/Elder 1988: 234f.). Here, besides the total tax level, the tax visibility thesis will be tested, since it is possible that citizens discount indirect and less visible taxes and therefore are prepared to pay more than they would under complete information (Wildavsky 1985: 245).

The importance of income tax is a useful proxy for tax visibility (Gelissen 2002: 81). Based on Eurobarometer data from 1992, Gelissen (2002: 81) analysed welfare attitudes in 11 countries. Importance of income tax (tax visibility) is significantly negatively related to support for welfare state extensiveness, and, even more so, intensiveness (possibly because the priced questions explicitly refers to spending). Misiolek and Elder (1988: 238) defined not only income taxes, but also sales taxes as visible. They tested effects in American states not on attitudes but on government revenues and found positive, albeit insignificant effects.

Analysing 19 Western countries, Wilensky (2003: 379) found out that a high proportion of visible taxes is an impressing determinant of citizens´ resistance against the tax burden. Possibly causality between taxation and welfare spending or welfare attitudes is reversed. High welfare spending necessitates high revenues from taxes, including "regressive taxes", that is indirect and therefore less visible taxes like value-added taxes (Ganghof 2006: 361). Though, for this direction of causality to apply, indirect taxes have not merely to be higher in high-spending welfare states, but also higher in relation to direct taxes. This may happen if policymakers shift revenue sources to indirect taxes to avoid public discontent.

Personal income tax and contribution levels are proxies for tax visibility, without taking indirect taxes and therefore direct taxes´ relative importance into account. Measuring direct tax level in relation to indirect taxes suggests that direct taxes become less annoying if indirect taxes are also high. More straightforward is the assumption that indirect taxes vastly slip taxpayers´ attention and that direct taxes affect welfare attitudes.

7.1.6.9   Globalisation: Trade openness and foreign direct investment (FDI)

Referring to Hirst and Thompson, Mishra (1999: 4) emphasises the distinction between internationalisation and globalisation. In the former, companies remain principally national, while engaging in increasing trade and FDI (FDI may be considered an indicator of globalisation, cf. Kittel 2006: 653). Under globalisation, national economies are no longer distinguishable since production is globalised, corporations do no longer clearly belong to one country and countries are less able to exert influence over corporations.

While internationalisation is not new and has varied over the course of history, globalisation is a new phenomenon (Mishra 1999: 4). National governments have incentives to reduce taxes (and spending) under circumstances of internationalisation to attract FDI, but globalisation may affect welfare states more strongly since corporations react more sensibly to international differences in circumstances set by national governments.

Yet, as de Grauwe and Polan (2005: 108ff.) show, in 21 OECD countries social spending as percentage of GDP is negatively related to their rank on both competitive indices (the highly intercorrelated indices are constructed by the International Institute for Management Development in Lausanne and the World Economic Forum), so that countries with high spending are among the most competitive.[57]

Prior to World War I, Britain and some other European countries had higher capital mobility and foreign trade than in the 1990s. However, since prior to WW I the welfare state merely existed rudimentarily, internationalisation and, even more so, globalisation developments are new to the welfare state, since during the creation and expansion of the modern welfare state after WW II national economies were relatively closed. National

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[57]   Although de Grauwe and Polan use spending data from 1997 and competitiveness rankings from 1998-2002 and 1999-2001 respectively, they (2005: 111) have to admit that this does not rule out reverse causality, because of social security outlays´ intertemporal stability: "Causality is likely to run in both directions" (2005: 111), either if extra income from high competitiveness is spent on social security, or if social security raises competitiveness through its pacifying effects and improved institutions and human capital (de Grauwe/Polan 2005: 118f.).

governments are less autonomous to regulate their economies, to create full employment[58] or to boost domestic demand, because via import leakages governmental transfer payments may increase demand for imported rather than domestically produced goods (Mishra 1999: 5f., Esping-Andersen 1996a: 4, Jessop 1993: 13f.) or services. Further, countries which are part of the EMU cannot try to stimulate their economies via lower base rates. This is even more so since in contrast to the Federal Reserve Bank in the US, the European Central Bank has not to follow the goals of higher economic growth and low unemployment, but merely low inflation (Korpi 2003: 604). Shortly put, high taxes and social security contributions may motivate companies and capital to leave the country (Mishra 1999: 6). Government revenues are the basis for government spending, so that internationalisation and more so globalisation may result in pressures to dismantle welfare states and to limit government spending to those areas which may be considered vital to competitiveness, such as education, research, internal security, infrastructure (de Grauwe/Polan 2005: 107) and subsidies to promising new economic sectors and technologies. What is prone to cuts under competitiveness considerations are transfer payments like unemployment or pension benefits.

Contrary to standard claims that internationalisation and globalisation will inevitably reduce government spending, Garrett (1998a: 3f., see also Huber/Stephens 2001a: 15 and Rhodes 1996: 307) suspects that the opposite applies. Besides 'exit' threats of asset holders, increasing insecurity makes citizens demand higher government protection. Analogous, Kittel (2006: 652) states that competition by low-wage countries leads to rising fears of unemployment and therefore rising demands for protection. The causal nexus depicted by Kittel alleges a relationship between globalisation and fears of unemployment; this fear may even have spread beyond low-skilled workers deeply into societies (Garrett 1998b: 788). Yet, analysing 21 OECD countries between 1991 and 2006, Oesch (2010: 45ff.) found no significant effects of trade openness on low-skilled unemployment (even negative effects, albeit insignificant).

Exogenous factors' effects are filtered through national institutions (Esping-Andersen/Przworski 2001: 8), so that relationships between trade or FDI on the one side and fears of unemployment and therefore demands for protection should be blurred. One reason is that institutional filters are not randomly distributed across countries, because citizens could demand them as preconditions for accepting globalisation.

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[58] Not equivalent to the absence of unemployment. Allowing for frictional unemployment caused by the time that passes between two jobs, Beveridge defined full employment as an unemployment rate of three percent or less (Lee 1997: 36). Depending on labour market flexibility, frictional unemployment may be even higher if the rising number of job changes is not compensated by shorter mean job seeking durations.

This assumption still allows for positive relationships between globalisation and support for unemployment benefits. Examining claims that globalisation raises demands for protection with policy consequences, Rodrik (1998: 997ff.) sees a positive relationship between trade openness from 1980 to 1989 and government spending in 1990 – 1992 in 23 OECD countries (but not for the 1985-1989 period), controlled for other factors. Although the relationship may be spurious, since small countries have high trade/GDP ratios[59] and may have higher spending because of economies of scale or because they have better opportunities to borrow money, this is not the case. Rodrik suggests that citizens´ attitudes are the link between trade openness and higher government spending; governments buy acquiescence to openness with higher protection (Rodrik 1998: 998, see also de Grauwe/Polan 2005: 111). Therefore, social security spending is positively fostered by trade openness (Rodrik 1998: 1019).

While Rodrik persuasively shows the relationship between economic openness[60] and rising social security spending, evidence for the intervening status of citizens´ demands (and attitudes) is less convincing. The idea of positive effects of trade openness on the size of the public economy (and empirical proofs) date back to Cameron (1978: 1253). Though Cameron explains increased governmental activity with the necessity to compensate for negative effects, it is not clear if this increased activity results from increased demands to do so, which, in turn, could result from increased perceptions that a larger scope of government is necessary. Cameron´s (1978: 1256) chart does not explicitly contain citizens´ attitudes, but factors possibly affected by these attitudes (unionisation and leftist-dominated governments).

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[59]   Basically Ebbinghaus (2005b: 137) supports this view and states that "the size of population can serve as a proxy for 'globalization': the smaller the country, the more the economy is dependent on imports and exports". Alesina and Wacziarg (1998: 310ff.) find a very strong negative relationship between population size and trade/GDP-ratio, even controlled for various other factors. This is not merely because domestic markets are small, but also because tariffs are lower in smaller countries (1998: 317). Yet, they (1998: 306) use population size but argue that market size matters. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998: 312f.) also found out that government consumption as percentage of GDP between 1960 and 1989 has been negatively related to population size, whereas the effects became stronger over the decades.
        There is also the idea that trade openness affects country size, because secessions become more attractive. Under free trade circumstances they no longer bring about smaller and therefore less effective markets (Alesina/Wacziarg 1998: 307). This idea gains some support by simultaneously increasing trade and increasing number of countries after 1945. Alesina and Wacziarg acknowledge that other factors like decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union may have been the main driving forces behind the rising number of countries, yet add for consideration that possibly some former eastern bloc countries would not have chosen independence if tariffs would be prohibitively high.
[60]   Koster (2007: 9ff.) analyses effects of social and political openness on welfare spending as a percentage of GDP and Scruggs´ welfare state generosity data in 18 countries between 1970 and 2000. Neither social openness nor political openness has significant effects on welfare state characteristics. Contrastingly, analysing effects on welfare spending in 45 non-socialist countries between 1960 and 1980, Strang and Chang (1993: 245ff.) demonstrated that ratification of ILO conventions increases future welfare spending in industrialised countries (yet not significantly in less developed countries), especially where prior spending is low and leftist parties are weak.

Referring to Rodrik, Alesina et al. (2001: 21) are doubtful and express that the question if there are effects from economic openness is not satisfactorily answered yet. They suggest that economies of scale may be expected rather in the provision of public goods. Referring to a working paper published by Rodrik in 1996, on which the above-mentioned article seems to be based, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998: 318) replicate and vary the calculations. The main finding is that "using not the log but the actual value of the ratio variables, which is a more standard way to proceed" (Alesina/Wacziarg 1998: 317), the effects from trade openness to government expenditure nearly vanish in both calculations, with and without population size as control variable.

Levy (Durlauf/Levy 2001: 267) challenges the idea that in any country trade openness may lead to greater demands for social protection.[61] Rather, this effect may be restricted to countries with a unified working class. In other countries, economic openness and insecurity may lead to demands for smaller government, since citizens may try to accumulate own reserves to save for impending unemployment (Durlauf/Levy 2001: 267f.).

Burgoon (2001: 536ff.) subdivided trade openness and welfare effort. Among the numerous findings his analysis of 19 countries provides, some are relevant here: Retirement cash payments and service provision are significantly negatively related to general trade openness and insignificantly negatively to low-wage imports and FDI (Burgoon 2001: 538f.; 541ff.; also Jensen 2011a: 177ff. found out that globalisation negatively affects welfare spending). Conversely, spending on training and relocation is positively affected. This effect may be stronger in countries with high pension outlays and low education and job adjustment outlays (Burgoon 2001: 547). While it is therefore possible that citizens in economically open countries demand lower government expenditures for (unproductive) retirement benefits, the same may apply to unemployment benefits in order to reduce work disincentives (Swank 2001: 205). Contrasting, since it is possible that economic openness and competition increase pressures for industrial workers to retire early, even higher citizen demands for retirement benefits may be expected from economic openness.

In Jahn´s (2009: 103ff.) analysis of 21 OECD countries, trade/GDP-ratio is negatively related to social security spending´s share of GDP. This applies not to the 1980s (weak and

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[61] Iversen and Cusack detected effects from deindustrialisation to welfare spending, partially via demands for more generous transfers articulated against the backdrop of higher job insecurity. Yet, they (2000: 341) could not find any effects from trade openness to deindustrialization. Nevertheless, trade openness could enter the causal nexus by increasing job insecurity and therefore demands for generous transfer payments. Across the 30 ESS4 countries, estimated likelihood of own unemployment is slightly negatively (-.24) related to KOF globalization index and slightly positively (.122) to trade-to-gdp-ratio (both insignificant, n=30). Subjective risk of unemployment is affected by the unemployment rate and estimates of the unemployment rate, not by globalisation.

insignificant effects), but for the period from 1991 to 2003 and, even more so, the subperiod from 1997 to 2003. These results contradict Rodrik´s results only for the period from 1990 to 1992, since both agree on insignificance in the 1980s, and Rodrik´s analysis does not include the later time period for which Jahn found strong negative effects.

Lastly, it is possible that globalisation leads to convergence between welfare states, if it reduces extensive welfare states and vice versa. Possibly, globalisation has no or hardly discernible effects on welfare states (for a short literature summary see Koster 2007: 9).

Summarising, contrasting hypothesis can be formulated concerning the effects of trade on the attitudes to cash benefits.

Figures measuring globalisation are merely proxies for citizens´ estimations of the degree of globalisation. The latter is important (see also Hay/Rosamond 2002: 148). Public perceptions of globalisation may deviate from objective measures because political actors may exaggerate globalisation´s degree and present it as an external economic constraint in order to gain support for otherwise unpopular policies, such as welfare retrenchment (Hay/Rosamond 2002: 150ff.). Likewise, citizens may underestimate globalisation.

As with globalisation´s effects on policies (Jensen 2011a: 176) and with other effects on attitudes, it is assumable that globalisations´ effects on attitudes are time-lagged.

7.1.7 Overview of macro hypotheses

Table 7.2: Overview of macro hypotheses

Independent variables	Dependent variables			
	Government resp.		Earnings-relatedn.	
	Old	UE	Pen	UEB
Policies: Replacement rates/de-commodification	+ / -	+ / -		
Policies: Earnings-relatedness	+	+	+	+
Welfare regimes	r	r	r	r
GDP per capita	+ / -	+ / -		
Income inequality / relative poverty	+ / -	+ / -	+ / -	+ / -
Skewed income distribution		+ / -	+ / -	+ / -
Early retirement	-			
Pension age	+			
Old-age dependency ratio	-			
Unemployment rate		+ / -		
Share of long-term unemployed		-		
Taxes/contributions	+ / -	+ / -		
Globalisation	-	+ / -		

r: regime-specific effects (pro dominant ideology) according to figure 4.6. For CEE countries contrasting hypotheses (see chapter 4.3.5)

7.1.8   Multilevel modelling

The neglect of context effects not only results in incomplete explanations but also in wrong estimations of individual effects (Oberwittler 2003: 12). Yet, as will be seen, it is not clear which level of aggregation constitutes the relevant context. Explaining multilevel modelling, various authors use examples far below the national level (e.g. Hox 1995: 6, Kreft/de Leeuw 2002: 1, Oberwittler 2003: 13, Bickel 2007: 2ff.). Yet, as Hox (1995: 7f.) notes,

> "multilevel problems must be addressed by multilevel theories […] ideally, a multilevel theory should specify which variables belong to which level, and which direct effects and cross-level interaction effects can be expected […] these theories […] postulate one or more psychological processes that mediate between individual variables and group variables. Since a global explanation by 'group telepathy' is generally not acceptable, communication processes and the internal structure of groups become important".

According to "a realist perspective on the philosophy of science" (Kittel 2006: 241), causal relations on the macro level need a micro link. The question is to which degree citizens perceive some of the country level variables mentioned above.

Sample size and multilevel modelling

Since sample sizes at the group level are smaller than at the individual level, the former´s sample size is crucial. Large samples at the individual level can partially compensate for low samples at the group level (Maas/Hox 2005: 86f.).

Several authors have calculated the necessary number of groups for multilevel analyses. Referring to studies conducted by Bassari (1988) and van der Leeden and Busing (1994), Kreft and de Leeuw (1998: 125) state that at least 30 groups are needed. At the lower limit of 30 groups, many observations per group are needed to obtain a high power to detect cross-level interactions.[62] Although the number of macro units is 30 (Germany is treated as one country, since both parts of Germany have the same values in the independent variables), data for the independent variables is far below 30, so that the number of cases is no more than 25 or 20. This is considered too low. Generally, sample size at the highest level is the most common data problem making multilevel modelling impossible (Snijders/Bosker 1999: 140).

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[62]   ESS offers a two-step sample: Firstly, countries are chosen, then individuals. A noteworthy factor Snijders and Bosker (1999: 23f.) point out is that with a two-stage sample instead of a simple random sample the effective sample sizes decreases with rising cluster homogeneity.

7.1.9   Regressions at the macro level

In small/medium-n analyses the number of independent variables is necessarily limited (Shalev 2007b: 267). This accentuates the problem of alternative yet untested explanations, since "the effects of particular 'forces' are generally contingent on the presence/absence of others" (Scruggs 2007b: 310). Pooling observations is not a solution to the problem if researchers are interested in differences between countries and their causes and consequences (Pontusson 2007: 187). In our case, pooling is not possibly anyway due to lack of data.

The view that multiple regressions´ underlying assumption is linear causality is partially supported by Shalev (2007b: 290), who criticises Esping-Andersen´s use of multiple regressions without bearing in mind that causal relationships differ across different contexts. Esping-Andersen (2007b: 335f.) concedes that his use of multiple regressions to explain welfare statism was not appropriate. Yet, in contrast to Shalev, he rejects the complete abandonment of multiple regressions in small-n comparisons and prefers to supplement them with a closer analysis of the cases. Pontusson (2007: 326) remarks that the critique that "regression analysis assumes a linear-additive conception of causality" is valid merely regarding older analyses. He also states that in the 'typological tradition' causal effects are thought to vary across clusters, and this can only be tested via multiple regressions by incorporating regime dummies. The downside here is that the categorisation of cases to regimes affects results. This problem is exacerbated if independent variables are not just continuous, but if cases are distributed across values with densely populated border regions. As can be seen in numerous variables, this is the case (tables in appendix A2). In contrast, Scruggs´ (2007b: 186) suggestion of scatterplots to show non-linear causal relationships does not demand the introduction of dummies and therefore not the categorisation of cases, yet the number of independent variables is low due to graphical limitations. Rubinson and Ragin (2007: 385) point out that "it is difficult to visualize a plot with more than three dimensions". It is possible (see, e.g., Verba et al. 1995: 122). Here, three-dimensional graphs with coloured bars supplement macro regression analyses to depict major findings.

Regression analyses are variable oriented, trying to find out what causes what. Cases are merely "instances of relationships between variables" (Rubinson/Ragin 2007: 375). When conducting regression analyses, the procedure may be independent or dependent- variable-centred. In the former case, the question is if X1, X2 or X3 better explains Y. In dependent variable-centred analyses, the question is "what causes Y?" (Kenworthy 2007: 345).

On the micro level, large-n regression analyses allow for conclusions about "even the most unlikely combinations of the independent variable" (Shalev 2007b: 267), since they occur, if not in the sample, then in the basic population. In contrast, in small/medium-n analyses, all cases are included, so that "if a particular configuration of attributes does not exist in a cross-national dataset, it does not exist at all" (Shalev 2007b: 267, emphasis left aside). Moreover, "the attributes of societies are not subject to infinite variation in unlimited combination with one another" (Shalev 2007b: 268), so that the nonexistence of some combinations is not caused by the limited number of cases, but by the incompatibility of some characteristics. For example, as will be shown, none of the countries analysed here has high benefits for long-term unemployed and at the same time high poverty risk rates (Fig. 7.25).[63]

The number of cases on the macro level has implications for the number of variables. Jahn (2009a: 182) suggests that the maximum number of variables is one less than the number of cases divided by 3; so in our case here 30 countries translate into 10 minus 1, i.e. 9 variables at most. Further, to avoid multicollinearity, there should be no strong correlation between the independent variables. Further, homoscedasticity should be given and the values of the variables should be normally distributed. Lastly, to avoid an omitted variable bias all important variables should be included (Jahn 2009a: 182).

As in the case of multilevel analyses, the problem here is the number of cases. With one independent variable, the number of cases is determined by available data for this variable, which is at 25, 20 or even lower. Adding a second independent variable often further lowers the number of cases, since countries without available data for the second variable drop out. This makes results even more unstable than the higher number of independent variables alone, as numerous tests show. The only solution is to restrict the number of independent variables to one, and to conduct numerous analyses with different data from different sources, trying to avoid generalisations based on one data source.

This does not solve the problem of spurious correlations, but graphs incorporating three important variables for each of the four attitudes can at least partially show correlations between independent variables. Additionally, these graphs reveal the location of countries and allow for the determination of nearly ideal-typical countries.

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[63] For example, Shalev (2007b: 281) refers to Rothstein´s analysis of 18 OECD countries and the question if the existence of the Ghent system lead to the emergence of strong unions. There seems to be strong relationship, yet the problem of the lack of control variables is expressed in Shalev´s (2007b: 270) qualification "unless Ghent is but a spurious understudy of the real star of the causal show".

Further, in cases where a separate analysis of western countries brings out different results, for these countries a separate graph is shown (due to the low number of CEE countries with available data, CEE graphs would contain single-digit numbers of countries). Additional macro regressions were conducted for western countries exclusively. In the few cases where results markedly differ due to the exclusion of CEE countries, separate results are shown. This limits the problem of spurious correlations, since in many independent variables the main dividing line is between western Europe and CEE countries.

Problems concerning the different nature of macro data

Basically there are two types of aggregate data.

(1) Aggregate data may result from the aggregation of individual data, such as the number of children per family, unemployment rate or mean values of responses to survey items.

If the distribution of individual traits on which the aggregate data is based is unimodal, a typical feature of the population can be identified (Kittel 2009: 280). For example, if the number of children in the population is unimodally distributed, families with two children may be described as 'typical' in this country. With the same mean (or even median) but a bimodal distribution (and a different modal value, of one or three), one or three children (mode) may be considered 'typical' whereas families with two children rarely or never occur.

(2) System variables express emergent traits of cases, here countries. There are both, macrostructures and collective actions. Macrostructures are institutions, laws, or society´s culture. Kittel (2009: 281) describes these as relatively constant circumstances surrounding individuals´ or groups´ actions and notices that these macro structures are often considered independent variables and seldom the other way round.

The second category of system variables are actions done by or rather for cases, such as actions by government. Although actions are carried out by individuals, these actions are emergent in the sense that they result not from an aggregation of individual decisions, but from many decisions which are not made by those carrying out these actions but from the population which implements its preferences via the democratic process. As Kittel (2009: 281 f.) explains, actions taken by government deviate from the 'median voter' to the degree that distortions are caused by the structure of decision making and the exertion of influence by particular groups exceeding the influence they should have according to the share of the

population they represent. As examples for actions taken by government Kittel (2009: 282) mentions tax rates or family benefits. Certain arrangements of governmental actions may be considered results of institutional and cultural traits and at the same time factors affecting individual behaviour, which in turn is, if aggregated, seen on the macro level. This is analogous to the 'Coleman Bathtub'. So government action is considered as dependent and independent factor (Kittel 2009: 282).

The advantage of the analyses of aggregate data is the possibility to process huge amounts of information and to come to statistically valid conclusions. On the other hand, the differences and particularities between lower units may be veiled and wrong conclusions might be drawn ('whole nation bias', cf. Rokkan 1970: 49). Further, correlation may not necessarily be interpreted as causality. For this purpose, good and plausible theoretical explanations are crucial (Jahn 2009a: 175).

Data for different countries should be comparable. For example, in the case of unemployment rates international organisations try to harmonise these figures (Jahn 2009b: 182).

The following paragraph is based on and very close to Kittel (2009: 278ff.) and depicts the basic problem concerning comparisons between aggregated data and system variables. As Kittel emphasises, assumed causal nexuses on the macro level are considered not falsified if other possibly relevant factors are held constant and several independent cases show the causal nexus. The effect is supposed to be stochastic, so that deviant cases still conform to the model. The error term contains unconsidered factors and expresses the deviation from the expected value; this deviation does not falsify the theoretical assumption since it is considered random. Therefore, as Kittel (2009: 279) states, the error term is important regarding the test of the hypothesis and it is necessary to differentiate between various sources of error. Measurement errors are unproblematic as long as they are randomly distributed around the 'real' values, i.e. that they cause underestimation as well as overestimation, and smaller errors occur more frequently than larger errors. Though uncertainty is negatively related to sample size, at least aggregated survey data consist of many single observations containing errors which cancel each other out if they are random:

> "Despite the impossibility of predicting individual behaviour, in practice sufficient individuals act in an identical way, thereby producing stochastic but stable regularities at the macrolevel" (Kittel 2006: 657, see also Kuklinski/Hurley 1996: 139; Page and Shapiro 1992: 384f.).

External factors occurring randomly and distorting the results are likewise unproblematic, since they differ not in the nature, but the source of error: It is not caused by measurement, but by parts of the observed world. Occurring non-randomly, i.e. systematic, the error term gets distorted and the observed effect deviates from the postulated effect. In homogeneous cases, the inclusion of the controlling factor eliminates the effect on the error term. In heterogeneous cases the relation of components is unclear, so that disturbing factors have altogether to be excluded. As Kittel (2009: 279) points out, this requirement is not even met in physics so that artificial laboratory situations have to be created to eliminate possibly interfering factors. Summarising, the detection of causal mechanisms depends on various factors: Exact measurement should be given via the equivalence of question meaning, sampling etc. on the dependent side and valid measurement of welfare state traits and other macro variables like GDP, unemployment rate and so on the independent side. Secondly, higher heterogeneity leads to a higher number of necessary cases to detect causality. Further, exogenous factors have to be taken into account. Lastly, the probability of detecting a causal relationship rises with the number of randomly selected cases which are independent of each other. The assumption of homogeneity implies that either the cases have to be sufficiently homogenous, or all factors causing heterogeneity have to be taken into account (Kittel 2009: 288f.). The independence of factors is discussed in the next subchapter.

Kittel states that the approach to show causal nexuses depends on the normal distribution of the variables. Using the categorisation above, he states that if macro data are based on micro data and the latter is normally distributed, then the huge number of cases on the micro level causes robustness in the macro level (Kittel 2009: 291f.). This applies to survey data or to aggregated data like GDP or unemployment rate. In contrast, collective actions like government expenses or replacement rates result from negotiations between various groups representing various parts of society. Kittel (2006: 658f.) refers to Peter Abell´s distinction between parametric and strategic interaction. In the former, individuals respond independently, as is the case in opinion surveys. In the latter "actors respond to each other´s behaviour" (Kittel 2006: 659). In the case of aggregated micro data, the number of individual values gets combined into an average value via ex post aggregation. Here, "the assumptions of independence and identity of behaviour at the micro level, jointly with the law of large numbers, justify the validity of the quantitative analysis of aggregate data at the macro level". In contrast, government action does not correspond to the mean or median of citizen attitudes (next page):

"The collective action has been preceded by a deliberative process of collective policy formation, which has selected one particular collective option from the multitude of possibilities. Both crucial assumptions, independence and identity, are indefensible in this situation" (Kittel 2006: 659f.)

In these cases, decisions do not cancel each other out; strong deviations do not get muted. Therefore, Kittel (2009: 292) expects stronger variance between countries and the subsumption of observed phenomena to be deficient (Kittel 2009: 292): For government action, there is no reason to assume a normal distribution, so that descriptive statistic is not useful. This is caused by the non-applicability of the central limit theorem due to the collective character of government decision (Kittel 2006: 660). The central limit theorem "postulates that the sum (or average) of a sufficiently large number of independent random variables approximately follows a normal distribution" (Tijms 2007: 160). Therefore, the mean values of citizens´ attitudes in each country should follow a normal distribution, while this cannot be expected to be the case with values resulting from government action such as replacement rates, generosity figures, etc. Yet the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that nearly all of the numerous macro variables used here are normally distributed[64], so that indeed border regions are densely populated, if borders are drawn near the middle. This is an argument for the use of this data and against regime classifications.

Kittel (2006: 660) points to literature discussing the 'social choice problem', that no or an infinite number of equilibrium solution exist, so that collective decisions cannot be predicted, also not from the aggregation of micro data. Kittel (2009: 292f.) concludes that the different nature of micro and macro data could be the reason why causalities between institutional variables and aggregated data are hard to detect, whereas causalities between real macro data are far more stable in the face of different countries and periods.

The different nature of macro data has to be borne in mind when expecting macro effects on citizens´ attitudes.

Non-independence of cases: Diffusion

'Galton´s Problem' is the shortcoming of explanations based solely on processes internal to societies without bearing in mind the possibility of borrowing or semi-diffusion. Originally, in the late 19th century Sir Francis Galton doubted a functionalistic explanation of similar

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[64] Exceptions are pensions replacement rates at 50 percent of earnings (figures from Whitehouse), pension generosity in the 2000s, unemployment generosity in the 2000s, unemployment rate 2008 (OECD data), and legislated retirement age (in all four cases, data from ISG, Whitehouse [men and women] and Eurostat). Many cabinet strengths of ideological orientations are not normally distributed, too.

marriage laws in geographically close cultures and suggested that these similarities are not caused by similar conditions but by a common source (Jahn 2009b: 94), so that due to diffusion, observations are not independent (for Naroll´s distinction between borrowing and semi-diffusion see Jahn 2009b: 95).

Policy diffusion is caused by "competition, learning, and social emulation" (Gilardi 2010: 650, also stating that empirically it is hard to discriminate between these three factors; for definitions of these terms see 2010: 661) and often correlated with geographical proximity. For example, the Scandinavian countries, Germany and Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium, or all Anglo-Saxon countries are believed to have learned from and influenced each other (Esping-Andersen/Przworski 2001: 6). Collier and Messick presented a map suggesting that the spread of certain social policy programmes took place within regions and may not be explained solely by internal factors like state of industrialisation. Further, Walker found out that policy adoption diffused between US states; the same can be said about Gray´s results (all subsumed by Ross/Homer 1976: 2ff.), whereas Volden et al. (2008: 319ff.) suggest that similar policy developments have been misinterpreted as diffusion while in fact they were similar reactions to common problems.[65] The underlying conception is that of 'families of nations' which "have common policy outcomes in consequence of shared historical and cultural attributes" (Castles 1994: 21). If social policy programmes spread from one region to another, then human ideas, attitudes etc. have to be involved, either of elites or ordinary citizens who force through their ideas. In the latter case, attitudes in one country have been changed by policies or attitudes in another country.

In case the observations are not independent, a basic assumption for multiple regression analyses is violated, resulting in biased error coefficients and unequal error variance (heteroskedasticity) and a lower real number of cases (Esping-Andersen/Przworski 2001: 6, Esping-Andersen 2007: 338, Jahn 2009b: 94).

One solution is the introduction of regime-dummies. Yet a problem with the degrees of freedom emerges (Esping-Andersen/Przworski 2001: 7; Esping-Andersen 2007: 338). Further, this presupposes that countries can be unambiguously categorised to regimes. Esping-Andersen (2007: 338) states that dependence "is theoretically interesting because it suggests that some cases follow a similar logic by way of, e.g. mutually influencing each other". Here, the underlying assumption seems to be intra-regime dependence. Given that

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[65]   Gilardi (2010: 650ff.) shows that learning effects, i.e. effects of other countries´ experiences on policy makers, depends on the latter´s ideological position. For example, he found that signs that unemployment benefit cuts lead to electoral success makes right parties adopt these policies, whereas left parties are more prone to cutting benefits if experience in other countries indicate that this brings along lower unemployment rates.

welfare regimes are constituted of geographically close countries with similar background characteristics, problems, and even related languages, the idea that one country´s policymakers look for viable solutions in countries of the same regime is plausible (a special case occurs when two or more countries emerge from the same country, cf. Esping-Andersen 2007: 338). Due to various developments subsumable under the terms 'globalisation', 'transnationalisation', 'Europeanisation' etc., the diffusion of ideas, best practices or role models to countries neither geographically nor culturally or linguistically (a possible "diffusion of ideas through a common language", cf. Castles 1994: 21) close becomes more likely. Intra-regime diffusion should lose ground to inter-regime diffusion. Against the backdrop of Esping-Andersen´s idea of welfare states being set on one particular path from the beginning with programmed development (Borchert 1998: 145), these developments taking place decades after the initial set-up should not matter. In a less path-dependent view, these developments should matter. Fortunately for our analysis here, due to national media systems and the relative insignificance of international media, and the fact that most social contacts exist between people living in the same country rather than in different countries, the diffusion of attitudes seems less likely than the diffusion of policies.

The second solution is to analyse in detail if, how, and why diffusion happened. Besides suggesting that Galton´s Problem is not too grave, Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1997: 61) suggest that "comparative history" offers the best way to deal with it. The development of cases (countries) over time can be analysed and local characteristics may be considered. 'Black boxes' may be opened by "moving from statements about associations between variables to statements about causality" since quantitatively detected associations between variables partially cannot give ultimate answers which causes what, given the correlation is not spurious in the first place. Here the introduction of intervening variables could not completely solve the problem (Rueschemeyer/Stephens 1997: 62f.).

Although the option to analyse diffusion processes is "more alluring" (Esping-Andersen 2007: 338), one problem is that the number of diffusion processes is vast: A given programme has numerous characteristics. For each of these characteristics, one or more different countries could have been the role models. This may change over the course of time. This could be analysed and depicted only with a very small number of cases. Further, it should be hard to detect diffusion processes since conceivably only sometimes they are presented as such.

There are two more (similar) solutions. Firstly, cases could be dropped so that from a group with suspected high diffusion only one country enters the analysis. Given today´s close

relationships between countries, this seems to be unrealistic. The second solution is the selection of cases with maximum independence. This is what is done in the 'most different systems design' (Jahn 2009b: 97f.). Even if it would be possible to detect cases which are largely independent of each other, given possibly numerous diffusion processes in the EU, this would result in a small-n comparison of a handful countries scattered across Europe.

Historical contingency

A problem similar to 'Galton´s Problem' and diffusion is historical contingency, i.e. the fact that current national borders are a snapshot in time and could quite be different. For example, if the northern European countries would have merged into a 'Nordic Union', there would be no such thing as a social democratic cluster. The same applies for the US, which could be not one but far more countries (Ebbinghaus 2005b: 134ff.). In the European context, the UK could be several countries (Scotland and England/Wales/Northern Ireland), and several countries could be one country: Slovenia and Croatia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the five ex-Soviet countries analysed here. Two things result from this:

First, the changeability of national borders and the number of countries principally contradicts the idea of laws or regularities independent of space and time (Kittel 2006: 663). This problem may be circumvented by re-formulating assumptions and findings so that they are limited to the region and time period under scrutiny. This view also brings along the decision between what Casti (1989, cited in Kittel 2006: 664ff.) termed 'operation science' and 'origin science'. In the former, repeatable processes are explained by universal laws. The question here is how things work. In the latter, the goal is to explain how singular events or circumstances came into being. Here, "not the usual that can be captured by some regularity, but the unusual, the irregular, the departure from the normal operation of the system" (Kittel 2006: 665) is to be explained. Clearly, Kittel refers to "revolutions, regime changes, welfare retrenchment and similar events" and not to attitudes. Yet the pattern of Europeans´ attitudes towards the welfare states in 2008 is not what one would expect from standard explanations. Nevertheless, there is a pattern, as will be seen, more so in the case of preferences for government responsibility than in the case of earnings-relatedness. Endeavours to explain such circumstances use "known regularities at the micro-level for providing an account of the origin of the observed singular event" (Kittel 2006: 666, emphasis omitted).

Neither our explanandum nor the explanans fulfils the criteria of identity and independence. There is a variety of partially contradicting assumed regularities. Many circumstances like globalisation, unemployment rate, income inequality, and so on allow for two diametrically opposed logical attitudinal reactions. Therefore it would be daring to generally preclude from reactions in one direction that reactions could be the other way around, somewhere else or at another time. The task will be to find out which of the contradicting possible reactions took place and to isolate regularities accounting for our findings.

Yet second, because of historical contingency what Ragin termed 'limited diversity' occurs, that is the co-occurrence of certain characteristics like strong social democratic parties, powerful unions, Protestantism, high trade etc. (Ebbinghaus 2005b: 148). Therefore, crucial factors partially cannot be singled out. Likewise, there are logically possible combinations which do not exist (Ebbinghaus 2005b: 148).

Further, and related to this, it may be asked if it each case should be treated as equally important, regardless of population size (Ebbinghaus 2005b: 136).

Endogeneity

Lastly, the problem of endogeneity occurs when independent variables may be caused by dependent variables or both are affected by a third variable (Esping-Andersen/Przeworski 2001: 8, see also Esping-Andersen 2007: 340, Jahn 2009b: 96). This is plausible especially in the case of welfare state characteristics like replacement rates, or welfare state types. They may not just affect, but also result from attitudes. Both may be affected by wealth etc.

Case-oriented research

Low-tech-techniques which do not conceal the names of the cases are case-oriented. Here, the focus is on cases: "Where variable-oriented researchers view the social world as a manifestation of the myriad relationships among variables, case-oriented researchers see many different sets of cases" (Rubinson/Ragin 2007: 375).[66] On the basis of Shalev´s critique that multiple regressions cannot separate additional, conditional effects and multiple causal pathways Rubinson and Ragin (2007: 375) conclude that regressions are "not well suited for the analysis of causal complexity". They exemplify the point with reference to Hall and

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[66] Shalev (2007c: 394) doubts that there is a fundamental difference between case-oriented and variable-oriented research, since variable-oriented research is often conducted to test generalisations drawn from a particular country, while case-oriented research still tries to come to generalizations.

Franzese, who tested the hypothesis that in countries with low wage coordination, the relationship between central bank independence and unemployment rate is stronger than in countries with high wage coordination. Yet, "their results only describe relationships among variables" (Rubinson/Ragin 2007: 376). A case-oriented approach would look at specific features without regarding outliers. Case-oriented research can detect (and explain) outliers.

Rubinson and Ragin (2007: 387) state that "most of the studies that Shalev reviews involve between 14 and 18 countries, numbers small enough to constrain available degrees of freedom but large enough to hinder in-depth analysis of each case". Less than 25 or 20 countries available for regression analyses and 30 countries in total here pose a similar problem.

The low-tech techniques Shalev (2007b: 261) recommends, such as "tabular and graphical methods" allow a closer scrutiny of individual cases, especially deviant ones, against the drawback of a very low number of explanatory variables (Scruggs 2007b: 329). The problem here is not that this inhibits the "almost universally condemned" (Scruggs 2007b: 321) hunt for high R^2s[67], but that with a very low number of variables interaction effects between them become undetectable (Scruggs 2007b: 329). In Scruggs´ (2007b: 330) view, the need to control for other factors legitimises to neglect the names of the cases and their particular circumstances which may account for deviations. Here, graphical illustrations show the placement of singular cases.

Significance in analyses covering the whole basic population

Countries are not randomly selected and are, due to increasing financial interlocking, diffusion of ideas and policies, not independent of each other (Kittel 2009: 290); as depicted above. One solution to the problem of a non-random sample is to regard analysed countries not as sample representative of all countries, but as a basic population in itself. In this case, there is no conclusion from the observed cases to cases not included in the sample (Kittel 2009: 291, Berg-Schlosser/Quenter 1996: 103). Here, the role of statistical significance and the conclusion to a 'super population' is controversial:

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[67] The "past tradition of employing MR (multiple regression, author) to show that our b and R^2 are bigger than others´" (Esping-Andersen 2007: 341, see also Clarke/Primo 2007: 741ff.) lies at the root of "the backstage data-mining that goes on behind most frontstage hypothesis-testing" (Shalev 2007c: 406, see also Rueschemeyer/Stephens 1997: 69). Here, the main problem seems not to be the inclusion or exclusion of variables for the sake of high explained variance and the subsequent hypothesis formulation based on empirical results. Rather, in the case of the introduction of regime dummies, categorizations of ambiguous cases to certain regimes may be based on how their inclusion to or exclusion of regimes affects results. Given that for ambiguous cases there is a myriad of conflicting categorisations, categorisations could be chosen which in the end bring about welcome results, while others could be neglected.

Shortly put, Esping-Andersen (2007: 349) advises to give more attention to regression coefficients and their robustness than to statistical significance. Berg-Schlosser and Quenter (1996: 102) state that non-random samples and the absence of normal distributions disallow for the calculation of statistical significance. Further, they also advise to pay attention to the fact that with a low number of cases the exclusion of one or a few cases could lead to quite different results. Concluding, in the discussion of macro results significance will be discussed solely if it is not directly to be seen in figures (i.e. in the case of correlations between independent variables).

7.1.10 Macro analyses

Regression results are shown as graphs, and not as tables, since the presentation of regression results as tables "can strain even the most seasoned journal reader" (Kastellec/Leoni 2007:755). Further, a great amount of experimental research shows that graphs are superior for comparisons, while tables for the communication of exact results (Kastellec/Leoni 2007: 757). Here, the focus is on comparison of variables and countries. The authors (2007: 763) emphasise the advantages in the special case of regression results. As tables, graphs can communicate point estimates and statistical significance, i.e. the same information as tables, with the additional advantage that effect sizes are easily visible. Further, with reference to Gill (1999: 663), they point to the advantage that confidence intervals are shown, which is also possible in tables but is not done in the tables presented in the five issues of leading political science journals they analysed. Confidence intervals get shorter as sample sizes get larger (Gill 1999: 663), vividly depicting higher certainty with larger samples. Here, this is clearly visible in the comparison between macro and micro regression analyses and within micro regression analyses between countries with larger and smaller sample sizes and in the case of logistic regression analyses in the results for the few countries with low numbers of respondents bearing the attitude to be explained. Gill (1999: 663) points out that against the backdrop of different sample sizes and the arbitrariness of the 5 percent-significance level, interpretations should be cautious and concludes:

> "From the current presentation of null hypothesis significance testing in published work it is very easy to confuse statistical significance with theoretical or substantive importance. It is also possible to have data which tells us something about an important political question, but which does not pass an arbitrary significance level threshold" (1999: 669).

7.1.10.1 Government responsibility for the old

Fig. 7.3 shows that the bivariate relationship between generosity and support for government´s responsibility for the old´s material well-being is in most cases positive. Citizens support generous benefits where benefits are generous and vice versa.

Fig. 7.4 (next page) shows the exception, the negative relationship resulting from Eurostat 2008 data (in descriptions below regression figures, variables shown in separate figures where country locations can be seen are in bold type). Though the number of cases is high, the relationship is driven by Cypriots´ and Bulgarians´ support for government responsibility against the backdrop of low gross[68] replacement rates. Fig. 7.5 (next page)

Figure 7.3: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Replacement rates/de-commodification

1 = P minimum 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=0.14;n=10 | 2 = P standard 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=0;n=10 | 3 = Net repl. rate 100% of individ. earn. 2002 (Whitehouse); aR²=-0.01;n= 24 | 4 = Net P wealth men 100% of av. earn. 2002 (Whitehouse);aR²=-0.04;n=24 | 5 = Net P level med. of av. net earn. bef. 2007 (Whitehouse/Queisser);aR²=-0.02;n=19 | 6 = Net P level pre-reform med. of av. net earn. (Whitehouse/Queisser);aR²=-0.12;n=10 | 7 = Single P. repl.rates 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.08;n=11 | 8 = Couple P. repl.rates 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=0.10;n=11 | 9 = Net replacement rate 2006 (European Commission, ISG);aR²=-0.04;aR²=;n=23 | 10 = Net P level (mean of 6 income levels) bef. 2007 (Whitehouse);aR²=0.02;n=24 | 11 = Net repl. rate (mean of 6 income levels) bef. 2007 (Whitehouse);aR²=0.04;n=24 | **12 = Gross repl.rate 2006 (European Commission, ISG);aR²=-0.01;n=23** | 13 = Gross repl.rate 2006 (European Commission, ISG);aR²=0.21;n=13 (without CEE countries) | 14 = Net repl.rate 2006 (European Commission, ISG);aR²=-0.04;n=23 | **15 = Repl. rates 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.09;n=25** | 20 = Decomm. P 1980 (Esping-Andersen); aR²=0.03;n=11 | 21 = Decomm. P 1980 (Scruggs/Allan);aR²=-0.05;n=11 | 22 = P Generosity 1980 (Scruggs/Allan); aR²=-0.11;n=11 | 23 = Single P. repl.rates 1971 (Scruggs);aR²=0.26;n=11 | 24 = Single P. repl.rates 1980 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.03;n=11 | 25 = Single P. repl.rates 1990 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.01;n=11 | 26 = Couple P. repl.rates 1971 (Scruggs);aR²=0.27;n=11 | 27 = Couple P. repl.rates 1980 (Scruggs);aR²=0.00;n=11 | 28 = Couple P. repl.rates 1990 (Scruggs);aR²=0.07;n=11 | 30 = Single P. repl.rates change 1980-2002 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.07;n=11 | 31 = Couple P. repl.rates change 1980-2002 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.08;n=11

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[68] "In terms of behavioural responses, net replacement rates should be more significant than gross replacement rates" (Martin 1996: 105, see also Kenworthy 2003: 1191).

shows that the positive relationship resulting from ISG data results from Southern countries: Pensions are high in Greece and on the Iberian peninsula, and citizens strongly support government responsibility.

Benefits´ earnings-relatedness is mostly positively related to strong support for government responsibility (Fig. 7.6, next page). Three out of four measurements of earnings-relatedness are positively related, one is virtually unrelated. Pension equality is weakly negatively related. Citizens support high benefits where these benefits are earnings-related.

Figure 7.4: Relationship between pension replacement rate and support for government responsibility for the old

Pearson´s r -.33

Figure 7.5: Relationship between pension replacement rate and support for government responsibility for the old

Pearson´s r .19

Figure 7.6: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Pension earnings-relatedness

1 = Net repl. rate ratio 2.5/0.5 2002 (Whitehouse);aR²=0.02;n=24 | 2 = Net P wealth men ratio 2.5/0.5 2002 (Whitehouse);aR²=0.01;n=19 | 3 = Net P level ratio 2/0.5 bef. 2007 (Whitehouse/Queisser); aR²=-0.12;n=10 | **4 = Net P level ratio 2.5/0.5 2002 (Whitehouse); aR²=0.05;n=24** | 10 = P equality 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=0.54;n=9 | 11 = P equality 1980/81 (Scruggs);aR²=0.46;n=10

As shown in Fig. 4.1, earnings-relatedness is positively related to replacement rates. Citizens´ higher support due to earnings-related benefits could be the crucial link (see also Korpi/Palme 1998).

Fig. 7.7 (next page) shows the results based on data from Whitehouse (analysis 4 in Fig. 7.6).

Figure 7.7: Relationship between pension earnings-relatedness and support for government responsibility for the old

Pearson´s r .26

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
Figure 7.8: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Welfare regimes

Liberal;aR²=-0.04| Conservative;aR²=0.20| Social democratic;aR²=-0.03| Southern;aR²=0| CEE;aR²=0.11.
All variables n = 30.

Fig. 7.8 shows effects from regime dummies on support for government responsibility for the old. Interpretation of results depends on the understanding of the dependent variable. Understood as 'range' item, liberal welfare states should have negative effects which they do have not. The negative effect from conservative countries would also contradict expectations, the neutral one from social democratic countries should be positive. Merely the positive effect from southernness is plausible and, even more so, the positive CEE effect due to primary socialisation under socialist regimes. This effect is driven by countries east of the Visegrád group. This is even more surprising against the backdrop of the positive relationship between replacement rates and attitudes.

Results 1 and 2 in Fig. 7.9 (next page) show relationships between GDP per capita and support for governments´ responsibility for the old. The effect becomes weaker without CEE countries (result 2), but is still negative: Within Europe, and within western Europe, the richer a country is, the less citizens are inclined to support government responsibility for the old.

Inequality and relative poverty lead to support for (ostensibly redistributive) generous pensions (results 10 to 14). Result 10 shows effects from the Gini coefficient, which is related to relative poverty. Result 11 shows the elderly´s poverty rate. It is noteworthy that here the strongest correlation can be found (also shown in Fig. 7.10, next page). It is improbable that correlations here are spurious and caused by omitted variables and by chance the strongest effects are to be found in the case of old age poverty. Plausibly, effects from poverty risk before socials security (result 12) are weak, since this poverty is merely theoretical and not to

Figure 7.9: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: GDP per capita/ inequality/ relative poverty

1 = GDP per capita 2008 (UN);aR²=0.19;n=30 | 2 = GDP per capita 2008 (UN);aR²=0.02 ;n=17, (without CEE countries) | 10 = Gini (CIA Fact Book);aR²=0.04;n=30 | **11 = Poverty Risk of Elderly 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.34;n=25** | 12 = Poverty risk bef. social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat); aR²=0.01;n=24 | 13 = Poverty risk after social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.23;n=24 | 14 = Percentage of poverty left after benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.18;n=24

be found in citizens´ life worlds. Result 13 shows poverty risk after social security. Result 14 shows the percentage of poverty left after benefits. We can state that relative poverty is systematically related to people´s support for material support for the elderly.

Figure 7.10: Relationship between poverty risk of the elderly and support for government responsibility for the old

Pearson´s r .61, significant at 1 percent-level

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Figure 7.11: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Early retirement/pension age

1 = Ratio empl. rates 15-64 /55-64 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=-0.01;n=27 | 10 = Average age of new retirees retrieving a statutory pension 2006 (European Commission, ISG);aR²=-0.05;n=19 | 11 = Actual retirement age 2006/2007/2008 (Eurostat);aR²=-0.04;n=26 | 12 = Legislated P eligibility age men 2006 (European Commission, ISG);aR²=-0.05;n=23 | 13 = Legislated P eligibility age men 2006 (Whitehouse); aR²=-0.04;n=27 | 14 = Legislated P eligibility age women 2006 (European Commission, ISG);aR²=-0.04;n=23 | 15 = Legislated P eligibility age women 2006 (Whitehouse);aR²=-0.04;n=27

Fig. 7.11 shows only weak effects from pension age legislation and early retirement on attitudes. Result 1 weakly confirms the hypothesis that early retirement fosters anti-pension attitudes. The higher the employment ratio between all citizens in working age and elderly employment rate, the less the support for generous benefits. Results 10 to 15 show weak negative relationship between actual and legislated retirement ages and support for government responsibility. The sooner people are allowed to retire or the sooner they retire the higher support for government responsibility.

Figure 7.12: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Old-age dependency ratio/taxes and contributions/globalisation

1 = Old-age dependency ratio 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=-0.041;n=26 | 2 = Old-age dependency ratio 2020 (Eurostat);aR²=0.04;n=24 | 3 = Old-age dependency ratio 2030 (Eurostat);aR²=0.12;n=24 | 4 = Old-age dependency ratio 2040 (Eurostat);aR²=0.08;n=24 | 5 = Old-age dependency ratio 2050 (Eurostat);aR²=-0.04;n=24 | 10 = Income tax and social security cont. rates on gross labour inc., mean of 4 inc.levels 2008 (OECD);aR²=0.03;n=19 | 11 = Government revenue % of GDP 2008, 3 year moving average (OECD);aR²=-0.05;n=22 | 12 = Income taxes, mean of 4 family types (OECD);aR²=-0.01;n=22 | 13 = Taxes as percentage of GDP 2008 (OECD);aR²=-0.05;n=22 | 14 = Total taxes and social security contributions as % of GDP 2008 (European Commission);aR²=0.11;n=24 | 15 = Social contributions as % of GDP 2008 (European Commission);aR²=0.17;n=24 | 16 = Social contributions as % of GDP employees 2008 (European Commission);aR²=0.28;n=24 | 17 = Direct taxes as percentage of total taxes 2008 (European Commission Services);aR²=-0.04;n=24 | 18 = Direct taxes as % of GDP 2008 (European Commission);aR²=-0.02;n=24 | 20 = Economic Globalisation 2008 (KOF, ETH Zurich);aR²=-0;n=30 | 21 = Trade-to-GDP-ratio 2006/2007/2008 (WTO);aR²=-0.02;n=30.

Results 1 to 5 in Fig. 7.12 show that dependency ratios in 2008 were virtually unrelated to atitudes, but dependency ratios in 2020 and, even more so, 2030 and 2040 reduce support. Possibly dependency ratios mirror news coverage concerning pension scheme sustainability. 2050 dependency ratios seem to be too far away and possibly also unrelated to published opinion.

Related to this, results 10 to 18 show effects from tax and contribution burdens. All nine measures are negatively related to support for government responsibility. Especially taxes and contributions measured by the European Commission (results 14, 15 and 16) lead to declining support for government responsibility for the old.

Also Globalisation leads to low support for generous pensions. Since the KOF index from ETH Zurich and trade-to-GDP-ratio figures from WTO are strongly correlated (Pearson´s r .65, highest level of significance, 30 cases), the similarity of effects is unsurprising.

Fig 7.13 (next page) shows the relationship between citizens´ attitudes concerning government responsibility for the old and three macro determinants in 23 countries (since gross replacement rates are available for only 23 countries). Citizens´ attitudes are slightly positively related to gross replacement rates (Pearson´s r .19; European Commission: ISG) and strongly negatively related to GDP per capita (Pearson´s r -.49, UN data) and social contributions´ (employers and employees; European Commission) share of GDP (Pearson´s r -.45). Among the three independent variables, replacement rates are slightly positively related to GDP per capita (.27) and social contributions (.11), and social contributions and GDP per capita are slightly negatively related (-.15). Therefore, the farther to the bottom of the graph (high replacement rates), the farther to the right of the graph (low GDP per capita) and the smaller the bar (low contributions), the higher are citizens´ expectations (dark colour). Countries near this ideal type are encircling the right corner: Greece and Spain with their high replacement rates (both medium GDP per capita), and Portugal, Hungary and Poland with lower GDPs but also lower replacement rates. Especially Portugal and Poland have low social contributions, which is above medium in all of the five countries. In contrast, on the left side France and the Netherlands fit the pattern of the typical countries where citizens prefer low government responsibility. Their replacement rates are on a medium level, but their GDP per capita and their social contributions are high: Their light colour shows that these countries´ citizens have comparably low preferences for government responsibility for the old.

Correlations may be spurious, e.g. since preferences for government responsibility as well as low GDP per capita may both result from a socialist past. Therefore, the same analysis has been conducted without CEE countries. In these 13 countries, citizens´ preferences are strongly positively correlated to replacement rates (.52) and strongly negatively correlated to GDP per capita and social contributions (-.51 and -.50 respectively; all three correlations are significant at the 10 percent-level.). The graph will not be shown since it contains nothing new. The elimination of outliers somewhat waters down the result, but it takes the exclusion of several countries to completely blur the pattern.

Figure 7.13: Relationship between pension gross replacement rates, GDP per capita, social contributions and support for government responsibility for the old

7.1.10.2 Government responsibility for the unemployed

Fig. 7.14 (next page) shows partially inconclusive results. Using OECD data (results 1 to 3), benefit generosity is negatively related to support for government responsibility. This strongly contradicts findings for pensions. Possibly high pensions do not lead to declining support for government responsibility since pensions are majority benefits most people expect to receive one day, whilst high unemployment benefits induce the impression that the unemployed are well off (see also Fig. 7.75 below) and lead to lower support for generosity. This would support Soroka and Wlezien´s (2005: 665ff.) result. They show that Britsh citizens react to expenditure changes with preferences for the opposite direction (they analyse other policy fields, not pensions and unemployment benefits).

Figure 7.14: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Replacement rates/decommodification/replacement rate development

1 = U. benefits short-term and long-term unemployment, 67% of av. earn 2008 (OECD); aR²=0.18;n=25 | 2 = U. benefits short-term and long-term unemployment, 100% of av. earn 2008 (OECD); aR²= 0.17 ;n= 25 | 3 = U. benefits short-term and long-term unemployment, 150% of av. earn 2008 (OECD);aR²=0.13;n=25 | 4 = Unemployment insurance repl. rates 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.12;n=10 | 5 = Single U. repl.rates 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.08;n=11 | 6 = Couple U. repl.rates 2002 (Scruggs); aR²=-0.07;n=11 | 7 = U repl. rates (Iversen/Stephens);aR²=0.01;n=11 | 8 = U. repl. rates, mean of 3 wage levels, 6 family types, initial+long-term (OECD);aR²=0.18;n=25 | **9 = U. benefits long-term unemployment, 100% of av. earn 2008 (OECD) ,aR²= 0.34 ;n= 25** |10 = U. benefits short-term unemployment, 100% of av. earn 2008 (OECD); aR²= -0.04 ;n= 25 | 20 = Decomm. U 1980 (Esping-Andersen);aR²=-0.03;n=11 | 21 = Decomm. U 1980 (Scruggs/Allan);aR²=-0.08;n=11 | 22 = U. Generosity 1980 (Scruggs/Allan);aR²=-0.04;n=11 | 23 = Single U. repl.rates 1971 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.11;n=11 | 24 = Single U. repl.rates 1980 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.10;n=11 | 25 = Single U. repl.rates 1990 (Scruggs);aR²=0;n=11 | 26 = Couple U. repl.rates 1971 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.11;n=11 | 27 = Couple U. repl.rates 1980 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.11;n=11 | 28 = Couple U. repl.rates 1990 (Scruggs);aR²=0.16;n=11 | 30 = Single U. repl.rates change 1980-2002 (Scruggs);aR²=-0;n=31 | Couple P. repl.rates change 1980-2002 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.09;n=11

Results 4 to 7 show positive effects, but figures are older and the number of cases is far smaller. OECD figures (results 8 and 9) support the idea that generous unemployment benefits lead to demands for less generosity. Benefits for the short-term unemployed (result 10) are very weakly related to attitudes. Plausibly it´s generosity towards the unemployed (8) or the long-term unemployed (9), but less so to the short-term unemployed which reduces support for government responsibility. Short-term generosity, which stronger affects the fluctual 'normally employed' unemployed, is far more accepted.

Results 20 to 28 show effects from past generosity. In most cases, effects are negative. Results 30 and 31 show effects from changes: Increases in replacement rates are accompanied by stronger support for generosity.

Fig. 7.15 (next page) shows result 9: The higher the benefits for the long-term unemployed, the lower is citizen support for government responsibility for the unemployed. Markedly, the

social democratic countries are above the regression line, i.e. they have high benefits and nevertheless not low support for government responsibility. In Southern countries, benefits are low and support is high. Conservative countries (especially Belgium) have high benefits and low support for government responsibility.

Figure 7.15: Relationship between benefits of the long-term unemployed and support for government responsibility for the unemployed

Pearson´s r -.60, significant at 1 percent-level

Figure 7.16: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness

1 = U. earn. ratio 150 / 67 initial + long-term 2008 (OECD);aR²=-0.03;n= 25 | 10 = U. equality 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=0.04;n=10 | 11 = U. equality 1980/81 (Scruggs);aR²=-0.08;n=11

Fig. 7.16 shows that earnings-relatedness is negatively related to support for generous benefits (result 1), and correspondingly benefit equality (10, 11) is positively related. Seemingly

earnings-relatedness does not foster support for high benefits, whereas it is possible that these earnings-related benefits are already generous (see also Fig. 4.2) and therefore related to low support as shown in Fig. 7.14.

Figure 7.17: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Welfare regime

Liberal;aR²=0.03 | Conservative;aR²=0.14 | Social democratic;aR²=-0.03 | Southern;aR²=0.13 | CEE;aR²=-0
All variables n = 30.

Fig. 7.17 cannot support the claim the conservative and southern countries are attitudinally similar. Liberal effects are negative, conservative effects even more so.

Fig 7.18 (next page) shows that high GDP per capita is negatively related to support for government responsibility for the unemployed (results 1 and 2), as in the case of pensions. Plausibly, inequality (10) and relative poverty (results 11 to 14) are positively related to support for (redistributive) unemployment benefits. Again, plausibly poverty before social security benefits is weaker related, since it is a theoretical 'what if'- figure not existing in people´s life worlds.

Results 20 to 27 show effects from the income skew. Highly skewed income distributions are negatively correlated to support for (redistributive) unemployment benefits. Since the skew is high if those with high incomes are far apart from those with mean incomes put in relation to the distance between mean and low incomes, this implies that in societies in which the middle classes are close to the poor, redistributive policies are unpopular. This is not in line with results from Lupu and Pontusson (2011: 316ff.) but more so with what Corneo and Grüner (2000: 1491ff.) stated. The middle classes want to keep their economic distance to the poor ('social rivalry hypothesis'). Results 21 and 23 show that effects are stronger without CEE countries.

Figure 7.18: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: GDP per capita/inequality/relative poverty/Skewed income distribution

1 = GDP per capita 2008 (UN);aR²=0.09;n=30 | 2 = GDP per capita 2008 (UN);aR²=0.09;n=17 (without CEE countries | 10 = Gini (CIA Fact Book);aR²=0.07;n=30 | 11 = Poverty risk bef. social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.04;n=24 | **12 = Poverty risk after social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.35;n=24 |13 = Poverty risk after social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.06;n=14 (Without CEE countries) |** 14 = Percentage of poverty left after benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.25;n=24 | 20 = Income skew percentiles 5,50,95 (LIS);aR²=0.01;n=18 | 21 = Income skew percentiles 5,50,95 (LIS);aR²=0.21;n=13 (without CEE countries) | 22 = Income skew percentiles 10,50,90 (LIS);aR²=-0;n=18 | 23 = Income skew percentiles 10,50,90 (LIS);aR²=0.21;n=13 (without CEE countries) | 24 = Income skew percentiles 25,50,75 (LIS);aR²=-0.06;n=18 | 25 = Income skew percentiles 5,50,95 (ESS4, adjusted);aR²=0.01;n=30 | 26 = Income skew percentiles 10,50,90 (ESS4 adjusted);aR²=0.03;n=30 | 27 = Income skew percentiles 25,50,75 (ESS4, adjusted);aR²=0.16;n=30

The six income skews are only weakly correlated to the Gini coefficient. Those skews calculated from LIS data are positively correlated (n =18), those calculated from ESS data negatively (n=30). Only the ESS skew with the 10th and the 90th percentile is statistically significantly related to the Gini index (Pearson´s r-37, significant at the 5 percent-level). Skew effects are not hidden inequality effects.

Figs. 7.19 and 7.20 show effects from poverty risk after benefits, with and without CEE countries. Without CEE countries effects are weaker. Social democratic countries are under the line, implying their citizens support unemployment benefits more than their poverty rates suggest. For southern and liberal countries the opposite applies.

Figure 7.19: Relationship between post-tax/post-transfer poverty risk and support for government responsibility for the unemployed

Pearson´s r .62, significant at 1 percent-level

Figure 7.20: Relationship between post-tax/post-transfer poverty risk and support for government responsibility for the unemployed (without CEE countries)

Pearson´s r .37

Results 1 to 5 in Fig. 7.21 (next page) show effects from unemployment rates from different sources. Generally, support for government responsibility is higher if unemployment is high, which confirms Heien´s (2002) results. The share of long-term unemployed among the unemployed reduces support. This is line with the idea that a higher share of long-term unemployed either negatively affects perceptions of deservingness because long unemployment spells could foster the suspicion that search efforts are insufficient (see Fig. 7.39 below).

Figure 7.21: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Unemployment rate/share of long-term unemployed amond the unemployed

1 = Unemployment Rate 2008 (OECD);aR²=-0.05;n=19 | **2 = Unemployment Rate 2008 (OECD);aR²=0.16;n=14 (Without CEE countries)** | 3 = Unemployment Rate 2008 (ILO Labor Fource Survey);aR²= 0.01;n=30 | 4 = Unemployment Rate 2008 (ILO Employment Office Records);aR²=-0.08;n=14 | 5 = Unemployment Rate Sep. 2008 (Eurostat|;aR²=-0.02;n=26 | 10 = Percentage of long-term among unemployed (OECD);aR²=0.06;n=19 | 11 = Weighted share of longterm-unemployed 2008 (OECD),aR²= 0;n= 23

Fig. 7.22 shows result 2, the correlation between unemployment rate and support for government responsibility without CEE countries. In social democratic countries, support for government responsibility is stronger than unemployment rates would suggest, in conservative countries the opposite applies.

Figure 7.22: Relationship between unemployment rate and support for government responsibility for the unemployed (without CEE countries)

Pearson´s r .47, significant at 10 percent-level

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Figure 7.23: Macro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Taxes/contributions/globalisation

1 = Income tax and social security cont. rates on gross labour inc., mean of 4 inc.levels 2008 (OECD);aR²=-0.06;n=18 | 2 = Government revenue % of GDP 2008, 3 year moving average (OECD);aR²=-0.03;n=22 | 3 = Income taxes, mean of 4 family types (OECD);aR²=-0.03;n=22 | 4 = Taxes as percentage of GDP 2008 (OECD);aR²=-0.02;n=22 | 5 = Total taxes and social security contributions as % of GDP 2008 (European Commission);aR²=0.09;n=24 | 6 = Social contributions as % of GDP 2008 (European Commission);aR²=0.05;n=24 | **7 = Social contributions as % of GDP employees 2008 (European Commission);aR²=0.17;n=24** | 8 = Direct taxes as percentage of total taxes 2008 (European Commission Services);aR²=-0.04;n=24 | 9 = Direct taxes as % of GDP 2008 (European Commission); aR²=-0.02;n=24 | 10 = Economic Globalisation 2008 (KOF, ETH Zurich);aR²=0.04;n=30 | 11 = Trade-to-GDP-ratio 2006/2007/2008 (WTO);aR²=0.09;n=30

Fig. 7.23 shows that taxes and contributions lead to lower support for government responsibility for the unemployed (results 1 to 9). This also applies to globalisation (10, 11). Possibly citizens do not react to globalisation via stronger demands for protection, but via stronger demands for competitiveness due to lower government outlays (and revenues).

Fig. 7.25 (page after next) shows the correlation between three macro variables and citizens´ preferences for government responsibility for the unemployed´s standard of living in 23 countries. The earnings of the long-term unemployed with average previous earnings (OECD) are strongly negatively correlated (Pearson´s r -.58, significant at the 1 percent-level) to citizens´ support for high unemployment benefits: Poverty risk after social security benefits (Eurostat) is positively related to citizens´ preferences (Pearson´s r .62; significant at the 1 percent-level). Lastly, high social contributions for employees are negatively correlated (Pearson´s r -.44) to support for government responsibility for the unemployed (significant at the 5 percent-level).

Figure 7.24: Relationship between social contributions for employees and support for government responsibility for the unemployed (without CEE countries)

Among the independent variables, earnings of the long-term unemployed and poverty risk are strongly negatively correlated (Pearson´s r -.64. significant at the 1 percent-level), showing that generous long-term unemployment benefits prevent widespread relative poverty. Contributions for employees are positively related to earnings for the long-term unemployed and negatively to relative poverty (both correlations: Pearson´s r -.42, significant at the 5 percent-level). This shows that high contributions, high benefits and low poverty are inseparable, but lead to citizens´ rejection of government responsibility. Replacing earnings of the long-term unemployed with different figures, e.g. mean earnings of the short-term and long-term unemployed across three previous wage levels[69] and six family types (OECD) merely alters the figures, but the basic patterns remains. But using earnings of the short-term unemployed (OECD) alters the figures, since these are unrelated to citizens´ attitudes. It´s the long-term unemployed´s material well-being that causes people to reject government responsibility for the unemployed. Variables 9 and 10 in Fig. 7.14 also show this. For interpretation of graph 7.2 one has to bear in mind that the left side is largely, but not exclusively populated by CEE countries.

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[69] Mean values are sensitive to the inclusion of income groups. For countries with stonger positively earnings-related benefits these mean values are higher if more higher income groups are included. Further, there are inter-country differences in the relative size of each income group. In countries with higher income inequality the relative share of those earning markedly more or less than average earnings is higher than in countries with a more equal income distribution.

Figure 7.25: Relationship between earnings of the long-term unemployed, post-tax/post-transfer poverty risk, employees´ social contributions and support for government responsibility for the unemployed

Again, these analyses were repeated without CEE countries to avoid spurious correlations. In the analyses with 13 Western countries the pattern remains (again, the graph is not shown, since it contains nothing new): The earnings of the long-term unemployed are strongly negatively correlated (Pearson´s r -.70) to citizens´ support for high unemployment benefits. Poverty risk after social security benefits (Eurostat) is positively correlated to citizens´ preferences (Pearson´s r .35). And high social contributions for employees are negatively correlated (Pearson´s r -.39) to support for government responsibility for the unemployed.

Earnings of the long-term unemployed and poverty risk are strongly negatively correlated (Pearson´s r -.72. significant at the 5 percent-level). Contributions for employees are positively related to earnings for the long-term unemployed (Pearson´s r .27) and negatively to relative poverty (Pearson´s r -.25, both insignificant). And again, earnings during the initial phase of unemployment are virtually uncorrelated to citizens´ attitudes.

7.1.10.3 Earnings-relatedness: Pensions

Figure 7.26: Macro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Positive pension earnings-relatedness

1 = Net repl. rate ratio 2.5/0.5 2002 (Whitehouse);aR²=0.20;n=24 | 2 = Net P wealth men ratio 2.5/0.5 2002 (Whitehouse);aR²=0.02;n=19 | 3 = Net P level ratio 2/0.5 bef. 2007 (Whitehouse/Queisser); aR²=-0.06;n=10 | **4 = Net P level ratio 2.5/0.5 2002 (Whitehouse); aR²=0.16;n=24** | 10 = P equality 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=0.54;n=9 | 11 = P equality 1980/81 (Scruggs);aR²=0.46;n=10

Fig. 7.26 shows that in general, citizens prefer positively earnings-related pensions where pensions are positively earnings-related (results 1 to 4) and where benefit equality is low (results 10 and 11). Here, citizens get what they want or vice versa.

Figure 7.27: Relationship between positive pension earnings-relatedness and support for positive pension earnings-relatedness

Pearson´s r .41, significant at 5 percent-level

Fig. 7.27 (above) visualises result 4. The net pension level ratio between high and low earners in the early 2000s is positively related to support for positive earnings-relatedness.

Figure 7.28: Macro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Welfare regimes

Liberal;aR²=0.06 | Conservative;aR²=-0.03 | Social democratic;aR²=0.04 | Southern;aR²=-0.02 | CEE;aR²=0.35. All variables n = 30.

In contrast to government responsibility, Fig. 7.28 shows regime patterns more as expected. Lowest support for positive earnings-relatedness is to be found in liberal and social democratic countries. In conservative and southern countries, support is higher, albeit one would expect southern Europeans to be stronger in favour of positive earnings-relatedness as citizens of conservative welfare states. CEE citizens strongly support positive earnings-relatedness. Communist/socialist countries placed emphasis on work and equality. CEE citizens in 2008/2009 supported earnings-related benefits, though they also support equality (Fig. 4.6).

Expectations regarding effects from inequality on support for (ostensibly inequality fostering) earnings-relatedness are contrasting. On the one hand, inequality could lead to support for more equality, i.e. earnings-unrelated or negatively earnings-related benefits. On the other hand, inequality could reduce solidarity, also due to different lifestyles, and rejection of equality. Results in Fig. 7.29 (next page) are inconclusive. Summarising effects from the Gini coefficient (result 1) and relative poverty rates (results 2 to 5), it seems that inequality is positively related to support for positive earnings-relatedness. Either inequality reduces support for redistribution, or (less probable) people know about Korpi and Palme´s 'paradox of redistribution' and support earnings-related benefits because these benefits lead to higher budgets and, at the bottom line, to more equality.

Figure 7.29: Macro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Positive pension earnings-relatedness Income inequality/relative poverty/skewed income distribution

1 = Gini (CIA Fact Book);aR²=-0.03;n=30 | 2 = Poverty Risk of Elderly 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=-0.01;n=25 | 3 = Poverty risk bef. social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=-0.01;n=24 | 4 = Poverty risk after social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.13;n=24 | 5 = Percentage of poverty left after benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.23;n=24 | 10 = Income skew percentiles 5,50.95 (LIS);aR²=-0.05;n=18 | 11 = Income skew percentiles 10.50.90 (LIS);aR²=0.02;n=18 | 12 = Income skew percentiles 25,50.75 (LIS);aR²=0.18;n=18 | 13 = Income skew percentiles 5,50.95 (ESS4, adjusted);aR²=0.17;n=30 | 14 = Income skew percentiles 10.50.90 (ESS4, adjusted);aR²=0.20;n=30 | 15 = Income skew percentiles 25,50.75 (ESS4, adjusted);aR²=0.01;n=30

Fig. 7.30 (next page) shows the correlation between citizens´ preference for positively earnings-related pensions, the net pension level ratio between those with 50 percent and 250 percent of average net earnings (calculated on the basis of data provided by Whitehouse), GDP per capita (UN) and the income skew (calculated from weighted household income in ESS 4 with the 10th and the 90th percentile and median earnings).

Across 24 countries, citizens´ preference for positive earnings-relatedness is strongly positively correlated to actual earnings-relatedness, negatively correlated to GDP per capita and positively correlated to the income skew (Pearson´s r .44, -.44 and .49, significant at the 5 percent-level): Earnings-related pensions are preferred in poor countries where pensions are earnings-related and where incomes of medium earners are far away from high earners in relation to their closeness to low earners. Therefore, the ideal country for high support for positive earnings-relatedness is located below (high earnings-relatedness), right (low GDP per capita) and has a high bar (high income skew). This is Slovakia and, with a lower income skew, Poland. On the other side, the ideal country is Denmark. This country has ideal preconditions for low support for earnings-related pensions (leaving aside the outlier Norway, Denmark´s GDP is also very high).

Among the independent variables, pensions´ earnings-relatedness and GDP per capita are strongly negatively correlated (Pearson´s r -.56, significant at the 5 percent-level): The left-right-axis is densely populated, whereas no country is on the front and the left (higher earnings-relatedness and high GDP), and merely the Czech Republic is at the back and the right (low earnings-relatedness despite low wealth). Income skew is weakly correlated to earnings-relatedness (Pearson´s r .26, insignificant), so that countries below have higher bars.

Figure 7.30: Relationship between positive pension earnings-relatedness, GDP per capita, skewed income distribution and support for positive pension earnings-relatedness

An analysis without CEE countries shows a slightly different pattern. Across 16 Western countries, correlations between citizens´ preferences and pension´s earnings-relatedness (Pearson´s r .22, insignificant) and GDP per capita are weaker (-.09, both insignificant), and stronger between preferences and the income skew (.59, significant at the 5 percent-level). The negative correlation between pensions´ earnings-relatedness and GDP per capita (-.33,

insignificant) weakens yet remains, the correlation between income skew and earnings-relatedness vanishes (-.05, insignificant). Fig. 7.31 shows that moving to the front, bars get only marginally darker, and the placement to the left (high GDP per capita) is irrelevant for bars´ colours. The strong correlation to the income skew is difficult to detect, since for practical reasons the graph is not as high as wide or deep, yet higher bars are darker.

Figure 7.31: Relationship between positive pension earnings-relatedness, GDP per capita, skewed income distribution and support for positive pension earnings-relatedness (without CEE countries)

7.1.10.4   Earnings-relatedness: Unemployment benefits

Figure 7.32: Macro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness

1 = U. earn. ratio 150 / 67 initial + long-term 2008 (OECD);aR²=0.16;n=25 | 2 = U. earn. ratio 150 / 67 initial + long-term 2008 (OECD);aR²=0.42;n=15 (without CEE countries)| 10 = U. equality 2002 (Scruggs);aR²=0.26;n=10 | 11 = U. equality 1980/81 (Scruggs);aR²=0.12;n=11

Analogous to pensions, citizens get earnings-related unemployment benefits where they want them or vice versa (Fig. 7.32). Effects are even stronger without CEE countries (result 2). Fig. 7.33 visualises result 1. Benefit ratios between those earning 150 percent of average earnings and those earning 67 percent are strongly related to support for positive earnings-relatedness.

Figure 7.33: Relationship between positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness and support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness

Pearson´s r .50, significant at 5 percent-level, United Kingdom and Ireland: similar figures

Figure 7.34: Macro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Welfare regimes

Liberal;aR²=0.03;n | Conservative;aR²=-0.01 | Social democratic;aR²=-0.03 | Southern;aR²=0.02 | CEE;aR²=0.
All variables n = 30.

Again, regime patterns are not completely as expected. Southern Europeans´ low support for positive earnings-relatedness (Fig. 7.34) is surprising. Referring to Fig. 7.33 (above), it is clear that this is caused by mean support for negative earnings-relatedness in Turkey and Greece.

Figure 7.35: Macro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Income inequality/relative poverty/skewed income distribution

1 = Gini (CIA Fact Book);aR²=-0.03;n=30 | 2 = Poverty risk bef. social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.06;n=24 | 3 = Poverty risk after social security benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=-0.03;n=24 | 4 = Percentage of poverty left after benefits 2008 (Eurostat);aR²=0.02;n=24 | 10 = Income skew percentiles 5,50,95 (LIS);aR²=-0.03;n=18 | 11 = Income skew percentiles 10,50,90 (LIS);aR²=-0.06;n=18 | 12 = Income skew percentiles 25,50,75 (LIS);aR²=-0.05;n=18 | 13 = Income skew percentiles 5,50,95 (ESS4, adjusted);aR²=0.05;n=30 | 14 = Income skew percentiles 10,50,90 (ESS4, adjusted);aR²=0.16;n=30 | 15 = Income skew percentiles 25,50,75 (ESS4, adjusted);aR²=0.04;n=30

Fig. 7.35 yields inconclusive results. In two cases, inequality is negatively related to support for positive earnings-relatedness (results 1 and 2), in two cases it is positively related (3 and 4). Results 10 to 15 show effects from income skew. In most cases, a skewed income distribution fosters support for positive earnings-relatedness, primarily in the case of result 14 (skew with 90th and 10th percentile calculated from ESS4 data). Generally, the closer median earners are to low earners in relation to their distance to high earners (high skew), the more citizens support positive earnings-relatedness. As in the case of pensions, the 'social rivalry hypothesis' gets more support from data than the 'social affinity hypothesis'.

As in the case of pensions, in the case of unemployment benefits citizens´ preference for positive earnings-relatedness is strongly correlated to actual earnings-relatedness (Pearson´s r .44, significant at the 5 percent-level. Here, the benefit ratio between previous earners of 67 percent and 150 percent the average wage is used; OECD). Mean benefit level (calculated from OECD figures; Pearson´s r .42) and income skew (Pearson's R .47; 10th, 90th percentile and median income) are also strongly correlated to preference for unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness. The ideal country for high preferences for earnings-relatedness therefore lies at the front (higher actual earnings-relatedness), at the left side (high benefit level) and has a high bar (high income skew). A small group of countries comes close to the ideal type: Portugal, Latvia, Slovakia, Germany and Switzerland. The perfect contrasting countries are Romania, Greece, and Turkey, the latter combining all three factors leading to the rejection of positive earnings-relatedness.

Among the independent variables, earnings-relatedness and mean benefit level are positively correlated (Pearson´s r .38, significant at the 10 percent-level), suggesting that generous benefits are supported as long as they are earnings-related.

Repeating the analyses without CEE countries leads to similar, yet stronger correlations: Across the 16 western countries, preferences for earnings-relatedness are stronger (Pearson´s r .66, significant at the 5 percent-level) correlated to actual earnings-relatedness and to mean benefit level (Pearson's R .59, both significant at the 5 percent-level) and slightly weaker to income skew (Pearson's R .47, significant at the 10 percent-level). Also the correlation between earnings-relatedness and mean benefit level (Pearson's R .47, significant at the 10 percent-level) is stronger.

Again, the figure for the Western countries is not shown since it merely confirms the results of the analyses with all countries with available data.

Figure 7.36: Relationship between positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness, unemployment benefit level, skewed income distribution (calculated with 10th and 90th from adjusted ESS4 household income) and support for positive unemployment benefit earningsrelatedness

7.1.11 Summary

7.1.11.1 Generosity

Citizens support generous pensions where pensions are generous. For unemployment benefits results are inconclusive, but point in the negative direction. OECD data suggests negative relationships. Older data from Scruggs suggests positive relationships. Effects are weaker and the number of cases is lower. With older data, de-commodification scores suggest negative relationships, replacement rates positive ones. Changes and attitudes point in the same direction.

Here, a first noteworthy macro result emerges. Generous pensions are accompanied by citizens' support, generous unemployment benefits not.

Results for effects from earnings-relatedness on support for generosity are similar. Earnings-related pensions lead to support for generous pensions, which is plausible. For earnings-related unemployment benefits the opposite applies.

Several other macro variables have been tested. For pensions, early retirement and retirement ages are virtually irrelevant. For both policy fields regime effects are partially as expected. Further, wealth (GDP) has negative effects and inequality (Gini) has positive effects for both policy fields. Since wealth and equality are positively correlated, support is higher in poorer (and therefore more unequal) societies. For unemployment benefits, skewed incomes have negative attitudinal effects. The closer those with medium incomes are to those with low incomes, the lower a society supports (redistributive) unemployment benefits.

While early retirement and legislated retirement ages are unimportant for pension attitudes, projected dependency ratios have negative effects. This means that the extent of the real demographic problem matters, whereas the comparatively minor problem of early retirement does not. The opposite applies to unemployment rates. Seemingly citizens consider the unemployed as more deserving if unemployment is higher. Plausibly, higher shares of long-term unemployed reduced support for generosity, possibly due the idea that long-term unemployment results from lack of effort.

In both policy fields, higher taxes and contributions reduce support for generous benefits. High fiscal burdens do not make people expect generous benefits for their money, but less generous benefits (and, in turn, lower burdens).

7.1.11.2 Earnings-relatedness

Citizen support earnings-related cash benefits where benefits are earnings-related, in pensions and even more so in unemployment benefits. For both policy fields regime effects are mostly as expected: Amongst western European countries, citizens of conservative countries are the strongest supporters of higher benefits for higher earners, whereas southern Europeans also rank high. CEE citizens strongly prefer earnings-related benefits.

Results for income inequality and relative poverty are inconclusive. But skewed income distributions with closeness of median incomes to low incomes are positively related to support for earnings-related pensions and, to a lesser degree, earnings-related unemployment benefits. If income distributions affect attitudes (rather than vice versa), the

large group around median incomes supports earnings-related benefits in order to keep their distance to low earners.

7.2 Micro level

Figure 7.37: Causal model

Number: Chapters

7.2.1 Micro determinants

Factors expected to affect attitudes are grouped into several categories. Categorisations cannot be clear-cut. For example, estimates of the unemployment rate are in the last category (views of dependent groups), since one may assume that respondents thinking that the unemployment rate is low consider it easy to find a job, so that those nevertheless jobless are to be blamed. On the other hand, the view that the unemployment rate is low has financing implications, because at a given benefit level a low unemployment rate means a lighter financial burden.

In these chapters, expectations on the four dependent variables are formulated respectively obvious from argumentation. To give an overview, table 7.5 will show expected effects of these variables on the four dependent variables.

7.2.1.1 Sociodemographics

Age

Age may matter for welfare attitudes in two respects: As an indicator of a person´s position in the life cycle and as an indicator of birth and socialisation (Edlund 1999: 355).

Regarding life cycle effects, Edlund (1999: 355) expects that due to their worse situation on labour markets the youngest as well as the oldest are the strongest supporters of the welfare state. This general expectation has to be considered more carefully concerning pension and unemployment payments.

Plausibly, support for governmental responsibility for the old may rise linearly with age. Younger cohorts should reject governmental responsibility for the old, since for demographic reasons they may expect to get far less than they pay in (Alber 2001: 19; Ullrich 2006b: 497). While the authors refer to Germany, the pattern that the younger ones see a more negative cost-benefit ratio or less personal importance of governmental responsibility for the old may apply to most contributory schemes.

Kluegel and Miyano (1995: 83) assume that younger workers have higher risks of getting unemployed and have less accumulated savings to compensate for unemployment-induced income losses. The impact of fear of unemployment will enter the analysis separately, but lower savings, not in the analysis, may motivate younger people to support government responsibility. Likewise, possibly older workers assume that their chances of finding new employment after becoming unemployed are low. In contrast, pensioners or workers who would be allowed to retire early if they lost their job can be sure that they will never be unemployed. Therefore, and if they think that spending on the unemployed rivals spending on the old,[70] they could reject government responsibility.

Generational effects should be strongest in countries which underwent the biggest transformations. In CEE countries later birth cohorts were primarily socialised after the demise of socialist regimes, so that the education system could not indoctrinate socialist attitudes. Slightly earlier generations could have been primarily socialised under breeding discontent with socialist regimes and thoughts. Other countries also underwent significant transformations (e.g. the UK).

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[70] Analysing the EU-15 and several time points per country (between 1990 and 2003), Börsch-Supan (2006: 10f.) found out that spending towards the elderly (expenditures for old-age, disability and survivor pensions) and spending towards the young (unemployment benefits, family and child support, education) are positively related. Yet, measuring effort not in absolute Euro figures, but in percentage of GDP, a different picture emerges. Though in most countries relationships are positive, they are only in some cases significant. It appears that the clear positive relationship in absolute Euros results merely from a country´s wealth. Lastly, Börsch-Supan (2006: 26) does not rule out that higher pension spending levels in the future, in this case the time after 2003, will lead to crowding out of spending for the poor by spending on the old or vice versa. Contrastingly, in an analysis of 18 countries between 1980 and 2005 Lupu and Pontusson (2011: 326f.) found out that a higher percentage of elderly has negative effects on nonelderly welfare spending.

Age could also affect support for earnings-related benefits. In the case of pensions, it could be known that earnings-related benefits are generally higher, so that older people support earnings-related pensions. For unemployment benefits, older workers could have entitlements to longer (high) earnings-related benefits; those younger could have paid in not long enough to qualify for these benefits.

Gender

Plausibly there are many indirect factors of gender on welfare attitudes, which are controlled for by other variables. The main arguments in the indirect factors are that welfare services relieve women from unpaid care work and offer them employment opportunities in the same field (Pettersen 1995: 204; Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003: 425). This applies to health, elderly care and education and not to cash benefits.

'Real' gender effects may lie in the different socialisation girls and women are believed to receive. They are thought to develop a "'rationality of caring' involving concern, consideration and devotion to others" (Svallfors 1995b: 55). These attitudes related to domestic matters are thought to be conveyed to the public arena (Svallfors 1995b: 55). On the other hand, holding constant for other variables in a Dutch study women were more sceptical about welfare policies´ consequences (van Oorschot 2010: 25).

The second reason why gender may matter controlled for other variables is disposable income. The inclusion of adjusted household income in the analysis presumes that household income is equally distributed among household members. If this is not the case, that is if women are poorer than weighted household income suggests, then, all else equal, women may support government´s basic responsibility more than men do. This reason is related to one brought forward by DiPrete (2002: 288). Women lose about a quarter of their income (adjusted for household size) after marriage breaks up (see also Orloff 1993: 319). So besides adjusted household income and fear of unemployment, which are included in the analysis, the possibility of divorce and therefore loss of income may motivate women to support the welfare state. The size of the negative impact of divorces seems to be regime specific, being the biggest in conservative Germany, the smallest in social-democratic Sweden and in between in the liberal United States (DiPrete 2002: 289). An important factor contributing to divorced women´s economic vulnerability is that most single-parent households are single-mother households (DiPrete 2002: 291) and that single-parenthood is significantly related to relative poverty (Moller et al. 2003: 27). Further, entitlements to contributory benefits are

based on previous work performance. Therefore, the inclusion of household income does not adequately 'control for' the lower income of women. At a given household income women´s attitudes could be more low-earner-like.

Due to their lower 'own' income, women could reject earnings-related benefits.

Education

In contrast to Page and Shapiro´s (1992: 357ff.) broad definition of education including statements by experts, politicians and public officials, here merely education received in educational institutions is defined as 'education'.

As Heien (2002: 61, see also Linos/West 2003: 400) notes, two contrasting effects are possible. Firstly, he mentions Robinson and Bell´s (1978: 129) assumption that education fosters 'enlightenment' and therefore support for the civilizational value of equality. Robinson and Bell (1978: 129) expect that due to enlightenment education should foster pro-welfare attitudes. At the same time, the authors see the possibility of diverging effects in different education systems. As hypothesised by the authors, in England, due to enlightenment effects, education fosters support of equality. In the US, the effects are negative, presumably because status effects of education are stronger than enlightenment effects (Robinson/Bell 1978: 137).

According to Jackman and Muha (1984: 751ff.), education should foster enlightenment, democratic values and therefore diminish negative attitudes towards other groups, an assumption the authors cannot confirm unambiguously. Possibly this affects views concerning these groups´ deservingness. Analogously, education could lead to the rejection of earnings-related benefits, since these provide less help to the poor than flat-rate benefits, holding mean benefit levels constant. Though, some authors (Jackman/Muha 1984: 753; Heien 2002: 61) doubt if the higher educated apply their ascribed higher understanding of abstract values to concrete situations.[71] Lastly, Krömmelbein et al. (2007: 39) suggest that higher education may raise the understanding of welfare´s importance for society´s stability and development. Contrastingly, one could also suppose that educations raises the understanding of welfare policies´ negative effects.

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[71] The other objection Heien (2002: 61) mentions are the socio-economic interests of the higher educated. These will be controlled for by the inclusion of household income. Interestingly, Korpi (2003: 603f.) suggests that the lower unemployment rate of the higher educated does not result from a rising sophistication of tasks due to technological developments. In times of low unemployment, the higher educated already had lower unemployment rates than the lower educated. Further, Korpi points out that several studies show that education rose strongly in past decades and that many employees are educationally overqualified. He (2003: 604) suggests that effects from education on unemployment probability result from the use of formal education as a main criteria for sorting out applicants.

Education may also lead to negative welfare attitudes since educational institutions reward performance and effort, so that the longer socialisation in them may foster the belief that success and failure are closely linked to individual performance (Heien 2002: 61). The same idea is brought forward by Jackman and Muha (1984: 761), who suspect that the formally higher educated know or think that their status results from their own achievements in the educational system. Further, education could foster support for earnings-related benefits, due to the 'success ideology' (Heien 2002) and the belief that hard work has to pay off.

Lastly, regime-specific effects are possible. If educational institutions spread society´s dominant ideology, staying long in them could indoctrinate the dominant attitudes concerning welfare (Jackman/Muha 1984: 761). If dominant ideology and real welfare arrangements correlate, then education could foster support for the status quo. Likewise, educational institutions could convey deviant opinions. Iversen and Soskice (2001: 886) suspect that free-market economic theory dominated universities in the 1990s. Yet here, two aspects may weaken possible effects: First, there may be generational differences, if not just 1990s students were exposed to economic liberalism but, e.g., 1970s students were exposed to Keynesianism as the dominant view. Second, it is questionable that a significant proportion of university students are exposed to economic theory or welfare state research. Yet, if educational institutions, beginning with schools, teach basic correct facts (Page/Shapiro 1992: 358), amongst them how the country´s welfare programmes are designed, educational institutions may cause support for the status quo. A different expectation is that since it is positively correlated with higher income, education should foster anti-redistributive attitudes, but education´s effect on critical thinking should lead to opposition to dominant views, so that in countries where the dominant elite opinion is anti-redistribution, education´s anti-redistribution attitudinal effects should be weaker. Using ESS2 data from 23 countries, Jakobsen (2011: 103ff.) confirms this.

Here, what Iversen and Soskice (2001: 875) term "the cognitive aspects of education" will be discussed. Yet, education does not lead only to certain mind-sets or a certain level of income. Rather, education also implies a certain set of skills. If these skills are non-portable because they are "specific to a particular firm, industry, or occupation", workers demand high protection, whereas workers with portable skills demand merely low protection. Workers with specific skills are in danger of losing income if they cannot find a new job where these skills are applicable (Iversen/Soskice 2001: 876). Second, they could face worse chances than those

with portable skills to find a new job. The second option is to be found in the 'fear of unemployment' – item, since the question is how likely the respondent thinks it is that he/she will become unemployed and look for work for more than four weeks.

Iversen and Soskice (2001: 889) suggest that differences between countries in respect to their social protection result from different interests of their citizens. These are affected by portable or non-portable skills, which in turn are affected by the educational system. Therefore, they state that Germany with its high proportion of workers who had long vocational training (see also Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2002: 76f.) has high levels of social protection, whereas for the US the opposite holds true. Iversen and Soskice (2001: 888f.) find a strong correlation (Pearson´s r .82) between the number of vocationally trained workers and government transfers as a share of GDP in 20 countries and interpret this cautiously as a confirmation, yet add for consideration that crucial confounding variables may lack.

Adjusted household income

The welfare state redistributes income from the better-off to the worse-off (Svallfors 1991) and the better-off seemingly dislike the welfare state (Forma/Kangas 1999: 165, Jakobsen 2011: 108ff.). At the same time, those with higher incomes should prefer earnings-related welfare benefits.

Plausibly the whole household´s financial situation determines a person´s interest, so that household income is preferable to individual income (Heien 2002: 76f.). In our case, household income is relative within countries, meaning that in every country respondents have values between 1 and 10. The country-relative household income has to be adjusted for household size, under the assumption that costs do not rise linearly with the number of household members because of economies of scale (Bradley et al. 2003: 209). This reflects best, but not ideal practice, because several factors have to be neglected. Firstly, respondents´ financial assets are unknown, including real estate. Given the same net income, people having to pay for rent or mortgages have less disposable income than homeowners, having to pay solely for maintenance. Further, some parents have children not living in the same household, but are yet financially dependent. Additionally, there are regional differences in living costs within countries. Lastly, material wealth may be unevenly distributed within households.

Further, analogous to Kumlin´s (2002b: 48) definition of self-interest, household income disregards people´s expectations. Lower earners´ rejection of redistributive policies may result from self-interest if they expect a significant rise in income (Kumlin 2002b: 48

points out that long-term self-interest is methodologically difficult since, as "almost anything can happen in our lives with at least a reasonable probability", almost every attitude may be an expression of long-term self-interest which is immunised against falsification this way).

An alternative measure takes individuals´ subjective evaluation into account. Weatherford (1983: 163) suggests an index combining satisfaction with household income and with standard of living or, alternatively, subjective evaluations of the trend of household income, meaning the level of current household income compared with income one year ago.

Financers, receivers and providers of welfare services and payments: Main source of household income pensions/unemployment benefits

Goul Andersen (1992: 15) categorised citizens into three groups: Publicly supported, public employees, and privately employed. He suspects that the privately employed have negative attitudes towards the welfare state. Heien (2002: 62ff.) describes these groups, whereas in our case the first group is relevant.

The clients or consumers of the welfare state are dependent on its cash benefits and services. They can be expected to support the welfare state (Castles 2004: 94). As Papadakis (1993: 251) with reference to Lepsius notes, this group consists of many groups; among others, pensioners and the unemployed. They are situated in the "realm of 'residual' labour power" where "life is virtually de-commodified" (Offe 1984: 45). Concerning the unemployed, Klausen (1995: 266) states that some of them are not unemployed because of current economic circumstances, but even when the economy is thriving. They may be expected to be the strongest supporters of unemployment benefits. It is possible that being employed or unemployed does not affect attitudes strongly, as in van Oorschot´s (2006: 28) analysis of Dutch survey data, if people´s employment status changes frequently ('fading-away of class boundaries', cf. van Oorschot 2006: 28).

The second group, the financers, receives little from the welfare state but has to pay taxes and contributions. The self-employed and the employed, the higher educated and members of higher social strata belong to this group. This group can be expected to have negative attitudes towards governmental responsibility. In contrast to education, from which this group may benefit disproportionally, in the case of unemployment benefits this group does not benefit currently. Since public pension schemes are also mostly redistributive, this group possibly prefers less governmental responsibility in this policy area.

The third group consists of the suppliers of welfare services. Besides public officials, those employed in the fields of health and elderly care and education benefit from the welfare state due to job opportunities (Heien 2002: 64). Those people are self-employed or employed and pay for welfare services and benefits others receive. In the case of cash benefits, there are no providers of services, merely administrators, so that members of the third group largely belong to the financers. On the other hand, due to their daily experiences with welfare recipients, providers of welfare services may feel concerned about their clients´ well-being and support programmes which benefit them (Svallfors 1995b: 55), or, conversely, their concern for dependents´ well-being could have been decisive in their career choice. Therefore, welfare employees in some areas may be expected to display support for welfare policies which cannot be explained by mere self-interest.

The first group may be expected to support high governmental responsibility; the second group can be expected to support low responsibility and high earnings-relatedness of benefits. The first group should be divided in the case of earnings-relatedness, depending on previous earnings. The last group should be located in-between, but in the case of cash benefits (pensions and unemployment) only a small fraction of them belongs to the providers; the others do not have any self-interest reasons to support governmental responsibility for the old.

Parents´ status (primary socialisation and inheritance)

The societal group one belonged to during primary socialisation affects welfare attitudes (Heien 2002: 60). Political attitudes get conveyed from parents to children (Kumlin 2002b: 125), whereas later developments in one´s life modify the attitudes acquired. A proxy for parents´ socioeconomic status is their level of education, since this correlates positively with income and occupational status.

One interpretative shortcoming of this approach is the underlying assumption that parents´ status merely expresses its direct effects on attitudes in primary socialisation. Parents´ status has also effects on inheritance. Since data contain no questions regarding assets, effects from parents´ status to welfare attitudes could be mistaken for educatory effects when actually attitudes are affected by self-interest[72] resulting from inherited material well-being (inherited educational chances are already in the variable 'education').

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[72] In Kumlin´s (2002b: 197) concept, objective self-interest affects both, political orientations and subjective self-interest. The latter also affects political orientations, in Kumlin´s (2002b: 202) causal model subjective self-interests´s effects are stronger than objective self-interest.

Past unemployment for at least three months

The formerly unemployed may support governmental responsibility for the unemployed. Mueller (1963: 230ff., see also Halvorsen 2002b: 4f.) found out that respondents who are frequently unemployed are more in favour of higher unemployment compensation than those who are seldomly unemployed and especially those who were never unemployed and interprets this correlation as partially caused by self-interest. Since this implies that past unemployment is a proxy of subjective probability of future unemployment and fear of unemployment enters the analysis as a separate variable, any effects detected may not be interpreted in such manner. Rather, different explanations are plausible.

First, they may have experienced financial paucity and the difficulties to find a new job and therefore have understanding for the difficulties facing the currently unemployed (Mueller 1963: 231). Second, although they are financers of unemployment benefits, for the sake of reciprocity they may feel obliged to support the unemployed.

Past unemployed could reject positive earnings-relatedness in pensions since due to lower or no contributions during unemployment they are entitled to lower benefits.

Subjective risk of labour market inactivity (unemployment, retirement)

Those feeling at risk of becoming unemployed should support unemployment benefits. In modern societies the risk of unemployment is one of the biggest risks (DiPrete 2002: 292). Subjective risk of unemployment should be higher when unemployment is higher (Clark et al. 2010: 52f.). Also within societies this risk is unevenly distributed. Semi- and unskilled workers face greater job insecurity (Bräuninger 2000: 1ff.), people in higher occupational strata have no strong self-interest reasons to be solidary towards those for whom the risk of becoming unemployed is immanent.

In the case of retirement, the risk of becoming dependent is strongly correlated with age. The older a person is the closer is the time when he or she becomes dependent upon retirement benefits. Though, there may be gender differences, since, as seen above, in some countries women´s retirement age is below men´s. Far more important is early retirement, because here risk is unevenly distributed. If persons are forced into early retirement because they lose their job and chances of finding a new job are marginal, elderly unemployed persons or those fearing to lose their job might support governmental responsibility for the elderly. Likewise, those whose physical or psychological condition hinders them to carry on working

may support governmental responsibility for early retirement so that they can leave their job prematurely without becoming unemployed. Lastly, some workers may simply prefer early retirement to working. Health, in turn, is positively correlated with social status (for Germany: Richter/Hurrelmann 2007: 3), while at the same time higher-status people have often physically undemanding work. Therefore, lower status people might support possibilities for early retirement because they need it most.

As Korpi and Palme (2003: 430) note, the backbone of pro-welfare attitudes are not actual receivers of welfare benefits, whose number is small in many areas, but people who fear risks and benefit not by receiving help but by knowing that they would be helped if need be.

Union membership

Esping-Andersen (1990: 179) argues that unions do not care for the unemployed workers, but for the employed and their wages and job security. Unions contribute to unemployment by enforcing wages above the market-clearing level (Western 1998: 231, see also van der Horst 2003: 8ff. for US/Europe differences), whereas unemployment in turn depresses wages (van der Horst 2003: 18), especially of those with skills similar to the unemployed´s skills.

Esping-Andersen expects unionised workers to be relatively unconcerned with the situation of the unemployed. Contrastingly, Gelissen (2000: 289) points out that union membership may lead to demands not just for the protection of workers but also "other individuals who are dependent on the market for their livelihood". This may include the unemployed (Heien 2002: 62). Kluegel and Miyano (1995: 83) also expect that union members demand protection from the market´s uncertainties; therefore, besides job protection union members demand adequate unemployment benefits (see also Iversen/Soskice 2009: 446). Given that unemployment benefits equalise incomes and unions prefer material equality (Beramendi/Cusack 2009: 262), union members should be supportive of unemployment benefits. Further, high unemployment benefits strengthen workers´ bargaining position, since employers´ power results from the threat to lay off workers. Further, governmental responsibility for the unemployed may weaken their willingness to take on work. This willingness, though, increases labour supply and therefore lowers wages, which runs against unions goals. To unions, unemployment benefits are part of wage policies, keeping employed worker´s otherwise cheap and desperate competitors not too cheap and desperate and

therefore at bay (Alber 1982: 167). Union membership should foster support for governmental responsibility for the unemployed.

Concerning pensions, a similar logic applies. Pensions allow elderly workers to quit work, lowering labour supply and raising wages. Further, unions sometimes adhere to the 'lump-of-labour-fallacy', i.e. the belief that retirement 'frees up' jobs for young jobseekers.

If unions (and, therefore, union members) support earnings-related benefits or not crucially depends on whom unions feel responsible to. Unions could represent the employed´s as well as the unemployed´s interests, as argued by Vijlbrief and van de Wijngaert (1995: 237ff.). In this case, unions could reject earnings-related benefits, since in general the unemployed´s qualifications are lower than the employed´s, so that the currently unemployed had lower previous wages, which in turn implies lower benefits. This brings along higher inequality, since those who had worse opportunities to save for unemployment receive lower benefits. Following, unions should reject earnings-related benefits. Further, lower benefits for the currently unemployed lower their reservation wage, putting downward pressure on wages. This argumentation is based on an exogenously given level of unemployment compensation. If, as Korpi and Palme (1998) argue, earnings-related schemes raise the total budget and foster equality due to this overcompensating effect, unions feeling responsible for the employed as well as the unemployed could support earnings-related schemes.

If unions feel responsible merely for their employed members, as Goerke and Madsen (2003: 46) assume, they should support earnings-related benefits, since their employed members´ qualifications and therefore their earnings are higher. But also here the low benefits for the less qualified (or long-term) unemployed could reduce reservation wages and put downward pressure on employed members´ wages.

News media consumption

The argument that news media consumption affects welfare attitudes has been brought forward above in the chapter concerning effects from policies and those responsible for them on citizens´ attitudes (ch. 7.1.3). In the case of Scandinavian countries, Halvorsen (2002b: 7) states that media give the impression that the unemployed are welfare scroungers. Kumlin (2002b: 115, see also 2002b: 303) cites several studies suggesting that political media coverage became more negative of government action. An alternative view is that news media spread a society´s dominant ideology. In contrast (and based on older findings) Weatherford

(1983: 166ff.) shows that print media use leads to the use of collective economic data and less personal everyday knowledge (see also Mondak et al. 1996: 262, and Bauknecht/Remer-Bollow 2012: 353 for different effects from print media and TV on views about the unemployed).

7.2.1.2 General social attitudes

Social trust

Generalised social trust makes individuals believe that moral hazard will not leave oneself with suckers pay-off, while others cheat by evading taxes and claiming benefits to which they are not entitled (Rothstein 2002: 909). For the Dutch case, van Oorschot (2002a: 42) could show that citizens with higher general trust are more willing to contribute to social security.

7.2.1.3 General political attitudes

Left-right self-placement

Self-interest is egocentric and short-termed and concerns itself with material well-being. In contrast, 'symbolic politics' consists of "rather general predispositions, such as party identification, liberal or conservative ideology […]" (Sears et al. 1980: 671). Individuals acquire these predispositions during primary socialisation and use them as guidelines in the formation of attitudes on policy issues. Whereas according to the self-interest approach political attitudes are determined by personal gains and losses, in "'symbolic politics', one´s political and personal lives exist largely isolated from one another" (Sears et al. 1980: 671).[73] Sears et al. (1980: 674) included ideology in their analysis by using respondents´ liberal-conservative self-placement; the European equivalent is the left-right self-placement (Fuchs/Klingemann 1990: 203). Attitudes towards the welfare state may result from these ideological positions (Borre/Goldsmith 1995a: 20). Yet the direction of causality is not clear. Support for the welfare state may affect left-right placement rather than vice versa. Further, "ideological orientation […] is something so general as to be out of reach of most citizens" (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 344).

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[73] Though symbolic attitudes may result from self-interest and not primary socialisation (Sears et al. 1980: 676), Sears et al. can prove that at least not short-term interests are determinants of symbolic attitudes. Political ideology results not solely from self-interest, but the prevalence of left self-placement among those who benefit from the welfare state and the opposite for those on the right is too much of a coincidence.

Possibly the assumption that those locating themselves on the left side of the political spectrum support governmental responsibility while those on the right side reject it is too simple in its one-dimensionality. This view neglects the existence of other cleavages besides the one between labour and capital like "moral conservatism vs. liberalism" (Kumlin 2007: 93) or 'New Politics':

> "Religious values, liberalist economic values and materialist values contribute independently of each other to a rightist identification. By contrast secular, economic leftist and post-materialist values contribute to identification with the left […] left-right self-placement may thus be caused by several value orientations or political issue dimensions" (Knutsen 1998b: 294).

'Independently' means that not the whole set is necessary, so that one could be secular and post-materialist and therefore identify with the left, without holding pro-welfare attitudes. To locate oneself on the left side of some cleavage does not logically imply a location on the left side of another cleavage. Civil libertarianism is 'left', yet could result from a basic libertarian ideology, which in turn suggests 'right' anti-welfare attitudes. In this case, based on moral convictions someone could be self-located on the left side of the political spectrum and demand low government outlays. Different dimensions of policy preferences, like governmental support for the unemployed, abortion, and third, help for minorities, seem to be unrelated, but within agendas (like social welfare) people tend to hold consistent attitudes (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 344f. referring to Carmines/Layman). Further, definitions of 'left' or 'right' are interpersonally different (Knutsen 1998b: 293f., see also Kumlin 2002b: 120).

This ambiguousness is fostered by the rise of 'New Politics', which could lead to a change of the meanings of left and right (Knutsen 1998a: 65) for some people. Considering that western European publics have become more secular and post-materialist (Knutsen 1998b: 294 referring to several studies), while economic values remained relatively stable, possibly these publics moved to the left without becoming more pro-welfare. As Knutsen (1998b: 294) notes, the spread of secularism and post-materialism has not been equal across Western Europe. Given that this value change at least partially results from economic development, and given that CEE and southern countries differ from Western Europe in some economic indicators, it is possible that in CEE and southern countries the spread of 'New Politics' is not as advanced as in Western Europe. This, in turn, implies that in CEE and southern countries 'left' and 'right' are less interpreted in new ways and are more strongly connected to the 'old' economic/welfare cleavage, so that possibly the explanatory power in these countries from left-right self-placement is higher.

An argument against the objection that 'New Politics' initially changed the meaning of 'left' and right' can be found in Fuchs and Klingemann´s (1990: 213) analysis of the meanings of 'left' in the Netherlands and Germany in 1974 and 1980. 'Left' has been associated with the political ideologies communism, socialism and 'real' socialism and the specific societal goal of nationalisation in both countries by respondents, while liberalism can be found as political ideology only associated with 'right', where 'market economy' and 'private property' are specific societal values. Yet among the ideologies on the right side are several referring more strongly to moral than economic issues, such as 'Christian'. Among the ten most frequently mentioned types of meanings of left are communism and socialism and social democratic parties (PvdA and SPD), i.e. the class cleavage dominated the interpretations (Fuchs/Klingemann 1990: 223), but, as noted above, survey data is from 1974 and 1980.

Huber and Inglehart´s (1995: 73ff.) analysis is based on expert opinions on the meaning of the left vs. right conflict. 24 countries which later took part in ESS4 were analysed (not counting Austria for lack of ESS data. Northern Ireland entered the analysis separately because it may be considered a different society than mainland UK´s society). There are huge differences in the prevalence of the economic interpretation, ranging from 88 percent in Ireland to 27 percent in Lithuania (and similarly low figures in the other post-Soviet countries Estonia, Russia and Ukraine) and irrelevance of the economic interpretation in Romania (albeit with only two national experts answering the survey). Therefore, the left-right dimension is politically meaningful in all countries but with differing meanings (Huber/Inglehart 1995: 90).

This squares with Knutsen´s (1998a: 63ff.) analyses of experts´ judgments from the years 1982 and 1993. In all 13 countries analysed, the economic dimension was the most frequently mentioned, but variance between countries was considerable.[74]

Besides self-placements caused by other cleavages, Kumlin (2007: 93) mentions the 'partisan component' of this placement. This suggests that people place themselves on the left-right dimension where they suppose their favourite party to be (Knutsen 1998b: 295, see also Kumlin 2002b: 120f.). The problem here is that 'true' right persons may think about voting for a left party because they are not satisfied with a current right government, and therefore state that they would be 'left', although this is not the case (Kumlin 2007: 93) or vice versa. Another point is the relative importance of ideological position or party choice in

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[74]   Current events may affect interpretations of left and right: Expert judgements were from 1982 and 1993. In Germany, experts oftenly mentioned xenophobia. In 1992 (Rostock, Mölln) and 1993 (Solingen) there were xenophobic assaults in Germany. This is also the case in Huber and Inglehart´s analysis: Only 35 percent of experts mentioned the economic conflict, and 24 percent interpreted left vs. right as a conflict about xenophobia.

different countries. Based on Percheron and Jennings (1981), Sapiro (2004: 7f.) states that dependent upon the structure of the party system either the one or the other is the more central political concept. In our context this implies that (leaving aside reverse causality) relative effect strength from left-right self-placement or party identification may differ systematically between countries.

Lastly, respondents unsure about their location may prefer self-locations on the centre of the scale instead of refusing to answer, especially people with little political knowledge or interest (Knutsen 1998b: 303f, Converse/Pierce 1986: 128). Further, more people may locate themselves on the centre of the spectrum because 'left' and 'right' lose relevance and affiliation because "this terminology reflects the conflict lines of industrial society (Knutsen 1998b: 304 referring to Kitschelt/Hellemans 1990: 214). Tellingly, more than thirty percent of respondents answering the left-right questions in ESS4 place themselves exactly in the centre (value 5), whereas neighbouring categories gain roughly ten percent. Comparing educational attainments, those categorising themselves at the centre rank markedly lower than all others except the extreme left and right, i.e. the middle category is a proxy for 'don´t know'.

Political ideology (party support)

It is assumable that citizens bear attitudes towards the welfare state congruent to their favourite party´s ideological alignment. Causality is not clear, so that it cannot be answered if people chose parties which match their welfare attitudes or vice versa.

Political trust

In order to support government action, political trust is crucial. When policies entail risks, as is the case in welfare policies, and individual taxpayers may do not get what they paid for, political trust helps people to decide whether to support government action (Rudolph/Popp 2009: 332, for weak evidence see also Edlund 1999: 360f., for contrasting evidence see Rudolph/Popp 2009: 340).

In welfare systems, the time span between paying in and receiving benefits is often long, contributing to uncertainty (Rothstein 2002: 909). The question is not just if governments leave the money in the respective policy fields and refrain from side-subsidising other areas. It is also if they deal wisely with the financial resources they get or if they squander money. Yet while Jakobsen (2011: 103ff.) found negative effects of institutional

trust on support for redistributive policies, analysing 18 countries between 1984 and 2000, Rothstein et al. (2009: 17ff.) could find significant positive macro effects of 'Quality of Government' (three indicators combined), which should be positively related to political trust, on welfare outlays as a percentage of GDP and benefit generosity.

7.2.1.4 Values

Schwartz Value Scale

> "Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies […] people decide what is good or bad, justified or illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, by considering the effects on attaining their cherished values" (Schwartz 2007: 171, emphasis left aside. See also Rokeach 1968: 551).

Post-materialist values flourish under economic security, for which government may be held responsible (Klein/Schilling 1994: 623) so that post-materialists may want government to secure the material basis of their world view. Further, post-materialists may be seen as altruistic people caring for the common good (Gelissen 2002: 68, who found weak, albeit significant positive effects of post-materialism on support for an extensive welfare state) and other people´s well-being (Janmaat/Braun 2009: 46). Roller (1995: 172) refers to other authors arguing that the post-materialist left has adopted the old materialist left´s goals of socioeconomic equality. On the other hand, Edlund (1999: 355) expects younger people to be less supportive of the welfare state because of the post-materialist values Inglehart ascribed to them.

The items Inglehart uses to measure post-materialism are not in the data used here. ESS contains the Schwartz value scale (for the discussion of the problem of self-reported values see Schwartz 2007: 177). Schwartz introduces ten basic values, which should "include all the core values recognised in cultures around the world" (2007: 173), which may be further summarised into four higher order value types. They are partially analogical to Inglehart´s two dimensions (Besley 2006: 45). Comparing Schwartz´ and Inglehart´s items, it seems that the former may be theoretically even stronger related to welfare attitudes. For example, respondents get asked if they consider it important to be rich, to help others, that people get treated equally or that government protects against all threats. Since these dimensions and Inglehart´s survival/self-expression dimension are partially analogical, values on the left side of Fig. 7.38 may be described as post-materialist and correspondingly those on the right side as materialist.

Figure 7.38: Ten value types and four higher order value types

Openness to change	Stimulation	Hedonism	Achievement	Self-enhancement
	Self-Direction		Power	
Self-transcendence	Universalism		Security	Conservation
	Benevolence		Conformity	Tradition	

Own presentation based on Schwartz 1992: 45, Schwartz/Sagiv 1995: 96, Schwartz 2007: 175

Since 'Hedonism' belongs to both 'Openness to change' and 'Self-enhancement' (Schwartz/Sagiv 1995: 95 and Figure 7.38, see also Schwartz 2007: 181), hedonism values will be left out in the construction of indices for the higher order value types.

Due to a "the trade-off among relevant values" (Schwartz 2007: 180), not absolute value scores of respondents enter the analysis, but value importance relative to other values, so that each response is corrected for individual mean (Schwartz 2007: 180).

Based on the idea that 'Openness to change' and 'Self-transcendence' are analogical to post-materialist values, which contain old 'left' goals like material equality and government interference in the economy, these higher order value types should lead to support for government responsibility and rejection of earnings-relatedness, whereas for 'Conservation' and 'Self-enhancement' the opposite applies. Further, 'Self-transcendence' emphasises the "acceptance of others as equals and concerns for their welfare" (Schwartz/Sagiv 1995: 95), whereas 'Self-enhancement' is the opposite (Schwartz/Sagiv 1995: 95, see also Schwartz 1994: 22). Here, the strongest effects on support for government responsibility and the equality of benefits are expected.

Religiosity

Although religion plays a minor role in most people´s lifes in secularised countries, this does not necessarily imply that religion can be neglected in explaining welfare attitudes. Religions´ effects on culture can outlive religions´ genuine importance by far. Further, in some European countries people are more religious than in others. Instead of the old cleavage between Protestantism and Catholicism, in most western countries a new cleavage between religious and non-religious citizens may have emerged (Stegmueller et al. 2011: 2ff.).

Stegmueller et al. (2011: 2) expect religious citizens to adjust their norms and preferences to those dominant in their religious group. Two contrasting effects from religiosity are plausible: On the one hand, religious people could be willing to help those in economic hardship (see also Scheve/Stasavage 2006: 260). On the other hand, the

longstanding conflict between church and state may lead religious people to reject state activity and state influence (Stegmueller et al. 2011: 3 explain this in more detail). Using ESS1-3 data, including 16 western European countries in their analysis Stegmueller et al. (2011: 4ff.) show that Catholic and more so Protestant denomination negatively affects support for redistribution (to a lesser degree this applies also to other denominations). Church attendance has far weaker effects. Differences between Catholics and Protestants are far smaller (and statistically not to be distinguished from zero) than between religious and non-religious respondents. Summarising the different effects of denomination and church attendance, the authors (2011: 11) conclude that respondents´ cleavage position is far more relevant than their integration in religious groups:

> "In the process of secularization, large-scale religious organizations may have lost their power to influence policy making directly. However, religion continues to influence individual´s attitudes and beliefs – which are not restricted to questions of 'private morale'" (Stegmueller et al. 2011: 11)

A different explanation for religiosity´s effects on welfare attitudes is that religiosity offers a psychic buffer against loss of job or income (for evidences see Clark and Lelkes 2005: 8ff.). Further, religiosity may include or foster the belief that hard work will or should be rewarded (Scheve/Stasavange 2006: 256ff.), leading to perceptions of dependents´ low deservingness and, consequently, anti-welfare attitudes. Lastly, an "issue bundling effect" combining pro-religious and anti-welfare positions in one political camp (the right) could lead to lower welfare spending, even if anti-welfare candidates are voted for their religious stands, which does yet not explain anti-welfare attitudes amongst religious citizens (Scheve/Stasavange 2006: 261). Regarding our argument above concerning parties´ effect on public opinion, it is possible that religious citizens identify with parties or candidates for their religious stands, yet in turn are partially affected by their party´s or candidates´ welfare position.

Analysing 22 OECD countries between 1990 and 1998, Scheve and Stasavange (2006: 258ff.) find a negative macro relationship between religiosity (importance of god in people´s lifes) and social security spending as a percentage of GDP. Based on the 1996 ISSP data from 11 countries, it is shown that religious attendance lowers support for higher social spending (an index consisting of unemployment, health care and pension spending). To prove that religious attendance does not reduce support for all kinds of government spending but only for spending for insurance against adverse life events, Scheve and Stasavage (2006: 282ff.) show that there are no negative effects on support for spending in five other policy fields.

7.2.1.5 General welfare state attitudes

Preference for higher social spending and higher taxes

Although people prefer small government when asked about the role of government in general and higher government spending when it comes to certain programmes, it is feasible that general attitudes towards the role of government affect attitudes concerning certain programmes. The question used in ESS4 taps the 'degree' dimension of welfare attitudes, i.e. the status quo is considered and people answer in which direction changes should go. In contrast, the 'range' dimension is tapped by questions concerning government responsibility in general. Although it is logically possible to prefer high government responsibility and lower spending at the same time if government is considered to do too much, demands for lower spending mirror a general preference for less government and should contain demands for low government spending in particular programmes.

Attitude: Social benefits have negative effects

The view that welfare policies have negative consequences should lead to the rejection of government responsibility, for positive effects the opposite should apply. The items used here ('benefits make people lazy/less willing to care for on another etc.) vastly belong to the 'free market' conception with preferences for private responsibility (Staerklé et al 2012: 87, 95).

Preference for governmental reduction of income differences

Since in most cases cash benefits are redistributive, support for governmental redistribution should foster support for generous cash benefits, since redistributions is the product of budget size and targeting.

Attitude: Fairness requires material equality

Cash benefits are (to different degrees) redistributive. People preferring material equality are expected to support government responsibility for the old and the unemployed. Further, they should reject earnings-related benefits, under the assumption that the counterintuitive pro-

redistributive effects of earnings-related benefits as shown by Korpi and Palme are not generally known.

7.2.1.6 Financing attitudes

Satisfaction with the state of the economy

Citizens express satisfaction with the current state of the whole economy, although situations differ in different sectors (Kumlin 2007: 91). This satisfaction is either based on temporal comparisons and therefore determined by boom and bust cycles, or on comparisons with other countries. The latter view is supported by a strong and highly significant correlation (Pearson´s r .7) between GDP per capita in 2008 (UN data) and satisfaction with the state of the economy (life satisfaction is correlated with Pearson .8 with GDP per capita, n=30, ESS4 data).

Heien (2002: 55f.) mentions the economic situation as a possible macro determinant of citizens´ attitudes towards the welfare state. Though, likewise plausible (or even more so) is that citizens assessment of the economic situation matters. As Heien notes in the macro assumption, two contrasting effects are possible.

On the one hand, citizens may think anti-cyclical. The assessment of a bad economic situation may increase demands, since it implies that the number of dependents rises, at least in the case of unemployment (or pensions due to rising early retirement). Further, a Keynesian argument is that transfer benefits spur domestic demand and improve the economic situation.

On the other hand, citizens may demand lower government responsibility if they are not satisfied with their country´s economy. The reasons may be that they consider welfare benefits harmful to the economy or that a bad state of the economy means insufficient tax and contribution revenues to finance generous welfare benefits.

A daring hypothesis is that the subjective state of economy affects attitudes towards earnings-relatedness because of these benefits´ effects on labour supply and therefore economic development. If earnings-related benefits disincentivise higher earners to work, who in turn are more productive, respondents dissatisfied with the state of the economy could reject earnings-related benefits. A second reason is that earnings-relatedness increases the mean benefit level, so that under the assuming that benefits harm the economy earnings-relatedness gets rejected.

Estimated pension affordability

People thinking that in the medium run their country´s pensions can be as generous as today or even become more generous should support government responsibility for the old.

Preference for progressive taxation

Support for higher taxes for higher earners can result from two considerations. On the one hand, it may result from demands for material equality. In this case, it should be associated with a rejection of positively earnings-related welfare benefits. On the other hand, support for higher taxes for higher earners may mirror support for higher benefits for higher earners or knowledge that benefits are positively earnings-related. In this case, respondents support higher taxes for higher earners because they support higher benefits for them or vice versa.

7.2.1.7 Views about dependent groups

Besides ideological considerations of egalitarianism on one side and limited government on the other, also feelings towards dependents matter for welfare attitudes (Steenbergen/Brewer 2004: 101).

Positive attitude towards the old

Respondents who have positive feelings for people over 70 are expected to support government responsibility for the material well-being of this group. If citizens suspect or know that generally earnings-related benefits are higher, those with positive feelings for the old could also support earnings-related benefits.

Estimated standard of living of dependents

If items concerning government responsibility are not purely 'range' items, but at least parially 'degree' items, i.e. expressing that more or less should be spent, then assessments of standards of living should affect attitudes. The higher the estimated standard of living, the lower support for responsibility should be, because the 'need' criterion is violated. Contrastingly, for unemployment benefits Larsen (2008: 154f.) states that:

> "It is a classic thesis that pursuing a welfare policy that allows recipients to continue an 'ordinary' lifestyle reduces the risk of stigmatizing (otherwise) poor and unemployed citizens. The basic argument is that reduced differences in economic resources between the majority and the bottom of society generate more similar living styles, […] easier for the bottom to fulfil the identity criterion"

This should also apply to old people. Low standards of living of dependents violates the 'identity' criterion pointed out by van Oorschot (2000: 36), so that those paying are disinclined to consider recipients deserving.

Additionally, as in the case of pensions, if citizens think (or know) that earnings-related unemployment benefits are generally higher than flat-rate benefits, those assuming that the unemployed are well-off should reject earnings-related benefits.

Suspicion of fraud

People suspecting welfare recipients to benefit from fraudulent behaviour could demand two things: Either benefits should be kept as they are, with improved checks on beneficiaries´ claims. Or benefits should be cut, since this makes fraudulent behaviour less attractive and lowers benefits for those who behave nevertheless fraudulent. Since fraudulent behavior is far more probable in the case of unemployment benefits, effects should be found primarily there.

Ascription of individual responsibility for unemployment

Van Oorschot (2000: 36) lists five criteria under which people evaluate dependents´ deservingness: 'Control', 'need', 'identity', 'attitude' and 'reciprocity'. He (2000: 38) finds out that the Dutch clearly distinguish between the lack of ability and the lack of willingness to work. In his study, control over the own situation is the most important deservingness criterion, also depicted by Sniderman as the 'self-help' heuristic, according to which people support governmental assistance for those who try to help themselves. The importance of 'control' has already been stated by Furnham (1983: 148): "The acceptance of social welfare programs […] may depend upon their beliefs about the causes of unemployment".

The perception of 'control' may be affected by the degree of job opportunities, which in turn may be dependent on welfare regime (Larsen 2008: 151) and estimated or real unemployment rate. Larsen suggests that the three welfare regimes´ different employment trajectories have consequences on how the public perceives the unemployed. The liberal welfare states created new jobs by allowing low wages, the social democratic welfare states

created jobs in the public sector (see also Stephens 1996: 35) and the conservative welfare states did not create jobs but reduced unemployment (or avoided its rise or at least tried to) by lowering the number of people looking for work, partially via early retirement (cf. Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 35) and tax incentives for single- earner families. Besides levels of unemployment, Larsen (2008: 157f.) suggests that conservative welfare states´ protection of job insiders to the outsiders´ disadvantage contributes to the perception that the unemployed are less in control of their situation. Therefore, Larsen expects the unemployed in this regime to be perceived in low control of their situation, in the social democratic regime in medium control and in the liberal regime in high control. For example, many British citizens see poverty´s roots in "laziness and lack of willpower" (Glazer 1986: 58).

Table 7.3: Correlations between unemployment rates, share of long-term unemployed and perceptions of deservingness ('control')

	Unemployment rate				Percent of long-term UE	Weighted share of long-term UE
	OECD	ILO LFS	ILO EOR	Eurostat	OECD	OECD
"Most unemployed do not really try to find a job"	.25 (19)	.36 (30)	.51 (14)	.21 (26)	.58* (19)	.20 (23)

*: p < .05 **: p < .01; ***: p < .001. In brackets: Number of countries. LFS: Labour Force Survey. EOR: Employment Office Records. Data from 2008, Eurostat 09/2008. Long-term unemployed: 12 months and over. Support for the view that "most unemployed people do not really try to find a job": ESS4.

Although a negative relationship between unemployment rate and support the statement that most unemployed people look for work insufficiently is plausible, since a high unemployment rate suggest a systemic failure and not individual failure, on the macro level the opposite applies: Unemployment rates of the four international institutions and the view that the unemployed are not trying to find a job are positively correlated (Table 7.3). Further, a high share of long-term unemployed among the unemployed fosters the belief that the unemployed´s search endeavours are insufficient (Fig. 7.39, next page).[75] Given that long-term unemployment results from an enduring lack of success at job-hunting, the conclusion

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[75] Significant positive effects of the unemployment rate on the view that the unemployed´s search efforts are insufficient are still to be found even controlled for numerous other variables. Contrastingly, a higher share of people who were unemployed in the past has significant negative effects. On the micro level, support for Christian democratic, conservative or liberal parties (as a proxy for ideology) has significant positive effects, for social democratic ideology the opposite applies (Bauknecht/Remer-Bollow 2012: 353).

that this lack of success is partially caused by insufficient endeavours is close. Additionally, long-term unemployed´s limited financial opportunities and therefore consumption patterns different from society´s majority allow this majority to distance itself from this group.

Figure 7.39: Correlations between share of long-term unemployed and perceptions of deservingness ('control')

Pearson´s r .58, significant at 5 percent-level. Percentage of long-term unemployed: OECD. Support for the view that "most unemployed people do not really try to find a job": ESS4. 1 ='disagree strongy', 5 = 'agree strongly'.

Assessment of job opportunities for young people

The ESS4 questionnaire does not contain an item concerning respondents´ evaluations of unemployed people´s chances to find a job. As a proxy, evaluations of young people´s chances are used. Respondents may think of the unemployed and their chances in general when answering this question, since they are ignorant concerning young people´s special position. In this case using this proxy is promising. But if respondents consider young people´s chances as asked, answers reflect a combination of young people´s special status (making the proxy less promising) and the unemployed´s chances in general (making the proxy more promising), since youth unemployment is correlated with prime age unemployment. The overrepresentation of young people among the unemployed differs between countries (Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 42f.). Respondents thinking that (young) people´s chance to find a job are good should reject government responsibility for the unemployed, since they consider unemployment as at least partially voluntary, so that the criterion 'control' is violated.

Estimated unemployment rate

Far more plausible than actual unemployment rate´s effects on respondents´ attitudes are effects from estimations of unemployment rates on attitudes towards the unemployed. For this, the same effects as stated above in macro variable unemployment rate should be observable. For the US, Kuklinski and Quirk (2000: 171) found out that in general people overestimate the number of welfare recipients, and that this negative stereotype fosters anti-welfare attitudes and, they suggest, possibly vice versa.

As table A2.1 (appendix) shows, respondents´ estimates of unemployment rates were grossly higher than unemployment rates reported by various international institutions. But in two out of four cases, respondents´ estimates correlated positively and significantly with official figures (Table 7.1).

7.2.2 Different conflicts in different regimes

Besides mean levels of support for governmental responsibility and earnings-relatedness, welfare regimes should also affect differences in national levels of variance (Jæger 2009: 726 states this in the context of support for redistribution). A first approximation to plausible hypotheses is that variance in socioeconomic conditions (or ethnic composition) affects variance in attitudes, so that attitude variance should be highest in liberal welfare states and lowest in social democratic welfare states with conservative welfare states in between (Jæger 2009: 726). At the same time, Jæger (2009: 726f.) presents the rival hypothesis that political factors like the scope of redistribution might foster political controversy, in effect leading to higher attitudinal variance, so that the latter should be highest in social democratic countries. Using 1996 and 1999 ISSP data, Jæger (2009: 727ff.) shows that variance in support for governmental redistribution is highest in the social democratic regime, lower in the conservative regime and lowest in the liberal regime, so that the political explanation incorporating the extent of redistribution seems to apply (see also chapter 9.3).

Esping-Andersen (1990: 227f.) expects different conflicts to be prevalent in different welfare regimes: Conflicts between private and public employees in social democratic countries; between labour market insiders and outsiders in conservative countries and between different classes in liberal states (see also Edlund 2007: 33). Accordingly, Matheson and Wearing (1999: 136) state individual economic circumstances are embedded in social surroundings, so that being in a certain position has different meanings in different countries.

The bigger the explanatory power of a variable at the individual level, the bigger the conflict of interest between these groups. These calculations show merely differences in attitudes, for them to become conflicts these diverging attitudes have to be articulated.

Several authors examined if conflicts and their virulence are shaped by welfare regimes. Van Oorschot (2006: 34) analysed to what extent 23 European countries´ citizens feel concerned about various dependent groups (old, sick, unemployed, immigrants). He could not find any systematic differences between individual-level explanatory factors across countries and therefore regimes. Svallfors´ (1997: 293; for methodological critique see Linos/West 2003: 393ff.) analysis of four countries belonging to four regimes found the same patterns of individual effects on support for redistribution, job guarantees and basic income. In the US interests are stronger determined by occupation than in the other three countries. However, since income has not been introduced in the regression, the correlation may be spurious and run from income to attitudes, which in turn would confirm Esping-Andersen´s assumption about class conflicts being prevalent in liberal states. Further, the individual-level variable 'unemployed' is significant merely in Norway and Germany, suggesting that conflicts between the unemployed and others are more severe in their respective regimes. Edlund (1999: 362), comparing Norway and the US, summarises: "Arguments claiming that social conflict scenarios will vary systematically among different welfare state regimes cannot be sustained". His more recent analysis (2007: 30ff.) can be considered a

> "refutation of the claim that countries facing severe material inequality and social insecurity provide an environment that is likely to propel class-based conflict over state-organized welfare policy […] conflict on the terrain of the welfare state is more salient in Sweden and Norway" (Edlund 2007: 68, see also chapter 9.3).

Additionally, summarising Svallfors´ (1997) and Evans´ (1996) studies, Larsen (2008: 147) concludes "class differences seem to be very similar in different regimes".

Expanding Esping-Andersen´s assumption, Heien (2002: 66) expects that in Italy conflicts between labour-market insiders and outsiders are prevalent, as in conservative welfare states, since insiders are highly protected and entitled to generous benefits while outsiders are badly covered by social security systems. In the case of Eastern Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria he expects conflicts between labour market insiders and outsiders, too, and between men and women, since the latter´s situation has changed since transformation (for developments in gender-specific labour market participation rates see also Michoń 2008: 168). Further, as mentioned above, it is plausible that in these countries conflicts exist

between the young, whose primary socialisation took place after 1990, and the middle aged and old, who were socialised under socialism.

Further, Edlund (2007: 40) suggests that in countries with higher material inequality, conflicts between classes should be greater than in countries with a relatively equal income distribution. Edlund (2007: 41, see also Kumlin 2002b: 140) assumes "that the salience of the welfare state in the political sphere varies among different welfare regimes", since spending, taxing and redistribution in the social democratic regime has a stronger impact on citizens´ life and brings along more attention from interest groups than in the liberal regime. This squares with results in chapter 9.3, showing significant positive relationships between welfare spending and attitude differences between citizens adhering to different political ideologies.

7.2.3 State of research

Micro Variables

Since the state of research is more confusing on the micro level than on the macro level, Table 7.4 (next three pages) presents an overview of previous findings on the micro level.

Table 7.4: State of research: Micro effects

Source	Data	Countries	Dependent Variable	Results
Bean/Pa padakis 1998	ISSP 1990+ 1996	6 western	Support for government responsibility for old/unemployed	„variables representing the class politics approach receive a good deal of support, and have consistently significant and substantial effects across most of the countries" (223)
Gelissen 2000; 2002	Euro barome ter 1992	11 European	General Extensiveness	**Positive effects**: Gender (female) Education Left self-placement Union membership Post-materialism Not working Unemployed Old/disabled **No/minor effects:** Age Low income **Negative effects:** Subject. social class Occ. service class
Heien 2002	ISSP 1996	8 mostly western	Support for old and sick	**Positive effects**: Gender (female) Age (55+) **Negative effects:** Income Subjective class
			Support for unemployed + Provide job for everyone	**Positive effects**: Gender (female) Union (2 out of 8) **Different effects:** Age (2 coun.+, 2 -) **Negative effects:** Education Income Self-employed Subjective class
Blekesau ne/Quad agno 2003	ISSP 1996	23 mostly western	Support for the unemployed	**Positive effects**: Gender (female) Age Unemployed
			Support for sick and old	

Table 7.4: State of research: Micro effects (continued)

Source	Data	Countries	Dependent Variable	Results
Fraile/ Ferrer 2005	ISSP 1996	13 countries, 8 European	Support for less spending on unemployment benefits	**Positive effects**: Gender (male) Age (55+) Income **Negative effects:** Unemployed Retired (weak) Right self-placement
Jæger 2006b	ESS1 ESS2	13 western European	Support for redistribution	**Positive effects**: Age Unemployed **Negative effects:** Gender (male) Education
Busemeyer et al. 2009	ISSP 1996	14 mostly western	Support for more spending on pensions	**Positive effects**: Gender (female) Retired or > 60 and not working **Negative effects:** Education Income < 30 and working < 30 and in education
			Support for more spending on unemployment benefits	**Positive effects**: Gender (female) 30-59 and not working **Negative effects:** Income Education
Breznau 2010	ISEA 1994-1999	AU, BG, FI, NL, PL	Support for government control of social services, price controls and subsidies for basic needs	**Positive effects**: Egalitarian values (strong) **Negative effects:** Age Education Income Church attendance
Baslevent/Kirmanoglu 2011	ESS4	18 European Regressions across all countries (n=26 044), therefore many significant effects	Support for government responsibility for old	**Positive effects**: Age Gender (female) Employed Unemployed (strong) Interests dimension **Negative effects:** Education Income Right self-placement Openness to change

Table 7.4: State of research: Micro effects (continued)

Source	Data	Countries	Dependent Variable	Results
Baslevent/Kirmanoglu 2011	ESS4	18 European Regressions across all countries (n=26 044), therefore many significant effects	Support for government responsibility for unemployed	**Positive effects**: Gender (female) Unemployed Interests dimension **Negative effects:** Employed Right self-placement Openness to change
Rehm 2011	ISSP 2006	20 mostly western	Support for higher expenses for the unemployed	**Positive effects**: Age Gender (female) Unemployed Objective risk of unemployment Skill specifity (weak) **Negative effects:** Income Education Employed Retired
van Oorschot/Meuleman 2012	ESS4	22	Support for government responsibility for old	**Positive effects**: Age higher than 29 Support for equality Subj. P affordability Attitude toward elderly **Negative effects:** Education Subjective income Political trust Politically right Est. standard living of pensioners
			Support for government responsibility for unemployed	**Positive effects**: Retired Support for equality Politically rleft Attitude towards unemployed **Negative effects:** Gender (male) Education Subjective income Self-employed Est. standard living of unemployed

7.2.4 Micro analyses

Table 7.5 (this page and next) shows an overview of the numerous hyptheses at the micro level.

Table 7.5: Overview of micro hypotheses

Independent variables	Dependent variables			
	Government resp.		Earnings-relatedn.	
	Old	UE	Pen	UEB
Sociodemographics				
Age	+	+ / -	+	+
Gender (female)	+	+	-	-
Education	+ / - / r	+ / - / r	+ / - / r	+ / - / r
Adjusted household income	-	-	+	+
Main income source: pensions	+		+ / -	
Main income source: unemployment benefits		+		+ / -
Parents´ status (socialisation and inheritance)	-	-	+	
Past unemployment for at least three months		+	-	+ / -
Subjective risk of unemployment		+		+ / -
Union membership	+	+	+ / -	+ / -
News media consumption	+ / - / r	+ / - / r	+ / - / r	+ / - / r
General social attitudes				
Social trust	+	+		
General political attitudes				
Self-placement: Right	-	-	+	+
Ideology: Socialist/communist	++	++	-	-
Ideology: Social democratic	++	++	-	-
Ideology: Liberal	--	--	-	-
Ideology: Christian democratic/religious	+	+	+	+
Ideology: Conservative	-	-	-	-
Political trust	+	+	+	
Values				
Openness to change	+	+	-	-
Conservation	-	-	+	+
Self-enhancement	-	-	+	+
Self-transcendence	+	+	-	-
Religiosity	+ / -	+ / -	+	+

r: regime-specific effects (pro dominant ideology) according to figure 4.6. For CEE countries contrasting hypotheses (see chapter 4.3.5)

Table 7.5: Overview of micro hypotheses (continued)

General welfare state attitudes				
Preference for higher social spending/taxes	+	+		
Preference for gov. red. of income differences	+	+	-	-
Attitude: Social benefits have negative effects	-	-		
Attitude: Fairness requires material equality	+	+	-	-
Welfare state financing				
Satisfaction with the state of economy	+ / -	+ / -	-	-
Estimated pension affordability	+		+ / -	
Preference for progressive taxation			+ / -	+ / -
Views about dependent groups				
Positive attitude towards the old	+		+	
Estimated standard of living of pensioners	-		-	
Estimated standard of living of the unemployed		++ / -		-
Suspicion of fraud	-	--		
Ascription of ind. responsib. for unemployment		-		-
Assessment of job opportunities for young people		-		+ / -
Estimated unemployment rate		++ / -		+ / -

r: regime-specific effects (pro dominant ideology) according to figure 4.6. For CEE countries contrasting hypotheses (see chapter 4.3.5)

Regression analyses

Gelman and Hill (2007: 69) provide several suggestions. Firstly, all theoretically relevant variables should be included. Yet too many predictors lead to parameter estimates which are too variable to be useful (Gelman/Hill 2007: 69). For the exclusion of variables, statistically insignificant predictors with the expected sign should be kept in the model. For insignificant predictors without the expected sign, they (2007: 69) suggest to "consider removing it from the model". For significant predictors without the expected sign, they suggest to "think hard if it makes sense" and to include "potential lurking variables".

For the sake of inter-country comparability, for a certain dependent variable the same independent variables should be included in all countries (this goes merely as far as possible, since in some countries some political ideologies have no supporters according to our classification based on party identification and voting behaviour). This complicates the matter since effects could be different between countries.

The first step to exclude possibly redundant variables was to test for multicollinearity. Urban and Mayerl (2006: 232) suggest that the VIF-score should not exceed 5.0. In most of

the 120 regressions, the VIF-score for the higher order value type 'conservation' exceeded 5.0, which is not surprising given the circular structure of Schwartz values.

Hereafter, regression results will be shown. For all four dependent variables, numbers of cases, adjusted R² values and standard errors are to be found in the Tables A3.1 and A3.4.

7.2.4.1   Government responsibility for the old

For the regressions with the same independent variables in every country, the number of the independent variables has been reduced. To ascertain which variables are most likely redundant, in the first step one regression analysis in each country has been conducted. Beta values, if negative, have been turned into positive figures, and added across all countries. The variable with the lowest sum got dropped. This procedure has been repeated until 14 variables plus ideology (their number differing between countries) were left. Due to its high theoretical value, ideology was not dropped out even if effects were weak. As stated above, the main argument is that citizens vote for parties or feel attached to parties due to their own political beliefs. But parties may also affect their voters´ and supporters´ attitudes. Further, it can be shown that political ideology, even controlled for numerous other variables, is partially related to citizens´ welfare attitudes in a meaningful way.

Sociodemographics

Figure 7.40: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Age

De: Germany (east); Dw: Germany (west)

Controlled for numerous other factors there is no general tendency of (positive) age effects on support for government responsibility for the old (Fig. 7.40 above). Yet since age is a genuinely independent variable affecting life circumstances and attitudes and not vice versa, age could nevertheless raise support for government responsibility for the old. Fig. 7.41 shows that bivariately age is positively related to support for government responsibility for the old in most countries, and in all CEE countries. Generally, age effects are stronger in CEE countries, suggesting that in CEE countries older citizen differ more strongly from the young than in other countries, possibly due to socialisation effects. Positive age effects may result from the fact that the young have reason to believe that they will get far less from public pensions than they pay in (Alber 2001: 19; Ullrich 2006b: 497).

Figure 7.41: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Age (uncontrolled for other factors)

BE: n =1759,aR² =.02 ,s.e. =1.468 | De: n =955,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.951 | Dw: n =1761,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.054 | FR: n =2070,aR² =.02 ,s.e. =1.622 | DK: n =1597,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.502 | FI: n =2186 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.233 | NO: n =1546 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.398 | SE: n =1819,aR² =.02 ,s.e. =1.463 | IE: n =1756 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.520 | GB: n =2320 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.466 | CY: n =1212 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.375 | ES: n =2550 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.292 | GR: n =2063 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.568 | PT: n =2360 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.722 | TR: n =2338 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.381 | CZ: n =2006 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.166 | HU: n =1533 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.791 | PL: n =1607 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.677 | SK: n =1789 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.927 | SI: n =1282 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.719 | HR: n =1432 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.781 | EE: n =1642 ,aR² =.02 ,s.e. =1.541 | LV: n =1977 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.418 | LT: n =1992 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.373 | BG: n =2219 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.508 | RO: n =2045 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.369 | UA: n =1833 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1,723 | RU: n =2497 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.674 | CH: n =1805 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.911 | NL: n =1770 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.394 | IL: n =2442 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.581.

Controlled for numerous other factors, the results for gender are inconclusive (Fig. 7.42). Therefore, it is possible that 'rationality of caring' (Svallfors 1995b: 55) is either absent or expressed in other variables, such as values. Uncontrolled for other factors, the effect of gender (female) on support for government responsibility is positive (Fig. 7.43).

Figure 7.42: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Gender (female)

Figure 7.43: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Gender (female; uncontrolled for other factors)

BE: n =1759,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.482 | De: n =964,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.951 | Dw: n =1778,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.047 |
FR: n =2070,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.636 | DK: n =1597,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.498 | FI: n =2186 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.234 |
NO: n =1546 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.401 | SE: n =1819,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.470 | IE: n =1762 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.519 |
GB: n =2332 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.469 | CY: n =1212 ,aR² =-,00 ,s.e. =1.377 | ES: n =2555 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.299 |
GR: n =2065 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.567 | PT: n =2361 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.723 | TR: n =2366 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.392 |
CZ: n =2006 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.163 | HU: n =1533 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.794 | PL: n =1607 ,aR² =-,00 ,s.e. =1.671 |
SK: n =1802 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.929 | SI: n =1282 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.725 | HR: n =1459 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.771 |
EE: n =1642 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.555 | LV: n =1977 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.424 | LT: n =1981 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.376 |
BG: n =2219 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.511 | RO: n =2075 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.376 | UA: n =1833 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.731 |
RU: n =2500 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.682 | CH: n =1805 ,aR² =.00,s.e. =1.914 | NL: n =1770 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.396 |
IL: n =2467 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.585.

Fig. 7.44 (next page) shows that education´s effects are negative (though this is a disputable calculation, the regression coefficients add up to -0.63).[76]

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[76]   Adding up effect size to ascertain determinants´ total relevance is a crude yet meaningful way to ascertain determinants´ total effect. Since negative and positive effects neutralise each other, this value does not express relevance of variables, but total effect across countries. Variables can be highly relevant yet without total effect, if they have strongly positive and strongly negative effects in different countries.

These effects are controlled for various other factors, but not income, since income got erased from the model due to weak effects. Higher formal education has negative effects on support for government responsibility for the old. Therefore, results do not support the 'enlightenment' effect with its high emphasis on the civilizational value of equality (Heien 2002: 61, referring to Robinson/Bell 1978: 129). Rather, education brings along anti-welfare attitudes, possibly due to the belief that well-being depends on individual performance and less so on external circumstance (Heien 2002: 61), or due to correlated higher income. It is also possible that those higher educated know more about pension schemes´ problems, since the questions regarding the country´s ability to pay pensions ten years from now did not enter the analysis. The same applies to news media consumption.

Figure 7.44: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Education

General political attitudes

Figure 7.45: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Self-placement right

In the mean across all countries placement on the right side of the political spectrum does not affect support for generous pension policies (Fig. 7.45 above). Part of the story are counterintuitive positive effects in Turkey and Israel, but results in other countries are also unconvincing.

Based on some authors´ (Edlund 1999: 360f., Rothstein 2002: 909, 2009: 17ff.) ideas and findings, it has been hypothesised that political trust fosters pro-welfare attitudes. This is not the case. Across all countries, political trust strongly (-1.08) negatively affects support for governmental responsibility (Fig. 7.46, next page). There are two explanations for this counterintuitive finding: Either those with higher political trust also have higher incomes and therefore anti-welfare attitudes (but income itself had weak effects). Or politically trusting citizens are knowledgeable about pension schemes problems. The negative effects are in line with what Rudolph/Popp (2009: 340) and Jakobsen (2011: 103ff.) found out. Possibly political actors promote pension retrenchment, and politically trusting citizens follow their reasoning (for numerous possible reasons for effects in the wrong direction see also Kennedy 2005: 77ff.).

Figure 7.46: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Political trust

Values

It has been hypothesised that 'Openness to change' and 'Self-transcendence' are similar to post-materialist values (Besley 2006: 45), which in turn, should foster support for the welfare state. This cannot be supported. 'Openness to change' strongly (-1.37) leads to lower support for government responsibility for the old (Fig. 7.47, next page). Again, it is possible that part of the effect results from omitting income from the model, yet as stated above, income´s

effects were weak, so this is not an important cause. Since age is included, these are no hidden age effects due 'Openness' values being more prevalent amongst the young.

Figure 7.47: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Openness to change

Self-enhancement (importance of richness, success, importance, and respect from others) has been hypothesised to foster anti-welfare attitudes. Fig. 7.48 shows that Self-enhancement values very strongly (-2.04) diminish support for generous pensions.

Figure 7.48: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Self-enhancement

Self-transcendence items were importance of equality and equality of opportunities, understanding of different people, helpfulness, loyalty, and care for nature and environment. Being the opposite of Self-enhancement values, contrary effects were expected. Yet effects are only slightly (0.18) positive (Fig. 7.49, next page). Possibly too many items are only weakly related to the welfare state.

Figure 7.49: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Self-transcendence

Due to multicollinearity and low VIF values, ‚conservation' had to be dropped out of the model.

General welfare state attitudes

Citizens supporting higher government spending and taxation also support government responsibility for the old (1.43). The pattern is consistent across western Europe; exceptions are to be found in some CEE countries (Fig. 7.50).

Figure 7.50: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Preference for higher social spending and higher taxes

Several items measuring the view that welfare policies have negative effects were combined into one index. These negative effects were effects on the economy, on tax/contribution burdens, on working morale, solidarity, and on self-reliance. The belief that welfare policies

have negative effects has very strong (-2.16) negative effects on support for government responsibility for the old (Fig. 7.51).

Figure 7.51: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Attitude: Social benefits have negative effects

The idea that government should reduce differences in income levels fosters pro-welfare attitudes, since cash benefits are mostly redistributive. The total effect of 2.85 across all countries and the existence of only one country with different effects provides strong empirical support (Fig. 7.52).

Figure 7.52: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Preference for governmental reduction of income differences

The belief that only societies with small differences in living standards can be fair societies, an item not explicitly referring to government actions, should foster pro-welfare attitudes. The effects are very strong (2.76, Fig. 7.53, next page).

Figure 7.53: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Attitudes: fairness requires material equality

Welfare state financing

For satisfaction with the state of the economy two contrasting hypotheses were formulated.

On the one side, the anti-cyclical argument states that a bad economic situation necessitates higher welfare expenses. Firstly because the number of dependents rises, possibly due to spreading early retirement. Further, opportunities for additional incomes besides benefits for pensioners are worse. Lastly, the Keynesian argument is that government should spur economic growth by raising citizens´ incomes and therefore domestic demand.

On the other side, citizens may feel that government revenues are low, which in turn necessitates lower expenses. Further, social security contributions increase the price of labour and therefore further lessen labour demand, so that lower tax/contribution burdens would steer bad labour market conditions in the different direction.

Fig. 7.54 (next page) shows that positive evaluations of the economic situation very strongly (-2.44) reduce demand for generous pensions. The anti-cyclical hypothesis gains more support.

Estimates of future pension affordability did not make it into the whole regression. Appendix A3 shows that subjective pensions affordability (variable 61) has been included in seven country specific regressions, six times fostering pro-generosity attitudes, one time reducing them (Ukraine). This sheds some weak light on negative effects of old age dependency ratios on attitudes (Fig. 7.9) since subjective affordability is affected by dependency ratios (table 3.1).

Figure 7.54: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Satisfaction with the state of the economy

Views about dependent groups

The most trivial factor is the most important one. Respondents were asked how negative or positive they feel towards people over 70. These feelings have very strong effects (4.85) on support for government responsibility for the old (Fig. 7.55). This is controlled for age. People liking old people are in favour of generous pensions.

Figure 7.55: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Positive attitude towards the old

A variable not in the whole model due to too weak effects across the 31 societies has been the estimated standard of living of pensioners. Variable 71 in Appendix 3 shows that in most countries the estimated standard of living has remarkable negative effects on support for government responsibility for the old (see also van Oorschot/Meuleman 2012: 47 and 42 for

determinants of estimates of standards of living of the old and the unemployed). This provides microfoundations for various macro findings: The negative macro relationship between GDP per capita and support for government responsibility for the old (Fig. 7.9) could partially result from the strong positive effect of a country´s wealth on the view that pensioners are well-off (Fig. 7.56), which has negative effects on support for government responsibility for the old. In this sense, the absence of absolute poverty reduces support for generosity, whereas no remarkable effects from pension levels on etimates of the standard of living of the old could be found.

Figure 7.56: Relationship between GDP per capita and estimates of the standard of living of pensioners

Pearson´s r .82, significant at 1 percent-level

General political attitudes: Ideology

Respondents were categorised to ideological positions according to the party they voted for in the last national election or, if not available, according to the party they feel close to. Expectations are similar to the 'Three Worlds' macro hypotheses. Therefore, socialists/communists should strongly support generous pensions, social democrats less so, Christian democrats even less so and secular conservatives and primarily liberals should be the strongest opponents of government action in the economic sphere (see also Fig. 9.2). Figs. 7.57-7.61 show effects from ideology, controlled for numerous other factors. Summarising, communist ideology has positive (0.27) effects, social democracy also (0.26), secular conservatism has weaker effects (0.10) and Christian democracy has slightly negative effects (-0.02). Strangely, liberalism (0.29) has the strongest positive effects.

Positive effects from socialism/communism are strongly driven by Turkish (and Greek) socialists/communists (Fig. 7.57). The social democratic result of 0.26 is largely caused by Southern Europe (0.18), compensating for other regions with negative or neutral effects. The counter intuitive liberal result (0.29, Fig. 7.59, next page) is vastly caused by CEE citizens (0.23). Here, supporting liberal parties is positively related to pro-pension attitudes, controlled for many other variables.

Figure 7.57: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Support for socialist/communist parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.58: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Support for social democratic parties (proxy for ideology)

The Christian democratic (-0.02, Fig. 7.60, next page) result is partially in line with expectations. Effects are below those of left parties, but also below pro-market parties. Generally, effects are negative in Western Europe and positive in CEE countries (0.15). Coming to the too positive effects of secular conservatism (Fig. 7.61, page after next), the

effects are negative in Western Europe, as expected, but positive CEE effects (0.18) lead to positive effects. Chapter 9 will also show that primarily in CEE and partially in Southern Europe attitudes of party supporters are not es expected.

Figure 7.59: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Support for liberal parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.60: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Support for Christian democratic/religious parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.61: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Support for conservative parties (proxy for ideology)

Analyses with the variables with the highest effect strength in particular countries are to found in appendix A3.

7.2.4.2 Government responsibility for the unemployed

To reduce the number of independent variables, the same method as in the case of government responsibility for the old has been applied.

Sociodemographics

Controlled for several other factors, age slightly (-0.17) reduces support for government responsibility for the unemployed (Fig. 7.62, next page), whereas this is mainly driven by CEE countries (-0.16). This is surprising, since one might expect older CEE citizens to be strong supporters of generosity, due to their primary socialisation under socialism/communism.

Bivariately (Fig. 7.63, next page) it becomes clear that age leads to support for responsibility. The pattern is to be found in all five regions, also in CEE.

Figure 7.62: Age: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Age

Figure 7.63: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Age (uncontrolled for other factors)

BE: n =1753,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.918 | De: n =952,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.272 | Dw: n =1752,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.113 | FR: n =2059,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.042 | DK: n =1588,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.954 | FI: n =2183 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.667 | NO: n =1544 ,aR² =.02 ,s.e. =1.817 | SE: n =1807,aR² =.02 ,s.e. =1.868 | IE: n =1752 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.005 | GB: n =2313 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.188 | CY: n =1192 ,aR² =-,00 ,s.e. =1.981 | ES: n =2511 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.879 | GR: n =2065 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.915 | PT: n =2346 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.122 | TR: n =2334 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.485 | CZ: n =1995 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.511 | HU: n =1526 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.492 | PL: n =1580 ,aR² =-,00 ,s.e. =2.471 | SK: n =1777 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.428 | SI: n =1275 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.230 | HR: n =1426 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.206 | EE: n =1634 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.223 | LV: n =1975 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.994 | LT: n =1981 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.089 | BG: n =2192 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.725 | RO: n =2017 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.412 | UA: n =1818 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.411 | RU: n =2436 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.706 | CH: n =1801 ,aR² =.01,s.e. =1.955 | NL: n =1762 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.626 | IL: n =2421 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.281.

Controlled for several other factors, gender (-0.04) is virtually meaningless for support for government responsibility for the unemployed (Fig. 7.64, next page). Since gender is, as age, a genuinely independent variable, single-explanans regressions were conducted. Fig. 7.64 (next page) shows that the gender female is positively related to support for generous

unemployment benefits (1.18), implying that gender leads to other factors weakening gender´s effects.

Figure 7.64: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Gender (female)

Figure 7.65: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed:Gender (female; uncontrolled for the factors)

BE: n =1753,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.918 | De: n =961,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.286 | Dw: n =1769,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.118 | FR: n =2059,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.045 | DK: n =1588,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.953 | FI: n =2183 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =1.663 | NO: n =1544 ,aR² =-,00 ,s.e. =1.832 | SE: n =1807,aR² =.02 ,s.e. =1.870 | IE: n =1758 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.008 | GB: n =2330 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.193 | CY: n =1192 ,aR² =-,00 ,s.e. =1.981 | ES: n =2515 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.880 | GR: n =2067 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.914 | PT: n =2347 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.126 | TR: n =2361 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.501 | CZ: n =1995 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.510 | HU: n =1526 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.490 | PL: n =1508 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.469 | SK: n =1789 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.441 | SI: n =1275 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.226 | HR: n =1450 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.209 | EE: n =1634 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.234 | LV: n =1975 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.,002 | LT: n =1981 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.089 | BG: n =2192 ,aR² =.01 ,s.e. =2.716 | RO: n =2045 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.426 | UA: n =1818 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.413 | RU: n =2440 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.716 | CH: n =1801 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.960 | NL: n =1762 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =1.635 | IL: n =2446 ,aR² =.00 ,s.e. =2.292.

As in the case of pensions, education (-.99) lowers support for unemployment benefit generosity (Fig. 7.66). Again, it has to be stated that income was not in the model due to its weak effects, so part of the effect may result from omitting income.

Figure 7.66: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Education

Values

Hypotheses for effects from higher order value types are similar in the case of pensions and unemployment benefits. 'Openness to change' values have been expected to foster pro-welfare attitudes. As in the case of pensions, this cannot be confirmed. Effects are strongly (-1.57) negative (Fig. 7.67).

Figure 7.67: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Openness to change

As expected, Self-enhancement values decrease (-0.89) support for generous unemployment benefits. The sole exception is Southern Europe, with positive total effects (Fig. 7.68, next page).

Figure 7.68: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Self-enhancement

Although self-transcendence effects are also negative (-0.29), they are only weakly so. This result disconfirming the hypothesis is strongly (-0.22) caused by CEE countries (Fig. 7.69).

Figure 7.69: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Self-transcendence

General welfare state attitudes

Support for higher spending and taxing strongly raises support for government responsibility for the unemployed (2.41, Fig. 7.70, next page).

Figure 7.70: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Preference for higher social spending and higher taxes

Given that the index for negative effects consists of items more strongly related to unemployment benefits (working morale, solidarity, self-reliance), the stronger negative effects (-3.70) than in the case of pensions are highly plausible (Fig. 7.71).

Figure 7.71: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Attitude: Social benefits have negative effects

Support for governmental income redistribution (2.68, Fig. 7.72, next page) and support for the idea that only societies with small income differences can be fair societies (3.02, Fig. 7.73, also next page) foster preferences for generous unemployment benefits. In the latter case, effects in all 31 societies are in the same direction.

Figure 7.72: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Preference for govemmental reduction of income differences

Figure 7.73: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Attitude: Fairness requires material equality

Views about dependent groups

As hypothesised, the belief that the unemployed are materially well off very strongly reduces support for government responsibility for the unemployed (-.3.30, Fig. 7.74, next page). Without Cyprus the effect would be even stronger (3.45, see also van Oorschot/Meuleman 2012: 48). This result shows that the dependent variables are not unanimously range-items. Citizen do not interpret the question merely as a question of basic responsibility, but also as question of higher or lower spending per dependent person.

Figure 7.74: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Estimated standard of living of the unemployed

If unemployment results from lacking effort, the important deservingness criterion of 'control' is violated. The belief that the unemployed´s search efforts are insufficient strongly reduces support for generous benefits. Only in Eastern Germany effects are positive (0.01). Kittel (2006: 666f.) points out:

> "[…] social macro-phenomena cannot be explained by establishing macro-correlations. Instead they might be explained by tracing the causal mechanisms underlying their origin, which rely on the operation of social micro-phenomena […] the existence of regularities at the macro-level is at least not impossible if macro-phenomena are the result of some typical behaviour at the level of individuals […]".

Fig. 7.77 (page after next) and various other micro effects at least allusively show macro-correlations´ underlying micro causality: Higher replacement rates foster the belief that the unemployed are well-off (Fig. 7.75, next page). This belief reduces support for generous unemployment benefits (Fig. 7.74). On the macro level, generous benefits reduce support for governments´ responsibility for the unemployed (Fig. 7.14).

Figure 7.75: Unemployment benefit replacement rate and estimates of standards of living

Pearson´s r .66, highest level of significance. Replacement rates: Mean of 3 wage levels, 6 family types and initial and long-term calculated from OECD data.

A second causal path would be: Estimates of the standard of living of the unemployed are strongly positively affected by GDP per capita (Fig. 7.76). Therefore, effects in Fig. 7.74 (preceding page) provide a microfoundation of the negative macro effects of GDP per capita on support for government responsibility for the unemployed (Fig. 7.18).

Figure 7.76: Relationship between GDP per capita and estimates of the standard of living of the unemployed

Pearson´s r .88, significant at 1 percent-level. GDP: UN

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Figure 7.77: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Ascription of individual responsibility for unemployment

Also Fig. 7.77 sheds light on the negative macro effect of the share of the long-term unemployed among the unemployed on support for government responsibility (Fig. 7.21). A higher share of long-term unemployed fosters the belief that the unemployed´s search efforts are insufficient (Fig. 7.39). This belief reduces support for government responsibility (Fig. 7.77).

As a proxy for the unemployed´s chances to find paid work, perceived opportunities for young people to find a job have been used, since their opportunities and opportunities of the 'normal' unemployed are correlated. Effects are relatively weak (-1.03) and, in the means, not to be found in conservative, social democratic or liberal welfare states (Fig. 7.78).

Figure 7.78: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Assessment of opportunities for young people

Concerning perceptions of the unemployment rate, the positive hypothesis had stronger theoretical arguments. The idea was that high unemployment rates increase deservingness, since unemployment is considered less resulting from individual failure and more from systemic grievances. On the opposite, Kuklinski and Quirk (2000: 171) have shown that people overestimate the number of welfare dependents, with anti-welfare attitudes resulting from this stereotype. Also in ESS4 unemployment rates were grossly overestimated (table A2.1). But high estimates have strong (2.07, Fig. 7.79 below) positive effects on support for government responsibility, implying that deservingness is considered higher. This result provides another micro foundation for macro effects. Table 7.1 shows that the estimated unemployment rate is positively affected by the actual unemployment rate. Fig. 7.79 (below) shows that higher estimates of unemployment rates foster support for generous benefits. This even controlled for the assumption that "most unemployed people do not really to try to find a job" (Fig. 7.77). Therefore Fig. 7.79 (below) slightly indicates that the positive effect of higher unemployment rates on support for government responsibility (Fig. 7.21) is partially caused by higher estimates of unemployment rates which, in turn, foster support for government responsibility (Fig. 7.79).

Figure 7.79: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Estimated unemployment rate

General political attitudes: Ideology

Controlled for various factors, support of socialist/communist parties (as a proxy for closeness to their ideology) has positive mean effects (0.11), which would be stronger without Turkey and Cyprus (Fig. 7.80, next page). The positive result is caused by the old welfare regimes. Social democratic adherence had slightly negative effects (-0.04). Positive effects of all four

other regimes were turned negative due to CEE countries (Fig. 7.81). As expected, liberal support had the strongest negative effects (-0.13). Again, effects were as expected (negative) in Western Europe and not as expected (positive) in CEE countries (Fig. 7.82, next page). Support of Christian democratic/religious parties (Fig. 7.83) has the strongest positive effect (0.15), but this is largely caused by the strong effect in Turkey (0.12), whereas in Cyprus (-0.10) effects were strongly negative: Being a supporter of the Turkish AKP is strongly related to pro-unemployment benefit attitudes, whereas support for the Cypriot DISY has contrasting effects. Lastly, in the mean support for secular conservative parties had no effects (0.00, Fig. 7.84, next page). Yet again effects were strongly positive in Turkey (0.07). Expected negative effects could be found for supporters of the Swedish Moderata samlingspartiet (-0.06).

Figure 7.80: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Support for socialist/communist parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.81: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Support for social democratic parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.82: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Support for liberal parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.83: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Support for Christian democratic/liberal (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.84: Micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Support for conservative parties (proxy for ideology)

Again, regressions with the variables with the highest effect strength in particular countries are to found in 3.

7.2.4.3 Earnings-relatedness: Pensions

Logistic regressions with the dependent variable 'support for positive earnings-relatedness' have been conducted. In order to depict negative effects in logistic regressions comparable to positive effects, negative values were transformed in this manner: 1+(1-(1/value)). Figures show effect coefficients (points) and confidence intervals (lines).

Sociodemographics

With a mean effect of 1.05 (Fig. 7.85), age has positive effects, whereas the effect of Denmark (-0.85) has been left unconsidered in this calculation (calculations for Denmark are prone to errors due to the lower number of Danes supporting higher pensions for higher earners).[77] The hypothesis was that age effects could be positive if it is known that earnings-related benefits are generally higher. Another interpretation is that the younger are less in favour of traditional pension schemes and want government merely to provide for basic needs.

Figure 7.85: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Age

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
[77]   As a rule of thumb Mayerl and Urban (2010: 26) state that both groups should be populated by at least ten percent of the sample. For Denmark, Turkey and Greece, in the country specific logistic regressions (appendix A3) additional regression with the dependent variable support for negative earnings-relatedness are shown, since these groups are larger.

As expected, gender´s effects are negative (0.91 without Denmark, Fig. 7.86). The exclusion of Turkey, the second country with instable results due to the low number of respondents supporting positive earnings-related pensions weakens the effects.

Figure 7.86: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Gender (female)

Although income has been incorporated in the model, education has impressive positive effects (1.21, Fig. 7.87). A real non-self-interest education effect could be that the higher educated know that higher earners pay higher contributions than lower earners.

Figure 7.87: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Education

The most plausible micro determinant is income. Effects (1.13) are positive, but not as strong as one might expect (Fig. 7.88, next page).

Figure 7.88: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Adjusted household income

The idea was that those who have been unemployed reject positive earnings-relatedness since they accumulated fewer entitlements. Indeed, effects are negative, albeit only weakly (0.95, Fig. 7.89). Without Turkey, effects are nearly absent (0.97).

Figure 7.89: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Past unemployment for at least three months

General political attitudes

As expected, those on the right side of the political spectrum support higher pensions for higher earners (1.09, Fig. 7.90, next page). Without Denmark and Turkey and their low number of supporters of positively earnings-related pensions, effects are weaker (1.06).

Figure 7.90: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Self-placement right

Values

It was hypothsised that people holding post-materialist higher order values like 'Openness to change' and 'Self-transcendence' reject positive earnings-relatedness, whereas those holding 'conservation' and 'Self-enhancement' higher order values support it.

Effects from 'openness to change' are absent in the mean (1.00, Fig. 7.91). 'Enhancement' effects are positive (1.04, Fig. 7.92, next page). 'Transcendence' effects are weakly positive (1.02, Fig. 7.93), but would be absent (1.00) without Turkey, a country with unstable results. Again, 'conservation' could not be included due to multicollinearity.

Figure 7.91: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Openness to change

Figure 7.92: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Self-enhancement

Figure 7.93: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Self-transcendence

General welfare state attitudes

Plausibly, those wanting government to reduce income differences should reject positive earnings-relatedness and its inherent Matthew principle. With very strong (0.81) effects this hypothesis can be supported (Fig. 7.94, next page).

Figure 7.94: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Preference for governmental reduction of income differences

Likewise, the idea that societies can only be fair if differences in incomes are small was expected to lead to rejection of positive higher pensions for higher earners. This is the case (0.84, Fig. 7.95).

Figure 7.95: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Attitude: Fairness requires material equality

Welfare state financing

For earnings-related taxation, two contrasting hypotheses had been formulated. On the one hand, support for higher taxes for higher earners could result from preferences for material equality. In this case, those supporting higher taxes for higher earners should reject positive earnings-relatedness. On the other hand, higher taxes for higher earners could be considered as belonging to higher benefits for higher earners, justifying these higher benefits. This is the

case (1.26, Fig. 7.96). This result shows that citizens have basic understandings of contributory schemes, since for them earnings-related benefits and earnings-related contributions belong together.

Figure 7.96: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Preference for progressive taxation

Views about dependent groups

The hypothesis was that those with positive feelings towards the old support positively earnings-related pensions, possibly because they know or suspect that generally such benefits are higher. The positive effect can be empirically supported (1.07, Fig. 7.97).

Figure 7.97: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Positive attitude towards the old

The result here could contradict the interpretation that positive effects from positive feelings towards the old result from respondents knowing or guessing that these benefits are generally

higher: Estimates of high standards of living of pensioners also foster pro-earnings-related attitudes (1.06, Fig. 7.98).

Figure 7.98: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Estimated standard of living of pensioners

General political attitudes: Ideology

Support for religious/Christian democratic parties and, to a lesser degree, support for secular conservative parties as proxies for their respective ideologies should foster support for higher pensions for higher earners. The other three ideologies should have negative effects, especially socialism/communism.

Indeed, socialist/communist effects are weakly negative (0.99), without the countries with the low number of cases Denmark and Turkey effects are stronger (0.98, Fig. 7.99, next page). Social democratic effects are also negative (0.99, without Denmark and Turkey the value is 0.98, Fig. 7.100, also next page). Liberalism has neutral effects (1.00), without Denmark effects would be positive (1.01, Fig. 7.101, next page). As expected, Christian democratic/religious ideology (1.02) has positive effects, yet without Turkey effects are weaker (1.01, Fig. 7.102, page after next). Adherence to secular conservative parties has neutral effects (1.00, also without Denmark and Turkey, Fig. 7.103, also page after next).

Generally, one can conclude that support for left parties has negative effects on preferences for higher pensions for higher earners, liberalism and secular conservatism have neutral effects in the mean, and Christian democracy has positive effects. In contrast to government responsibility, here ideology hypotheses could be supported, albeit weakly and with various differences between countries. Given the weak effects, results could be quite different with more, less or other countries.

Figure 7.99: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Support for socialist/communist parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.100: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Support for social democratic parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.101: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Support for liberal parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.102: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Support for Christian democratic/religious parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.103: Micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Support for conservative parties (proxy for ideology)

7.2.4.4 Earnings-relatedness: Unemployment benefits

In the case of unemployment benefits, Greece and Turkey are the countries with low numbers of respondents supporting positive earnings-relatedness.

Sociodemographics

As expected, age positively affects support for earnings-related unemployment benefits (1.05). Effects are stronger without Greece and Turkey (1.06, Fig. 7.104, next page).

Figure 7.104: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Age

Females were expected to show weaker support for earnings-related benefits. Indeed, total effects are negative (0.97, Fig. 7.105). This is similar to the case of pensions´ earnings-relatedness, again even controlled for household income and various views about equality. It is possible that women indeed bear their lower income within households in mind with low personal entitlements.

Figure 7.105: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Gender (female)

As with pensions, also in the case of unemployment benefits the higher educated are more in favour of positive earnings-relatedness. Effects are strong (1.14) and stronger (1.16) without Greece and Turkey (Fig. 7.106, next page).

Figure 7.106: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Education

Income positively affects preferences for positive earnings-relatedness (1.13, without Greece and Turkey 1.12, Fig. 7.107). Again, effects from income are weaker than from education.

Figure 7.107: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Adjusted household income

The idea was that news media affects attitudes in the direction of the status quo. Effects are neutral in the mean (1.00, Fig. 7.108, next page).

In conservative countries news media positively affects support for higher unemployment benefits for higher earners (1.06), less so in liberal (1.02) and in social democratic countries (1.01). In Southern countries (1.05 without Greece and Turkey, 1.01 with all five countries) effects are positive. In CEE effects are clearly negative (0.90). Since these effects are controlled for various factors, for Western Europe it can be stated that news media consumption fosters pro-earnings-related attitudes, in CEE the opposite applies. This cannot be explained with the educatory effect of news media (i.e. news media telling people

how the system is organised), since CEE cash benefits are also positively earnings-related. These effects are controlled for various attitudes concerning equality, so that these CEE effects could mirror genuine effects of political and public debates.

Figure 7.108: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: News media consumption

Values

In the case of values, hypotheses are similar to those for pensions: Postmaterialist higher order value types should foster rejection of higher benefits for higher earners; the opposite is expected for both other higher order value types.

Self-enhancement values lead to support for positive earnings relatedness (1.13 for all countries and 1.12 without Greece and Turkey, Fig. 7.109). Self-transcendence (1.01) has

Figure 7.109: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Self-enhancement

weak positive effects, vanishing (1.00) if Greece and Turkey are left out. Both other higher order value types were not included in the model due to multicollinearity or weak effects.

Figure 7.110: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Self-transcendence

Positively earnings-related benefits are crucial in male-breadwinner models, since income losses due to (men´s) unemployment cannot be compensated with a second (women´s) wage. Therefore, religious people were expected to support higher unemployment benefits for higher earners. This is the case (1.02 with and without Greece and Turkey). In Israel, religiosity has very strong effects on support for higher benefits for the previously higher earning unemployed. Without Israel, overall effects are very weak (Fig. 7.111), and countries spread above and below the line.

Figure 7.111: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Religiosity

Earnings-related unemployment benefits create inequality between the unemployed, so that support for government action to reduce income inequality should foster rejection of earnings-related benefits. This is the case (0.91 with and without Greece and Turkey, Fig. 7.112).

Figure 7.112: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Preference for governmental reduction of income differences

Likewise, preferences for small differences in standards of living should lead to low support for differences in unemployment benefits. Effects are strongly negative (0.82 or 0.85 without Greece and Turkey; Fig. 7.113).

Figure 7.113: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Attitude: Fairness requires material equality

Welfare state financing

As with pensions, preferences for positively earnings-related taxes go hand in hand with the same in benefits (1.22 for all countries, 1.16 without Southern countries, Fig. 7.114). Attidudinally, support for higher payments to those with higher prior incomes are mirrored with support for the same principle on the financing side.

Figure 7.114: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Preference for progressive taxation

Views about dependent groups

The belief that the unemployed are materially well off reduces preferences for positively earnings-related benefits (0.98 with and without Greece and Turkey, Fig. 7.115, next page). Possibly these benefits are considered overtly generous; indeed generally these benefits are higher.

Contrastingly, if citizens think the unemployed´s search efforts are insufficient and at the same time think (or know) that earnings-related benefits are generous, citizens assuming a high standard of living of the unemployed should reject earnings-related benefits.

The assumption that the unemployed are well-off increases support for earnings-related benefits (1.04, Fig. 7.116, next page). This counterintuitive effect completely vanishes (1.00) without Greece and Turkey.

Figure 7.115: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Estimated standard of living of the unemployed

Figure 7.116: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Ascription of individual responsibility for unemployment

Above we have seen that higher estimates of unemployment rates lead to stronger support for generous benefits. Given that earnings-related benefits are more generous, higher estimates of unemployment rates should lead to support for earnings-related benefits (and rejection of low flat-rate benefits). Yet high estimates of unemployment rates strongly (0.88) lead to rejection of higher benefits for higher earners (without Greece and Turkey: 0.89, Fig. 7.117, next page).

Figure 7.117: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Estimated unemployment rate

General political attitudes: Ideology

For unemployment benefits and their earnings-relatedness, hypotheses for political ideologies are similar as in the case of pensions.

As expected, Socialism/Communism (0.98) has negative effects (Fig. 7.118). Social democracy (1.05) has positive effects (Fig. 7.119, next page). Liberalism (1.01, there are no liberal party supporters in Greece and Turkey) has roughly neutral effects (Fig. 7.120, next page). Christian democracy (0.98) has negative effects (Fig. 7.121, also next page), countering the hypotheses. This is not caused by single outliers. Conservatism (1.05) has positive effects (Fig. 7.122, page after next, all without Greece and Turkey). This is also not caused by single outliers. Ideology hypotheses cannot be confirmed.

Figure 7.118: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Support for socialist/communist parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.119: Party support: Social democratic parties

Figure 7.120: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Support for liberal parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.121: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Support for Christian democratic/religious parties (proxy for ideology)

Figure 7.122: Micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Support for conservative parties (proxy for ideology)

7.2.5 Summary

For 31 societies regressions with the same variables have been conducted (the sole differences were the ideology variables). Welfare attitudes depend on what citizens think about the welfare state and its dependents, the economy and about material justice. Other variables are far less relevant. This supports Breznau´s (2010: 458) results for other welfare areas and five countries: "What an individual stands to gain or lose […] matters only slightly" (Breznau 2010: 478).

The strongest effects on support for government responsibility for the old were: The higher order value of Self-enhancement (-2.04), the idea that welfare benefits have negative effects (-2.16), support for government action to reduce income differences (2.85), the idea that only societies with small differences in standards of living can be considered fair (2.76) and satisfaction with the state of economy (-2.44). The most important factor are generally positive feelings towards people over 70 (4.85).

Evaluations of the standard of living of pensioners did not make it into the whole regression since effects were too weak. Yet the appendix to chapter 7.2 (A3) shows that across most countries higher estimates of pensioners´ standard of living (variable 71) have strong and significant negative effects on support for government responsibility for the old.

Likewise, support for government responsibility for the unemployed´s material well-being depends on what people think of the unemployed, beliefs of justice and considerations concerning benefits´ effects. The most important determinant are beliefs concerning welfare

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states´ negative effects (-3.70). Views about the unemployed are very important, such as beliefs about their standard of living (-3.30 or -3.45 respectively), their search efforts (-3.02) or estimated unemployment rate (2.07) as a proxy for deservingness or low costs. Support for income redistribution (2.68) and relatively equal standards of living (3.02) are further factors explaining these attitudes. Effects from estimates of the unemployment rate (Fig. 7.70) support on the micro level what has been stated about the macro level (Fig. 7.20).

Higher pensions for higher earners are supported by those preferring higher taxes for higher earners. Effects are strong (1.26). Therefore, support for higher taxes for higher earners is not part of support for redistribution, but the flipside of positive earnings-relatedness. Citizens know what kinds of benefits belong to what kind of contributions.

Further, education fosters support for earnings-related pensions (1.21), which is impressive given that this is controlled for income. Income´s own effects are weaker (1.13). As one might expect, those considering only societies with small differences in standards of living as just (0.81) and those wanting government to redistribute income (0.84) reject positively earnings-related pensions.

As with pensions, in the case of unemployment benefits support for higher benefits for higher earners is strongly positively correlated to support for higher taxes for this group (1.22 or 1.16 respectively). Again, education (1.14 or 1.16) is more important than income (1.12 or 1.13). The idea that small differences in standards of living are constitutive of a fair society (0.82 or 0.85) brings along rejection of higher benefits for unemployed with previously higher earnings. This also applies to support for governmental income redistribution (0.91). Self-enhancement values ('it is important to be rich, to be successful[…]') foster support for positively earnings-related benefits (1.13).

In some instances there are inter-regime differences in effect sizes. For example, uncontrolled age effects are stronger pro-pension in CEE countries, suggesting socialist socialisation effects. CEE citizens´ estimation of the unemployment rate is far more important for support of unemployment benefits, suggesting the criterion 'control' is very important there.

In some other cases effects are more in the expected direction in Western Europe, but generally different clashes of interest in different regimes, to be found in different strong effect sizes, cannot be established, especially not between the 'old' welfare regimes.

Macro-micro-macro links

For both policy fields it has been stated that estimated high standards of living of dependents negatively affect support for governmental responsibility. Yet only estimates of the unemployed´s standard of living are markedly related to benefit generosity. Estimates of both groups´ standard of living are strongly positively affect by national wealth. As with satisfaction with household income, standards of living are evaluated in absolute terms.

Unfavourable projected dependency ratios lead to negative evaluations of future affordability, which in turn reduces support for government responsibility for the old. Here, citizens react to objective problems. Though high estimates of the pensioners´ standard of living reduce support for government responsibility, these estimates are virtually unrelated to pension levels. This may partially explain why high pensions do not lead to low support for government responsibility for the old (Fig. 7.3).

A higher share of long-term unemployed among the unemployed fosters the belief that search efforts are insufficient, which in turn reduces support for government responsibility and gives a clue about the micro-mechanism of the negative macro effect of the share of long-term unemployed on support for support for government responsibility. Since the relative share of the long-term unemployed is logically the exact opposite of the relative share of the short-term unemployed, the negative effect on search efforts implies a positive effect of the share of short-term unemployed on evaluations of the unemployed´s search efforts.

Though counterintuitively also a higher unemployment rate is positively correlated to the belief that search efforts are insufficient, the direct macro link between unemployment rate and support for government responsibility is positive, es expected. Besides above result for the share of the long-term unemployed, Fig. 7.14 shows that among various measures of benefit levels, the benefit level of the long-term unemployed has the strongest negative effect on support for government responsibility, albeit the negative effect across various wage levels, family constallations and previous wage levels are also impressive. Short-term generosity alone has virtually no effect on attitudes.

Concluding for unemployment benefits, the combination of national wealth (reducing absolute poverty), a high share of long-term unemployed among the unemployed and generous benefits for this group reduces support for government responsibility.

Summarising result for both policy fields, one can cautiously conclude:

Programmes for the majority (pensions) can be generous without self-destructing effects. Generosity does not lead to the impression that this group is well-off, merely GDP per capita does so, providing a microfoundation for welfare states´ declining relevance with rising wealth.

Programmes for a smaller part of the population (short-term unemployed) are only weakly related to support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Short-term unemployment benefits may be generous (possibly because most people can be short-term unemployed at some time). Further, a higher share of short-term unemployed among the unemployed fosters the belief that search efforts are sufficient. One could say: In this case the unemployed are 'normal' people with 'normal' search habits.

Generous programmes for the long-term unemployed are rejected. Further, a higher share of long-term unemployed leads to the impression that search efforts are insufficient. The welfare state´s first and foremost goal is to reduce poverty. Amongst various factors, generous benefits for the long-term unemployed have negative effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed, yet amongst various factors exactly these benefits are poverty-alleviating (see Fig. 3.4), alongside with declining support when the number of dependents (share of the long-term unemployed) rises. Another effect stems from GDP, so that in wealthier countries support is lower, which is plausible given that those relatively poor in these countries are absolutely poor more seldom than those in poorer countries.

8 Welfare attitudes in Europe

Figure 8.1: Causal model

Numbers: Chapters.

8.1 State of research

Several authors have tried to examine if there is a fit between the welfare regime a country belongs to and its citizens´ attitudes. Additionally, as stated in the previous chapter, there are inter-country differences in the ascription of government responsibility for various dependent groups. Here, the current state of empirical research will be depicted to integrate the following analyses. This can only be done in respect to the responsibility items, since the items concerning earnings-relatedness were not included in surveys preceding ESS4.

Using Eurobarometer data from 1992, Gelissen (2000: 292ff.; 2002: 81) compared citizen attitudes in 11 European nations concerning preferred general extensiveness. The regime patterns which could be discovered contradicted theoretical assumptions. In contrast to the reference category "Liberal Regime", every other regime had negative values. The strongest negative effect had, surprisingly, the social democratic regime. Further, based on data from ISSP 1996, Gelissen (2002: 113) analysed support for governmental responsibility for various welfare tasks in 14 countries, eight of them European. As expected, overseas Anglo-Saxon citizens rather reject governmental responsibility and Southern citizens support it. In between there is no pattern. Citizens of the European liberal countries display high (Ireland) and medium (UK) support, social democratic citizens too (high: Norway, medium: Sweden). There is no proximity between corporatist and southern countries, since western Germans display the lowest support in Europe, the French´s support is rather high and, as stated,

Spaniards and Italians strongly support governmental responsibility. Additionally, using European Values Survey data from 1999, in 13 countries Gelissen (2002: 113) analysed support for the view that in order for a society to be considered just, people should be recognised on their merits ('equity'). The expectation was that citizens of liberal welfare states show the strongest support for this view. This could be confirmed. Further, the social democratic countries Denmark and Sweden are at the bottom end of the table.

As Gelissen (2002: 115) notes, some countries are very often at the top of the list. This is surprising, since the attitudes may be considered mutually exclusive. With reference to Jasso and Wegener, Gelissen notes that possibly in some countries like Portugal citizens express themselves stronger, while in others like Denmark they prefer understatement.

Gelissen (2002: 113) analysed citizens´ attitudes concerning government responsibility for various groups (solidarity). Further, he analysed their preferences for the consideration of three principles in welfare policies. As Peillon (1996: 180) notes,

> "the need/desert/right basis of welfare is closely implicated in Esping-Andersen´s classification […] the liberal welfare regime relies on needs […] the conservative/corporatist regime […] principle of insurance (merit) […] the social-democratic regime […] rights, which generate universal social services".

If actual policies matter for citizens´ attitudes or vice versa, one could expect citizens of various regimes to prefer their respective principles.

Concerning solidarity, Gelissen (2002: 112) sees the top group as consisting of ostensibly immature welfare states delivering less than their citizens would prefer. The second group is composed of countries in which the state plays or has played[78] an important part in the provision of welfare. In the third group, primarily its bottom, the liberal and radical Anglo-Saxon welfare states are to be found.

Southern Europeans display the highest support for equality, while the middle group consists mainly of conservative countries. Surprisingly, social-democratic countries´ citizens are the weakest supporters of equality. Gelissen (2002: 114) states that

> "citizens of immature welfare states want more equality, whereas those in more mature welfare states are in favour of levelling but are, at the same time, more willing to accept income inequality".

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[78]   Given that data are from 1999 and that effects of institutions on attitudes may be time-lagged (Gelissen 2002: 100) and that the UK´s liberal transformation began rather in the mid-to-end 1980s than earlier, under the assumption that time lags may be rather long, this may be plausible. Another interpretation would be that the UK´s welfare policies deviated from its citizens´ attitudes.

Though income inequality is higher in immature (southern) welfare states (Table A2.4), Gelissen´s interpretation of *more* equality presupposes that this question belongs to the 'degree'- dimension of welfare policies. In this case, respondents evaluate changes from the status quo. Under this assumption, against the backdrop of higher equality in social democratic welfare states than in Southern ones, effects of the regime on attitudes could be proven. Though, this assumption inverts the idea that regime characteristics and citizen attitudes converge. To the contrary, following this, citizens may be expected to place high value on things which are neglected in their country. This is solely plausible in the case of questions concerning the degree- dimension with citizens wanting more or less than actual policies offer. The range dimension, though, refers to government responsibility, in which citizen attitudes might be expected to correlate with actual policies.

Table 8.1: Preferred level of solidarity, equality, need, and equity

Solidarity	Equality	Need	Equity
ES	PT	GR	PT
IE	GR	PT	IE
IT	ES	IE	UK
NO	FR	FR	GR
FR	IE	BE	FR
UK	BE	UK	BE
SE	IT	ES	AT
PH	AT	IT	ES
Dw	Dw	SE / NL	NL
NZ	UK	Dw /AT	Dw
JP/ CD	SE	DK	SE
AU	NL		IT
US	DK		DK

Based on Gelissen 2002: 113. Colours according to my classification. Yellow: Liberal. Black: Conservative. Red: Social democratic. Blue: Southern. Grey: Uncategorised. Bold: Countries analysed here.
Solidarity: ISSP 1996: Govt. Responsibility for sick, old, unemployed, provide job for everyone who wants one, reduce income differences between rich and poor, financial help for college students from low-income families, provide housing for those who can´t afford it.
Equality (Social Democratic) EVS 1999 Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens
Need EVS 1999 (guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, clothing, education, health "little variation)
Equity Recognizing people on their merits Expected: liberal rank higher than conservative EVS 1999

More important is the 'need' dimension, since two of the seven items refer to the old and the unemployed and belong to the 'range' dimension ("it is government´s responsibility to […]"). Here, one might expect the social democratic countries to be at the top of the list, the liberal ones at the bottom and the conservative and Southern ones somewhere in between. No matter if one takes Gelissen´s (2002: 107) classification of countries or the one used here, the only

pattern that emerges are two Southern countries at the top and two social democratic countries rather at the bottom.

Lastly, Gelissen (2002: 114f.) expected citizens of liberal countries to display the strongest support for the equity principle. Since Ireland and the UK rank high and only the Portuguese who strongly support every principle rank higher, this can be confirmed. Also the higher ranking of conservative countries than social democratic ones is plausible.

Combining the countries into regimes and estimating their effects in a hierarchical linear model, Gelissen (2002: 116ff.) came to these results:

Table 8.2: Regime effects on support of solidarity, equality, need, and equity

	Solidarity	Equality	Need	Equity
Liberal (ref.)				
Conservative				-
Social democratic	+	-	-	-
Southern	+	+		-
Explained variance	24%	49%	7%	8%

Based on Gelissen (2002: 119). Only level-2 and significant results shown.

Citizens of social democratic and southern welfare states support the principle of solidarity stronger than those of other welfare states. Surprisingly, in social democratic countries the principle of equality gets rejected, whereas southern Europeans support it. In the case of the 'need' principle, which is most interesting, since two of the indexed items refer to the old and the unemployed and are similar to the items used in our analysis, another surprising finding occurs: Citizens of social democratic countries reject government responsibility for various needy groups stronger than citizens of any other regime. According to Gelissen (2002: 118), this might be caused by the high tax burden. Lastly, citizens of liberal welfare states support the principle of equity stronger than those of the three other regimes. As Gelissen (2002: 118) notes, this is unsurprising, since equity is compatible to weak solidarity.

Based on ISSP 1996 data, Gerhardts (2005: 188) compared Europeans´ attitudes towards governmental responsibility for the old and the unemployed. In both cases, no country patterns can be detected. Also using ISSP data from 1996, Heien (2002: 131) combines support for governmental responsibility for the old and the sick, since they correlated highly. Country patterns can be found: Support is highest in social democratic Norway, followed by three former socialist countries. Yet, support is higher in the liberal UK than in Italy and Germany. In the case of the unemployed, a similar pattern emerges: Again support is highest

in Norway and two former socialist countries. Again, in the UK support is higher than might be expected. Table 8.3 (this page and next) summarises previous findings.

Table 8.3: State of research: Country patterns

Source	Data	Countries	Variables	Results for ESS4 countries
Bean/Papadakis 1998	ISSP 1990, 1996	6 western, 4 European, 3 ESS4 countries	Government's responsibility for old/ unemployed	NO (highest), UK, Dw "[…] the argument about the variation in mass support for services in different types of welfare regime is weak […] even in liberal regimes there is not an overwhelming body of opinion against supporting the poor and disadvantaged" (1998: 229).
Marshall et al. 1999	ISJP 1991	13, 11 European, 11 in ESS4		The Principle of desert, i.e. that people should be rewarded according to their efforts is supported in old market economies as well as in former socialist countries.
Gelissen 2000; 2002	Euro barome ter 1992	11 western European	General Extensiveness	Highest support in liberal countries followed by corporatist, southern, social democratic countries.
Gelissen 2002	ISSP 1996	14, 8 European, 7 ESS4	Solidarity: Govt. Responsibility for numerous tasks, amongst them support for the old and the unemployed	ES (highest), IE, NO, FR, UK, SE, Dw (lowest) Equity (Conservative): Recognising people of their merits: PT (highest), IE, UK, GR, FR, BE, ES, NL, Dw, SE, DK (lowest)
Heien 2002	ISSP 1996	8, 7 of them European, 6 in ESS4	Government should be responsible for the old and sick	NO (highest), BG, De, HU/UK, Dw (lowest)
			Government should be responsible for the unemployed	NO (highest), De, BG, Dw, UK, HU (lowest)

Table 8.3: State of research: Country patterns (continued)

Gerhardts 2005	European Values Study 1999/2000	14 European, 13 of them are also in ESS4	Government should be responsible for the old	LV (highest), IE, ES, PL, De, HU, UK, BG, SE, CZ, Dw, FR (lowest).
			Government should be responsible for the unemployed	ES (highest), De, IE, SE, BG, Slovenia, LV, PL, FR, Dw, UK, HU, CZ (lowest)
Baslevent/Kirmanoglu 2011: 347	ESS4	18	Government responsibility for the old, the unemployed	Same data used as in the analyses here
van Oorschot/Meuleman 2012	ESS4	22		
Brooks 2012				

8.2 Results

In contrast to pension payments, which most people may expect to receive one day, many people do not expect ever to receive unemployment benefits[79] (Pettersen 1995: 222). Additionally, the public possibly perceives the unemployed to be less deserving than the old. Further, there are less unemployed than pensioners in Europe. Therefore, support for unemployment benefits should be lower than for pension benefits.

8.2.1 Support for government responsibility for the old

Fig. 8.2 (next page) shows country mean support for government responsibility "to provide a reasonable standard of living for the old". Support is high (mean 8.5, median 8.6, each country equally weighted).

Support is comparatively weak in Switzerland (7.2), Germany (7.4) and other conservative/uncategorised welfare states (the Netherlands 7.7, Belgium 7.9, France 7.9).

In social democratic countries support is higher. These countries are not far apart (Denmark 8.3, Finland 8.4, Sweden 8.5, Norway 8.7). This also applies to the liberal countries Ireland (8.5) and the UK (8.5; if two countries have the same value, the first-mentioned country has the lower second decimal place).

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[79]   In an analysis covering the years 1975 - 2004 of the German birth cohorts 1950 – 1954, Schmillen and Möller (2012: 33ff.) find that 60 percent of the sample experienced not a single day of unemployment between ages 25 and 50, while almost half of the total amount of unemployment affect five percent of the population.

Figure 8.2: Country mean support for government responsibility for the old

At about the same level as liberal and social democratic countries (between 8 and 9) are the Visegrád and former Yugoslavian countries. Weakest support for government responsibility for the old are to be found in the Czech Republic (8.2), Slovakia (8.3) and Slovenia (8.3). Support is higher in Poland (8.7), Croatia (8.7) and Hungary (8.8).

Southern countries Portugal (8.8), Spain (8.9), Greece (8.9) Cyprus (9.1) and uncategorised Israel (9.1) have roughly the same high values, Turkey (8.1) is an outlier.

Post-soviet countries were subdivided into Baltics on the one side and Ukraine and Russia on the other. Attitudinally, with the exception of Estonia (8.7) they are similar: Russians (9.2), Lithuanians (9.2), Ukrainians (9.3) and Latvians (9.3) are very strong supporters of government responsibility for the old. The value of Bulgaria (9.2) is also high, whereas support in Romania is weakest (8.0) of all CEE countries.

There is some relation to the 'Worlds of Welfare', albeit in various respects not as expected. Interpretation of results depends on if one understands the dependent variable as question concerning the 'range' or 'degree' dimension. Part of the explanation of this pattern

is to be found in chapter 7. Here, it will be tried to interpret results against the backdrop of chapter 4.3, where circumstances and developments in the 30 countries have been depicted.

Figure 8.3: Region mean support for government responsibility for the old

<div align="right">Cartography: Dipl.-Geogr. Bernhard Jakob</div>

Conservative welfare states, Switzerland and the Netherlands

Support is comparatively weak in Switzerland (7.2) and Germany (7.4) and higher in other conservative/uncategorised welfare states (the Netherlands 7.7, Belgium 7.9, France 7.9).

Chapter 4.3.6 shows that various authors have described the Netherlands as conservative and Switzerland as rather liberal. In both countries government is directly responsible only for low levels of payments to pensioners, so a short and oversimplified interpretation is that in both government responsibility is low and citizens prefer it that way.

Chapter 4.3.1 shows that German as well as French government budgets are heavily strained due to side-payments, since contributions do not cover outlays. France´s pension scheme was reformed to merely small degrees, so that contributions had to rise (Schludi 2005: 194ff.), whereas in Germany major reforms were more liberal (Stoy 2013, forthcoming).

Problems at the national level are a possible explanation for the French result, but Fig. 8.3 shows that intra-German differences are large: As with unemployment benefits, the German mean value is boosted by some eastern German regions (9.0 in sparsely populated Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; in contrast 6.9 in Hesse, the lowest regional mean in Europe). While this is plausible in the latter case since these regions are stronger dependent on unemployment benefits due to higher unemployment, in the case of pensions there is no self-interest explanation.

The Belgian pension scheme resembles the schemes of neighbouring France and Germany, the Belgians´ attitudes, too. Though support in Brussels (7.3) is very low, the low number of Belgians living there limits effects on the country´s mean.

Social democratic welfare states

Support for government responsibility for the old is weakest in Denmark (8.3), slightly stronger in Finland (8.4) and Sweden (8.5) and highest in Norway (8.7).

Denmark is the country with strongest movements towards individual responsibility; Bismarckian elements were introduced, basic pensions will be less important in the future and the earnings-related part is market-provided (chapter 4.3.2). As one might expect under the 'range'- interpretation, the Danish pension scheme is less based on government responsibility and the Danes are the weakest supporters of government responsibility in the North. Likewise, government responsibility is rather high in Norway and did not decline in the 1990s; minimum pensions have been increased, oil revenues could be used for the shift from a pay-as-you-go to a funded scheme, and Norwegians are the strongest supporters of government responsibility for the old among social democratic countries. In both countries one might depict as in-between based on chapter 4.3.2, attitudes are so, too. Sweden implemented cuts in the late 1990s, in Finland the national pension became less important and the employment pension more. Further, Finland is the most 'Bismarckian' amongst social democratic countries (Abrahamson 2003: 13). It cannot be tested due to lacking same item-scaled older data, but possibly Norwegians´ attitudes are on 'normal' northern levels and support for government responsibility is lower in the three other countries according to their pace of declining government responsibility, or vice versa.

Liberal welfare states

Understood as 'range' item concerning basic responsibility independent of the status quo, one should expect citizens of liberal countries to have the lowest values. This is not the case, they are merely slightly below the mean and the median (both countries at rounded 8.5 with the UK being slightly above and Ireland slightly below). This pattern could merely be explained via the 'degree' interpretation. In both countries government responsibility is low, in Ireland this has always been the case, in the UK government responsibility declined since the 1980s.

The idea that citizens of liberal welfare states want their governments to bear higher responsibility is hard to establish considering that primarily UK citizens support low government responsibility for the unemployed. Fig. 8.10 shows that there is s strong positive macro correlation between support for government responsibility for the old and for the unemployed, but lying far below the regression line the UK´s citizens strongly undersupport government responsibility for the unemployed. This applies far less to Ireland.

Southern welfare states and Israel

Support levels in Portugal (8.8), Spain (8.9) and Greece (8.9) Cyprus (9.1) and uncategorised Israel (9.1) are nor far apart. Turkey (8.1) deviates from this pattern.

Southern Europeans strongly support government responsibility for the old, but figure 8.10 shows that their attitudes are not biased towards pensions. Rather, given their level of support for unemployment benefits, they undersupport government responsibility for the old. Possibly the description of these countries as "welfare laggards" (Katrougalos 1996: 41) is appropriate, if these high country mean values depict support for higher spending, especially in the case of unemployment benefits, where southern countries undersupport their citizens.

Schemes are similar, with the Greek one being the most generous (high spending can only partially be explained with demographics, cf. Papatheodorou 2007: 293, replacement rates are high yet still insufficient for parts of the population due to coverage gaps, Hering 2006: 8ff.). The Spanish scheme also offers very high replacement rates (Marco 2001: 5), whereas the Portuguese scheme is slightly less generous partially due to lower ceilings (Albuquerque et al. 2009: 4ff.) and partially since many pensioners have not enough contribution years (Pereirinha et al. 2007: 498). For these three countries, the idea that support is weaker in less generous schemes can be supported weakly, which is compatible with low support in Turkey against the backdrop of lower pension benefits (Grütjen 2007: 48).

CEE welfare states: Visegrád and former Yugoslavian countries

Support for government responsibility for the old is lower than in other CEE countries. Internally this group can be subdivided between formerly Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic 8.2, Slovakia 8.3) and Slovenia (8.3) on one side and Poland (8.7), Croatia (8.7) and Hungary (8.8) on the other. Support is partially lower than in social democratic and liberal countries and markedly lower than in Southern Europe. Hungary´s scheme has on the one side been described as partially liberal, on the other as being the most generous besides Slovenia´s schemes. Poland´s scheme is strongly World Bank-affected with inadequate future benefit levels. Croatian replacement rates have been described as very low. In all three countries, support for government responsibility is rather high. In Slovenia, the most generous and social democratic country here, support is weak. This also applies to the Czech Republic, though this scheme has been described as not World Bank-affected. In Slovakia support for government responsibility for the old is nearly as low as in the Czech Republic, which is in line with these countries recent and future developments, i.e. a weakening of government responsibility (Kilianová et al. 2006: 4, Svoreňová 2006: 102).

CEE welfare states: Post- Soviet I: The Baltics

As cited in chapter 4.3.5, the Baltic countries offer weak support for the elderly (Bohle/Greskovits 2009: 53), yet support for government responsibility is very high in Latvia (9.3) and Lithuania (9.2), and high in Estonia (8.7).

The Estonian scheme has been described as liberal or Bismarckian (with more widespread private pensions), Latvia's scheme as closer to the Swedish model, and Lithuania´s scheme as the most Bismarckian. In this sense, one could conclude that citizens´ support for government reflects actual circumstances. Differences between Baltic countries can not be explained with strong Russian minorities, since the two countries with these minorities (Estonia and Latvia) are not the countries with highest support (Latvia and Lithuania, where support is on Ukrainian/Russian levels).

CEE welfare states: South-eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Romania

Both countries embraced reform after transition half-heartedly. In the late 1990s they switched their schemes according to the World Bank –three pillar suggestion. Benefits are

low, and given that these countries´ GDPs per capita are low (especially Bulgaria´s, see Fig. 7.56) these low benefits lead to absolute poverty amongst the old. The strong attitudinal difference between these countries, with Romanians being the weakest supporters of government responsibility for the old (8.0) among CEE countries and Bulgarians (9.2) at levels of post-Soviet countries, cannot be explained with findings in chapter 4.3.5.

CEE welfare states: Post- Soviet II: Ukraine and Russia

Both countries have very low replacement rates and, given that these rates imply even lower benefits against the backdrop of Russia´s and especially Ukraine´s low GDP per capita (Fig. 7.56), the old are mostly poor in absolute terms.

Russia´s and Ukraine´s weak social protection is accompanied by very high support for government responsibility for the old (Russia 9.2, Ukraine 9.3). This can be interpreted in two ways: Either Russians´ support for generosity is on medium levels and they want more than the status quo offers (the 'degree' interpretation). Or the items tap the 'range' dimension considerably. In this case, low social protection and high support for social protection in Russia may coexist since Russia belongs to the 'informalized' model, as stated by Drahokoupil and Myant (2010: 278):

> "The state does not provide the social protection that the population implicitly demands. It may have legal obligations to do so, but fails to honour them. Informal solutions are then found by enterprises and individuals, who make informal payments for what may formally be publicly provided services".

Given that Russians´ support for government responsibility for the unemployed is not as high as for pensions in relative terms (in comparison with other countries), this seems to apply more to pensions.

Regional differences are strong in Ukraine, values are between 7.7 and 9.7.

8.2.2 Support for government responsibility for the unemployed

As Fig. 8.10 (at the end of ch. 8.2.4) gives reasons to suspect, the pattern looks partially similar as in the case of pensions. Fig. 8.4 (next page) shows that there is a large central European area of low support for government responsibility for the unemployed (albeit, in all countries mean values are above 5, so that government responsibility gets supported rather than rejected).

The lowest values are to be found in Slovakia (5.9), the UK (6.0), the conservative or uncategorised welfare states Belgium (6.1), France (6.2), Switzerland (6.3), the Netherlands (6.3) and Germany (6.3) and CEE countries Czech Republic (6.2) and Poland (6.4).

Figure 8.4: Country mean support for government responsibility for the unemployed

Cartography: Dipl.-Geogr. Bernhard Jakob

Support is higher in Denmark (6.6), Slovenia (6.8) Ireland (6.8) and Hungary (6.9). Far above Denmark are the other social democratic countries Norway (7.3), Sweden (7.4) and Finland (7.5). At roughly the same level is a heterogeneous group of Russia (7.1), Bulgaria (7.3), Estonia (7.3), and Portugal (7.3). In other southern countries support for government responsibility is higher than in Portugal: Cyprus (7.6), Turkey (7.7) and Spain (7.8). Similar values are to be found in the, again heterogeneous, group of Croatia (7.7), Israel (7.6) and Romania (7.7). Values of more than 8 are to be found in post-Soviet countries Ukraine (8.1) Lithuania (8.3), Latvia (8.5) and the southern country Greece (8.5).

Conservative welfare states, Switzerland and the Netherlands

Again, support for government responsibility is low in these countries. Figure 8.10 shows that these countries´ citizens relatively weakly support government responsibility for both the old and the unemployed. Scattered around the regression line, these countries vividly show that also on the macro level welfare attitudes result from underlying factors like 'culture', if this would not be the case and area-specific circumstances were too influential, attitudes between both policy fields would be correlated more weakly.

Chapter 4.3.1 shows that systems in Belgium, France and Germany are roughly similar, and so are attitudes. France´s schemes underwent some minor cuts, Germany´s too.

Figure 8.5: Region mean support for government responsibility for the unemployed

Cartography: Dipl.-Geogr. Bernhard Jakob

The Swiss unemployment scheme is a conservative-liberal mix, the Dutch one (chapter 4.3.6) changed partially from conservative to liberal elements (Clasen/van Oorschot 2000: 100).

In order to understand differences between these countries, Fig. 8.5 showing regional mean values has be taken into account: Nearly all regions in the five countries have similar mean values. Yet the German mean is boosted by high mean values in some eastern German

regions, primarily Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (8.0) and Brandenburg (7.4), where unemployment is high. Effects were stronger if these regions were not as sparsely populated as they are. To a far lesser degree this also applies to the Swiss region of Zurich (6.5). While the mean value of Flanders (6.2) is at a Dutch level, the mean value for Belgium is depressed by the low value in Wallonia (5.8), which is strongly counterintuitive given that unemployment is higher there.

Social democratic welfare states

Danes (6.6) weakly support government responsibility for the unemployed. Values in Norway (7.3), Sweden (7.4) and Finland (7.5) are markedly higher. Fig. 8.5 shows that in regional terms social democratic countries are internally homogeneous.

Albeit ostensibly the most liberal northern country, Denmark´s unemployment scheme has often been depicted as rather generous (Hammer 1999: 125; Aaberge et al. 2000: 85, Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 200), yet with some cuts in the 1990s (Stephens 1996: 54, Goul Andersen 2002: 143, 159). Further, the 'flexicurity' model of weak employment protection (Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 42) leads to many Danes facing short-term unemployment (Goul Andersen 2002: 146ff.). One should suspect that Danes demand generous protection for their often experienced short unemployment periods and to know many others with similar experiences so that support for government responsibility is high. This is not the case, at least not when compared to other social democratic countries. Rather, amongst Northerners only Danes undersupport government responsibility for the unemployed when compared to pensions (Fig. 8.10), so that this not merely reflects Danes´ general more liberal attitudes.

Norway´s replacement rate has been described as the second least generous in the North (Aaberge et al. 2000: 85), Sweden´s as highly generous (Furåker 2002: 136, Schmid 1995: 69), the latter with cuts in the 1990s (Jochem 2004: 248; Lindbom 2001: 178), yet rising coverage (Lindbom 2001: 182). The Finnish scheme is the least generous, reinforcing Finland´s unnordishness (Kvist 1999: 243). The small differences in country mean support for government responsibility cannot be explained with these differences in actual policies.

Liberal welfare states

The Irish unemployment scheme is ungenerous (Aust/Leitner 2004: 315, Gallie/Paugam 2002a: 10), whereas the mean value of 6.8 is high when compared to central Europe.

As stated above, the UK´s (6.0) citizens weakly support government responsibility for the unemployed, Ireland´s mean value (6.8) is higher. Figure 8.10 shows that low support in the UK does not reflect general liberal anti-welfare attitudes; rejection of generosity is restricted to unemployment. The UK´s benefits were cut in recent decades and are low (Clasen/Clegg 2006b: 203, see also Schmid 1995: 63, 69, Beissinger/Büsse 2001: 79, Boeri et al. 2000: 17). In this sense, the UK´s mean value ideal-typically reflects policies. Based on Gelissen´s (2000, 2002) result with data from 1992, where support for general extensiveness was highest in liberal countries, it one might suspect that the UK´s policies changed and its citizens´ attitudes followed suit. Figure 8.5 shows that other factors are also crucial: Northern Irish support is at high 6.9. this cannot be explained with unemployment rates; in autumn 2008 Northern Irish unemployment has been below the national mean (as in the years before and after).

Southern welfare states and Israel

Leaving aside Greece (8.5), these countries are at roughly the same level: Portugal (7.3) has the lowest value, support is higher in Israel (7.6), Cyprus (7.6), Turkey (7.7) and Spain (7.8).

It is difficult to explain this pattern. The comparatively low Portuguese value partially results from the populous 'Norte' region (6.7), whereas this in turn cannot be explained via unemployment rates (the unemployment rate in this rather poor region has been at normal Portugues levels, cf. Eurostat 2008). Also the unemployment scheme (chapter 4.3.4) cannot contribute to the explanantion. Spain´s high support could partially be explained with its high unemployment rate (cf. Eurostat 2008), but the regional pattern not. Unemployment and support for government benefits had been higher in the south, but high support especially in the Basque country (8.6) against the backdrop of low unemployment contradicts this. The sole explanation for the high Spanish value found in actual policies is the low coverage (Gil-Escoin/Vázquez 2007: 178ff.).

Israel (Wilensky 2003: 368) and Cyprus (Ioannuou et al. 2007: 89) were both described as countries where welfare issues were overshadowed by foreign policy issues, whereas only in Israel military spending is high. Both countries come from a British Beveridgean tradition.

Chapter 4.3.6 shows that Israel´s unemployment scheme moved in the liberal direction (Doron 2000: 101) with rising relative poverty (Room 2000: 94), yet Rosenhek (2003: 99) states that replacement rates did not decline between 1980 and 1999. Still, support for

government responsibility is comparatively high in Israel, whereas internal differences are remarkable (Jerusalem 7.0, Tel Aviv 8.2).

The Beveridgean Cypriot scheme has been supplemented with other elements, yet in 2007 Ioannou et al. (106) still could state that Cypriot welfare state lags behind. The comparatively high support has been stated against the backdrop of a very low unemployment rate in 2008 (Eurostat).

The Greek scheme as been depicted as ungenerous, with low replacement rates (Papadopoulos 2006: 229f.), low coverage and short entitlements (Papatheodorou 2007: 294). A possible interpretation is that the scheme is insufficient and the Greek demand more to cover for the unemployed´s basic needs, albeit this 'degree' interpretation can always serve as proxy interpretation when attitudes do not fit actual policies.

High support for unemployment benefits shows that low female employment and fallow potential does not lead to low demands due possibilities to compensate as stated in ch. 4.6.1.2. High demands could just result from non-existing second incomes (which would partially explain low support in Portugal with high female employment rates).

CEE welfare states: Visegrád and former Yugoslavian countries

The lowest support amongst all European countries can be found in Slovakia (5.9). Support for government responsibility is also low in the other ex-Czechoslovakian country (6.2), a little bit higher in Poland (6.4) and markedly higher in Slovenia (6.8), Hungary (6.9) and very high for this region in Croatia (7.7). In all these countries with the exception of Croatia, support for government responsibility for the unemployed is lower than values for the old might suggest (figure 8.10).

Drahokoupil and Myant (2010: 276ff.) state that Slovakia underwent "dramatic welfare retrenchment", making the Slovakian welfare state belonging to the 'minimal' model. Although the authors state that opposition was strong, Slovakians´ attitudes towards unemployment benefits are liberal, reflecting recent benefit cuts depicted by Bednárik and Škorpík (2007: 9f.). The Slovakian result supports the interpretation of the responsibility items as 'range' items. Following the 'degree' interpretation, Slovakian retrenchment, accompanied by opposition (Drahokoupil/Myant 2010: 279) should result in support for higher protection. The 'range' interpretation allows for low support for government responsibility. In this case, Slovakia offers low generosity and its citizens support low generosity, leaving aside the question what caused what.

Due to reforms in the 1990s, Czech benefits are low and drop or end fast (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 142ff., see also Saxonberg/Sirovátka 2009: 191ff., whereas Brown 2007: 1482 sees social democratic leanings). Also here attitudes and policies fit.

Polish benefits were cut in 1994, and many long-term unemployed are not covered. Yet initial benefit levels of 70 per cent of previous earnings (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 76ff) are comparatively high. Cautiously defining the Polish scheme as more generous than those of ex-Czechoslovakian countries, higher support for government responsibility would support the idea that attitudes reflect policies.

The Slovenian welfare state has been described as the most 'European' in the region (Tomka 2006: 15). Ignjatović et al. (2002: 203ff.) state that the scheme has been liberalised, but with replacement rates of 70 per cent in the first three months of unemployment and 60 percent afterwards, with insurance-payments paid out for up to two years depending on previous employment duration, the Slovenian scheme seems to be the most generous amongst these countries. Here again, Slovenians´ higher (6.8) preferences for government responsibility for the unemployed fits the pattern.

Also Croatia´s policies are shown in chapter 4.3.5. One the one hand there is Behar´s (2009: 80) statement that Croatia is the only country offering full replacement, on the other hand only a small minority of the unemployed receive insurance benefits, whereas the other are dependent on social assistance (Stubbs/Zrinščak 2009: 17f.). In Croatia support for government responsibility is higher than support for pensions suggests, possibly resulting from the country´s high unemployment in 2008 (Eurostat).

CEE welfare states: Post- Soviet I: The Baltics

The pattern is similar as in the case of pensions: Support for government responsibility is lowest in Estonia (7.3), and higher in Lithuania (8.3) and Latvia (8.5).

Baltic unemployment benefits are low and short (Aidukaite 2006: 263, Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 198), whereas Lithuania´s scheme seems to be the strictest due to harder eligibility criteria, and lower and faster expiring benefits. Generally, a low share of the unemployed receive benefits (Aidukaite 2006: 267f.).

Estonia offers the lowest replacement rate in the EU (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 200). Lithuania´s scheme has been described as the most liberal in the Baltics (Aidukaite 2006: 267f.). The Latvia scheme is slightly dependent on contribution years, benefits are low and drop fast and therefore possibly insufficient (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 169f.)

Against this backdrop, the high values for Lithuania and Latvia can either be interpreted as demands for higher generosity because benefits are insufficient, or a high basic preference for government protection in these post-Soviet countries. Yet Estonia´s mean value (7.3) is lower than neighbouring Finland´s (7.4), and would be even lower without its north-eastern region (8.6). In this (albeit sparsely populated) region, the share of Russians is high.

CEE welfare states: South-eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Romania

In contrast to pensions, Romanians (7.7) are more supportive of government responsibility than Bulgarians (7.3). Figure 8.10 shows that Romanians oversupport unemployment benefits, where for Bulgarians this applies to pensions (or undersupport the other programme).

Due to reforms after 2000, Romanian unemployment benefits are low (at about 26 per cent of the average wage in 2008, cf. Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 206ff.). In Bulgaria, benefits have been cut in the 1990s, but were still on an average CEE level in the late 1990s (Vodopivec et al. 2003: 16ff.). Interpreting the items as 'degree' items, one could interpret higher support in Romania as preferences for better protection against the backdrop of weak protection, while Bulgarians are more satisfied.

CEE welfare states: Post- Soviet II: Ukraine and Russia

Support for government responsibility for the unemployed is higher in Ukraine (8.1) and lower in Russia (7.1).

Both countries´ benefits were low and declined further (Svejnar 2001: 8). The Ukrainian scheme is liberal, offers very low benefits and low coverage (Kupets 2006: 231f.). Considering that these low benefits refer to the country´s incomes, against the backdrop of this country´s very low GDP per capita it is unsurprising that unemployment compensation is a merely peripheral source of income for the unemployed; help form other household members is crucial (Kupets 2006: 231ff.).

Russian initial benefits are low; after one year they are negligible (OECD 2011:39). On should expect Russians to show high support for government responsibility if understood as 'degree' item. Benefits are low and Russians have at least not higher preferences for government responsibility for the unemployed. Considering both countries´ policies their citizens´ high support for pensions and the comparatively low support for government responsibility for the unemployed, especially in Russia, is noteworthy.

Albeit poverty and unemployment strongly differ between Russian regions (Manning 2004: 217), attitudinal differences between regions are not huge: Highest support is to be found in West Siberia (7.8), lowest in 'North and North West' (6.6, the region bordering to Finland and the Baltics) and Center (6.7, including Moscow).

8.2.3   Support for positive pension earnings-relatedness

Figure 8.6 shows European countries colored according to their mean values. Blue means that on average this country´s citizens prefer higher pensions for those with higher previous earnings, red the opposite.

In a few countries on average citizens prefer negatively earnings-related pensions: Turkey (1.7), Denmark (1.8) and the Netherlands (below 2.0). Weakly positive earnings-related pensions are preferred in liberal welfare states UK (above 2.0) and Ireland (2.1), Israel (above 2.0) and partially Switzerland (2.2). In the same light blue category are Finland as well as Belgium and Greece (both 2.2).

Figure 8.6: Country mean support for pension earnings-relatedness

Cartography: Dipl.-Geogr. Bernhard Jakob

Support is higher in Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Hungary, Cyprus and France (2.3), in Estonia and Romania (2.4) and Croatia (below 2.5). The group with highest support for higher pensions for higher earners consists of Latvia, the Czech Republic (both above 2.5), Slovakia, Spain, Portugal, Russia (below 2.6), Germany, Poland (above 2.6), Ukraine and Bulgaria (below 2.7) and Lithuania, the country with highest value (above 2.7).

Conservative welfare states and Switzerland

In the case of government responsibility, conservative countries as well as Switzerland and the Netherlands have similar country values. This does not apply to earnings-relatedness.

Conservative core countries Belgium (2.2), France (2.3) and Germany (2.6) markedly differ in their citizens´ support for positively earnings-related pensions. Chapter 4.3.1 provides merely weak explanations for this pattern; the schemes are similarly conservative. Earnings-relatedness has been weakend in Belgium due to recent reforms (Natali 2004: 346f.); the opposite applies the France in the 1990s (Bonoli 2001: 257). This system is Bismarckian (Ughetto/Bouget 2002: 104). German pensions have been depicted as strongly Bismarckian (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 102) with weak redistribution (Börsch-Supan 2001: 162). Reforms weakened the principle of income-maintenance in favour of basic security (Tálos 2004: 220ff.), so that earnings-relatedness will be stronger market-provided in coming decades. As one might expect in a country closer to the liberal type (e.g. Scruggs 2006: 353, Goul Andersen/Jensen 2002: 29, Trampusch 2008: 50), support for positive earnings-relatedness in Switzerland (2.2) is lower than in the three countries above. Comparing Switzerland´s description in chapter 4.3.6, one sees that the Swiss scheme is as earnings-related as the three other countries´ schemes, yet only a small part is provided by government. The other earnings-related part is compulsory (Queisser/Vittas 2000: 5ff.) yet market-provided (Myles/Pierson 2001: 317).

Figure 8.7 (next page) shows that regional differences are small. In two eastern German regions support for positive earnings-relatedness is lower, in two western German regions it is higher. Counterintuitively, in Wallonia support for positive earnings-relatedness is higher, although the region is poorer, whereas the value for Flanders is closer to the Dutch mean.

Figure 8.7: Region mean support for pension earnings-relatedness

Social democratic welfare states and the Netherlands

In Denmark (1.8) and the Netherlands (below 2.0, both salmon-coloured, Fig. 8.6) in the mean citizens prefer higher pensions for lower earners. Here, Denmark strongly deviates from other social democratic countries Finland (above 2.2), Norway (below 2.3), and Sweden (2.3).

The Dutch result fits the description in chapter 4.3.6 of the country becoming more liberal. The mean value is close to the UK and Ireland. In the Netherlands government provides a base pension and no earnings-related benefits (de Vos/Kapteyn 2001: 241).

In Denmark (see chapter 4.3.2), the other strongly changing country besides the Netherlands (Cox 2001: 463ff., see also Goul Andersen 2002: 156), there are earnings-related occupational pensions (Green-Pedersen/Lindbom 2006: 254). Though some authors see Bismarckian elements becoming more important (Ebbinghaus/Schulze 2007: 276), the scheme is comparable to the ones in Switzerland and the Netherlands, since earnings-related benefits are market-provided (Myles/Pierson 2001: 317).

Finnish pensions are strongly earnings-related without upper ceiling (Hinrichs/Kangas 2003: 582ff.) and described as Bismarckian (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 108, Hinrichs/Kangas 2003: 582, already Esping-Andersen 1990:86 hinted in this direction). This explains the higher value than in Denmark and the Netherlands, but not the slightly lower value than in Norway and Sweden. In Norway earnings-relatedness was weak due to declining replacement rates with rising income; this has been further weakened (Ervik 2001: 52). In Sweden, Bismarckian elements got stronger (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 8) so that pensions are possibly strongly Bismarckian (Schludi 2005: 99, Werding 2003: 13). This is congruent to the relatively (compared to other social democratic countries) high support for higher pensions for higher earners.

Liberal welfare states

Both the UK (above 2.0) and Ireland (below 2.1) prefer earnings-unrelated benefits in the means. This fits what one would expect in liberal countries. In both countries government provide low flat-rate pensions (UK: see Budd/Campbell, Ireland: see Myles/Pierson 2001: 317). Here, attitudes fit policies. Again, regional differences are negligible.

Southern welfare states and Israel

Figure 8.6 shows that these countries can be subdivided into three regional groups: Negative (Turkey, 1.7) and nearly neutral (Israel, slightly above 2.0) preferences for earnings-relatedness in the east, medium support for positive earnings-relatedness in Greece (2.2) and neighbouring Cyprus (2.3) and strong preferences for positively earnings-related benefits on the Iberian peninsula (Spain and Portugal below 2.6).

 Since 1999, Turkey´s (albeit comparatively low) pensions take into account previous income and the number of days worked, with very high maximum replacement rates and very low flat-rate payments for those ineligible for insurance pensions. The scheme is unequal and very 'Southern' (Grütjen 2007: 49ff., see chapter 4.3.4). Turkish attitudes are the opposite.

 Figure 8.7 shows that regional differences within Turkey are strong. Citizen in the South-East strongly prefer negative earnings-relatedness (this is the Turkish region with most respondents), whereas in Eastern Marmara positive earnings-relatedness (2.2) is supported.

 Israel´s pensions are earnings-related (Ajzenstadt/Gal 2001: 310, Weihl 1998: 4), whereas in the mean its citizens prefer flat-rate benefits.

Greek pensions are strongly unequal, with very high replacement rates on the one side and coverage gaps on the other (Hering 2006: 8ff.). Against this backdrop, Greek support for positive earnings-relatedness is comparatively weak, but in comparison to support for earnings-related unemployment benefits it is high (Fig. 8.11).

The Cypriot scheme is also contribution-based (Pashardes 2003: 42, Ioannou et al. 2007: 101). With British Beveridgean origins, the scheme developed in the Bismarckian direction (Natali 2004: 362). Cypriot attitudes could partially reflect this.

Only in Spain and Portugal attitudes are as pro-earnings-related as one might expect in southern countries. The Spanish scheme is Bismarckian (Guillén 2007: 118ff.) with strong a reference to contribution years (Vidal-Meliá/Dominguez-Fabián 2006: 613, Marco 2001: 5), possibly Bismarckian elements get weaker (Moreno 2008: 2). The Portuguese scheme is similar (Albuquerque et al. 2009: 4, Pereirinha et al. 2007: 488f, Whitehouse/Queisser 2007: 130f.). In both countries, attitudes reflect policies or vice versa.

CEE welfare states: Visegrád and former Yugoslavian countries

Citizens of the most social democratic country, Slovenia, have the lowest preferences for higher pensions for higher earners (below 2.3). Yet the pension scheme is Bismarckian (see chapter 4.3.5). Support is slightly higher in Hungary (above 2.3). Due to a reform in 1998 Hungarian pensions will become less redistributive and more private. The number of contribution years is important; the scheme has liberal traits and becomes markedly Bismarckian (Baum-Ceisig et al 2008: 94ff). Also in Croatia (below 2.5) reforms in 1999 strengthened earnings-relatedness. Support in the Czech Republic (above 2.5) and Slovakia (below 2.6) is nearly identical. The Czech scheme regards earnings and contribution years, yet is markedly redistributive (Potůček 2007: 141). Slovakian pensions became less generous and less redistribute (Svoreňová 2006: 102) and therefore more earnings-related. Slovaks´ attitudes are in line with these developments and an older survey, in which they preferred contribution-benefit-links (Svoreňová 2006: 101).

Highest support in this group is to be found in Poland (above 2.6). The scheme was Bismarckian until 1998, yet reforms did not raise redistribution since responsibility will be transformed to the market. Benefits are strongly linked to earnings, so that the high support fits expectations.

Not differences between these countries, but their overall level of support for positive earnings-relatedness reflects the Bismarckian elements of these countries´ pension policies.

With the exception of Poland, where positive earnings-relatedness is stronger supported in western regions, regional differences within countries are small.

CEE welfare states: Post- Soviet I: The Baltics

Generally support for positively earnings-related pensions is high in Baltic countries. It is lowest in Estonia (2.4) where the pension system is liberal/Bismarckian (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 194f.). Latvia´s scheme has been described as more liberal (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 157ff.), but support is higher (above 2.5). In Lithuania with the most Bismarckian scheme in the Baltics (Natali 2004: 362ff.), support for positive earnings-relatedness is highest in Europe (2.7). Regional differences within countries are small. In two Estonian regions preferences for positive earnings-relatedness are at low Finnish (2.2) levels.

CEE welfare states: South-eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Romania

Higher pensions for higher earners are strongly preferred in Bulgaria (2.7), and Romania (2.4). Both countries followed the World bank´s three pillar model (Sotiropoulos/Pop 2007: 62), in both countries pensions are low (Bulgaria: Asenova/McKinnon 2007: 390ff., Romania: Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 186, for both countries Stanovnik 2009: 60). Lower replacement rates imply weaker practical earnings-relatedness. Against this backdrop, especially Bulgarian pensions fall short of citizens´ preference for high earnings-relatedness. In Romania, preference for positive earnings-relatedness is higher (2.6) in Bucharest.

CEE welfare states: Post- Soviet II: Ukraine and Russia

Both countries´ citizens (Ukraine: 2.7, Russia 2.6) strongly support higher pensions for higher earners. The new Ukrainian scheme strongly regards contribution years and has very high ceilings (chapter 4.3.5). Yet due to rising minimum pensions ninety percent of Ukrainian pensioners receive these (Rohozynsky 2006: 33), so that earnings-relatedness is virtually absent, which contradicts citizens´ high support for positive earnings-relatedness. The Russian situation is similar. Albeit the second pillar is earnings-related, due to low contributions the flat-rate first pillar predominates (chapter 4.3.5). Given this the very low replacement rate (24

percent of all pillars combined in 2004 and still declining, cf. Hauner 2008: 4f.), Russian pensions are also virtually earnings-unrelated.

For both countries the same as for Bulgaria and Romania can be concluded. Citizens´ preferences are not reflected in actual policies.

8.2.4 Support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness

Fig. 8.8 shows country mean values for support for positively earnings-related unemployment benefits. In the mean across all countries, it is slightly lower (2.21) than support for positive pension earnings-relatedness (2.34).

Figure 8.8: Country mean support for unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness

Cartography: Dipl.-Geogr. Bernhard Jakob

Fig. 8.11 shows that in the case of earnings-relatedness country mean support is even more strongly positively correlated than in the case of government responsibility.

In Turkey, support for negative earnings-relatedness (1.6) is even stronger than in the case of pensions (1.7). On the negative side are also Greece (1.9) and Hungary (below 2.0). Roughly neutral in the country mean are citizens of Slovenia (2.0) and those of liberal UK and

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Ireland, and of Croatia (above 2.0). More on the positive earnings-related side are Denmark, Cyprus (below 2.1), Belgium, Romania and Estonia (above 2.1), Finland (below 2.2), Poland and Sweden (2.2), Norway and the Netherlands (above 2.2).

Higher unemployment benefits for those with higher previous earnings are stronger supported in France, Israel (below 2.3), Switzerland (2.3), Bulgaria (above 2.3), Russia and Ukraine (below 2.4), the Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania (above 2.4). Slovakia´s and Spain´s values are below 2.5. Two countries are dark blue: Portugal (2.5) and Germany (above 2.5).

Figure 8.9: Region mean support for unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness

Cartography: Dipl.-Geogr. Bernhard Jakob

Conservative welfare states, Switzerland and the Netherlands

As with pensions, country mean support for higher benefits for higher earners are strongly different between conservative countries. Belgians (2.1) only weakly support positively earnings-related unemployment benefits, against the backdrop of an earnings-related scheme (chapter 4.3.1). The Dutch value (2.2) is higher. This country´s unemployment scheme became weaker earnings-related since the share of unemployed receiving insurance benefits

declined due to a rising number of necessary contribution years (Clasen/van Oorschot 2002: 100, van Oorschot 2002b: 114). On the attitudinal level this supports the classification of both countries as social democratic Hybrids (Arts/Gelissen 2001: 290).

The French (below 2.3) and the Swiss (2.3) support earnings-related benefits to similar degrees. French unemployment benefits are strongly earnings-related (Clasen/Clegg 2006a: 536), the scheme is Bismarckian (Ughetto/Bouget 2002: 104). Support in eastern France is higher and similar to the Swiss mean. The Swiss scheme (chapter 4.3.6) consists of earnings-related insurance benefits which drop to means-tested benefits after expiration (e.g. Hotz-Hart et al 2006: 651). This also results from Scruggs and Allan (Table 4.2) showing low benefit equality in Switzerland. Swiss attitudes match its policies.

Germany (above 2.5) is the European country with strongest support for higher unemployment benefits for higher earners. The scheme closely links contributions to benefits (Schmid 1995: 70), due to later reforms about half of the unemployment receive insurance benefits (Clasen/Clegg 2006a: 538). This result for Germany could explain why a fast drop of benefits to the flat-rate means-tested level has been partially rejected by the public, leading to policy changes in favour of longer-enduring insurance benefits for elderly workers than originally intended. Remarkably, figure 8.8 shows that support for positive earnings-relatedness not lower in eastern Germany despite earnings being lower there. In this sense, neither self-interest nor GDR socialisation with preference for material equality is to be found in the reagional pattern of attitudes towards unemployment benefits´ earnings-relatedness.

Social democratic welfare states

Figure 8.8 shows that these countries are similarly at the weakly positive side. The lowest value is to be found in Denmark (below 2.1), whereas values in Finland (below 2.2), Sweden (2.2) and Norway (above 2.2) are higher and similar (see also Fig. 8.11).

With Denmark, again in the most liberal social democratic country positive earnings-relatedness is weakly supported, yet more than the case of pensions would suggest (Fig. 8.11). Finland´s mean value is partially unexpected, since its scheme has been described as more earnings-related than those of Sweden and Denmark (Ervasti 2002: 187). The value for Sweden is slightly higher, its scheme has been described as weakly earnings-related (Schmid 1995: 63) but has grown stronger (Lindbom/Rothstein 2004: 18). The highest value for Norway, primarily resulting from high values in Oslo and another southern region, is

unexpected against the backdrop of Finland´s result, but still, differences between the three northern countries are small.

Liberal welfare states

Both countries are slightly above 2.0, as one might expect. Ireland abolished earnings-related benefits in 1995 (Schömann et al. 2000: 37), the UK in 1982 (e.g. Clasen/Clegg 2003b: 203, for both countries see Schmid 1995: 70f.). Attitudes match policies, and Northern Irish attitudes are exactly as in neighbouring Irish regions.

Southern welfare states and Israel

Country placement is similar as with pensions (see also Fig. 8.11). In Turkey, higher benefits for lower earnings gain even more support (1.6), in contrast to pensions Greece is on the negative side (1.9), Cyprus (below 2.1) is only weakly pro-positive earnings-relatedness. In Israel (below 2.3) positive earnings-relatedness is supported in unemployment benefits and not in pensions (slightly above 2.0). In Spain (below 2.5) and Portugal (2.5) support for higher benefits for higher earners is strong. Portugal has the second highest value in Europe.

Turkish attitudes do not fit welfare policies, since benefits are positively related to previous earnings, albeit ceiled at a low level (Grütjen 2007: 53). All Turkish regions are on the negative side (Fig. 8.9), yet the pattern is similar to pensions with strongest support for negative earnings-relatedness in the south-east. In contrast to pensions, the Greek (weakly) support negative earnings-relatedness in unemployment benefits. This is incompatible with high conditionality on insurance principles in the scheme depicted by Papadopoulos (2006: 229f.). Cyprus is weakly on the positive side, albeit benefits are higher for higher earners, but for only a short time (Ioannou 2007: 98ff.). Preferences for positively earnings-related benefits are stronger in Israel, where developments were in the liberal direction (Rosenhek 2003: 86f.). The dark blue colour of one region (Judea-Samaria and Gaza) results from 22 respondents giving the same answer. As with pensions, in the south negative earnings-relatedness is preferred.

Spain´s high support (below 2.5) matches its scheme, being depicted as generous depending on prior contributions (Gil-Escoin/Vázquz 2007: 178ff.). Portugal´s (2.5) support for positive earnings-relatedness is high, albeit benefits are ceiled at thrice the minimum wage (Pereirinha 2007: 490ff.). Regional differences are strong in Spain, with nearly earnings-

neutral benefits being preferred in la Rioja (below 2.1) and very strong support for higher unemployment benefits for higher earners (2.8) on the Balearics.

CEE welfare states: Visegrád and former Yugoslavian countries

In contrast to pensions, attitude differences for unemployment earnings-relatedness are remarkable within this group. On the weakly negative (or neutral) side is Hungary (below 2.0), a country with benefits dropping very fast to a low lump sum (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 107ff.). In neighbouring Slovenia (2.0) and Croatia (above 2.0) values are nearly similar as in Hungary. Slovenia´s system became less earnings-related in 1998 due to shorter eligibility periods for insurance benefits (Ignjatović et al. 2002: 211). Croatia´s entitlement durations in the insurance scheme are so short that only a one fifth of the unemployed receive earnings-related benefits (Stubbs/Zrinščak 2009: 17f.). Due to this, weakly earnings-relatedness attitudes partially match policies.

Higher unemployment benefits for higher earners are more popular in Poland (2.2). The unemployment scheme has been depicted as not clearly classifiable into the three 'Worlds of Welfare' (Brown 2007: 1482); eligibility is short (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 80). Positively earnings-related benefits are more strongly supported in the Czech Republic (above 2.4) and Slovakia (below 2.5). Also in the Czech Republic eligibility duration in the earnings-related pillar has been shortened, and benefits have low ceilings (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 142ff.). The Slovakian scheme has been cut back generally, but due to hard eligibility criteria, low ceilings and short durations (Bednárik/Škorpík 2007: 9f.), benefits are earnings-related on a medium/low level.

CEE welfare states: Post- Soviet I: The Baltics

As in the case of pensions, Estonians (above 2.1) far weaker support higher benefits for higher earners than Latvians and Lithuanians (above 2.4). Estonia´s unemployment compensation has been described as liberal or Bismarckian (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 188ff.), practically the low benefits (Trumm/Ainsaar 2007: 200) do not allow for high earnings-relatedness. Latvia´s scheme takes the number of years worked weakly into account. Earnings-related benefits drop fast, therefore the system is only weakly status-preserving (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 170). The Lithuanian system is a targeted and basic-security one (Aidukaite 2006: 267f.). Primarily in these two countries, attitudes are different from policies.

CEE welfare states: South-eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Romania

Differences between both countries are similar to the case of pensions, but on a lower level: In Romania support for higher benefits for higher earners is low (above 2.1), in Bulgaria it is higher (above 2.3). The Romanian scheme offers low benefits with a low ceiling (Baum-Ceisig et al. 2008: 206ff.) and is therefore weakly earnings-related. Differences between regions are remarkable, with on average negative earnings-relatedness being preferred in the north (1.9) and the centre (below 2.0) and strongest support for positive earnings-relatedness in the capital (above 2.3).

Bulgaria´s mean value does not reflect policies in the late 1990s, since due to a low ceiling benefits were weakly earnings-related back then (Vodopivec et al. (2003: 16ff.). In Romania weak support for higher benefits for higher earners match depicted weak earnings-relatednes in chapter 4.3.5.

CEE welfare states: Post- Soviet II: Ukraine and Russia

Preferences for positive earnings-relatedness are similarly and high in both countries (below 2.4). Ukrainian benefits are very low and cover only a minority of the jobless (Kupets 2006: 231f.), so that they cannot be status-preserving. This also applies to Russia (OECD 2011:39). In both countries attitudes deviate from policies, since citizen demand earnings-related benefits on a high level, yet government offer benefits low enough to be actually flat-rate.

Figure 8.10: Macro relationship between support for government responsibility in both policy fields

Pearson´s r .68, significant at 1%-level

Figure 8.11: Macro relationship between support for earnings-relatedness in both policy fields

8.2.5   Intra-country differences and diffusion

Cross-border similarities

In chapter 7.1.9 it has been argued that various authors (Esping-Andersen/Przeworski 2001: 6, Jahn 2009b: 95) have pointed to the possibility that policy diffusion can happen, primarily between geographically close regions or countries. Some authors (summarising: Ross/Homer 1976: 2ff.) have shown cases of policy diffusion, others (Volden et al. 2008: 319ff.) state that similarities are partially misinterpreted as diffusion albeit they constitute similar reactions to similar problems. Further, it has been argued that due to globalisation and Europeanisation, diffusion may happen without geographical, cultural or linguistic proximity.

An early case of diffusion is shown in ch. 4.3.5 in the case of Visegrád countries´ Bismarckian tradition, stemming from past German-Austrian influence in this region. In the same chapter, the 'Europe effect' from (prospective) EU membership has been mentioned, as well as widespread influence from the World Bank´s standard pension scheme suggestion, also in CEE countries.

It has been argued that policies do not spread by themselves from one country to another, but either elites´ or citizens´ attitudes should be the link, and it has been argued that diffusion processes are very hard to isolate. Some noteworthy patterns will be discussed, yet it cannot be clearly ascertained if they result from diffusion processes, similar background characteristics like 'culture', or similar national/regional circumstances. Further, it has not to

be necessarily welfare attitudes that diffuse, but basic conceptions of government´s role and how economy is supposed to be organised.

It is hard to imagine cross-border attitude diffusion on the population level between countries or regions with different languages, so that discussion below will be restricted to more likely cases.

Without concluding that this is caused by diffusion, attitude similarity for government responsibility for the old is impressive in some border regions, e.g. southern Germany and Switzerland, Flanders and the Netherlands. Similarly, regional mean values in south-western Russia are similar to values in Ukraine.

For unemployment benefits (Fig. 8.5), there is a huge area of regionally similar attitudes in Western Europe. Northern Irish attitudes are more 'Irish' than 'British', albeit objective circumstance cannot account for this (see above). Values in Flanders are more on the higher Dutch level, values in Wallonia more on the low level of neighbouring eastern France, albeit the distribution of unemployment in Belgium would suggest that Walloons are more dependent on unemployment benefits.

Also in the case of earnings-related pensions, Belgian regions are close to their neighbours with the same language. Again, Flemings are on the lower Dutch side and Walloons on the higher French side, although the former´s earnings are higher. In some cases, values in the eastern Baltics are close to Russian values, possibly due to the concentration of the Russian minority.

The Northern Irish mean support for earnings-related unemployment benefits is similar to neighbouring Irish regions and less so to UK regions. There are also similarities between southern Germany and Switzerland; the low southern German value cannot be explained with self-interest, since earnings are comparatively high there.

Further research, possibly based on "comparative history" (Rueschemeyer/Stephens 1996: 61) could illuminate these patterns.

Differences within countries

Some countries are regionally homogenous. This applies to most countries of Western Europe, with the exception of German east-west differences in the case of government responsibility for the old and the unemployed, and Spain for earnings-related unemployment

benefits. Intra-Turkish differences in preferences for higher pensions for lower earners are remarkable.

Differences are larger within some CEE countries. In Ukraine, in the region around Kiev, support for government responsibility is markedly lower than in other regions. This also applies to a region in southern Poland. Also in the Baltics and Romania regional differences are remarkable. While intra-European differences are comparatively strong in the case of earnings-relatedness, intra-country differences are to be found primarily in preferences for government responsibility.

As argued, regional differences in attitudes necessarily imply that national policies are considered too generous or ungenerous in some regions.

8.2.6 The intertemporal stability of macro attitude values

In both cases, government responsibility for the old as well as the unemployed, intertemporal stability in country mean values can be detected. Comparison of Eurobarometer 1995 and ESS4 data show that countries where a large share of the population state in 1995 that only government should be responsible for pensions, support for government responsibility to provide for the old was higher in 2008/2009 (fig 8.12). The same applies to European Values Study data from 1999/2000 for both, pensions (Fig. 8.13) and, to a lesser degree, unemployment benefits (Fig. 8.14).

Figure 8.12: Intertemporal stability of support for government responsibility for the old 1995-2008/2009

Pearson´s r .82, significant at 1 percent-level. Data source: Eurobarometer 44.0 (1995): Gelissen 2002: 178. Support for government responsibility for the old: ESS4.

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Figure 8.13: Intertemporal stability of support for government responsibility for the old 1999/2000-2008/2009

Pearson´s r .64, significant at 5 percent-level. Data source: European Values Study 1999/2000: Gerhardts 2005: 188. Support for government responsibility for the old: ESS4.

Figure 8.14: Intertemporal stability of support for government responsibility for the unemployed 1999/2000-2008/2009

Pearson´s r .41, insignificant. Data source: European Values Study 1999/2000: Gerhardts 2005: 188. Support for government responsibility for the old: ESS4.

8.2.7 Summary

In chapter 5.2.1.2 it has been argued that European welfare policies presuppose roughly coherent attitudes in EU countries, independent of being implemented as 'hard law' or 'soft law', the latter being nonbinding suggestions yet with normative impact on national policymakers. This even more so in the highly unlikely case of an EU welfare budget.

Support for government responsibility for the old is between 7.4 (Germany) and 9.3 (Latvia). The difference of less than two scale points on an 11-point-scale is small. This

confirms Heien´s (2002: 113) analysis of ISSP data from 1985, 1990 and 1996. Here, in all three waves Europeans supported government responsibility for the old to more than 90 percent, even in the UK and Western Germany, whereas in the US it was 74 percent.

In the case of unemployment support is lower, ranging from 5.9 in Slovakia to 8.5 in Latvia and Greece. Given that placements nearer to the center of the scale allow for higher differences, 2.6 points out of 10 are also not high. Again, Heien´s (2002: 113) result shows that in 1996 in the mean in all seven European countries analysed citizens supported government responsibility for the unemployed (from 28 percent in Hungary to 87 percent in Norway), whereas US citizens slightly (-7 percent) rejected it. The view of common European attitudes, especially in contrast to the US, is supported by Marshall et al´s (1999: 356) analyses of ISJP data from 1991: The statement that "the government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living" is highly supported in Europe (between 62 percent in the Netherlands and 91 percent in Estonia) and weakly in the US (19 percent; within Europe, values are lower in the UK, France and the Netherlands and higher in CEE countries).

For earnings-relatedness, intra-EU differences are stronger, from mean support for negatively earnings-related benefits in Denmark (1.8) to very strong support in Lithuania (2.7). On a scale from 1 to 3, a difference of 0.9 is remarkable. This applies less to unemployment. On the negative side is Greece (1.9); on the most strongly positive is Germany. Due to lack of prior survey items, results for earnings-relatedness cannot be compared in the context of an existing state of research.

Higher support for government responsibility for the old is a common finding when comparing both policy fields. Greater differences in the case of earnings-relatedness with unemployment benefits being more often near the neutral point could result from a wider understanding of unemployment compensation as need-based support, whereas pensions are more understood as reward for lifetime merit and contributions. Further, earnings-related pensions should be fairer since the link between contributions and benefits is stronger than in the case of unemployment, where some pay in and never receive benefits and others gain more from contributory schemes than they pay in.

Attitudes towards responsibility would be homogeneous enough not to necessarily dissatisfy one country´s citizens due to too high or low generosity (acceptance of EU regulations and inter-country redistribution being a different matter). Yet the configuration is difficult, especially in the case of pensions with some supporting Beverdigean earnings-unrelatedness and others strongly preferring Bismarckian earnings-relatedness.

9   Welfare attitudes and voting behavior

Figure 9.1: Causal model

Numbers: Chapters.

9.1 Public opinion affecting welfare policies

The assumption that there is a somehow genuine will of the people which will get politically implemented in an undistorted way is rooted in the classical doctrine of democracy (Blomberg/Kroll 1999: 58). The assumption that ideas foster support for institutions may be termed *culturalist* (Rohrschneider 1999: 14).

According to Downs (1960: 541), this view is appropriate, since in democratic systems voters´ preferences roughly determine the level of state intervention in the economic sphere. This descriptive statement constitutes the core of what democracy implies. It may as well be expressed normatively. In Sigel´s (2007: 59) "best of all democratic worlds" voters´ preferences are converted into policies, which in turn have outcomes as intended by voters. Here, citizen control not just politicians´ actions, but also these actions´ consequences. This impact of citizens´ attitudes on policies may be either direct or indirect (Borre 1995: 368). The indirect influences may result from "a 'median voter' mechanism, media debates, or lobby group activities" (van Oorschot 2006: 24). Political macro phenomena could result from actions taken by individuals or groups, whose preferences are not functions of the polity but result from other factors (March/Olsen 1989: 4). Several studies support this view:

In Page and Shapiro´s (1983: 185) analysis, in most cases changes in public opinion preceded changes in policies.[80] Page and Shapiro (1983: 177) measured policy outputs in the time span between two years before the respective opinion survey and four years after them. Since time lags between policy changes and opinion changes can be rather long, it is possible that some policy changes with long-term effects on public opinion went unnoticed. Further, as the authors (1983: 187) note, intermittent survey data can show that opinion changes preceded policy changes, but not rule out reverse causality, since early opinion changes may have happened while no surveys were conducted.

Besides this methodological problem, policymakers may anticipate public opinion and implement policies before public opinion gets expressed in surveys. In this case, policies were affected by public opinion, although the temporal order of measurement suggests otherwise.

Farkes, Shapiro and Page (1990, cited in Brettschneider 1995: 88) analysed US public opinion and government spending between 1972 and 1989. In some areas (environment protection, space travel, narcotics) public assessments that spending is too high led to lower spending in the subsequent year. Similarly Roberts and Kim (2011: 819ff.) have shown that public support significantly predicted economic reform pace in 16 post-communist countries between 1990 and 1997, also controlling for other relevant factors like unemployment.

Contrastingly, Brooks (1990: 513, see also 1987: 477) stated for his few cases of consistency between public opinion and policies in Germany that correlation is not causation. Consistency may be spurious, if elites happen to be of the same opinion as citizens and act without regard to citizen preferences.

In a review of 30 studies, Burstein (2003: 29ff.) analysed 52 coefficients in various policy fields, five of them in the field of social welfare. His conclusion is that in three-quarters of cases relationships between opinion and policies were statistically significant, yet the direction of causality is not always clear (see footnote in Burstein 2003: 33). Further, nearly all of the studies are limited to the US.

Brooks and Manza (2006: 474ff.) suggested that politicians have incentives to do what voters want them to do. Using OECD welfare spending data and ISSP opinion survey data and including control variables such as GDP per capita, unemployment rate and female labour

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[80]   The authors (1983: 175f.) suggest that responsiveness is positively correlated to salience, so that in low-salience areas like foreign policy congruence between public opinion and policies may be lower (see also Brooks 1990: 515f.). Though, Page and Shapiro (1983: 182) could not find any significant differences, nor could Brooks (1990: 516f.) in the case of Germany. This squares with his finding that in Western Germany at about 1980 and France from 1946 until 1984 in supposedly less salient foreign policy issues congruence between public opinion and policies has been higher than in the case of domestic or redistributive policies (Germany: Brooks 1990: 517ff; France: Brooks 1987: 473ff.). Contrastingly, comparing the 11 coefficients where salience has been taken into account with the 41 coefficients where this has not been the case, Burstein (2003: 34) concludes cautiously that salience fosters responsiveness.

force participation, they show that citizens´ preferences are an important determinant of welfare spending in the subsequent year. They also detected welfare regime differences, with Christian democratic countries´ spending levels being influenced the most by their citizens´ attitudes. Some of the effects from mass opinion on welfare spending seem to run via party control. In sum, they (2006: 488) found effects from public opinion on policies.

In contrast, Farkes et al.´s regression analyses could not detect effects, yet graphical illustration implied otherwise. Further, question wording referred to government spending in general, while the dependent variable merely incorporated spending on the national level. In the reverse direction, higher spending in the social area, health care and education led to demands for lower spending in the following year (see Brettschneider 1995: 88ff.). In the area of social welfare policies in the US, Rochefort (1986) states that "public policy-making seems to respond directly to subsuming climates of opinion that envelop elites and the mass citizenry alike" (cited in Brettschneider 1995: 94). Both results, public opinion as determinant of spending developments and as corrective of apparently unwanted deviations from the status quo instead of adaptions of public opinion to policies ("phony consensus", cf. Brooks 1990: 510) support the view of public opinion as exogenous. The same applies to Jacobs and Shapiro´s (1994: 9f.) summary of previous studies, concluding that there is "sizeable statistical relationship between measures of mass public preferences and policy making".

The reverse stance is taken by Schattschneider (1960: 129ff.). Comparing opinion polls conducted between 1935 and 1946 and US policies until 1960, he concludes that public opinion is a weak predictor of public policy. Brooks´ (1990: 512ff.) results for Western Germany at around 1980 came to the same conclusion. In sixty percent of 146 cases he found that policies deviated from citizens´ preferences in the preceding year. Beforehand, Schumpeter (1962) took a similar stance:

> "[…] the classical theory centred in the proposition that 'the people' hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to this opinion – in a democracy – by choosing 'representatives' who will see to it that that opinion is carried out (269) […] voters do not decide issues (282)".

On the other hand, since welfare policies may be considered belonging to those policies Schumpeter (1962: 255) terms "quantitative in nature or admit of gradation", "fair compromise" (1962: 255) is more probable than in political questions allowing solely blanket approval or rejection.

For citizens´ attitudes to affect policies, relevant political actors have to get active (Pfau-Effinger 2009: 14). Yet it takes time for government to convert demands[81] into policies (Goldsmith 1995: 26f.). This may be due to several reasons: Firstly, information concerning citizens´ preferences has to be transmitted to political actors. This may happen via political participation, albeit various forms of participation have their disadvantages. Voting, e.g., enables citizens not to convey detailed information concerning their preferences to policymakers. Further, between opinion changes and the next election years may pass. Other forms of participation allow the expression of demands more detailed and quickly than voting, though they have other disadvantages. Demonstrations and petitions have to be organised by someone and party-related participation is time-consuming (Verba et al. 1995: 48). Moreover, these activities put lower pressure on the political system; in contrast to elections, some other forms of political participation may be just be ignored. Lastly, the higher socio-economic bias than in elections limits the value of information gained from these participatory acts. Alternatively, policymakers can gain information from opinion surveys.[82] In this case, it is not always clear 'who leads whom' (Zaller 1992: 268 with reference to a tale in which a revolutionary is surprised by a mob rushing through the street and gets to the head of the mob). Both, participation and opinion surveys, lead to time lags between public opinion changes and recognition by policymakers, given that the latter follows the former. Even when public opinion is known to policymakers, time passes until legislation is drafted, gets legislative approval and comes into effect.

All analyses above had to deal with the question which time lag between the measurement of public opinion and policy should be used to ascertain if there are effects from the former to the latter. Brooks (1990: 512) admitted that the choice for a certain time lag is arbitrary.

Expressing both influences stemming from public opinion and time lags, Lane (1985: 267) states that today´s policies result from yesterday´s political culture.

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[81]   Demands result from wants, which are exogenous to the political system. If politicised, wants are turned into demands (Roller 1995: 57). Possibly, wants may be subdivided into Harris´ (1987: 124) categories "needs" and "preferences". The former are "basic and fundamental to any human functioning" (Harris 1987: 124), the latter not. Harris states that "it is not possible to identify a limited and objective set of needs that can act as an uncontroversial foundation for a welfare state" (1987: 125); a similar stance is taken by Goodin (1992: 28ff.): If needs should be given priority over desires (this term seems to be similar to Harris´ preferences), desires would be presented as needs. Therefore, Goodin (1992: 51) considers needs as "socially constructed" and to be not superior to desires (1992: 29).

[82]   By participants´ unrepresentativeness (Verba et al. 1995: 2), policymakers get a distorted image of public opinion. The same applies to opinion surveys, albeit to a far lesser degree, if not the whole populace gets asked. This distortion is supposed to be alleviated by weighting according to socio-demographic factors.

9.1.1 Effects from welfare attitudes to voting behaviour

Congruence between welfare attitudes and voting behaviour

If there is some systematic relation between welfare attitudes and voting behaviour and an according relation between cabinet composition and welfare policies,[83] then citizens´ attitudes affect welfare polcies.

In the 'Responsible Party Model'[84], voters compare their issue positions to party programmes, vote for the party with the programme closest to the own preferences and parties try to convert their programmes into policies (Pierce 1999: 9, for evidence see Lewis 1980: 290, for the 'democratic linkage' idea see also Brooks 1985: 251).

First, it will be shown that citizens´ attitudes are systematically related to the ideological orientation of the parties they vote for. Ultimately voting allows citizens to choose leaders and leading parties (Verba et al. 1995: 9). In contrast, we will not compare voters´ issue positions to elites´ issue positions, but voters´ electoral choice and elites´ actions. Possibly Pierce´s analysis (below) is flawed due to the use of elites´ attitudes and not actions, and the use of mean values of elite attitudes, ignoring power asymmetries within parties. Therefore, the use of elite actions is more straightforward. This proof would concern the type of political participation with the lowest capacity for conveying information to political decision-makers (Verba et al. 1995: 48). Yet if it could be shown that parties´ ideological orientation determines their welfare policies, mediated by the vote citizens´ attitudes affect welfare policies.

Pierce (1999: 12ff.) analysed if individual-level positions matched mean party positions in France (1967), the Netherlands (1971 and 1990), Western Germany (1987), the US (1987 and 1988) and Sweden (1988). The choice for individual positions has been based on three flaws inherent to mean values of individual positions: Firstly, the type of aggregate data is different, since „the voters for a given party do not constitute an operating entity in a way that a party´s

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[83]   Amongst other things, Lijphart (1997: 4) bases his argument for the importance of elections and equal electoral participation between socioeconomic groups on the latter link. "There is an extensive comparative literature about welfare […] that is unanimous in its conclusion that parties do matter".
[84]   The alternative to the Responsible Party Model is the Constituency Model (both being ideal types). Here, voters do not instruct their parties, but their local representative in national parliament. This implies that parliamentarians are free to vote in discordance with their party´s main policy. Pierce (1999: 10f.) states that the US is the sole system he is aware of which comes close to the Constituency Model, while the European systems are closer to the Responsible Party Model.

elites do" (Pierce 1999: 14), since there is much more communication within a party than between its voters. This problem is similar to the different types of aggregate data depicted above (ch. 7.1.9). Second, mean values conceal deviations, which should be greater in voters' attitudes than in elites´ attitudes (Pierce 1999: 14). The third reason is that voters may be closer to a different party´s elite than to their own party´s elite, if the mean value is used. Pierce (1999: 25ff.) summarises his results:

> „Our analysis so far indicates strongly that voter-party issue congruence is far from impressive […] when one controls for the size of the party system, the proportion of voters for any given party that is closest to that party [...] is often not much larger than what chance alone would produce [...] no evidence to support the notion that many voters approach their electoral choices on the basis of matching their personal packages of issue positions with those offered by the parties […] we have found little support for the party representation model of mass-elite relations" (Pierce 1999: 30).

Political problems enforce choices between mutually exclusive values, such as individual freedom versus order (Sniderman/Theriault 2004: 141). In the case of policies benefitting the poor, opportunity and compassion on one side and costs and negative consequences for those paying on the other side are two competing viewpoints (Sniderman/Theriault 2004: 142).

In our case, competing values are liberty and security in the case of government responsibility, and equality versus merit in the case of earnings-relatedness. Parties position themselves in these value conflicts (Sniderman/Theriault 2004: 141ff.). The more important an issue is in electoral competition, the more citizens are able to link parties with positions in this issue (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 348). Since welfare issues are highly important and debated in most European countries, it may be expected that citizens roughly know where parties stand. There are inter-party differences in the emphasis placed on certain issues (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 348), so that citizens may be expected to know the location of parties which are keen to compete on welfare issues. The emphasis parties place on issues should also be related to the reasons why citizens vote for them.

Under the assumption of the Michigan model (Campbell et al. 1960: 529ff.), besides welfare attitudes party identification, evaluations of politicians and other issues are relevant for electoral choice, too. Party identification has various sources, e.g. socialisation by parents, personal social surroundings, personal circumstances, social and political forces, and so on (Campbell et al. 1960: 146ff.). As Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 88) note, the question if party identification is exogenous or endogenous has been widely debated. Testing for this by using panel data, Lewis-Beck et al. (2008: 88ff., see also Jakobsen 2011: 111) can show that party

identification´s effects on electoral choice is overestimated in cross-sectional analyses since party identification is partially endogenous. Other effects are underestimated. Resulting from this, party identification may not serve as a different factor determining vote choice besides welfare attitudes. These attitudes are already included in party identification and vice versa. It does not matter for which reasons a voter voted for a party as long as this party pushes through welfare policies supported by the voter.

Expectations concerning voters´ and party identifiers´ attitudes are similar to party rule expectations. Liberals, Christian democrats and conservatives are expected to bear more negative attitudes towards the welfare state, either from more negative attitudes concerning welfare states´ effects (van Oorschot 2010: 19) or other reasons like personal cost-benefit considerations. The opposite applies to social democrats and socialists/communists. Christian democrats, and, to a lesser degree, conservatives, are expected to support earnings-related benefits. Liberals and social democrats are expected to support earnings-unrelated benefits and socialists/communists could, due to their radical preference for material equality, support negative earnings-relatedness, compensating for prior earnings inequality.

9.1.2 Effects from party identification to welfare attitudes

Though traditional liberal democratic theory promotes public opinion affecting political elites´ actions, the reverse may also hold true (Borre/Goldsmith 1995: 7).

Citizens´ welfare attitudes may affect their voting behavior, which in turn affects welfare institutions and policies in the long run. On the other hand, individuals may identify with larger units – amongst them, political parties – and act from their perspective (Scharpf 2000: 111). Parties may offer cues how to evaluate policies, so that they significantly affect public opinion (Campbell et al. 1960: 128, see also Kumlin 2002b: 56ff. for party identification as symbolic orientation affecting opinion and self-interest affecting symbolic orientations; for effects dependent on information exposure see also Bullock 2011: 496ff.).

Bullock (2011: 498) reports on six studies with inconclusive results. Effects from party cues on attitudes vary between three percent and 43 percent. Presenting two experiments, Bullock (2011: 496ff.) came to the conclusion that policy information has stronger effects on attitudes than party cues, yet with considerable individual-level variation.

In another study, a sample of liberal and conservative US college students had to evaluate welfare reforms leading to generous or stringent benefits. Additional fake information on preferences of members of both parties in the House of Representatives

affected these students´ evaluations: "Once the policy was socially defined as liberal or conservative, the persuasive impact of its objective content was reduced to nil" (Cohen 2003: 811). Further, "the factors that participants claimed to have affected their attitudes diverged from the factors that actually did" (Cohen 2003: 811), since students claimed to have been affected by the proposals´ details and their "philosophy of government" and less by "what the typical Democratic or Republican believes". In a second study amongst liberal students, it could be shown that effects from information of party stands on attitudes were independent of welfare knowledge. In a third experiment with students of both political camps previous results could be confirmed. Further, information concerning parties´ preferences had no negative effects on respondents´ efforts in reading about the subject and thinking about it (Cohen 2003: 815). A fourth study amongst liberal students could show that partisan information affected not just attitudes, but also behaviour, since effects on editorials written by students could be detected (Cohen 2003: 812ff.).

Individual preferences consist of self-interest, normative role expectations and identity. Identity may be understood as simplified self-image (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 56). Primarily highly politicised citizens may define themselves as adherents of a certain political ideology, which results from identification with a certain political party or leads to party identification. In situations in which neither self-interest nor normative role expectations suggest preferences, identity may simplify preference formation and reduce complexity (Scharpf 2000: 119f.). In this respect, party identification, identity and party ideology can affect citizens´ welfare attitudes, primarily if self-interest and normative role expectations cannot offer clear guidance. If institutions (here: parties) "generate beliefs in a legitimate order, they simplify politics by ensuring that many things are taken as given" (Olsen 2007: 5).

In order to be effective, identity has to be stable across time. This loss of flexibility may result in an insufficient adaption to changing circumstances (Scharpf 2000: 120), which is another micro factor leading to path dependent developments.

Parties offer choices to the public (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 346) and tell which choice they consider best. "By structuring political choice spaces, parties facilitate citizens´ reasoning consistently from basic principles" (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 346, see also Sniderman 2000: 75). Further, parties frame issues, define the problem and offer solutions (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 346f.). Taken together, parties may affect citizens´ attitudes towards the welfare states, especially their own supporters´ attitudes.

9.2 Congruence between welfare attitudes and party support

Voting behaviour is determined by various factors, of which welfare attitudes are but one. One could determine relevant factors of voting behaviour, including party identification (leaving aside its endogenous nature), candidate preferences (not in ESS data due to the comparative perspective) and other issues.

This would not answer the question how citizens´ welfare attitudes are represented via their voting behaviour. If a person votes for a party belonging to a certain ideological orientation and parties of this ideological orientation push through welfare policies in line with this person´s welfare attitudes, it is irrelevant if this person voted for this party because of congruence between the person´s welfare attitudes and this party´s policies. If this person voted for this party for other reasons than welfare policies, the person supports preferred welfare policies nevertheless. In the extreme scenario, a person casting a random vote may support preferred welfare policies. Yet, the relevance of the following analyses depends on parties´ effects on welfare policies (chapter 10).

Results

Respondents are categorised according to their past voting decision. If they did not vote, their party identification is used, since this constitutes a good predictor of future voting choices.

The colour of the diamonds expresses the political ideology: Purple for communist/socialist parties, red for social democratic parties, and yellow for liberal parties, light blue for Christian democratic/religious parties and dark blue for conservative parties. The size of the diamonds shows the share of each group among respondents voting for or identifying with these parties among those respondents who can be attributed to the five ideological directions, so that the sum is one hundred percent. Ideological directions with less than five percent are not shown.

The graphs contain two dimensions: Support for government responsibility for a "reasonable standard of living" for the old (left graph) and the unemployed (right graph). Answer scales were from 0 to 10, yet for graphical reasons the vertical line begins at 5, so that even diamonds at the bottom are still on the side of preferred government responsibility and attitudinal differences appear larger than they are.

The horizontal location shows preferred earnings-relatedness: -1 means lower earners should get higher benefits, 0 means earnings-unrelatedness and 1 means higher earners should get higher benefits.

Fig. 9.2 shows a rough ideal-typical location of party voters and party identifiers. Comparable to welfare regimes, social democrats and liberals are expected to support earnings-unrelated benefits, on a high or low level respectively. Christian democrats are expected to support earnings-related benefits on a medium level. Conservatives are expected to be located between liberals and Christian democrats. Socialists or communists should display the highest support for governmental responsibility and could even support negative earnings-relatedness in order to compensate for prior inequalities.

Figure 9.2: Ideal-typical locations of voters and party identifiers.


9.2.1 Conservative welfare states

Figure 9.3: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Belgium

government responsibility for the old n = 988 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 978 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 982 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 977

Figure 9.4: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Germany (east)

government responsibility for the old n = 543 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 509 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 543 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 523

Figure 9.5: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Germany (west)

government responsibility for the old n = 1105 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1061 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1103 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1066

Figure 9.6: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: France

government responsibility for the old n = 1123 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1080 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1118 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n =1087

In France and in Western Germany (figs. 9.6 and 9.5, preceding page), expectations could be confirmed. Supporters of the French UMP, which has been categorised as conservative, and of the German Christian democrats CDU/CSU are less in favour of government responsibility and more in favour of earnings-related benefits than supporters of social democratic parties. In both countries, voters and identifiers of socialist parties are the strongest supporters of governmental responsibility and the weakest supporters of positive earnings-relatedness. In Eastern Germany, the sole real deviation is the relative pro-earnings-related attitudes of social democratic supporters (the location of supporters of the liberal FDP is based on merely about fifty cases). In Belgium, in the case of pensions there are merely minor differences. Supporters of the social democratic parties (7.89) are slightly more in favour of government responsibility for the old than those of liberal parties (7.82) and slightly less than those of Christian democratic parties (7.92). In the case of earnings-relatedness, the scores are: Social democrats 0.24, liberals 0.29 and Christian democrats 0.23. Supporters of liberal parties are least in favour of government responsibility.

In sum, in France and (primarily western) Germany expectations could be completely confirmed, in Belgium only partially.

9.2.2 Social democratic welfare states

Figure 9.7: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Denmark

government responsibility for the old n = 1261 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1236 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1254 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1216

Figure 9.8: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Finland

government responsibility for the old n = 945 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 917 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 944 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 922

Figure 9.9: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Norway

government responsibility for the old n = 1225 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1209 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1225 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1205

Figure 9.10: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Sweden

government responsibility for the old n = 1427 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1368 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1419 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1364

In Denmark, apart from supporters of Det Konservative Folkeparti who display lower support for government responsibility for the old and the unemployed than supporters of liberal parties, expectations could be confirmed. This also applies to Finland, where supporters of the conservative National Coalition Party are less in favour of government responsibility and more of earnings-relatedness than supporters of other parties. Merely the few supporters of the Christian Democrats deviate from the expected pattern. This also applies to Norway for supporters of the Kristelig Folkeparti ('Christian People´s Party'), whose welfare attitudes do not differ from those of supporters of the social democratic Arbeiderpartiet ('Workers´ Party'), and, in the case of pensions, the liberal parties Venstre ('left') and Fremskrittsparti (Progress Party). Supporters of socialist/communist parties and the conservative Høyre ('right') bear expected attitudes. The Swedish pattern is similar to the Danish one. The few supporters of Kristdemokraterna are close to supporters of the liberal Centerparti and Folkepartiet liberalerna and the conservative Moderata Samlingspartiet.

In sum, party voters and party supporters in social democratic welfare states show expected attitude patterns.

9.2.3 Liberal welfare states

Figure 9.11: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Ireland

government responsibility for the old n = 1194 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1178 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1192 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1181

Figure 9.12: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Ireland (different categorisation of Labour Party)

Figure 9.13: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: United Kingdom

government responsibility for the old n = 1483 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1448 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1475 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1447

Support for government responsibility is slightly higher among supporters of the Irish socialist/communist Labour party and Sinn Fein (preceding page). Those supporters are slightly on the side of negative earnings-relatedness. Generally supporters of different Irish parties have similar attitudes. Differences between supporters of the liberal Fianna Fáil and the very small liberal Progressive Democrats on one side and the Christian democratic Fianna Gael are negligible. A different categorisation of the Labour party (social democratic instead of socialist/communist), shown in the second set of graphs for Ireland, shows that supporters of the Labour party are close to supporters of both big parties, whereas Sinn Fein supporters differ especially due to their high support for government responsibility for the old.

In the UK, differences between supporters of conservative parties (Conservative Party and the very few Ulster Unionist party supporters) and supporters of social democratic parties (Labour and the very small Northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party) are as expected. Social democrats are more pro-government and, in the mean, on the side of negative

earnings-relatedness. The location of liberals close to social democrats is caused by the categorisation of the Liberal democrats as liberal party.

9.2.4 Southern welfare states

Figure 9.14: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Cyprus

government responsibility for the old n = 892| earnings-relatedness pensions n = 804 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 879 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 813

Figure 9.15: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Spain

government responsibility for the old n = 1505 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1455 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1483 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1446

Figure 9.16: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Greece

government responsibility for the old n = 1240 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1164 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1241 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1190

Figure 9.17: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Portugal

government responsibility for the old n = 1148 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1005 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1143 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 990

Figure 9.18: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Turkey

government responsibility for the old n = 1210 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1129 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1210 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1115

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In the case of Cyprus, differences between supporters of parties from different ideological camps are negligible in the case of pensions. Supporters of the Christian democratic party Dimokratikós Sinayermós (DISY, 'Democratic Rally') differ from other party supporters in their lower support for generous unemployment benefits.

The Spanish pattern largely meets theoretical expectations. Voters and identifiers of the conservative parties Partido Popular and the far smaller Convergència I Unió are least in favour of government responsibility and most in favour of positive earnings-relatedness. Supporters of the social democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español support higher government responsibility and less positive earnings-relatedness. In the case of earnings-relatedness, supporters of the socialist/communist Izquierda Unida ('United Left') are located in between, but they are the strongest supporters of generous welfare benefits.

Also in Greece supporters of the conservative party (Nea Dimokrati) have the lowest support for governmental responsibility. Voters and adherents of the social democratic Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and especially the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) are stronger supporters of benefit generosity. In the case of earnings-relatedness, there are no marked differences.

In the case of Portugal, except slightly lower support for positive earnings-relatedness among supporters of socialist/communist parties Bloco de Esquerda ('Leftist Bloc') and the Portuguese Communist Party and slightly higher support for generous unemployment benefits there are no relevant differences between voters and identifiers of parties of different ideological camps. The categorisation of the Partido Social Democrata as liberal is justified yet not unequivocal. Yet since this is the only party labelled as liberal in Portugal, a different categorisation (with the label 'PSD') leads to the same result, ideological congruence to supporters of the social democratic Partido Socialista.

In Turkey, the country with the strongest support for negative earnings-relatedness, the pattern is largely unexplainable. The high support of voters and adherents of the socialist/communist Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP; 'Democratic Society Party') and the very small Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP; 'Freedom and Solidarity Party') for negative earnings-relatedness of benefits is in line with expectations. Yet, they display comparatively low support for governmental responsibility for the unemployed. Moreover, supporters of social democratic parties are less in favour of negative earnings-relatedness than the numerous supporters of the religious Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP; 'Justice and Development Party').

Summarising, in two out of five Southern countries (Greece and Spain) expectations could be met, in the other three countries not.

9.2.5   CEE welfare states

Visegrád and former Yugoslavian countries (FYC)

Figure 9.19: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Czech Republic

government responsibility for the old n = 975 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 918 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 972 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 922

Figure 9.20: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Hungary

government responsibility for the old n = 938 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 856 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 934 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 842

Figure 9.21: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Poland

government responsibility for the old n = 931 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 891 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 916 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 885

Figure 9.22: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Slovakia

government responsibility for the old n = 973 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 901 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 967 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 917

Figure 9.23: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Slovenia

government responsibility for the old n = 575 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 539 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 569 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 540

Figure 9.24: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Croatia

government responsibility for the old n = 743 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 654 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 740 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 701

Party voters and adherents in the Czech Republic largely display expected attitude differences. Merely supporters of the small Christian democratic KDU- ČSL are less in favour of positive earnings-relatedness than one might expect and, in the case of pensions, stronger supporters of government responsibility than supporters of the social democratic party ČSSD.

In Hungary, supporters of the Christian democratic Fidesz are more in favour of government responsibility than supporters of the social democratic Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP; 'Hungarian Socialist Party'). Further, social democrats are stronger supporters of positively earnings-related pensions, whereas in the case of unemployment benefits this applies to Christian democrats.

Supporters of Polish parties of different ideological orientations display similar attitudes, whereas supporters of the big party 'Law and Justice' are the strongest supporters of government responsibility. Less generous benefits and stronger earnings-relatedness is supported by supporters of Christian democratic parties, Donald Tusk´s 'Civic Platform' (the party with most Polish voters in ESS4) and the small 'League of Polish Families'. The few supporters of social democratic parties are most in favour of positive earnings-relatedness and most strongly opposed to generous unemployment benefits. The categorisation of 'Law and Justice', the party of the Kaczyński twins as liberal is debatable. Re-labelling the party as conservative or Christian democratic would change the counterintuitive findings, but result in more than three-quarters of Polish respondents labelled as supporters of Christian democratic or conservative parties, making comparisons impossible.

Also the Slovakian result is inconclusive. Supporters of the Christian democratic parties SDKU and KDH show stronger support for positive earnings-relatedness than those of the social democratic SMER, but also stronger support for government responsibility.

The Slovenian results are inconclusive, too. Here, the small black diamond shows the values for the supporters of DeSUS, the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia. These party´s supporters´ pro-pension attitudes are in line with expectations.

As with Slovenia, the Croatian results are not in the expected direction. Supporters of the Christian democratic parties, the large HDZ and the small HSS are less in favour of positive earnings-relatedness than supporters of the social democratic SDP. In the case of government responsibility, supporters of parties of all three ideological directions differ only very slightly, with supporters of liberal parties being less in favour of government responsibility than supporters of Christian democratic and social democratic parties (8.64/8.76/8.74 in the case of the old, 7.50/7.55/7.53 in the case of the unemployed).

The Croatian Pensioner´s Party (HSU) has too few supporters to be shown here.

In sum, results for Visegrád and Former Yugoslavian Countries are inconclusive. The only country with results as expected is the Czech Republic.

Post-Soviet I: The Baltics

Figure 9.25: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Estonia

government responsibility for the old n = 990 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 937 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 987 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 947

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Figure 9.26: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Latvia

government responsibility for the old n = 646 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 593 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 645 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 604

Figure 9.27: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Lithuania

government responsibility for the old n = 575 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 538 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 571 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 530

Supporters of the Estonian parties labelled as liberal, Eesti Keskerakond ('The Estonian Centre Party') and Eesti Reformierakond, which are the biggest Estonian parties, show high support for government responsibility for the old and the unemployed. Given that these parties´ categorisation seems rather uncontroversial, this is surprising. Further, supporters of social democratic Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond display values even slightly below those of supporters of the conservative parties. Differences in preferred earnings-relatedness are small; social democrats stated slightly lower support for positive earnings-relatedness than others.

In Latvia, differences are small and also not in the expected direction. Supporters of Tautas Partija ('People´s Party'), a party difficult to categorise and meanwhile non-existent, are shown with the black diamond. Supporters of the liberal parties do not show expected attitudes. Supporters of the socialist/communist Saskaņas Centrs are the least in favour of

government responsibility, in the case of unemployment benefits with the same (8.26) value as supporters of Tautas Partija. Further, they support positive earnings-relatedness.

Also Lithuanian party supporters´ attitudes are not as expected. In the case of pensions, voters and adherents of the conservative parties show the highest support for governmental responsibility and the lowest support for positive earnings-relatedness, attitudes more in line with socialist/communist ideology. Generally, in the case of pensions, supporters of Lithuanian parties of different ideological directions support very high government responsibility. Also, differences in supporters´ attitudes towards unemployment benefits show no clear pattern. There is inter-ideological consensus for positive earnings-relatedness, and differences in preferred generosity are not of the expected nature.

In sum, expectations could not be met in Baltic countries.

South-eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Romania

Figure 9.28: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Bulgaria

government responsibility for the old n = 818 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 742 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 810 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 741

In Bulgaria, voters and adherents of socialist/communist parties (9.33) show a slightly higher preference for government responsibility for the old than social democrats (9.28) and Christian democrats (9.24). Yet their preference for earnings-relatedness is also the highest. Supporters of Natzionalno Dvijenie Simeon Vtori ('National Movement Simeon the Second'), which has been defined as liberal, have the lowest preferences for government responsibility.

Figure 9.29: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Romania

government responsibility for the old n = 1239 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1036 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1222 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1032

Supporters of Romanian Christian democratic parties, the large Partidul Democrat Liberal and the small PNŢ-CD (Christian-Democratic National Peasants´ Party) support governmental responsibility to a lower degree than supporters of other parties. In the case of the Christian democratic and social democratic parties, the expectations are met, yet supporters of the liberal Partidul National Liberal do not fit into the pattern because they are the strongest proponents of governmental responsibility in both policy fields.

Post-Soviet II: Ukraine and Russia

Figure 9.30: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Ukraine

government responsibility for the old n = 1289 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1032 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1280 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1115

Figure 9.31: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Russia

government responsibility for the old n = 1742 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1481 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1742 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1454

Supporters of all Ukrainian parties or Blocks prefer high and strongly earnings-related pensions (preceding page). It is not possible to ideologically locate the Blocks named after their leaders. Supporters of the communist and socialist parties are least in favour of positive earnings-relatedness in the case of pensions. Supporters of the Party of regions (grey) most strongly support high pensions, supporters of the Block of Yulia Tymoshenko (green) less so and supporters of Block 'Our Ukraine – People´s Self- Defense' (black) slightly less. Also in the case of unemployment benefits differences are small. Here, supporters of socialist/communist parties show the highest preference for government responsibility (8.33, hidden behind the grey diamond) and supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko the lowest (7.88).

In Russia, the party with the most supporters is Putin´s Yedínaya Rossíya ('United Russia', black diamond). Supporters of Sjuganov´s socialist/communist KPRF (purple diamond) have in both policy fields the weakest preference for positive earnings-relatedness and are most in favour of generous unemployment benefits, which are opposed by supporters of Zhirinovsky´s LDPR (the small light blue diamond).

9.2.6   Uncategorised welfare states

Attitudes of Swiss party supporters fit the expected pattern. The black diamond shows the location of supporters of the 'Schweizerische Volkspartei' (Swiss People´s Party), a party difficult to categorise but doubtlessly on the right side of the political spectrum. The only deviation is caused by the few supporters of the socialist/communist parties 'Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz' ('Swiss party of work') and the larger (to be continued on the page after next)

Figure 9.32: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Switzerland

government responsibility for the old n = 942 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 921 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 936 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 915

Figure 9.33: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: the Netherlands

government responsibility for the old n = 1289 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1276 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1288 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1263

Figure 9.34: Party supporters´ attitudes towards cash benefits: Israel

government responsibility for the old n = 1357 | earnings-relatedness pensions n = 1333 | government responsibility for the unemployed n = 1352 | earnings-relatedness unemployment benefits n = 1314

Grünliberale Partei der Schweiz ('Green Liberal Party of Switzerland'). Possibly the categorisation of the latter party as socialist/communist is inappropriate. Yet in the case of unemployment benefits supporters of these parties have highest preferences for government responsibility, but also for positive earnings-relatedness.

Albeit with small differences, Dutch party voters and adherents meet expectations in the case of pensions and unemployment benefits. Merely in the case of the latter, supporters of the socialist/communist Socialistische Partij are more in favour of positive earnings-relatedness than supporters of the social democratic Partij van de Arbeid ('Labour Party').

In Israel, supporters of religious parties have lower preferences for government responsibility for the old than those of other parties. In the mean, supporters of all parties are located near earnings-unrelatedness, with only supporters of the liberal parties Kadima and the very small Shinui being on the side of positive earnings-relatedness. In the case of the unemployed, supporters of all ideological directions roughly have the same preferences for governmental responsibility. Voters and adherents of the social democratic parties HaAvoda ('Labour'), the smaller Meretz and tiny Balad have the lowest values here and the highest in the case of pensions. Supporters of religious parties have the lowest preferences for positively earnings-related unemployment benefits.

In sum, results for Switzerland and the Netherlands are strongly as expected, results for Israel not.

9.3 Summary

All things considered, in Western Europe attitudes of supporters of parties from different ideological camps as are expected. This applies primarily to social democratic welfare states and the uncategorised welfare states Switzerland and the Netherlands. In the conservative welfare states France and (primarily western) Germany result are also as expected, in Belgium less so. In the liberal welfare state Ireland there are no remarkable differences between supporters of the two big parties, in the UK results fit expectations.

In two (Spain and Greece) out of five southern countries expectations are met. In the case of CEE countries, only results for the Czech Republic fit the pattern, to a lesser degree this can be said for Romania, too.

There are several explanations for this east-west divide. On the methodological level, it is possible that it is easier for researchers to correctly categorise western parties, which are in most cases also older than eastern parties.

On the theoretical level, it is possible that in CEE political parties have not as clear profiles as western parties or CEE voters and party adherents do not see existing party differences as clearly as they are. The calculation of attitude differences between supporters of parties from different ideological camps cautiously supports this claim: For each country and each of the four dependent variables, the mean value of party voters and adherents has been calculated by weighting party means according to party share in the country. For each party the distance to this country mean has been calculated. The country distance (Appendix 4, Table A4.31) results from adding the distances of the parties, weighted by party share. For the 14 CEE countries and 17 western countries (Eastern and Western Germany analysed separately), the mean distance values have been calculated. In all of the four variables, distances are greater in the west, insignificantly in the case of government responsibility and significant on the 10 percent-level in the case of earnings-relatedness.[85]

Besides unclear party profiles or voters´ cluelessness, another explanation would be that welfare issues are not as important in CEE countries as in Western Europe, so that vote choices and party attachments are weaker related to welfare issues.

On face value, this claim is hard to establish. Both the idea that welfare policies are more important to citizens if they are poorer and CEE countries´ tradition of political systems placing high emphasis on welfare outputs contradict this claim. In order to analyse if low salience of welfare policies are a relevant cause of low distance values, this salience has to be operationalised. Due to the lack of relevant questions in ESS4, other variables have to be used. Using macro data like expenditure levels and measures of government intervention is one possibility. The argument is that the more governments burden their citizens with taxes and contributions and the higher benefits are, the more parties are pressed to let citizens know where they stand on these issues, the more citizens are interested in parties´ stances and the more citizens vote for or adhere to parties according to their welfare positions. Before showing results supporting this argument, the counterargument that low tax and contribution burdens and low welfare benefits may result from a high salient preference of the population for small government should not be left unregarded.

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[85]   Further, country distances in both responsibility (Pearson´s r at .79) and earnings-relatedness (.75, both highly significant) are strongly correlated, suggesting that differences in basic responsibility exist across policy fields, as well as differences in preferred earnings-relatedness.

High spending, stark differences between party adherents

The idea is that higher welfare expenses exaberate class conflicts (Jordan 2010: 865 with reference to Svallfors 2007). The explanation that welfare issues and party´s positions could be less salient due to lower welfare expenditures as shares of GDPs in CEE countries can partially be established by data. The higher countries´ welfare efforts, the higher are attitudes differences between voters and adherents of parties from different ideological camps. This pattern can be established for various measures of government intervention like government revenue, tax levels and replacement rates. In some cases, correlations are significant despite the low number of cases. Supporter distance in the case of government responsibility for the unemployed is positively and significantly (5 percent-level) correlated to government revenue as share of GDP (Pearson´s r .52), total tax level (.51), direct tax level (.46) and earnings of the long-term unemployed (.38/.37/.38 for previous low, medium and high-earners. Significant at the 10 percent-level). Results for governmental responsibility for the old are less conclusive. Correlations with government intervention are insignificant and only in most cases positive. Supporter distance in the case of earnings-relatedness is positive in most case, yet in the case of pensions merely the correlation with pension replacement rates (Pearson´s r .34) is significant (at the 10 percent-level). This also applies to supporters´ distance in unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness, correlations with earnings for the long-term unemployed are at .35, .32 and .31 for the three previous earnings levels, significant at the 10 percent-level merely for low earners. The number of cases is between 23 and 26.

A replication of the analyses with Western Europe confirms that these results are no artefact of a co-occurrence of profiled parties and high levels of government intervention in the west. Still, with 17 instead of 23 cases supporter distance in preferred governmental responsibility for the unemployed is strongly correlated with government revenue as a share of GDP (Pearson´s r .55), total tax level (.53), and direct tax level (.68, all three significant at the 5 percent-level despite the lower number of cases). Correlations with earnings of the long-term unemployed are still strong (.43/.40/.40 for various previous earnings levels), yet no longer significant at the 10 percent-level due to the lower number of cases. For governmental responsibility for the old, results are still insignificant. For pensions´ earnings-relatedness, correlation with replacement rates gets insignificant, and correlations of party supporters´ distance with benefit levels of the long-term unemployed get weaker (.24/.20/.18) and insignificant. The number of cases is 15 or 16 respectively.

In order to analyse if this correlation between state intervention and supporters´ distances is a western phenomenon, despite the low number of cases separate analyses for CEE countries have been conducted. Results are similar. In the overwhelming majority of cases, correlations are positive. In some instance, they are significant. Supporters´ distance in the case of governmental responsibility for the old is strongly (Pearson´s r .71, significant at the 10 percent-level, n=7) correlated to government revenue as a share of GDP. Cyclically adjusted tax levels are strongly positively correlated to supporters distance in the case of governmental responsibility for the old (.67, significant at the 5 percent-level), the unemployed (.58, significant at the 10 percent-level) and unemployment benefits´ earnings-relatedness (.56, significant at the 10 percent-level), and insignificantly to earnings-related pensions (.49; n = 11). This also applies to social contributions´ share of GDP. Correlations are .63 and .43 for governmental responsibility for the old and the unemployed, significant at the 5 percent- level in the first case. Correlations between social contributions´ share of GDP and different values in the case of earnings-relatedness are .72 and .75 for pensions and unemployment benefits, in both cases at 5 percent-significance (n = 11).

In sum, low welfare expenditure results from or leads to smaller differences between adherents of different political ideologies, possibly due to lower salience of welfare statism.

Lastly, this chapter shows within-country relations between attitudes and voting behaviour, and chapter 10 will show how this affects policies. Different ideologies have different meanings in different countries. For example, supporters of the conservative Høyre in Norway are more in favour of government responsibility for the unemployed than western German supporters of the social democratic SPD. Plausibly, parties´ proposals and policies should be related to voters´ preferences

To which degree citizens´ attitudes and policies fit is shown in chapters 7.1 and 8.

10 Effects from voting behaviour on welfare policies

Figure 10.1: Causal model

Numbers: Chapters.

10.1 The two-dimensional model of political representation

The following chapter sheds light on the causal link from citizens´ attitudes to welfare policies. Step 2 in the causal model deals with the question whom citizens with certain welfare attitudes vote for. Step 3 deals with what parties do when they are in office. Both questions are related to political representation.

Andeweg and Thomassen (2005: 510ff.) merged two dimensions into a new typology of political representation. The first dimension is based on Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996). In

> "representation run from below, the process starts with the citizens, who enter the political process with crystallized views. Political representation then serves to translate these views as best as possible into government policy, as it is described in the principal-agent model" (Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 511)

The opposite of the populist kind of representative democracy is the elitist representation from above. Here, political elites not merely convert citizens´ preferences into policies, but have their own agenda and want citizens to support it. In Esaiasson and Holmberg´s (1996) view, "the touchstone for representation from below is responsiveness […] the touchstone for representation from above is accountability" (cited in Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 511). Andeweg and Thomassen (2005: 511) point to the emphasis laid upon the concept of a mandate by Esaiasson and Holmberg, whereas a mandate authorises for future policies and accountability refers to approval to past policies. Here, Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996)

already introduce the second dimension. Parties get hold accountable for their past activities or get authorised to govern for the following legislative period, depending on retrospective or prospective voting, both being ideal types.

This is very close to the tidal dimension mentioned by Bendor, Glazer and Hammond (see Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 510). In the ex ante case, principals do not employ the agent, in the ex post case they dismiss the agent. Andeweg and Thomassen (2005: 512) summarise the two dimensions and two tidal perspectives:

Figure 10.2: Political representation

		Control mechanism	
		ex ante	ex post
Direction	from above	*authorisation*	*accountability*
	from below	*delegation*	*responsiveness*

Source: Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 512

The chain of delegation mirrors the chain of accountability, so that power is delegated from the principal to the agent, whereas the agent is accountable to the principal (Strøm 2000: 267). It is not entirely clear if Strøm uses terms in the same manner as Andeweg and Thomassen. Yet considering that the delegation of power is done by citizens (from below) and takes place before chosen agents can act, and afterwards political elites (acting from above) can be held accountable for their policies, it seems to fit into Fig. 10.2. The greater the relative weight of delegation against accountability, the higher the chances of citizens to turn their preferences into policies should be. In extreme scenarios, citizens could delegate political power to representatives who do exactly what they want them to do, if citizens are fully informed about programmes. Conversely, citizens could be fully informed about who is responsible for which policies and vote incumbents out of office in every election, just to replace them with similar unresponsive new incumbents in a series of unresponsive governments.

For *delegation*, considered the ideal case by Andeweg and Thomassen, exogenous and stable preferences among the citizenry are crucial. Further, political actors´ actions have to be predictable (Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 512). Moving to ex post control, *responsiveness* implies that politicians are highly attentive to public opinion. In this mode, public opinion is unstable (Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 513). Therefore, it would be insufficient to vote the right agents into office who keep their promises (which is uncertain, given that they may be "bribed or co-opted", cf. March/Olsen 1989: 11); the unstableness of public opinion necessitates that political elites have a seismographic sense of it. *Authorization* implies that parties offer programmes, and subsequently voting decisions are based on preferences for programmes (Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 513). Here, exogenous preferences on the side of

voters are unnecessary (Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 513). Moreover, the weaker voters´ exogenous preferences are, the more *authorization* is a top-down mode. Lastly, *accountability* includes stable or instable, exogenous or endogenous voter preferences, and what political actors will do may be unforeseeable. The only relevant factors are that political actors have to be motivated to win a coming election and that voters are able to tell who is responsible for what in the ending legislative period (Andeweg/Thomassen 2005: 513f.).

Strøm (2000: 268ff.) presents a comparison of the chain of delegation (from left to right in Fig. 10.3) and the chain of accountability (from right to left) in parliamentarian and presidential systems. In both cases, at the endpoints there are numerous actors, voters on the left side and civil servants on the right side. Yet, in parliamentarian systems, agents have merely a single principal (*singularity principle*), leading to "a single chain of command" (Strøm 2000: 269). Here, principals are accountable to one agent (Strøm 2000: 269; in Fig. 10.3 ever actor has only one actor to his left), and the PM is the bottleneck.

In contrast, in presidential systems there may be several, competing principals for some agents (Strøm 2000: 269). Principals cannot monopolistically give orders, neither is their satisfaction with agents´ activities the latter´s sole source of legitimacy.

Figure 10.3: Delegation and accountability under parliamentary and presidential government

Source: Strøm 2000: 269

Agency problems occur if the agents´ and principal´s interests and incentives deviate (Strøm 2000: 270). Coming to the reasons underlying agency problems, the connection to the modes depicted by Andeweg and Thomassen becomes clear. Agency problems may result either from *omission*, i.e. non-action on the side of the agent when action would be appropriate to

serve the interests of the principal, or "*commission* (sabotage)" (Strøm 2000: 270, emphasis in original), if action is taken which is not in the interest of the principal.

Underlying reasons may be hidden information or hidden action. The former is given if principals are insufficiently informed about their agents´ preferences or skills. Here, the problem of adverse selection may occur, so that not the ideal agents are chosen. This is a problem of delegation. Hidden action is possible if agents have some leeway in their activities because principals are not able to completely observe their activities. This may lead to moral hazard, arising if after elections agents want and can act secretly not in the interest of the principal (Strøm 2000: 270f.).

Successful *delegation* is dependent upon citizens´ political knowledge. To raise responsiveness, citizens should vote according to their issue orientation, and hope to assess more or less correctly the candidates´ or parties´ preferences and skills. In contrast, under *accountability* responsiveness is higher if citizens are not attentive prior to elections, but during legislative periods. Yet, in both cases institutional circumstances vastly affect citizens´ chances to transfer their preferences into policies.

One basic distinguishing characteristic between democracies is that between parliamentary and presidential systems. Most European countries are parliamentarian systems, which ones exactly depends upon underlying definitions.[86] In parliamentarian systems, there are more steps from citizens to political decision makers, of which in turn fewer are directly elected (Strøm 2000: 272f.), leading to more indirect accountability, less information, and therefore a higher likelihood of agency losses (Strøm 2000: 277), defined as deviations of agents´ activities from principals´ preferences, holding constant the level of information on the side of the principals (Strøm 2000: 275).

Based on other authors, Strøm (2000: 277) states that "a singular chain of delegation is only as strong as its weakest link". A weak link could be politicians ignoring their voters´ preferences, so that orders given from politicians to bureaucrats are worthless in terms of responsiveness, since these orders are unconnected to citizens´ preferences. This agency loss can be avoided by circumventing the weak link. Yet, the impossibility to circumvent, or the

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[86] Based on Steffani (1979), Strøm (2000: 265) distinguishes between *parliamentary democracy* and *parliamentary government* and defines the latter as "*system of government in which the prime minister and [...] cabinet are accountable to any majority of the members of parliament and can be voted out of office by the latter* through an ordinary or constructive vote of no confidence" (emphasis in original). He (2000: 265f.) argues that although this definition entails that parliament can vote the cabinet out of office, yet not that it selects the cabinet in the first place, this does not matter, since the threat of voting out of office is the main characteristic of the relationship between parliament and cabinet. Defining parliamentarism this way and defining presidentialism "as a regime in which the head of state is a president with significant powers who is popularly elected for a fixed term" (Strøm 2000: 266), some countries may be parliamentary as well as presidential (France) and some neither (Switzerland).

absence of competition, is characteristic of parliamentary democracy (Strøm 2000: 277). Besides that vote, most other forms of political participation, like party work, donations to political parties, or demonstrations also rely on parliament´s (or cabinet´s) care for citizens´ preferences. Merely direct democratic ways, like legally binding petitions, could circumvent parliaments´/cabinet´s irresponsiveness. This also applies to bribery and direct contacts to politicians.

Further, there are less or no competing agents in parliamentarian systems, undermining competition between them (2000: 273). As Fig. 10.3 shows, in parliamentarian systems voters elect only parliament (though on different government levels), in presidential systems also a second chamber and the president (yet, also in parliamentarian systems, e.g. in Germany or Austria, there are second chambers, although not directly elected by citizens. And the Italian Senate is elected directly by citizens). Conversely, there are no competing principals in parliamentarian systems, so that principals reap the benefits of their monitoring efforts alone, and no competing principals intervene. Although this should foster their motivation to closely control their agents and limit the latters´ leeway (Strøm 2000: 276), Fig. 10.3 shows that this does not apply to voters, who are principals without competition in both systems.

Institutional checks, such as required majorities in Senate and House, are also fewer in parliamentarian systems (Strøm 2000: 273; yet, checks and competition are mutually exclusive, cf. Strøm 2000: 275). Consequently, in parliamentarian systems ex ante control is far more important than ex post accountability (Strøm 2000: 273). This is fostered by the high prominence of parties in parliamentary systems, which "control delegation from voters to representatives, as well as from representatives to the chief executive" (Strøm 2000: 273).

Consequently, both are crucial for the conversion of citizen preferences into policies in European countries: Ex ante selection, and parties, i.e. the election of certain political parties should be decisive for responsiveness, also in the case of welfare policies. The main causal chain from citizens´ preferences to welfare policies should begin with the election of the correct parties (Strøm 2000: 282). Yet parliamentarianism is less transparent during legislative periods than presidentialism (Strøm 2000: 281f.), especially under multiparty coalitions. *Information decay* caused by the declining usefulness of prior experience and ascriptive characteristics leaves voters with higher uncertainty. On the other hand, indirect accountability from cabinet to parliament and from there to voters gets more direct. Higher electoral volatility motivates politicians (or, rather, cabinet) to act according to voters´ preferences, even long before the next elections (Strøm 2000: 283f.). This leaves cabinet with

two principals (parliament and voters), which is uncommon in parliamentary systems, and could lead to balancing acts, since parliament can vote cabinet out of office, but also voters can do that. This reduction of vicariousness could make citizens´ attitudes and attitude changes more important for policymaking.

10.2 Effects from ruling partisanship to welfare policies

10.2.1 Vote-seeking and policy-seeking parties

Two major factors are relevant: Firstly, parties may try to win elections by "bidding up" (Cameron 1978: 1246) their welfare offers to the electorate. This is congruent with Schumpeter´s (1962: 269) notion of the democratic method as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people´s vote". Congruently, Downs (1957: 136) distinguishes between the private motive and the social function of an actor´s activity. The former may consist of "the enjoyment of income, prestige, or power", that is, advantages dependent upon electoral results (and electoral laws). Following this, Downs (1957: 137) expects that political parties´ utility function is unitary since they are interested only in votes. In order to reap the benefits of being in office still after elections, politicians may raise spending or cut taxes as far as possible (Downs 1957: 52).

Under this assumption, parties are either what Strøm (1990: 566) terms 'vote-seeking parties' or 'office-seeking parties' (see also Shepsle 2006: 28f.), though both kinds are not be clearly distinguishable, since votes are the basis for offices.

Most or all of the countries analysed here are democratic, and the consideration that parties are vote- or office- seekers may apply to all democratic countries. Therefore, no inferences can be drawn to differences between welfare states without incorporating citizens´ attitudes and preferences. In this model, parties only convert voters´ preferences into policies.

While in this theory parties are comparable to the income maximisers Levi (1991: 133) characterises as an rather rare extreme continuum endpoint, the other theory stressing the importance of parties supposes the contrasting unitary utility function by supposing that they are purely moral and feel entirely obliged to what they define as the social good. This theory stresses the importance of the ruling parties´ ideological orientation (Cameron 1978: 1246). In this case the ideal type of the "policy-seeking party" (Strøm 1990: 566) is considered realistic (since votes are the basis for policies, both ideas are compatible, cf. Hibbs 1992: 362).

Several reasons can cause policies to deviate from the median voter: Party activists or leaders may force through their own agendas. Policy-dimensions can be cross-cutting (Iversen 2001: 45), so that parties get voted into office for their positions on one dimension, while they represent a minority opinion on some other dimension. Related to this is the Ostrogorski Paradox, leading to deviations between the electorates´ preferences and policies. This may happen even under perfect information concerning parties´ issue standpoints, purely issue-oriented voting and parties keeping their word after election (Kelly 1989: 71f.). Lastly, though parties may be expected to consider all interests in society, the may be dependent upon electoral support from certain groups (Scharpf 2000: 127).

Dealing with the question under which circumstances (besides publicly perceptible positive effects before election, cf. Kitschelt 2001: 274) vote- or office-seeking parties adapt unpopular retrenchment policies, Kitschelt (2001: 265ff.) came to the following conclusions: Governments have better opportunities to implement unpopular policies if oppositional powers have no credibility in sustaining the welfare state and voters have no alternatives. In this sense, mostly left governments may retrench the welfare state, since they are opposed by right parties, which are more probable to be considered anti-welfare parties. Social democratic governments with strong pro-welfare credibility and with market-liberal oppositions may retrench the welfare state with reference to the 'Nixon in China' logic: The accusation of 'selling out' is less likely in such constellations (Kitschelt 2001: 275). Right-wing parties in government may actually have to offer higher welfare benefits than left-wing governments, since they have to "compensate for the electorate's default mistrust of the right-wing" (Jensen 2010: 283). Yet this logic is partially based on circumstances from the English-speaking countries´ majoritarian systems where voters and politicians have not the alternative of more extreme and credible parties on their side of the ideological spectrum (Ross 2000: 156f.). In countries with proportional election systems, left parties dismantling the welfare state may lose votes and seats to parties to the left promising to raise benefits. Though, Jensen´s (2010: 291ff.) results suggest that parties try to compensate for their lack of issue ownership when they are in government in a country which is normally governed by the other camp. However, it is not clear to which degree this is a strategic move motivated by electoral considerations or if vested interests created during prior governments which mainly consisted of the party from the opposing camp hinder the normally inferior party to pull through their own policy preferences. This possibility is also pointed out by Jensen (2010: 295). Lastly, Green-Pedersen (2007: 14) objects that studies supporting the view that left parties are more prone to cutbacks are based on a low number of cases.

Based on the Phillips curve,[87] which depicts a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, Hibbs (1977: 1467ff.) stated that a country´s location on this curve – i.e., which evil it embraces in order to avoid the other – is partially determined by government partisanship. Hibbs (1992: 362f.) argues that unemployment negatively affects the lower classes, whereas inflation hurts the upper classes, because lower-class members hold mainly human capital and not much financial capital, so they are more reliant on the sale of their manpower to earn their living. Further, they hold more unprotected jobs with lower qualifications, so unemployment occurs more often here than in upper classes. Members of the upper class hold more financial capital, so mainly they are affected by inflation, while their jobs are more secure.

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[87]   The Philipps curve is an aspect of welfare spending, tendencially reducing unemployment by spurring domestic demand (leaving aside possible disincentive effects) and at the same time inflation.

Analysing 12 Western countries, Hibbs (1977: 1471ff.) supports the idea that unemployment and inflation are inversely related and that socialist-labour party rule is positively related to inflation (analysing 16 European countries in 2002, Goul Andersen and Jensen [2002: 27] could not find a systematic pattern of high inflation in countries with low or rapidly declining unemployment). Accordingly, socialist-labour rule is negatively related to unemployment (Hibbs 1977: 1474). Yet governments emphasising low unemployment instead of price stability and balanced budgets do not have necessarily to raise spending for public employment or transfer payments, the latter of which may boost domestic demand and therefore lower unemployment. As Hibbs (1977: 1487) illustrates, after Eisenhower´s policies in favour of balanced budgets and low inflation, the Kennedy/Nixon administrations lowered taxes to stimulate the US economy. In sum, if an economic upturn is prioritised over low inflation, welfare spending is merely the lower-class benefitting way of doing so, while tax cuts are the libertarian option.

In the ideal-typical Phillips curve inflation approaches infinity when the unemployment rate approaches zero percent while on the other side, rising unemployment leads to deflation (Johnson 1968: 985). The Phillips curve is contested by the Friedman-Phelps model, stating that the choice between unemployment and inflation can be merely limited in time and that unemployment results mainly from decisions at the micro level (this view is supported by Baccaro and Rei´s [2007: 551] analysis, showing a short-term Phillips curve effect of consumer prices indexes on unemployment, but no five-year effect). Unemployment in the Friedman-Phelps model is at the level where the unemployed put them via their unwillingness to take up work because of a lack of incentives or periods of searching. Phillips curve unemployment is interpreted as transitory phenomenon in times of higher uncertainty and fluctuations in the unemployment rate: Higher inflation makes unemployed persons believe that real wages are rising, which accelerates job search, while under lower inflation the opposite occurs. In the long run, workers can assess real wages more correctly and unemployment returns to its 'natural' level and Phillips curve effects vanish (Friedman 1977: 451ff., Rothschild 1978: 22ff.).

Yet the distinction between the short-term Phillips curve depicting the trade-off between unemployment and inflation and the long-term Philipps curve with the 'natural' rate of unemployment independent of inflation, has political implications. Assuming that low unemployment and low inflation raise governments´ chances to get re-elected, the short-term Phillips curve can be exploited. Wagschal (2003: 297ff.) depicts this as follows: Low unemployment in combination with low inflation get the governing party 50 percent of the votes, if one or both parameters is at a medium level, then 48 percent, if one or both parameters is at a high level, then 46 percent.

Ideally for government, in the second last year before election, inflation is very low and would bring about 50 percent of votes, yet unemployment is at such a high level that 46 percent would be the result. In the year before election, government raise spending so that inflation is still low enough to get 50 percent, yet unemployment is at the level which brings about 48 percent, i.e. the result would be 48 percent and therefore a lost election. In election year, inflation rises and unemployment declines (because governments try to "buy votes" in elections years, cf. Kumlin 2002b: 179 not supporting this view). Therefore, in election years inflation is at its highest level, and unemployment at its lowest, yet both are in the 50 percent region: Government get re-elected. In the year after election, government tries to limit spending and rising debt, so that unemployment will be at its highest levels and inflation on a lower level. Here, the combination of both factors is so unfortunate as to bring about 46 percent or less because of high unemployment. In the course of time, debts accumulate despite efforts to curb them, since this 'stop and go' causes transaction costs; additionally the efforts to curb inflation lead to higher interest rates, which raise government debt (Wagschal 2003: 299). Apart from this theory, based on 21 OECD democracies, Wagschal (2003: 309, 317) could not detect significant rises in debts before elections, but debt-raising effects from the frequency of elections.

Parties representing these classes act in their respective classes´ interests ('Partisan Theory'). Later more explicitly, Hibbs (1992: 362) assumed that "policies should be more expansionary […] under Left parties than Right ones". Yet even appreciating that the assumption of the Phillips curve is wrong, i.e. that there is no trade-off between unemployment and inflation (see footnote), the assumption of partisan effects can be maintained. Parties get elected and try to push through policies benefitting their core constituency. Here, parties´ vote-maximising behaviour is compatible to on-going ideological and programmatic differences between parties, since governments push through policies deviating from the median voter in order to get re-elected (Zohlnhöfer 2003: 49).

As will be seen below, among the many findings several studies yielded, one is the difference between Christian democratic and conservative or liberal parties in their welfare policies and some common traits between Christian democratic[88] and social democratic parties – at least in general welfare benefit level, yet not in welfare benefit distribution (see also Huber/Stephens 2001a: 16).

A more fundamental critique of the 'Partisan Theory' points to the underlying static view of parties basing their electoral success on their core constituency and not trying to win other parties´ voters by adopting some of their positions. Against the backdrop of shrinking core constituencies and shrinking clearly definable social groups, this strategy should become more attractive and blur party profiles.[89] Yet a complete heterogenisation of voters of certain parties did not occur; still certain profiles can be detected (chapter 9). Accordingly, voter homogeneity should be positively related to party differences, and with increasing heterogeneity these differences should vanish (Zohlnhöfer 2003: 50). Though, the whole reasoning is based on the view that voter preferences are determined by interests resulting from their objective membership to societal groups or classes. A different view is that voters´ ideas and interests deviate from their objective positions, since they have own ideas on how society or economy works and what the appropriate actions are (Zohlnhöfer 2003: 52f.). In this case, economically left parties would not base their support merely on those who are supposed to benefit from their policies, but also from members of other societal groups who

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[88] Castles (1994: 24) states that in predominantly Catholic countries like Ireland and France the Catholic Church may affect politicians from all parties and not just parties labelled as 'Christian'. This seems plausible, otherwise a 'liberal' party like Fianna Fáil would probably not have been the most successful party in Ireland. As an alternative to analyses of ruling parties´ partisanship effect on welfare state characteristics, Castles tests if there is a 'Catholic world of welfare'. Castles finds higher social security expenditures in these countries in 1960 and, even more so, in 1990, suggesting crucial effects from religion on welfare statism (Castles 1994: 26).

[89] Further, analogous to the Cleavage theory, the idea of parties basing their victories on their core constituency and benefitting them in return is hard-pressed to explain electoral volatility, since the size of societal groups does not change significantly between elections.

think that their policies are just or economically senseful etc., while some workers might vote for liberal parties, since they think low taxes and less strict labour laws reduce unemployment. Both views, voters voting according to their objective group membership and voters voting for parties according to their differing ideas and interests allow for party differences. Things are different if parties get elected for charismatic candidates. Although Zohlnhöfer (2003: 53) states that in OECD-democracies merely seldom parties are focused on a leader personality, what remains is that candidate orientation heterogenises parties´ voter base. This, in turn, could lead to less clear party profiles, but merely under the controversial assumption that candidate orientations gain importance in electoral behaviour.

Another point is that due to different policy fields and issues, party differences and voter heterogeneity within parties in respect to certain fields and issues may coexist (Zohlnhöfer 2003: 53). For example, Christian democratic parties´ core constituency is possibly more defined by its values in the conflict between church and state than their common economic or welfare interests. On the one hand, these parties are based on the middle and upper classes rejecting high fiscal burdens and favouring fragmented (earnings-related) programmes. On the other hand competition with social democratic parties makes Christian democratic parties cater to the needs of the lower classes (Huber/Stephens 2001a: 19). This leads to differences between these parties and typical 'right' parties (Zohlnhöfer 2003: 49) in respect to welfare policies.

Lastly, the direction of causality between government´s ideological orientation and welfare policies seems to be obvious at first sight. Yet in the context of their discussion of the endogeneity problem, i.e. the possibility that not just X causes Y but also vice versa, Esping-Andersen and Przworski (2001: 8f.) suggest that possibly welfare state characteristics affects government partisanship or that both result from the same factors. Given that welfare state policies create their own constituencies defending the status quo, this is plausible. Likewise, both factors may correlate because they result from the same factor. In Esping-Andersen´s and Przworski´s (2001:9) example, 'Swedishness' may lead to both, a generous welfare state and social democratic electoral successes.

The idea that ruling parties´ ideological orientations shape – in the long run – welfare state characteristics is based on Esping-Andersen´s (1990: 27) labelling of social democratic welfare states according to social democracy´s crucial impact upon these welfare states. The same could be said for conservative/corporatist welfare states, which have been shaped "by

conservative reformers as Bismarck and von Taaffe" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 24) and liberal welfare states based on "liberal work-ethic norms" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26).

That party ideology affects policies is not as trivial as it may seem at first sight. Parties´ electoral orientation, second parliament chambers (with different majorities than in the first chambers), presidentialism, direct democracy and constitutional jurisdiction may lower the capability of governments to push through their programmes (Zohlnhöfer 2003: 65f.).

In the following, several findings to partisanship effects will be presented. This is done to cover the decades between 1945 and around 2000. Following this, analyses will show that for welfare policies after 2000 party dominance matters. The time periods other authors´ analyses cover are roughly subdivided in the time from the end of the World War II until the mid-1970s and a second time period from the mid-1970s into the 1990s. The time periods are important since causal heterogeneity across different periods of welfare state expansion, stagnation and possibly retrenchment cannot be assumed. Kittel (2006: 661f.), for example, explains this with reference to Cronbach (1975: 123) stating that "the half-life of an empirical proposition may be great or small. The more open a system, the shorter the half-life of relations within it are likely to be" (quoted from Kittel 2006: 661). Kittel (2006: 661f.) points out that concerning individual attitudes Cronbach suggested a half-life period of a decade and infers that due to their higher openness, relations in nation states should have an even shorter half-life period.

10.2.2 State of research

10.2.2.1   Golden age partisanship effects

Hewitt (1977: 458ff.) found out that socialist party strength in legislatures in 25 countries between 1945 and 1965 is positively related to economic equality and redistribution. For a similarly period, Davis et al. (1974: 431) have shown that between 1963 and 1974 Congressional and Presidential partisanship affected US non-defence public spending in the expected direction. For the following period (1960-1975), Cameron (1978: 1252ff.) has shown a positive relationship between increases of government revenues as a percentage of GDP (and, presumably, expenditures) and social democratic or labour parties in government. He analysed the same 18 countries Esping-Andersen analysed in the "Three Worlds". Consonantly, Castles and McKinlay (1979: 166) have shown for 19 countries that electoral success of right parties (measured in votes) between 1958 and 1972 leads to lower public

welfare expenditures (index composed of three variables). The effect is strong and highly significant. Borg and Castles (1981: 617ff.) have shown that right parties in 16 countries (they left aside Switzerland and the US) negatively affected changes in expenditures for the old, the sick, the unemployed, and families (more than left party strength affects it positively). Hicks et al. (1989: 423f.) analysed partisanship effects in 16 developed democracies between 1957 and 1982 and found out that left party government[90] has positive effects on welfare spending as a percentage of GDP. Muller (1989: 367) analysed the same 18 countries as Esping-Andersen. He found out that right party strength between 1960 and 1975 is positively related to income inequality, whereas for left party strength the opposite holds true. In contrast, in O´Connor and Bryn´s (1998: 59f.) analysis of effects of left representation in cabinet in a similar period (1960-1980) and similar countries (Esping-Andersen´s countries, but without Japan) offers merely weak support for partisanship effects. For the earlier starting period from 1950 to 1980 and the same countries plus Japan, Pampel and Williamson (1988: 1450f.) concluded: Legislative strength of parties represented in cabinet is no important determinant of government expenditures for pensions, health, maternity, families, employment injuries and the unemployed. In contrast, for the period from 1960 to 1985 and 15 OECD countries (Esping-Andersen´s countries minus Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand), Roubini and Sachs (1989: 118f.) found out that left governments spent more as a percentage of GDP.

Blais et al. (1993: 41) analysed 15 democracies between 1960 and 1987. In their pooled data analysis, total public domestic non-defence spending as a percentage of GDP is weakly positively related to the share of left parties in cabinet (though partisanship of minority governments does not have any effects), while short-term effects of government partisanship are not statistically significant. They (1993: 55f.) point to the possibility that partisanship effects are time-lagged, since some programmes have to mature until they have their full budgetary effects. Further, it is possible that governments only significantly affect policies if they are in office long enough (Blais et al. 1993: 56), since it may take time for government to make bureaucracy act as wanted (Emmenegger 2007: 84). Time lags should not be equal across all countries, since some governments´ decisions have immediate effects and others´ have effects which come into being decades later (Kittel 2006: 660). Kittel (2006: 660) points to further inter-government differences. Some governments may prefer many small steps over a few long-negotiated big reforms, some governments´ reforms may be

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[90]   Binary coded: Value 1 if left parties participate in government, have more than 45 percent of the seats in the lower house that are held by governing parties, and have more seats than centre or right parties in government; otherwise 0 (Hicks et al. 1989: 408).

undone by their successors, some governments´ plans may not be implemented due to early elections etc. He concludes:

> "The question is how all these incalculable and, because of the social choice problem, unpredictable variations can be summarized in a single coefficient, which is independent of time and space. How can we even expect to find a systematic empirical relationship between two variables under these conditions?"

Possibly, if these distorting effects mentioned by Kittel are randomly distributed across governments of different partisanship, partisanship effects can nevertheless be detected. This can be seen in the results presented here and in the analyses below.

Analysing 15 OECD countries between 1965 and 1995, Swank (2001: 222ff.) could find merely insignificant effects from left or Christian democratic government on welfare effort. Yet this insignificance is sensitive to the inclusion of other variables. For the period between 1960 and 1982, Hicks and Swank (1992: 665) analysed Esping-Andersen´s 18 countries and found that governments composed of centre parties spent more than left governments. Analysing the same countries and the same time period, but operationalising the dependent variable differently,[91] Hicks and Misra (1993: 692) found out that left party cabinet participation lead to higher welfare spending, especially after 1974. This squares with Garrett´s (1998a: 78) results. Analysing the time between 1966 and 1990 in 14 highly developed countries, left-labour power and government spending in the 1980s were correlated. Congruently to Hicks and Misra (1993: 692), who found stronger partisanship effects after 1974, in Garrett´s three periods after 1973 correlations are higher than in 1966-1973. The same applies to income transfers, whereas here higher partisanship effects start only in the 1980-1984 period. Yet, controlled for other factors like GDP growth or percentage of old-age population, left-labour power remains a positive, but insignificant predictor of both, total spending and income transfers. Only in combination with trade or capital mobility, left-labour power significantly raises government spending (Garrett 1998a: 78ff.) and tax revenues, even controlled for other factors (Garrett 1998a: 90). In this respect, growing trade may strengthen partisanship effects, which in turn supports the thesis that these effects do not vanish due to growing external pressures, but foster parties´ importance. This may be a reason for the strengthening of partisanship effects Garrett discovered in the uncontrolled effects (next page):

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[91] Hicks and Swank (1992: 670) measured "Left Party Government Leadership" binary, 1 if the left party´s cabinet seats outnumbered those of centre and right parties, 0 if not. Hicks and Misra (1993: 703f.) measured "Left rule" as a continuous variable, the proportion of cabinet seats held by left parties.

Covering the period from 1961 to 1993 and fifteen OECD countries (not included: Ireland, New Zealand and Australia), Iversen (2001: 58ff.) found out that Left incumbency in the previous year does not significantly affect total government spending or government transfers, but boosts government consumption and replacement rates.[92] Iversen (2001: 77) concludes that right governments emphasised welfare state arrangements which preserve dependents´ status and income, while left governments have fostered more egalitarian programmes. In another study, Iversen and Soskice (2006: 172) analysed 14 countries from the late 1960s to the late 1990s. Right incumbency had negative effects on redistribution. Similarly, in Strang and Chang´s (1993: 249ff.) analysis of 18 countries between 1960 and 1980, left party rule had significant positive effects on welfare spending as a percentage of GDP, while right party rule had negative effects. Lastly, in an analysis of 16 European countries between 1961 and 1989, Obinger and Schmitt (2011: 261ff.) could not detect any significant effects of left or Christian democratic cabinet partisanship ("both party families with a strong pro-welfare orientation", 2011: 261) on annual changes in social spending.

Results presented above refer to pre- oil-crisis periods or to periods stretching over the mid-1970s. Swank (1988: 1132ff) doubts that partisanship effects got stronger after the oil crisis. She analysed non-military outlays in the 18 countries Esping-Andersen categorised. In her results, between 1960 and 1973, right parties in government negatively affected expenditures. Though, in the 1973-1980 era, these effects vanished (1988: 1137.). Swank (1988: 1127) suspects that for economic reasons and Keynesianism´s lower influence parties of different ideological backgrounds converged in austerity.

Other authors suggest the opposite: Hicks and Misra (1993: 696), with references to Crouch´s polarisation thesis, explain their results in the following way (next page):

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[92]   In Green-Pedersen´s (2007: 15) view, besides differences in the number of countries analysed, one major cause of different assessments of partisanship effects lies in different dependent variables: Congruently to Iversen´s results, he states that analyses of replacement rates often come to the conclusion that politics matter, while analyses using social expenditures as a share of GDP as dependent variable come to the conclusion that this is not the case. This is highly plausible: Benefit levels, conditions of eligibility and entitlements periods are directly affected by political decisions, in other words, they are *outputs* of the political system. Expenditure levels, in contrast, result from these factors and other factors not directly changeable by political decisions, such as the number of dependents. Therefore, these levels may be considered *outcomes*: "If the primary focus of interest is the political process which brings about welfare state change researchers are well advised to focus on policy outputs, as policy outcomes are influenced by a range of social, economic and political factors" (Sigel 2007: 55). Further, in respect to our question replacement rates are far more important than total spending, since our survey items seem to imply government responsibility for a single unemployed or retired person and not for all of them divided by their number. If this were the case, we should expect high support for government responsibility for the unemployed or the old in countries where their relative share of the population is high. Although a positive relationship between unemployment rate and preferences for government responsibility may be detected, this should result from higher perceived 'deservingness' or the higher likelihood of personal acquaintance with unemployed persons and not by respondents understanding the answer continuum as ranging from low to high proportion of GDP and taking into account the number of dependents.

> "Perhaps support for expanded social spending was so prevalent before post-OPEC challenges to the Keynesian welfare state that expansions of welfare effort really did not differ across parties".

Summarising, pre-oil shock partisanship effects may be weakened by upward convergence and post- oil shock effects by downward convergence.

10.2.2.2   Post- oil shock partisanship effects

Roubini and Sachs (1989: 102) summarise the economic changes in the 1970s as follows:

> "All of the OECD economies experienced a steep decline in total factor productivity growth beginning in the early 1970s, and almost all suffered a terms-of-trade deterioration following the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979".

In Pierson´s (1996: 29) view, retrenchment cannot be explained with the same factors as expansion. Therefore and because of possibly instable macro relationships it should not be taken for granted that while partisanship mattered during welfare states´ expansion, this necessarily applies to times of austerity.

Allan and Scruggs (2004: 504) analysed the effects of left or right party strength in government (measured in cabinet seats) on replacement rates in unemployment schemes between 1975 and 1999 in the 18 countries Esping-Andersen analysed. Thereby they circumvent the fallacy of mistaking overall spending as valid indicators of welfare state generosity without taking into account changes in the number of dependents. They (2004: 505ff.) find partisanship effects in the expected direction.

Amable et al. (2006: 427ff.) analysed partisan effects for the reaction to structural change in the same countries for the period 1981-1999 and used two measures of welfare statism: Overall spending as a percentage of GDP and net replacement rate, as used by Allan and Scruggs. They find partisan effects for both, spending/GDP and sickness replacement rates, whereas generally structural change has a positive effect on welfare spending.

Korpi and Palme (2003: 441) also based their analysis on the same 18 countries, in the time between 1975 and 1995. Their analysis of replacement rates shows that secular conservative parties were more likely to cut welfare payments than left parties, with confessional (i.e. Christian democratic) parties in between. A similar time span has been analysed by Pontusson et al. (2002: 304). They found out that left rule between 1970 and 1990 had positive effects on unemployment replacement rates in the first year of unemployment between 1985 and 1991 in 15 affluent countries. Yet this association is weaker

than between left governments and high marginal tax rates, and they point out that replacement rates do not tell the whole story. Coverage is a second relevant factor of generosity.[93] For the time span between 1975 and 2001 and 17 developed democracies, Brady et al. (2005: 930ff.) found out that left cabinets positively affected de-commodification, social welfare expenditures and social security transfers. Christian democracy´s positive effects are significant merely in the case of de-commodification.

De Haan and Sturm (1994: 165f.) show that both, the share of parliamentary seats held by left parties and the share of cabinet seats, significantly positively affected government spending as a share of GDP in the 12 EC countries in 1989 (the effect of parliamentary seats is stronger). Further, "in countries having left-wing governments the share of government spending in total output is generally higher" (1994: 168). Though, for 21 OECD countries they (1997: 746) find that government spending between 1982 and 1992 is not affected by the share of cabinet seats held by social democratic and other left parties. Lipsmeyer (2000: 1197ff.) analysed partisanship effects in six CEE countries (the Visegrád countries, Slovenia and Estonia). After 1992, right or centre party dominance in parliament was significantly related to cuts in unemployment and pension replacement rates or eligibility durations.

Bradley et al. (2003: 193ff.) analysed effects of government partisanship in 14 Western countries on redistribution. The time span differs across countries, yet nearly all time points are between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s. In their results, left governments had a positive impact on redistribution and post-tax/transfer inequality reduction whereas for Christian democratic governments the opposite holds true. Christian democratic welfare states have more egalitarian effects than liberal welfare states, yet not because of Christian democratic parties, but because they tend to have stronger unions or longer periods of leftist governments than liberal welfare states (Bradley et al. 2003: 225f.).

Kittel and Obinger´s analysis of the time between 1980 and 1997, "a period marking the end of the expansionary phase" (2003: 5) is insightful. Differentiating between Leftist, Christian democratic and conservative/liberal parties, they present several findings: In the 21 OECD countries observed (Esping-Andersen´s 18 countries plus Spain, Portugal and Greece), leftist representation in government leads significantly (at least at the 10 percent-level) to stronger growth of social spending; for secular conservative parties the opposite applies. Yet, with the

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[93]　Due to rising long-term unemployment the neglect of this group by a focus on the first year of unemployment is problematic. In southern welfare states replacement rates drop sharply for the long-term unemployed. A focus on the first year would overestimate these countries´ generosity (with the exception of Italy, which is not in our analysis, these countries are not included in Pontusson et al.´s calculations).

introduction of the controls (trade openness, growth of unemployment, the share of the elderly in the population) the already weak significance vanished. Therefore they conclude that left partisanship effects are fragile (2003: 42). Analysing net social expenditure, the picture changes: Partisanship between 1945 and 1995 has effects on gross spending levels in 1995: "The findings […] strongly confirm the 'parties do matter hypothesis'" (Kittel/Obinger 2003: 44). Though, Christian democracy has no significant effects. Further, other partisanship effects are restricted to gross social spending, whereas net social spending seems unaffected. Regarding temporal stability, some results suggest that partisanship effects are smaller in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Kittel and Obinger (2003: 48) suspect that in the 1980s, parties still mattered because there still was some leeway. The 1990s´ cost containment happened regardless of party colour (see also Huber/Stephens 2001b: 125).

This idea is supported by the view that, beginning in the 1990s and possibly caused by pressures from globalisation, social democratic parties partially adopted their Christian democratic competitors´ policies. This is Seeleib-Kaiser´s (2002: 480ff.) conclusion based on analyses including the Dutch PvdA, the German SPD, the Swedish SAP and the British Labour Party. The programmatic changes of these four parties imply less government responsibility in favour of more market and community – based arrangements.[94] Congruently, Keman (2010: 671ff.) analysed 19 social democratic parties in 18 countries (two in Belgium). In the period between 1991 and 2004 on average these parties were less politically left and slightly less pro-welfare than between 1975 and 1990 (the sole party becoming remarkably more pro-welfare has been the social democratic party of New Zealand), but electorally more successful. More recently, Jensen (2011b: 125) analysed effects of Left parliamentary strength on health care spending and social care spending in 18 countries between 1980 and 1990, 1991 and 2001 and 1980 and 2001. The sole significant effect was a *negative* effect of left government strength on social care expenditure between 1991 and 2001, supporting the Nixon-goes-to-China hypothesis (Jensen 2011b: 131).

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[94]   In a non-quantitative description of the Dutch, German, Swedish and British social democratic parties and their orientations form the 1980s onwards, Seeleib-Kaiser (2002: 483ff.) incorporated a two-dimensional model. One dimension is market vs. state, the other individuals vs. community. He assigns four political ideologies: Liberalism (market, individuals), conservatism (market, community), social democracy (state, individuals) and Christian democracy (state, community). He (2002: 489) asserts that the social democratic parties of the four countries moved away from state and individual orientation and looked more towards the market and the community to provide welfare. As a result, there are new similarities between social democratic and Christian democratic parties: "A Christ-democratization of social democratic parties" (2002: 493, my translation from original German.). Since Seeleib-Kaiser finds no signs of significant programmatic changes among the Christian democratic parties, the "parties-do-matter" hypothesis is weakened by social democrats´ move towards Christian democracy. In sum, he notes that his findings challenge the use of party categorisations as "social democratic" or "Christian democratic" as determinants of welfare policies from the 1990s onwards.

Pennings (2005) explored partisanship effects on welfare spending in 21 countries (Esping-Andersen´s 18 countries plus Spain, Portugal and Greece) between 1980 and 1998 by using fuzzy sets. Left cabinet seats positively affected welfare outlays (Pennings 2005: 335). Analysing effects of Left parties´ cabinet share between 1960 and 2003 on welfare spending in 23 countries in 2003, Castles (2009: 54) found significant positive effects on working-age cash expenditures and total public social expenditure, both as a percentage of GDP. Effects on age-related cash expenditures were positive, yet statistically insignificant. Jensen´s (2010: 287ff.) study of spending in 18 Western nations between 1980 and 2000 and cabinet partisanship since 1946 shows that left-wing parties spent more on welfare. Yet, analysing 18 countries between 1985 and 2002, he (2011: 178ff.) found no Left cabinet effect on social spending as a percentage of GDP. Emmenegger (2007: 85ff.) analysed effects of cabinet composition on welfare spending in 18 countries between 1980 and 2000, 15 of them European. Left and centre party rule, if enduring long enough, significantly raises welfare outlays. The effect rises with the number of years in office (Emmenegger 2007: 90f.).

Returning to above-mentioned Garrett´s results, in another analysis, he (1995: 674) could not find any systematic significant effects of left-labour power (left party representation and union strength) on government spending from the 1960s to 1990 in 15 countries. In contrast, Iversen and Cusack (2000: 324ff.) could find significant effects of left labour power on government consumption, although they analysed the same countries and the same time span. They (2000: 322) point out that results are "highly sensitive to the precise specification of the control variables". Though, in their respecification (1961-1993) partisan effects on consumption and transfer levels are absent, whereas they qualify this finding:

> "All of the political variables turn out to affect civilian government consumption in the predicted direction […] a typical left government spends about 2 percent more than a typical right government if we look at the long run" (Iversen/Cusack 2000: 335).

Important here is the reason they bring up: They point out that the absence of effects on overall spending levels does not prove that partisanship effects are absent, since "the level of transfer payments is not necessarily a contentious partisan issue, unlike the distributive composition of such payments" (Iversen/Cusack 2000: 335). This is congruent with Esping-Andersen´s (1990: 115) statement that

> "there is no reason to believe that expenditure commitments, as such, should be related to left-party power. A large social wage could emerge as well from authoritarian regimes or from Catholicism".

Accordingly, the insight that Left parties foster higher welfare spending covers only one aspect of cash benefits. It just confirms that social democratic parties spend more on welfare, but neglects the distribution of benefits. It analyses a line instead of a triangle.

Huber et al. (1993: 734ff.) analysed effects of cabinet partisanship on social security transfers as a percentage of GDP in 17 OECD countries between 1956 and 1988. They found that primarily social democratic incumbency fosters government revenue (and, presumably, spending), and an expansion of the public sector. Christian democracy strongly and positively affects transfer payments. Though, it "tends to reproduce social inequalities" (1993: 740) while the expansion of the public sector by social democratic parties is seen by Huber et al. (1993: 740) as a reflection of these parties´ commitment to reduce inequalities. Therefore, social democrats and Christian democrats cause high spending, but the latter ones do so in a less redistributing manner (Huber et al. 1993: 713). This is also expressed in Esping-Andersen and van Kersbergen´s (1992: 194) statement that "aggregate spending ratios fail to distinguish the characteristic effects of social democracy from those of other political forces such as Christian democracy". This is supported by Pampel and Williamson (1988: 1451), who explain largely absent partisanship effects in their analyses with the assumption that rather the distribution of benefits than their overall level may be affected by partisanship.

Besides the concentration on spending levels instead of spending distribution, the use of spending as a percentage of GDP without regard to the number of dependents may be criticised. Overall spending levels are often strongly affected by demographic factors, since expenditures on two out of the three most expensive programmes, pensions and health, are partially determined the share of the aged among the population (Fig. 3.3). The inclusion of demographic factors in many analyses minimises this error. Further, spurious partisanship effects can solely be mistaken as real causal effects by the neglect of demographic factors if demographic factors are systematically related to partisanship.

Another factor is influence of opposition parties on governments´ behaviour: "Government stances will also depend on the feasibility and likely policy appeal of alternative government coalitions" (Kitschelt 2001: 268f.). Although in contrast to the vote- or office- seeking party the policy-seeking party may place lower emphasis on re-election, plausibly policy-seeking parties also place emphasis on it, since staying in government is a necessary precondition to carry on preferred policies. Therefore, even policy-seeking parties may be affected by oppositional parties and their strength. Hicks and Swank incorporated oppositional parties

into their analysis, and found that "contagion from the left" sometimes raises right and centre governments´ welfare spending (1992: 665ff.).

10.2.3 The special case of CEE countries

As can be seen, none but one (Lipsmeyer 2000: 1197ff.) of the analyses cited here incorporates former socialist countries (for critique of the assumption of similar effects of government partisanship in different countries see Jensen 2011: 175). Tavits and Letki (2009: 555ff.) argue that in CEE countries leftist parties pushed through politics of the right and vice versa, since leftist parties had to prove their rejection of socialism and had a more loyal electorate, which enabled them to implement unpopular policies with less fear of losing elections. At the same time, rightist parties did not have to prove their pro-market stance (Tavits/Letki 2009: 557). Another reason is partially based on an argument already to be found above, namely that welfare cuts conducted by leftist parties are considered necessary by the electorate – "why else would a party with a pro-welfare image take an electorally suicidal policy turn?" (Tavits/Letki 2009: 556). Another cause is that the left sides of political spectra were less fragmented, leading to lower competition for left parties, since voters could not vote for parties further to the left (Tavits/Letki 2009: 555). Analysing 13 CEE countries between 1989 and 2004, Tavits and Letki (2009: 561ff.) show significant negative effects of left cabinet partisanship on various measures of welfare spending levels (not replacement rates), controlled for numerous other factors.

Because of these results, additional separate calculations for CEE countries will be conducted, and, mirroring this, calculations for non-CEE countries alone.

10.2.4 Summary

As shown, what Skocpol and Amenta (1986: 141) and Quadagno (1987: 115) wrote for the state of research until the mid-1980s, that parties matter, still applies according to the summarised literature. Out of more than 30 studies cited here, more than 25 came to the conclusion that the ideological orientation of predominant parties matters for welfare expenditures. Still, there are slight indications that partisanship mattered less in welfare state retrenchment than in expansion.

The few analyses incorporating welfare states´ two-dimensionality confirm that social democratic parties spend more, and more equally. Christian democratic parties spend sometimes less, and to support status differences (yet, earnings-related benefits are mostly

financed via earnings-related contributions, which in turn equalise net earnings). Secular conservative parties or liberal parties spent less (and won votes for retrenchment, cf. Giger/Nelson 2010: 1 ff. analysing 18 Western countries between 1970 and 2002).

10.3 Measuring ruling partisanship

One way to measure ruling partisanship is to use the percentage of votes parties of different ideological affiliations get at elections, as done by Castles and McKinlay (1979: 166). The advantage is that this measure captures parties´ popularity in the electorate. If a party has a certain share of the votes but a far lower share of parliamentary seats (due to disproportional representation) or cabinet seats (maybe because in coalitions the leading party has to court necessary smaller parties by offering them a higher share of cabinet seats than their legislative strength suggests, or if a party is considered as extreme and therefore not as viable coalition partner), then its popularity within the electorate may still force ruling parties to adopt some of their policies. As Borg and Castles (1981: 605) note, this measure´s legitimisation rests "upon the assumption that politicians take note of the divisions in popular public opinion in formulating their policy decisions".

Secondly, the percentage of legislative seats may be used, as done by Hewitt (1977: 458) or Pampel and Williamson (1988: 1450f.). After all, in parliamentary systems laws and regulations have to pass parliament. Hewitt argues that oppositional parties have an impact, since ruling parties may try to lower oppositions parties´ appeal by adopting some of their proposals (the 'contagion from the left/right' argument). Borg and Castles (1981: 606) see this measures´ advantage in the attention it pays to "the distorting effect of electoral politics".

Blais et al. (1993: 50, see also Emmenegger 2007: 86) criticise the use of votes or parliamentary seats as indicators of the strength of different political camps, arguing that

> "if the basic decision-making unit is the cabinet, an assumption that underlies the whole approach, surely the most logical indicator is the percentage of cabinet positions held by parties of various stripes".

Huber et al. (1993: 725) support this: "Cabinet share measures direct influence on policy". Though, Pampel and Williamson (1988: 1436f.) point out that differences between legislative and cabinet seat shares are small. The disadvantage of this method is that contagion effects from the right or the left on the governing parties have to be neglected. Further, in coalitions smaller parties´ possibilities to defend their positions is varying. Their threats to leave the coalition are more credible if they have other options, and their threats are more serious if

they are indispensable for government majority in parliament, which is not the case for all coalition parties in oversized coalitions (Strøm 2000: 280).

As noted above, party strength is measured in all years since democratisation. Here, the 'cumulative share of seats' is defined as the cabinet share a party held from 1945 or later democratisation until 2008 (cf. Jensen 2010: 287).

Therefore, in some countries cabinet composition six decades ago is believed to be systematically related to welfare policies in the early 2000s, 2008 or 2011. There are two reasons why this is possible. Firstly, as seen in the results above, partisanship effects are often time-lagged. If one adheres to Kittel and Obinger´s (2003: 39f.) view that welfare state arrangements are highly path-dependent or not, it is clear that government

> "takes over many of the activities of its predecessors without really considering doing away with any of them, although it may consider marginal alterations of their quantity or reorganization of their administration" (Downs 1957: 69).

Another reason not to downweight post-war cabinets is its inherent arbitrariness.

In contrast to Jensen (2010: 288), who categorised countries into left-wing or right-wing dominated, depending on which parties held more cabinet seats over time, here a simple dichotomy will be foregone in favour of percentages of each ideological direction. Cabinet shares are weighted by the number of months; parties of the same ideological orientation are subsumed into one number of an ideological direction in a certain time span.

10.3.1 Categorisation of parties

Parties will be categorised into nine ideological orientations: Green, socialist/communist, social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic/religious, secular conservative, right-wing, agrarian, and regional/ethnic. Number, names of categories and borders between them are debatable (Mair/Mudde 1998: 221f. summarise positions concerning these questions).

Secular conservative and Christian democratic/religious parties are treated as two different categories, since the latter are believed to be more pro-welfare. This is caused by the Catholic social teaching (Obinger/Kittel 2003: 362) and Protestantism´s various effects on welfare states (ch. 2.2.1).

Based on Kitschelt´s statement that "the New Left stands for 'leftist' income redistribution […] the New Radical Right […] advocates free market economics […]" (cited in Knutsen 1998a: 74), Knutsen (1998a: 74) suspects that Green parties should be located on the economic left side, and right-wing parties on the right side. Also ethnic parties should be on the anti-welfare side, since they "clearly belong to the non-socialist, or bourgeois, group of parties" (Knutsen 1998: 72), while he emphasises that they do not define themselves in left-right terms (Knutsen elaborates national specifics). Yet, parties differ in the issues they accentuate (Sniderman/Bullock 2004: 348). Generally, for green, agrarian, regional/ethnic and nationalist parties welfare state issues are secondary.

It has to be settled which party can be attributed to which ideological direction. There are several ways of doing this: As pointed out by Esping-Andersen and van Kersbergen (1992: 189), Petersen and Thomas define those parties as social democratic which belong to the 2nd International. Another way of identifying to which ideological camp a party belongs to is to analyse their goals and choices. The third, and as Esping-Andersen and van Kersbergen point out, most common approach is to label 'social democratic' those parties on the left (and, correspondingly, Christian democratic or conservative those on the right).

If possible, parties are categorised according to Armingeon et al.´s (2010) Comparative Political Data Set Codebooks or to Lane et al.´s (1997) Political Data Handbook. Mair and Mudde (1998: 218f.) address the problem that such data sets are, and have to be, created by the use of the same scales which are applied to different political systems, independent of local context. Further, developed in the western context, it is questionable if they are applicable to CEE countries and if categories developed decades ago are still applicable. Mair and Mudde (1998: 225) state that the use of ideology, in contrast to the use of origin,[95] allows for re-categorisations of parties which changed their ideological orientation. Given the huge number of countries and, consequently, parties, it is not possible to do this within the frame of this work. Further, ostensibly only a small number of parties changed basic ideological orientations.

For parties which may not be categorised using these sources, categorisation from the Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services´ 'Election Database', or categorisations by other

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[95]   One of Mair and Mudde´s (1998: 223f.) two suggestions is to categorise parties according to their origin, to tap "into what parties are rather than what parties do" (1998: 223). Following from this, "a socialist party is a socialist party is a socialist party, regardless of the extent to which its ideology, policies, or electoral base might later be modified" (1998: 223). In our context, this is not useful, since what voters´ anticipations of parties´ policies when in office and their actual policies are relevant for the causel link between attitudes and policies, i.e.what they do and possibly promise to do.

authors are used, or their affiliation to European party families via their membership or affiliation to political groups in the European Parliament. The latter method "enjoys the advantage of being straightforward and easy to apply" and results from parties´ self-categorisation (Mair/Mudde 1998: 216), which is superior based on the idea that parties know best where they stand. Though Mair and Mudde (1998: 216f.) state that this method gains relevance, they list several disadvantages. First, the method is more applicable for parties belonging to old party families like Christian democrats, social democrats and liberals. Further, categorisations depend on the selection of the relevant transnational federations, since some parties may belong to one party family in one federation and to a different one in another (Mair/Mudde 1998: 217). Nevertheless, during categorisation it became obvious that this is the case with only a small minority of parties.

Parties still uncategorised after these steps were classified according to descriptions of their ideology and welfare state programmes. Here, ascription such as 'free-market' or 'social democratic' guided the classifications. In the appendixes A4 and A5 all sources considered are listed, though not all sources confirmed chosen categorisations.

Results are highly sensible to the categorisation of long-term successful parties. A vivid case is Ireland, where the categorisation of Fianna Fáil results in high values for the liberal direction.

10.3.2 Cabinet Ideology

The period from the postwar era until 2008 will be categorised into three sub periods: Pre- oil shock, post- oil shock until 1990, and post-1990. The period beginning in 1991 is considered a different phase, since very roughly around this time it may be argued that back then welfare states were in a period of reconsidering their institutions (March/Olsen 1989: 167). For ideologies´ cabinet strength in three subperiods and the whole period see appendix A5.

Ruling partisanship and welfare policies: Analysis

The distinction between coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs) and possibly weaker partisanship effects on welfare policies and/or advantages for left-wing parties to implement their goals in CMEs and advantages for right-wing parties in LMEs (Beramendi/Cusack 2009: 263f.) will be left out in the analysis below.

The advantage of using relatively long time periods is that governments decide on changes which have time-lagged consequences for various reasons. Pierson (2004: 88) points to "systemic retrenchments", e.g. decisions to limit tax burdens which will lead to cutbacks later: "A conservative government´s main impact on the welfare state might be felt a decade or more after it had left office" (Pierson 2004: 88). In the case of causal chain arguments like this, it is important that there is a small number of strong chain links. If not, the multiplication of probabilities results in only a weak link (Pierson 2004: 88).

Besides that, changes may be introduced intentionally with time lags. If cutbacks are expected to fuel protests or electoral disadvantages, it could be advisable for governments to implement time-lagged cutbacks.

Yet long observation periods also come with an important disadvantage. Although below (Fig. 10.10) it will be shown that cabinet strength of different ideological orientations is very stable between observation periods, intra-period changes are left unregarded. The German case is a vivid example: In the periods 1975-1990 as well as 1991-2008, Christian democratic/religious and social democratic cabinet share is roughly equal (the former being slightly higher). The long time periods conceal what happened due to changing cabinet compositions in 1982, 1998 and 2005.

There are three basic assumptions concerning partisanship effects on welfare state policies. All three are ideal cases.

Firstly, cabinet composition may be irrelevant in this respect. This would imply that, even if welfare attitudes are systematically related to electoral decisions, citizens do not affect welfare policies in their favored directions via their vote.

Secondly, later governments could change or abolish previous governments' policies, so that later cabinet compositions are more important.

Lastly, initial cabinets could have set the country on a specific path hard to reverse by subsequent cabinets. This would imply that an early window of opportunity is closed now, so that current elections do not affect welfare policies. Pierson (2004: 91) states that expenditure growth in the case of income transfers programmes since the mid- 1970s has been caused mostly by the maturing of earlier commitments and less by new decisions. Although this refers more to total outlays and less to replacement rates, the latter may rise if a rising share of dependents fulfils conditions to have high replacements rates.

The third case is closely linked to the idea of path dependence. If recent cabinet composition is far more closely linked to current welfare state characteristics than cabinet

composition in a previous time period, policies are merely weakly path dependent. If the opposite applies, first cabinets have set welfare states on a specific path hard to reverse by subsequent cabinets (see also Giger/Nelsen 2010: 7).

10.3.3 Reducing the number of ideological orientations

The first finding is that cabinet strength of various ideological orientations is negatively correlated. There are two contrasting explanations. Either an ideological orientation has a low cabinet share because another, ideologically distinct orientation holds power. Or an ideological orientation is weak because a similar orientation holds cabinet shares. In this case, both orientations are substitutable, or one ideology is weak because a successful party between two ideologies has been categorised as belonging to the ideology, so that due to categorisation decisions the value of the first ideology has been reduced. Problematically, both cases, the success of one ideology and the mathematically logical unsuccessfulness of a contrasting ideology and the substitutability of one ideology for another or borderline categorisations lead to the same result, a negative correlation between both ideological strengths. Tables 10.1- 10.4 show these correlations in the four periods.

Table 10.1: Correlations between ideologies´ cabinet strengths 1945-12/1974

	Social dem	Liberal	Christian dem.	Conservative
Socialist/communist	-.34	.58*	-.23	-.25
Socdem	-	-.37	-.47	-.16
Liberal		-	.05	-.36
Christian dem.			-	-.45

n = 13; *: p < .05

Table 10.2: Correlations between ideologies´ cabinet strengths 1975-12/1990

	Social dem	Liberal	Christian dem.	Conservative
Socialist/communist	-.44	.34	.11	.42
Socdem	-	-.45	-.54*	.04
Liberal		-	.49	-.73**
Christian dem.			-	-.57*

n = 16; *: p < .05

Table 10.4 (next page) shows correlations for the whole period. The strongest negative correlations are between conservative and liberal parties, between Christian democratic/ religious and social democratic parties and between the latter and socialist/communist parties.

Especially socialist/communist parties and conservative parties have high figures of mutual exclusiveness.

Table 10.3: Correlations between ideologies´ cabinet strengths 1991-2008

	Social dem	Liberal	Christian dem.	Conservative
Socialist/communist	-.45*	.13	.17	-.23
Socdem	-	-.38	-.31	.20
Liberal		-	-.07	-.49*
Christian dem.			-	-.37

n = 27; *: p < .05. The maximum number of cases is 27. Due to their different political systems, Russia and Ukraine are not in the analyses. Further, numerous endeavours to ascertain Cyprus´ cabinet composition between 1978 and 1998 did not yield any results. Several sources, including emabssies in Nikosia and Berlin, could not provide useful information.

Table 10.4: Correlations between ideologies´ cabinet strengths 1945-2008

	Social dem	Liberal	Christian dem.	Conservative
Socialist/communist	-.43*	.16	.08	-.25
Socdem	-	-.35	-.47*	.12
Liberal		-	.01	-.50**
rel			-	-.40*

n = 27; *: p < .05 **: p < .01;

It becomes clear that some ideologies have to be subsumed because they are functionally similar. Socialist/communist parties have the below high value of 69 percent mutual exclusiveness (table 10.5) mainly because in many countries they never held any cabinet seats. Yet, Table 10.4 shows that this only leads to significant negative cabinet strength with social democratic parties. Therefore, and because socialist/communist parties may in some respects be considered extreme versions of social democratic parties, both ideologies get subsumed into the new category "left parties", the strong social democratic parties (29.5 percent over the whole period) and the weak socialist/communist parties (2.2 percent, mainly due to 22.1 percent in Lithuania).

Further, conservative parties have a high value of mutual exclusiveness (52 percent, Table 10.5) and are absent in nine countries. Exclusiveness values for liberal (13/27) and Christian democratic/religious (14/27) parties to conservative parties are similar. Christian democratic/religious and liberal strength in the whole period is similar, with Christian democratic/religious (17.9 percent) parties being a little bit stronger than liberal (17.8 percent) and conservative parties (16.2 percent).

Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 (above) show that only in the first period the negative correlation between conservative and religious parties has been stronger than between conservative and liberal parties. Further, a 'libcon' category would have a lower standard

deviation (19.85) than the 'relcon' category (23.20), implying that the combination of liberal and conservative cabinet strength leads to a more equal distribution between countries than the combination of Christian democratic/religious and conservative parties.

Liberal and Christian democratic/religious parties have a very low number of mutual exclusive countries (3/24) and in most periods negligible correlations in their cabinet strength.

Table 10.5: Absence of one ideology in the presence of the other, 1945-2008

	Social dem	Liberal	Chr. dem	Conservative	Mutual exclusiveness
Socialist/communist	19/27	16/24	14/23	17/22	69
Socdem	-	5/27	6/27	8/26	35
Liberal	5/27	-	3/24	13/27	36
Chr. dem	6/27	3/24	-	14/27	37
Conservative	8/26	13/27	14/27	-	52

First figure: Cases in which one of both ideologies is absent. Second figure: Number of cases in which at least one ideology is present.

Three ideological directions remain: Left (social democratic and socialist/communist), Christian democratic/religious and liberal/conservative. In all three periods left cabinet strength is negatively correlated to Christian democratic/religious and to liberal/conservative strength. Figs. 10.4-10.8 show negative relationships between left and Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength.

Figure 10.4: Relationship between left and Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength 1945-1974

Pearson´s r -.49, significant at 10 percent-level

Figure 10.5: Relationship between left and Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength 1975 –1990

Pearson´s r -.56, significant at 5 percent-level

Figure 10.6: Relationship between left and Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength 1991-2008

Pearson´s r -.42, significant at 5 percent-level

Figure 10.7: Relationship between left and Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength (without Croatia)

Figure 10.8: Relationship between left and Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength 1995-2008 (without CEE and southern countries)

For liberal/conservative parties results are similar. Correlations with left parties are at -.43 in the first (n=13) and second period (n=16, significant at the 10 percent-level in the second period) and at -.22 (n=27) in the third period (insignificant) and -.23 for the whole period.

Without Southern and CEE countries, the correlation in the second period is at -.31 (n=12) and in the third period at -.67 (n=12, significant at the 5 percent-level).

10.3.4 Intertemporal stability of party dominance

The last point to be discussed about party rule before party rule´s effects on welfare policies can be analysed is party rule stability. There is considerable stability across time.

Table 10.6: Intertemporal stability of cabinet strength of different ideologies

	Left 1	Left 2	Chr. dem 1	Chr. dem 2	Lib/con 1	Lib/con 2
Period 2	.78**		.87***		.75**	
Period 3	.83***	.61* (.63*)	.64*	.68***(.64*)	.60*	.54* (.56*)
n	13	16 (13)	13	16 (13)	13	16 (13)

*: p < .05 **: p < .01; ***: p < .001. Figures in brackets: Result for the the 13 countries already in period 1 (i.e. without GR, PT, ES).

Figure 10.9: Relationship between Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength 1945-12/1974 and 1975-1990

Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Turkey: Same values.

The high intercorrelation obstructs the assessment of path dependent effects. Given that in numerous countries there has been merely one party for each ideological direction, seemingly 'delegation' is more important than 'accountability' (see chapter 10.1 and figure 10.2): If citizens were being left disappointed by numerous governments and voted them out of office (accountability), ideological directions´ strength (which equals parties if there is just one party for each direction) would be less stable between periods. The high importance of 'delegation' implies that citizens´ chances to turn their preferences into policies should have been high (see chapter 10.1). Chapter 10.4 will show if this is the case.

10.4   Parties' effects on welfare policies

For the operationalisation of the dependent variables see appendix A5.

10.4.1 Pension and unemployment benefit levels: Generosity

Figure 10.10: Effects of left cabinet strength on cash benefit levels

Pensions: **1945-1974 aR²=-.09;n= 13**| 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=-.09;n= 12| 1975-1990 aR²=-.07;n=16 | 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.08;n= 12| 1991-2008 aR²=.07;n=24 | 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.08;n= 13| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.09;n= 10| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=.21;n= 11| **1945-2008 aR²=.09;n= 24**| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.05;n= 13| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.04;n= 10

Unemployment benefits: 1945-1974 aR²=-.05;n=13 | 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=-.08;n= 12| 1975-1990 aR²=-.02;n= 16| **1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.02;n= 12**| 1991-2008 aR²=-.04;n= 25| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.07;n= 15| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.06;n= 11| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.06;n= 10| **1945-2008 aR²=-.04;n= 25**| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.08;n= 15| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.11;n= 11

Left power in nearly all periods is positively related to pension generosity in the early 2000s and in 2008 (Fig. 10.10). Given that the sole exception is negative only due to Turkey, it is concludeable that generally left cabinet share is positively related to pension generosity.

This also applies to left power and unemployment generosity before 1990. In the period 1991-2008 effects are slightly positive across all countries, but negative without southern and CEE countries and in CEE countries (the latter fact in line with results of Tavits and Letki 2009: 561ff.). Overall, left power has weak positive effects, and weak negative effects without southern and CEE countries. As in ch. 7.1, results in bold type are shown in two-dimensional graphs visualizing the placement of countries.

Figure 10.11: Relationship between left cabinet strength 1945-1974 and pension generosity early 2000s

Pearson´s r: -.05. Generosity: mean of 16 indicators

Fig. 10.11 shows the left effect of Fig. 10.10. Left cabinet share between 1945 and 1974 is negatively related to pension generosity (mean of 16 indicators) in the early 2000s. One can imagine the effect of Turkey on the regression line. Without Turkey, the line rises.

Figure 10.12: Relationship between left cabinet strength 1945-2008 and pension replacement rates 2008

Pearson´s r: .36, significant at 10 percent-level

Left power between 1945 and 2008 is positively and significantly (at the 10 percent-level) related to pension replacement rates in 2008 (Fig. 10.12). Sweden affects the result positively.

Figure 10.13: Relationship between left cabinet strength 1975-1990 and unemployment benefit generosity early 2000s

Pearson´s r: .36

For Western Europe without southern countries, left cabinet share between 1975 and 1990 is positively related to unemployment benefit generosity in the 2000s (Fig. 10.13). Due to the low number of cases, a different composition of countries, e.g. the elimination of the liberal countries, would markedly change results.

Figure 10.14: : Relationship between left cabinet between 1945- 2008 and unemployment benefit replacement rates 2008

Pearson´s r: .06

Fig. 10.14 (preceding page) shows that left cabinet share between 1945 and 2008 is slightly positively related to unemployment benefit replacement rate in 2008. There are remarkable outliers: Without Greece and Romania the positive effect would be stronger, without Turkey weaker.

Figure 10.15: Effects of Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength on cash benefit levels

Pensions: 1945-1974 aR²=-.09;n= 13| 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=-.08;n= 12| 1975-1990 aR²=.03;n= 16| **1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.10;n= 12**| 1991-2008 aR²=-.02;n= 24| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=.03;n= 13| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.08;n= 10| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.11;n= 11| 1945-2008 aR²=-.01;n= 24| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=.04;n= 13| **1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.10;n= 10**

Unemployment benefits: 1945-1974 aR²=.02;n= 13| 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=-.02;n= 12| 1975-1990 aR²=.04;n= 16| 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.05;n= 12| 1991-2008 aR²=-.04;n= 25| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.06;n= 15| **1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.08;n= 11**| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.12;n= 10| **1945-2008 aR²=.08;n= 25**| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=.14;n= 15| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.05;n= 11.

Christian democratic/religious cabinet share in most periods is negatively related to pension generosity in the early 2000s and in 2008. This cabinet share in all periods is positively related to unemployment generosity (Fig. 10.15).

Fig 10.16 (next page) shows neutral effects of Christian democratic cabinet share between 1975 and 1990 on pension generosity in the early 2000s (without southern countries). Without the Netherlands ranking high on both, effects would be negative due to Germany and Belgium.

Figure 10.16: Relationship between Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength 1975-1990 and pension generosity early 2000s (without southern countries)

Figure 10.17: Relationship between Christian democratic cabinet strength 1945-2008 and pension replacement rates 2008 (without CEE and southern countries)

In western Europe (without south) Christian democratic power between 1945 and 2008 is negatively related to pension replacement rates in 2008 (Fig. 10.17). Effects would be far weaker without France and Sweden. France would be far more Christian democratic if several conservative parties would have been categorised differently, so that the line would fall less steeply. Sweden markedly affects results (Switzerland is not in the figure since Swiss replacement rates are not in used Eurostat data).

Figure 10.18: Relationship between Christian democratic cabinet strength 1991-2008 and unemployment benefit replacement rates 2008 (without CEE and southern countries)

Pearson´s r: .41

In western countries (without Southern Europe) Christian democratic power between 1991 and 2008 has positive effects on unemployment benefit replacement rates in 2008. As Fig. 10.18 shows, effects would be weaker or absent without liberal countries.

Figure 10.19: Relationship between Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength 1945- 2008 and pension replacement rates 2008

Pearson´s r .35, significant at 10 percent-level

For all countries available and the whole period between democratisation and 2008, Christian democratic/religious cabinet share positively affected replacement rates in 2008 (Fig. 10.19) .

The rising line is caused primarily by Germany and neighbouring countries Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland on the high side, and Turkey and Greece on the low side.

Figure 10.20: Effects of liberal/conservative cabinet strength on cash benefit levels

Pensions: 1945-1974 aR²=-.09;n= 13| 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=.04;n= 12| 1975-1990 aR²=-.02;n= 16| **1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.02;n= 12**| 1991-2008 aR²=-.05;n= 24| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.09;n= 13| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.13;n= 10| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.10;n= 11| **1945-2008 aR²=-.05;n= 24**| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.09;n= 13| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.13;n= 10

Unemployment benefits: 1945-1974 aR²=.30;n= 13| 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=.22;n= 12| 1975-1990 aR²=.45;n= 16| 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=.45;n= 12| 1991-2008 aR²=-.04;n= 25| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.01;n= 15| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.08;n=11| **1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.03;n=10**| 1945-2008 aR²=-.00;n= 25| **1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=.21;n= 15**| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.07;n= 11.

Figure 10.21: Relationship between liberal/conservative cabinet strength 1975-1990 and pension generosity early 2000s

Pearson´s r -.27

As expected, liberal/secular conservative cabinet share in numerous periods and regions is negatively related to generosity. This applies to pensions, but even more so to unemployment benefits (Fig. 10.20, preceding page).

Fig. 10.21 (also preceding page) shows the negative relationship between liberal/secular conservative cabinet share in non-southern countries between 1975 and 1990 and pension generosity in the early 2000s. Negative effects are caused primarily by liberal countries.

Figure 10.22: Relationship between liberal/conservative cabinet strength 1945-2008 and pension replacement rates 2008

Pearson´s r -.02

For all countries and the whole period, effects on pension replacement rates are neutral (Fig. 10.22). One of the few cases of positive effects is CEE countries and unemployment replacement rates (Fig. 10.23, next page). Effects would be stronger without Estonia. Possibly liberal/secular conservative parties had to prove their distance to the 'Washington Consensus'.

Figure 10.23: Relationship between liberal/conservative cabinet strength 1991-2008 and unemployment benefit replacement rates 2008 (CEE)

Pearson´s r .29

Figure 10.24: Relationship between liberal/conservative cabinet strength 1945- 2008 and unemployment benefit replacement rates 2008 (without CEE)

Pearson´s r -.51, significant at 10 percent-level

For non-CEE countries, effects are as expected (Fig. 10.24). In countries with high cabinet shares of liberal and secular conservative parties (liberal and southern countries), unemployment benefit replacement rates low.

10.4.2 Pensions and unemployment benefits: Earnings-relatedness

Figure 10.25: Effects of left cabinet strength on positive earnings-relatedness

Pensions: 1945-1974 aR²=-.09;n= 13| 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=-.10;n= 12| **1975-1990 aR²=-.06;n= 16**| 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.08;n= 12| 1991-2008 aR²=-.03;n= 22| **1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=.05;n= 16**| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.01;n= 12| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.25;n= 6| 1945-2008 aR²=-.03;n= 22| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=.01;n= 16| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.00;n= 12.

Unemployment benefits: 1945-1974 aR²=-.03;n= 12| **1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=.10;n=11**| 1975-1990 aR²=-.07;n= 15| 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.10;n= 11| 1991-2008 aR²=.02;n= 25| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.06;n= 15| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.01;n= 11| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.00;n= 10| **1945-2008 aR²=.02;n= 25**| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.05;n= 15| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.01;n= 11

Overall, left parties in cabinet had positive effects on earnings-related pensions and negative effects on earnings-related unemployment benefits (Fig. 10.25).

Figure 10.26: Relationship between left cabinet strength 1975-1990 and positive pension earnings-relatedness early 2000s

Pearson´s r .11

Left power between 1975 and 1990 has weak positive effects on pensions´ earnings-relatedness in the early 2000s (Fig. 10.26, preceding page). For the period after 1990 and earnings-relatedness in 2011, effects are stronger (Fig. 10.27, without CEE countries). Both graphs show the highly 'Bismarckised' Sweden with high earnings-relatedness.

Figure 10.27: Relationship between left cabinet strength 1991-2008 and positive pension earnings-relatedness 2011

Pearson´s r .33

Figure 10.28: Relationship between left cabinet strength 1945-1974 and positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness 2008 (without Turkey)

Pearson´s r -.43

As stated above, left power is often negatively related to earnings-related unemployment benefits. This applies to the period from 1945 to 1974 (Fig. 10.28, preceding page) and the whole period (Fig. 10.29).

Figure 10.29: Relationship between left cabinet strength 1945- 2008 and positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness 2008

Pearson´s r -.25

Figure 10.30: Effects of Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength on positive earnings-relatedness

Pensions: 1945-1974 aR²=-.02;n= 13| **1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=.03;n= 12**| 1975-1990 aR²=-.07;n= 16| 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.06;n= 12| 1991-2008 aR²=-.04;n= 22| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.07;n= 16| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.02;n= 12| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.17;n= 6| **1945-2008 aR²=-.05;n= 22**| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.06;n= 16| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.08;n= 12.
Unemployment benefits: 1945-1974 aR²=.02;n= 12| 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=-.04;n= 11| 1975-1990 aR²=-.07;n= 15| 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.11;n= 11| 1991-2008 aR²=-.02;n= 25| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.07;n= 15| **1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.06;n= 11**| **1991-2008 CEE aR²=.10;n= 10**| 1945-2008 aR²=-.04;n= 25| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.05;n= 15| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.05;n= 11.

Overall, Christian democratic/religious cabinet share fosters earnings-relatedness (Fig. 10.30).

Figure 10.31: Relationship between Christian democratic cabinet strength 1945-1974 and positive pension earnings-relatedness early 2000s

For the first period, Fig. 10.31 shows a positive relationship in the case of pensions. It becomes clear that the rising line vastly results from high values in the Netherlands and in Germany. Without these countries, effects would be negative.

Figure 10.32: Relationship between Christian democratic/religious cabinet strength 1945-2008 and positive pension earnings-relatedness early 2000s

For the whole period and all countries, effects on pension earnings-relatedness in 2011 are neutral (Fig. 10.32). In the case of unemployment benefits, for western non-southern countries and the period from 1991 to 2008 effects are positive (Fig. 10.33, next page). Highest values

are in Germany and Switzerland, the line would rise steeper if some French parties on the right would had been categorised as Christian democratic instead of secular conservative.

Figure 10.33: Relationship between Christian democratic cabinet strength 1991-2008 and positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness early 2000s (without CEE and southern countries)

Pearson´s r .39

For CEE countries, effects are negative (Fig. 10.34). Again, party rule effects in CEE countries are not as expected.

Figure 10.34: Relationship between Christian democratic cabinet strength 1991-2008 and positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness 2008 (CEE)

Pearson´s r -.44

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
Figure 10.35: Effects of liberal/conservative cabinet strength on positive earnings-relatedness in cash benefits

Pensions: 1945-1974 aR²=.13;n= 13| **1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=.35;n= 12**| 1975-1990 aR²=-.04;n= 16| 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=.34;n= 12| 1991-2008 aR²=.17;n= 22| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=.14;n= 16| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.30;n= 12| 1991-2008 CEE aR²=-.01;n= 6| **1945-2008 aR²=.14;n= 22**| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=.11;n= 16| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=.46;n= 12

Unemployment benefits: 1945-1974 aR²=-.09;n= 12| 1945-1974 w/o TR aR²=-.10;n= 11| 1975-1990 aR²=-.02;n= 15| 1975-1990 w/o South aR²=-.01;n= 11| 1991-2008 aR²=-.04;n= 25| 1991-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.02;n= 15| 1991-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.05;n= 11| **1991-2008 CEE aR²=.04;n= 10**| 1945-2008 aR²=-.04;n= 25| 1945-2008 w/o CEE aR²=-.06;n= 15| 1945-2008 w/o CEE, South aR²=-.10;n=11

Liberal or secular conservative cabinet strength is strongly negatively related to benefit earnings-relatedness (Fig. 10.36). The sole noteworthy positive effect is to be found in the case of unemployment benefits and CEE countries.

Figure 10.36: Relationship between liberal/conservative cabinet strength 1945-1974 and positive pension earnings-relatedness early 2000s (without Turkey)

Pearson´s r -.64, significant at 5 percent-level

Fig. 10.36 shows strong and significant negative effects of liberal/secular conservative strength between 1945 and 1974 on pension earnings-relatedness in the 2000s.This is not only caused by liberal countries, but also by Denmark.

Figure 10.37: Relationship between liberal/conservative cabinet strength 1945- 2008 and positive pension earnings-relatedness 2011

Pearson´s r -.43, significant at 5 percent-level

For all countries and the whole period Fig. 10.37 shows that liberal/conservative cabinet strength significantly (at the 5 percent level) reduced pensions´ earnings-relatedness in 2011.

Figure 10.38: Relationship between liberal/conservative cabinet strength 1991-2008 and positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness 2008 (CEE)

Pearson´s r .31

In CEE countries, a higher liberal/conservative cabinet share leads to stronger earnings-related unemployment benefits, whereas the result is strongly affected by Estonia (Fig. 10.38, preceding page). For western countries between 1945 and 2008 effects are weakly in the expected negative direction (Fig. 10.39).

Figure 10.39: Relationship between liberal/conservative cabinet strength 1945-2008 and positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness 2008 (without CEE)

Pearson´s r -.14

10.5 Summary

Basically the hypotheses can be confirmed: Left cabinets lead to generous benefits, especially in the case of pensions. Christian democratic cabinets lead to less generous benefits if one combines both policy fields. More detailed, pension generosity is affected negatively and unemployment benefit generosity is affected positively. Liberal/secular conservatives have negative effects in both policy fields.

Left parties are the most generous, Christian democratic/religious parties are less generous and liberal/secular conservative parties induce low benefits.

Left governments foster earnings-related pensions, but weaken earnings-relatedness in the case of unemployment benefits. Christian democratic/religious parties raise earnings-relatedness in both fields, more in pensions than in unemployment benefits. Liberal/secular conservative parties have negative effects in both fields, but more so in the case of pensions.

Earnings-relatedness flourishes under Christian democratic/religious parties, less so under left parties. Liberal/secular conservative parties prefer benefit equality.

11 Summary and conclusion

Amongst macro determinants of attitudes towards government responsibility and earnings-relatedness are welfare policies and other factors affected by these, like tax/contribution levels, income distribution (and, related, relative poverty and old-age poverty), unemployment rates and long-term unemployment, job opportunities, and, less affected by welfare policies, old-age dependency ratios and GDP per capita (ch. 7.1). For several of these macro factors, micro mechanisms have been depicted, primarily for views concerning dependent groups and estimates of the number of dependents. Further relevant micro factors are beliefs about justice (ch. 7.2). Both levels partially explain the European and regional pattern depicted in chapter 8, partially recent developments (ch. 4.3) are relevant.

Attitudes are systematically related to voting decisions (ch. 9), and these, aggregated to cabinet compositions, affect welfare policies (ch. 10). In both cases, relationships are as expected only in western European countries.

What follows is a more detailed summary.

The relevance of citizens´ attitudes for welfare policies

Several factors considered relevant to the development of welfare states have been discussed (ch. 2.2.1); most of them refer to citizens´ attitudes. Religion and denomination are believed to have affected and still affect these attitudes. The 'logic of industrialism' ostensibly ignores political factors, yet the main reasons why new needs should lead to welfare policies catering to these needs should be citizens´ preferences. This also applies to shifts from the secondary to the tertiary sector. The 'democratisation' argument more explicitly refers to citizens´ attitudes, yet also undemocratic political systems can gain legitimacy via welfare policies. Here, citizen preferences are crucial since endeavours to gain legitimacy try to implement policies in line with these preferences. Also the neo-Marxist approach explaining welfare state development with efforts to mitigate class conflicts implies that citizens´ preferences are crucial, since the idea of calming down conflicts presupposes that people can be satisfied via policy outputs. Solely the bureaucratic approach can vastly ignore citizens´ attitudes by decoupling welfare output from policymakers (in Fig. 10.3 delegation from ministers to departments would be weak).

As stated, attitudes towards the welfare state are relevant for various reasons. One of these reasons is effects on political support if expectations are met or not. Chapter 7.1.5 shortly states that this is chronically the case since citizens´ willingness to pay does not fit their benefit expectations. The relevant reasons in our context are effects on policies.

Measuring attitudes

Items concerning government responsibility are frequently believed to catch the 'range' dimension of welfare policies, i.e. the question of basic responsibility without regard for the status quo. In chapter 6 it is argued that according to the traditional understanding of 'range' governments can either be responsible or not and if so, to a more or less high degree. In prior items answers were phrased accordingly. Answer scales allowed respondents to express uncertainty ('definitely', 'probably' etc.). Items in ESS4 presented responsibility as continuous, ranging from 'not at all' to 'entirely'. Understood in the binary sense, we should expect nearly all citizens in all countries to support government responsibility. Yet citizens understood responsibility as continuous.

The principles of distribution referred to previous earnings (and contributions), i.e. the (conservative) 'merit' dimension. As stated in the introduction, previous earnings (and contributions) are but one entitlement criterion.

Welfare policies affect macro factors

Chapter 3 depicts consequences of benefits´ generosity and earnings-relatedness.

Fig. 3.1 shows that high pension replacement rates reduce relative old-age poverty, whereas no regime patterns can be detected. Since relative poverty takes into account other citizens´ earnings, in pay-as-you-go schemes generous pensions have a double effect, raising retirees´ income and lowering incomes of those working. Based on 25 countries, it can be stated that generous pensions are significantly (at the ten percent level) negatively (Pearson´s r -.35) related to actual retirement ages (the exclusion of France lead to weaker and insignificant results), i.e. generous pensions lead to earlier retirement.

Under constant replacement rates, earnings-related benefits reward later retirement, which unburdens pension schemes. Further, also stated in chapter 3, early retirement could foster unemployment amongst the young. But earnings-related pensions are generally higher

than flat-rate pensions (figure 4.1), so that early retirement is more attractive. For 26 countries, pension level ratio between high and low earners and retirement age is weakly (Pearson´s r -.24, insignificant) negatively correlated (and not correlated without Slovakia and Poland). As one might theoretically expect from contrasting incentives, earnings-relatedness does not affect actual retirement ages, but it is possible that it affects labour supply of the whole workforce in (chapter 3.1.3).

In sum, support for generous and earnings-related retirement benefits affects these benefits via various steps depicted above and partially results from these benefits. Effects on retirement ages are weakly negative with corresponding weak effects on pension schemes´ problems.

Generous unemployment benefits reduce relative poverty (figure 3.3) but have a self-destructing mechanism, since they lead to the belief that the unemployed are well-off, fostering anti-benefit attitudes. On the other hand, there is a self-supporting mechanism of generous benefits. Given that possibly (evidence is mixed) generous benefits foster unemployment (chapter 3.2) and high unemployment fosters pro-benefit attitudes, there is a slight self-supporting counter mechanism. As stated, generous benefits increase unemployment rather than diminish it. This is problematic for various reasons: Firstly, it burdens those working. Further, it reduces the earnings of the unemployed, since benefits are lower than lost earnings. Moreover, health and life satisfaction are negatively affected (Lee 1997: 37, Clark/Lelkes 2005: 1ff., Clark et al. 2010: 53, Grosso/Smith 2012: 79).

Earnings-related unemployment benefits could spur economic growth and therefore reduce unemployment. Further, earnings-related benefits could reduce unemployment due to lower wages depending on unions´ goals. Lastly, in Goerke and Madsen´s (2003: 49ff.) analysis earnings-related benefits reduce wages and foster employment. This is supported by the model of Heer and Morgenstern (2000: 1ff.),

Contrastingly, Schluter´s (1997: 489ff.) model shows neutral effects below a critical tax/contribution point and negative effects of earnings-related benefits above. In this sense, earnings-relatedness is harmful when combined with generosity. Likewise, holding job security constant, earnings-related benefits reduce the advantages of re-employment as argued by Hey and Mavromaras (1981: 318ff.; for all these arguments see chapter 3.2.2.2).

Responses to the 'Trilemma of the Service Economy' affect macro factors

The 'Trilemma of the Service Economy', a sub-phenomenon of path dependence, is depicted in chapter 4.6.1.2. Iversen and Wren stated that liberal countries neglect earnings equality in favour of employment growth and tax restraint. Figure 4.9 shows that poverty is high in liberal countries when compared to conservative and especially social democratic countries, but on southern levels and lower than in CEE countries. It cannot be ascertained if this results from regime-specific responses or other factors, but both liberal countries have different poverty traits: Ireland strongly reduces its very high pre-tax/pre-transfer poverty while the UK weakly reduces its medium market poverty to end up with above-medium poverty. CEE and southern countries reduce poverty only to a small degree. Given that poverty and inequality foster pro-transfer attitudes, resulting in higher cash benefits and lower inequality, inequality is self-destructing. Yet CEE and southern countries have high inequality despite these mechanisms, possibly because they have the weakest links between attitudes and policies.

Social democratic countries are believed to have high taxes and contributions. This is the case. Fiscal burdens have negative effects on pro-benefit attitudes. Therefore, if social democratic countries spend revenues on public service (creating high employment with relatively equal wages), they not only have less financial resources left for cash benefits but also foster anti-benefit attitudes. Especially in these countries the link between attitudes and voting behavior is strong, so that their response to the 'Trilemma' lowers cash benefits, also due to low inequality reducing support for (redistributive) cash benefits.

Conservative countries are believed to reduce employment, partially via early retirement. Actual retirement ages have shown to not affect citizens´ attitudes towards pensions. While chapter 4.6.1.2 shows that conservative countries have low employment rates, their taxes and contributions are not far below those of social democratic countries. Following from this, in the irrelevant macro effect (early retirement) they differ from social democratic countries, in the relevant one (fiscal burdens) only slightly.

Macro factors affect attitudes

On the macro level, generous pensions and earnings-related benefits in both policy fields are positively correlated with pro-generosity and pro-earnings-related attitudes. For the generosity

of unemployment benefits this is not the case. The implication is that generous unemployment benefits cannot breed their own support, if policies affect attitudes. Chapter 7.1.1 has shown that various 'New Institutionalisms' expect citizen attitudes to be affected by institutions. This probably is the case. Yet chapter 7.1.3 expresses that policymakers might try to breed support for their policies. If correlations between policies and attitudes result not from these polices but accompanying justifications by policymakers, the latter are unsuccessful in selling generous unemployment benefits.

If causality is reversed, i.e. from attitudes to policies, citizens get generous pensions and earnings-related benefits in both policy fields if they want them, but not in the case of unemployment benefits. For other macro factors, the direction of causality is clearer. Inequality and relative poverty foster pro-welfare attitudes (diminishing inequality and relative poverty are welfare states´ main goals, c.f. chapter 2.1), whereas reverse causality is implausible. The same applies to projected dependency ratios. Mirroring public debate and media coverage, worse demographic situations foster anti-pension attitudes, whereas it is hard to imagine how anti-pension attitudes should worsen demographic situations.

The same 'financing' logic does not apply to unemployment benefits: Higher unemployment rates lead to pro-benefit attitudes, plausible due to higher perceived deservingness. Deservingness of the unemployed is negatively affected by the share of long-term unemployed. Tax and contribution burdens reduce support for generous benefits. Again, reverse causality is illogical. Concluding for chapter 7.1, amongst other macro factors welfare policies affect welfare attitudes.

Micro factors affect attitudes

On the micro level, attitudes largely depend on what people think about the welfare state and its dependents. Further, there are basic conceptions of justice. For different reasons citizens may think that "for a society to be fair differences in standards of living should be small". Looking at the mean values, it becomes clear that these attitudes´ origins are unclear. In descending order, agreement is strongest in Southern countries, weaker in CEE countries, conservative countries and liberal countries and weakest in social democratic countries (the latter due to the Danes´ low agreement).

Other attitudes partially originate in the political sphere. Support for income redistribution by government is fostered by income inequality which, in turn, partially results

from political decisions. Support for income redistribution has strong pro-welfare (figures 7.46 and 7.65) and anti-earnings-relatedness (figures 7.86 and 7.104) attitudinal effects.

The belief that the standard of living of dependents is high, shown to strongly reduce support for generous benefits, is strongly affected by benefit generosity in the case of unemployment, and GDP per capita in the case of both policy fields. Here, the negative macro relationships between replacement rate and support for generosity get their micro foundation. Also the idea that "most unemployed people do not really try to find a job" partially originates in the political sphere. A strong effect (figure 7.34) from the share of long-term unemployed amongst the unemployed on this attitude suggests that political efforts and non-efforts to get people back into paid work quickly have attitudinal consequences. There are numerous other relevant factors shown in chapter 7.2.

Europeans´ attitudes towards cash benefits

Chapter 8 shows country and region mean values of citizens´ attitudes towards pensions and unemployment benefits. Generally, support for government responsibility is high, especially in the case of pensions. Analyses based on older data show that Europeans are vastly stronger in favour of government responsibility than US citizens, and that country values in the 1990s and 2008/2009 are strongly correlated, suggesting macro stability of attitudes, which implications for path dependent developments.

Support for earnings-relatedness is slightly on the positive side in the mean across all countries, stronger in the case of pensions than in the case of unemployment benefits, allowing for the cautious conclusion that pensions are more considered rewards for lifetime earnings and contributions and unemployment benefits more to alleviate economic hardship.

The country pattern shows lowest support for generous pensions in conservative welfare states and the Netherlands and Switzerland, higher support in other western European countries and in the Visegrád states and highest values in post-Soviet countries. For unemployment benefits there is a large area of low support including conservative countries, the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Visegrád countries. Support is higher in social democratic countries. Southern Europe and non-Visegrád CEE are internally heterogeneous with higher support for government responsibility.

For earnings-relatedness a different pattern occurs, with Germany, Spain, Portugal and primarily CEE countries with high support for positively earnings-related pensions and attitudes near earnings-unrelatedness primarily on the British Isles, in Denmark and the

Netherlands and Belgium. The pattern for unemployment benefits is vaguely similar. Generally, in the case of government responsibility as well as earnings-relatedness, country mean values between both policy fields are highly correlated.

Some countries have remarkable regional attitude differences, implying that national welfare policies have to leave some regions dissatisfied. Further, in a few cases where this seems to be plausible given shared languages or historical backgrounds, cross-border regional similarities against the backdrop of intra-country regional differences have been detected.

Considering differences between EU countries, it becomes clear that different preferences for government responsibility pose no obstacle to EU welfare policies, but strongly differing support for earnings-related benefits does so.

From attitudes to policies: Voting behaviour

Chapter 9 established the first of two links from attitudes to policies. It has been argued that different factors affect voting decisions, but they are not completely separable. Party identification is partially endogenous, in our context one could say that welfare attitudes´ effects on voting decisions would be underestimated when 'controlled for' party identification since party identification partially results from welfare attitudes.

The idea has been that supporters (voters and, if information is not available, identifiers) of parties belonging to different ideological camps differ in their welfare attitudes. If this is the case and if welfare attitudes are relevant for voting decisions (which is assumable considering the relevance of welfare issues in public policy debates), welfare attitudes are relevant for cabinet compositions.

In Western Europe, party supporters largely differ as expected. This is the case in all social democratic countries, in most conservative countries and the Netherlands and Switzerland, in one (UK) of both liberal countries and less so in the South (only Spain and Greece meet the expected pattern, Cyprus, Portugal and Turkey not). In CEE countries, supporters largely differ not in the expected direction. There are several explanations. The most obvious is that CEE parties have been categorised wrongly. This is possible, but categorisations were based on numerous reliable sources. Another possibility rests in CEE political systems. CEE democracies are young, so parties have either less sharp welfare profiles or voters do not recognise them. This may be part of the story. Another possibility is that welfare policies are less important in CEE countries. Considering that these countries are relatively poor and had regimes strongly emphasising their welfare achievements, this seems

improbable. But one supporting finding emerges: Attitudinal distances between supporters of different ideological directions are strongly correlated to their respective countries level of welfare expenditures. This no artifact resulting from CEE countries´ low values on both counts; results can be substantiated with Western data alone. Therefore, one can conclude that CEE party supporters differ in their attitudes not as expected partially because differences between supporters are smaller, which is the case partially because spending is low.

From attitudes to policies: Parties do matter

In chapter 10 effects from cabinet composition on welfare policies are shown. This is only important if there is some systematic relationship between citizen attitudes and party support, which is the case only in Western countries.

Different models of political representation suggest differing degrees of citizen influence. The intertemporal stability of ideological strength in cabinets suggests that 'delegation' has been more important than 'accountability', implying that parties roughly did what voters wanted. Before analyses, the five ideological directions had to be reduced to three, since the strength of similar directions is negatively correlated because they are functionally equivalent. Results support the hypotheses, but cannot establish path dependent effects due to mentioned intertemporal stability: If ideology x is strong in period 2 and 3 and policies after period 3 are as one might expect from ideology x rule, one cannot ascertain which period has been relevant. Predomination of one ideology over decades could result from path dependence.

As stated in chapter 10.5, the summary of chapter 10, vastly cabinet strength matters for cash benefits in the expected direction.

The analytical utility of the 'Worlds of Welfare Capitalism'

The 'Worlds of Welfare Capitalism' are ideal types (chapter 4.1.4). But they have been of little analytical value and served, along with suggestions to expand this classification, mainly as principle of structuring. For various reasons:

Firstly, chapters 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 have shown that since the time of Esping-Andersen´s data assessment some significant changes took place. Chapter 4.6 (path dependence) shows the theoretical foundation of change and path-dependence.

The idea of path dependence suggests that classifications valid in 1980 are largely still so in 2008. The various reasons why welfare states should develop in path dependent manners have been depicted above. At the same time, Borchert (1998: 137ff.) suggests that Esping-Andersen´s classification has been wrong and is more or less correct due to change. Fenger´s (2007: 22f.) cluster analysis supports Esping-Andersen´s classification with data from about 2000, but with numerous non-welfare variables.

Secondly, as stated in chapter 4.2.1 correlations between various policy fields are low so that using the term 'regime' may be wrong (Scruggs/Allan 2006a; see also Kasza 2002: 271). For our data here this may be related to changes since 1980 and path independence, yet Scruggs and Allan have shown that these correlations have been already weak with Esping-Andersen´s data. Yet replications from Scruggs and Allan show that values in 1980/1981 and 2002 are strongly correlated, possibly via path dependent mechanisms depicted in chapter 4.6.

Fig. 4.4 shows that pension and unemployment benefit replacement rates are virtually independent of each other, so at least for Eurostat 2008 figures overarching principles can be rejected. The same applies to earnings-relatedness in both policy fields (Fig. 4.5).

Further, mostly not even in one single dimension regimes cannot be detected. For example, figure 3.1 shows no regime patterns in pension replacement rates, figure 3.3 merely divides between CEE and non-CEE. Figure 4.1 shows that pensions are weakly earnings-related in liberal countries and strongly in CEE countries, but social democratic and conservative countries do not differ. Further, figure 4.2 shows that social democratic countries spend less on pensions than their demographic situation implies (which may also result from higher retirement ages and not low pensions). Figure 4.3 offers only weak support for stronger earnings-related unemployment benefits in conservative and Southern countries, but at least can establish high benefits in social democratic countries.

In contrast, tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6 suggest that at least mean values support specific regime traits, whereas table 4.7 does not. Figure 4.9 shows that social democratic and conservative countries have low relative poverty rates, and social democratic countries are strong poverty (i.e. inequality) opponents. Not belonging to welfare policies but partially resulting from them, figure 7.34 shows that social democratic countries have very low shares of long-term unemployed among the unemployed.

Yet it has to be objected that macro data have their shortcomings (ch. 4.2.2).

Thirdly, only 11 out of the 30 countries analysed here have been categorised by Esping-Andersen. Even if his classification would be useful, it covers a minority of countries.

12 References

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13 Appendix

13.1 A1: Variables from ESS 4

Dependent variables

Government responsibility for the old/for the unemployed:
People have different views on what responsibilities of governments should or should not be. For ech of the tasks I read out please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think governments should have. 0 means it should not be governments´ responsibility at all and 10 means it should be entirely governments´ responsibility. To[…]
[…]ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?
[…]ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?

Annotations in the questionnaire:
 "Governments" in the sense of <u>all</u> governments and NOT only the people now governing / present regime. The 'state' can be used instead of governments if appropriate.
"Standard of living": people´s material circumstances.
The old: This question refers to things like pensions, other benefits or facilities for retired people.
"Unemployed": people who cannot find paid work.

Pensions´ earnings-relatedness:
Some people say that <u>higher</u> earners should get larger old age pensions because they have paid in more. Others say that <u>lower</u> earners should get larger old age pensions because their needs are greater. Which of the three statements on this card comes closest to your view?
Higher earners should get a larger old age pension than lower earners
High and low earners should get the same amount of old age pension
Lower earners should get a larger old age pension than higher earneers.
Three point scale: Negative earnings-relatedness, third proposal, (1), earnings-unrelatedness, second proposal, (2), positive earnings-relatedness, first proposal, (3).

Unemployment benefits´ earnings-relatedness
Some people say that <u>higher</u> earners should get more benefit when they are temporarily unemployed because they paid more in tax, whilst others think that <u>lower</u> earners should get more because they are in greater need. Using this card, please tell me which of the three statements you agree with <u>most</u>?
Higher earners who become unemployed temporarily should get more in benefit
Higher and lower earners should get the same amount of benefit
Lower earners who become unemployed temporarily should get more in benefit.
Three point scale: Negative earnings-relatedness, third proposal, (1), earnings-unrelatedness, second proposal, (2), positive earnings-relatedness, first proposal, (3).
Annotation in the questionnaire: "Unemployed": people who cannot find paid work.

Independent Variables

Age:
Open-ended question (year of birth).
Age calculated as 2008 minus year of birth

Gender
Interviewer instruction: Code sex

Education
What is the highest level of education you have achieved? Please use this card.
Not completed primary education
Primary or first stage of basic
Lower secondary or second stage of basic
Upper secondary
Post secondary, non tertiary
First stage of tertiary
Second stage of tertiary

Five-stage variable:
ISCED 0-1: Less than lower secondary education
ISCED 2: Lower secondary education completed
ISCED 3: Upper secondary eduation completed
ISCED 4: Post-secondrad non-tertiary education completed
ISCED 5-6: Tertiary education completed

Adjusted household income
Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household´s total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from <u>all</u> sources? If you don´t know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income.

The ten income ranges were supposed to correspond broadly to deciles of the actual household income range in each country.
Due to the higher number of missing values, those had to be imputed per country via multiple imputations. Before, scale points were transformed into sums of money. For each country, the middle middle point of the income ranges has been used (for the highest range, due to the lack of an upper bound the lowest point of the range had to be used). Values have been logaritmized and de-logarithmized after imputation.
The following variables were used:
Age below 35: For exact phrasing and calculation of age see above.
Age over 60: For exact phrasing and calculation of age see above.
Gender: For interviewer instruction see above.
Education: For exact phrasing see above.
Currently in paid work: using this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? Select all that apply.
[...]in <u>paid work</u> (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)
Job responsibility: In your main job, do/did you have any responsibility for supervising the work of other employees?
Annotation in the questionnaire: "Supervising": intended in the sense of both monitoring and being responsible for the work of others.
Current unemployment: using this card, which of these dexriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? Select all that apply
[…]<u>unemployed</u> and actively looking for a job
[…]<u>unemployed</u>, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job
Unemployed for more than three months in the past 5 years: Have any of these periods been within the past 5 years?

Annotation in the questionnaire: These periods refer to the periods of more than 3 months at F27 author: Have you <u>ever</u> been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months

Migrant: Respondend coded as migrant if one of the following three questions has been answered with "no":

Were you born in (country)

Was your father born in (country)

Was your mother born in (country)

Feeling about household´s income nowadays: Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household´s income nowadays?

Living comfortably on present income

Coping on present income

Finding it difficult on present income

Finding it very difficult on present income

Annotation in the questionnaire:"Feel": 'describe', 'view' or 'see'.

In order to weight household income by household composition, income ranges had to be recoded into sum of money (monthly income). Household income has been divided according to household composition: The respondent counted as 1, other adult household older than 18 years members as 0.5 and household members below 18 as 0.3. If the respondent was below 18, the respondent has been counted as 0.8, since with an adult member of household the weight is 1.3, as would occur if the respondent was an adult and the second person not. This is according to the "OECD-modified scale" is also used by Eurostat (www.oecd.org/social/familiesandchildren/35411111.pdf). Based on the idea that income differences matter less with rising income, i.e. the distance between 45 000 € and 50 000 € matters less than between 10 000 € and 15 000 €, a square root transformation has been conducted. It reduces differences not as much as a logarithmic transformation (Gelman/Hill 2007: 65). The backside of turning negative values into positive ones does not apply to household income. Since results with square-rooted values were similar to unsquare-rooted values, the latter have been unsed in the final analyses.

Main source of income: Pensions / unemployment benefits

Please consider the income of all household members and any income which may be received by the household as a whole. What is the *main* source of income in your household?

[…]pensions

[…]unemployment/redundancy benefits

Parents´ status

What is the highest level of education your father/mother achieved. Same answer scales as in the question concerning the repondents´ education (see above). Father´s and mother´s level are added and divided by the number of parents whose level of education has been stated by the respondent.

Union membership

Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union?

Yes, currently | Yes, previously | No

Three point scale: No (0), previously (1), currently (2).

News media consumption

And again on an averge weekday, how much of your time watching television is spent watching <u>news</u> or programmes about <u>politics and current affairs</u>?

And again on an average weekday, how much of your time listening to the radio is spent listening to <u>news</u> or programmes about <u>politics and current affairs</u>?
And how much of this time is spent reading <u>about politics and current affairs</u>? the question refers to internet us on an average weekday

No time at all | Less than ½ hour | ½ hour to 1 hour | More than 1 hour, up to 1½ hours | More than 1½ hours, up to 2 hours | More than 2 hours, up to 2½ hours | More than 2½ hours, up to 3 hours | More than 3 hours

Answers entered an additive index. The final variable results from the division by the number of news media questions answered.

Social trust
Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can´t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can´t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.
Annotation in the questionnaire: "Can´t be too careful": need to be wary or always somewhat suspicious.

Using this card, do you think that most people try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?
Annotation in the questionnaire:"Take advantage": exploit or cheat; "fair": in the sense of treat appropriately and straightforwardly

Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?
Annotation in the questionnaire: The intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic helpfulness.

Answers entered an additive index. The final variable results from the division by the number of news media questions answered. Only the first item measures trust directly, while estimations of others´ fairness and helpfulness may be related to trust, but are not trust. Therefore, and since the three items were part of Rosenberg´s misanthrophy scale, arguably the three items catch rather general positive or negative feelings towards others than generalized social trust (Jagodzinski/Manabe 2007: 15f., who add for consideration that if misanthrophy and interpersonal trust are similar in cause and effect they are interchangeabale). Nevertheless, since this is the standard way of including social trust in political science analyses and the first questions has its own weakness in its two-dimensionality (since trust is not the opposite of carefulness, cf. Miller/Mitamura 2003: 62f.), an index combining the three items has been used.

Left-right placement
In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself in this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Voting decision
Which party did you vote for in that election author: "that election" refers to the last national election mentione din the preceding question

Party identification
Which one? Author: refers to the preceding question: "Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?

Political trust
Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.
[…]country´s parliament?
[…]politicans?
[…]political parties?

Schwartz values
Here briefly we describe some people. Please read each description and tick the bok on each line that shows how much each person is or is not like you. How much like you is this person:
[…]very much like me (6)
[…]like me (5)
[…]somewhat like me (4)
[…]a little like me (3)
[…]not like me (2)
[…]not like me at all (1)
Values in brackets result from recoding the scale.
Using Schwartz´ syntax, the ten value types were calculated as follows: Each respondent had a mean value across the 21 questions to measure general acquiescence. Values for the ten value types were calculated as means across two or three values minus the general mean value. The ten value types (for female respondents questions have been phrased with female reference):
Security: It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids analything that might endanger his safety | It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so that it can defend its citizens.
Annotations in the questionnaire:Secure: "In the sense of the surroundings actually being secure, and not that he feels secure.. "Ensures" in the sense of 'guarantees'.
Conformity: He believes that people should do what they´re told. He thinks people should follow rules all the time, even when no-one is watching | It is important to him to always behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
Annotations in the questionnaire: "Told": The idea here is that when someone else tells you what to do in actual interpersonal interaction, (implying also that the person has some authority), you should do it. "Rules" in the sense of 'rules and regulations'.
Tradition: It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself | Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family.
Benevolence: It´s very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being | It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him.
Annotations in the questionnaire: "Care for": here in the sense of actively promote their well-being. "Devote": is intended to convey deep concern for these peopleand readiness to invest his time, resources and energy in their welfare.
Universalism: He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life | It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still

wants to understand them | He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.
Annotations in the questionnaire: "Different" in almost any way. The key idea is that he sees difference/diversity positively and as something worth learning about. "Care for": look after, basically synonymous with 'looking after' in the second sentence.
Self-Direction: Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way | It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others.
Annotations in the questionnaire:Having new ideas, with an emphasis on the creative side of having them through generating them himself. "Depend" in the sense of not to have depend on people.
Stimulation: He likes suprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life | He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life
Annotations in the questionnaire: Important for himself (his life) is the focus. "Exciting" more in the sense of 'exhilarating' than 'dangerous'.
Achievement: It´s important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does | Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognise his achievements.
Annotations in the questionnaire: The idea is to show whatever abilities he has, with no assumption that he actually has great abilities. It is important to him to be perceived as being able. He wants his actions to be admired, not his person
Power: It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot on money and expensive things | It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says.
Annotations in the questionnaire: "Expensive": in the sense of costing a lot rather than being 'luxury' items. Get/have this respect, not <u>deserve</u> respect.
Hedonism: Not calculated since it belongs to two higher order value types

Higher order value types calculated as mean of value types:
Openness to change: Self-Direction | Stimulation
Conservation: Security | Conformity | Tradition
Self-enhancement: Achievement | Power
Self-transcendence: Benevolence | Universalism

Religiosity
Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? Scale ranges from 0 'not at all religious' to 10 'very religious'.

Preference for higher social spending and higher taxes
Many social benefits and services are paid for by taxes. If the government <u>had</u> to choose between increasing taxes and spending more on social benefits and severices, <u>or</u> decreasing taxes and spending on social benefits and services, which should they do? Choose your anyswer from this card.
Scale ranges from 0 'government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services' to 10 'government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services'.

Attitude: Social benefits have negative effects
Using this card please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in country[…]
[…]place too great a strain in the economy?

[…]cost businesses too much in taxes and charges?
[…]make people lazy?
[…]make people less willing to care for one another?
[…]make people less willing to look after themselves and their family?
Index based on these items. Scale ranges: 'agree strongly', 'agree', 'neither agree nor disagree', 'disagree', 'disagree strongly'. The final variable results from the division by the number of news media questions answered.

Preference for governmental reduction of income differences
Using this card, please say to what extent you aree or disagree with each of the following statements.
The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Scale ranges: 'agree strongly' (5), 'agree' (4), 'neither agree nor disagree' (3), 'disagree' (2), 'disagree strongly' (1). Values in brackets result from recoding the scale.

Attitude: Fairness requires material equality
Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following.
For a society to be fair, differences in people´s standard of living should be small. Scale ranges: 'agree strongly' (5), 'agree' (4), 'neither agree nor disagree' (3), 'disagree' (2), 'disagree strongly' (1). Values in brackets result from recoding the scale.
Annotations in the questionnaire: "Fair" in the sense of a just society. "Standard of living": people´s mazerial circumstances.

Satisfaction with the state of the economy.
On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in country? Scale ranges from 0 'extremely dissatisfied' to 10'extremely satisfied'

Estimated pension affordability
There is also some debate nowadays about the cost of pension in country. Thinking of ten years from now, which of the statements on this card comes closest to your own opinion?
country will not be able to afford the present level of old age pension.
country will be able to afford the present level of old age pension but not to increase it
country will be able to afford to increase the lvele of old age pension.

Positive attitude towards the old
And overall, how negative or positive do <u>you</u> feel towards people over 70? Scale ranges from 0 'extremely negative' to 10 'extremely positive'.

Estimated standard of living of pensioners/the unemployed
Using this card, what do you think overall about the standard of living of pensioner/people who are unemployed? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means extremely baad and 10 means extremely good.

Suspicion of fraud
Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about people in country.
Many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled. Scale ranges: 'agree strongly' (5), 'agree' (4), 'neither agree nor disagree' (3), 'disagree' (2), 'disagree strongly' (1). Values in brackets result from recoding the scale.

Past unemployment for at least three month
Have you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months?

Estimated likelihood of future unemployment
Using this card, please tell me how likely it is that during the bext 12 months you will be unemployed and looking for work for at least four consectutive weeks? Scale range: 'not at all likely', 'not very likely', 'likely', 'very likely'.

Ascription of individual responsibility for unemployment
Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about people in country.
Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job. Scale ranges: 'agree strongly' (5), 'agree' (4), 'neither agree nor disagree' (3), 'disagree' (2), 'disagree strongly' (1). Values in brackets result from recoding the scale.
Annotation in the questionnaire: "Unemployed": people who cannot find paid work.

Assessment of job opportunities for young people
And what do you think overall about the opportunities for young people to find their first full-time job in country? Scale ranges from 0 'extremely bad' to 10 'extremely good'.

Estimated unemployment rate
Of every 100 people of working age in country how many would you say are unemployed and looking for work? Choose your answer from this card. If you are not sure please give your best guess. Scale ranges: '0-4, '5-9', '10-14, '15-19', '20-24', '25-29, '30-34', '35-39, '40-44', '45-49', '50 or more'.

Preference for progressive taxation
Think of two people, one earning twice as much as the other. Which of the three statements on this card comes closest to how you think they should be taxed?
They should both pay the same share (same %) of their earnings so that the person earnings twice as much pays double in tax.
The higher earner should pay a higher share (a higher %) of their earnings in tax so the person earnings twice as much pays more than double in tax.
They should both pay the same actual amount of money in tax regardless of their different levels of earnings.
Recoded so that the third proposal (lump sum) has the value 1, the first proposal (flat tax) has the value 2 and the second proposal (progressive taxation) the value 3.

For logistic regressions, metric variables were z-standardised.

13.2 A2: Macro figures

Table A2.1

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n
BE	5.4	1.6	5.0	3.3	4.8	1.7	3.1	1.8	6	7		7	53	12.4
DE	4.6	1.6	3.8	3.0	4.4	1.4	3.1	1.3	8	8	9	7	53	10.5
FR	5.0	1.7	3.8	3.1	3.6	1.4	3.2	1.7	7	7		8	38	9.2
mean	5.0	1.6	4.2	3.1	4.2	1.5	3.1	1.6	7	7		7	48	10.7
DK	3.2	1.5	5.1	2.5	4.1	1.8	3.6	1.4	3	3	2	3	16	7.6
FI	3.5	1.5	4.2	3.0	5.2	1.8	3.1	1.3	6	6		7	18	4.1
NO	3.0	1.4	5.0	2.6	3.7	2.0	3.5	1.1	3	3	2	3	6	5.1
SE	3.7	1.5	4.2	2.5	3.4	1.7	3.5	1.1	6	6	3	6	12	4.9
mean	3.3	1.5	4.6	2.7	4.1	1.8	3.4	1.2	5	5	2	5	13	5.4
IE	6.5	1.9	4.6	2.8	5.5	1.8	3.1	1.3	5	5		7	29	14.7
UK	5.4	1.7	4.7	3.2	4.0	1.6	3.2	1.2	5	5		6	26	11.5
mean	5.9	1.8	4.7	3.0	4.8	1.7	3.1	1.3	5	5		6	27	13.1
CY	3.3	1.5	4.5	3.4	6.6	2.0	2.9	1.3		4		4		16.3
ES	5.7	1.7	3.7	2.8	4.5	1.9	3.0	1.4	11	11	11	13	24	18.6
GR	5.7	1.8	2.3	2.8	6.3	1.8	2.4	1.4	7	7		8	50	26.3
PT	6.3	1.6	3.1	3.2	5.9	1.8	2.5	1.3	8	8		8	48	11.5
TU	7.0	1.9	2.3	3.4	7.4	2.0	2.4	1.6	11	11		10	27	43.4
mean	5.6	1.7	3.2	3.1	6.1	1.9		1.4	10	8		8	37	23.2
CZ	3.5	1.9	3.9	3.2	2.3	1.8	2.8	1.4	44	6	6	4	50	17.8
HU	7.4	1.8	2.4	3.3	4.4	1.5	2.4	1.8	8	8		8	48	12.4
PL	4.7	1.6	2.4	3.6	6.5	1.6	2.8	1.9	7	7	10	7	29	13.9
SK	4.6	1.6	2.8	3.7	5.8	2.0	2.7	1.4	10	10	8	9	66	15.4
SI	5.1	1.6	3.4	3.4	4.7	1.5	3.2	2.1		4		4		8.5
HR	6.3	1.8	1.9	3.1	6.2	1.7	2.9	1.6		8		8		14.3
EE	5.0	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.8	2.3	2.8	1.1		6		7		7.3
LV	6.8	2.1	2.2	2.8	4.0	1.7	2.3	1.2		8		8		6.7
LT	6.2	2.0	2.5	3.0	5.5	1.6	2.3	1.2		6	6	7		5.3
BG	6.4	2.0	1.3	2.8	4.3		2.0	1.4		6	6	5		9.0
RO	5.8	1.7	2.6	3.3	6.8	2.0	2.4	1.4		6	4	6		13.2
UA	7.5	2.0	1.4	2.8	4.9	2.0	2.0			6				
RU	6.2	1.7	1.8	3.2	4.5	2.3	2.3			6	2			
mean	5.8	1.8	2.4	3.2	4.9	1.8	2.5	1.5	17	7	6	7	48	11.3
CH	2.8	1.5	4.9	2.8	5.0	1.8	3.4	1.2	3	3	3		34	11.9
NL	4.0	1.5	5.2	2.9	4.9	1.7	3.4	1.5	3	3	2	3	37	12.1
IL	5.3	1.8	3.3	3.0	4.7	2.1	2.8							

Columns described on next page

ESS country mean values:

a: estimated unemployment rate (ESS4). 1 = 0-4 per cent, 2 = 4-9 per cent[…]10 = 45-49 per cent, 11 = 50 per cent or more | b: estimated likelihood of own unemployment. 1 = not at all likely, 2= not very likely, 3 = likely, 4 = very likely | c: estimated standard of living of the unemployed. 0 = extremely bad, 10 = extremely good | d: "most unemployed people do not really try to find a job". 1 = Disagree strongly, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree = 5 = agree strongly | e: Subjective religiosity. 0 = not at all religious, 10 = very religious. (ESS 4, own calculation) | f: Level of old age pension affordable 10 years from now. 1 = country will not be able to afford present level, 2 = country will be able to afford present level, but not be able to increase pension level, 3 = country will be able to afford to increase pension level | g: feeling about household´s income nowadays: 1 = very difficult on present income, 2 = difficult on present income, 3 = coping on present income, 4 = living comfortably on present income.

Employment figures:

h: Difference in employment ratios between men and women. Own calculation based on employment ratios (2008, Eurostat) | i =early retirement: employment rate 15-64/employment rate 55-64. Own calculation based on employment ratios (2008, Eurostat) | j = Unemployment Rate 2008 (OECD) | k = Unemployment Rate ILO Labor Fource Survey | l = Unemployment Rate ILO Employment Office Records | m = Unemployment Rate Eurostat Sep. 2008 | n = % of long-term (12 months and over) in unemployment (OECD)

Table A2.2

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s
BE	38	72	63	11	57		39	39	70	52	56	44	70	45	15	13	14	15	27
DE	20	62	72	13	51	68	18	23	63	68	67	43	63	44	9	9	9	18	17
FR	54	55	65	12	55	67	42	65	79	64	64	66	79	66	12	12	12	23	35
mean	37	63	67	12	54	68	33	42	71	61	62	51	71	52	12	11	12	19	26
DK	51	58	54	8	82		44	57	71	47	55	49	71	41	15	14	12	47	42
FI	39	63	72	11	60	62	31	48	69	71	74	64	69	49	14	14	13	33	42
NO	55	63	65	10	61		44	66		58	67			52	15	14	12	39	42
SE			68	11	57	69	35	43	67	71	76	65	67	62	17	17	15	35	43
mean	48	61	65	10	65	66	39	54	92	62	68	81	92	51	15	15	13	39	42
IE	40	46	37	7	39		35	45	82	32	36	73	82	49	7	8	8	23	31
UK	37	57	48	7	39	38	39	59	75	43	46	60	75	43	9	9	9	26	40
mean	39	52	43	7	39		37	52	78	38	41	67	78	46	8	8	8	25	36
CY									54			49	54	32					
ES			88	13	73				97	86	84	91	97	49					
GR			100	15	97				115	96	100	105	115	41					
PT			80	12	59	98			91	85	89	75	91	51					
TU			103	13	88	131				96	96								
mean			93	13	79	115													
CZ			58	10	61				79	49	54	61	79	51					
HU			91	15	89	80			100	87	90	64	100	61					
PL			70	10	64	68			78	63	70	63	78	46					
SK			60	10	62	71			63	62	62	49	63	54					
SI									82			64	82	44					
HR			62	9						55	62			50					
EE			61	9					41	61	61	33	41	45					

LV			82	12					78	80	80	61	78	30				
LT			71	10					57	67	71	41	57	44				
BG			75	11					53	66	68	42	53	34				
RO									36			27	36	49				
UA																		
RU																		
mean			70	11	54	73			67	65	69	50	67	46				
CH	31	48	67	12	59		39	45		54	56				9	12	12	0	40
NL	52	52	84	13	86		51	60	92	81	85	71	92	43	11	12	12	46	55
IL																		

a = Old-age Pension (minimum) 2002 (Scruggs 2006)| b = Old-age Pension (standard) 2002 (Scruggs 2006) | c = Net replacement rate (100% of individual earnings) (Whitehouse 2007:57ff) | d = Net pension wealth men (100% of average earnings) (Whitehouse 2007: 57ff)

Pension wealth takes into account not only pension level, but also the duration of payments, which depends "on age of retirement and life expectancy at that age" (Whitehouse 2007: 28) | e = Net Pension Level Current (Median of average net earnings) (Whitehouse/ Queisser 2007: 102ff) | f = Net Pension Level Pre-reform (Median of average net earnings) (Whitehouse/ Queisser 2007: 102ff) . Pre-reform figures: "The pre-reform scenario is built on the following question: what would the parameters and rules of the pension system have been in 2004 had the pension reform not taken place? This stylised approach is designed to isolate the effects of the reform programme from other changes of the past decade. Thus, mortality rates and economic variables are the same in the two scenarios and the same modelling methodology is used" (Whitehouse/Queisser 2007: 65) | g = Single Pension Replacement Rates 02 (Scruggs 2007a: 146) | h = Couple Pension Replacement Rates 02 (Scruggs 2007a: 146) | i = Net replacement rate 2006 (ISG: Indicator Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee ISG 2009b) | j = Net pension level (mean of six earnings levels). Own calculations based on data from Whitehouse 2007| k = Net replacement rate Mean (own calculations based on data from Whitehouse 2007:57ff) | l = Pension Gross Replacement Rate 2006 (ISG: Indicator Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee ISG 2009b) | m = Pension Net Replacement Rate 2006 (ISG: Indicator Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee ISG 2009b)| n = Pension Replacement Rates in 2008 (Eurostat) Indicator defined as ratio between median gross income of pensions in the age group between 65 and 74 and median gross income of the age group between 50 and 59, excluding social security benefits | o = De-commodification (Pension) 1980 (Esping-Andersen) | p = De-commodification (Pension) 1980 (Scruggs/ Allan 2006a) | q = Benefit Generosity (Pension) 1980 (Scruggs/ Allan 2006a) r = Single Pension Replacement Rates 1971 (Scruggs 2007a:) |s = Single Pension Replacement Rates 1980 (Scruggs 2007a:)

Table A2.3

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r
BE	37	19	30	36	12	9	0.4	83	34	1.4	49	69				1.3	52	68
DE	18	29	27	26	1	-4	0.9	62	54	2.6	32	82	3	40	120	3.2	37	118
FR	45	37	60	68	7	5	0.6	84	53	2.5	42	103	2.9	43	124	2.1	56	120
mean	33	28	39	43	7	3	0.6	76	47	2.2	41	85	3.0	42	122	2.2	48	102
DK	51	53	57	61	2	0	0.3	96	31	1.7	70	119				1.2	52	61
FI	38	48	61	53	-11	-12	0.8	87	72	2.7	45	121	2.7	45	122	2.9	51	147
NO	43	52	56	56	2	10	0.5	86	43	2.3	42	95				1.9	46	89
SE	43	45	53	53	-8	-10	0.8	90	75	2.9	43	123	3	45	136	3.2	48	155
mean	44	50	57	56	-4	-3	0.6	90	55	2.4	50	115	2.9	45	129	2.3	49	113
IE	36	20	36	43	4	9	0.3	63	18	1	39	39				1	37	37

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r
UK	41	43	57	65	-1	2	0.3	78	25	1.3	36	45	1.6	29	45	1.3	44	56
mean	39	32	47	54	2	6	0.3	71	22	1.2	38	42				1.2	41	47
CY																		
ES							0.8	89	69	2.9	46	133				3.1	50	154
GR							1	100	100	3.1	60	118				4.2	50	210
PT							0.8	116	87	2.9	45	130	3.6	59	199	3	62	186
TU							0.6	113	67	4	52	208	4	77	309	2.8	59	165
mean								105	81	3.2	51	147	3.8	68	254		55	179
CZ							0.4	88	31	1.5	52	76				1.5	46	71
HU							0.9	87	82	2.9	58	167	2.9	53	154	3.3	49	164
PL							1	70	71	3.8	39	147	2.6	50	128	4.6	36	167
SK							1.2	58	68	3.9	37	146	1.8	42	76	5	30	151
SI																		
HR							0.9	67	59							3.2	38	123
EE							1	60	62							4	35	140
LV							0.8	89	73							3.8	46	177
LT							0.8	82	64							3.1	47	145
BG							0.8	67	53							3	39	116
RO																		
UA																		
RU																		
mean							0.9	74	63	2.7	34	115	2.4	48	119	3.5	41	139
CH	42	0	47	49	-1	-2	0.5	71	34	1.7	39	67				2	38	76
NL	48	55	67	58	-4	-7	1	83	83	3.1	53	166				3.7	46	170
IL																		

a = Single Pension Replacement Rates 90 (Scruggs 2007a: 146) | b = Couple Pension Replacement Rates 71 (Scruggs 2007a: 146) | c = Couple Pension Replacement Rates 80 (Scruggs 2007a: 146) | d = Couple Pension Replacement Rates 90 (Scruggs 2007a: 146) | e = Single Pension Replacement Rates Difference 80-02 (Changes: Own calculation based on Scruggs 2007a: 146) | f = Couple Pension Replacement Rates Difference 80-02 (Changes: Own calculation based on Scruggs 2007a: 146) | g = Net replacement rate Ratio 2.5/0.5 (own calculations based on Whitehouse 2007:57ff) | h = Net replacement rate (50% of individual earnings) (Whitehouse 2007:57ff) | i = Net replacement rate (250% of individual earnings) (Whitehouse 2007:57ff) | j = Net Pension Level Current Ratio (Whitehouse/ Queisser 2007: 102ff) | k = Net Pension Level Current (50% of average net earnings) (Whitehouse/ Queisser 2007: 102ff) | l = Net Pension Level Current (200% of average net earnings) (Whitehouse/ Queisser 2007: 102ff) | m = Net Pension Level Pre-reform Ratio (Whitehouse/ Queisser 2007: 102ff) | n = Net Pension Level Pre-reform (50% of average net earnings) (Whitehouse/ Queisser 2007: 102ff) | o = Net Pension Level Pre-reform (200% of average net earnings) (Whitehouse/ Queisser 2007: 102ff) | p = Net Pension Level Ratio 2.5/0.5 (Whitehouse 2007: 57ff) | q = Net Pension Level (50% of average net earnings) (Whitehouse 2007: 57ff) | r = Net Pension Level (250% of average net earnings) (Whitehouse 2007: 57ff).

Table A2.4

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o
BE	0.9	0.9	1.8		61.6	65	65	64	65	47822	28	21	27	15	56
DE	0.7	0.8	1.3		61.7	65	65	65	65	43937	27	15	24	15	63
FR	0.7	0.9	1.7	60	59.2	60	60	60	60	44245	32.7	11	23	13	57
mean	0.8	0.8	1.6	60	60.8	63	63	63	63	45335	29.2	16	25	14	59

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o
DK	1.0	1.0	1.4	61	61.3	65	65	65	65	62115	24	18	28	12	43
FI			1.3	60	61.6	63	65	63	65	51153	29.5	22	28	14	50
NO	0.7	0.6	1.1		64		67		67	93157	25	15	26	11	42
SE	0.8	0.7	1.1	65	63.8	61	65	61	65	52632	23	15	29	12	41
mean	0.8	0.8	1.2	62	62.7	63	66	63	66	64764	25.4	18	28	12	44
IE	1.0	1.0	1.3	65	61.1	65	65	65	65	60570	32	21	34	16	47
UK	0.8	1.0	1.2	62	63.1	65	65	60	65	43022	34	28	29	19	66
mean	0.9	1.0	1.3	64	62.1	65	65	63	65	51796	33	24	31.5	17.5	56.5
CY			1.3	64	63.5	65	65	65	65	31693	29	48	22	16	73
ES			1.4	63	62.6	65	65	65	65	35306	32	27	24	20	83
GR			1.4	60	61.4	65	65	60	65	30216	33	22	23	20	87
PT			1.3	64	62.6	65	65	65	65	23689	38.5	22	25	18	72
TU			1.6				60		58	10297	43.6				
mean			1.4	63	62.5	65	64	64	64	26240	31.3	30	23.5	18.5	78.8
CZ			1.4	59	60.6	62	63	60	61	21723	26	7	20	9	45
HU			1.8	59	59.8	62	62	61	62	15390	28	4	30	12	40
PL			1.9	58	59.3	65	65	60	60	13852	34.9	12	25	17	68
SK			1.4	58	58.7	62	62	56	62	17348	26	10	18	11	61
SI			2.1	62	59.8	63	63	61	61	27058	24	21	23	12	52
HR			1.6		59.9		65		60	15823	29	30			
EE			1.1	60	61.2	63	63	59	63	17773	34	39	25	19	76
LV			1.2	60	62.7	62	62	62	62	14729	36	51	27	20	74
LT			1.2	60	59.9	63	63	60	60	14153	36	30	30	26	87
BG			1.4		64.1	63	63	59	60	6827	30.7	34	27	21	78
RO			1.4		64.3	62	62	57	57	9465	32	26	31	23	74
UA										3914	31				
RU										11601	41.5				
mean			1.5	60	60.9	63	63	60	61	14589		24	26	17	66
CH	1	1	1.2		63.7		65		64	66447	33.7				
NL	1	1	1.5	65	63.2	65	65	65	65	52766	30.9	9	20	11	55
IL										28434	38.6				

a = Scruggs Pension Equality 2002 (Calculations based on data provided by Scruggs) Ratio of standard to maximum benefit for unemployment, sickness and pension insurance (Scruggs/Allan 2006b: 18): The higher the score, the more equal and the less earnings-related are the payments | b = Scruggs Pension Equality 1980/81 | c = Ratio Employment rate 15-64 / Employment rate 55-64 (Eurostat) | d = Average age at of new flows of retirees retrieving a statutory pension retirement 2006 (ISG 2009b) | e = Retirement age (Eurostat) 2006, 2007, 2008 | f = Actually legislated pension eligibility age 2006 (men) (ISG 2009b) | g = Actually legislated pension eligibility age 2006 (men) (Whitehouse 2007) | h = Actually legislated pension eligibility age 2006 (women) (ISG2009b) | i = Actually legislated pension eligibility age 2006 (women) (Whitehouse 2007) | j = GDP per capita 2008 current prices US-Dollar (UN) | k = Gini CIA Fact Book | l = At Poverty Risk of Elderly 2008 (Eurostat)
m = Poverty risk before social security benefits (Eurostat, Social Cohesion) | n = Poverty risk after social security benefits (Eurostat, Social Cohesion) | o = Poverty left (Eurostat, Social Cohesion) own calculation

Table A2.5

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
BE	26	31	38	42	44	43	44	37	44	43	14	4	39	17	92	177
DE	30	35	46	55	56	42	37	32	36	39	15	6	29	12	74	87
FR	25	33	39	44	45	30	43	24	44	42	16	4	28	12	73	56
mean	27	33	41	47	48	38	41	31	41	41	15	5	32	14	80	107
DK	24	32	38	43	41	44	48	38	48	47	1	6	62	30	89	103
FI	25	37	44	45	47	32	43	30	43	41	12	2	41	17	87	88
NO	22	28	34	40	41	31	43	28	43	0	9	4	53	23	75	76
SE	27	34	37	41	42	30	47	27	46	45	9	0	43	20	89	97
mean	24	33	38	42	43	34	44	32	44	32	9	4	49	21	84	89
IE	16	20	25	31	40	22	29	13	29	28	5	2	39	12	93	149
UK	24	29	33	37	38	27	35	25	36	37	7	3	49	18	77	58
mean	20	24	29	34	39	24	32	19	32	32	6	2	44	15	85	104
CY	18	22	27	31	38					37	8	2	33	13	87	97
ES	24	27	34	46	59	20	34	15	33	32	12	2	34	11	79	60
GR	28	33	39	48	57	26	31	20	32	29	11	4	26	8	76	54
PT	26	31	37	45	53	24	32	19	33	32	9	4	30	10	84	74
TU	11					28	24	27	24						56	49
mean	21	28	34	43	52	24	30	20	30	33	10	3	31	11	76	67
CZ	21	31	36	43	55	24	36	15	36	33	16	4	22	8	86	152
HU	24	30	34	40	51	39	40	38	40	39	14	3	26	11	89	159
PL	19	27	36	41	56	25	34	21	34	33	11	5	25	9	72	84
SK	17	24	32	40	56	23	29	17	29	27	12	3	22	7	85	171
SI	23	31	41	49	59		37	29	37	34	14	7	24	9	82	138
HR	26														74	93
EE	25	29	34	39	47		33	12	32	30	12	0	25	8	90	162
LV										26	8	2	34	10	80	103
LT	23	26	35	42	51					27	9	1	31	9	79	127
BG	25	31	36	44	55					29	8	3	21	7	78	147
RO	21	26	30	41	54					25	9	3	24	7	70	76
UA															63	98
RU															50	54
mean	22	26	31	38	48	28	29	20	29	30	11	3	25	8	77	120
CH	24	30	38	44	45	23	29	13	29						78	113
NL	22	31	40	47	46	33	39	28	39	38	15	7	31	12	92	137
IL							34	16	34						80	86

a = Old-Age dependency ratios 2008 (Eurostat) | b = Old-Age dependency ratios 2020 (Eurostat, projected) | c = Old-Age dependency ratios 2030 (Eurostat, projected) | d = Old-Age dependency ratios 2040 (Eurostat, projected) | e = Old-Age dependency ratios 2050 (Eurostat, projected) | f = Income tax and social security cont. rates on gross labour inc., mean of 4 inc.levels 2008 (OECD) | g = Government revenue % of GDP 2008, 3 year moving average (OECD) | h = Income taxes, mean of 4 family types (OECD) | i = Taxes as percentage of GDP

Table A2.6

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	r	s
BE	76	61	48	63	66	61	0,6	62	78	67	82	78	71	84	77	59	51	70
DE	72	63	54	66	60	72	0,6	63	59	61	88	77	78	92	76	60	59	85
FR	70	59	52	70	70	73	0,7	60	70	71	84	82	81	85	79	66	67	80
mean	72	61	51	66	65	69	0,7	61	69	66	85	79	77	87	77	62	59	78
DK	86	69	56	63	59	64	0,7	70	83	85	91	89	88	93	88	61	63	74
FI	75	63	51	62	57	67	0,6	63	65	77	79	86	83	83	79	51	61	72
NO	76	64	49	69	65	72	0,7	63	67	69	84	95	81	86	80	64	65	79
SE	74	56	44		75	78	0,8	58	72	72	86	85	82	87	81	50	50	71
mean	78	63	50	67	64	70	0,7	63	72	76	85	89	84	87	82	57	60	74
IE	65	57	39	44	29	58	0,3	52	42	66	71	65	74	76	66	31	48	59
UK	65	53	39	37	18	55	0,2	52	54	65	59	73	79	66	66	38	45	48
mean	65	55	39	41	24	57	0,3	52	48	66	65	69	77	71	66	35	47	54
CY																		
ES	63	54	41					53	77	74	89	76	75	89	80	61	61	77
GR	44	34	26					34	54	58	69	67	71	81	67	40	42	58
PT	67	62	57					62	78	75	91	79	77	91	82	84	78	92
TU	45	34	25					34	65	64	86	64	63	86	71	45	45	70
mean	54	46	37					46	69	68	84	72	72	87	75	58	57	74
CZ	66	57	47					56	60	66	79	76	72	84	73	53	58	74
HU	68	58	46					57	73	75	86	83	79	88	81	59	61	77
PL	62	47	35					48	66	67	71	84	59	75	70	45	46	58
SK	59	53	49					53	62	58	85	64	60	86	69	65	59	82
SI	77	68	52					66	83	88	82	86	92	76	85	64	73	79
HR																		
EE	54	48	42					48	57	77	60	55	80	55	64	54	56	72
LV	63	59	55					59	76	93	75	73	94	80	82	83	80	92
LT	67	53	38					53	77	88	77	78	89	77	81	61	61	77
BG	64	47	34					48	74	87	78	78	88	74	80	50	50	70
RO	49	38	30					39	55	79	57	56	80	56	64	42	42	66
UA																		
RU																		
mean	63	53	43					53	68	78	75	73	79	75	75	58	59	75
CH	79	68	59	77	72	82	0,6	68	83	89	84	84	89	85	86	72	73	82
NL	87	70	54	73	78	77	0,8	70	100	84	98	107	83	91	94	73	74	82
IL																	51	70

a = Average net replacement rates for six family types, average net replacement rates over 60 months of unemployment at 67% of average earnings,2008 OECD | b = Average net replacement rates for six family types, average net replacement rates over 60 months of unemployment at 100% of average earnings,2008 OECD | c = Average net replacement rates for six family types, average net replacement rates over 60 months of unemployment at 150% of average earnings,2008 OECD | d = Unemployment Insurance replacement rates 2002 (Scruggs 2006) | e = Single Unemployment Replacement Rates 2002 (Scruggs 2007a: 144) | f = Couple Unemployment Replacement Rates 2002 (Scruggs 2007a: 144) | g = Iversen/ Stephens Unemployment Replacement Rates (Scruggs 2007a: 144) | h = 3 wage levels, 6 family types, initial and long-term. Based on OECD data:

Net Replacement Rates: Initial Phase of Unemployment, 67% of Average Wage

i = No Children Single Person | j = No Children One-earner married couple | k = No Children Two- earner married couple | l = 2 children Lone parent | m = 2 children One-earner married couple | n = 2 children Two - earner married couple | o = Mean

Net Replacement Rates: Initial Phase of Unemployment, 100% of Average Wage

p = No Children Single Person | q = No Children One-earner married couple | r = No Children

s = Two - earner married couple (to be continued in the table below)

Table A2.7

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r
BE	62	56	73	62	43	38	58	48	44	61	49	69	67	75	82	75	78	74
DE	70	72	89	73	57	57	79	64	66	84	68	48	62	59	84	84	64	67
FR	71	71	81	73	69	67	77	68	67	78	71	49	61	53	66	74	56	60
mean	68	66	81	69	56	54	71	60	59	74	63	55	63	62	77	78	66	67
DK	76	73	77	71	47	48	62	64	59	65	58	79	97	59	83	111	70	83
FI	75	73	76	68	44	48	63	60	57	67	57	61	82	56	71	92	64	71
NO	79	69	81	73	46	47	64	59	51	66	56	54	76	52	88	105	56	72
SE	68	60	72	62	38	38	59	53	46	61	49	63	78	50	62	88	54	66
mean	75	69	77	69	44	45	62	59	53	65	55	64	83	54	76	99	61	73
IE	56	59	64	53	23	36	49	44	46	54	42	74	95	54	72	97	62	76
UK	63	69	56	53	26	31	39	45	50	45	39	54	65	50	73	79	65	64
mean	60	64	60	53	25	34	44	45	48	50	41	64	80	52	73	88	64	70
CY																		
ES	76	75	87	73	42	42	62	54	53	70	54	32	39	53	48	53	53	46
GR	50	52	68	52	27	29	46	35	36	54	38	0	0	50	12	4	51	20
PT	82	78	92	84	84	78	90	84	78	90	84	24	47	52	54	73	55	51
TU	44	44	70	53	31	31	55	31	31	55	39	0	0	52	0	0	53	18
mean	63	62	79	66	46	45	63	51	50	67	54	14	22	52	29	33	53	34
CZ	67	61	78	65	50	51	69	55	52	72	58	50	51	69	55	52	72	58
HU	70	70	80	70	44	45	64	55	54	68	55	30	55	50	62	70	58	54
PL	64	46	62	54	31	32	45	44	33	49	39	35	49	52	63	57	61	53
SK	66	61	84	70	67	63	80	67	64	81	70	27	42	54	49	55	58	48
SI	86	86	81	78	45	52	63	66	65	67	60	47	69	56	80	86	73	69
HR																		
EE	61	57	75	63	53	54	68	59	58	70	60	27	36	53	38	48	57	43
LV	78	75	93	84	84	82	91	81	79	92	85	34	38	53	40	38	57	43
LT	62	63	78	67	41	41	60	43	43	61	48	23	46	50	62	84	53	53

BG	55	55	72	59	33	33	54	38	38	56	42	24	36	50	56	61	54	47
RO	44	44	68	51	32	32	54	35	35	56	41	12	21	51	27	33	53	33
UA																		
RU																		
mean	65	62	77	66	48	49	65	54	52	67	56	31	44	54	53	58	60	50
CH	87	88	88	82	72	71	80	82	81	87	79	69	86	50	79	89	56	72
NL	70	75	81	76	55	56	68	56	58	68	60	85	99	53	95	112	54	83
IL																		

Net Replacement Rates: Initial Phase of Unemployment, 100% of Average

a = 2 children Lone parent | b = 2 children One-earner married couple | c = 2 children Two - earner married couple | d = Mean

Net Replacement Rates: Initial Phase of Unemployment, 150% of Average Wage

e = No Children Single Person | f = No Children One-earner married couple | g = No Children Two - earner married couple | h = 2 children Lone parent | i = 2 children One-earner married couple | j = 2 children Two - earner married couple | k = mean

Net Replacement Rates: Long-term Unemployment, 67% of Average Wage

l = No Children Single Person | m = No Children One-earner married couple | n = No Children Two - earner married couple | o = 2 children Lone parent | p = 2 children One-earner married couple | q = 2 children Two - earner married couple | r = mean

Table A2.8

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r
BE	52	51	64	65	59	67	60	38	38	53	50	46	57	47	38	38	53	50
DE	36	46	50	65	66	55	53	25	32	40	47	48	44	39	25	32	40	47
FR	34	42	43	48	54	46	45	24	29	34	34	37	36	32	24	29	34	34
mean	41	46	52	59	60	56	53	29	33	42	44	44	46	39	29	33	42	44
DK	58	72	48	70	91	58	66	45	55	40	60	75	49	54	45	55	40	60
FI	44	60	47	59	75	55	57	32	44	39	45	56	46	44	32	44	39	45
NO	38	55	43	65	78	47	54	27	40	35	49	58	38	41	27	40	35	49
SE	44	54	41	49	65	45	50	33	41	34	39	50	38	39	33	41	34	39
mean	46	60	45	61	77	51	57	34	45	37	48	60	43	45	34	45	37	48
IE	54	68	45	62	77	52	60	40	51	37	49	60	44	47	40	51	37	49
UK	38	45	41	63	69	54	52	26	31	33	45	50	44	38	26	31	33	45
mean	46	57	43	63	73	53	56	33	41	35	47	55	44	43	33	41	35	47
CY																		
ES	23	28	44	34	38	44	35	16	20	35	25	27	36	27	16	20	35	25
GR	0	0	42	9	3	43	16	0	0	33	6	2	34	13	0	0	33	6
PT	17	33	43	40	52	47	39	13	23	35	30	38	38	30	13	23	35	30
TU	0	0	42	0	0	43	14	0	0	33	0	0	34	11	0	0	33	0
mean	10	15	43	21	23	44	26	7	11	34	15	17	36	20	7	11	34	15
CZ	30	47	47	53	57	52	48	21	34	37	38	44	42	36	21	34	37	38
HU	23	43	44	51	59	52	45	17	31	37	40	46	44	36	17	31	37	40
PL	24	34	42	48	44	50	40	16	23	33	33	32	40	30	16	23	33	33
SK	19	29	44	36	39	48	36	13	20	35	26	29	39	27	13	20	35	26

SI	33	51	46	73	78	61	57	23	37	37	56	59	50	44	23	37	37	56
HR																		
EE	18	25	43	28	35	47	33	12	17	34	20	25	38	24	12	17	34	20
LV	23	26	43	29	28	47	33	16	18	34	20	20	38	24	16	18	34	20
LT	16	31	41	44	59	43	39	11	21	32	31	41	34	28	11	21	32	31
BG	16	24	40	39	43	44	34	11	16	31	27	30	35	25	11	16	31	27
RO	8	15	41	19	24	44	25	6	10	32	14	17	35	19	6	10	32	14
UA																		
RU																		
mean	21	33	43	42	47	49	39	15	23	34	31	34	40	29	15	23	34	31
CH	47	60	41	58	67	46	53	32	39	32	40	45	36	37	32	39	32	40
NL	61	72	44	72	83	45	63	43	52	35	54	61	37	47	43	52	35	54
IL																		

Net Replacement Rates: Long-term Unemployment, 100% of Average Wage

a = No Children Single Person | b = No Children One-earner married couple | c = No Children Two - earner married couple | d = 2 children Lone parent | e = 2 children One-earner married couple | f = 2 children Two - earner married couple | g = mean

Net Replacement Rates: Long-term Unemployment, 150% of Average Wage

h = No Children Single Person | i = No Children One-earner married couple | j = No Children Two - earner married couple | k = 2 children Lone parent | l = 2 children One-earner married couple | m = 2 children Two - earner married couple | n = mean

Net Replacement Rates: Average net replacement rates over 60 months of unemployment and average for four family types

o = No Children Single Person | p = No Children Single Person | q = No Children Single Person | r = 2 children Lone parent | (to be continued in the table below)

Table A2.9

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r
BE	46	57	47	65	65	77	62	49	74	60	47	9	10	10	53	67	64	63
DE	48	44	39	33	64	76	73	68	67	53	39	8	8	8	63	68	63	78
FR	37	36	32	57	61	79	73	71	60	45	32	6	6	6	43	68	70	35
mean	44	46	39	52	63	77	69	63	67	53	39	8	8	8	53	68	66	59
DK	75	49	54	65	91	88	71	58	83	66	54	8	9	9	87	78	68	90
FI	56	46	44	60	70	79	68	57	71	57	44	5	5	5	40	34	63	48
NO	58	38	41	44	73	80	73	56	72	54	41	9	9	9	52	70	68	68
SE	50	38	39	47	67	81	62	49	66	50	39	7	9	9	75	82	85	82
mean	60	43	45	54	75	82	69	55	73	57	45	7	8	8	64	66	71	72
IE	60	44	47	55	75	66	53	42	76	60	47	8	8	7	24	60	35	47
UK	50	44	38	58	61	66	53	39	64	52	38	7	7	7	55	46	20	72
mean	55	44	43	57	68	66	53	41	70	56	43	8	8	7	40	53	28	60
CY																		
ES	27	36	27	38	48	80	73	54	46	35	27							
GR	2	34	13	23	23	67	52	38	20	16	13							
PT	38	38	30	49	61	82	84	84	51	39	30							
TU	0	34	11	9	9	71	53	39	18	14	11							

mean	17	36	20	30	35	75	66	54	34	26	20							
CZ	44	42	36	29	55	73	65	58	58	48	36							
HU	46	44	36	20	51	81	70	55	54	45	36							
PL	32	40	30	38	48	70	54	39	53	40	30							
SK	29	39	27	11	39	69	70	70	48	36	27							
SI	59	50	44	67	67	85	78	60	69	57	44							
HR																		
EE	25	38	24	15	35	64	63	60	43	33	24							
LV	20	38	24	37	39	82	84	85	43	33	24							
LT	41	34	28	9	48	81	67	48	53	39	28							
BG	30	35	25	17	42	80	59	42	47	34	25							
RO	17	35	19	15	26	64	51	41	33	25	19							
UA																		
RU																		
mean	34	40	29	26	45	75	66	56	50	39	29							
CH	45	36	37	24	73	85	82	79	72	53	39	9	9	9	25	69	72	38
NL	61	37	47	49	83	91	76	60	83	63	47	11	11	11	87	86	74	94
IL										6								

Net Replacement Rates: Average net replacement rates over 60 months of unemployment and average for four family types

a = 2 children One-earner married couple | b = 2 children Two - earner married couple | c = mean | d = 60 months average a: Average of net replacement rate over 60 months of unemployment, 2008: Overall average *without* social assistance (No children, single person/No children, one-earner married couple/2 children lone parent/2 children one-earner married couple) | e = 60 months average b: Average of net replacement rate over 60 months of unemployment, 2008: Overall average *with* social assistance (No children, single person/No children, one-earner married couple/2 children lone parent/2 children one-earner married couple) | f = Earnings Initial Phase of Unemployment for six family types (67% of Average Wage) (OECD) | g = Earnings Initial Phase of Unemployment for six family types(100% of Average Wage) (OECD) | h = Earnings Initial Phase of Unemployment for six family types (150% of Average Wage) (OECD) | i = Earnings Long Term Unemployment for six family types (67% of Average Wage) (OECD) | j = Earnings Long Term Unemployment for six family types (100% of Average Wage) (OECD) | k = Earnings Long Term Unemployment for six family types(150% of Average Wage) (OECD) | l = Esping-Anderson De-commodification (Unemployment) | m = Scruggs/ Allan De-commodification (Unemployment) | n = Scruggs/ Allan Benefit Generosity (Unemployment) | o = Single Unemployment Replacement Rates 1971 (Scruggs 2007a: 144) | p = Single Unemployment Replacement Rates 1980 (Scruggs 2007a: 144) | q = Single Unemployment Replacement Rates 1990 (Scruggs 2007a: 144) | r = Couple Unemployment Replacement Rates 1971 (Scruggs 2007a: 144)

Table A2.10

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n
BE	67	60	-1	-6	64	1.0	1.0	8934	11056	14206	20350	27638	36420	44037
DE	70	70	-8	2	74	0.7	0.7	8879	11209	15587	20916	28327	37617	45522
FR	61	63	2	12	72	0.2	0.3	8115	9969	13587	18784	26178	36076	43990
mean	66	64	-2	3	70	0.6	0.7	8643	10745	14460	20017	27381	36704	44516

DK	81	73	-19	-17	65	1.0	1.0	9956	11673	14643	20359	27197	34034	38974
FI	48	73	23	19	67	-1.0	1.0	8066	9984	13892	19523	26864	35427	42979
NO	75	73	-5	-3	63	1.0	0.6	11172	13955	19164	25587	32750	41153	48947
SE	85	81	-7	-7	60	1.0	1.0	9896	11652	14896	20370	26801	34107	39700
mean	72	75	-2	-2	64	0.5	0.9	9773	11816	15649	21460	28403	36180	42650
IE	85	64	-31	-27	63	1.0	0.8	6457	7284	10173	17414	25825	34837	40795
UK	63	36	-28	-8	59	1.0	1.0	7973	9855	13521	19961	30063	43958	55676
mean	74	50	-30	-18	61	1.0	0.9	7215	8570	11847	18688	27944	39398	48236
CY														
ES					63			5491	6978	10057	15673	23502	32511	39447
GR					61			4745	6255	9639	14441	21741	30678	38554
PT					81									
TU					58									
mean					66			5118	6617	9848	15057	22622	31595	39001
CZ					71									
HU					67			3646	4707	6223	8250	11314	15423	20125
PL					56			2727	3544	5097	7301	10215	14308	18039
SK					79									
SI					67			5066	6464	9285	12672	16624	21629	25757
HR														
EE					75			1942	2451	3381	4961	7618	11514	14653
LV					80									
LT					56									
BG					53									
RO					61									
UA														
RU								689	1035	1742	2746	4739	7971	10768
mean					67			2814	3640	5146	7186	10102	14169	17868
CH	83	82	3	1	74	0.6	0.8	10404	13599	18846	26087	35168	45292	53913
NL	89	78	-8	-12	61	0.8	0.9							
IL								4573	5730	9040	15449	24140	34189	42815

Table A2.11

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	j	i	j	k	l	m
BE	1.0	1.0	1.0	6071	7333	9839	13000	16667	20333	23333	0.8	0.9	1.0
DE	0.9	1.0	1.0	6600	7334	13200	17396	23762	33267	35401	0.8	0.8	1.0
FR	1.0	1.0	1.0	5700	7715	12462	16201	21143	29600	32801	0.7	0.9	1.0
mean	1.0	1.0	1.0	6124	7460	11834	15532	20524	27734	30512	0.8	0.9	1.0
DK	0.9	1.0	1.0	7417	11597	18519	24644	32858	40005	48006	0.6	0.8	1.0
FI	0.9	0.9	1.0	5400	8396	12594	18442	23994	33196	34194	0.5	0.8	0.9
NO	0.8	0.9	1.0	11867	14410	19169	24722	31023	41364	44500	0.9	1.0	1.0
SE	1.0	1.0	1.0	9120	11850	14661	20457	25690	32134	35638	0.8	0.9	0.9
mean	0.9	0.95	1.0	8451	11563	16236	22066	28391	36675	40585	0.7	0.9	0.95
IE	0.9	0.8	0.9	5000	7222	12667	17000	26000	36667	39000	0.7	0.9	1.1
UK	1.1	1.1	1.0	4411	4411	8912	13678	21662	29161	34472	0.8	0.7	1.0
mean	1.0	0.95	0.95	4706	5817	10790	15339	23831	32914	36736	0.75	0.8	1.05
CY				3900	7840	12105	17256	21570	28760	34000	0.5	0.8	0.9
ES	0.9	0.9	1.0	4194	5534	8052	10736	13108	17477	21496	0.8	0.8	0.9
GR	0.9	0.9	1.0	3417	4762	6404	8610	11886	15146	17220	0.8	1.0	1.0
PT				2500	3463	5000	6478	8267	10000	12400	0.7	0.8	1.0
TU				372	486	1156	2095	3073	4323	6052	0.5	0.5	0.8
mean	0.9	0.9	1.0	2877	4417	6543	9035	11581	15141	18234	0.66	0.8	0.9
CZ				2208	4415	6623	7727	11039	15454	16558	0.6	1.1	1.2
HU	1.1	1.1	1.0	1414	1895	2652	3410	4593	5684	6441	0.8	0.9	1.1
PL	0.9	1.0	1.0	1203	1569	2405	3368	4450	5880	7056	0.8	0.8	0.9
SK				2102	3002	3941	6305	11822	18390	19703	1.0	1.4	1.2
SI	0.8	0.9	1.0	2302	3082	4736	7262	10273	12752	15350	0.7	0.8	0.9
HR				1021	1532	2671	4416	6444	8280	10064	0.5	0.7	0.9
EE	1.2	1.2	1.1	1480	2183	3322	4522	6784	9434	11075	0.8	1.0	1.1
LV				1164	1629	2444	3423	4449	6043	7240	0.7	0.8	0.9
LT				1241	1891	2836	3545	4875	6500	7977	0.8	1.0	1.1
BG				613	919	1105	1799	2611	3544	4506	0.9	1.0	0.9
RO				2500	3463	5000	6478	8267	10000	12400	0.7	0.8	1.0
UA				277	416	654	1004	1406	1831	2130	0.6	0.8	0.9
RU	1.0	1.1	1.1	730	974	1460	2272	3515	4976	5679	0.8	0.9	1.0
mean	1.0	1.0	1.0	1404	2075	3065	4272	6194	8367	9706	0.7	0.9	1.0

	0.8	0.9	1.0	10364	16780	25170	33067	46227	57213	62349	0.6	0.9	1.1
CH	0.8	0.9	1.0	10364	16780	25170	33067	46227	57213	62349	0.6	0.9	1.1
NL				5850	9452	13350	18267	23952	30167	33533	0.6	0.9	1.0
IL	0.8	0.8	0.9	1208	2088	4651	8526	13018	18363	20986	0.4	0.5	0.8

Income percentiles (Luxembourg Income Study)
Income skews (calculated from Luxembourg Income Study income percentiles)
a = calculated with 5th and 95th percentile | b = calculated with 10th and 90th percentile | c = calculated with 25th and 75th percentile

Income percentiles (calculated from adjusted household income, ESS4, Euro)
d = 5th | e = 10th | f = 25th | g = median | h = 75th | i = 90th | j = 95th

Income skews (calculated from ESS4 income percentile)
k = calculated with 5th and 95th percentile | l = calculated with 10th and 90th percentile | m = calculated with 25th and 75th percentile.

13.3 A3: Appendix to chapter 7.2

Table A3.1: Common regression model: Number of cases, adjusted R², standard error

	Government responsibility					
	For the old			For the unemployed		
	n	aR²	s.e.	n	aR²	s.e.
BE	1632	0.08	1.410	1648	0.15	1.773
De	827	0.18	1.767	854	0.25	1.970
Dw	1533	0.12	1.880	1580	0.14	1.919
FR	1883	0.14	1.504	1923	0.20	1.825
DK	1451	0.13	1.396	1408	0.21	1.727
FI	1776	0.14	1.114	1794	0.21	1.445
NO	1339	0.08	1.322	1342	0.15	1.674
SE	1424	0.11	1.342	1427	0.16	1.674
IE	1572	0.09	1.435	1654	0.14	1.842
GB	1997	0.11	1.387	2079	0.21	1.940
CY	864	0.14	1.301	764	0.16	1.751
ES	1812	0.14	1.210	1798	0.10	1.763
GR	1536	0.13	1.509	1786	0.13	1.796
PT	1194	0.31	1.528	1397	0.14	1.926
TR	1446	0.20	2.199	1376	0.14	2.373
CZ	1600	0.10	2.006	1605	0.18	2.227
HU	1038	0.08	1.753	1192	0.12	2.304
PL	1178	0.12	1.561	1231	0.16	2.255
SK	1367	0.11	1.870	1411	0.17	2.120
SI	919	0.12	1.627	1011	0.12	2.064
HR	923	0.17	1.676	1058	0.21	1.946
EE	1163	0.21	1.463	1283	0.21	1.974
LV	1447	0.15	1.339	1509	0.18	1.849

LT	1187	0.12	1.427	1460	0.19	1.919
BG	1245	0.12	1.446	1296	0.22	2.457
RO	1229	0.21	2.129	1365	0.18	2.208
UA	849	0.12	1.785	1159	0.17	2.225
RU	1321	0.18	1.517	1639	0.15	2.498
CH	1562	0.12	1.811	1544	0.15	1.761
NL	1610	0.08	1.328	1552	0.12	1.496
IL	1839	0.31	1.373	1734	0.13	2.077

Table A3.2: Country-specific regressions: Support for government responsibility for the old

	Sociodemographics		**Values**
1	Age	40	Openness to change
2	Gender (female)	41	Conservation*
3	Education	42	Self-enhancement
		43	Self-transcendence
10	Adjusted household income*	44	Religiosity *
11	Main income source: pensions*		**General welfare state attitudes**
12	Parents´ status (parents´ education as proxy)*	50	Preference for higher social spending/taxes
13	Union membership *	51	Attitude: Social benefits have negative effects
14	News media consumption *	52	Preference for gov. red. of income differences
	General social attitudes	53	Attitude: Fairness requires material equality
20	Social trust *		**Welfare state financing**
	General political attitudes	60	Satisfaction with the state of economy
30	Self-placement: right	61	Estimated pension affordability *
31	Ideology: Socialist/communist		**Views about dependent groups**
32	Ideology: Social democratic	70	Positive attitude towards the old
33	Ideology: Liberal	71	Estimated standard of living of pensioners*
34	Ideology: Christian democratic/religious	72	Suspicion of fraud *
35	Ideology: Conservative		
36	Political trust*		

*variable not in the common regression model

Figure A3.1: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Belgium

n = 1628 | aR²= .10 | standard error = 1.40

Figure A3.2: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Germany (e)

n = 826 | aR²= .20 | standard error = 1.74

Figure A3.3: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Germany (w)

n = 1622 | aR²= .15 | standard error = 1.84

Figure A3.4: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: France

n = 1933 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.49

Figure A3.5: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Denmark

n = 1453 | aR²= .14 | standard error = 1.39

Figure A3.6: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Finland

n = 1845 | aR²= .14 | standard error = 1.11

Figure A3.7: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Norway

n = 1366 | aR²= .10 | standard error = 1.31

Figure A3.8: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Sweden

n = 1462 | aR²= .13 | standard error = 1.32

Figure A3.9: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Ireland

n = 1555 | aR²= .10 | standard error = 1.43

Figure A3.10: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: UK

n = 1844 | aR²= .14 | standard error = 1.36

Figure A3.11: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Cyprus

n = 863 | aR²= .14 | standard error = 1.30

Figure A3.12: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Spain

n = 1720 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.19

Figure A3.13: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Greece

n = 1609 | aR²= .13 | standard error = 1.49

Figure A3.14: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Portugal

n = 1573 | aR²= .31 | standard error = 1.56

Figure A3.15: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old:Turkey

n = 1316 | aR²= .22 | standard error = 1.94

Figure A3.16: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Czech Republic

n = 1619 | aR²= .12 | standard error = 2.00

Figure A3.17: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Hungary

n = 1006 | aR²= .09 | standard error = 1.73

Figure A3.18: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Poland

n = 1305 | aR²= .13 | standard error = 1.55

Figure A3.19: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Slovakia

n = 1262 | aR²= .13 | standard error = 1.84

Figure A3.20: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Slovenia

n = 1096 | aR²= .12 | standard error = 1.62

Figure A3.21: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Croatia

n = 1194 | aR²= .19 | standard error = 1.61

Figure A3.22: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Estonia

n = 1144 | aR²= .22 | standard error = 1.45

Figure A3.23: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Latvia

n = 1456 | aR²= .15 | standard error = 1.31

Figure A3.24: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Lithuania

n = 1250 | aR²= .13 | standard error = 1.38

Figure A3.25: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Bulgaria

n = 1449 | aR²= .14 | standard error = 1.47

Figure A3.26: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Romania

n = 1480 | aR²= .25 | standard error = 2.08

Figure A3.27: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Ukraine

n = 804 | aR²= .13 | standard error = 1.66

Figure A3.28: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Russia

n = 1664 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.57

Figure A3.29: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Switzerland

n = 1619 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.76

Figure A3.30: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: the Netherlands

n = 1562 | aR²= .11 | standard error = 1.28

Figure A3.31: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Israel

n = 1905 | aR²= .32 | standard error = 1.35

Table A3.3:Country-specific regressions: Support for government responsibility for the unemployed

	Sociodemographics		Values
1	Age	40	Openness to change
2	Gender (female)	41	Conservation*
3	Education	42	Self-enhancement
		43	Self-transcendence
10	Adjusted household income*	44	Religiosity*
11	Main income source: Unemployment benefits*		**General welfare state attitudes**
12	Parents´ status (parents´ education as proxy)*	50	Preference for higher social spending/taxes
13	Union membership*	51	Attitude: Social benefits have negative effects
14	News media consumption*	52	Preference for gov. red. of income differences
15	Past unemployment for at least three months	53	Attitude: Fairness requires material equality
16	Subjective risk of unemployment*		
	General social attitudes		
20	Social trust*		**Welfare state financing**
	General political attitudes	60	Satisfaction with the state of economy*
30	Self-placement: right*		**Views about dependent groups**
31	Ideology: Socialist/communist		
32	Ideology: Social democratic		
33	Ideology: Liberal	71	Estimated standard of living of the unemployed
34	Ideology: Christian democrativ/religious	72	Suspicion of fraud*

35	Ideology: Conservative	73	Ascription of ind. responsib. for unemployment
36	Political Trust	74	Assessment of job opportunities for young people
		75	Estimated unemployment rate

*variable not in the common regression model

Figure A3.32: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the unemployed: Belgium

n = 1592 | aR² = .17 | standard error = 1.74

Figure A3.33: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Germany (e)

n = 818 | aR² = .27 | standard error = 1.92

Figure A3.34: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Germany (w)

n = 1605 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.89

Figure A3.35: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: the France

n = 1925 | aR²= .20 | standard error = 1.82

Figure A3.36: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Denmark

n = 1438 | aR²= .23 | standard error = 1.70

Figure A3.37: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Finland

n = 1805 | aR²= .22 | standard error = 1.44

Figure A3.38: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Norway

n = 1361 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.67

Figure A3.39: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Sweden

n = 1410 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.68

Figure A3.40: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Ireland

n = 1639 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.84

Figure A3.41: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: United Kingdom

n = 2072 | aR²= .22 | standard error = 1.93

Figure A3.42: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Cyprus

n = 767 | aR²= .18 | standard error = 1.73

Figure A3.43: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Spain

n = 1932 | aR²= .11 | standard error = 1.77

Figure A3.44: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Greece

n = 1585 | aR²= .14 | standard error = 1.8

Figure A3.45: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Portugal

n = 1566 | aR²= .14 | standard error = 1.93

Figure A3.46: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Turkey

n = 1601 | aR²= .18 | standard error = 2.29

Figure A3.47: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Czech Republic

n = 1582 | aR²= .19 | standard error = 2.23

Figure A3.48: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Hungary

n = 1241 | aR²= .13 | standard error = 2.28

Figure A3.49: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Poland

n = 1209 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 2.24

Figure A3.50: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Slovakia

n = 1346 | aR²= .20 | standard error = 2.11

Figure A3.51: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Slovenia

n = 998 | aR²= .13 | standard error = 2.05

Figure A3.52: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Croatia

n = 1048 | aR²= .21 | standard error = 1.94

Figure A3.53: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Estonia

n = 1200 | aR²= .21 | standard error = 1.97

Figure A3.54: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Latvia

n = 1350 | aR²= .20 | standard error = 1.82

Figure A3.55: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Lithuania

n = 1463 | aR²= .22 | standard error = 1.88

Figure A3.56: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old:Bulgaria

n = 1417 | aR²= .22 | standard error = 2.45

Figure A3.57: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Romania

n = 1431 | aR²= .21 | standard error = 2.15

Figure A3.58: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Ukraine

n = 1209 | aR²= .14 | standard error = 2.12

Figure A3.59: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Russia

n = 1627 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.50

Figure A3.60: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Switzerland

n = 1509 | aR²= .16 | standard error = 1.76

Figure A3.61: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: the Netherlands

n = 1553 | aR²= .15 | standard error = 1.49

Figure A3.62: Country-specific micro effects on support for government responsibility for the old: Israel

n = 1703 | aR²= .15 | standard error = 2.05

Table A3.4: Common regression model: Number of cases, Pseudo R², standard error

	Earnings-relatedness					
	Pensions			Unemployment benefits		
	n	Nagelkerke´s R²	s.e.	n	Nagelkerke´s R²	s.e.
BE	1610	.10	.052	1633	.06	.057
De	800	.20	.072	841	.20	.070
Dw	1475	.14	.058	1546	.08	.052
FR	1826	.17	.047	1848	.11	.048
DK	1358	.20	.121	1329	.05	.080
DK neg	1358	.11	.062	-		
FI	1719	.20	.049	1743	.15	.052
NO	1315	.15	.057	1320	.15	.060
SE	1377	.18	.055	1385	.16	.058

IE	1539	.06	.066	1630	.05	.072
GB	1947	.06	.060	2041	.07	.064
CY	780	.10	.071	679	.23	.089
ES	1824	.13	.048	1830	.08	.047
GR	1540	.09	.053	1791	.08	.080
GR neg	-			1791	.14	.058
PT	1239	.18	.061	1331	.14	.056
TR	1418	.13	.082	1463	.21	.101
TR neg	1418	.17	.058	1463	.21	.054
CZ	1541	.14	.053	1490	.10	.052
HU	951	.14	.064	1054	.08	.072
PL	1194	.15	.063	1229	.05	.065
SK	1263	.25	.057	1333	.11	.054
SI	884	.22	.067	964	.13	.081
HR	821	.11	.070	961	.08	.092
EE	1141	.12	.060	1281	.09	.069
LV	1422	.14	.054	1434	.11	.053
LT	1122	.05	.071	1392	.07	.054
BG	1320	.12	.062	1358	.09	.054
RO	1023	.14	.063	1090	.07	.068
UA	725	.12	.080	1041	.12	.064
RU	1198	.05	.060	1481	.02	.053
CH	1490	.13	.055	1479	.14	.053
NL	1551	.11	.074	1500	.09	.054
IL	1802	.10	.058	1694	.21	.049

Table A4.3: : Common regression model: Number of cases, Pseudo R², standard error (continued)

Pensions

Table A3.5: Country-specific regressions: Support for positive pension earnings-relatedness

	Sociodemographics		Values
1	Age	40	Openness to change
2	Gender (female)	41	Conservation*
3	Education	42	Self-enhancement
		43	Self-transcendence
10	Adjusted household income	44	Religiosity*
11	Main income source: pensions*		**General welfare state attitudes**
12	Parents´ status (parents´ education as proxy)*	52	Preference for gov. red. of income differences
13	Union membership*	53	Attitude: Fairness requires material equality
14	News media consumption *		**Welfare state financing**

15	Past unemployment for at least three months	60	Satisfaction with the state of economy*
	General political attitudes	61	Estimated pension affordability*
30	Self-placement: right	62	Preference for progressive taxation
31	Ideology: Socialist/communist		**Views about dependent groups**
32	Ideology: Social democratic	70	Positive attitude towards the old
33	Ideology: Liberal	71	Estimated standard of living of pensioners
34	Ideology: Christian democratic/religious		
35	Ideology: Conservative		
36	Political trust*		

*variable not in the common regression model

Figure A3.63: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Belgium

n = 1628 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .11 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.64: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Germany (e)

n = 837 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .21 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.65: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Germany (w)

n = 1448 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .10 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.66: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: France

n = 1726 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .18 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.67: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Denmark

n = 1347 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .20 | standard error = .12

Figure A3.68: Country-specific micro effects on support for negative pension earnings-relatedness: Denmark

n = 1365 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .11 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.69: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Finland

n = 1804 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .19 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.70: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Norway

n = 1334 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .15 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.71: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Sweden

n = 1376 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .19 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.72: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Ireland

n = 1483 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .08 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.73: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: United Kingdom

n = 1836 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .08 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.74: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Cyprus

n = 782 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .09 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.75: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Spain

n = 1609 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .09 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.76: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Greece

n = 1454 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .11 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.77: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Portugal

n = 1029 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .22 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.78: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Turkey

n = 1316 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .14 | standard error = .08

Figure A3.79: Country-specific micro effects on support for negative pension earnings-relatedness: Turkey

n = 1456 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .23 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.80: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Czech Republic

n = 1478 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .15 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.81: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Hungary

n = 903 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .18 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.82: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Poland

n = 1200 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .15 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.83: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Slovakia

n = 1247 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .26 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.84: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Slovenia

n = 853 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .22 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.85: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Croatia

n = 739 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .15 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.86: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Estonia

n = 1063 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .13 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.87: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Latvia

n = 1456 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .16 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.88: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Lithuania

n = 1542 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .06 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.89: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Bulgaria

n = 1708 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .11 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.90: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Romania

n = 801 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .17 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.91: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Ukraine

n = 904 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .20 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.92: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Russia

n = 1044 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .08 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.93: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Switzerland

n = 1496 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .13 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.94: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: the Netherlands

n = 1536 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .13 | standard error = .08

Figure A3.95: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive pension earnings-relatedness: Israel

n = 1695 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .01 | standard error = .06

Unemployment benefits

TableA.36: Country-specific regressions: Support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness

	Sociodemographics		Values
1	Age	40	Openness to change*
2	Gender (female)	41	Conservation*
3	Education	42	Self-enhancement
		43	Self-transcendence
10	Adjusted household income	44	Religiosity
11	Main income source: Unemployment benefits*		**General welfare state attitudes**
12	Parents´ status (parents´ education as proxy)*	52	Preference for gov. red. of income differences
13	Union membership*	53	Attitude: Fairness requires material equality
14	News media consumption		**Welfare state financing**
15	Past unemployment for at least three months*	60	Satisfaction with the state of economy*
16	Subjective risk of unemployment*	62	Preference for progressive taxation
	General political attitudes		**Views about dependent groups**
30	Self-placement: right*	71	Estimated standard of living of the unemployed
31	Ideology: Socialist/communist	73	Ascription of ind. responsib. for unemployment
32	Ideology: Social democratic	75	Estimated unemployment Rate
33	Ideology: Liberal		
34	Ideology: Christian democratic/religious		
35	Ideology: Conservative		

*variable not in the common regression model

Figure A3.96: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Belgium

n = 1574 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .07 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.97: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Germany (e)

n = 833 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .22 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.98: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Germany (w)

n = 1547 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .08 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.99: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: France

n = 1876 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .12 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.100: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Denmark

n = 1352 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .06 | standard error = .08

Figure A3.101: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Finland

n = 1762 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .15 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.102: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Norway

n = 1325 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .15 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.103: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Sweden

n = 1406 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .17 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.104: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness Ireland

n = 1491 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .06 | standard error = .08

Figure A3.105: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: United Kingdom

n = 2071 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .07 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.106: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Denmark

n = 808 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .24 | standard error = .08

Figure A3.107: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Spain

n = 783 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .10 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.108: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Greece

n = 1551 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .09 | standard error = .09

Figure A3.109: Country-specific micro effects on support for negative unemployment benefit eearnings-relatedness: Greece

n = 1791 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .14 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.110: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Portugal

n = 1518 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .13 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.111: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Turkey

n = 1249 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .33 | standard error = .11

Figure A3.112: Country-specific micro effects on support for negative unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Turkey

n = 1458 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .22 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.113: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Czech Republic

n = 1501 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .12 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.114: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Hungary

n = 1048 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .08 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.115: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Poland

n = 1258 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .05 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.116: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Slovakia

n = 1287 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .12 | standard error = .06

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Figure A3.117: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Slovenia

n = 986 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .13 | standard error = .08

Figure A3.118: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Croatia

n = 893 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .11 | standard error = .10

Figure A3.119: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Estonia

n = 1123 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .09 | standard error = .07

Figure A3.120: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Latvia

n = 1285 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .15 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.121: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Lithuania

n = 1387 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .07 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.122: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Bulgaria

n = 1670 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .10 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.123: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Romania

n = 767 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .13 | standard error = .08

Figure A3.124: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Ukraine

n = 1027 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .12 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.125: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Russia

n = 1060 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .05 | standard error = .06

Figure A3.126: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Switzerland

n = 1435 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .15 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.127: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: the Netherlands

n = 1518 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .09 | standard error = .05

Figure A3.128: Country-specific micro effects on support for positive unemployment benefit earnings-relatedness: Israel

n = 1591 | Nagelkerke´s R²= .22 | standard error = .05

13.4 A4: Appendix to chapter 9

Column I (Ideology):
1: Green/ecologist
2: Socialist/communist
3: Social democratic
4: Liberal
5: Christian democratic/religious
6: Conservative
7: Nationalist/right-wing
8: Agrarian
9: Regional/ethnic minorities

Table A4.1: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Belgium

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Groen!	1	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Budge et al. 2001: 194 Hix/ Lord 1997: 39, Hecking 2006: 57, European Green Party (EGP), Norwegian Social Science Data Services: European Election Database (NSD).
2/2	Christian-Democrat and Flemish (CD&V)	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Hecking (2006), Hix /Lord (1997), Hecking (2006), Lane et al. (1997), European People´s Party (EPP), NSD
3/3	N-VA	9	Hecking (2006), NSD
4/4	Lijst Dedecker	4	Pauwels (2010), NSD
/5	SP.A. Spirit Social Progressive Alternative/SPIRIT	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Hix/ Lord 1997: 37,Hecking 2006: 56ff., Party of the European Socialists (PES), Siaroff (2000), NSD
5/6	Vlaams – Progressieven	9	Hecking (2006)
7/8	Vlaams Belang	9	Mapping Policy Preferences (MPP) I / II, Hix/Lord (1997), Hecking (2006), Lane et al. (1997), NSD
8/9, 7	Open VLD + Vivant	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Hecking (2006) , Hix /Lord (1997), European Liberal Democrats (ELDR), Siaroff (2000), Vivant Homepage, NSD
9/10	CDH	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Hecking 2006: 53, EPP, NSD
10/11	Ecolo Greens	1	MPP I / II, Hix /Lord (1997), Hecking (2006), EGP, NSD
11/12	Front National	9	Hix /Lord (1997)
12/13	MR	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Hecking (2006), ELDR, NSD
13/14	PS	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Budge et al. 2001:195, MPP I / II, Hix /Lord (1997), Hecking (2006), Lane et al.(1997), Siaroff (2000), NSD

Table A4.2: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Germany

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1	SDP (SPD)	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 199, Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), PES, NSD
2	Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU)	5	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 29, Budge et al. 2001: 200, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997) EPP, NSD
3	Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)	1	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 29, Budge et al. 2001: 199, EGP, NSD
4	Liberal Democratic Party (FDP)	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 29, Budge et al. 2001: 199, Hix/ Lord 1997: 34, Siaroff 2000: 271f. Lane et al.(1997), ELDR, NSD
5	The Left Party of Democratic Socialism (Linkspartei.PDS)	2	MPP I / II, Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), EL, NSD
6	Republican Party (Republikaner)	7	Hix/Lord (1997), Lane et al.(1997)
7	National Democratic Party/German People´s Union (NPD/DVU)	7	Siaroff, Alan (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), Lane et al.(1997)

Table A4.3: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): France

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1	CPNT	8	Hainsworth (2006), Höhne (2006)
2	FN (Front National)	7	MPP I / II, Lane et al.(1997), Siaroff (2000), NSD
3	LCR (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire)	2	Höhne (2006)
4	LO (Lutte Ouvrière)	2	Hix/Lord (1997), Höhne (2006)
5/6	MPF	5	Höhne (2006), Hainsworth (2006)
6/7	Nouveau Centre	-	NSD
7/8	PC (Parti Communiste)	2	Lane et al.(1997), EL, NSD
8/10	PS (Parti Socialiste)	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 198, Siaroff 2000: 258, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), PES, NSD
9	PRG (Parti Radical de Gauche)	4	Hainsworth (2006), ELDR
10/12	UDF-MoDem (Mouvement Democrate)	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001:199 MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hainsworth (2006), Gallagher et al. (2006), NSD
11	UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire)	6	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 199, Hainsworth 2006: 104, EPP, NSD
12/13	Les Verts	1	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 198 MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), EGP, NSD
13/14	Autres mouvements écolog.	1	
14/	Divers gauche	-	
15/	Divers droite	-	

Table A4.4: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Denmark

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Socialdemokraterne	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), Steffen (2006), PES, NSD
2/2	Det Radikale Venstre	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 197, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), ELDR, NSD
3/3	Det Konservative Folkeparti	6	MPP I / II, EPP, Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Budge et al. 2001: 197 Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997) , NSD
4/4	SF – Socialistisk Folkeparti	2	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Steffen (2006), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), EGP, NSD
5/5	Dansk Folkeparti	7	MPP I / II, Siaroff, Alan (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), NSD
6/6	Kristendemokraterne	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Hix/ Lord 1997: 30, Steffen 2006: 105, EPP
7/7	Venstre, Danmarks Liberal Parti	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 197, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), ELDR, NSD
8/8	Ny Alliance	4	Liberal Alliance Homepage (market-oriented), NSD
9/9	Enhedslisten, De Rød-Grønne	2	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), European Left (EL), NSD

Table A4.5: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Finland

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
	Suomen Kristillinen Liitto	-	Hix/Lord (1997)
1/1	The National Coalition Party	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001:198, Hix/ Lord 1997: 31, Lane et al. 1997: 139, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), EPP, NSD
2/2	The Swedish People´s Party (SPP)	9	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 198 MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), NSD
3/3	Liberals (The liberal party of Finland)	4	Liberaalit Homepage
4/4	The Centre Party	8	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 198, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), ELDR, NSD
5/5	True Finns	8	MPP I / II, NSD
6/6	Christian Democrats	5	EPP, NSD
7/7	The Green League	1	Budge et al. 2001: 197, Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Siaroff 2000: 244, Hix/ Lord 1997: 41 Jahn et al. (2006), EGP, NSD
8/8	Finnish SDP	3	Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), PES, NSD
9/9	The Left Alliance	2	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001:197, Siaroff 2000: 242, Hix/ Lord 1997: 41, Lane et al. 1997: 139, EL, NSD

ESS Vote/PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
10/10	Communist Party of Finland	2	EL
11/11	The Communist Worker´s Party of Finland	2	Siaroff (2000)

Table A4.6: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Norway

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Red Electoral Alliance (RV)	2	Esaisson/Heidar (2000; appendix), NSD
2/2	Socialist left Party (SV)	2	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001: 208, Siaroff (2000), Steffen (2006), NSD
3/3	Labour Party	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Steffen 2006: 105 Budge et al. 2001: 208, PES, NSD
4/4	Liberal Party (V)	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001: 208, Lane et al. 1997: 144, Siaroff (2000), ELDR, NSD
5/5	Christian People´s Party (KrF)	5	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32 Budge et al. 2001: 208, Siaroff (2000), EPP, NSD
6/6	Centre Party (Sp)	8	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001: 208, Siaroff (2000), NSD
7/7	Conservative Party (H)	6	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001: 208, Siaroff (2000), Esaisson/Heidar (2000; appendix), EPP, NSD
8/8	Progress Party (FrP)	4	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al. (1997), Armingeon et al. 2012 , Widfeld (2000), Esaisson/Heidar (2000; appendix), NSD
9/9	Coast Party (KYST)	-	

Table A4.7: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Sweden

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Centre Party Centern	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, Budge et al. 2001: 210MPP I / II, ELDR, NSD
2/2	Liberals Folkpartiet liberalerna	4	MPP I / II, Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), ELDR, NSD
3/3	Christian Democrats	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, Hix/ Lord 1997: 30 Steffen 2006: 105, NSD
4/4	Miljöpartiet de gröna	1	MPP I / II, Hix/Lord (1997), EGP, NSD
5/5	Conservative Moderata samlingspartiet	6	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), NSD
6/6	Social Democrats Socialdemokraterna	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, NSD
7/7	Left Vänsterpartiet	2	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), Steffen (2006), NSD

Table A4.8: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Ireland

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	FF Fianna Fáil	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 30, Budge et al. 2001: 201, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), McBride (2006), Plasser/Ulram (2006), ELDR, NSD
2/2	FG Fine Gael	5	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 30, Budge et al. 2001: 201, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), Obinger/Tálos (2006), EPP, NSD
3/3	Labour Party	2	Armingeon et al. 2011: 29, Hix/Lord (1997), Siaroff (2000), PES, NSD
4/	Progressive Democrats	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 30, Budge et al. 2001: 201 Siaroff 2000: 304, MPP I / II, Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), McBride (2006), Siaroff (2000), The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009)
5/4	Green	1	Armingeon et al. 2011: 30, Budge et al. 2001: 201, Hix/ Lord 1997: 39, MPP I / II, Dunphy /Bale (2007), EGP, NSD
6/5	Sinn Fein	2	Siaroff (2000), McBride (2006), NSD
7/	Independent	-	McBride (2006)

Table A4.9: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): United Kingdom

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Conservative	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 34, Budge et al. 2001: 213 Siaroff 2000: 467, MPP I / II, ECR, NSD
2/2	Labour	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 34, Budge et al. 2001: 213 MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), Helms (2006), PES, NSD
3/3	Liberal Democrat	4	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Armingeon et al. 2012 , Hix/Lord (1997), Gallagher/Laver/Mair (2006), Helms (2006), ELDR, NSD
4/4	Scottish National Party	9	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), NSD
5/5	Plaid Cymru	9	Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), NSD
6/6	Green Party	1	Hix/Lord (1997), EGP
11/11	Ulster Unionist Party (NIR)	6	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), ECR
12/12	Democratic Unionist Party (NIR)	9	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000)
13/13	Sinn Fein (NIR)	2	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), NSD
14/14	Social Democratic and Labour Party (NIR)	3	Lazaridis, Gabriella (2009), Hix/Lord (1997), PES, NSD
15/15	Alliance Party (NIR)	4	Siaroff (2000), ELDR
16/16	Progressive Unionist Party (NIR)	-	
17/17	United Kingdom Unionist Party (NIR)	-	Siaroff (2000)
18/18	Womens Coalition NIR)	-	

ESS Vote/PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
19/19	United unionist Assembly Party (NIR)	-	Siaroff (2000)
20/20	Northern Ireland Unionist Party (NIR)	-	
21/21	Workers Party (NIR)	-	

Table A4.10: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Cyprus

ESS Vote/PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)	2	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 26, Siaroff (2000), Ker-Lindsay/Webb (2004), Kaymak/Faustmann (2009), Dunphy/Bale (2007), Michael (2007), Lazaridis (2009), NSD
2/2	Demokrat Party (DIKO)	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 26, Siaroff (2000): 208, Ker-Lindsay/ Webb (2004): 975, Dunphy/ Bale 2007: 295, The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009), NSD
3/3	Democratic Rally (DISY)	5	MPP I / II, EPP, Siaroff (2000), Ker-Lindsay/Webb (2004), Dunphy/Bale (2007), Michael (2007), NSD
4/4	European Party (EVROKO)	-	
5/5	The Cyprus Green Party	1	EGP
6/6	United Democrats (EDI)	4	ELDR
7/7	Social Democrats (KS EDEK)	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 26, Siaroff (2000), PES, Kaymak/Faustmann (2009), PES, Dunphy/Bale (2007), Lazaridis (2009), NSD

Table A4.11: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Spain

ESS Vote/PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Partido Popular	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, Budge et al. 2001: 210 MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), EPP, NSD
2/2	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, Budge et al. 2001: 209 MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), PES, NSD
3/3	Izquierda Unida (IU)	2	MPP I / II, EL, NSD
4/4	Convergència I Unió (CiU)	6	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), NSD
5/5	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	9	MPP I / II, Hix /Lord (1997), NSD
6/6	Partido Nationalista Vasco (PNV)	9	Hix /Lord (1997), Siaroff (2000), Haas (2006), NSD
7/7	Bloque Nationalista Galego (BNG)	9	MPP I / II, NSD
8/8	Coalición Canaria-Partido Nationalista Canario (CC-PNC)	9	Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), Haas (2006) , NSD
9/9	Nafarroa-Bai (NA-BAI)	9	Haas (2006)
10/10	Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD)		

Table A4.12: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Greece

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Panhellenic Socialist Movement – PASOK	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 29, Budge et al. 2001: 200, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), PES, NSD
2/2	New Democracy – ND	6	MPP I / II, EPP, Armingeon et al. 2011: 29, Budge et al. 2001: 200, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Hix/Lord (1997), NSD, EPP
3/3	Communist Party – KKE	2	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), NSD
4/4	Coalition of the Radical Left	2	Armingeon et al. 2011: 29 EL, NSD
5/5	Popular Orthodox Rally – LAOS	7	Lazaridis (2009), Armingeon et al. 2012, NSD
6/6	Greens	1	EGP, NSD

Table A4.13: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Portugal

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	BE – Bloco de Esquerda	2	EL, NSD
2/2	CDS/PP – Centro Democrático Social/Partido Popular	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001:209, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), Freire (2006), EPP, NSD
3/3	PCP-PEV	2	MPP I / II, NSD
4/4	PCTP-MRPP	-	
5/5	PDA	-	
6/6	PH – Partido Humanista	-	
7/7	PND – Partido da Nova Democracia	-	
8/8	PNR – Partido Nacional Renovador	-	
9/9	POUS – Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista	-	
10/10	PSD – Partido Social Democrata	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001: 209, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al.(1997), Freire (2006), Hix/Lord (1997), EPP, NSD
11/11	PS – Partido Socialista	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Freire (2006), PES, NSD

Table A4.14: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Turkey

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Adalet Kalkinma Partisi (AKP)	5	EPP, NSD
2/2	Anavatan Partisis (ANAP)	6	Siaroff 2000: 454, Klingemann et al. 2006: 207 Marckhgott 2007: 47, MPP I / II
3/3	Buyuk Birlek Partisi (BBP)	-	

4/4	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)	3	Siaroff 2000: 453, Klingemann et al. 2006:, MPP I / II,PES, NSD
5/5	Demokrat Parti (DP)	6	Siaroff (2000), Budge et al. 2001: 212
6/6	Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP)	2	EL
7/7	Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP)	3	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Klingemann et al. 2006: 207, Marckhgott 2007: 47
8/8	Emek Partisi (EMEP)	-	
9/9	Isci Partisi (IP)	-	
10/10	Milliyetci Harekhet Partisi (MHP)	7	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), NSD
11/11	Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ODP)	2	EL
12/12	Saadet Partisi (SP)	-	NSD
13/13	Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti (SHP)	3	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Klingemann et al. 2006: 207
14/14	T. Komunist Partisi (TKP)	-	

Table A4.15: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Czech Republic

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	KSCM	2	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012, NSD
2/2	ČSSD	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Eckert 2008: 104f., PES, Armingeon et al. 2012, NSD
3/3	SZ	1	EGP, Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Armingeon et al. 2012
4/4	KDU- ČSL	5	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Klingemann et al. 2006: 214, Siaroff 2000: 220, Eckert 2008: 106, Armingeon et al. 2012 , EPP
5/5	ODS	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Klingemann et al. 2006: 214, Eckert 2008: 103f., Armingeon et al. 2012 European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), NSD

Table A4.16: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Hungary

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Fidesz – KDNP	5	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 31, Klingemann et al. 2006: 219, Siaroff (2000), EPP, NSD
2/2	MDF	6	Armingeon et al. 2012: 30, Klingemann et al. 2006: 219 Körösényi et al. 2010: 390ff., MPP I / II
3/3	MIÉP	7	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000)
4/4	MSZP	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 30, Klingemann et al. 2006: 219, Siaroff 2000: 289f., Körösényi et al. 2010: 394f., MPP I / II, PES, NSD
5/5	Munkáspárt	2	Armingeon et al. 2012, EL
6/6	SZDSZ	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 31, Klingemann et al. 2006: 219, Siaroff 2000: 289, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), ELDR

7/7	Centrumpárt	6	Armingeon et al. 2012
8/8	Kereszténydemokrata Párt – Keresztény Centrum Összefogás	4	Armingeon et al. 2012
9/9	Magyar Vidék és Polgári Párt	-	
10/10	MCF Roma Összefogás Párt	-	
/11	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	7	Márkus (2010), NSD
/12	Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt	3	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012, PES

Table A4.17: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Poland

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/-	Left and Democrats	3	Armingeon et al.2012
2/1	League of Polish Families	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37, Mudde 2005: 159
3/2	Civic Platform	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37, EPP, NSD, Carbone 2010:110
-/3	Democratic Party	4	MPP I / II,ELDT, Armingeon et al. 2012: 37, Klingemann et al. 2006: 225
4/-	Polish Labour Party	2	
5/4	Polish Peoples Party	8	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al.2012, EPP, NSD
6/5	Law and Justice	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 37 Klingemann et al. 2006: 225, ECR, NSD (5)
7/6	Self-Defence	6	MPP I / II, Gallagher et al. (2006), Armingeon et al. 2012: 37, Klingemann et al. 2006: 226
-/7	SDP of Poland	3	Armingeon et al. 2012
-/8	DLA	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 37, Siaroff (2000), Gwiazda 2008: 809, PES, NSD
-/9	Labour Union	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 37, Klingemann et al. 2006: 225, Siaroff (2000), Eckert (2008), PES

Table A4.18: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Slovakia

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)	7	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 39, Klingemann et al. 2006: 231, Vachudova 2008: 391, Siaroff (2000),
2/2	Slovak Democratic Christian Union (SDKU)	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39, EPP
3/3	SMER – sociálna demokracia	3	Armingeon et al. 2012 , PES, NSD
4/4	SMK (SMK)	9	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39, NSD
5/5	Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39, Siaroff (2000) , EPP, NSD
6/6	SNS (SNS)	7	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al.2012 , NSD

Table A4.19: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Slovenia

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia – DESUS	N	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012
2/2	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia – LDS	4	Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012 , ELDR, NSD
3/3	LIPA – Party	4	Armingeon et al. 2012
4/4	New Slovenia – Christian Peoples Party – Nsi	5	Armingeon et al. 2012 , EPP, NSD
5/5	SDS - Slovenska demokratska stranka	5	Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012 , EPP, NSD
6/6	Slovene Peoples Party – SLS	5	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012, EPP, NSD
7/7	Slovene National Party – SNS	9	Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012 , NSD
8/8	Social Democrats – SD	3	PES, NSD
9/9	ZARES – New Politics	4	ELDR

Table A4.20: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Croatia

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Hrvatska demokrtska zajednica (HDZ)	5	MPP I / II, Armingeon/Careja 2007: 11 (CPDS II, Annex), Klingemann et al. 2006: 213, Siaroff 2000: 203, Pickering/ Baskin 2008: 528, EPP, NSD
2/2	Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske (SDP)	3	MPP I / II, PES, Pickering/Baskin (2008), NSD
3/3	Hrvatska narodna stranka – Liberalni demokrati (HNS)	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon/ Careja 2007: 11, Klingemann et al. 2006: 213, Siaroff 2000: 203, ELDR
4/4	Hrvatska seljacka stranka (HSS)	5	EPP, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), NSD
5/5	Hrvatsko socijalno – liberalna stranka (HSLS)	4	Armingeon/Careja 2007: 11, Klingemann et al. 2006: 212, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), ELDR, NSD
6/6	Istarski demokrtski sabor (IDS)	4	MPP I / II, ELDR, PES
7/7	Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonje i Baranje (HDSSB)	-	
8/8	Samostalna demokratska Srpska stranka (SDSS)		Pickering/Baskin (2008)
9/9	Hrvatska stranka prava (HSP)	7	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), NSD
10/10	Hrvatska stranka umirovljenika (HSU)	-	

Table A4.21: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Estonia

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	6	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Klingemann et al. 2006: 216, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012, EPP,NSD
2/2	The Estonian Centre Party	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Klingemann et al. 2006: 215 MPP I / II, ELDR, NSD
3/3	Estonian Reform Party	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Klingemann et al. 2006: 215 Siaroff 2000: 236, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), ELDR, NSD
4/4	The People´s Union of Estonia	6	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Klingemann et al. 2006: 216 MPP I / II, NSD
5/5	The SDP	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27, Klingemann et al. 2006: 215 Siaroff 2000: 236, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), PES, NSD
6/6	Estonian Greens	1	Armingeon et al. 2012, EGP, NSD
7/7	Party of Estonian Christian Democrats	5	ECPM Homepage
8/8	Estonian United Left Party	2	EL
9/9	Estonian Independence Party	7	Estonian Independence Party Homepage
10/10	Russian Party in Estonia	9	Armingeon et al. 2012

Table A4.22: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Latvia

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	The People´s Party Tautas partija	N	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012 , Zake (2002), EPP
2/2	Greens and Farmers Union (ZZS) Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība	-	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012
3/3	New Era / Jaunais laiks	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012 , EPP
4/4	Concord Centre (SC) "Saskaņas Centrs"	2	MPP I / II, NSD
5/5	Latvia´s First party/Latvia´s Way (LPP/LC). Latvijas Pirmās partijas un partijas "Latvijas Ceļš" vēlēšanu apvienība	4	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al.2012: 33 , Gallagher/Laver/Mair (2006), Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
6/6	For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK Apvienība "Tēvzemei un Brīvībai"/LNNK	7	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 33, Klingemann et al. 2006: 221, Gallagher/Laver/Mair (2006), Siaroff (2000), Zake (2002), ECR
7/7	For Human Rights in a United Latvia Politisko organizāciju apvienība "Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā"	4	MPP I / II

Table A4.23: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Lithuania

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
	Lithuanian Reform Movement –Sajudis		Siaroff (2000)
1	LSDP	3	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012 , PES
2	Union of Russians of Lithuania LRS	9	
3	Frontas	2	Woolfson (2010)
4	Lithuanian Centre Party LCP		
5	Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats TS-LKD	5	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012 , EPP, NSD, BBC
6	NU NS	-	NSD, Armingeon et al. 2012: 34: 4
7	Party of Civic Democracy (PDP)		
8	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA)	9	NSD
9	National Resurrection Party (TPP)	6	Armingeon et al. 2012: 35, NSD
10	Coalition "Labour party + youth"	-	Holmes/Lightfoot (2011), Ramonaitė (2006)
/11	Labourist Party (satellite of Labour and youth)	-	
11/12	Liberals´ Movement of the Republic of Lithuania (LRLS)	4	NSD
12/13	Lithuania Peasant Popular Union (LVLS)	8	NSD
13/14	Party "Order and Justice" (TT)	6	NSD
14/15	LCU (LiCS)	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 34, Klingemann et al. 2006: 221 Siaroff 2000: 334f., ELD, NSD
15/16	Party "Young Lithuania" (JL)		
16/17	Lithuanian Social Democratic Union (LSDS)		
/18	Lithuanian Freedom Union (LLS)		
/19	Lithuanian People's Union "For the Fair Lithuania" UTL"		

Table A4.24: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Bulgaria

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1	KzB Koalitziia za Balgarija	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 25, NSD
2	Dvijenie za Prava i Svobodi (DPS)	9	Armingeon et al. 2012, NSD
3	Koalitziia na Rozata	-	
4	Demokrati za Silna Balgarija	5	EPP
5	NDSV	-	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 26 Klingemann et al. 2006: 212
6	Koalitziia ODS	-	
7	Koalitziia BNS	-	
8	Novo Vreme	-	
9	Evroroma	9	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012
10	Koalitziia Ataka	7	MPP I / II, The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009)

	Party identification		
1	BSP	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 25, Klingemann et al. 2006: 211, Siaroff (2000), Eckert (2008), PES, Spirova (2005), Armingeon et al. 2012
2	BND	-	
3	VMRO-BND	5	EPP
4	GERB	5	EPP, NSD
5	DPS Coalition Movement for Rights and Freedoms	9	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 25, Klingemann et al. 2006: 212, Siaroff 2000: 196, Spirova 2005: 605, Eckert 2008: 97f.
6	Dvijenie Gergiovden	-	
7	DSB	5	EPP
8	DP	5	Eckert (2008), EPP
9	BZNS-NS	8	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), EPP, Spirova (2005)
10	NDSV	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012: 26, Klingemann et al. 2006: 212
11	Ataka	7	MPP I / II, The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009), NSD
12	Novo Vreme	-	
13	RZS	6	MPP I / II, NSD
14	Evroroma	9	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2012
15	SDS	5	MPP I / II, Eckert (2008), EPP, Spirova (2005), Armingeon et al. 2012: 25, Klingemann et al. 2006: 211, Spirova 2005: 603, Eckert 2008: 98, EPP, NSD
16	SSD	-	Spirova (2005)
17	OBT	3	MPP I / II

Table A4.25: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Romania

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/2	PD-L (Partidul Democrat Liberal)	5	EPP, NSD (3/4)
2/3	Alianta PSD-PC	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38, Eckert (2008), Socialist International, PES, NSD
3/1	PNL	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38, Siaroff (2000), Eckert (2008), ELDR, NSD
4/4	PRM	7	Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012 , Eckert (2008), Sum (2010), NSD
5/5	UDMR	9	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39, Siaroff (2000), Eckert (2008), EPP, NSD
/6	PC	-	
6/7	PNG-CD	7	Sum (2010), NSD
9/9	PNȚ-CD (vote) PPCD (PNȚ-CD) (PI)	5	EPP
11	Other: PR		
12/8	Other: PIN		
13	Other: FDGR		
14	PSD	3	Eckert (2008), Armingeon et al. 2012 , PES

Table A4.26: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Ukraine

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Block of Lytvyn	N	
2/2	Block of Yulia Tymoshenko	N	
3/3	Block 'Our Ukraine – People´s self-defense'	N	
4/4	Communist Party of Ukraine	2	Siaroff (2000)
5/5	Party of regions	N	
6/6	Progressive Socialist party of Ukraine	2	Siaroff (2000)
7/7	Socialist Party of Ukraine	2	Siaroff (2000)

Table A4.27: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Russia

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Edinaya Rossiya	N	
2/2	KPRF	2	Siaroff (2000)
3/3	LDPR	N	
4/4	Rodina	3	MPP I / II
5/5	Union of the Right Forces	6	MPP I / II

6/6	Yabloko	4	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), ELDR
7/7	Agrarian Party	2	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000)
8/8	Russian party of pensioners and party of social justice	N	
9/9	Party of Revival of Russia – Russian Party of Life	N	
11/11	Fair Russia	N	
15/15	Green Party	1	EGP

Table A4.28: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Switzerland

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	FDP	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, Budge et al. 2001: 211, MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Lane et al. (1997), ELDR, NSD
2/2	CVP	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, Budge et al. 2001: 211 MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), EPP, NSD
3/3	SPS	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, Budge et al. 2001: 211 MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), PES, NSD
4/4	SVP	N	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), Armingeon et al. 2012 , NSD (8/6)
5/5	LP	4	Siaroff (2000)
6/6	CSP	5	Lane /McKay /Newton (1997)
7/7	PdA	2	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), EL
8/8	GPS	1	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), EGP, NSD
9/9	GLP	2	Leuthold/Bornand (2008), NSD (4/1)
10/10	SD	7	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000)
11/11	EDU	7	MPP I / II
12/12	EVP	5	MPP I / II, Siaroff (2000), NSD (center-left on social issues)
13/13	Lega dei Ticinese	7	Albertazzi (2006), NSD

Table A4.29: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): The Netherlands

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	Christian Democratic Party ,CDA	5	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001: 20, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), EPP, NSD
2/2	Labour Party, PvdA	3	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 31, Budge et al. 2001: 207, Siaroff 2000: 361, Hix/ Lord 1997: 37, PES, NSD
3/3	Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001: 207, Lane et al. (1997), Hix/Lord (1997), Siaroff (2000), ELDR, NSD
4/4	List Pim Fortuyn, LPF	7	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32
5/5	Democrats ´66	4	MPP I / II, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32, Budge et al. 2001: 207, Siaroff (2000), Hix/Lord (1997), ELDR, NSD
6/6	Green Left	1	MPP I / II, Hix/Lord (1997), Siaroff (2000), EGP, NSD
7/7	Socialist Party	2	MPP I / II, Hix/Lord (1997), NSD

ESS Vote/PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
8/8	Christian Union ChristenUnie	5	MPP I / II, ECR,, Armingeon et al. 2011: 32 NSD
9/9	Liveable Netherlands	-	Lucardie (2006)
10/10	Social Reformed Party SGP	5	NSD
11/11	PVV (List Wilders)	7	
12/12	Party for the Animals	-	NSD
/13	TON (List Verdonk)	-	

Table A4.30: Parties in ESS4 (vote/party identification): Israel

ESS Vote/ PI	Party	I	Sources for classification
1/1	HaAvoda (Labor)	3	PES
2/2	Likud	6	Bard/ Schwartz 2005: 69, Timm 2003: 132
3/3	Kadima	4	Süddeutsche.de
4/4	Shas	5	
5/5	Meretz	3	Timm 2003: 132, Mazie 2006: 78
6/6	National Religious Party	5	Mazie 2006: 25
7/7	United Torah Judaism	5	Morris 1996 ('ultraorthodox')
8/8	Pensioners of Israel to the Knesset	Pens	
9/9	Yisrael Beiteinu	7	Timm 2003: 132, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Welt Online
10/10	Hadash	2	MPP I / II, Pickering/Baskin (2008), Knesset Website
11/11	Balad, Hadash-Balad	3	MPP I / II, Pickering/Baskin (2008)
12/12	Ra´am – Ya´al	-	
13/13	Hetz	-	
14/14	Shinui	4	Timm 2003: 132
15/15	Ale Yarok	-	
16/16	HaYerukim	-	

Table A4.31: Attitude differences between voters and adherents of parties from different ideological camps

	Government responsibility		Earnings-relatedness	
	old	unemployed	pensions	unemployment b.
BE	.04	0.25	0.03	0.02
Do	.18	0.24	0.09	0.09
Dw	.32	0.37	0.20	0.14
FR	.31	0.34	0.01	0.04
DK	.31	0.28	0.07	0.08
FI	.24	0.44	0.05	0.05
NO	.16	0.27	0.04	0.01
SE	.21	0.42	0.13	0.09
IE	.07	0.20	0.03	0.01
UK	.12	0.18	0.10	0.11
CY	.08	0.19	0.04	0.06
ES	.07	0.15	0.03	0.01
GR	.14	0.40	0.09	0.08
PT	.04	0.18	0.13	0.23
TU	.07	0.11	0.05	0.04
CZ	.27	0.49	0.09	0.08
HU	.25	0.40	0.07	0.04
PL	.14	0.14	0.03	0.02
SK	.06	0.07	0.03	0.02
SI	.18	0.13	0.04	0.02
HR	.02	0.50	0.05	0.05
EE	.24	0.35	0.05	0.04
LV	.09	0.51	0.04	0.02
LT	.10	0.04	0.04	0.03
BG	.16	0.34	0.03	0.04
RO	.14	0.42	0.09	0.09
UA	.23	0.22	0.03	0.11
RU	.03	0.20	0.06	0.04
CH	.39	0.16	0.08	0.05
NL	.08	0.24	0.05	0.05
IL	.20	0.01	0.04	0.03

Cabinet ideology

Column I (Ideology):
1: Green/ecologist
2: Socialist/communist
3: Social democratic
4: Liberal
5: Christian democratic/religious
6: Conservative
7: Nationalist/right-wing
8: Agrarian
9: Regional/ethnic minorities

Table A5.1

Belgium					
Start	End	Party	% Cab inet	ID	Source of classification
Mar 1946	Apr 1946	Independent	30	-	
Mar 1946	Apr 1946	PSB-BSP	65	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Mar 1946	Apr 1946	PLP-PVV	5	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Apr 1946	Aug 1946	Independent	14	-	
Apr 1946	Aug 1946	PSB-BSP Socialist Party	36	3	
Apr 1946	Aug 1946	KPB/PCB Communist Party	18	2	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Apr 1946	Aug 1946	PLP-PVV Liberal Party	32	4	
Aug 1946	Mar 1947	Independent	15	-	
Aug 1946	Mar 1947	PSB-BSP	35	3	
Aug 1946	Mar 1947	KPB/PCB	20	2	
Aug 1946	Mar 1947	PLP-PVV	30	4	
Mar 1947	Nov 1948	Independent	10	-	
Mar 1947	Nov 1948	PSB-BSP	48	3	
Mar 1947	Nov 1948	PSC-CVP Christian Peoples Party	43	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Nov 1948	Aug 1949	Independent	15	-	
Nov 1948	Aug 1949	PSB-BSP	40	3	
Nov 1948	Aug 1949	PSC-CVP	45	5	
Aug 1949	Jun 1950	PSC-CVP	55	5	
Aug 1949	Jun 1950	PLP-PVV	45	4	
Jun 1950	Aug 1950	PSC-CVP	100	5	
Aug 1950	Jan 1952	Independent	6	-	
Aug 1950	Jan 1952	PSC-CVP	94	5	

Jan 1952	Apr 1954	Independent	6	-	
Jan 1952	Apr 1954	PSC-CVP	94	5	
Apr 1954	Jun 1958	PSB-BSP	56	3	
Apr 1954	Jun 1958	PLP-PVV	44	4	
Jun 1958	Nov 1958	PSC-CVP	100	5	
Nov 1958	Sep 1960	PSC-CVP	67	5	
Nov 1958	Sep 1960	PLP-PVV	33	4	
Sep 1960	Apr 1961	PSC-CVP	62	5	
Sep 1960	Apr 1961	PLP-PVV	38	4	
Apr 1961	Jul 1965	PSB-BSP	43	3	
Apr 1961	Jul 1965	PSC-CVP	57	5	
Jul 1965	Mar 1966	PSB-BSP	40	3	
Jul 1965	Mar 1966	PSC-CVP	60	5	
Mar 1966	Jun 1968	PSC-CVP	68	5	
Mar 1966	Jun 1968	PLP-PVV	32	4	
Jun 1968	Jan 1972	PSB-BSP	41	3	
Jun 1968	Jan 1972	CVP Flemish Christian Peoples Party	59	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Jan 1972	Jan 1973	PSB-BSP	43	3	
Jan 1972	Jan 1973	CVP	38	5	
Jan 1972	Jan 1973	PSC Francophone Christian Peoples Party	19	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Jan 1973	Apr 1974	PSB-BSP	36	3	
Jan 1973	Apr 1974	CVP	32	5	
Jan 1973	Apr 1974	PSC	11	5	
Jan 1973	Apr 1974	PVV Flemish Liberal Party	21	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Apr 1974	Jun 1974	CVP	40	5	
Apr 1974	Jun 1974	PRL Francophone Liberal Party	16	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Apr 1974	Jun 1974	PSC	32	5	
Apr 1974	Jun 1974	PVV	12	4	
Jun 1974	Dec 1976	CVP	40	5	
Jun 1974	Dec 1976	PRL	12	4	
Jun 1974	Dec 1976	PSC	32	5	
Jun 1974	Dec 1976	PVV	12	4	
Jun 1974	Dec 1976	RW Walloon Rally	4	9	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Dec 1976	Jun 1977	CVP	38	5	
Dec 1976	Jun 1977	PRL	13	4	
Dec 1976	Jun 1977	PSC	31	5	
Dec 1976	Jun 1977	PVV	13	4	
Dec 1976	Jun 1977	RW	6	9	
Jun 1977	Oct 1978	PSB-BSP	38	3	
Jun 1977	Oct 1978	CVP	21	5	
Jun 1977	Oct 1978	FDF French-Speaking Front	14	9	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27

Jun 1977	Oct 1978	PSC	21	5	
Jun 1977	Oct 1978	DU Flemish Peoples Union	7	9	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27 Hecking 2006
Oct 1978	Apr 1979	PSB-BSP	38	3	
Oct 1978	Apr 1979	CVP	24	5	
Oct 1978	Apr 1979	FDF	10	9	
Oct 1978	Apr 1979	PSC	21	5	
Oct 1978	Apr 1979	DU	7	9	
Apr 1979	Jan 1980	SP Flemish Socialist Party	34	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Apr 1979	Jan 1980	CVP	31	5	
Apr 1979	Jan 1980	FDF	9	9	
Apr 1979	Jan 1980	PS Francophone Socialist Party	6	3	Appendix 4
Apr 1979	Jan 1980	PSC	19	5	
Jan 1980	May 1980	SP	32	3	
Jan 1980	May 1980	CVP	29	5	
Jan 1980	May 1980	PS	16	3	
Jan 1980	May 1980	PSC	23	5	
May 1980	Oct 1980	SP	15	3	
May 1980	Oct 1980	CVP	24	5	
May 1980	Oct 1980	PRL	6	4	
May 1980	Oct 1980	PS	18	3	
May 1980	Oct 1980	PSC	18	5	
May 1980	Oct 1980	PVV	18	4	
Oct 1980	Apr 1981	SP	28	3	
Oct 1980	Apr 1981	CVP	28	5	
Oct 1980	Apr 1981	PS	19	3	
Oct 1980	Apr 1981	PSC	25	5	
Apr 1981	Dec 1981	SP	27	3	
Apr 1981	Dec 1981	CVP	29	5	
Apr 1981	Dec 1981	PS	21	3	
Apr 1981	Dec 1981	PSC	24	5	
Dec 1981	Nov 1985	CVP	25	5	
Dec 1981	Nov 1985	PRL	33	4	
Dec 1981	Nov 1985	PSC	21	5	
Dec 1981	Nov 1985	PVV	21	4	
Nov 1985	Oct 1987	CVP	24	5	
Nov 1985	Oct 1987	PRL	28	4	
Nov 1985	Oct 1987	PSC	24	5	
Nov 1985	Oct 1987	PVV	24	4	
Oct 1987	Jun 1988	CVP	24	5	
Oct 1987	Jun 1988	PRL	28	4	
Oct 1987	Jun 1988	PSC	24	5	
Oct 1987	Jun 1988	PVV	24	4	

Jun 1988	Mar 1992	SP	21	3	
Jun 1988	Mar 1992	CVP	25	5	
Jun 1988	Mar 1992	PS	25	3	
Jun 1988	Mar 1992	PSC	18	5	
Jun 1988	Mar 1992	DU	11	9	
Mar 1992	Jun 1995	SP	19	3	
Mar 1992	Jun 1995	CVP	27	5	
Mar 1992	Jun 1995	PS	39	3	
Mar 1992	Jun 1995	PSC	15	5	
Jun 1995	Jul 1999	SP	17	3	
Jun 1995	Jul 1999	CVP	38	5	
Jun 1995	Jul 1999	PS	29	3	
Jun 1995	Jul 1999	PSC	17	5	
Jul 1999	May 2003	Open VLD Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	28	4	
Jul 1999	May 2003	PRL/ FDF/ MCC	17	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27 Hecking 2006: 54f.
Jul 1999	May 2003	SP	17	3	
Jul 1999	May 2003	PS	17	3	
Jul 1999	May 2003	Agalev	11	1	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27
Jul 1999	May 2003	Ecolo Greens	11	1	Appendix 4
May 2003	Jul 2003	Open VLD	28	4	Appendix 4
May 2003	Jul 2003	PRL/ FDF/ MCC	17	4	
May 2003	Jul 2003	SP	17	3	
May 2003	Jul 2003	PS	22	3	
May 2003	Jul 2003	Agalev	11	1	
May 2003	Jul 2003	MR Reform Movement	6	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27 Hecking 2006: 54f. ELDR
Jul 2003	Nov 2005	Open VLD	24	4	
Jul 2003	Nov 2005	sp.a/ Spirit Social Progressive Alternative/SPIRIT	29	3	Appendix 4
Jul 2003	Nov 2005	PS	24	3	

Jul 2003	Nov 2005	MR	24	4	
Nov 2005	Jul 2007	Open VLD	23	4	
Nov 2005	Jul 2007	sp.a	32	3	
Nov 2005	Jul 2007	PS	23	3	
Nov 2005	Jul 2007	MR	23	4	
Jul 2007	Dec 2007	Open VLD	25	4	
Jul 2007	Dec 2007	sp.a	35	3	
Jul 2007	Dec 2007	PS	20	3	
Jul 2007	Dec 2007	MR	20	4	
Dec 2007	Mar 2008	Open VLD	21	4	
Dec 2007	Mar 2008	PS	21	3	
Dec 2007	Mar 2008	MR	21	4	
Dec 2007	Mar 2008	CDH Democrat Humanist Centre	7	5	Appendix 4
Dec 2007	Mar 2008	Christian-Democrat & Flemish/New Flemish Alliance (CD&V/ NV-A)	29	-	Armingeon et al. 2011: 27, Hecking 2006: 53/ 57, EPP
Mar 2008	Sep 2008	Open VLD	18	4	
Mar 2008	Sep 2008	PS	23	3	
Mar 2008	Sep 2008	MR	23	4	
Mar 2008	Sep 2008	CDH	10	5	
Mar 2008	Sep 2008	CD&V/ NV-A	27	-	
Sep 2008	Nov 2008	Open VLD	18	4	
Sep 2008	Nov 2008	PS	23	3	
Sep 2008	Nov 2008	MR	23	4	
Sep 2008	Nov 2008	CDH	10	5	
Sep 2008	Nov 2008	CD&V	27	5	Appendix 4
		Germany			
Sep 1949	Oct 1953	CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Union	59	5	Appendix 4
Sep 1949	Oct 1953	DP German Party	12	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 29
Sep 1949	Oct 1953	FDP Free Democratc Party	29	4	Appendix 4
Oct 1953	Jul 1955	CDU/CSU	71	5	
Oct 1953	Jul 1955	DP German Party	12	6	
Oct 1953	Jul 1955	FDP	29	4	
Jul 1955	Mar 1956	CDU/CSU	67	5	
Jul 1955	Mar 1956	DP German Party	6	6	
Jul 1955	Mar 1956	FDP	28	4	
Mar 1956	Oct 1957	CDU/CSU	65	5	

Mar 1956	Oct 1957	DP German Party	10	6	
Mar 1956	Oct 1957	FDP	25	4	
Oct 1957	Jul 1960	CDU/CSU	90	5	
Oct 1957	Jul 1960	DP German Party	11	6	
Jul 1960	Nov 1961	CDU/CSU	100	5	
Nov 1961	Nov 1962	CDU/CSU	78	5	
Nov 1961	Nov 1962	FDP	22	4	
Nov 1962	Dec 1962	CDU/CSU	100	5	
Dec 1962	Oct 1963	CDU/CSU	78	5	
Dec 1962	Oct 1963	FDP	22	4	
Oct 1963	Oct 1965	CDU/CSU	75	5	
Oct 1963	Oct 1965	FDP	25	4	
Oct 1965	Oct 1966	CDU/CSU	81	5	
Oct 1965	Oct 1966	FDP	19	4	
Oct 1966	Dec 1966	CDU/CSU	100	5	
Dec 1966	Oct 1969	CDU/CSU	50	5	
Dec 1966	Oct 1969	SPD Social Democrats	50	3	Appendix 4
Oct 1969	May 1972	FDP	22	4	
Oct 1969	May 1972	Independents	6	-	
Oct 1969	May 1972	SPD Social Democrats	72	3	
May 1972	Dec 1972	FDP	24	4	
May 1972	Dec 1972	SPD Social Democrats	77	3	
Dec 1972	May 1974	FDP	30	4	
Dec 1972	May 1974	SPD Social Democrats	70	3	
May 1974	Dec 1976	FDP	28	4	
May 1974	Dec 1976	SPD Social Democrats	72	3	
Dec 1976	Nov 1980	FDP	29	4	
Dec 1976	Nov 1980	SPD Social Democrats	71	3	
Nov 1980	Sep 1982	FDP	28	4	
Nov 1980	Sep 1982	SPD Social Democrats	72	3	
Sep 1982	Oct 1982	SPD Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 1982	Mar 1983	CDU/CSU	68	5	
Oct 1982	Mar 1983	FDP	32	4	
Mar 1983	Mar 1987	CDU/CSU	74	5	
Mar 1983	Mar 1987	FDP	26	4	
Mar 1987	Jan 1991	CDU/CSU	71	5	
Mar 1987	Jan 1991	FDP	29	4	
Jan 1991	Nov 1994	CDU/CSU	73	5	
Jan 1991	Nov 1994	FDP	27	4	
Nov 1994	Sep 1998	CDU/CSU	80	5	
Nov 1994	Sep 1998	FDP	20	4	
Sep 1998	Aug 1999	Bündnis 90/Grüne	19	1	Appendix 4
Sep 1998	Aug 1999	SPD Social Democrats	81	3	
Aug 1999	Oct 2002	Bündnis 90/Grüne	20	1	

Aug 1999	Oct 2002	SPD Social Democrats	80	3	
Oct 2002	Nov 2005	Bündnis 90/Grüne	21	1	
Oct 2002	Nov 2005	SPD Social Democrats	79	3	
Nov 2005	Aug 2008	CDU/CSU	50	5	
Nov 2005	Aug 2008	SPD Social Democrats	50	3	
France					
Dec 1946	Jan 1947	PS	100	3	Appendix 4
Jan 1947	May 1947	Conservatives	7	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Jan 1947	May 1947	MRP Popular Republican Movement	18	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Jan 1947	May 1947	PCF Communist Party	25	2	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28 Lane et al. 1997: 139
Jan 1947	May 1947	RRS Radical Socialist Party	18	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Jan 1947	May 1947	PS	32	3	
May 1947	Oct 1947	Conservatives	7	6	
May 1947	Oct 1947	MRP	29	5	
May 1947	Oct 1947	RRS	18	4	
May 1947	Oct 1947	PS	46	3	
Oct 1947	Nov 1947	Conservatives	7	6	
Oct 1947	Nov 1947	MRP	20	5	
Oct 1947	Nov 1947	RRS	13	4	
Oct 1947	Nov 1947	PS	60	3	
Nov 1947	Jul 1948	Independents	6		
Nov 1947	Jul 1948	Gaullists	6	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Nov 1947	Jul 1948	MRP	35	5	
Nov 1947	Jul 1948	RRS	18	4	
Nov 1947	Jul 1948	PS	35	3	
Jul 1948	Sep 1948	Conservatives	14	6	
Jul 1948	Sep 1948	MRP	32	5	
Jul 1948	Sep 1948	RRS	23	4	
Jul 1948	Sep 1948	PS	32	3	
Sep 1948	Sep 1948	Conservatives	6	6	
Sep 1948	Sep 1948	MRP	39	5	
Sep 1948	Sep 1948	RRS	22	4	
Sep 1948	Sep 1948	PS	33	3	
Sep 1948	Oct 1949	Conservatives	10	6	
Sep 1948	Oct 1949	Gaullists	5	6	
Sep 1948	Oct 1949	MRP	25	5	
Sep 1948	Oct 1949	RRS	35	4	
Sep 1948	Oct 1949	PS	25	3	
Oct 1949	Feb 1950	Conservatives	5	6	
Oct 1949	Feb 1950	Independents	10	-	

Oct 1949	Feb 1950	Gaullists	10	6	
Oct 1949	Feb 1950	MRP	33	5	
Oct 1949	Feb 1950	RRS	10	4	
Oct 1949	Feb 1950	PS	33	3	
Feb 1950	Jul 1950	Conservatives	11	6	
Feb 1950	Jul 1950	Independents	11	-	
Feb 1950	Jul 1950	Gaullists	16	6	
Feb 1950	Jul 1950	MRP	42	5	
Feb 1950	Jul 1950	RRS	21	4	
Jul 1950	Jul 1950	Conservatives	8	6	
Jul 1950	Jul 1950	Independents	8	-	
Jul 1950	Jul 1950	Gaullists	13	6	
Jul 1950	Jul 1950	MRP	46	5	
Jul 1950	Jul 1950	RRS	25	4	
Jul 1950	Mar 1951	Conservatives	9	6	
Jul 1950	Mar 1951	Independents	9	-	
Jul 1950	Mar 1951	Gaullists	9	6	
Jul 1950	Mar 1951	MRP	30	5	
Jul 1950	Mar 1951	RRS	26	4	
Jul 1950	Mar 1951	PS	17	3	
Mar 1951	Aug 1951	Conservatives	8	6	
Mar 1951	Aug 1951	Independents	8	-	
Mar 1951	Aug 1951	Gaullists	13	6	
Mar 1951	Aug 1951	MRP	33	5	
Mar 1951	Aug 1951	RRS	21	4	
Mar 1951	Aug 1951	PS	17	3	
Aug 1951	Jan 1952	Conservatives	28	6	
Aug 1951	Jan 1952	Gaullists	3	6	
Aug 1951	Jan 1952	MRP	35	5	
Aug 1951	Jan 1952	RRS	35	4	
Jan 1952	Mar 1952	Conservatives	27	6	
Jan 1952	Mar 1952	Gaullists	10	6	
Jan 1952	Mar 1952	MRP	30	5	
Jan 1952	Mar 1952	RRS	33	4	
Mar 1952	Jan 1953	Conservatives	48	6	
Mar 1952	Jan 1953	Gaullists	10	6	
Mar 1952	Jan 1953	MRP	19	5	
Mar 1952	Jan 1953	RRS	24	4	
Jan 1953	Jun 1953	Conservatives	32	6	
Jan 1953	Jun 1953	Gaullists	4	6	
Jan 1953	Jun 1953	MRP	28	5	
Jan 1953	Jun 1953	RRS	36	4	
Jun 1953	Jun 1954	Conservatives	33	6	
Jun 1953	Jun 1954	Gaullists	13	6	
Jun 1953	Jun 1954	MRP	25	5	

Jun 1953	Jun 1954	RRS	29	4	
Jun 1954	Feb 1955	Conservatives	22	6	
Jun 1954	Feb 1955	Gaullists	44	6	
Jun 1954	Feb 1955	MRP	6	5	
Jun 1954	Feb 1955	RRS	28	4	
Feb 1955	Jan 1956	Conservatives	19	6	
Feb 1955	Jan 1956	Gaullists	24	6	
Feb 1955	Jan 1956	MRP	29	5	
Feb 1955	Jan 1956	RRS	29	4	
Jan 1956	Jun 1957	Independents	6	-	
Jan 1956	Jun 1957	Gaullists	19	6	
Jan 1956	Jun 1957	RRS	31	4	
Jan 1956	Jun 1957	PS	44	3	
Jun 1957	Nov 1957	Gaullists	20	6	
Jun 1957	Nov 1957	RRS	47	4	
Jun 1957	Nov 1957	PS	33	3	
Nov 1957	May 1958	Conservatives	16	6	
Nov 1957	May 1958	Gaullists	26	6	
Nov 1957	May 1958	MRP	21	5	
Nov 1957	May 1958	RRS	16	4	
Nov 1957	May 1958	PS	21	3	
May 1958	Jun 1958	Conservatives	20	6	
May 1958	Jun 1958	Gaullists	15	6	
May 1958	Jun 1958	MRP	30	5	
May 1958	Jun 1958	RRS	35	4	
Jun 1958	Jan 1959	Conservatives	12	6	
Jun 1958	Jan 1959	Independents	32	-	
Jun 1958	Jan 1959	Gaullists	24	6	
Jun 1958	Jan 1959	MRP	12	5	
Jun 1958	Jan 1959	RRS	8	4	
Jun 1958	Jan 1959	PS	12	3	
Jan 1959	Apr 1962	Conservatives	18	6	
Jan 1959	Apr 1962	Independents	32	-	
Jan 1959	Apr 1962	Gaullists	27	6	
Jan 1959	Apr 1962	MRP	18	5	
Jan 1959	Apr 1962	RRS	5	4	
Apr 1962	May 1962	Conservatives	13	6	
Apr 1962	May 1962	Independents	29	-	
Apr 1962	May 1962	Gaullists	42	6	
Apr 1962	May 1962	MRP	17	5	
May 1962	Dec-1962	Conservatives	17	6	
May 1962	Dec-1962	Independents	29	-	
May 1962	Dec-1962	Gaullists	50	6	
Dec-1962	Jan 1966	Independents	25	-	
Dec-1962	Jan 1966	Gaullists	63	6	

Dec-1962	Jan 1966	Independent Republicans (IR)	13	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Jan 1966	Apr 1967	Independents	25	-	
Jan 1966	Apr 1967	Gaullists	70	6	
Jan 1966	Apr 1967	IR	5	6	
Apr 1967	May 1968	Independents	17	-	
Apr 1967	May 1968	Gaullists	46	6	
Apr 1967	May 1968	IR	38	6	
May 1968	Jul 1968	Independents	28	-	
May 1968	Jul 1968	IR	72	6	
Jul 1968	Jun 1969	Independents	18	-	
Jul 1968	Jun 1969	Gaullists	59	6	
Jul 1968	Jun 1969	IR	23	6	
Jun 1969	Jul 1972	Democratic Centre	13	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Jun 1969	Jul 1972	Gaullists	65	6	
Jun 1969	Jul 1972	IR	22	6	
Jul 1972	Apr 1973	Democratic Centre	14	5	
Jul 1972	Apr 1973	Gaullists	68	6	
Jul 1972	Apr 1973	IR	18	6	
Apr 1973	Mar 1974	Centre Démocratie et Progrès (CDP)	12	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Apr 1973	Mar 1974	Independents	12	-	
Apr 1973	Mar 1974	Gaullists	54	6	
Apr 1973	Mar 1974	IR	23	6	
Mar 1974	May 1974	CDP	5	6	
Mar 1974	May 1974	Independents	14	-	
Mar 1974	May 1974	Gaullists	62	6	
Mar 1974	May 1974	IR	19	6	
May 1974	Aug 1976	CDP	12	6	
May 1974	Aug 1976	Independents	18	-	
May 1974	Aug 1976	Gaullists	29	6	
May 1974	Aug 1976	IR	29	6	
May 1974	Aug 1976	MRG Left Radicals	6	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
May 1974	Aug 1976	Mouvement reformateur	6	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Aug 1976	Mar 1977	CDP	18	6	
Aug 1976	Mar 1977	Independents	18	-	
Aug 1976	Mar 1977	Gaullists	23	6	
Aug 1976	Mar 1977	IR	23	6	
Aug 1976	Mar 1977	MRG Left Radicals	18	4	
Mar 1977	Apr 1978	CDP	26	6	
Mar 1977	Apr 1978	Independents	26	-	
Mar 1977	Apr 1978	Gaullists	26	6	
Mar 1977	Apr 1978	IR	21	6	
Apr 1978	May 1981	Independents	24	-	

Apr 1978	May 1981	Gaullists	41	6	
Apr 1978	May 1981	UDF	35	6	Appendix 4
May 1981	Jun 1981	PS	100	3	
Jun 1981	Mar 1983	PCF	11	2	
Jun 1981	Mar 1983	PS	89	3	
Mar 1983	Jul 1984	PCF	14	2	
Mar 1983	Jul 1984	PS	86	3	
Jul 1984	Mar 1986	PS	100	3	
Mar 1986	Mar 1988	Independents	10		
Mar 1986	Mar 1988	Gaullists	48	6	
Mar 1986	Mar 1988	UDF	42	6	
Mar 1988	Jun 1988	PS	92	3	
Mar 1988	Jun 1988	UDF	8	6	
Jun 1988	May 1991	Independents	16	-	
Jun 1988	May 1991	PS	84	3	
May 1991	Apr 1992	Independents	19	-	
May 1991	Apr 1992	PS	82	3	
Apr 1992	Mar 1993	Independents	33	-	
Apr 1992	Mar 1993	PS	67	3	
Mar 1993	May 1995	Independents	13	-	
Mar 1993	May 1995	Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR)	47	6	
Mar 1993	May 1995	UDF	41	6	
May 1995	Nov 1995	Independents	3	-	
May 1995	Nov 1995	RPR	50	6	
May 1995	Nov 1995	UDF	47	6	
Nov 1995	Jun 1997	Independents	5	-	
Nov 1995	Jun 1997	RPR	46	6	
Nov 1995	Jun 1997	UDF	50	6	
Jun 1997	Mar 1998	Ecologistes Greens Les Verts	6	1	Appendix 4
Jun 1997	Mar 1998	PCF	12	2	
Jun 1997	Mar 1998	PS	71	3	
Jun 1997	Mar 1998	Mouvement des Citoyens (MC)	6	-	
Jun 1997	Mar 1998	PRG Parti des Radicaux de gauche	6	4	
Mar 1998	Mar 2000	Ecologistes Greens	6	1	
Mar 1998	Mar 2000	PCF	11	2	
Mar 1998	Mar 2000	PS	72	3	
Mar 1998	Mar 2000	MC	6	-	
Mar 1998	Mar 2000	PRG	6	4	
Mar 2000	May 2002	Ecologistes Greens	5	1	
Mar 2000	May 2002	PCF	10	2	
Mar 2000	May 2002	PS	76	3	

Mar 2000	May 2002	MDC	5	-	
Mar 2000	May 2002	PRG	5	4	
May 2002	Mar 2004	Independents	31	-	
May 2002	Mar 2004	UMP Union pour la majorité présidentielle	63	6	Appendix 4
May 2002	Mar 2004	UDF	6	6	
Mar 2004	Feb 2005	UMP	94	6	
Mar 2004	Feb 2005	UDF	6	6	
Feb 2005	May 2007	Independents	6	-	
Feb 2005	May 2007	UMP	89	6	
Feb 2005	May 2007	UDF	6	6	
May 2007	Sep 2008	Independents	19	-	
May 2007	Sep 2008	UMP	75	6	
May 2007	Sep 2008	NC Nouveau centre	6	-	
		Denmark			
Nov 1945	Nov 1947	Independent	7	-	
Nov 1945	Nov 1947	Venstre Liberal Party	100	4	Appendix 4
Nov 1947	Sep 1950	Independent	6		
Nov 1947	Sep 1950	Socialdemokraterne (SD)	94	3	Appendix 4
Sep 1950	Oct 1950	Independent	7	-	
Sep 1950	Oct 1950	SD	93	3	
Oct 1950	May 1953	Conservative Peoples Party (KON)	53	6	Appendix 4
Oct 1950	May 1953	Venstre	47	4	
May 1953	Sep 1953	KON	53	6	
May 1953	Sep 1953	Venstre	47	4	
Sep 1953	Feb 1955	SD	100	3	
Feb 1955	May 1957	SD	100	3	
May 1957	Feb 1960	Rets Justice Party	15	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
May 1957	Feb 1960	Radikale Venstre (RV)	25	4	
May 1957	Feb 1960	SD	60	3	
Feb 1960	Nov 1960	Rets Justice Party	15	4	
Feb 1960	Nov 1960	RV	25	4	Appendix 4
Feb 1960	Nov 1960	SD	60	3	
Nov 1960	Sep 1962	Independent	6	-	
Nov 1960	Sep 1962	RV	29	4	
Nov 1960	Sep 1962	SD	65	3	
Sep 1962	Sep 1964	Independent	6	-	
Sep 1962	Sep 1964	RV	22	4	
Sep 1962	Sep 1964	SD	72	3	
Sep 1964	Nov 1966	SD	100	3	
Nov 1966	Feb 1968	SD	100	3	

Feb 1968	Oct 1971	KON	40	6	
Feb 1968	Oct 1971	Venstre	30	4	
Feb 1968	Oct 1971	RV	30	4	
Oct 1971	Oct 1972	Independent	5	-	
Oct 1971	Oct 1972	SD	95	3	
Oct 1972	Dec 1973	Independent	5		
Oct 1972	Dec 1973	SD	95	3	
Dec 1973	Feb 1975	Venstre	100	4	
Feb 1975	Feb 1977	SD	100	3	
Feb 1977	Aug 1978	SD	100	3	
Aug 1978	Oct 1979	Venstre	36	4	
Aug 1978	Oct 1979	SD	64	3	
Oct 1979	Dec 1981	SD	100	3	
Dec 1981	Sep 1982	SD	100	3	
Sep 1982	Jan 1984	CD Centre Democrats	17	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Sep 1982	Jan 1984	KON	35	6	
Sep 1982	Jan 1984	Kristendemokraterne	9	5	
Sep 1982	Jan 1984	Venstre	39	4	
Jan 1984	Sep 1987	CD Centre Democrats	17	4	
Jan 1984	Sep 1987	KON	35	6	
Jan 1984	Sep 1987	Kristendemokraterne	9	5	
Jan 1984	Sep 1987	Venstre	39	4	
Sep 1987	Jun 1988	CD Centre Democrats	13	4	
Sep 1987	Jun 1988	KON	50	6	
Sep 1987	Jun 1988	Kristendemokraterne	4	5	
Sep 1987	Jun 1988	Venstre	33	4	
Jun 1988	Dec 1990	KON	50	6	
Jun 1988	Dec 1990	Venstre	27	4	
Jun 1988	Dec 1990	RV	23	4	
Dec 1990	Jan 1993	KON	50	6	
Dec 1990	Jan 1993	Venstre	50	4	
Jan 1993	Sep 1994	CD Centre Democrats	20	4	
Jan 1993	Sep 1994	Kristendemokraterne	8	5	
Jan 1993	Sep 1994	RV	12	4	
Jan 1993	Sep 1994	SD	60	3	
Sep 1994	Mar 1998	CD Centre Democrats	8	4	
Sep 1994	Mar 1998	RV	17	4	
Sep 1994	Mar 1998	SD	75	3	
Mar 1998	Nov 2001	RV	26	4	
Mar 1998	Nov 2001	SD	74	3	
Nov 2001	Aug 2004	KON	33	6	
Nov 2001	Aug 2004	Venstre	67	4	
Aug 2004	Feb 2005	KON	63	6	
Aug 2004	Feb 2005	Venstre	37	4	
Feb 2005	Nov 2007	KON	63	6	

Feb 2005	Nov 2007	Venstre	37	4	
Nov 2007	Sep 2008	KON	63	6	
Nov 2007	Sep 2008	Venstre	37	4	

Finland

Apr 1945	Mar 1946	Independent	17	-	
Apr 1945	Mar 1946	LKP Liberal Peoples Party	8	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Apr 1945	Mar 1946	KC Centre Party	33	8	Appendix 4
Apr 1945	Mar 1946	SSDP Finnish SDP	17	3	Appendix 4
Apr 1945	Mar 1946	SKDL Peoples Democratic Union	25	2	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Mar 1946	Jul 1948	Independent	7	-	
Mar 1946	Jul 1948	KC	2	8	
Mar 1946	Jul 1948	Swedish People`s Party (SPP)	7	9	Appendix 4
Mar 1946	Jul 1948	SSDP	27	3	
Mar 1946	Jul 1948	SKDL	40	2	
Jul 1948	Mar 1950	Independent	8	-	
Jul 1948	Mar 1950	SSDP	92	3	
Mar 1950	Jan 1951	LKP	18	4	
Mar 1950	Jan 1951	KC	64	8	
Mar 1950	Jan 1951	SPP	18	9	
Jan 1951	Mar 1951	LKP	9	4	
Jan 1951	Mar 1951	KC	55	8	
Jan 1951	Mar 1951	SPP	9	9	
Jan 1951	Mar 1951	SSDP	27	3	
Mar 1951	Sep 1951	LKP	14	4	
Mar 1951	Sep 1951	KC	71	8	
Mar 1951	Sep 1951	SPP	14	9	
Sep 1951	Jul 1953	LKP	9	4	
Sep 1951	Jul 1953	KC	27	8	
Sep 1951	Jul 1953	SPP	18	9	
Sep 1951	Jul 1953	SSDP	46	3	
Jul 1953	Nov 1953	Independent	27	-	
Jul 1953	Nov 1953	KC	55	8	
Jul 1953	Nov 1953	SPP	18	9	
Nov 1953	May 1954	Independent	36	-	
Nov 1953	May 1954	LKP	27	4	
Nov 1953	May 1954	KK National Coalition	27	6	Appendix 4
Nov 1953	May 1954	SPP	9	9	
May 1954	Oct 1954	Independent	9	-	
May 1954	Oct 1954	KC	46	8	
May 1954	Oct 1954	SPP	9	9	

May 1954	Oct 1954	SSDP	36	3	
Oct 1954	Mar 1956	KC	46	8	
Oct 1954	Mar 1956	SSDP	55	3	
Mar 1956	May 1957	Independent	9	-	
Mar 1956	May 1957	LKP	9	4	
Mar 1956	May 1957	KC	36	8	
Mar 1956	May 1957	SPP	9	9	
Mar 1956	May 1957	SSDP	36	3	
May 1957	Jul 1957	Independent	9	-	
May 1957	Jul 1957	LKP	27	4	
May 1957	Jul 1957	KC	55	8	
May 1957	Jul 1957	SPP	9	9	
Jul 1957	Sep 1957	Independent	9	-	
Jul 1957	Sep 1957	LKP	27	4	
Jul 1957	Sep 1957	KC	64	8	
Sep 1957	Nov 1957	Independent	17	-	
Sep 1957	Nov 1957	LKP	25	4	
Sep 1957	Nov 1957	KC	5	8	
Sep 1957	Nov 1957	SSDP	8	3	
Nov 1957	Apr 1958	Independent	100	-	
Apr 1958	Aug 1958	Independent	100	-	
Aug 1958	Jan 1959	LKP	8	4	
Aug 1958	Jan 1959	KC	42	8	
Aug 1958	Jan 1959	KK	17	6	
Aug 1958	Jan 1959	SPP	8	9	
Aug 1958	Jan 1959	SSDP	25	3	
Jan 1959	Jul 1961	Independent	33	-	
Jan 1959	Jul 1961	KC	67	8	
Jul 1961	Apr 1962	Independent	9	-	
Jul 1961	Apr 1962	KC	91	8	
Apr 1962	Oct 1963	Independent	9	-	
Apr 1962	Oct 1963	LKP	18	4	
Apr 1962	Oct 1963	KC	46	8	
Apr 1962	Oct 1963	KK	18	6	
Apr 1962	Oct 1963	SPP	9	9	
Oct 1963	Dec 1963	LKP	20	4	
Oct 1963	Dec 1963	KC	50	8	
Oct 1963	Dec 1963	KK	20	6	
Oct 1963	Dec 1963	SPP	10	9	
Dec 1963	Sep 1964	Independent	100	-	
Sep 1964	May 1966	LKP	18	4	
Sep 1964	May 1966	KC	46	8	
Sep 1964	May 1966	KK	18	6	
Sep 1964	May 1966	SPP	18	9	
May 1966	Mar 1968	KC	27	8	

May 1966	Mar 1968	SSDP	46	3	
May 1966	Mar 1968	SKDL	18	2	
May 1966	Mar 1968	TPSL Social Democratic League	9	2	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28
Mar 1968	May 1970	KC	39	8	
Mar 1968	May 1970	SPP	8	9	
Mar 1968	May 1970	SSDP	31	3	
Mar 1968	May 1970	SKDL	15	2	
Mar 1968	May 1970	TPSL	8	2	
May 1970	Jul 1970	Independent	100	-	
Jul 1970	Mar 1971	LKP	14	4	
Jul 1970	Mar 1971	KC	29	8	
Jul 1970	Mar 1971	SPP	14	9	
Jul 1970	Mar 1971	SSDP	21	3	
Jul 1970	Mar 1971	SKDL	21	2	
Mar 1971	Oct 1971	LKP	13	4	
Mar 1971	Oct 1971	KC	25	8	
Mar 1971	Oct 1971	SPP	13	9	
Mar 1971	Oct 1971	SSDP	50	3	
Oct 1971	Feb 1972	Independent	33	-	
Oct 1971	Feb 1972	LKP	7	4	
Oct 1971	Feb 1972	KC	20	8	
Oct 1971	Feb 1972	KK	13	6	
Oct 1971	Feb 1972	SSDP	27	3	
Feb 1972	Sep 1972	SSDP	100	3	
Sep 1972	Jun 1975	Independent	100	-	
Jun 1975	Nov 1975	Independent	30		
Jun 1975	Nov 1975	LKP	5	4	
Jun 1975	Nov 1975	KC	20	8	
Jun 1975	Nov 1975	KK	5	6	
Jun 1975	Nov 1975	SPP	10	9	
Jun 1975	Nov 1975	SSDP	30	3	
Nov 1975	Sep 1976	Independent	9	-	
Nov 1975	Sep 1976	LKP	9	4	
Nov 1975	Sep 1976	KC	18	8	
Nov 1975	Sep 1976	SPP	9	9	
Nov 1975	Sep 1976	SSDP	32	3	
Nov 1975	Sep 1976	SKDL	23	2	
Sep 1976	May 1977	Independent	6	-	
Sep 1976	May 1977	LKP	17	4	
Sep 1976	May 1977	KC	61	8	
Sep 1976	May 1977	SPP	17	9	
May 1977	Mar 1978	Independent	6	-	
May 1977	Mar 1978	LKP	6	4	
May 1977	Mar 1978	KC	39	8	

May 1977	Mar 1978	SPP	6	9	
May 1977	Mar 1978	SSDP	28	3	
May 1977	Mar 1978	SKDL	17	2	
Mar 1978	May 1979	Independent	6	-	
Mar 1978	May 1979	LKP	13	4	
Mar 1978	May 1979	KC	38	8	
Mar 1978	May 1979	SSDP	25	3	
Mar 1978	May 1979	SKDL	19	2	
May 1979	Feb 1982	Independent	5	-	
May 1979	Feb 1982	KC	36	8	
May 1979	Feb 1982	SPP	9	9	
May 1979	Feb 1982	SSDP	32	3	
May 1979	Feb 1982	SKDL	14	2	
Feb 1982	Dec 1982	Independent	5	-	
Feb 1982	Dec 1982	KC	4	8	
Feb 1982	Dec 1982	SPP	10	9	
Feb 1982	Dec 1982	SSDP	30	3	
Feb 1982	Dec 1982	SKDL	15	2	
Dec 1982	May 1983	LKP	5	4	
Dec 1982	May 1983	KC	38	8	
Dec 1982	May 1983	SPP	10	9	
Dec 1982	May 1983	SSDP	48	3	
May 1983	Apr 1987	SMP Finnish Rural Party	9	8	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, Budge et al. 2001: 198
May 1983	Apr 1987	KC	32	8	
May 1983	Apr 1987	SPP	9	9	
May 1983	Apr 1987	SSDP	50	3	
Apr 1987	Aug 1990	SMP	4	8	
Apr 1987	Aug 1990	KK	35	6	
Apr 1987	Aug 1990	SPP	13	9	
Apr 1987	Aug 1990	SSDP	48	3	
Aug 1990	Apr 1991	KK	42	6	
Aug 1990	Apr 1991	SPP	11	9	
Aug 1990	Apr 1991	SSDP	47	3	
Apr 1991	Jun 1994	KC	50	8	
Apr 1991	Jun 1994	KK	33	6	
Apr 1991	Jun 1994	SPP	11	9	
Apr 1991	Jun 1994	SKL Christian League	6	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 28, EPP
Jun 1994	Apr 1995	KC	50	8	
Jun 1994	Apr 1995	KK	39	6	
Jun 1994	Apr 1995	SPP	11	9	
Apr 1995	Apr 1999	Independent	5	-	
Apr 1995	Apr 1999	SVL Green League	5	1	Appendix
Apr 1995	Apr 1999	KK	26	6	
Apr 1995	Apr 1999	SPP	11	9	

Apr 1995	Apr 1999	SSDP	37	3	
Apr 1995	Apr 1999	VL Left Wing Alliance	16	2	Appendix 4
Apr 1999	Apr 2000	Independent	6	-	
Apr 1999	Apr 2000	SVL Green Union	6	1	
Apr 1999	Apr 2000	KK	33	6	
Apr 1999	Apr 2000	SPP	11	9	
Apr 1999	Apr 2000	SSDP	33	3	
Apr 1999	Apr 2000	VL	11	2	
Apr 2000	Apr 2002	Independent	6	-	
Apr 2000	Apr 2002	SVL	11	1	
Apr 2000	Apr 2002	KK	33	6	
Apr 2000	Apr 2002	SPP	6	9	
Apr 2000	Apr 2002	SSDP	33	3	
Apr 2000	Apr 2002	VL	11	2	
Apr 2002	Apr 2003	KK	39	6	
Apr 2002	Apr 2003	SPP	11	9	
Apr 2002	Apr 2003	SSDP	39	3	
Apr 2002	Apr 2003	VL	11	2	
Apr 2003	Apr 2007	KC	44	8	
Apr 2003	Apr 2007	SPP	11	9	
Apr 2003	Apr 2007	SSDP	44	3	
Apr 2007	Sep 2008	KC	40	8	
Apr 2007	Sep 2008	SVL	10	1	
Apr 2007	Sep 2008	KK	40	6	
Apr 2007	Sep 2008	SPP	10	9	
		Norway			
Nov 1945	Oct 1949	DNA Labour Party	100	3	Appendix 4
Oct 1949	Nov 1951	DNA	100	3	
Nov 1951	Oct 1953	DNA	100	3	
Oct 1953	Jan 1955	DNA	100	3	
Jan 1955	Oct 1957	DNA	100	3	
Oct 1957	Sep 1961	DNA	100	3	
Sep 1961	Aug 1963	DNA	100	3	
Aug 1963	Sep 1963	Høyre Conservatives	31	6	Appendix 4
Aug 1963	Sep 1963	SP Centre Party	25	8	Appendix 4
Aug 1963	Sep 1963	KF Christian Peoples Party	19	5	Appendix 4
Aug 1963	Sep 1963	Venstre Liberals	25	4	Appendix 4
Sep 1963	Oct 1965	DNA	100	3	
Oct 1965	Sep 1969	Høyre	41	6	
Oct 1965	Sep 1969	S P Centre Party	18	8	
Oct 1965	Sep 1969	KF	24	5	

Oct 1965	Sep 1969	Ven Liberals	18	4	
Sep 1969	Mar 1971	Høyre	41	6	
Sep 1969	Mar 1971	S P Centre Party	18	8	
Sep 1969	Mar 1971	KF	24	5	
Sep 1969	Mar 1971	Ven Liberals	18	4	
Mar 1971	Oct 1972	DNA	100	3	
Oct 1972	Oct 1973	S P Centre Party	41	8	
Oct 1972	Oct 1973	KF	24	5	
Oct 1972	Oct 1973	Ven Liberals	35	4	
Oct 1973	Jan 1976	DNA	100	3	
Jan 1976	Sep 1977	DNA	100	3	
Sep 1977	Feb 1981	DNA	100	3	
Feb 1981	Oct 1981	DNA	100	3	
Oct-1981	Jun 1983	Høyre	100	6	
Jun 1983	Nov 1985	Høyre	70	6	
Jun 1983	Nov 1985	S P Centre Party	17	8	
Jun 1983	Nov 1985	KF	13	5	
Nov 1985	May 1986	Høyre	57	6	
Nov 1985	May 1986	S P Centre Party	22	8	
Nov 1985	May 1986	KF	22	5	
May 1986	Oct 1989	DNA	100	3	
Oct 1989	Nov 1990	Høyre	41	6	
Oct 1989	Nov 1990	S P Centre Party	23	8	
Oct 1989	Nov 1990	KF	36	5	
Nov 1990	Oct 1993	DNA	100	3	
Oct 1993	Oct 1996	DNA	100	3	
Oct 1996	Oct 1997	DNA	100	3	
Oct 1997	Mar 2000	S P Centre Party	32	8	
Oct 1997	Mar 2000	KF	47	5	
Oct 1997	Mar 2000	Ven Liberals	21	4	
Mar 2000	Oct 2001	DNA	100	3	
Oct 2001	Oct 2005	KF	32	5	
Oct 2001	Oct 2005	Høyre	53	6	
Oct 2001	Oct 2005	Ven Liberals	16	4	
Oct 2005	Aug 2008	DNA	53	3	
Oct 2005	Aug 2008	SV Socialist Left Party	26	2	
Oct 2005	Aug 2008	S P Centre Party	21	8	Appendix 4
		Sweden			
Oct 1946	Oct 1948	SSA Social Democrats	88	3	Appendix 4
Oct 1946	Oct 1948	Independent	12	-	
Oct 1948	Oct 1951	SSA Social Democrats	85	3	
Oct 1948	Oct 1951	Independent	15	-	
Oct 1951	Sep 1952	CP Centre Party	29	4	Appendix 4

Oct 1951	Sep 1952	SSA Social Democrats	53	3	
Oct 1951	Sep 1952	Independent	18	-	
Sep 1952	Sep 1956	CP Centre Party	29	4	
Sep 1952	Sep 1956	SSA Social Democrats	53	3	
Sep 1952	Sep 1956	Independent	18	-	
Sep 1956	Oct 1957	CP Centre Party	28	8	
Sep 1956	Oct 1957	SSA Social Democrats	5	3	
Sep 1956	Oct 1957	Independent	22	-	
Oct 1957	Jun 1958	SSA Social Democrats	88	3	
Oct 1957	Jun 1958	Independent	13	-	
Jun 1958	Oct 1960	SSA Social Democrats	94	3	
Jun 1958	Oct 1960	Independent	6	-	
Oct 1960	Oct 1964	SSA Social Democrats	93	3	
Oct 1960	Oct 1964	Independent	7	-	
Oct 1964	Sep 1968	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Sep 1968	Oct 1969	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 1969	Sep 1970	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Sep 1970	Oct 1973	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 1973	Oct 1976	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 1976	Oct 1978	CP Centre Party	46	8	
Oct 1976	Oct 1978	FP Peoples Party	29	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33 Budge et al. 2001: 210
Oct 1976	Oct 1978	MS Moderate Unity Party	21	6	
Oct 1976	Oct 1978	Independent	4	-	
Oct 1978	Oct 1979	FP Peoples Party	96	4	
Oct 1978	Oct 1979	Independent	4	-	
Oct 1979	May 1981	CP Centre Party	33	8	
Oct 1979	May 1981	FP Peoples Party	29	4	
Oct 1979	May 1981	MS	33	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33 Budge et al. 2001: 210
Oct 1979	May 1981	Independent	4	-	
May 1981	Oct 1982	CP Centre Party	50	8	
May 1981	Oct 1982	FP Peoples Party	46	4	
May 1981	Oct 1982	Independent	4	-	
May 1982	Oct-1985	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 1985	Mar 1986	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Mar 1986	Oct 1988	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 1988	Feb 1990	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Feb 1990	Oct 1991	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 1991	Oct 1994	CP Centre Party	28	8	
Oct 1991	Oct 1994	FP Peoples Party	28	4	
Oct 1991	Oct 1994	KDS Christian Democrats	7	5	Appendix 4
Oct 1991	Oct 1994	MS	35	6	

Oct 1991	Oct 1994	Independent	3	-	
Oct 1994	Mar 1996	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Mar 1996	Sep 1998	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Sep 1998	Nov 2001	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Nov 2001	Jan 2002	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Jan 2002	Oct 2002	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 2002	Oct 2006	SSA Social Democrats	100	3	
Oct 2006	Sep 2008	MS	50	6	
Oct 2006	Sep 2008	CP Centre Party	18	8	
Oct 2006	Sep 2008	FP Peoples Party	18	4	
Oct 2006	Sep 2008	KDS	14	5	
		Ireland			
Feb 1948	Jun 1951	CnP Republican Party	13	-	
Feb 1948	Jun 1951	CnT Party of the Land	6	4	Armingeon et al. 2011: 30
Feb 1948	Jun 1951	Fine Gael	44	5	Appendix 4
Feb 1948	Jun 1951	Independents	6	-	
Feb 1948	Jun 1951	Labour Party	31	2	Appendix 4
Jun 1951	Jun 1954	Fianna Fail	100	4	Appendix 4
Jun 1954	Mar 1957	CnT Party of the Land	6	4	
Jun 1954	Mar 1957	Fine Gael	65	5	
Jun 1954	Mar 1957	Labour Party	29	2	
Mar 1957	Jun 1959	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Jun 1959	Oct 1961	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Oct 1961	Apr 1965	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Apr 1965	Nov 1966	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Nov 1966	Jul 1969	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Jul 1969	Mar 1973	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Mar 1973	Jul 1977	Fine Gael	56	5	
Mar 1973	Jul 1977	Labour Party	44	2	
Jul 1977	Dec 1979	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Dec 1979	Jun 1981	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Jun 1981	Mar 1982	Fine Gael	100	5	
Jun 1981	Mar 1982	Labour Party	46	2	
Mar 1982	Dec 1982	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Dec 1982	Mar 1987	Fine Gael	59	5	
Dec 1982	Mar 1987	Labour Party	41	2	
Mar 1987	Jul 1989	Fianna Fail	100	4	
Jul 1989	Feb 1992	Fianna Fail	86	4	
Jul 1989	Feb 1992	PDP Progressive Democratic Party	14	4	Appendix 4
Feb 1992	Jan 1993	Fianna Fail	90	4	
Feb 1992	Jan 1993	PDP	11	4	
Jan 1993	Dec 1994	Fianna Fail	57	4	
Jan 1993	Dec 1994	Labour Party	43	2	

Dec 1994	Jun 1997	Fine Gael	47	5	
Dec 1994	Jun 1997	Labour Party	53	2	
Jun 1997	Jun 2002	Fianna Fail	93	4	
Jun 1997	Jun 2002	PDP	7	4	
Jun 2002	Jun 2007	Fianna Fail	87	4	
Jun 2002	Jun 2007	PDP	13	4	
Jun 2007	May 2008	Fianna Fail	80	4	
Jun 2007	May 2008	PDP	7	4	
Jun 2007	May 2008	Green Party	13	1	
May 2008	Sep 2009	Fianna Fail	80	4	
May 2008	Sep 2009	PDP	7	4	
May 2008	Sep 2009	Green Party	13	1	Appendix 4

United Kingdom

Jul 1945	Feb 1950	Labour Party	100	3	Appendix 4
Feb 1950	Oct 1951	Labour Party	100	3	
Oct 1951	Apr 1955	Conservative Party	100	6	Appendix 4
Apr 1955	May 1955	Conservative Party	100	6	
May 1955	Jan 1957	Conservative Party	100	6	
Jan 1957	Oct 1959	Conservative Party	100	6	
Oct 1959	Oct 1963	Conservative Party	100	6	
Oct 1963	Oct 1964	Conservative Party	100	6	
Oct 1964	Apr 1966	Labour Party	100	3	
Apr 1966	Jun 1970	Labour Party	100	3	
Jun 1970	Mar 1974	Conservative Party	100	6	
Mar 1974	Oct 1974	Labour Party	100	3	
Oct 1974	Apr 1976	Labour Party	100	3	
Apr 1976	May 1979	Labour Party	100	3	
May 1979	Jun 1983	Conservative Party	100	6	
Jun 1983	Jun 1987	Conservative Party	100	6	
Jun 1987	Nov 1990	Conservative Party	100	6	
Nov 1990	Apr 1992	Conservative Party	100	6	
Apr 1992	May 1997	Conservative Party	100	6	
May 1997	Jun 2001	Labour Party	100	3	
Jun 2001	May 2005	Labour Party	100	3	
May 2005	Jun 2007	Labour Party	100	3	
Jun 2007	Jan 2008	Labour Party	100	3	
Jan 2008	Sep 2008	Labour Party	100	3	

		Spain			
Jul 1977	Apr 1979	Independents	7	-	
Jul 1977	Apr 1979	UCD Democratic Centre	93	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33
Apr 1979	Feb 1981	Independents	3	-	
Apr 1979	Feb 1981	UCD	97	6	
Feb 1981	Dec 1982	UCD	100	6	
Dec 1982	Jul 1986	PSOE Socialist Party	100	3	
Jul 1986	Dec 1989	PSOE Socialist Party	100	3	
Dec 1989	Jul 1993	PSOE Socialist Party	100	3	
Jul 1993	May 1996	PSOE Socialist Party	57	3	
Jul 1993	May 1996	Independents	44	-	
May 1996	Apr 2000	AP/Partido Popular Alliance (AP/PPA)	100	6	Appendix 4
Apr 2000	Apr 2004	AP/PPA	100	6	
Apr 2004	Apr 2008	PSOE Socialist Party	100	3	
Apr 2008	Sep 2008	PSOE Socialist Party	100	3	
		Greece			
Nov 1974	Nov 1977	ND New Democracy	100	6	Appendix 4
Nov 1977	May 1980	ND New Democracy	100	6	
May 1980	Oct 1981	ND New Democracy	100	6	
Oct 1981	Jun 1985	PASOK	100	3	Appendix 4
Jun 1985	Jul 1985	PASOK	100	3	
Jul 1985	Jul 1989	PASOK	100	3	
Jul 1989	Oct 1989	ND New Democracy	93	6	
02. Jul 89	Oct 1989	Coalition left and Progress	7	2	Armingeon et al. 2011: 29
Oct 1989	Nov 1989	Independents	100	-	
Nov 1989	Feb 1990	Independents	32	-	
Nov 1989	Feb 1990	ND New Democracy	28	6	
Nov 1989	Feb 1990	PASOK	36	3	
Nov 1989	Feb 1990	Coalition left and Progress	4	2	
Feb 1990	Apr 1990	Independents	100	-	
Apr 1990	Oct 1993	ND New Democracy	100	6	
Oct 1993	Sep 1996	PASOK	100	3	
Sep 1996	Apr 2000	PASOK	100	3	
Apr 2000	Mar 2004	PASOK	100	3	
Mar 2004	Oct 2007	ND New Democracy	100	6	
Oct 2007	Oct 2008	ND New Democracy	100	6	
Oct 2008	Jul 2009	ND New Democracy	100	6	

Jul 1976	Jan 1978	PS Socialist Party	65	3	Appendix 4
Jul 1976	Jan 1978	Independents	35	-	
Jan 1978	Aug 1978	CDS Centre Social Democrats	20	5	Appendix 4
Jan 1978	Aug 1978	PS	70	3	
Jan 1978	Aug 1978	Independents	10	-	
Aug 1978	Nov 1978	Independents	100	-	
Nov 1978	Aug 1979	Independents	100	-	
Aug 1979	Jan 1980	Independents	100	-	
Jan 1980	Jan 1981	CDS	39	5	
Jan 1980	Jan 1981	PSD Social Democrats	56	4	Appendix 4
Jan 1980	Jan 1981	Independents	6	-	
Jan 1981	Sep 1981	CDS	36	5	
Jan 1981	Sep 1981	PSD	50	3	
Jan 1981	Sep 1981	Independents	9	-	
Jan 1981	Sep 1981	PMP Popular Monarchist Party	5	6	Armingeon et al. 2011: 32
Sep 1981	Jun 1983	CDS	35	5	
Sep 1981	Jun 1983	PSD	57	4	
Sep 1981	Jun 1983	Independents	4	-	
Sep 1981	Jun 1983	PMP	4	6	
Jun 1983	Nov 1985	PSP	45	3	
Jun 1983	Nov 1985	PSD	45	4	
Jun 1983	Nov 1985	Independents	10	-	
Nov 1985	Aug 1987	PSD	89	4	
Nov 1985	Aug 1987	Independents	11	-	
Aug 1987	Oct 1991	PSD	95	4	
Aug 1987	Oct 1991	Independents	5	-	
Oct 1991	Oct 1995	PSD	100	4	
Oct 1995	Oct 1999	PSP	100	3	
Oct 1999	Dec 1999	PSP	95	3	
Oct 1999	Dec 1999	Independents	5	-	
Dec 1999	Jul 2000	PSP	90	3	
Dec 1999	Jul 2000	Independents	11	-	
Jul 2000	Sep 2000	PSP	74	3	
Jul 2000	Sep 2000	Independents	26	-	
Sep 2000	Jul 2001	PSP	58	3	
Sep 2000	Jul 2001	Independents	42	-	
Jul 2001	Apr 2002	PSP	61	3	
Jul 2001	Apr 2002	Independents	39	-	
Apr 2002	Jul 2004	Independents	6	-	
Apr 2002	Jul 2004	PSD	78	4	

Apr 2002	Jul 2004	CDS	17	5	
Jul 2004	Dec 2004	Independents	5	-	
Jul 2004	Dec 2004	PSD	80	4	
Jul 2004	Dec 2004	CDS	15	5	
Dec 2004	Mar 2005	No government		-	
Mar 2005	Jul 2006	PSP	53	3	
Mar 2005	Jul 2006	Independents	47	-	
Jul 2006	May 2007	PSP	59	3	
Jul 2006	May 2007	Independents	41	-	
May 2007	Jan 2008	PSP	53	3	
May 2007	Jan 2008	Independents	47	-	
Jan 2008	Oct 2008	PSP	59	3	
Jan 2008	Oct 2008	Independents	41		
Turkey					
Aug 1946	Sep 1947	PP Populist Party	100	3	Budge et al. 2001: 212
Sep 1947	Jun 1948	PP Populist Party	100	3	
Jun 1948	Jan 1949	PP Populist Party	100	3	
Jan 1949	May 1950	PP Populist Party	100	3	
May 1950	Mar 1951	PP Populist Party	7	3	
May 1950	Mar 1951	Democratic Party	93	6	Appendix 4
Mar 1951	May 1954	Democratic Party	100	6	
May 1954	Dec 1955	Democratic Party	100	6	
Dec 1955	Nov 1957	Democratic Party	100	6	
Nov 1957	Nov 1961	Democratic Party	100	6	
Nov 1961	Jun 1962	Republican People´s Party (CHP)	58	3	
Nov 1961	Jun 1962	Justice Party	42	6	Budge et al. 2001: 212
Jun 1962	Dec 1963	CHP	42	3	
Jun 1962	Dec 1963	Republican Peasants' Nation Party (RPNP)	21	6	Time 1965, Zürcher 2004: 232
Jun 1962	Dec 1963	New Turkey Party	26	6	Landau 1974: 16
Jun 1962	Dec 1963	Independents	11	-	
Dec 1963	Feb 1965	CHP	95	3	
Dec 1963	Feb 1965	Independents	5	-	
Feb 1965	Oct 1965	Justice Party	32	6	
Feb 1965	Oct 1965	RPNP	21	6	
Feb 1965	Oct 1965	New Turkey Party	16	6	
Feb 1965	Oct 1965	Nation Party	16	6	
Feb 1965	Oct 1965	Independents	16	-	
Oct 1965	Nov 1969	Justice Party	100	6	
Nov 1969	Mar 1970	Justice Party	100	6	
Mar 1970	Mar 1971	Justice Party	100	6	
Mar 1971	Dec 1971	CHP	5	3	
Mar 1971	Dec 1971	Justice Party	15	6	

Mar 1971	Dec 1971	NRP	5	-	
Mar 1971	Dec 1971	Independents	75	-	
Dec 1971	May 1972	CHP	20	3	
Dec 1971	May 1972	Justice Party	15	6	
Dec 1971	May 1972	NRP	10	-	
Dec 1971	May 1972	Independents	55	-	
May 1972	Apr 1973	CHP	24	3	
May 1972	Apr 1973	Justice Party	24	6	
May 1972	Apr 1973	NRP	10	-	
May 1972	Apr 1973	Independents	43	-	
Apr 1973	Jan 1974	Justice Party	53	6	
Apr 1973	Jan 1974	RRP	24	-	
Apr 1973	Jan 1974	Independents	24	-	
Jan 1974	Nov 1974	CHP	65	3	
Jan 1974	Nov 1974	National Salvation Party (NSP)	35	7	Lapidus 2002: 508 Budge et al. 2001: 213
Nov 1974	Mar 1975	RRP	29	-	
Nov 1974	Mar 1975	Independents	71	-	
Mar 1975	Jun 1975	Justice Party	50	6	
Mar 1975	Jun 1975	RRP	14	-	
Mar 1975	Jun 1975	NSP	32	7	
Mar 1975	Jun 1975	NAP National Action Party	5	7	Budge et al. 2001: 213
Jun 1975	Jul 1975	CHP	96	3	
Jun 1975	Jul 1975	Independents	5	-	
Jul 1975	Jan 1978	Justice Party	57	6	
Jul 1975	Jan 1978	NSP	26	7	
Jul 1975	Jan 1978	NAP	17	7	
Jan 1978	Nov 1979	Democratic Party	4	6	
Jan 1978	Nov 1979	CHP	61	3	
Jan 1978	Nov 1979	RRP	7	-	
Jan 1978	Nov 1979	Independents	29	-	
Nov 1979	Dec 1983	Justice Party	100	6	
Dec 1983	Dec 1987	Motherland Party (ANAP)	100	6	Appendix 4
Dec 1987	Nov 1989	ANAP	100	6	
Nov 1989	Jun 1991	ANAP	100	6	
Jun 1991	Nov 1991	ANAP	100	6	
Nov 1991	Jun 1993	The True Path Party	67	6	Klingemann et al. 2006: 207
Nov 1991	Jun 1993	Social Democratic People´s Party (SHP)	33	3	Appendix 4
Jun 1993	Mar 1995	The True Path Party	59	6	
Jun 1993	Mar 1995	SHP	41	3	
Mar 1995	Oct 1995	CHP	44	3	
Mar 1995	Oct 1995	The True Path Party	56	6	

Oct 1995	Mar 1996	CHP	39	3	
Oct 1995	Mar 1996	The True Path Party	55	6	
Oct 1995	Mar 1996	Independents	6	-	
Mar 1996	Jun 1996	ANAP	52	6	
Mar 1996	Jun 1996	The True Path Party	49	6	
Jun 1996	Jul 1997	The True Path Party	43	6	
Jun 1996	Jul 1997	Refah	57	7	Marckhgott 2007: 47 Klingemann et al. 2006: 207
Jul 1997	Jan 1999	ANAP	56	6	
Jul 1997	Jan 1999	The True Path Party	11	6	
Jul 1997	Jan 1999	Democratic Left Party (DSP)	31	3	Siaroff 2000: 453, Klingemann et al. 2006: 207, Marckhgott 2007: 47
Jul 1997	Jan 1999	Independents	3	-	
Feb 1999	Nov 2002	DSP	56	6	
Feb 1999	Nov 2002	The True Path Party	11	6	
Feb 1999	Nov 2002	DSP	31	3	Appendix 4
Feb 1999	Nov 2002	Independents	3	-	
Dez 2002	Mar 2003	AKP	100	5	Appendix 4
Apr 2003	Aug 2007	AKP	100	5	
Sept 2007	Jul 2011	AKP	100	5	
Czech Republic					
Jan 1993	Jan 1994	ODS	58	4	Appendix 4
Jan 1993	Jan 1994	ODA Civic Democratic Alliance	11	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27
Jan 1993	Jan 1994	KDS	11	10	
Jan 1993	Jan 1994	KDU-ČSL Christian Democratic Union	21	5	Appendix 4
Jan 1994	Jul 1996	ODS	65	4	
Jan 1994	Jul 1996	ODA	12	4	
Jan 1994	Jul 1996	KDU-ČSL	18	5	
Jan 1994	Jul 1996	Independent nominated by KDU- ČSL	6	5	
Jul 1996	Oct 1996	ODS	50	4	
Jul 1996	Oct 1996	ODA	25	4	
Jul 1996	Oct 1996	KDU-ČSL	25	5	
Oct 1996	Nov 1997	ODS	44	4	
Oct 1996	Nov 1997	ODA	25	4	
Oct 1996	Nov 1997	KDU-ČSL	25	5	
Oct 1996	Nov 1997	Independent	6	-	
Nov 1997	Dec 1997	-			
Dec 1997	Feb 1998	ODA	19	4	
Dec 1997	Feb 1998	KDU-ČSL	19	5	
Dec 1997	Feb 1998	US Freedom Union	25	4	
Dec 1997	Feb 1998	Independent nominated	13	5	

		by KDU- ČSL			
Dec 1997	Feb 1998	Independent	25	-	
Feb 1998	Aug 1998	ODA	13	4	
Feb 1998	Aug 1998	KDU-ČSL	20	5	
Feb 1998	Aug 1998	US Freedom Union	27	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27
Feb 1998	Aug 1998	Independent	40	-	
Aug 1998	Jul 1999	ČSSD Czechoslovak Party of Social Democracy	95	3	Appendix 4
Aug 1998	Jul 1999	Independent	5	-	
Jul 1999	Oct 1999	ČSSD	94	3	
Jul 1999	Oct 1999	Independent	6	-	
Oct 1999	Feb 2000	ČSSD	94	3	
Oct 1999	Feb 2000	Independent	6	-	
Feb 2000	Oct 2000	ČSSD	94	3	
Feb 2000	Oct 2000	Independent	6	-	
Oct 2000	Feb 2001	ČSSD	100	3	
Feb 2001	Jul 2002	ČSSD	94	3	
Feb 2001	Jul 2002	Independent	6	-	
Jul 2002	Jun 2003	ČSSD	65	3	
Jul 2002	Jun 2003	KDU-ČSL	18	5	
Jul 2002	Jun 2003	US-DEU	18	4	Lieb 2007: 11
Jul 2002	Jun 2003	Independent	6	-	
Jun 2003	Aug 2003	ČSSD	59	3	
Jun 2003	Aug 2003	KDU-ČSL	18	5	
Jun 2003	Aug 2003	US-DEU	18		
Jun 2003	Aug 2003	Independents	6	-	
Aug 2003	Aug 2004	ČSSD	53	3	
Aug 2003	Aug 2004	KDU-ČSL	18	5	
Aug 2003	Aug 2004	US-DEU	18	4	
Aug 2003	Aug 2004	Independents	12	-	
Aug 2004	Apr 2005	ČSSD	67	3	
Aug 2004	Apr 2005	KDU-ČSL	17	5	
Aug 2004	Apr 2005	US-DEU	17	4	
Apr 2005	Oct 2005	ČSSD	50	3	
Apr 2005	Oct 2005	KDU-ČSL	17	5	
Apr 2005	Oct 2005	US-DEU	11	4	
Apr 2005	Oct 2005	Independents nominated by ČSSD	17	3	
Apr 2005	Oct 2005	Independents nominated by US-DEU	6	4	
Oct 2005	Sep 2006	ČSSD	57	3	
Oct 2005	Sep 2006	KDU-ČSL	17	5	
Oct 2005	Sep 2006	US-DEU	12	4	
Oct 2005	Sep 2006	Independents	12	3	

		nominated by ČSSD			
Oct 2005	Sep 2006	Independents nominated by US-DEU	6	4	
Oct 2005	Jan 2007	ODS	60	4	
Oct 2005	Jan 2007	Independents nominated by US-DEU	40	4	
Jan 2007	Nov 2007	ODS	50	4	
Jan 2007	Nov 2007	KDU-ČSL	22	5	
Jan 2007	Nov 2007	SZ Green Party	17	1	Appendix 4
Jan 2007	Nov 2007	Independents nominated by KDU-ČSL	6	5	
Jan 2007	Nov 2007	Independents nominated by SZ	6	1	
Nov 2007	Apr 2008	ODS	53	4	
Nov 2007	Apr 2008	KDU-ČSL	18	5	
Nov 2007	Apr 2008	SZ Green Party	18	1	
Nov 2007	Apr 2008	Independents nominated by KDU-ČSL	6	5	
Nov 2007	Apr 2008	Independents nominated by SZ	6	1	
Apr 2008	May 2009	ODS	50	4	
Apr 2008	May 2009	KDU-ČSL	22	5	
Apr 2008	May 2009	SZ Green Party	17	1	
Apr 2008	May 2009	Independents nominated by KDU-ČSL	6	5	
Apr 2008	May 2009	Independents nominated by SZ	6	1	
May 2009	Jun 2009	Independents	6		
May 2009	Jun 2009	Independents nominated by ČSSD	44	3	
May 2009	Jun 2009	Independents nominated by KDU-ČSL	39	5	
May 2009	Jun 2009	Independents nominated by SZ	11	1	
		Hungary			
May 1990	Feb 1992	MDF Hungarian Democratic Forum	50	6	Appendix 4
May 1990	Feb 1992	FKGP Independents Smallholders Party	15	8	Armingeon et al. 2012: 30 Klingemann et al. 2006: 219
May 1990	Feb 1992	KDNP Christian Democratic People's Party	5	5	Appendix 4

May 1990	Feb 1992	Independents	30	-	
Feb 1992	Jun 1992	MDF	53	6	
Feb 1992	Jun 1992	FKGP	16	8	
Feb 1992	Jun 1992	KDNP	5	5	
Feb 1992	Jun 1992	Independents	26	-	
Jun 1992	Dec 1992	MDF	50	6	
Jun 1992	Dec 1992	FKGP	15	8	
Jun 1992	Dec 1992	KDNP	10	5	
Jun 1992	Dec 1992	Independents	25	-	
Dec 1992	Feb 1993	MDF	55	6	
Dec 1992	Feb 1993	FKGP	15	8	
Dec 1992	Feb 1993	KDNP	10	5	
Dec 1992	Feb 1993	Independents	20	-	
Feb 1993	Jul 1994	MDF	50	6	
Feb 1993	Jul 1994	Smallholders	17	8	
Feb 1993	Jul 1994	KDNP	17	5	
Feb 1993	Jul 1994	Independents	17	-	
Jul 1994	Mar 1995	MSZP Hungarian Socialist Party	79	3	Appendix 4
Jul 1994	Mar 1995	SZDSZ Alliance of Free Democrats	21	4	Appendix 4
Mar 1995	Jul 1998	MSZP	80	3	
Mar 1995	Jul 1998	SZDSZ	20	4	
Jul 1998	Jan 1999	Fidesz-MPP	71	5	Appendix 4
Jul 1998	Jan 1999	MDF	6	6	
Jul 1998	Jan 1999	FKGP Independent Smallholders Party	24	8	
Jan 1999	Apr 2002	Fidesz-MPP	72	4	
Jan 1999	Apr 2002	MDF	6	6	
Jan 1999	Apr 2002	FKGP	22	8	
Apr 2002	May 2003	MSZP	73	3	
Apr 2002	May 2003	SZDSZ	27	4	
May 2003	Sep 2003	MSZP	76	3	
May 2003	Sep 2003	SZDSZ	24	4	
Sep 2003	Jun 2006	MSZP	78	3	
Sep 2003	Jun 2006	SZDSZ	22	4	
Jun 2006	Jun 2007	MSZP	77	3	
Jun 2006	Jun 2007	SZDSZ	23	4	
Jun 2007	Feb 2008	MSZP	80	3	
Jun 2007	Feb 2008	SZDSZ	20	4	
Feb 2008	May 2008	MSZP	79	3	
Feb 2008	May 2008	SZDSZ	21	4	
May 2008	Feb 2009	MSZP	100	3	
Poland					

Jan 1991	Jul 1991	Democratic Union	5	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37 Klingemann et al. 2006: 225
Jan 1991	Jul 1991	Liberal Democratic Congress (LDC)	20	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37 Klingemann et al. 2006: 225
Jan 1991	Jul 1991	Center Alliance	10	-	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38 Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft Brandenburg, Bingen 2001, Eckert 2008: 113
Jan 1991	Jul 1991	National Christian Union (NCU)	5	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38 Cziomer 1995, Rose/Munro 2003: 231
Jan 1991	Jul 1991	Democratic Party	5	4	Appendix 4
Jan 1991	Jul 1991	Independents	55	-	
Jul 1991	Dec 1991	Democratic Union	5	4	
Jul 1991	Dec 1991	LDC	15	4	
Jul 1991	Dec 1991	Center Alliance	10	-	
Jul 1991	Dec 1991	NCU	5	5	
Jul 1991	Dec 1991	Democratic Party	5	4	
Jul 1991	Dec 1991	Independents	60	-	
Dec 1991	Jun 1992	Center Alliance	22	-	
Dec 1991	Jun 1992	NCU	17	5	
Dec 1991	Jun 1992	Agrarian Alliance	11	8	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37
Dec 1991	Jun 1992	Independents	50	-	
Jun 1992	Jul 1992	Democratic Union	6	4	
Jun 1992	Jul 1992	Center Alliance	11	-	
Jun 1992	Jul 1992	NCU	11	5	
Jun 1992	Jul 1992	Agrarian Alliance	11	8	
Jun 1992	Jul 1992	Polish Peasant Party	11	8	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37 Klingemann et al. 2006: 226 Siaroff 2000: 376, Eckert 2008: 114, EPP
Jun 1992	Jul 1992	Independents	50	-	
Jul 1992	Oct 1993	Democratic Union	20	4	
Jul 1992	Oct 1993	Polish Liberal Programme	20	4	Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft Brandenburg
Jul 1992	Oct 1993	Polish Convention	8	-	Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft Brandenburg
Jul 1992	Oct 1993	NCU	20	5	
Jul 1992	Oct 1993	Agrarian Alliance	16	8	
Jul 1992	Oct 1993	Independents	16	-	
Oct 1993	Feb 1994	PPP	38	8	
Oct 1993	Feb 1994	Democratic Left Alliance (DLA)	29	3	Appendix 4
Oct 1993	Feb 1994	Independents	33	-	
Feb 1994	Apr 1994	PPP	40	8	
Feb 1994	Apr 1994	DLA	25	3	
Feb 1994	Apr 1994	Independents	35	-	

Apr 1994	Nov 1994	PPP	38	8	
Apr 1994	Nov 1994	DLA	24	3	
Apr 1994	Nov 1994	Independents	38	-	
Nov 1994	Jan 1995	PPP	40	8	
Nov 1994	Jan 1995	DLA	25	3	
Nov 1994	Jan 1995	Independents	35	-	
Jan 1995	Mar 1995	PPP	42	8	
Jan 1995	Mar 1995	DLA	26	3	
Jan 1995	Mar 1995	Independents	32	-	
Mar 1995	Dec 1995	PPP	27	8	
Mar 1995	Dec 1995	DLA	38	3	
Mar 1995	Dec 1995	Independents	33	-	
Dec 1995	Jan 1996	PPP	33	8	
Dec 1995	Jan 1996	DLA	44	3	
Dec 1995	Jan 1996	Independents	22	-	
Jan 1996	Feb 1996	PPP	33	8	
Jan 1996	Feb 1996	DLA	38	3	
Jan 1996	Feb 1996	Independents	29	-	
Feb 1996	Sep 1996	PPP	33	8	
Feb 1996	Sep 1996	DLA	33	3	
Feb 1996	Sep 1996	Independents	33	-	
Sep 1996	Oct 1996	PPP	30	8	
Sep 1996	Oct 1996	DLA	35	3	
Sep 1996	Oct 1996	Independents	35	-	
Oct 1996	Nov 1996	PPP	32	8	
Oct 1996	Nov 1996	DLA	32	3	
Oct 1996	Nov 1996	Independents	37	-	
Nov 1996	Jan 1997	PPP	33	8	
Nov 1996	Jan 1997	DLA	33	3	
Nov 1996	Jan 1997	Independents	33	-	
Jan 1997	Jul 1997	PPP	38	8	
Jan 1997	Jul 1997	DLA	25	3	
Jan 1997	Jul 1997	Independents	38	-	
Jul 1997	Sep 1997	PPP	35	8	
Jul 1997	Sep 1997	DLA	35	3	
Jul 1997	Sep 1997	Independents	30	-	
Sep 1997	Oct 1997	PPP	37	8	
Sep 1997	Oct 1997	DLA	32	3	
Sep 1997	Oct 1997	Independents	32	-	
Oct 1997	Mar 1999	Electoral Action Solidarity (EAS)	75	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37 Klingemann et al. 2006: 225
Oct 1997	Mar 1999	Freedom Union	25	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37 Klingemann et al. 2006: 225
Mar 1990	Jun 2000	EAS	75	5	
Mar 1990	Jun 2000	Freedom Union	25	4	

Jun 2000	Aug 2000	EAS	84	5	
Jun 2000	Aug 2000	Independents	16	-	
Aug 2000	Feb 2001	EAS	79	5	
Aug 2000	Feb 2001	Independents	21	-	
Feb 2001	Jul 2001	EAS	74	5	
Feb 2001	Jul 2001	Independents	26	-	
Jul 2001	Oct 2002	EAS	79	5	
Jul 2001	Oct 2002	Independents	21	-	
Oct 2002	Jan 2003	PPP	13	8	
Oct 2002	Jan 2003	DLA	69	3	
Oct 2002	Jan 2003	Labour Union	6	3	Appendix 4
Oct 2002	Jan 2003	Independents	13	-	
Jan 2003	Mar 2003	PPP	13	8	
Jan 2003	Mar 2003	DLA	56	3	
Jan 2003	Mar 2003	Labour Union	13	3	
Jan 2003	Mar 2003	Independents	19	-	
Mar 2003	Apr 2003	DLA	63	3	
Mar 2003	Apr 2003	Labour Union	13	3	
Mar 2003	Apr 2003	Independents	25	-	
Apr 2003	Jun 2003	DLA	63	3	
Apr 2003	Jun 2003	Labour Union	6	3	
Apr 2003	Jun 2003	Independents	31	-	
Jun 2003	Jan 2004	DLA	59	3	
Jun 2003	Jan 2004	Labour Union	6	3	
Jun 2003	Jan 2004	Independents	35	-	
Jan 2004	May 2004	DLA	65	3	
Jan 2004	May 2004	Labour Union	6	3	
Jan 2004	May 2004	Independents	29	-	
May 2004	Jun 2004	DLA	50	3	
May 2004	Jun 2004	Labour Union	6	3	
May 2004	Jun 2004	Independents	44	-	
Jun 2004	Jul 2004	DLA	44	3	
Jun 2004	Jul 2004	Labour Union	6	3	
Jun 2004	Jul 2004	Independents	50	-	
Jul 2004	Nov 2004	DLA	44	3	
Jul 2004	Nov 2004	Labour Union	6	3	
Jul 2004	Nov 2004	Polish Social Democracy (PSD)	6	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 37
Jul 2004	Nov 2004	Independents	44	-	
Nov 2004	Jan 2005	DLA	41	3	
Nov 2004	Jan 2005	Labour Union	6	3	
Nov 2004	Jan 2005	PSD	6	3	
Nov 2004	Jan 2005	Independents	47	-	
Jan 2005	May 2005	DLA	35	3	
Jan 2005	May 2005	Labour Union	6	3	

Jan 2005	May 2005	PSD	6	3	
Jan 2005	May 2005	Independents	53	-	
May 2005	Nov 2005	DLA	29	3	
May 2005	Nov 2005	Labour Union	6	3	
May 2005	Nov 2005	PSD	6	3	
May 2005	Nov 2005	Independents	59	-	
Nov 2005	Feb 2006	Law and Justice	61	4	Appendix 4
Nov 2005	Feb 2006	Independents	39	-	
Feb 2006	May 2006	Law and Justice	67	7	
Feb 2006	May 2006	Independents	33	-	
May 2006	Jul 2006	Law and Justice	53	7	
May 2006	Jul 2006	Self-Defence	14	6	Appendix 4
May 2006	Jul 2006	League of Polish Families (LPF)	10	5	Appendix 4
May 2006	Jul 2006	Independents	24	-	
Jul 2006	Sep 2006	Law and Justice	59	7	
Jul 2006	Sep 2006	Self-Defence	14	6	
Jul 2006	Sep 2006	LPF	10	5	
Jul 2006	Sep 2006	Independents	18	-	
Sep 2006	Jul 2007	Law and Justice	55	7	
Sep 2006	Jul 2007	Self-Defence	14	6	
Sep 2006	Jul 2007	LPF	10	5	
Sep 2006	Jul 2007	Independents	23	-	
Jul 2007	Aug 2007	Law and Justice	61	7	
Jul 2007	Aug 2007	Self-Defence	9	6	
Jul 2007	Aug 2007	LPF	9	5	
Jul 2007	Aug 2007	Independents	22	-	
Aug 2007	Nov 2007	Law and Justice	65	7	
Aug 2007	Nov 2007	Independents	35	-	
Nov 2007	Nov 2008	Civic Platform	53	5	Appendix 4
Nov 2007	Nov 2008	PPP	16	8	
Nov 2007	Nov 2008	Independents	32	-	

Slovakia

Jun 1992	Mar 1993	Slovak National Party (SNS)	6	7	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39 Klingemann et al. 2006: 231 Siaroff 2000: 405f.
Jun 1992	Mar 1993	People's Party/Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)	81	7	Appendix 4
Jun 1992	Mar 1993	Independents	13	-	
Mar 1993	Nov 1993	HZDS	82	7	
Mar 1993	Nov 1993	Independents	18	-	
Nov 1993	Mar 1994	SNS	17	7	
Nov 1993	Mar 1994	HZDS	67	7	

Nov 1993	Mar 1994	Independents	17	-	
Mar 1994	Dec 1994	Christian Democratic Movement (KHD)	28	5	Appendix 4
Mar 1994	Dec 1994	Party of Democratic Left (PDL)	39	2	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39
Mar 1994	Dec 1994	Alternative of Political Realism	22	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39 Siaroff 2000: 405 Deegan-Krause 2009
Mar 1994	Dec 1994	Alliance of Democrats	6	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39 Siaroff 2000: 405 Deegan-Krause 2009
Mar 1994	Dec 1994	National Democratic Club	6	-	Deegan-Krause 2009
Dec 1994	Feb 1998	SNS	11	7	Appendix 4
Dec 1994	Feb 1998	HZDS	67	7	
Dec 1994	Feb 1998	Association of Workers in Slovakia (AWS)	22	2	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39 Deegan-Krause 2009
Feb 1998	Oct 1998	SNS	11	7	
Feb 1998	Oct 1998	HZDS	61	7	
Feb 1998	Oct 1998	AWS	22	2	
Feb 1998	Oct 1998	Independents	6	-	
Oct 1998	Nov 1998	SNS	11	7	
Oct 1998	Nov 1998	HZDS	56	7	
Oct 1998	Nov 1998	AWS	28	2	
Oct 1998	Nov 1998	Independents	6	-	
Nov 1998	Nov 2002	SDKU (SDKU)	40	5	Appendix 4
Nov 1998	Nov 2002	Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK)	15	9	Appendix 4
Nov 1998	Nov 2002	Christian Democratic Movement (CDM)	5	5	
Nov 1998	Nov 2002	PDL	30	2	
Nov 1998	Nov 2002	Party of Civic Understanding	10	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39
Nov 2002	May 2005	Party of Civic Understanding	38	5	
Nov 2002	May 2005	SMK	25	9	
Nov 2002	May 2005	CDM	19	5	
Nov 2002	May 2005	Alliance of a New Citizen (ANC)	19	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39
May 2005	Jun 2005	SDKU	40	5	
May 2005	Jun 2005	SMK	27	9	
May 2005	Jun 2005	CDM	20	5	
May 2005	Jun 2005	ANC	13	4	
Jun 2005	Aug 2005	SDKU	38	5	
Jun 2005	Aug 2005	SMK	25	9	
Jun 2005	Aug 2005	CDM	19	5	

Jun 2005	Aug 2005	ANC	19	4	
Aug 2005	Oct 2005	SDKU	40	5	
Aug 2005	Oct 2005	SMK	27	9	
Aug 2005	Oct 2005	CDM	20	5	
Aug 2005	Oct 2005	ANC	13	4	
Oct 2005	Feb 2006	SDKU	38	5	
Oct 2005	Feb 2006	SMK	25	9	
Oct 2005	Feb 2006	CDM	19	5	
Oct 2005	Feb 2006	ANC	19	4	
Feb 2006	Mar 2006	SDKU	44	5	
Feb 2006	Mar 2006	SMK	31	9	
Feb 2006	Mar 2006	ANC	19	4	
Feb 2006	Mar 2006	Independents	6	-	
Mar 2006	Jul 2006	SDKU	44	5	
Mar 2006	Jul 2006	SMK	31	9	
Mar 2006	Jul 2006	ANC	13	4	
Mar 2006	Jul 2006	Independents	13	-	
Jul 2006	Nov 2008	Direction/ Social Democracy	69	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39, PES
Jul 2006	Nov 2008	SNS	19	7	
Jul 2006	Nov 2008	HZDS	13	7	
Croatia					
Jan 1990	Dec 1990	HDZ Croatian Democratic Union	36	5	Appendix 4
Dec 1990	Dec 1991	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1991	Dec 1992	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1992	Dec 1993	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1993	Dec 1994	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1994	Dec 1995	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	HDZ	100	7	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	HNS Croatian People's Party	23	4	Appendix 4
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	Coalition SDP/CSLP	69	-	Armingeon/Careja 2007: 11, Klingemann et al. 2006: 212f. Siaroff 2000: 203, Pickering/ Baskin 2008: 530f., Bugajski 2002: 604, PES
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	HDZ	7	7	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	HNS	25	4	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	Coalition SDP/CSLP	74	-	
Dec 2001	Dec 2002	HNS	25	4	

Dec 2001	Dec 2002	Coalition SDP/CSLP	74	-	
Dec 2002	Dec 2003	HNS	25	4	
Dec 2002	Dec 2003	Coalition SDP/CSLP	73	-	
Dec 2002	Dec 2003	HDZ	2	7	
Dec 2003	Dec 2004	HDZ	98	7	
Dec 2003	Dec 2004	HSLS Croatian Social Liberal Party – Democratic Centre	2	4	Appendix 4
Dec 2004	Dec 2005	HDZ	98	5	Appendix 4
Dec 2004	Dec 2005	HSLS	2	4	Appendix 4
Dec 2005	Feb 2006	HDZ - Democratic Centre	95	5	
		DC	5	4	
Mar 2006	Dec 2007	HDZ	95	5	
		DC	5	4	
Jan 2007	Dec 2008	HDZ	95	5	
		DC	5	4	EPP

		Estonia			
Oct 1992	Nov 1994	Homeland- Isamaa	100	6	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27
Nov 1994	Apr 1995	Min. not classifiable	100	-	
Apr 1995	Nov 1995	KMU-K Estonian Coalition Party	40	8	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27 (KMU only) Klingemann et al. 2006: 216 (right-wing)
Apr 1995	Nov 1995	KMU-MU Estonian Rural Union	13	8	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27 (KMU only) Klingemann et al. 2006: 216
Apr 1995	Nov 1995	K	40	-	
Apr 1995	Nov 1995	KMU	7	8	
Nov 1995	Dec 1996	KMU-K	40	8	
Nov 1995	Dec 1996	KMU-MU	20	8	
Nov 1995	Dec 1996	R Estonian Reform Party	20	4	Appendix 4
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	KMU	100	8	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	KMU	100	8	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	IL Isamaaliit-Pro Patria Union	26	6	Appendix 4
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	M Moderates	25	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 27
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	KMU	23	8	
Dec 1999	Jan 2002	RE Reform Party	33	4	
Dec 1999	Jan 2002	IL Isamaaliit-Pro Patria Union	33	6	
Dec 1999	Jan 2002	M Moderates	33	3	
Jan 2002	Apr 2003	RE	43	4	
Jan 2002	Apr 2003	KeE Centre Party	57	4	Appendix 4

Apr 2003	Apr 2005	RE	36	4	
Apr 2003	Apr 2005	RP Res Publica	36	6	Appendix 4
Apr 2003	Apr 2005	RL Peoples Union	29	6	Appendix 4
Apr 2005	Apr 2007	RE	36	4	
Apr 2005	Apr 2007	KeE	36	4	
Apr 2005	Apr 2007	RL Peoples Union	29	6	
Apr 2007	Nov 2008	RE	43	4	
Apr 2007	Nov 2008	IRL Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	36	6	Appendix 4
Apr 2007	Nov 2008	SDE SDP	21	3	Appendix 4
		Latvia			
Aug 1993	Sep 1994	LC Latvia's Way	87	4	
Aug 1993	Sep 1994	LZS Latvian Farmers' Union	13	8	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33, Klingemann et al. 2006: 221
Sep 1994	Dec 1995	LC Latvia's Way	57	4	
Sep 1994	Dec 1995	TPA	14	-	
Sep 1994	Dec 1995	Independents	29	-	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	LC Latvia's Way	29	4	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	LZS	2	8	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	DPS Democratic Centre Party	31	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33 Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	TB For Homeland (Fatherland) and Freedom	24	7	Appendix 4
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	LVP Latvia's Unity Party	14	2	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33 Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	LC Latvia's Way	30	4	
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	TB/ LNNK For Fatherland and Freedom	10	7	Armingeon et al. 2012: 34 Klingemann et al. 2006: 221
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	DPS	32	3	
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	TB	15	7	
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	LVP	2	2	
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	United list of Latvia's Farmers' Union and Latvian Christian Democratic Union and Latgale Democratic Party (FCL)	12	6	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33 Klingemann et al. 2006: 221
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	LC Latvia's Way	39	4	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	TB/ LNNK	32	7	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	DPS	10	3	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	FCL	16	6	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	JP New Party	2	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33

					Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	TP People's Party	18	7	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33 Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	LC Latvia's Way	35	4	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	TB/ LNNK	29	7	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	JP	8	3	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	LSDA Latvian Social-Democratic Alliance	10	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33 Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	TP	36	7	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	LC Latvia's Way	31	4	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	TB/ LNNK	25	7	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	JP	8	3	
Dec 2000	Aug 2002	TP	33	7	
Dec 2000	Aug 2002	LC Latvia's Way	27	4	
Dec 2000	Aug 2002	TB/ LNNK	27	7	
Dec 2000	Aug 2002	JP	13	3	
Aug 2002	Nov 2002	TP	29	7	
Aug 2002	Nov 2002	LC Latvia's Way	29	4	
Aug 2002	Nov 2002	TB/ LNNK	29	7	
Aug 2002	Nov 2002	JP	14	3	
Nov 2002	Mar 2004	TB/ LNNK	11	7	
Nov 2002	Mar 2004	LPP First Party of Latvia	22	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33 Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
Nov 2002	Mar 2004	ZZS Greens and Farmers	17	-	Armingeon et al. 2012: 34 Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
Nov 2002	Mar 2004	JL New Era	50	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33 Klingemann et al. 2006: 220
Mar 2004	Dec 2004	TP	28	7	
Mar 2004	Dec 2004	LPP	39	5	
Mar 2004	Dec 2004	ZZS	22	-	
Mar 2004	Dec 2004	Independents	11	-	
Dec 2004	Apr 2006	TP	33	7	
Dec 2004	Apr 2006	LPP	17	5	
Dec 2004	Apr 2006	ZZS	17	-	
Dec 2004	Apr 2006	JL	33	4	
Apr 2006	Nov 2006	TP	44	7	
Apr 2006	Nov 2006	LC Latvia's Way	6	4	
Apr 2006	Nov 2006	LPP	22	5	
Apr 2006	Nov 2006	ZZS	28	-	
Nov 2006	Sep 2007	TP	33	7	
Nov 2006	Sep 2007	TB/ LNNK	17	7	
Nov 2006	Sep 2007	ZZS	28	-	
Nov 2006	Sep 2007	LPP/LC First Party of Latvia and Union Latvia's way	22	-	Armingeon et al. 2012: 33
Sep 2007	Dec 2007	TP	35	7	

Sep 2007	Dec 2007	TB/ LNNK	12	7	
Sep 2007	Dec 2007	ZZS	29	-	
Sep 2007	Dec 2007	LPP/LC	24	-	
Dec 2007	Apr 2009	TP	37	7	
Dec 2007	Apr 2009	TB/ LNNK	16	7	
Dec 2007	Apr 2009	LPP/LC	21	-	
Dec 2007	Apr 2009	ZZS	26	-	
Lithuania					
Dec 1992	Mar 1993	DLP	100	-	
Mar 1993	Feb 1996	DLP	100	-	
Feb 1996	Dec 1997	Homeland Union - Lithuanian Conservatives (HU-LC)	71	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 34 Klingemann et al. 2006: 222 Siaroff 2000: 334 EPP
Feb 1996	Dec 1997	Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LCDP)	16	5	Armingeon et al. 2012: 34 Klingemann et al. 2006: 222 Siaroff 2000: 334f.
Feb 1996	Dec 1997	Lithuanian Centre Union (LCU)	13	4	Appendix 4
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	HU-LC	71	4	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	LCDP	16	5	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	LCU	13	4	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	HU-LC	71	4	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	LCDP	16	5	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	LCU	13	4	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	HU-LC	71	4	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	LCDP	16	5	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	LCU	13	4	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	HU-LC	58	4	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	LCDP	13	5	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	LCU	11	4	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU)	10	4	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	New Union (Social Liberals) (NU)	8	-	Appendix 4
Dec 2001	May 2001	LLU	50	4	
Dec 2001	May 2001	NU	43	4	
Dec 2001	May 2001	Independent	7		
May 2001	Feb 2003	NU	43	4	
May 2001	Feb 2003	Social Democratic Party (SDP)	29	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 34, Klingemann et al. 2006: 221, Siaroff 2000: 335, NSD, PSD
May 2001	Feb 2003	Independent	28		
Feb 2003	Apr 2004	NU	36	4	
Feb 2003	Apr 2004	SDP	36	3	

Feb 2003	Apr 2004	Independent	29		
Apr 2004	Nov 2004	NU	36	4	
Apr 2004	Nov 2004	SDP	43	3	
Apr 2004	Nov 2004	Independent	22		
Nov 2004	Mar 2006	Labour Party	36	-	Armingeon et al. 2012: 34, NSD
Nov 2004	Mar 2006	NU	14	4	
Nov 2004	Mar 2006	SDP	43	3	
Nov 2004	Mar 2006	Union of Peasants' and New Democracy Parties (UPND)	7	-	
Mar 2006	Jun 2006	Labour Party	36	3	
Mar 2006	Jun 2006	NU	7	4	
Mar 2006	Jun 2006	SDP	50	3	
Mar 2006	Jun 2006	UPND	7	-	
Jun 2006	Jun 2007	SDP	50	3	
Jun 2006	Jun 2007	Civic Democracy Party	14	-	
Jun 2006	Jun 2007	Liberal and Centre Union (LCU)	14	4	Appendix 4
Jun 2006	Jun 2007	Lithuanian Peasants People Union (LPPU)	21	-	
Jun 2007	Jan 2008	SDP	57	3	
Jun 2007	Jan 2008	Civic Democracy Party	7	-	
Jun 2007	Jan 2008	LCU	14	4	
Jun 2007	Jan 2008	LPPU	21	-	
Jan 2008	May 2008	NU	7	4	
Jan 2008	May 2008	SDP	50	3	
Jan 2008	May 2008	Civic Democracy Party	7	-	
Jan 2008	May 2008	LCU	14	4	
Jan 2008	May 2008	LPPU	21	-	
May 2008	Dec 2008	NU	14	4	
May 2008	Dec 2008	SDP	43	3	
May 2008	Dec 2008	Civic Democracy Party	7	-	
May 2008	Dec 2008	LCU	14	4	
May 2008	Dec 2008	LPPU	21	-	
Dec 2008	Feb 2009	LCU	14	4	
Dec 2008	Feb 2009	Homeland Union/Lithuanian Christian Democrats (HU-LCD)	50	5	Appendix 4
Dec 2008	Feb 2009	Nation's Resurrection Party (NRP)	14	-	
Dec 2008	Feb 2009	Liberal Movement of Lithuanian Republic	21	4	Appendix 4
Feb 2009	Oct 2009	LCU	13	4	
Feb 2009	Oct 2009	HU-LCD	53	5	

Feb 2009	Oct 2009	NRP	13	-	
Feb 2009	Oct 2009	Liberal Movement of Lithuanian Republic	20	4	

		Bulgaria			
Nov 1991	Dec 1992	SDS Union of Democratic Forces	100	5	Appendix 4
Dec 1992	Oct 1994	Independents	100	-	
Oct 1994	Jan 1995	Minister not classifiab.	100	-	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	Independents	41	-	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party	47	3	Appendix 4
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	BSP/ AS-BZNS	6	-	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	BSP- EPC	6	-	
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	SDS	62	5	
		BSP	15	2	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	SDS	100	5	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	SDS	100	5	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	SDS	100	5	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	SDS	56	5	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	BSP	11	2	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	National Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV)	28	-	Appendix 4
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	Coalition Movement for Rights and Freedoms (CMRF)	5	9	Appendix 4
Dec 2001	Dec 2002	BSP	25	2	
Dec 2001	Dec 2002	NDSV	64	4	
Dec 2001	Dec 2002	CMRF	11	9	
Dec 2002	Dec 2003	BSP	25	2	
Dec 2002	Dec 2003	NDSV	64	4	
Dec 2002	Dec 2003	CMRF	11	9	
Dec 2003	Dec 2004	BSP	25	2	
Dec 2003	Dec 2004	NDSV	64	4	
Dec 2003	Dec 2004	CMRF	11	9	
Dec 2004	Dec 2005	BSP	34	2	
Dec 2004	Dec 2005	NDSV	51	4	
Dec 2004	Dec 2005	CMRF	15	9	
Dec 2005	Mar 2008	Independents	6	-	
Dec 2005	Mar 2008	NDSV	28	4	
Dec 2005	Mar 2008	DPS Movement for Rights and Freedoms	17	9	
Dec 2005	Mar 2008	KzB Coalition for Bulgaria	50	3	Appendix 4
Mar 2008	Mar 2009	Independents	5	-	

Mar 2008	Mar 2009	NDSV	26	-	
Mar 2008	Mar 2009	DPS	16	9	
Mar 2008	Mar 2009	KzB	53	3	
Romania					
Jun 1990	Oct 1991	FSN	100	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38
Oct 1991	Nov 1992	FSN	72	3	
Oct 1991	Nov 1992	NLP	17	4	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38
Oct 1991	Nov 1992	REM	6	1	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38
Oct 1991	Nov 1992	ADP	6	8	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38
Nov 1992	Mar 1994	FSND	95	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38, Stier 2009
Nov 1992	Mar 1994	Independents	5	-	
Mar 1994	Oct 1995	SDPR	80	-	
Mar 1994	Oct 1995	Party of National Unity of Romanians (PNU)	10	7	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38
Mar 1994	Oct 1995	Independents	10	-	
Oct 1995	Dec 1995	SDPR	93	-	
Oct 1995	Dec 1995	PNU	7	7	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	Democratic Party	2	3	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38 EPP
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania (UDMR)	1	9	Appendix 4
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	PNU	14	7	
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	SDP (PSD)	81	3	Appendix 4
Dec 1995	Dec 1996	Romanian Democratic Convention (RDC)	3	10	Armingeon et al. 2012: 39
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	Democratic Party	27	3	
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	UDMR	13	9	
Dec 1996	Dec 1997	RDC	61	-	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	Democratic Party	2	3	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	UDMR	17	9	
Dec 1997	Dec 1998	UDMR	82	9	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	Democratic Party	1	3	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	UDMR	18	9	
Dec 1998	Dec 1999	UDMR	82	9	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	Democratic Party	26	3	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	UDMR	13	9	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	SDP	1	3	
Dec 1999	Dec 2000	UDMR	60	9	
Dec 2000	Dec 2001	SDP	100	3	
Dec 2001	Dec 2002	SDP	100	3	
Dec 2002	Dec 2003	SDP	100	3	
Dec 2003	Dec 2004	SDP	99	3	
Dec 2003	Dec 2004	UDMR	1	9	

Dec 2004	Oct 2006	National Liberal Party (PNL)	40	4	
Dec 2004	Oct 2006	Democratic Party	32	3	
Dec 2004	Oct 2006	UDMR	16	9	
Dec 2004	Oct 2006	Humanist Party of Romania (HPR)	12	6	Armingeon et al. 2012: 38
Oct 2006	Dec 2006	PNL	36	4	
Oct 2006	Dec 2006	Democratic Party	36	3	
Oct 2006	Dec 2006	UDMR	16	9	
Oct 2006	Dec 2006	HPR	12	6	
Dec 2006	Apr 2007	PNL	40	4	
Dec 2006	Apr 2007	Democratic Party	36	3	
Dec 2006	Apr 2007	UDMR	16	9	
Dec 2006	Apr 2007	HPR	8	6	
Apr 2007	Dec 2008	PNL	78	4	
Apr 2007	Dec 2008	UDMR	22	9	

			Switzerland		
Dec 1947	Dec 1948	BGB-SVP Peoples Party	11	8	Armingeon et al. 2011: 33, Budge et al. 2001: 212, Siaroff 2000: 446f.
Dec 1947	Dec 1948	CVP-PDC Christian Democrats	33	5	Appendix 4
Dec 1947	Dec 1948	FDP-PRD Radical Democrats	33	4	Appendix 4
Dec 1947	Dec 1948	SPS-PSS Social Democrats	22	3	Appendix 4
Dec 1948	Dec 1949	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1948	Dec 1949	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1948	Dec 1949	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1948	Dec 1949	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1949	Dec 1950	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1949	Dec 1950	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1949	Dec 1950	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1949	Dec 1950	SPS-PSS	11	3	
Dec 1950	Dec 1951	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1950	Dec 1951	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1950	Dec 1951	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1950	Dec 1951	SPS-PSS	11	3	
Dec 1951	Dec 1952	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1951	Dec 1952	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1951	Dec 1952	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1951	Dec 1952	SPS-PSS	11	3	
Dec 1952	Dec 1953	BGB-SVP	10	8	
Dec 1952	Dec 1953	CVP-PDC	30	5	

Dec 1952	Dec 1953	FDP-PRD	40	4	
Dec 1952	Dec 1953	SPS-PSS	10	3	
Dec 1953	Dec 1954	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1953	Dec 1954	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1953	Dec 1954	FDP-PRD	56	4	
Dec 1954	Dec 1955	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1954	Dec 1955	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1954	Dec 1955	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1955	Dec 1956	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1955	Dec 1956	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1955	Dec 1956	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1956	Dec 1957	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1956	Dec 1957	CVP-PDC	44	5	
Dec 1956	Dec 1957	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1957	Dec 1958	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1957	Dec 1958	CVP-PDC	44	5	
Dec 1957	Dec 1958	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1958	Dec 1959	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1958	Dec 1959	CVP-PDC	44	5	
Dec 1958	Dec 1959	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1959	Dec 1960	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1959	Dec 1960	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1959	Dec 1960	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1959	Dec 1960	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1960	Dec 1961	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1960	Dec 1961	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1960	Dec 1961	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1960	Dec 1961	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1961	Dec 1962	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1961	Dec 1962	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1961	Dec 1962	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1961	Dec 1962	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1962	Dec 1963	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1962	Dec 1963	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1962	Dec 1963	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1962	Dec 1963	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1963	Dec 1964	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1963	Dec 1964	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1963	Dec 1964	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1963	Dec 1964	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1964	Dec 1965	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1964	Dec 1965	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1964	Dec 1965	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1964	Dec 1965	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1965	Dec 1966	BGB-SVP	11	8	

Dec 1965	Dec 1966	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1965	Dec 1966	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1965	Dec 1966	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1966	Dec 1967	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1966	Dec 1967	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1966	Dec 1967	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1966	Dec 1967	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1967	Dec 1968	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1967	Dec 1968	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1967	Dec 1968	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1967	Dec 1968	SPS-PSS	33	3l	
Dec 1968	Feb 1970	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1968	Feb 1970	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1968	Feb 1970	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1968	Feb 1970	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Feb 1970	Dec 1970	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Feb 1970	Dec 1970	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Feb 1970	Dec 1970	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Feb 1970	Dec 1970	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1970	Dec 1971	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1970	Dec 1971	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1970	Dec 1971	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1970	Dec 1971	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1971	Dec 1972	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1971	Dec 1972	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1971	Dec 1972	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1971	Dec 1972	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1972	Dec 1973	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1972	Dec 1973	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1972	Dec 1973	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1972	Dec 1973	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1973	Dec 1974	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1973	Dec 1974	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1973	Dec 1974	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1973	Dec 1974	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1974	Dec 1975	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1974	Dec 1975	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1974	Dec 1975	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1974	Dec 1975	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1975	Dec 1976	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1975	Dec 1976	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1975	Dec 1976	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1975	Dec 1976	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1976	Dec 1977	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1976	Dec 1977	CVP-PDC	33	5	

Dec 1976	Dec 1977	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1976	Dec 1977	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1977	Dec 1978	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1977	Dec 1978	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1977	Dec 1978	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1977	Dec 1978	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1978	Dec 1979	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1978	Dec 1979	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1978	Dec 1979	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1978	Dec 1979	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1979	Dec 1980	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1979	Dec 1980	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1979	Dec 1980	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1979	Dec 1980	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1980	Dec 1981	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1980	Dec 1981	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1980	Dec 1981	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1980	Dec 1981	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1981	Dec 1982	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1981	Dec 1982	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1981	Dec 1982	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1981	Dec 1982	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1982	Dec 1983	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1982	Dec 1983	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1982	Dec 1983	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1982	Dec 1983	SPS-PSS	44	3	
Dec 1983	Dec 1984	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1983	Dec 1984	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1983	Dec 1984	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1983	Dec 1984	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1984	Dec 1985	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1984	Dec 1985	CVP-PDC	44	5	
Dec 1984	Dec 1985	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1984	Dec 1985	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1985	Dec 1986	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1985	Dec 1986	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1985	Dec 1986	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1985	Dec 1986	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1986	Dec 1987	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1986	Dec 1987	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1986	Dec 1987	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1986	Dec 1987	SPS-PSS	44	3	
Dec 1987	Dec 1988	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1987	Dec 1988	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1987	Dec 1988	FDP-PRD	33	4	

Dec 1987	Dec 1988	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1988	Dec 1989	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1988	Dec 1989	SWI: CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1988	Dec 1989	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1988	Dec 1989	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1989	Dec 1990	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1989	Dec 1990	CVP-PDC	44	5	
Dec 1989	Dec 1990	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1989	Dec 1990	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1990	Dec 1991	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1990	Dec 1991	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1990	Dec 1991	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1990	Dec 1991	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1991	Dec 1992	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1991	Dec 1992	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1991	Dec 1992	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1991	Dec 1992	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1992	Dec 1993	BGB-SVP	22	8	
Dec 1992	Dec 1993	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1992	Dec 1993	FDP-PRD	22	4	
Dec 1992	Dec 1993	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1993	Dec 1994	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1993	Dec 1994	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1993	Dec 1994	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1993	Dec 1994	SPS-PSS	33	3	
Dec 1994	Dec 1995	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1994	Dec 1995	CVP-PDC	22	5	
Dec 1994	Dec 1995	FDP-PRD	44	4	
Dec 1994	Dec 1995	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1995	Dec 1999	BGB-SVP	11	8	
Dec 1995	Dec 1999	CVP-PDC	33	5	
Dec 1995	Dec 1999	FDP-PRD	33	4	
Dec 1995	Dec 1999	SPS-PSS	22	3	
Dec 1999	Dec 2003	BGB-SVP	14	8	
Dec 1999	Dec 2003	CVP-PDC	29	5	
Dec 1999	Dec 2003	FDP-PRD	29	4	
Dec 1999	Dec 2003	SPS-PSS	29	3	
Dec 2003	Dec 2007	BGB-SVP	29	8	
Dec 2003	Dec 2007	CVP-PDC	14	5	
Dec 2003	Dec 2007	FDP-PRD	29	4	
Dec 2003	Dec 2007	SPS-PSS	29	3	
Dec 2007	Jun 2008	BGB-SVP	29	8	
Dec 2007	Jun 2008	CVP-PDC	14	5	
Dec 2007	Jun 2008	FDP-PRD	29	4	
Dec 2007	Jun 2008	SPS-PSS	29	3	

Jun 2008	Dec 2008	CVP-PDC	14	5	
Jun 2008	Dec 2008	FDP-PRD	29	4	
Jun 2008	Dec 2008	SPS-PSS	29	3	
Jun 2008	Dec 2008	BDP Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland	29	4	„Liberal former SVP members" Swissinfo.ch
Dec 2008	Apr 2009	BGB-SVP	14	8	
Dec 2008	Apr 2009	CVP-PDC	14	5	
Dec 2008	Apr 2009	FDP-PRD	29	4	
Dec 2008	Apr 2009	SPS-PSS	29	3	
Dec 2008	Apr 2009	BDP	14	4	

Netherlands

Jul 1946	Aug 1948	KVP Catholic Peoples Party	35	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 31
Jul 1946	Aug 1948	Independents	29	-	
Jul 1946	Aug 1948	PvdA Labour Party	35	3	Appendix 4
Aug 1948	Mar 1951	CHU Christian Historical Union	6	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 31
Aug 1948	Mar 1951	KVP	39	5	
Aug 1948	Mar 1951	Independents	11	-	
Aug 1948	Mar 1951	PvdA	39	3	
Aug 1948	Mar 1951	VVD	6	4	Appendix 4
Mar 1951	Sep 1952	CHU	12	5	
Mar 1951	Sep 1952	KVP	35	5	
Mar 1951	Sep 1952	Independent	6	-	
Mar 1951	Sep 1952	PvdA	41	3	
Mar 1951	Sep 1952	VVD	6	4	
Sep 1952	Oct 1956	ARP Anti - Revolutionary Party	10	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 31
Sep 1952	Oct 1956	CHU	10	5	
Sep 1952	Oct 1956	KVP	40	5	
Sep 1952	Oct 1956	Independents	5	-	
Sep 1952	Oct 1956	PvdA	35	3	
Oct 1956	Dec 1958	ARP	11	5	
Oct 1956	Dec 1958	CHU	11	5	
Oct 1956	Dec 1958	KVP	39	5	
Oct 1956	Dec 1958	PvdA	39	3	
Dec 1958	May 1959	ARP	19	5	
Dec 1958	May 1959	CHU	19	5	
Dec 1958	May 1959	KVP	63	5	
May 1959	Jul 1963	ARP	12	5	
May 1959	Jul 1963	CHU	12	5	
May 1959	Jul 1963	KVP	53	5	
May 1959	Jul 1963	VVD Liberal Party	24	4	

Jul 1963	Apr 1965	ARP	18	5	
Jul 1963	Apr 1965	CHU	12	5	
Jul 1963	Apr 1965	KVP	47	5	
Jul 1963	Apr 1965	VVD	24	4	
Apr 1965	Nov 1966	ARP	25	5	
Apr 1965	Nov 1966	KVP	40	5	
Apr 1965	Nov 1966	PvdA	35	3	
Nov 1966	Apr 1967	ARP	37	5	
Nov 1966	Apr 1967	KVP	63	5	
Apr 1967	Jul 1971	ARP	32	5	
Apr 1967	Jul 1971	CHU	11	5	
Apr 1967	Jul 1971	KVP	37	5	
Apr 1967	Jul 1971	VVD	21	4	
Jul 1971	Aug 1972	ARP	20	5	
Jul 1971	Aug 1972	CHU	10	5	
Jul 1971	Aug 1972	DS 70 Democratic Socialists 70	10	3	Armingeon et al. 2011: 31
Jul 1971	Aug 1972	KVP	50	5	
Jul 1971	Aug 1972	VVD	20	4	
Aug 1972	May 1973	ARP	20	5	
Aug 1972	May 1973	CHU	10	5	
Aug 1972	May 1973	KVP	50	5	
Aug 1972	May 1973	VVD	20	4	
May 1973	Dec 1977	ARP	19	5	
May 1973	Dec 1977	D 66 Democrats 66	5	4	Appendix 4
May 1973	Dec 1977	KVP	24	5	
May 1973	Dec 1977	PPR Radical Political Party	14	5	Armingeon et al. 2011: 31
May 1973	Dec 1977	PvdA	38	3	
Dec 1977	Sep 1981	CDA Christian Democratic Appeal	65	5	Appendix 4
Dec 1977	Sep 1981	VVD	35	4	
Sep 1981	May 1982	CDA	43	5	
Sep 1981	May 1982	D 66	14	4	
Sep 1981	May 1982	PvdA	43	3	
May 1982	Nov 82	CDA	80	5	
May 1982	Nov 82	D 66	20	4	
May 1982	Jul 1986	CDA	55	5	
May 1982	Jul 1986	VVD	45	4	
Jul 1986	Nov 1989	CDA	60	5	
Jul 1986	Nov 1989	VVD	40	4	
Nov 1989	Aug 1994	CDA	40	5	
Nov 1989	Aug 1994	PvdA	60	3	
Aug 1994	May 1998	D 66	24	4	
Aug 1994	May 1998	PvdA	38	3	

Aug 1994	May 1998	VVD	38	4	
May 1998	Sep 1999	D 66	26	4	
May 1998	Sep 1999	PvdA	39	3	
May 1998	Sep 1999	VVD	35	4	
Sep 1999	Jul 2002	D 66	21	4	
Sep 1999	Jul 2002	PvdA	36	3	
Sep 1999	Jul 2002	VVD	43	4	
Jul 2002	Oct 2002	CDA	43	5	
Jul 2002	Oct 2002	LPF List Pim Fortuyn	29	7	Appendix 4
Jul 2002	Oct 2002	VVD	29	4	
Oct 2002	Dec 2002	CDA	50	5	
Oct 2002	Dec 2002	LPF	17	7	
Oct 2002	Dec 2002	VVD	33	4	
Dec 2002	May 2003	CDA	55	5	
Dec 2002	May 2003	LPF	18	7	
Dec 2002	May 2003	VVD	27	4	
May 2003	Jul 2006	D 66	13	4	
May 2003	Jul 2006	CDA	50	5	
May 2003	Jul 2006	VVD	38	4	
Jul 2006	Feb 2007	CDA	56	5	
Jul 2006	Feb 2007	VVD	44	4	
Feb 2007	Dec 2008	CDA	50	5	
Feb 2007	Dec 2008	PvdA	38	3	
Feb 2007	Dec 2008	CU ChristenUnie	13	5	Appendix 4
		Israel			
May 1948	Mar 1949	Provisorische Regierung	100	-	
Mar 1949	Oct 1950	Mapai	69	5	Bard/ Schwartz 2005: 64
Mar 1949	Oct 1950	URF United Religious Front	8	5	Knesset Website
Mar 1949	Oct 1950	Progressive Party	8	4	Knesset Website
Mar 1949	Oct 1950	URP	15	-	
Oct 1950	Mar 1951	Mapai	60	5	
Oct 1950	Mar 1951	URF	13	5	
Oct 1950	Mar 1951	Progressive Party	7	4	
Oct 1950	Mar 1951	URP	13	-	
Oct 1950	Mar 1951	Independents	7	-	
Mar 1951	Oct 1951	Mapai	60	5	
Mar 1951	Oct 1951	URF	13	5	
Mar 1951	Oct 1951	Progressive Party	7	4	
Mar 1951	Oct 1951	URP	13	-	
Mar 1951	Oct 1951	Independents	7	-	

Oct 1951	Dec 1952	Mapai	69	5	
Oct 1951	Dec 1952	URF	13	5	
Oct 1951	Dec 1952	URP	19	-	
Dec 1952	Jan 1954	Mapai	56	5	
Dec 1952	Jan 1954	Progressive Party	6	4	
Dec 1952	Jan 1954	GZ General Zionists	25	4	Knesset Website
Dec 1952	Jan 1954	HaMizrachi	13	5	Knesset Website
Jan 1954	Jun 1955	Mapai	59	5	
Jan 1954	Jun 1955	Progressive Party	6	4	
Jan 1954	Jun 1955	GZ General Zionists	24	4	
Jan 1954	Jun 1955	HaMizrachi	12	5	
Jun 1955	Nov 1955	Mapai	73	5	
Jun 1955	Nov 1955	Progressive Party	7	4	
Jun 1955	Nov 1955	HaMizrachi	20	5	
Nov 1955	Jan 1958	Mapai	56	5	
Nov 1955	Jan 1958	Progressive Party	6	4	
Nov 1955	Jan 1958	AA	13	-	
Nov 1955	Jan 1958	Mapam	13	3	Jelinek 2004: 155
Nov 1955	Jan 1958	NRP National Religious Party	13	5	Mazie 2006: 25
Jan 1958	Jul 1958	Mapai	56	5	
Jan 1958	Jul 1958	Progressive Party	6	4	
Jan 1958	Jul 1958	AA	13	-	
Jan 1958	Jul 1958	Mapam	13	3	
Jan 1958	Jul 1958	NRP	13	5	
Jul 1958	Jul 1959	Mapai	64	5	
Jul 1958	Jul 1959	Progressive Party	7	4	
Jul 1958	Jul 1959	AA	14	-	
Jul 1958	Jul 1959	Mapam	14	3	
Jul 1959	Dec 1959	Mapai	64	5	
Jul 1959	Dec 1959	Progressive Party	7	4	
Jul 1959	Dec 1959	AA	14	-	
Jul 1959	Dec 1959	Mapam	14	3	
Dec 1959	Jan 1961	Mapai	56	5	
Dec 1959	Jan 1961	Progressive Party	6	4	
Dec 1959	Jan 1961	AA	6	-	
Dec 1959	Jan 1961	Mapam	13	3	
Dec 1959	Jan 1961	NRP	13	5	
Dec 1959	Jan 1961	Independents	6	-	
Jan 1961	Nov 1961	Mapai	56	5	
Jan 1961	Nov 1961	Progressive Party	6	4	
Jan 1961	Nov 1961	AA	6	-	
Jan 1961	Nov 1961	Mapam	13	3	
Jan 1961	Nov 1961	NRP	13	5	
Jan 1961	Nov 1961	Independents	6	-	

Nov 1961	Jun 1963	Mapai	65	5	
Nov 1961	Jun 1963	AA	12	-	
Nov 1961	Jun 1963	NRP	24	5	
Jun 1963	Dec 1964	Mapai	60	5	
Jun 1963	Dec 1964	AA	13	-	
Jun 1963	Dec 1964	NRP	27	5	
Dec 1964	Jan 1966	Mapai	67	5	
Dec 1964	Jan 1966	AA	11	-	
Dec 1964	Jan 1966	NRP	22	5	
Jan 1966	Jun 1967	Mapai	56	5	
Jan 1966	Jun 1967	AA	11	-	
Jan 1966	Jun 1967	Mapam	11	3	
Jan 1966	Jun 1967	NRP	17	5	
Jan 1966	Jun 1967	Independent Liberals	6	4	Knesset Website
Jun 1967	Mar 1969	Mapai	47	5	
Jun 1967	Mar 1969	AA	11	-	
Jun 1967	Mar 1969	Mapam	11	3	
Jun 1967	Mar 1969	NRP	16	5	
Jun 1967	Mar 1969	Independent Liberals	5	4	
Jun 1967	Mar 1969	Rafi	5	-	
Jun 1967	Mar 1969	HRUT	5	-	
Mar 1969	Dec 1969	Mapai	45	5	
Mar 1969	Dec 1969	AA	10	-	
Mar 1969	Dec 1969	Mapam	10	3	
Mar 1969	Dec 1969	NRP	15	5	
Mar 1969	Dec 1969	Independent Liberals	5	4	
Mar 1969	Dec 1969	Rafi	10	-	
Mar 1969	Dec 1969	HRUT	5	-	
Dec 1969	Aug 1970	Mapai	27	5	
Dec 1969	Aug 1970	AA	9	-	
Dec 1969	Aug 1970	Mapam	9	3	
Dec 1969	Aug 1970	NRP	14	5	
Dec 1969	Aug 1970	Independent Liberals	5	4	
Dec 1969	Aug 1970	Rafi	14	-	
Dec 1969	Aug 1970	HRUT	14	-	
Dec 1969	Aug 1970	Liberal Party	9	4	Knesset Website
Aug 1970	Mar 1974	Mapai	38	5	
Aug 1970	Mar 1974	AA	13	-	
Aug 1970	Mar 1974	Mapam	13	3	
Aug 1970	Mar 1974	NRP	19	5	
Aug 1970	Mar 1974	Independent Liberals	6	4	
Aug 1970	Mar 1974	Rafi	13	-	
Mar 1974	Jun 1974	Mapai	62	5	
Mar 1974	Jun 1974	Mapam	10	3	
Mar 1974	Jun 1974	NRP	14	5	

Mar 1974	Jun 1974	Independent Liberals	10	4	
Mar 1974	Jun 1974	Rafi	5	-	
Jun 1974	Oct 1974	Mapai	75	5	
Jun 1974	Oct 1974	Mapam	10	3	
Jun 1974	Oct 1974	Independent Liberals	10	4	
Jun 1974	Oct 1974	CRIT	5	-	
Oct 1974	Dec 1976	Mapai	67	5	
Oct 1974	Dec 1976	Mapam	10	3	
Oct 1974	Dec 1976	NRP	14	5	
Oct 1974	Dec 1976	Independent Liberals	10	4	
Dec 1976	Jun 1977	Mapai	80	5	
Dec 1976	Jun 1977	Mapam	10	3	
Dec 1976	Jun 1977	Independent Liberals	10	4	
Jun 1977	Oct 1977	Likud/ Union	64	6	Appendix 4
Jun 1977	Oct 1977	NRP	29	5	
Jun 1977	Oct 1977	Independent	7	-	
Oct 1977	Aug 1981	Likud/ Union	56	6	
Oct 1977	Aug 1981	Hadash	17	2	Appendix 4
Oct 1977	Aug 1981	NRP	22	5	
Oct 1977	Aug 1981	Independent	6	-	
Aug 1981	Jul 1983	Likud/ Union	65	6	
Aug 1981	Jul 1983	TAMI	15	-	
Aug 1981	Jul 1983	NRP	20	5	
Jul 1983	Oct 1983	Likud/ Union	65	6	
Jul 1983	Oct 1983	TAMI	15	-	
Jul 1983	Oct 1983	NRP	20	5	
Oct 1983	Sep 1984	Likud/ Union	59	6	
Oct 1983	Sep 1984	TAMI	18	-	
Oct 1983	Sep 1984	NRP	18	5	
Oct 1983	Sep 1984	Independent	5	-	
Sep 1984	Oct 1986	Likud/ Union	39	6	
Sep 1984	Oct 1986	OMET	6	-	
Sep 1984	Oct 1986	Morasha	6	5	Knesset Website
Sep 1984	Oct 1986	Labor	39	3	Appendix 4
Sep 1984	Oct 1986	Shas/ Sephardic Torah Guardians (S/STG)	6	5	Bard/ Schwartz 2005: 67, Timm 2003: 132
Sep 1984	Oct 1986	NRP	6	5	
Oct 1986	Dec 1988	Likud/ Union	39	6	
Oct 1986	Dec 1988	OMET	6	-	
Oct 1986	Dec 1988	Morasha	6	5	
Oct 1986	Dec 1988	Labor	39	3	
Oct 1986	Dec 1988	S/STG	6	5	
Oct 1986	Dec 1988	NRP	6	5	
Dec 1988	Jun 1990	Likud/ Union	64	6	

Dec 1988	Jun 1990	Labor	36	3	
Jun 1990	Nov 1990	Likud/ Union	70	6	
Jun 1990	Nov 1990	S/STG	5	5	
Jun 1990	Nov 1990	NRP	15	5	
Jun 1990	Nov 1990	Tehiya/ Renaissance Movemen_t (T/RM)	5	5	Bard/ Schwartz 2005: 69
Jun 1990	Nov 1990	Tsomet/ Crossroads	5	6	Bard/ Schwartz 2005: 69
Nov 1990	Feb 1991	Likud/ Union	79	6	
Nov 1990	Feb 1991	S/STG	5	5	
Nov 1990	Feb 1991	NRP	11	5	
Nov 1990	Feb 1991	Tsomet/ Crossroads	5	6	
Feb 1991	Dec 1991	Likud/ Union	70	6	
Feb 1991	Dec 1991	S/STG	5	5	
Feb 1991	Dec 1991	NRP	10	5	
Feb 1991	Dec 1991	T/RM	5	5	
Feb 1991	Dec 1991	Tsomet/ Crossroads	5	6	
Feb 1991	Dec 1991	Moledet	5	6	Khanin 2001: 106, Reich/ Kieval 1993: 110
Dec 1991	Jan 1992	Likud/ Union	58	6	
Dec 1991	Jan 1992	S/STG	11	5	
Dec 1991	Jan 1992	NRP	11	5	
Dec 1991	Jan 1992	Promotion of the Zionist Idea (PotZI)	5	5	Knesset Website
Dec 1991	Jan 1992	T/RM	5	5	
Dec 1991	Jan 1992	Moledet	5	6	
Dec 1991	Jan 1992	Independents	5	-	
Jan 1992	Jul 1992	Likud/ Union	65	6	
Jan 1992	Jul 1992	S/STG	12	5	
Jan 1992	Jul 1992	NRP	12	5	
Jan 1992	Jul 1992	PotZI	6	5	
Jan 1992	Jul 1992	Independents	6	-	
Jul 1992	Dec 1992	Likud/ Union	77	6	
Jul 1992	Dec 1992	S/STG	6	5	
Jul 1992	Dec 1992	Meretz	18	3	Appendix 4
Dec 1992	Sep 1993	Likud/ Union	72	6	
Dec 1992	Sep 1993	S/STG	6	5	
Dec 1992	Sep 1993	Meretz	22	3	
Sep 1993	Nov 1995	Likud/ Union	77	6	
Sep 1993	Nov 1995	Meretz	24	3	
Nov 1995	Jun 1996	Labor	71	3	
Nov 1995	Jun 1996	Meretz	19	3	
Nov 1995	Jun 1996	Yi'ud	5	-	
Nov 1995	Jun 1996	Independents	5	-	
Jun 1996	Jul 1996	Likud/ Union	41	6	
Jun 1996	Jul 1996	S/STG	12	5	

Jun 1996	Jul 1996	NRP	12	5	
Jun 1996	Jul 1996	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	12	9	Bick 1998: 221, Bard/Schwartz 2005: 68, Timm 2003: 132
Jun 1996	Jul 1996	Tsomet	6	6	
Jun 1996	Jul 1996	Gesher	6	9	Knesset Website
Jun 1996	Jul 1996	The Third Way	6	-	
Jun 1996	Jul 1996	Independents	6	-	
Jul 1996	Aug 1996	Likud/ Union	44	6	
Jul 1996	Aug 1996	S/STG	11	5	
Jul 1996	Aug 1996	NRP	11	5	
Jul 1996	Aug 1996	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	11	9	
Jul 1996	Aug 1996	Tsomet	6	6	
Jul 1996	Aug 1996	Gesher	6	9	
Jul 1996	Aug 1996	The Third Way	6	-	
Jul 1996	Aug 1996	Independents	6	-	
Aug 1996	Jul 1997	Likud/ Union	50	6	
Aug 1996	Jul 1997	S/STG	11	5	
Aug 1996	Jul 1997	NRP	11	5	
Aug 1996	Jul 1997	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	11	9	
Aug 1996	Jul 1997	Tsomet	6	6	
Aug 1996	Jul 1997	Gesher	6	9	
Aug 1996	Jul 1997	The Third Way	6	-	
Jul 1997	Jan 1998	Likud/ Union	44	6	
Jul 1997	Jan 1998	S/STG	11	5	
Jul 1997	Jan 1998	NRP	11	5	
Jul 1997	Jan 1998	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	11	9	
Jul 1997	Jan 1998	Tsomet	6	6	
Jul 1997	Jan 1998	Gesher	6	9	
Jul 1997	Jan 1998	The Third Way	6	-	
Jul 1997	Jan 1998	Independents	6	-	
Jan 1998	Jan 1999	Likud/ Union	47	6	
Jan 1998	Jan 1999	S/STG	12	5	
Jan 1998	Jan 1999	NRP	12	5	
Jan 1998	Jan 1999	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	12	9	
Jan 1998	Jan 1999	Tsomet	6	6	
Jan 1998	Jan 1999	The Third Way	6	-	
Jan 1998	Jan 1999	Independents	6	-	
Jan 1999	Feb 1999	Likud/ Union	50	6	
Jan 1999	Feb 1999	S/STG	11	5	
Jan 1999	Feb 1999	NRP	11	5	
Jan 1999	Feb 1999	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	11	9	
Jan 1999	Feb 1999	Tsomet	6	6	
Jan 1999	Feb 1999	The Third Way	6	-	
Jan 1999	Feb 1999	Independents	6	-	
Feb 1999	Jul 1999	Likud/ Union	53	6	

Feb 1999	Jul 1999	S/STG	11	5	
Feb 1999	Jul 1999	NRP	11	5	
Feb 1999	Jul 1999	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	11	9	
Feb 1999	Jul 1999	Tsomet	5	6	
Feb 1999	Jul 1999	The Third Way	5	-	
Feb 1999	Jul 1999	Independents	5	-	
Jul 1999	Aug 1999	Labor	44	3	
Jul 1999	Aug 1999	S/STG	22	5	
Jul 1999	Aug 1999	NRP	6	5	
Jul 1999	Aug 1999	Meretz	11	3	
Jul 1999	Aug 1999	Centre Party	6	6	Bard/ Schwartz 2005: 68, Timm 2003: 132
Jul 1999	Aug 1999	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	6	9	
Jul 1999	Aug 1999	Gesher	6	9	
Aug 1999	May 2000	Labor	44	3	
Aug 1999	May 2000	S/STG	17	5	
Aug 1999	May 2000	NRP	4	5	
Aug 1999	May 2000	Meretz	13	3	
Aug 1999	May 2000	Centre Party	9	6	
Aug 1999	May 2000	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	4	9	
Aug 1999	May 2000	Gesher	4	9	
Aug 1999	May 2000	Meimad	4	5	Mazie 2006: 78
May 2000	Jun 2000	Labor	46	3	
May 2000	Jun 2000	S/STG	18	5	
May 2000	Jun 2000	NRP	5	5	
May 2000	Jun 2000	Meretz	14	3	
May 2000	Jun 2000	Centre Party	5	6	
May 2000	Jun 2000	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	5	9	
May 2000	Jun 2000	Gesher	5	9	
May 2000	Jun 2000	Meimad	5	5	
Jun 2000	Jul 2000	Labor	53	3	
Jun 2000	Jul 2000	S/STG	21	5	
Jun 2000	Jul 2000	NRP	5	5	
Jun 2000	Jul 2000	Centre Party	5	6	
Jun 2000	Jul 2000	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	5	9	
Jun 2000	Jul 2000	Gesher	5	9	
Jun 2000	Jul 2000	Meimad	5	5	
Jul 2000	Aug 2000	Labor	77	3	
Jul 2000	Aug 2000	Centre Party	8	6	
Jul 2000	Aug 2000	Gesher	8	9	
Jul 2000	Aug 2000	Meimad	8	5	
Aug 2000	Feb 2001	Labor	79	3	
Aug 2000	Feb 2001	Centre Party	14	6	
Aug 2000	Feb 2001	Meimad	7	5	
Feb 2001	Aug 2001	Likud/ Union	35	6	

Feb 2001	Aug 2001	Labor	31	6	
Feb 2001	Aug 2001	S/STG	19	5	
Feb 2001	Aug 2001	National Unity-Yisrael Beiteinu (NU-YB)	8	7	Appendix 4
Feb 2001	Aug 2001	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	4	9	
Feb 2001	Aug 2001	One Nation	4	3	Reich 2008: 219, Timm 2003: 132
Aug 2001	Jan 2002	Likud/ Union	32	6	
Aug 2001	Jan 2002	Labor	29	6	
Aug 2001	Jan 2002	S/STG	18	5	
Aug 2001	Jan 2002	Centre Party	7	6	
Aug 2001	Jan 2002	NU-YB	7	7	
Aug 2001	Jan 2002	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	4	9	
Aug 2001	Jan 2002	One Nation	4	3	
Jan 2002	Feb 2002	Likud/ Union	33	6	
Jan 2002	Feb 2002	Labor	26	6	
Jan 2002	Feb 2002	S/STG	19	5	
Jan 2002	Feb 2002	Centre Party	7	6	
Jan 2002	Feb 2002	NU-YB	7	7	
Jan 2002	Feb 2002	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	4	9	
Jan 2002	Feb 2002	One Nation	4	3	
Feb 2002	Mar 2002	Likud/ Union	36	6	
Feb 2002	Mar 2002	Labor	24	6	
Feb 2002	Mar 2002	S/STG	20	5	
Feb 2002	Mar 2002	Centre Party	8	6	
Feb 2002	Mar 2002	NU-YB	8	7	
Feb 2002	Mar 2002	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	4	9	
Mar 2002	Apr 2002	Likud/ Union	39	6	
Mar 2002	Apr 2002	Labor	26	6	
Mar 2002	Apr 2002	S/STG	22	5	
Mar 2002	Apr 2002	Centre Party	9	6	
Mar 2002	Apr 2002	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	4	9	
Apr 2002	May 2002	Likud/ Union	36	6	
Apr 2002	May 2002	Labor	24	6	
Apr 2002	May 2002	S/STG	20	5	
Apr 2002	May 2002	NRP	8	5	
Apr 2002	May 2002	Centre Party	8	6	
Apr 2002	May 2002	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	4	9	
May 2002	Jun 2002	Likud/ Union	43	6	
May 2002	Jun 2002	Labor	29	6	
May 2002	Jun 2002	S/STG	5	5	
May 2002	Jun 2002	NRP	10	5	
May 2002	Jun 2002	Centre Party	10	6	
May 2002	Jun 2002	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	5	9	
Jun 2002	Nov 2002	Likud/ Union	36	6	

Jun 2002	Nov 2002	Labor	24	6	
Jun 2002	Nov 2002	S/STG	20	5	
Jun 2002	Nov 2002	NRP	8	5	
Jun 2002	Nov 2002	Centre Party	8	6	
Jun 2002	Nov 2002	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	4	9	
Nov 2002	Feb 2003	Likud/ Union	52	6	
Nov 2002	Feb 2003	S/STG	24	5	
Nov 2002	Feb 2003	NRP	10	5	
Nov 2002	Feb 2003	Centre Party	10	6	
Nov 2002	Feb 2003	Yisrael Ba' Aliya	5	9	
Feb 2003	Jun 2004	Likud/ Union	61	6	
Feb 2003	Jun 2004	Shinui	22	4	Appendix 4
Feb 2003	Jun 2004	NRP	9	5	
Feb 2003	Jun 2004	NU-YB	9	7	
Jun 2004	Oct 2004	Likud/ Union	70	6	
Jun 2004	Oct 2004	Shinui	25	4	
Jun 2004	Oct 2004	NRP	5	5	
Oct 2004	Nov 2004	Likud/ Union	77	6	
Oct 2004	Nov 2004	Shinui	24	4	
Nov 2004	Jan 2005	Likud/ Union	100	6	
Jan 2005	May 2005	Likud/ Union	64	6	
Jan 2005	May 2005	Labor	36	4	
May 2005	Aug 2005	Likud/ Union	62	6	
May 2005	Aug 2005	Labor	38	4	
Aug 2005	Nov 2005	Likud/ Union	60	6	
Aug 2005	Nov 2005	Labor	40	4	
Nov 2005	Jan 2006	Likud/ Union	100	6	
Jan 2006	May 2006	Kadima	100	4	Appendix 4
May 2006	Aug 2006	S/STG	16	5	
May 2006	Aug 2006	Kadima	48	4	
May 2006	Aug 2006	Labor-Meimad	28	5	
May 2006	Aug 2006	Pensioners	8	-	
Aug 2006	Oct 2006	S/STG	17	5	
Aug 2006	Oct 2006	Kadima	46	4	
Aug 2006	Oct 2006	Labor-Meimad	29	5	Knesset Website
Aug 2006	Oct 2006	Pensioners	8	-	
Oct 2006	Nov 2007	S/STG	16	5	
Oct 2006	Nov 2007	Kadima	44	4	
Oct 2006	Nov 2007	Labor-Meimad	28	5	
Oct 2006	Nov 2007	Pensioners	8	-	
Oct 2006	Nov 2007	NU-YB	4	7	
Nov 2007	Jan 2007	S/STG	17	5	
Nov 2007	Jan 2007	Kadima	46	4	
Nov 2007	Jan 2007	Labor-Meimad	25	5	
Nov 2007	Jan 2007	Pensioners	8	-	

Nov 2007	Jan 2007	NU-YB	4	7	
Jan 2007	Feb 2007	S/STG	16	5	
Jan 2007	Feb 2007	Kadima	44	4	
Jan 2007	Feb 2007	Labor-Meimad	28	5	
Jan 2007	Feb 2007	Pensioners	8	-	
Jan 2007	Feb 2007	NU-YB	4	7	
Feb 2007	Mar 2007	S/STG	15	5	
Feb 2007	Mar 2007	Kadima	42	4	
Feb 2007	Mar 2007	Labor-Meimad	27	5	
Feb 2007	Mar 2007	Pensioners	8	-	
Feb 2007	Mar 2007	NU-YB	4	7	
Feb 2007	Mar 2007	Independents	4	-	
Mar 2007	Jun 2007	S/STG	15	5	
Mar 2007	Jun 2007	Kadima	41	4	
Mar 2007	Jun 2007	Labor-Meimad	26	5	
Mar 2007	Jun 2007	Pensioners	7	-	
Mar 2007	Jun 2007	NU-YB	7	7	
Mar 2007	Jun 2007	Independents	4	-	
Jun 2007	Jul 2007	S/STG	15	5	
Jun 2007	Jul 2007	Kadima	38	4	
Jun 2007	Jul 2007	Labor-Meimad	27	5	
Jun 2007	Jul 2007	Pensioners	8	-	
Jun 2007	Jul 2007	NU-YB	8	7	
Jun 2007	Jul 2007	Independents	4	-	
Jul 2007	Feb 2008	S/STG	15	5	
Jul 2007	Feb 2008	Kadima	41	4	
Jul 2007	Feb 2008	Labor-Meimad	26	5	
Jul 2007	Feb 2008	Pensioners	7	-	
Jul 2007	Feb 2008	NU-YB	7	7	
Jul 2007	Feb 2008	Independents	4	-	
Feb 2008	Jul 2008	S/STG	15	5	
Feb 2008	Jul 2008	Kadima	42	4	
Feb 2008	Jul 2008	Labor-Meimad	27	5	
Feb 2008	Jul 2008	Pensioners	8	-	
Feb 2008	Jul 2008	NU-YB	4	7	
Feb 2008	Jul 2008	Independents	4	-	
Jul 2008	Aug 2008	S/STG	15	5	
Jul 2008	Aug 2008	Kadima	44	4	
Jul 2008	Aug 2008	Labor-Meimad	26	5	
Jul 2008	Aug 2008	Pensioners	7	-	
Jul 2008	Aug 2008	NU-YB	4	7	
Jul 2008	Aug 2008	Independents	4	-	

Table A5.2: Cabinet ideology post WW II – 12/1974

	socialist/ communist	social democratic	liberal	Christian democratic/ religious	conservative
BE	0.61	28.86	15.51	52.63	0.00
DE	0.00	20.13	18.43	56.25	4.63
FR	0.30	8.41	12.33	14.24	54.40
DK	0.00	56.66	30.80	0.00	10.31
FI	7.82	24.47	5.71	0.00	2.89
NO	0.00	77.73	4.55	5.22	7.74
SE	0.00	85.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
IE	9.86	0.00	71.97	15.78	0.00
GB	0.00	43.22	0.00	0.00	56.78
TR	0.00	10.40	0.00	0.00	67.44
CH	0.00	18.97	36.18	30.93	0.00
NL	0.00	20.71	10.36	64.86	0.00
IL	0.00	6.87	5.55	70.60	0.00

Table A5.3: Cabinet ideology 1975 – 12/1990

	socialist/ communist	social democratic	liberal	Christian democratic /religious	conservative
BE	0.00	18.82	26.06	50.05	0.00
DE	0.00	35.10	27.96	36.94	0.00
FR	2.37	42.38	1.28	0.61	40.82
DK	0.00	44.51	31.41	2.90	21.18
FI	6.59	37.46	2.65	0.00	8.32
NO	0.00	64.59	0.00	5.11	25.46
SE	0.00	62.50	16.58	0.00	5.90
IE	19.77	0.00	51.49	28.74	0.00
GB	0.00	27.60	0.00	0.00	72.40
CY					
ES	0.00	59.26	0.00	0.00	39.29
GR	0.17	48.49	0.00	0.00	49.30
PT	0.00	17.41	53.07	9.36	0.73
TR	0.00	7.45	0.00	0.00	79.29
CH	0.00	29.17	27.08	30.56	0.00

NL	0.00	12.99	28.97	58.04	0.00
IL	4.40	14.10	0.00	27.47	45.57

Table A5.4: Cabinet ideology 1991/2008

	socialist/ communist	social democratic	liberal	Christian democratic/ religious	conservative
BE	0.00	46.13	23.99	22.96	0.00
DE	0.00	40.05	10.40	41.25	0.00
FR	2.98	30.75	0.52	0.00	51.33
DK	0.00	36.42	43.63	0.75	19.17
FI	6.16	26.63	0.00	1.01	25.90
NO	4.19	55.69	6.57	13.67	12.06
SE	0.00	72.56	6.57	2.61	11.13
IE	11.40	0.00	80.68	6.32	0.00
GB	0.00	63.68	0.00	0.00	36.32
CY					
ES	0.00	48.46	0.00	0.00	44.60
GR	0.00	54.59	0.00	0.00	45.41
PT	0.00	45.43	36.52	2.45	0.00
TR	0.00	25.33	0.00	31.16	45.10
CZ	0.00	38.13	6.21	15.39	25.92
HU	0.00	43.49	27.19	2.28	13.01
PL	0.00	19.66	10.45	22.92	0.53
SK	14.33	9.72	7.65	24.42	0.00
SI	0.00	22.82	40.72	12.73	0.00
HR	0.00	6.58	6.31	78.69	0.00
EE	0.00	8.27	33.56	0.00	35.82
LV	1.00	7.88	32.03	7.88	1.86
LT	22.05	4.00	18.31	30.31	0.00
BG	0.00	19.93	21.15	31.54	0.00
RO	0.00	51.71	12.93	0.00	1.43
UA					
RU					
CH	0.00	27.84	30.86	24.90	0.00
NL	0.00	32.48	39.09	27.45	0.00
IL	0.00	12.01	9.36	17.50	47.85

Table A5.5: Cabinet ideology post WW II – 2008

	socialist/ communist	social democratic	liberal	Christian democratic/ religious	conservative
BE	0.28	31.21	20.61	43.53	0.00
DE	0.00	30.17	18.60	46.51	1.99
FR	1.59	23.52	6.15	6.72	49.99
DK	0.00	47.83	34.59	0.95	15.59
FI	7.05	28.35	3.35	0.28	10.63
NO	1.19	68.15	3.97	7.58	13.47
SE	0.00	75.91	6.17	0.75	4.73
IE	12.09	0.00	69.31	16.27	0.00
GB	0.00	45.01	0.00	0.00	54.99
CY					
ES	0.00	53.12	0.00	0.00	42.31
GR	0.08	51.64	0.00	0.00	47.29
PT	0.00	32.93	43.90	5.53	0.32
TR	0.00	11.40	0.00	2.95	63.74
CZ	0.00	38.13	6.21	15.39	25.92
HU	0.00	43.49	27.19	2.28	13.01
PL	0.00	19.66	10.45	22.92	0.53
SK	14.33	9.72	7.65	24.42	0.00
SI	0.00	22.82	40.72	12.73	0.00
HR	0.00	6.58	6.31	78.69	0.00
EE	0.00	8.27	33.56	0.00	35.82
LV	1.00	7.88	32.03	7.88	1.86
LT	22.05	4.00	18.31	30.31	0.00
BG	0.00	19.93	21.15	31.54	0.00
RO	0.00	51.71	12.93	0.00	1.43
UA					
RU					
CH	0.00	24.21	32.24	29.10	0.00
NL	0.00	22.14	23.42	52.23	0.00
IL	0.97	10.60	4.71	41.46	46.37

Dependent variables

Pension generosity 2000s
Mean of 16 indicators

Pension replacement rate 2008

Data from Eurostat

Unemployment benefit generosity 2000s
Mean of 11 indicators. Figure from Iversen/Stephens multiplied with 100 (since they were scaled between o and 1).

Unemployment benefit replacement rate 2008
Six family types, 3 wage levels, initail and long-term (calculated from OECD data)

Pensions´ earnings-relatedness 2000s
Several figures were combined into a single figure. Figures like the division of pension levels or pension wealth of high earners by that of low earners express earnings-relatedness with values of over 1 (1 being earnings-unrelatedness, 5 perfect earnings-relatedness when levels of 0.5-times-earners and 2.5-times earners). Replacement rate comparison have figures of less than 1, with 1 being perfect positive earnings-relatedness, 0.2 being earnings-unrelatedness and 0 being perfect negative earnerings-relatedness (implying 2.5-times-earners receiving no pensions or 0.5-times earners receiving infinite pensions.) Still here, higher figures express higher earnings-relatedness, so that inversion values (1/value) would not work. For comparability, replacement rate ratios had to be converted so that 1 is equivalent to 5 since the same replacement rate (1) implies that 2.5-times earners receive pensions 5 times as high, 0.9 is equivalent to 4,5, 0,8 to 4, 0,7 to 3,5, 0,6 to 3, 0,5 to 2,5 0.4 to 2, 0.3 (the lowest real value) to 1.5, 0.2 to 1, 0.1 to 0.5, 0.05 to 0.25, 0.01 to 0.05 and 0.0 to 0.
Values for pension level ratiosn for 0.5-times-earners and 2.0-times-earners have been multiplkied with 1.25 to stretch the scale to 5.
The four now same-scaled figures have been combined into one signle figure, missing values have been imputed via mean values of the relavant countries for analyses for the periods before 1990.

Pensions´ earnings-relatedness 2011
For the period 1991 – 2008, OECD data from 2011 had to be used, since pension policies in the early 2000s can not be explained with party strength from 1991 until 2008. Replacement rates of those with 150 percent of mean earnings have been divided by replacemant rates of thos with 50 percent of mean earnings. 1 means perfect earnings-relatedness, below 1 higher replacement rates for those with lower prior earnings, above 1 the opposite

Unemployment benefits earnings-relatedness 2008
Only one figure will be used: The relationship between unemployment benefits for those with prior earnings 150 percent of the average wage to the benefits to the benefits for those with prior earnings 67 percent of the average wage (in both cases initial benefit level and long-term benefit level combined). OECD data is from 2008, so it will be used for all four periods.