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# Perceptions of Threat and Policy Attitudes: The Case of Support for Anti-Terrorism Policies in Germany

vorgelegt von

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Far-Reaching Political Consequences of Perceived Threat

It is often said that we are living in threatening times. Regardless of what one thinks of such diagnoses, many people in Germany and other countries today feel threatened by different events, contexts or groups. The spectrum of possible threats that are repeatedly mentioned ranges from the consequences of a globalised economy to terrorism and crime. Such threats perceived by the public can have political consequences. It is therefore important to reflect on possible effects of perceived threats on the political views of citizens – especially in times where several political actors seem to offer simple solutions in their political programmes to fears that they themselves fuel.

Perceptions of threat might translate into different dimensions of political attitudes and behavior. First, perceived threats play an important role in understanding intolerant attitudes and prejudices. Research on political tolerance, in particular, has shown that perceptions of particular groups as threatening result in higher support of civil liberties restrictions directed at these groups (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1981; Sullivan et al. 1993).

Second, several studies provide empirical evidence in favour of a relationship between perceptions of threat and far-right-wing or populist (party) preferences. For instance, Elad-Strenger and Shahar (2017: 1754) point to the relationship between a host of perceived threats and the endorsement of far-right positions. Turning to the public in Germany, feelings of cultural threat are regarded as an essential predictor for right-wing populist orientations (Rippl & Seipel 2018).

Third, existing studies show that perceived threats shape citizens' policy preferences in various policy domains. For instance, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009: 44) and Schoen (2006a) emphasize that threats or related emotions are important antecedents of foreign policy attitudes, while Stevens and Vaughan-Williams (2016) provide evidence for the policy consequences of different perceptions of security threat.

A study of public opinion on anti-terrorism policies and of the role of perceived threat is important as these perceptions may also affect policy, e.g. if political actors respond to threat-driven public demands in the area of domestic policy.

While a certain relationship between public opinion (on issues of domestic security) and policies is desirable from a normative point of view (e.g. Dahl 1971), findings from different research branches suggest that such a relationship does exist: First, situations of threat might give rise to an increased support of the executive. This may give the government greater leeway in decision-making on measures against these threats but also on other government activities. Research on the often cited "rally 'round the flag effect" (Mueller 1973) in the United States has repeatedly shown that public approval of the president increases in response to certain kinds of events such as international security crises, but also in response to terrorist threats (e.g. Hetherington & Nelson 2003; Ladd 2007).

Second, a threat-driven public opinion might represent a window of opportunity for the implementation of new policies (Kingdon & Thurber 2011). According to several authors (e.g. Glaessner 2003; Lange 2006), the anti-terrorism legislation in Germany immediately following the attacks of 09/11 contained many policy aims that had been planned before these incidents. A similar observation on the passing of preexisting agendas in the United States was made by Lewis (2005: 26). There was no major public opposition against these measures. On the contrary, given the context of the attacks and perceived threat, there was no doubt about the public's willingness to accept anti-terrorism measures in many countries.

Third, empirical analyses of legislation on domestic security point to the role of (threatdriven) public opinion: Wenzelburger and Staff (2016), for example, study potential determinants of German law and order policies between 1994 and 2013. Their analyses rather support the argument that public attention to security issues drives the adoption of legislation in the domains of domestic security and criminal law. König and Finke (2013: 278) examine German anti-terrorism legislation before and after the attacks of 09/11 and find that "once fear influences the public debate and the political agenda, no chamber dares to veto counterterrorist legislation". Threats seem to impose inaction costs on political parties. To avoid these costs in times of threat, political actors adopt anti-terrorism legislation.

In recent years, threats from terrorism have become an issue again in many countries. In Germany, Islamist terrorism and the cruel acts of the right-wing terrorist NSU in particular led to a situation where, decades after the Red Army Faction (RAF), terrorist threat became salient again. Against this background, one can imagine the following scenario that challenges Germany and other democratic countries:

Threat-driven support of anti-terrorism policies might result in new anti-terrorism legislation. Then, the question arises as to whether new and more severe anti-terrorism policies will be passed again and again if perceptions of threat persist: "While liberal democracies attempt to balance civil liberties and security, a threatened public skews the trade-off toward the latter" (Stevens & Vaughan-Williams 2016: 149). Norris and Inglehart (2019: 8) even point to the perils of a politics of fear that "drives the search for collective security for the tribe even if this means sacrificing personal freedoms". It becomes particularly problematic for democracies if large sections of the population from different ideological backgrounds repeatedly accept or demand restrictions of civil liberties. Such a scenario underlines the relevance of a study on perceived threat and policy support.

### **1.2.** The Purpose of the Present Study

Several studies highlight the importance of perceived threats, in particular terrorist threats, for support of anti-terrorism policies (e.g. Huddy et al. 2005; Davis 2007). However, there is still considerable need for research on the relationship between perceptions of threat and attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies.

In particular, researchers agree that the consequences of different types of threats need to be examined much more closely. For instance, Cohrs (2013: 52) states that "different kinds of perceived threat need to be distinguished", while Sullivan and Hendricks (2009: 384) emphasize that "perceived threat may have multiple dimensions and [...] each dimension can have a distinct impact on support for civil liberties".

First, security threats other than terrorism can raise public support of domestic security policies. Of course perceived terrorist threats deserve special attention, because one of the goals of terrorism is to create conditions of threat and to intimidate the population in order to elicit reactions of national authorities (e.g. Schmid 2011). However, other kinds of security threats could also lead many citizens to conclude that more government intervention is needed to ensure public safety.

Second, hardly any attention has been paid in previous research to the possibility that people might feel threatened by intrusive government measures and therefore reject these policies (Best et al. 2012). Yet concerns about government interference are an important part of the history of modern democracies and are at the heart of liberal democratic theories. Today, far-reaching anti-terrorism laws in many countries and particularly new possibilities in surveillance technology and data processing illustrate that it is important to examine the extent and consequences of perceived liberty threat among the public.

Third, the way in which threat affects anti-terrorism policy attitudes continues to be debated controversially. In particular, the interplay between threat and authoritarianism is at the centre of this debate.

This is where this study comes in. It focuses on perceived security threats and perceived liberty threats, and examines the relationship between these kinds of perceived threat and attitudes towards different anti-terrorism policies in Germany. The study theoretically discusses and systematically tests how the interaction between perceived threats and authoritarianism determines the public's support of a broad range of anti-terrorism policies in Germany.

So far, research on this topic refers to the United States in a large part. However, perceived threats and attitudes towards security policies as well as the relationships between these orientations might be different in Germany and other countries. Without discussing possible reasons for this in detail, these differences may be related to the presence or absence of security-related events (e.g. Kossowska et al. 2011: 254) or by differences in previous legislative responses to terrorism (e.g. Merolla & Zechmeister 2009: 195–199 on the relevance of country contexts). Studies on this dimension of public opinion in Germany, which has a different history of legislative responses to terrorism, for example, are scarce. It should also be noted that there are two types of limitations that are often inherent in these studies. On the one hand, the existing work on the relationship between threats and support of anti-terrorism policies or civil liberties restrictions in Germany is often based on analyses of narrow or non-random samples. For instance, Cohrs and his colleagues provide important insights into the interplay of threat and authoritarianism as well as into the consequences of threat for different orientations (e.g. Cohrs et al. 2005; Cohrs & Ibler 2009). Asbrock and Fritsche (2013) experimentally study authoritarian reactions to personal threat. However, it is important to review the findings of these studies using data from a broad sample. The present study employs data from a large telephone survey of a random sample of adults conducted in 2016.

On the other hand, several studies with a focus on Germany concentrate on the relationship between threat and attitudes towards a narrow range of anti-terrorism policies. For example, while Trüdinger and Steckermeier (2018) and Leese (2013) focus on surveillance measures aimed at combating crime and terrorism, Bug and Bukow (2017) analyse the acceptance of digital security measures, namely telecommunication data retention and passenger name records. Against the background of a variety of anti-terrorism policies adopted in Germany in recent years (see chapter 2), this study focuses on a broad range of policies as attitudinal objects. Evidence of relationships between perceived threats and attitudes towards a broad range of anti-terrorism policies would demonstrate that threatening situations systematically affect citizens' support of particular policies.

### **1.3.** Plan of this Study

Whether and how perceptions of security threat and of liberty threat are related to the support of anti-terrorism policies in Germany is discussed theoretically and analysed empirically in this study.

In the second chapter, which follows this introduction, I will concentrate on antiterrorism policies in Germany as an attitude object. This includes presenting and categorising existing studies that examine public opinion on anti-terrorism policies in different ways. After a description of recent legislation in this area, I will discuss the antiterrorism policy positions in the focus of this study.

The third chapter deals with perceptions of threat – starting with a section on the nature and origins of perceived threats and on related concepts. Distinguishing different types of perceived threats is an important part of this chapter. The latter will conclude with the discussion of what might be the attitudinal consequences of threat according to the Terror Management Theory, which still influences much of the research on the topic.

I will begin the fourth chapter by presenting theoretical arguments for a relationship between security threat and liberty threat on the one hand and anti-terrorism policy attitudes on the other. In the following sections of this chapter, I will discuss existing research on the interplay between authoritarian beliefs and perceptions of threat and formulate expectations on how authoritarianism and perceived threats might interact in shaping anti-terrorism policy attitudes.

The fifth chapter of this study will address issues related to the data employed in this study and to the measurement of key concepts and control variables. First, I will provide information about the survey data used and about the topics relevant to this study that were salient at the time of data collection in Germany. Descriptive results on perceptions of different threats and on the levels of support of different policies in Germany will be provided in this chapter as well.

Chapter 6 focuses on the empirical analysis of the relationships discussed in previous chapters. I will present various models to assess the relevance of perceived threats and

their interaction with authoritarianism for support of anti-terrorism policies. The visual presentation and discussion of interaction effects as well as subsequent regression diagnostics and comprehensive model validations are an important part of this chapter.

As there are still vivid theoretical discussions on different dimensions of threat and authoritarianism, the empirical analyses in Chapter 7 will focus on how different dimensions of these orientations relate to the support of anti-terrorism policies. In the concluding eighth chapter, I will highlight the key messages of the study and discuss their implications and proposals for further research.

# 2. Anti-Terrorism Policies as Attitudinal Objects

Attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies in a country have to be analysed against the background of its legal framework of domestic security and anti-terrorism policies, and of recent incidents and events related to terrorism or other sources of insecurity. This background will be provided in the following sections.

The German Constitution (the Basic Law of 1949) as the main guardian of individual liberties in Germany (e.g. Beckman 2007; Glaeßner 2010 with further interpretations of the constitutional law) and the decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court represent the most important points of reference for the protection of such liberties in the context of new anti-terrorism policies. I will therefore frequently refer to these norms and decisions below.<sup>1</sup>

However, before referring to recent legislation and events related to terrorism and insecurity, I will first give a brief overview of different approaches to studying attitudes and present my own approach. Second, I will take a closer look on developments in Germany's anti-terrorism policies in the period from September 11, 2001 until the end of the survey in 2016. Third, I will introduce and discuss the anti-terrorism policy positions analysed as attitudinal objects in the present study.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Two additions have to be made to the historical background and the tradition of balancing security and freedom in Germany: On the one hand, the German public is often said to be more sensitive to the issue of civil liberties and surveillance because of the violations of these rights experienced in the Third Reich and in the German Democratic Republic. On the other hand, Lange and Frevel (2008: 116) argue that calls for government intervention to guarantee safety and to fight terrorism have to be considered against the background of a long tradition of government responsibility for domestic security, which dates back to the Prussian police system.

# 2.1. Perspectives on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes and the Approach of the Present Study

The existing literature explores attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies from different perspectives. Studies of these attitudes often address the relationship between opposing positions on public safety and individual freedom, focusing on attitudes towards restrictions of civil liberties (e.g. Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009). Accordingly, many empirical studies specify their research objective as the extent to which restrictions of these rights by government security measures are accepted by the population in the context of terrorist threat (e.g. Hetherington & Suhay 2011, 2011; e.g. Kossowska et al. 2011; e.g. Lahav & Courtemanche 2012, 2012).

A large part of this research originates in the U.S. It builds on seminal works on political tolerance that studied support for civil liberties in context, specifically tolerance towards disliked groups (e.g. Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1981). Several insights from this literature on tolerance can be used to explain attitudes towards restrictions of civil liberties in the domain of anti-terrorism policies (for the differences and connections between tolerance and attitudes to civil liberties see Gibson 2013):

On the one hand, the situation plays a significant role in the support of civil liberties (restrictions) (Sniderman et al. 1996: 62). Thus, the attempt to map principled support of these rights makes little sense considering the importance of the context in which assessments are made. On the other hand, it is often a perceived threat that characterises situations in which civil liberties are called into question. In the literature on political tolerance this mainly refers to threats represented by the groups whose rights and liberties are at stake.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the U.S. and other attacks, the media coverage of terrorism, and new counter-terrorism laws in many countries (e.g. Haubrich 2003; Epifanio 2011) have contributed to a rising research interest in the "citizen-government exchange of civil liberties for national security" (Sullivan & Hendriks 2009: 381). Some works focus directly on attitudes towards terrorism-related policies. Most of these studies also mention the curtailment of civil liberties as a possible implication of these policies (e.g. Huddy et al. 2005; Huddy et al. 2007), but do not empha-

sise this aspect. Joslyn and Haider-Markel (2007: 309), for example, introduce their object of explanation as "policy preferences about combating terrorism" (similarly also Malhotra and Popp 2012: 38), Welch (2015) treats similar policy preferences as anti-terror punitiveness.

Empirical studies of attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies mainly address the following restrictions of civil liberties: restrictions of the freedom of opinion and the freedom of assembly, discrimination of target groups during the creation of profiles ("racial profiling"), restrictions of the right to legal proceedings (especially detention, search), torture, surveillance. It should be pointed out, however, that government measures can also include other terrorism-related policies than those related to individual rights and liberties, such as policies to help victims, or different forms of negotiation with terrorist organizations (Iyer et al. 2014).

Surveillance studies, a wide branch of research, has produced works dealing with the acceptance of state surveillance (Pavone & Degli Esposti 2012; e.g. Nakhaie & Lint 2013; Steinfeld 2017). They focus on strategic measures by government authorities to gather information (Lyon 2001; Marx 2015; Trüdinger & Steckermeier 2017) and thus on a subgroup of security policies that may not be consistent with civil liberties. Some of these also address the context of threat from terrorism (e.g. Trüdinger & Steckermeier 2017). Studies in this area show that anti-terrorism policies can be differentiated into many sub-dimensions. Government surveillance, for example, can refer to the monitoring of communication, personal finances, individual movements, public places, etc. (see e.g. the characterization of such measures in Lüdemann and Schlepper 2011, 2012). Several studies examine the relationship between terrorist threats and attitudes towards security policy from a risk acceptance perspective (e.g. Lerner & Keltner 2001; Sanquist et al. 2008).

Davis and Silver (2004) and Davis (2007) explicitly model the tension between support for civil liberties and domestic security. They start from the premise that in specific situations decisions in favour of either civil liberties or safety and order have to be made. They therefore combine individual measures intended to protect people from terrorism with the contestation of particular rights and liberties. Applying a value conflict approach in their study of American public opinion, several dimensions of anti-terrorism policies are presented as trade-offs between security and liberty. They investigate, for example, the following trade-off in the domain of electronic surveillance: "Some people say that government should be allowed to record telephone calls and monitor e-mail in order to prevent people from planning terrorist or criminal acts. Others say that people's conversations and e-mail are private and should be protected by the constitution" (Davis 2007: 44). This approach presents respondents with a policy in combination with two opposing positions. On the one hand, this approach makes the decision easier as it anchors individual responses. On the other hand, it already provides a specific framework for assessing the respective policies. It is debatable, however, whether respondents actually perceive the formulated trade-off behind the individual anti-terrorism policies and whether they consider it important. Individuals may choose to ignore such conflicts when they form their opinions (Hochschild 1981: 258).

Studies usually look at the main features of policy programmes rather than specific instruments a country has introduced. An exception, for example, is the explanation of attitudes to the Patriot Act provided by Chong and Druckman (2010) in the larger context of experimental work on framing effects. In their experimental study of support for counter-terrorism policies, Garcia and Geva (2014) equally focus on a specific piece of legislation, but in a hypothetical scenario: they manipulate the extent of terrorismrelated threat, the source of threat, and the level of invasiveness of a hypothetical counter-terrorist act announced by the President of the U.S.

While most works analyse attitudes towards a set of terrorism-related policies, there are also authors who concentrate on a particular policy. Some of these centre on people's willingness to support torture in certain situations, e.g. when there is a perceived threat (Nincic & Ramos 2011; e.g. Conrad et al. 2017). Other studies deal with attitudes to racial profiling (e.g. Weitzer & Tuch 2005; Johnson et al. 2011). Another group of studies focuses their attention on attitudes towards the severity of government action against terrorism without specifying the policies. Gadarian (2010) and Kam and Kinder (2007), for example, analyse people's preferences for government spending in this area.

The present study analyses a variety of anti-terrorism policies as attitudinal objects – this is to examine whether there are relationships between perceived threats and policy attitudes across a broad range of anti-terrorism measures. The purpose of this study is to explain policy positions, and thus the assessment of alternative political actions. Policy performance orientations (assessments of the results of political actions) are not in the focus of this study. In a perspective on future political governance, it is important to know how preferences for certain policies are related to threat.

Although anti-terrorism policies are the main focus of this study and current discussions about sew security measures often refer to the context of terrorism, it should be pointed out that many of the programmes analysed here may also be used to crack down on other crimes. The policies analysed in this study were presented to the respondents in the form of brief proposals. This approach is in line with the approaches of other studies that also explain attitudes to policies proposed to fight terrorism (e.g. Malhotra & Popp 2012: 38). All of these proposals had been discussed in Germany in recent years and some even made into law. A detailed presentation of these policies follows in the last section of this chapter.

#### 2.2. Terrorism and Recent Anti-Terrorism Policies in Germany

In this subchapter, I will give a brief overview of recent anti-terrorism legislation in Germany – as the background relevant for (the study of) attitudes towards policies in this domain. The devastating terrorist attacks of 09/11 mark the beginning of a new period, in which government authorities in Germany and many other countries passed new anti-terrorism legislation (e.g. Epifanio 2011 for an overview) in response to these "systemic shocks" (Lewis 2005: 18).<sup>2</sup>

After 2001, several anti-terrorism laws came into force in Germany, but in contrast to other countries, government activities to combat terrorism did not turn out to add a completely new dimension of domestic security in Germany. The authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany had reacted to terrorist attacks before, fighting the Red Army Faction from the 1960s to the 1980s. However, the attacks of 09/11 were considered to have acted as a "catalyst" of a realignment of Germany's anti-terrorism policy (Hein 2004: 146).

Two 'security packages' were passed in the year after the terrorist attacks on the United States. 'Security Package I' became effective in October 2001 and extended legislation on surveillance and controls at the airports, for example. Most notably, it restricted the so-called religious privilege by allowing authorities to ban religious groups (e.g. Glaessner 2003). Moreover, a new law was introduced "to prosecute those who belong to or support terrorist organizations if the individual resides in Germany or has German nationality – even if these individuals have committed no offenses within Germany" (Beckman 2007, 103). 'Security Package II' was more extensive and more controversially debated (Glaessner 2003: 52). Taking effect in January 2002, it contained important amendments to existing laws, such as the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz*), designed in particular to strengthen the competences of several actors in national security matters, e.g. the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution or the Federal Criminal Police Office.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  However, as Smith and Zeigler (2017) observe, the world after 9/11 has not necessarily become more dangerous in terms of terrorist incidents.

In 2003, anti-terror legislation was tightened when the catalogue of terrorist crimes was expanded in response to a EU resolution (Busch 2007: 414–415). Shortly after, the Joint Terror Defence Centre was launched to improve coordination between the various security services. For critics this represented a reversal of the constitutionally guaranteed separation of police forces and intelligence services. In the subsequent legislative period, the Joint Internet Centre was established as part of the Joint Terror Defence Centre. The Air Security Bill of 2005 regulated how to proceed when airplanes are used as weapons and even authorized the shooting down of airplanes with passengers. However, the Federal Constitutional Court declared this measure unconstitutional in 2006 (Rensen 2011; Busch 2015).

The replacement of the Red-Green government by the "grand coalition" of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats under Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2005 did not mark a significant change in the direction of anti-terrorism policy in Germany. Several additional measures were taken, with a particular focus on the rights and capacities of state authorities to collect and share security-related information (Busch 2010; Glaeßner 2010). The provision of new powers to the police and intelligence services continued with the Amendment to the Anti-Terror Act (*Terrorismusbekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz*) in 2006.

The Shared-Databases Act (Gesetz zur Errichtung gemeinsamer Dateien von Polizeibehörden und Nachrichtendiensten des Bundes und der Länder) of 2006 provided for the establishment of an anti-terror database. The law specifies the types of data to be stored in the database and stipulates the conditions of use for the stored data and the respective rules applicable to the involved authorities (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Federal Intelligence Service, Federal Criminal Police Office). The database, which was created at the Federal Criminal Police Office, is to facilitate the detection, investigation, and combat of international terrorism, primarily by improving cooperation between the authorities.

In January 2009, the controversial Federal Criminal Police Office Act (*Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskriminalamt*) became effective. This provided the Federal Criminal Police Office with numerous new

competencies, including the right to conduct pre-emptive investigations. The new law also regulates, for example, online searches of suspects' computers and computer-aided searches for people of certain characteristics, but also gives the authorities new powers of surveillance to monitor homes and telecommunications (Busch 2010: 414). The rules regarding online searches followed guidelines established by the Federal Constitutional Court, which in 2008 had revoked a change in the law of North Rhine-Westphalia permitting such access to suspects' computers (BVerfG 2008). Security considerations in connection with the surveillance opportunities offered by technology drove the decision of the grand coalition government to introduce electronic passports and electronic ID cards (Lüdemann & Schlepper 2011: 120). In May 2009, new anti-terror legislation was passed, stipulating the punishments for actions in preparation for acts of terror performed with the intent of committing such acts. This includes the participation in so-called terror camps, but also the sourcing of materials and the dissemination of instructions to build bombs (Bäcker et al. 2013: 27–29).

From 2009 until 2013, the coalition government of CDU/CSU and Liberals initiated several anti-terrorism measures, even though it was rather reluctant to adopt more restrictive law and order policies in general (Wenzelburger & Staff 2016: 333). In 2011, for instance, the terms of many provisions in the 'Security Packages' were extended and new provisions were added, which, for example, made it easier for intelligence and security services to collect information. Then two developments put the government under pressure: When after years of investigation the murders committed by Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU) over the course of several years were solved, the structure, focus, and work of the security services was called into question. The revelations of Edward Snowden about broad surveillance operations by the National Security Agency initiated debates, for example, about the controllability of German and foreign intelligence services and the role of the respective government, but without any immediate consequences for legislation (Lorenz & Riese 2015).

In the wake of the NSU murders the government decided to establish a central database for the information gathered by police forces and intelligence services (*Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus*) in 2012. In the same year, the responsibilities of the Joint Terror Defence Centre were expanded. The new Extremism and Terror Defence Centre was to improve the cooperation and flow of information between the various security services (Bäcker et al. 2013: 171).

During Angela Merkel's third term as chancellor, heading her second grand coalition government from 2013, the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe increased. In May 2014, four people died in the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels. The attack on Charlie Hebdo and a supermarket in Paris caused 17 deaths plus the death of the terrorists. In February 2015 an attack in Copenhagen also claimed lives. The risk of terrorist attacks in Europe was considered high.

In April 2015 the Bundestag passed new anti-terror legislation. Under the new laws, people travelling to countries regarded as training grounds for terrorists can be prosecuted, provided they intended to be trained in committing acts of terror, and suspects can have not only their passports but also their ID cards confiscated. In addition, the rules regarding the criminal offence of financing terrorism were tightened (Süddeutsche.de 2015c). In November 2015, shortly after the devastating series of attacks in Paris with a death toll of more than 100, the terms of the anti-terror laws passed immediately after the attacks in 2001 were extended. They are now in force until 2021.

In December 2015, a new law on the retention of data to support the combat of terrorism and crime came into force. The regulations provide for the "storage of certain data related to specific telecommunication events by the providers of telecommunication services without cause" (Rensen 2011: 645). They mark the current endpoint of a longer development: The EU Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EG) passed by the European Parliament in 2006 was implemented in national law in 2008. In 2010, however, the Federal Constitutional Court revoked this law (BVerfG 2010) and in 2014 the European Court of Justice declared the EU directive to be invalid. Every citizen in Germany is affected by the 2015 legislation as the new provisions make the pre-emptive storage of detailed records of telephone and internet traffic by service providers compulsory. Data retention and the related legal provisions are still among the most controversial issues on both the political and the judicial level.

The first half of 2016 saw a series of further terrorist attacks committed by radical Islamists in Istanbul and Brussels. In November 2015 a football match was cancelled in Germany because of a potential terrorist threat. In 2015 and early 2016 members of the police force were attacked by Islamist motivated perpetrators. Against this background a new anti-terror package was passed by the Bundestag in June 2016. By that time the survey analysed below was already completed, but the bill proposed by the cabinet had been being discussed and was approved a few weeks earlier. The new package introduced the requirement of proof of identity for purchasers of pay-as-you-go SIM cards and lowered the age limit for suspected terrorists whose data may be stored. The Federal Police was granted additional powers and may now use undercover agents to protect the public against threats, and the authorities of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution were expanded to include the exchange of data with foreign intelligence services (Deutscher Bundestag 2016).

The above overview reveals several key elements of anti-terrorism policy in Germany since 2001. These trends and priorities can be summarized as follows:

First, we see that many measures (e.g. ban on leaving the country, data exchange with foreign intelligence services) were introduced in response to the global nature of terrorist threat.

Second, a "process of centralisation and granting additional powers" to police and intelligence services (Glaeßner 2010: 488) can be observed. In view of federal traditions and the institutionalised separation of authorities (see above) this may be considered problematic.

Third, a tendency to place greater emphasis on the prevention of terrorist crimes can be noted, which is evident, for example, in the legislation introduced in 2015 that made activities in preparation of an act of terror a punishable offence if there is evidence of intent. Observers call this development the emergence of a prevention orientation in the law (e.g. Lange 2006: 91).

Fourth, and related to the previous point, new measures to gather data became a priority. According to Busch (2010: 427–428), for example, political action was driven by the paradigm that more information is essential to combating terrorism and that government must facilitate the gathering of relevant data.

Finally, the regulation of the expression of opinion in order to counter the recruitment and radicalisation of people via social media and in public, in contrast, was not a major issue during the study period.

Overall, the new laws introduced in Germany since 2001 indicate a slight trend towards tougher and more restrictive anti-terrorism policies. This corresponds with the assessment of Wenzelburger and Staff (2016: 319) of the general development of law and order legislation in Germany.

# 2.3. Anti-Terrorism Policy Positions within the Framework of this Analysis

The effects of threat are to be tested across a broad range of attitudes towards different anti-terrorism policies. This approach is adopted because of the possibility that perceptions of threat may only have consequences for a limited number of attitudes to very specific policies. Thus in addition to bills that have now become German law, the analysis also includes positions that are not represented in current legislation. However, all anti-terrorism policy positions analysed as attitudinal objects in this study have been discussed in Germany in recent years.

A sufficient breadth of the positions analysed is also ensured by the fact that the proposals focus on different aspects of several dimensions that are relevant for the study of domestic security policies. First, there is the question of how severely these proposals restrict fundamental rights. Second, the proposals can be differentiated by target group: some target the narrower circle of suspects, while others affect a wider circle of people. Third, they differ with regard to the current legal situation: some of them have been adopted, some have been partially adopted, and other positions are not represented in current legislation at all. Finally, the proposals focus on different dimensions of rights: apart from individual liberal rights (e.g. integrity of the person), these are individualcommunicative rights or political liberties, such as freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly (e.g. Franke 1998: 113) and procedural rights (for the different types of rights see, e.g., Freedom House 2017). Individual measures usually do not affect only one of these rights, in which case a clear match is not possible. Table 1 provides an overview of the policies that are examined as attitudinal objects in the present study. The above-described policy developments – particularly preventative measures, data collection, and surveillance – will be reflected in these policy positions. I will briefly present these policies on the following pages.

Table 1: Overview of Policy Positions in the Focus of the Present Study

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• Torture of suspec	ts to obtain information about planned terrorist attacks
• Preventive detent	ion of terror suspects
• Prohibition from	leaving the country for people suspected to join a terrorist group
Reinforced control	ols of people of certain characteristics and backgrounds
• Searching the hor	ne of terror suspects without a warrant
Recording inform	nation and fingerprints of suspects in a database
Monitoring teleph	none and online activities of suspects without a warrant
Sentencing profes	ssions of sympathy for terrorists in social networks
Banning public sp	beeches with professions of sympathy for terrorists
Banning demonst	rations and strikes upon a terrorist threat

#### \*Torture of suspects to obtain information about planned terrorist attacks

After the attacks of 09/11 calls to soften the ban on torture entered the discussion of measures to combat terrorism not just in the U.S. but also in Germany. These calls were not concerned with the use of torture to solve crimes, but usually suggested that torture should be allowed to avert dangers (Krane & Reichenbach 2006: 316) – such as imminent risks of attacks – or to save lives (so-called "rescue torture"). The case of Wolfgang Daschner, Vice President of the Frankfurt Police Department, who in 2002 threat-ened a kidnapper with torture to extract the location of an (already dead) child, fuelled the discussion of the issue in Germany for quite a while. The proposal to allow the use of torture to extract information about planned terror attacks represents an extreme violation of human dignity, i.e. the premise of all norms in a state governed by the rule of law (Bielefeldt 2007: 9). Thus this policy position is characterized as excessively severe. Its adoption would violate the ban on torture firmly established in the European Convention on Human Rights.

#### \*Preventive detention of terror suspects

As early as 2007, Wolfgang Schäuble, then Federal Minister of the Interior, publicly advocated the detention of people representing a threat to public safety as a possible measure to combat terror, following similar regulations in the U.S. (Spiegelonline 2007). However, German law already provides for preventive detention without evidence of a specific crime: the Residence Act allows preventive detention before a planned deportation, and state police law allows preventive custody – in most states usually for several days – to avert certain imminent dangers (Walther 2007 with a detailed discussion of the legal situation in Germany). In 2017, Bavaria indefinitely extended the period of preventive detention, with a judge having to rule about the continuation of such detention every three months. Bavaria also introduced "imminent danger" as a rather unspecific reason to justify the order of preventive detention (Süddeutsche.de 2017). Particularly the preventative character of this policy position and the related restriction of the presumption of innocence are problematic and raise numerous questions, e.g. what represents a reasonable suspicion or an imminent danger? They immediately affect the right of personal liberty.

#### \*Prohibition from leaving the country for people suspected of joining a terrorist group abroad

This proposal has already been adopted into German legislation as briefly mentioned above. According to the 2009 regulations, the active participation in a terror camp was considered a criminal offence, and suspects could have their passports confiscated. A problem identified with regard to these regulations was that many potential terrorists used their ID cards to travel via third countries to territories under the rule of the Islamic State, and might later return as a potential threat to public safety. The 2015 legislation provided for the confiscation of suspects' ID cards to prevent them from leaving Germany for countries known as terrorist training grounds. A replacement ID card can be issued, but that does not entitle the holder to leave Germany. These regulations implement the provisions of UN resolution 2178 (2014) on "foreign fighters". They were heavily criticized, however, particularly because of their preventative nature, which made the suspect's intentions rather than their actions a criminal offence, and because of the restrictions of an individual's freedom to travel.

#### \*Reinforced controls of people of certain characteristics and backgrounds

This proposal comes close to the method of "racial profiling", which uses "the physical characteristics, such as skin colour or facial features, of a person as a basis for decisions about police measures, such as identity checks" (Cremer 2013: 4). Such legislation does not exist. However, it has been widely lamented that this method is common police practice, especially when identity checks are conducted without cause. According to the German police forces, however, there is no evidence of this practice (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2018). Such measures would clearly violate the principle of equality stipulated in Article 3 of the Basic Law (Krane 2006: 254). According to experts, even conducting identity checks without cause is hardly consistent with the right to informational self-determination (Cremer 2013: 7). The proposed anti-terror measure thus involves a dramatic restriction of individual fundamental rights and may affect a larger part of the population.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Computer-aided search is another method to filter public or private databases for people with certain characteristics in order to limit the number of people to be checked Schewe (2006). After the attacks of 2001 the application of this method was extended to averting dangers by searching nationwide for Islamist terrorists on the basis of certain characteristics Rensen (2011). Overall, the success of this method was

#### \*Searching the home of terror suspects without a warrant

A police home search is a direct interference with the fundamental right to inviolability of the home (Article 13 Basic Law) and thus basically with "private space". Accordingly, the conditions under which such a search may be performed are clearly defined by law. It has been criticised (e.g. by a former constitutional judge in the newspaper taz 2011), however, that in practice the principle of proportionality applicable to home searches is often disregarded. Today, home searches may be conducted in the course of criminal prosecution and for the purpose of averting danger.

According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, home searches in the course of criminal prosecution (e.g. to arrest an offender or secure evidence) require indications of a criminal offence. Homes may be searched for the purpose of combating terrorism if, for example, a person is suspected of preparing a serious act of violence endangering the security of the state, financing terrorism, or supporting a terrorist organisations. In contrast to the proposal analysed here such a search requires a warrant. Only in the case of imminent danger the public prosecutor's office and their investigators may order a home search. Home searches for the purpose of averting a specific danger are regulated in state police and regulatory law and usually also require a warrant.

#### \*Recording information and fingerprints of suspects in a database

The legislation providing for the creation of an anti-terror database, which was passed in 2006, regulates the collection and storage of information about people who support or belong to terrorist organisations, use or advocate violence etc. In contrast to the proposal analysed here, the rules do not provide for the storage of fingerprints. However, they allow the storage of a wide variety of data, ranging from communication data, marital status, and nationality to information about the dangerousness of a person (Bundesgesetzblatt 2006). This scope of the data that may be collected without evidence of suspicious facts has been frequently criticised. The law restricts the fundamental rights to privacy of correspondence, postal privacy, privacy of telecommunications, and inviolability of the home.

limited. In 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court, while not declaring the method unconstitutional, defined very narrow terms for its use BVerfG (2006).

In 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court declared parts of the law unconstitutional and requested the legislative authority to make certain amendments. In their ruling the judges pointed out that the provision of data before a dangerous situation exists is inconsistent with the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the fundamental rights mentioned above. Moreover, "advocating violence" was considered an insufficient reason to store data about such advocators. With reference to the fundamental right to informational self-determination the Court required strong arguments to justify exceptions, as the usage of the database can interfere with the principle of informational separation (BVerfG 2013).

In response to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court the Bundestag passed amendments to the Shared-Databases Act in late 2014. These restricted the storage of data on contact persons of the main suspect, for example, and more narrowly defined the data allowed to be stored (Spiegelonline 2014). Overall, this policy position involves significant interferences with individual liberties for a small group of people.

#### \*Monitoring telephone and online activities of suspects without a warrant

In Germany, the law regulates various forms of communication monitoring. In connection with the combat of organised crime the Basic Law was amended in 1998 (new Sections 3 to 6 added to Article 13) to provide for the acoustic surveillance of homes for the purpose of criminal prosecution (and no longer exclusively for the purpose of averting danger) (Rensen 2011: 638–640). This amendment of the constitution to legalise electronic eavesdropping operations in private homes and public areas was widely criticised and regarded as interference particularly with the fundamental right to inviolability of the home.

In 2004 the Federal Constitutional Court declared not the amendment to the Basic Law but the provisions regarding the implementation of acoustic surveillance unconstitutional (BVerfG 2004), which were revised in 2005 (*Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Urteils des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur akustischen Wohnraumüberwachung*). Monitoring of private communications between the suspect and family members or close confidants, for example, was excluded. The acoustic surveillance of homes and telecommunications as well as online searches of suspects' computers require a warrant, as stipulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The proposal thus goes beyond the current legal framework.

Online searches were introduced in 2009 with the Federal Criminal Police Office Act mentioned above. Since the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on April 20, 2016, online searches and other surveillance measures may be used as long as very strict restrictions are complied with. For example, an independent authority has to view the collected data and filter them, if necessary, before the Federal Criminal Police Office may use them. The Court also required that the measures may only be used in the case of a looming danger. It thus introduced a clear barrier for the application of the rights of interference and specified the conditions for sharing the collected data with foreign intelligence services (BVerfG 2016). On the reuse of data collected from home surveillance or access to information technology systems, for example, the Court ruled: "Due to the severity of the interference, any reuse of such data is subject to the same conditions regarding dangerous situations that apply to the collection of the data" (BVerfG 2016).

#### \*Punishing professions of sympathy for terrorists in social networks

The question of whether professions of sympathy for terror groups, e.g. in social networks, should be banned relates to the right to freedom of opinion. It provides an example that illustrates how individual civil liberties – in a specific context in view of threat of terrorism – are called into question. Proposals for amendments to criminal law were put forward especially after the Islamic State declared their caliphate in 2014 and with reference to the return of IS fighters and IS recruitment efforts among refugees (e.g. Badische Zeitung 2016). Before 2002, however, professions of sympathy for terrorists had already been a criminal offence. This was regulated in Article 129a, which was introduced in response to terrorist acts committed by the RAF in the 1970. When in the aftermath of the twin tower attacks the red-green coalition government revised the antiterror laws in 2002, the punishability of participation in criminal and terrorist organisations was extended to foreign organizations. At the same time, Article 129a was liberalised and professions of sympathy were no longer considered sufficient to justify criminal punishment (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/8893 2002). This is the current legal situation. Supporting terrorist organisations and recruiting members and supporters are still punishable offences.

Proponents frequently point out the special role the Internet has in the radical Islamist scene (Süddeutsche.de 2015b). The scene relies heavily on means of communication provided by the Internet to network and promote their cause (Conway 2016 with questions for future research on this issue). Islamist contents disseminated via social networks are considered crucial for the radicalisation of young people. However, sympathies for terrorists may also be expressed by extreme right or left groups in the country, which also make use of new media.

Another problem is that such terrorism-related web content may be too vast to control and the debate about who is responsible for the contents or their deletion has only just started. The law governing legal enforcement in social networks (*Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz*, passed in 2017) prohibits the dissemination of illegal contents via the Internet and regulates the deletion of such contents.

#### \*Banning public speeches with professions of sympathy for terrorists

The legal background for the discussions about freedom of opinion described above (concerning expressions in social networks) also applies to the proposal to ban public speeches with professions of sympathy for terrorists. Publicly expressing these professions of sympathy currently does not represent a punishable offence. The proposal is criticized not only because it curtails freedom of opinion, but also because there are other legal means available, such as the law of associations and the prohibition of support of terrorist organizations.

#### \*Banning demonstrations and strikes upon a terrorist threat

This proposal, which represents a severe interference with the freedom of assembly, has a legal basis in state law governing the right to assembly. Approval for public meetings may be denied or revoked if they represent an immediate threat to public safety and order (see Ackermann 2015 for a detailed legal discussion). Rejections or revocations are fairly common, but rarely on the grounds of a terrorist threat. However, it was such a threat that led to a police ban on a demonstration organised by the Pegida movement and on other demonstrations in Dresden on January 19, 2015. Because of an imminent terrorist threat the police banned all public open air meetings (allegedly there had been specific threats of attacks by Islamists). Afterwards the ban was criticised by many groups, whose justification of their objections can be transferred to the proposal analysed here. They criticized the sweeping ban on all events scheduled for that day and questioned the existence of an immediate threat (Süddeutsche.de 2015a). Another aspect discussed was that such bans fuel reactions of fear and curtail fundamental rights, which was just what the terrorists wanted.

To conclude this chapter, the anti-terrorism policy proposals in the focus of this study are presented in Figure 1. This categorization is based on my assessments of their severity and of the size of the target group affected by the proposal in question. In addition, the figure depicts the current legal situation and the nature of civil liberties concerned (information on this is provided in the table caption). The diversity of the examined policies is clearly visible – especially if one accounts for the fact that some combinations of policy features (i.e. very severe policies affecting a large group) are not very plausible.




Figure 1: Dimensions of Selected Anti-Terrorism Policy Positions

Notes: Source: own categorization. Current legal situation: \* no adopted policy (others: adopted or partially adopted); dimensions of rights: non-italic items – personal liberties and integrity; italic items – communicative and political liberties; underlined item – equality and non-discrimination.

## 3. Discussing the Relevance of Different Kinds of Threat

In this section, I will first define the nature of perceived threats and shortly discuss why people might differ in their perceptions of threat. Second, I will focus on different kinds of threat and argue why it is important to consider the relationships between different kinds of threat and anti-terrorism policy attitudes. Third, I will present arguments from the Terror Management Theory (TMT) about the attitudinal consequences of grave threats. This section already gives first insights into how perceptions of threat could be related to attitudes towards civil liberties and antiterrorism policies.

#### 3.1. About the Nature and Origins of Perceived Threats

Perceived threat can be broadly understood as a person's perception or feeling that something aversive is going to happen (Fritsche et al. 2011: 103). A threat is perceived if persons or things are regarded as likely causes of harm (SOED 2002: 3251). In their discussion of the concept, Asbrock and Fritsche (2013: 37) point to the severity of threat, as perceptions of threat "occur if a person experiences or anticipates that the satisfaction of basic needs or goals is hampered". These needs and goals can be material, but also immaterial – to think about psychological needs, for example (e.g. Fritsche & Fischer 2008: 307).

Perceptions of threat are a subjective matter. Threats such as far-reaching economic crises or severe terrorist attacks can be seen as widely acknowledged external forces (Huddy et al. 2005: 594), events or conditions. Individual perceptions of threat, however, are different. Subjectively perceived threats do not necessarily have to correspond to an objectively threatening situation – if the latter can be determined at all. The determinants of different perceptions of threat cannot be examined in detail in this study. However, several categories of possible explanatory factors for these perceptions should be mentioned here. It is also important to bear in mind that different kinds of perceived threat can also have different causes (e.g. Andersen & Mayerl 2017).

Risk research has shown that some individuals are more likely to associate certain phenomena with risks or threats than others, for example because of their personal characteristics, experiences or cultural backgrounds (Kasperson et al. 1988; Wildavsky & Dake 1990; e.g. Sjoberg 2000). Risk assessments and factors that influence these risk assessments (e.g. age or education) are possible antecedents of threat perceptions (e.g. Brück & Müller 2010; May et al. 2011). Attitudes towards groups that people may associate with the threat also seem to be important (Andersen & Mayerl 2017).

The way media reports about certain events or conditions can also influence perceptions of threat (e.g. Jackson 2013 on narratives related to the perils of terrorism). For instance, scholars from security studies have shown how certain issues can be framed as security threats in political debates and the media – the so-called securitization (e.g. Bigo & Tsoukala 2008; Buzan et al. 2013; Buzan 2016). With regard to security threats in particular, personal experiences of insecurity or threat as well as a sense of vulnerability are considered to be important antecedents of these threats. This also applies to experiences of anomie, disorder or disintegration (e.g. Hale 2016).

Perceived threats are closely linked to fear and anxiety (e.g. Shaffer & Duckitt 2013). Perceived threat evokes negative emotional reactions (Vasilopoulos et al. 2018: 4), such as fear and anxiety (e.g. Merolla & Zechmeister 2009).<sup>4</sup> The connection between threats and fear becomes clear in the definition of the latter provided by the Oxford Dictionary: Fear can be described as an "emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impending danger, or by the prospect of some possible evil" (Weiner & Simpson 1989, 2004: 780).<sup>5</sup> Due to this emotional side, the consequences of perceived threats for people's political views can be quite considerable.

As Davis (2007: 61) writes, "the basis of both fear and anxiety is a concern that something bad is going to happen (or is happening), or a perceived threat and vulnerability." Fear and anxiety are very often used as synonyms in both German and English (Dehne 2017: 23), or fear is employed as a generic term (e.g. Huddy et al. 2005: 595). According to the Brockhaus Psychologie (2001: 186), a feeling of fear is related to real or only

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Anger is also one of the negative emotional reactions, as shown by Lerner et al. (2003) or Skitka et al. (2004). However, it is rarely associated with threat.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Fears are not necessarily associated with perceived threat. Huddy et al. (2005) distinguish between these reactions to external sources of threat. They show that they can have different attitudinal consequences when it comes to evaluating anti-terrorism policies. However, in very few cases data is available with which perceived threats and fears can be measured separately.

supposedly threatening objects, persons or events. It differs from a general, diffuse feeling of anxiety in its direction (fear of something). Because of the directionality of feelings in connection with perceptions of threat, I will subsequently speak of fears as possible emotional consequences of perceived threat.

Finally, perceptions of threat refer to a certain situation and can thus change quickly (e.g. Hetherington & Weiler 2010: 40). According to Marcus et al. (1995: 36), group-related threats can not only be conceived as "a personal disposition to believe the world is generally a threatening place" or as a standing decision. Above all, emphasizing the situational aspect, threat perceptions are to be understood as contemporary information. Given this situational and contextual nature of perceived threat, individual opinion formation can become particularly dynamic if perceived threat directly affects a broad range of political attitudes or meets personal dispositions and characteristics. In this perspective, perceived threats become "key precipitating or 'activating' features" (Lavine et al. 2002: 343). Thus, the consequences of perceived threat can be considerable as it might result in a complete change in political reasoning.

At the end of this section, both the emotional part and the situational element of perceived threats have to be highlighted. I will take up these two aspects in the theoretical expectations.

## **3.2.** Types of Perceived Threat: Expanding the Focus

Perceived threat has been identified as a key determinant of attitudes towards civil liberties and security policies in many studies. According to Davis and Silver (2004: 30), "if any factor is likely to drive people to cede civil liberties for security it is threat." The state of research therefore seems to be clear. However, studies on this relationship have considered a wide variety of different threats, some of which raise the question of the common denominator (e.g. Feldman 2013: 55). Thus, it is important to take into account the particularities of different threats and the mechanisms behind them. Different types of threat may differ in their consequences for the attitudes studied. This becomes clear in different positions of scholars on the relevance of personal and societal threat for support of civil liberties (see below). Therefore, I will categorize different types of perceived threat in the following. A first differentiation relates to the question of who is the perceived target of threat and a second to the question of what exactly is perceived as threatening (e.g. Cohrs 2013: 50).<sup>6</sup>

*Who is the target of threat*? Here, a distinction is generally made between personal or egocentric threat on the one hand and sociotropic threat on the other (sometimes the terms societal or collective threat are employed).<sup>7</sup> Perceived personal or egocentric threat is perceived threat to the individual (e.g. Gibson & Gouws 2005). On the other hand, sociotropic threat stands as threat against society, although this threat is sometimes understood as even broader – e.g. including the political order (e.g. Davis 2007: 63) or "cherished values and norms" (Davis & Silver 2004: 30).

The use of different labels clearly shows that two criteria have come into play for the distinction of these kinds of threat: the level of perceived threat (individual and aggregate level) and the underlying motive (egocentric and sociotropic). When it comes to the level of threat, mostly perceived dangers for the individuum and the country are investigated (see Stevens & Vaughan-Williams 2016 with a critical review). References to the motives (e.g. Joslyn & Haider-Markel 2007) establish a connection to works which examine the importance of self-interest for political attitudes (Sears 1986; e.g. Sears & Funk 1991) and which distinguish, in particular, between assessments of the overall economic situation and the personal economic situation (e.g. Kinder & Kiewiet 1979). While many researchers combine the terms personal and sociotropic threat, I will refer to personal and societal threat.

Research often emphasizes the relevance of societal threat as a factor influencing attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies, while the effects of personal threat are not addressed or are considered less serious (Davis & Silver 2004, 2004; e.g. Joslyn & Haider-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Another distinction is sometimes made between internal and external threat. For instance, Onraet et al. (2014), Onraet and van Hiel (2013), and van Hiel and Clercq (2009) refer to internal threat as threat stemming from the individual and to external threat as threat stemming from the society. In this perspective, internal threat covers different forms of individual trait and state anxiety (such as death anxiety). I do not rely on this distinction as I argue that perceived threat is not an individual trait but an individual's reaction to external stimuli. Thus, it needs to linked to particular circumstances.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Some researchers equally focus on this distinction between the individuum and society but additionally differentiate between threat with consequences at the societal or at the individual level. They argue, for example, that a threat on the societal level (e.g. a national economic crisis) can also have an impact on the individual. However, it is debatable whether there are always precise ideas behind individual perceptions of personal threat about possible consequences of these threats, so this distinction is not pursued further.

Markel 2007; Merolla & Zechmeister 2009; Malhotra & Popp 2012). The arguments for this are as follows: First, the tendency "to keep personal considerations out of decisions about national policies" (Huddy et al. 2002: 488) is well documented in other fields of attitude research. Second, individuals would find it easier to link events at the societal level with government policies: "if people view an issue to be a large-scale social problem [...] they are much more likely to hold government accountable" (Joslyn & Haider-Markel 2007: 308). Third, individuals could derive a greater relevance from the collective nature of a threat or also from the stronger – e.g. media – attention to societal threats (Stevens & Vaughan-Williams 2016: 154). Finally, collective threats particularly highlight "individuals' limitations with respect to controlling external circumstances that threaten their financial, psychological, and/or physical well-being" (Merolla & Zechmeister 2009: 27).

However, here I take the view that personal threat can also influence attitudes towards anti-terror policies – possibly, however, through other mechanisms. This is not only supported by clear empirical findings (Huddy et al. 2002; e.g. Hetherington & Suhay 2011), but also by the following reason: Personal threat is closer to the individual and may therefore be perceived as more serious (Huddy et al. 2002: 486). If individuals feel personally threatened, then they will probably be made particularly aware of their own vulnerability, and the attitudinal consequences can therefore be even more pronounced. Accordingly, Asbrock and Fritsche (2013: 39), for example, argue "that the role of personal threat might have been underestimated in previous research."

*What is perceived as threatening?* The various types of perceived threat can be differentiated according to areas and according to which good is in danger. In the former case, one can distinguish between threats to the societal order, the political system, to the economy etc. Only a few authors such as Stevens and Vaughan-Williams (2016) or Shaffer and Duckitt (2013) compare a wide range of perceived threats in a number of areas.

A differentiation of threats according to the good in danger can be based on the Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) (e.g. Stephan & Renfro 2002; Stephan & Stephan 2008). Focussing on intergroup relations, the revised version of this theory suggests two basic types of threat, namely realistic threats and symbolic threats.<sup>8</sup> Realistic threats "include threats to the ingroup's political or economic power, or physical well-being" (Stephan & Renfro 2002: 192), while symbolic threats refer "to the ingroup's value system, belief system, or worldview" (Stephan & Renfro 2002: 193). According to this theory, security threats belong to the category of realistc threats. The relevance of security threats is obvious: These threats are associated with increased uncertainties and vulnerabilities and thus with distinctly negative consequences for individuals (see below about the effects of threat). I will argue below that this focus on security threats as determinants of attitudes towards civil liberties and antiterrorism policies needs to be expanded.

The focus on terrorist threat as a particular kind of security threat is evident in that antiterrorism policy as the relevant attitude object usually represents a reaction to past or the prevention of future terrorist threats. As stated above, new laws were passed in Germany after the attacks of 9/11 in the field of domestic security. Research on the effects of perceived terrorist threat on attitudes towards antiterrorist policies equally expanded after 2001.

Different arguments can be used to emphasise the particular severity and reach of terrorist threat for citizens: It is one feature of modern terrorism that everybody can become a victim in the sense that time and place of terrorist incidents are not predictable (Asbrock & Fritsche 2013). As a consequence, terrorism tends to leave individuals in a state of uncertainty and systematically deprives people's sense of control (Fritsche et al. 2011; Leese 2013).

Furthermore, threats are an essential element of terrorism: There are many different understandings of the term terrorism, but recurrent definitions include the systematic use of violence or the threat of violence and a threat-based communication (e.g. Horgan 2005; Schmid 2011). The population is intimidated, also to put pressure on authorities (e.g. Hoffman & Shelby 2017: 619). The effects of terrorism thus "extend well beyond its immediate victims" (Huddy et al. 2005: 593).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The original version of the theory suggested four basic types of threat. Besides realistic and symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes were conceputalized as important dimensions of threat. Especially in analyses of immigration attitudes and intergroup threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes are useful concepts. As the present study does not focus on intergroup relations, these attitudes will not be discussed here.

Finally, the threat from terrorism is highly salient and captures public imagination (Huff & Kertzer 2017). This is also due to the fact that this topic is frequently reported in the media (e.g. Nacos et al. 2011).

However, the consequences of other forms of security threat, such as threat from crime, could also be far-reaching. There need be no "terror exception" (Mondak & Hurwitz 2012) in the relationship between perceived threat and anti-terrorism policy preferences. On the contrary, one can detect several similarities between terrorist threat and crime threat: On the one hand, perceptions of crime threat can also be accompanied by a feeling of vulnerability and by the impression that there is not enough protection against security threats. On the other hand, crime is an issue in our societies (e.g. Pfeiffer et al. 2016 with results on the importance of media reports), and the salience of crime threat has been shown to foster punitive attitudes (e.g. Costelloe et al. 2009).

It is a limitation of previous research in this domain that studies mainly focus on perceived threat to safety while hardly any attention has been paid to the possibility that people might feel threatened from a government's methods of maintaining security. Civil liberties, which can be restricted by a government's security measures, are to be understood in their historical origins and in a long tradition as protection from the state. Liberal democratic theory points to the relevance of these liberties as barriers for unwarranted government interference (see for an overview: Held 2006).

In this perspective, personal vulnerabilities might result from perceived threats to personal liberties. As Davis (2007: 31) puts it, "individuals face the dilemma of tolerating a sense of threat and vulnerability to both an external enemy and the government". Best et al. (2012) show that people might feel concerned about government's intrusiveness in case of government monitoring. These concerns negatively relate to support of antiterrorism policies. The authors state that "both safety from terrorism and liberty from an overly intrusive government are relevant to many ordinary citizens when evaluating domestic counterterrorism policies" (Best et al. 2012: 610). However, here are hardly any empirical findings on the consequences of perceived threats to individual liberties on attitudes to domestic security policies. Possible reasons for this research gap cannot be discussed in detail at this point, but it is worth mentioning an explanation offered by Regan (1995). She argues that the protection of privacy from government interference is still first seen as an individual right, while its societal relevance receives little attention. As a result, the issue is pushed into the background in relation to other collective rights and interests. However, far-reaching anti-terrorism laws and new developments in surveillance technology and data processing illustrate the importance of examining the extent and consequences of perceived liberty threat among the public.

So far, I have identified several gaps in research on the different types of perceived threat and their consequences on antiterrorism policy attitudes. This observation will guide the following chapters:

- First, we need more information on the potential effects of personal perceived threat. Therefore, these perceptions of threat will be considered in the present study.
- Second, a strong research focus lies on the effects of threat from terrorism on related policies. As discussed above, this connection seems to be obvious. However, do people react similarly to other security threats such as threat from different forms of crime? Therefore, my arguments and analyses will equally focus on perceived threats from crime.
- Finally, security threats are not the only possible form of threat people have in mind when evaluating anti-terrorism policies. These policies themselves might be perceived as a danger for individual liberties. Therefore, I will not only analyse the relationship between perceived threats to personal liberty and security, but I will also examine whether these two kinds of threats are associated with people's attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies.

# **3.3.** Attitudinal Consequences of Threat: The Contribution of Terror Management Theory

In this section, the framework of Terror Management Theory (TMT) serves to illustrate several mechanisms by which perceived threat of terrorism and other threats might relate to attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies. However, TMT should rather be regarded as a general theoretical superstructure for this study, since transferring this general model to the explanation of attitudes to anti-terrorism policies raises a number of issues. These issues will be addressed in the following discussion of TMT. In particular, sometimes contradictory expectations about the influence of threat on antiterrorism policy attitudes can be derived from the framework.

TMT provides a general model for explaining human social attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Solomon et al. 2004: 17). Its hypotheses have been assessed in a large number of empirical studies. Sometimes, it is even referred to as "the most extensively tested theory of psychological responses" (Huq 2013: 77). The starting point of the theory is the premise that people have a basic proclivity to remain alive. While we share this characteristic with other species, humans are aware of their existence and anticipate their death (e.g. Greenberg et al. 1990: 308). This awareness of vulnerability and mortality, "when juxtaposed with the drive to stay alive, creates the potential for paralyzing terror" (McGregor et al. 1998: 591).

The theory posits that humans manage this potential for terror and fear by constructing and maintaining cultural worldviews. The latter are conceptions of the world that "provide a meaningful explanation of life and our place in the cosmos; a set of standards for what is valuable behavior, good and evil" (Pyszczynski 2004: 830). Having faith in such a construction of the world and believing that one is meeting the standards prescribed by this worldview enables individuals to acquire a sense of personal value (self-esteem) and the capacity of facing the threat from death (e.g. Solomon et al. 2004: 22).

Two general hypotheses were derived from this perspective of the TMT (e.g. Pyszczynski et al. 1997: 2–3). The first hypothesis states that raising self-esteem reduces anxiety following a threat. The second hypothesis states that reminding people of their own death should increase their need of bolstering and defending their worldview (as these beliefs about the nature of reality protect them from fears and anxieties related to death). It is not possible here to review the numerous works that lend empirical support to these basic hypotheses or related expectations, but several authors such as Pyszcynski et al. (2003) or Solomon et al. (2004) provide excellent overviews of these studies.

Of particular importance for the explanation of attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies are the mechanisms by which – according to the mortality salience hypothesis – different kinds of threats can affect the policy attitudes analysed. Here, the main emphasis is on the threat from terrorism. Then the question should be discussed if other kinds of perceived threat relate to attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies in the framework of TMT and related works.

Stirring fears of death is a major element of terrorist strategy, as has been highlighted above. Several studies have shown that terrorism can make individual mortality more salient – either by personal experience, reports about previous attacks, or reminders of the possibility of future attacks. Pyszczynski and his colleagues (2003) show that the 9/11 attacks dramatically reminded Americans of their vulnerability and heightened the accessibility of their thoughts of death. In line with the predictions of TMT, "Americans responded with greatly heightened anxiety and efforts to protect themselves [...]. But more dramatically, Americans also behaved in ways reflective of the more symbolic terror management defences of clinging to one's worldview and shoring up one's self-esteem" (Pyszczynski 2004: 840).

Testing the effects of subliminal reminders of stimuli related to 9/11 on support for U.S. President George W. Bush, the study of Landau et al. (2004) provides empirical evidence that reminders of terrorism can have effects on political attitudes and behaviour (e.g. people's support of political leaders) that are similar to death-related thoughts. Conducting four different experiments with participants in Germany, Ullrich and Cohrs (2007) show that thinking about terrorism (terrorism salience) can increase people's worldview defence through system justification tendencies. However, they also suggest that terrorism salience and mortality salience might work through different mechanisms in influencing people's worldview-defending reactions (Ullrich & Cohrs 2007: 135).

According to TMT, there are different ways of maintaining and defending individual self-esteem and worldviews in reaction to mortality salience – induced by perceived threat from terrorism or other threats. These different reactions relate to support for anti-terrorism policies in a number of ways.

First, mortality salience is expected to produce attitudes defending established values and norms (as part of an existing worldview) and opposing those who are thought to threaten these values and norms. Thus people are expected to be in favour of antiterrorism measures, because terrorism does not only attack the established political order, but possibly also the value of life. Several authors have pointed out that mortality salience can lead to prejudice, intolerance, and stereotype orientations towards those with different worldviews (e.g. Greenberg et al. 1990; Schimel et al. 1999; Greenberg & Kosloff 2008; Das et al. 2009). Attitudes to terror suspects, in particular, are likely to be negative because these individuals might be associated with a group of people that has a different worldview. In other words, people are expected to support measures against terrorists as the latter are perceived as individuals who extremely challenge prevailing values and norms.<sup>9</sup>

Second, worldview defence can also include positive attitudes towards the existing political system, its institutions and its policies, and more pronounced national sentiments. Some studies explore the idea that mortality salience and threat increase allegiance to one's nation (Pyszczynski 2004; e.g. Castano et al. 2016). Support for the political system as part of the existing order may rise as well (e.g. Davis 2007: 62). These expectations can also be derived from combining system justification with TMT propositions (Ullrich & Cohrs 2007). According to both proponents of System Justification Theory and theorists of TMT, "system justification is one mechanism whereby individuals can reduce death anxiety" (Jost et al. 2004: 273). Accordingly, worldview-defending reactions may include positive evaluations of anti-terrorism policies as the purpose of the latter is to uphold the existing social and political order and to protect the population of a country.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Civil liberties, however, which may be curtailed by certain anti-terrorism policies, are also part of the existing order. Mortality salience may thus also lead to a stronger adherence to these established civil liberties and hence to a more critical assessment of individual anti-terrorism policies.

Third, individuals confronted with the salience of (their) death maintain faith in security-providing internalised worldviews (Arndt et al. 2004: 49). Supporting a strong government in the field of domestic security – but also in other domains – can constitute such a security-providing belief. One aspect of this belief would be that people demand a wide array of government anti-terrorism policies and express a willingness to sacrifice some personal liberties (Pyszczynski et al. 2003: 99).

Finally, several TMT studies relate worldview defence to attitudes prescribing harsher punishments of moral transgressors (e.g. Pyszczynski et al. 1999). Following those studies, threat can result, in particular, in positive attitudes towards those anti-terrorism policies that involve severe sentences or preventative measures directed against these "transgressors".

Several issues need to be discussed, however, if the arguments of this theory are employed to examine the relationships between perceptions of threat and attitudes to antiterrorism policies. First, although some propositions regarding the effects of mortality salience were transferred to perceived threat from terrorism, it still has to be determined whether this reasoning can also be applied to other kinds of perceived security threat. Empirically, this needs to be tested. Theoretically, there are some arguments in favour of expanding the framework:

On the one hand, people who feel threatened by crime, for example, may also have existential fears. On the other hand, various threats can cause serious fears, even though – at first sight – these threats do not seem to have any connection to mortality salience at all. As Arndt et al. (2004: 43) argue, "circumstances need not be tragic to activate thoughts of death." Thus, no existential crises are needed to activate the worldview-defending strategies mentioned above. According to a different view, it is perceived uncertainties and not exclusively mortality salience that bring about various forms of worldview defence (e.g. McGregor et al. 2001; van den Bos 2004). For instance, van den Bos (2004: 180) reviews different studies and finds "that mortality salience is important in predicting cultural worldview reactions, but that uncertainty salience can be even more important." These uncertainties can be caused by different kinds of perceived threat.

Second, the effects of mortality salience might depend on the values and worldviews an individual considers important and wants to defend. In this perspective, the effects of threat on attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies should be moderated by one's values or ideology (e.g. Greenberg et al. 1990: 315).

However, two different expectations about the interplay of these orientations can be found in the TMT literature. According to the worldview defence hypothesis, "people respond to the heightened salience of that which they fear by working harder to live up to the standards of value to which they are committed" (Pyszczynski et al. 2003: 107). A study on mortality salience and tolerance points out the interaction between mortality salience and the values prescribed by one's worldview (Greenberg et al. 1992): if individuals consider the value of tolerance important or if this value has recently been made salient, reminders of mortality can lead to more tolerant attitudes or at least cannot increase prejudice.

On the other hand, the conservative-shift hypothesis contends that threatening conditions "may lead both liberal and conservative individuals to endorse more conservative political attitudes" (Burke et al. 2013: 185). The fears related to mortality salience are expected to make people uphold their preferences for security, order, and the status quo (Pyszczynski 2004: 844–845). Comparing the results of existing studies in this domain, the meta-analysis from Burke et al. (2013: 196) suggests that mortality salience entails defence of one's ideology or worldview rather than conservative shifting, in particular when "additional components of a participant's worldview are rendered salient."

This section presented possible ways in which mortality salience or related threats – as studied in this manuscript – can affect attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies, according to TMT. The mechanisms at work may differ, however. It also became clear that perceived threat could influence the examined policy attitudes (e.g. attitudes towards policies that directly target terror suspects) in different ways.

In particular, TMT does not provide arguments about whether perceptions of threat should be directly related to the attitudes under study or whether they should interact with an individual's worldview (defense). Theoretical expectations about these relationships are formulated in the next chapter. Then, empirical tests are required to inform about the nature of the relationship between attitudes towards different anti-terrorism policies and perceived threat to liberty and security.

# 4. Theoretical Expectations about the Consequences of Perceived Threat

Today there is consensus in research that perceptions of threat are important to understand citizens' attitudes towards different kinds of domestic security policies. However, the way in which perceived threat affects these policy attitudes is controversially discussed. A situation perceived as threatening does not necessarily have to directly influence policy attitudes. Rather, it should be clarified whether one can expect an independent effect of different perceptions of threat on support of anti-terrorism policies, or whether the relevance of perceived threats can only be understood in their interaction with certain other variables. Authoritarianism plays a special role here, as explained below.

In this chapter, I will first provide arguments in favour of a positive (negative) relationship between perceptions of security threat and support of anti-terrorism policies. Then, I will discuss the possibility of an interaction between perceptions of threat and authoritarianism.

The following subchapters are structured as follows. After a discussion of different theoretical justifications for the underlying expectations, I will present related empirical support. In a first step, I will focus on the consequences of perceived security threat, and then the discussion is expanded to include the consequences of perceived liberty threat.

# 4.1. Linking Threat Perceptions with Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

*Perceptions of security threat:* Initially, one can expect that anti-terrorism policies are more likely to be advocated in the event of a perceived security threat than in the absence of such a threat. This relationship is illustrated in the upper part of Figure 2. It cannot be clearly deduced from a single theoretical approach, but can be substantiated by different points of view (e.g. Crowson et al. 2006).

The general argument underlying these perspectives is that people do not like to find themselves in threatening situations. One strategy to overcome or avoid threats directly focuses on the alleged sources of threat (e.g. Asbrock & Fritsche 2013: 37). Support of anti-terrorism policies makes sense as these policies might neutralize the source of threat (e.g. Gadarian 2010: 470) and contribute to a safer environment. In this sense, specific policies represent solutions to the problem of perceived security threats because they serve as instruments to achieve security and order in a society. The following approaches provide arguments for a positive relationship between perceived security threats and support of anti-terrorism policies:


In the framework of TMT, threatening situations might induce mortality salience. As discussed above (chapter 3.3), this relates to support for anti-terrorism policies in a number of ways. For instance, mortality salience might be positively related to support of anti-terrorism policies, because these policies are directed against a danger to the society and the existing order. Furthermore, according to the TMT, supporting these policies might be an element of a security-providing belief people adopt in situations of an existential threat (e.g. Pyszczynski et al. 1999; Pyszczynski 2004).

Research on political tolerance is also about reactions directed at the potential source of threat. This research has shown in different contexts that perceptions of particular groups as threatening result in lower levels of tolerance of these groups and in higher support of civil liberties restrictions directed at these groups (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1981; Sullivan et al. 1993).

Another theoretical justification of the general reaction hypothesis concentrates on cognitive processes underlying decisions on political issues. In this sense, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009), for example, argue that individuals employ different coping strategies to counter threat, as a threatening condition is perceived as a negative state. As Davis (2007: 63) argues, diminished cognitive processing characterizes decision making in conditions of threat. Individuals who feel threatened do not consider the full range of available considerations on an issue. Instead, they rely on options such as domestic security policies that are likely to reduce their fears.

These different theoretical arguments are supported by a variety of empirical findings on a positive relationship between perceived security threats and support of antiterrorism policies. Huddy et al. (2005: 594) note that "the effects of threat are especially impressive given its varied definition and measurement." For instance, Davis and Silver (2004) and Davis (2007) find that people with higher levels of perceived (sociotropic) threat are more willing to exchange civil liberties for security. While Joslyn and Haider-Markel (2007) equally show that sociotropic concern about terrorism predicts support for counterterrorism policies, Crowson et al. (2006) find weak direct effects of personal threat on attitudes towards restrictions on human rights. Empirical evidence on a relationship between perceived threat and policy preferences on civil liberties is equally reported by Huddy et al. (2005).

#### Figure 2: Relationships between Threat Perceptions and Support of Anti-Terrorism Policies



*Perceptions of liberty threat:* If individuals perceive their liberty as threatened, then it is reasonable to expect less support for these policies than in case of missing perceptions of liberty threat (see the lower part of Figure 2). The idea behind this is once again that people try to circumvent or counter potential sources of threat (Schoen 2006a: 445). I have shown above to what extent the anti-terrorism policy proposals examined here affect certain civil liberties. As anti-terrorism policies are a possible source of threat to liberty, less support for these policies is to be expected when individuals perceive such a threat.

The theoretical considerations on diminished cognitive processing that might characterize decision making in conditions of threat (e.g. Davis 2007: 63) can also be transferred to the case of liberty threat. Instead of considering the full range of available considerations on an issue, threatened individuals rely on options that are likely to reduce their fears. Defending civil liberties instead of supporting far-reaching anti-terrorism policies is an option to counter fears of suffering from civil liberties restrictions.

However, it must be added here that the negative relationship between perceptions of liberty threat and anti-terrorism policy support might be rather weak. First, it is possible that citizens are more likely to perceive the intended consequences of anti-terrorism policies – ensuring security and public order – than the side effects of these policies (e.g. possible restrictions on civil liberties). This may depend, for example, on how certain policy proposals are discussed in public. Second, it is open to question whether perceptions of liberty threat cause just as many (or less or more) fears as perceptions of security threat (cf. the assumptions of the TMT). Accordingly, it is unclear how strong the relationship between threat to liberty and rejection of anti-terrorism policies actually is.

Now, one might expect people to show a general response to threat. The corresponding general reaction hypothesis<sup>10</sup> would expect a positive (negative) effect of security (liberty) threat on the examined policy attitudes, independent of the ideological positioning of the individual and other factors. However, as argued below, it is very likely that people differ in how relevant perceptions of security threat and of liberty threat are to their policy attitudes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> One could also refer to it as the direct effect hypothesis. As studies in this domain often discuss a direct effect of threat on authoritarianism, this term is not used here. However, because authoritarianism is often measured using items on particular policy positions, findings on a relationship between threat and authoritarianism can in part be seen as empirical support for the general reaction hypothesis.

#### 4.2. The Interplay between Authoritarian Beliefs and Threat

I argue that the consequences of perceived threat for different policy attitudes can only be understood in their interaction with authoritarianism or related ideological orientations. Perceived threat can change rapidly depending on the context. As a situational variable, it is often expected to interact with ideological beliefs and with authoritarianism, in particular. Therefore, I will introduce the concept of authoritarianism in this section and discuss the two possible perspectives on an interplay between authoritarian beliefs and perceptions of threat.

Authoritarianism is one of the most important determinants of support for anti-terrorism policies (see Huq 2013 with an overview). According to Altemeyer (1988, 1996), the syndrome of right-wing authoritarianism comprises three dimensions of covarying orientations: endorsement of traditional norms of society, submission to societal and political authorities, and aggressive rejection of groups which are considered as deviating from prevalent norms.

Authoritarians are negatively oriented towards the loss of order and security (e.g. Hetherington & Suhay 2011: 548). They tend to support those policies that ensure social control or which are directed against people perceived as threatening (e.g. Cohrs et al. 2007: 444). For instance, unconventional people and activities might become the targets of authoritarian aggression. Furthermore, those scoring high in authoritarianism tend to favor laws that strictly regulate people's behavior. Given these descriptions of authoritarianism, authoritarians are expected to support a broad range of anti-terrorism policies (e.g. Altemeyer 1996: 9–11).

Authoritarianism can be understood as an important dimension of ideological beliefs (e.g. Duckitt & Fisher 2003; Duckitt & Sibley 2010).<sup>11</sup> In this perspective, authoritarian dispositions are conceptualized as expressions of motivational goals for social control

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> In these studies, social dominance orientation (SDO) is mentioned as the second dimension of ideological beliefs. Such an orientation consists in a general attitude "toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical". It predicts policy attitudes relevant to group relations (1994: 742). However, this orientation has so far not been proven important for the explanation of anti-terrorism policies. Therefore, it is not further investigated in this study.

and collective security (e.g. Duckitt & Sibley 2009; Jugert et al. 2009). These goals reflect interpretations of the world as dangerous (e.g. Duckitt & Fisher 2003: 201).

The concept of ideology and its use are multifaceted and cannot be discussed in detail here. A basic definition of ideology states "that ideology is shared, that it helps to interpret the social world, and that it normatively specifies (or requires) good and proper ways of addressing life's problems" (Jost et al. 2009: 309). In this sense, ideological orientations or dispositions reflect "images of the good society and the chief means of constructing such a society" (Downs 1957: 96). These basic beliefs are seen as an important guide for citizens' decisions on political issues. In fact, individuals often adopt certain policy positions out of ideological motives, and this in very different policy fields (e.g. Feldman 1988). This need not necessarily be due to the fact that individuals have ideologically structured belief systems. Ideological dispositions can serve as cues, heuristics or shortcuts that help people form opinions about different policies (e.g. Kuklinski & Quirk 2000; Schoen 2006b).

There is relative consensus among researchers today that authoritarianism involves deeply rooted dispositions and beliefs – that might help individuals to interpret the world. Even if it is still controversial whether authoritarianism should be treated as an ideology, a trait, or simply a syndrome of coherent attitudes (e.g. Hetherington & Weiler 2010: 35), the decisive point is that authoritarian dispositions are "situated near the beginning of the causal chain of political reasoning" (Hetherington & Weiler 2010: 36) serving as an important guide for policy attitudes.

The following expectations regarding the interaction between threat and authoritarianism or related ideological orientations are based on theoretical approaches that partly differ in the way they understand and apply the concepts of authoritarianism or related beliefs. Several arguments focus directly on authoritarianism; other ideas refer to the role of ideological dispositions in general. In any case, a study of the consequences of perceived threat for attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies must not ignore the effects of these variables.


The interplay between threat and authoritarianism can be explained by highlighting the moderating role of both variables, reflecting the two-sided character of an interaction.

On the one hand, recent studies emphasize the relevance of situational stimuli in the experience and expression of ideology (e.g. Jost et al. 2003: 340). In this perspective, it is reasonable to expect considerable situational variations in the impact of ideology on specific policy attitudes (e.g. Hetherington & Weiler 2010: 40 on situationism). In threatening situations, ideological postures might manifest themselves in ways other than under non-threatening conditions. On the other hand, particular conditions of threat might only be an important guide for the assessment of anti-terrorism policies for people with certain ideological ideas. Ideological dispositions thus act as a kind of filter through which the world is perceived and judged (e.g. Jost & Amodio 2012). In the following, I will consider the interplay between ideology and perceived threat from these two angles.

# 4.3. The Narrow Perspective on a Positive Interaction between Perceived Security Threats and Authoritarianism

Moving beyond the view of a general response to threat, one might expect that security threat, authoritarianism, and their positive interaction shape attitudes towards antiterrorism policies (see Figure 3 with two sides of the interaction between threat and authoritarianism). I will review the corresponding theoretical arguments and then briefly point to the limited scope of this approach.

#### Figure 3: A Positive Interaction between Security Threat and Authoritarianism



Several researchers suggest that threat activates the consequences of authoritarianism such as intolerance, prejudice, or punitiveness (e.g. Feldman & Stenner 1997). Thus, authoritarianism as an ideological predisposition has to be distinguished from authoritarian reactions in particular situations (such as the demand for restrictive government policies). Statistically, the relevant authors posit that authoritarianism positively interacts with threat in fostering behavioural and attitudinal manifestations of this disposition.

This approach is based on the assumption that authoritarian predispositions originate in the tension between social conformity and personal autonomy (e.g. Feldman 2003: 41). Authoritarians value conformity over autonomy, as "they believe that strongly held and rigorously enforced norms and values are needed to maintain social cohesion and order" (Feldman 2013: 57). To cope with threatening situations, authoritarians show reactions based on these value priorities. These individuals "should be much more likely than those who value autonomy to support the government when it wants to increase its control over social behaviour and punish nonconformity" (Feldman 2003: 49).

Authoritarians not only attach high importance to goals such as conformity and security, they also tend to react to threats of these goals and tend to believe that domestic security policies are effective to guarantee or to re-establish attainment of these goals (Cohrs 2013: 51–52). Thus, one can argue that perceived security threat triggers greater support of anti-terrorism policies among authoritarians or people from the ideological right as these policies are intended to provide security, maintain order and fight against terrorism as an extreme variant of non-conformity. Thus, the higher the perceived security threat, the more authoritarianism fosters support of anti-terrorism policies.

According to this theoretical framework, the positive interaction between security threats and authoritarianism can be even stronger if one considers that those low in authoritarianism become more opposed to these policies when perceptions of threat increase. As Feldman and Stenner (1997: 761–762) observe, perceptions of threat polarize the attitudes of those high and low in authoritarianism, with liberals becoming less punitive and ethnocentric.

This is in line with the hypothesis of worldview defence formulated within the Terror Management Theory: when mortality is made salient, individuals are expected to defend the values to which they are committed (e.g. Greenberg et al. 1990; Pyszczynski et al. 2003). If threats are perceived, the reactions of persons with opposing ideological positions differ widely according to this view - authoritarian persons, for example, tend to defend more restrictive and severe government policies and non-authoritarian persons tend to support more liberal policies.

A similar expectation on the interplay between threat and authoritarianism – but with a focus on the moderating role of ideology (see Figure 3) – can be derived from the motivated social cognition model of ideology (e.g. Jost et al. 2003; Jost et al. 2007; Thóris-dóttir & Jost 2011). Offering a motivational and situational account of political ideology, it holds that people adopt particular ideologies to satisfy different psychological needs (Jost et al. 2003). This approach focuses on psychological and neurological processes that are associated with the holding of different ideologies. It thus ties in with early works studying the relationship between personality and ideological positions (e.g. Adorno 1950). Specifically, conservative ideologies serve to manage uncertainty, threat, and fear. This idea can be expanded to rightist or authoritarian beliefs. According to this approach, conservatives are particularly motivated to attain certainty and security and to resolve threat (e.g. Jost & Amodio 2012: 62). In order to achieve these goals, appropriate policies can be supported.

The study from Oxley et al. (2008) fits in well with this – showing that people who are physiologically more sensitive to threat tend to support conservative positions, while individuals with a lower threat sensitivity are more likely to support liberal or leftist positions. To put it another way, conservatives might be more likely to react to security threat in supporting government policies intended to provide for more safety. In this perspective, it is also reasonable to expect that security threats will have a greater impact on policy attitudes of people with conservative or authoritarian beliefs than on the respective attitudes of liberals or non-authoritarians.

Several studies provide empirical support for the expected positive interaction between perceived threat and authoritarianism: Feldman and Stenner (1997) use NES data from

the United States and examine a wide range of dependent variables. They find strong connections between authoritarian predispositions and attitudinal manifestations of authoritarianism (e.g. preference for order vs. freedom, support of the death penalty) in the presence of threat. The results of several experimental studies with undergraduate students in the U.S. as participants suggest "that the cognitive and behavioral dispositions of authoritarians require the presence of at least a modicum of environmental threat to be put in action" (Lavine et al. 2002: 358).

Feldman (2003) equally focusses on a particular type of threat. Using data from a survey among undergraduate students, he shows that values on the social conformity – autonomy dimension are associated with intolerant attitudes and prejudice under the condition of perceived threat to social cohesion. Presenting data from student and nonstudent samples recruited in Germany, Stellmacher and Petzel (2005) provide empirical support for a positive interaction between threat and group authoritarianism.

In their comprehensive study on citizens' reactions to threat in the United States and Mexico, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) show, amongst others, that authoritarian predispositions are activated under conditions of terrorist threat. Stenner (2005) presents results from experimental studies and from analyses of survey data from the United States. She finds that normative threat, in particular, activates authoritarian predispositions and magnifies their influence on different forms of intolerant attitudes.

However, these arguments and findings in favour of a positive interaction between threat and authoritarianism mainly focus on the moderating effect of threat to social order and cohesion or on normative threat (e.g. Stenner 2005: 19–20). It needs to be questioned that authoritarians react similarly to other kinds of threat such as perceived threat to security. Furthermore, most of the empirical findings on such an interaction are observed when threat is operationalised via perceived ideological distance or negativity toward presidential candidates (Feldman & Stenner 1997; e.g. Feldman 2003). Such an operationalization of threat does not include the kinds of security threat analysed here. Therefore, another variant of an interaction effect of perceived security threat and authoritarianism on attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies will be discussed in the next subchapter.

# 4.4. Expectations about a Negative Interaction between Perceived Security Threat and Authoritarianism

Non-authoritarians or people from the ideological left might be more likely to react to security threat in altering their views and becoming more supportive of anti-terrorism policies. Furthermore, perceived security threat might be more influential for support of anti-terrorism policies among non-authoritarians or liberals. There are convincing theoretical arguments as well as empirical findings supporting this hypothesis of a negative interaction between ideological beliefs and perceived security threat (e.g. Nail et al. 2009; Hetherington & Weiler 2010; Hetherington & Suhay 2011; Vasilopoulos et al. 2018).

To substantiate this perspective on an interplay between threat and ideological disposition (see Figure 4), I will use two theoretical approaches – the theory of affective intelligence and a particular reading of the model of motivated social cognition. In the theory of affective intelligence, the emotional state of perceived threat is the starting point, while the arguments on motivated social cognition focus on the psychological functions of ideology.

Figure 4: A Negative Interaction between Security Threat and Authoritarianism



The theory of affective intelligence is particularly apt to take into account perceived threat as a situational variable and its moderating role (see the left part of Figure 4). This theory states that people have two strategies of making decisions available. Different situations require that individuals switch between different ways of making decisions (MacKuen et al. 2007: 124–129). This also holds for attitudes and behaviour in the domain of politics, such as voting decisions or judgements on political issues.

The proponents of this theory differentiate between two geographies of situations: In the geography of familiar situations, people rely on previously learned routines. They consider information provided by their disposition system and resort to learned repertoires of heuristics and dispositions such as ideology, value priorities, or party identification. In known and safe situations, it would be too costly to make new decisions without routines.

The geography of unfamiliar and uncertain situations poses different demands on individual decision-making. In these situations, "it would likely be potentially dangerous to ignore contemporary information and to rely thoughtlessly on preexisting courses of action" (Marcus et al. 2005: 951). Instead, the surveillance system is activated and pushes individuals to set aside reliance on routines and to rely on thoughtful consideration when making a judgment. According to the theory, "anxiety is the surveillance system's method of signalling that the moment has come to look for some new solution to novel environmental circumstances" (Marcus et al. 2000: 57).

Referring to this theory, one can argue that perceived security threat triggers greater support of anti-terrorism policies among non-authoritarians or people from the ideological left: Perceptions of security threat are an intrinsic feature of the geography of uncertain situations (e.g. Marcus et al. 2000: 56). As discussed above, perceived threats are often accompagnied by fears that might activate an individual's surveillance system.

Under these circumstances, non-authoritarian and left-wing citizens are less reliant on their convictions and more attentive to contemporary information with respect to the threatening situation (e.g. Marcus et al. 2005: 952). They "tend to ignore their ideological dispositions and move in the direction of endorsing calls for restrictive measures that seek to protect the public" (Vasilopoulos et al. 2018: 5). Authoritarians and right-wing citizens however, do not see themselves confronted with a challenge of their convictions.

Based on the theory of affective intelligence, I expect negative interactions between authoritarianism on the one hand and perceived threat on the other hand when it comes to the antecedents of attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies. In order for this to happen, however, within the framework of this theory the following condition must be fulfilled.<sup>12</sup> Perceptions of threat should be accompanied above all by fears. For instance, as Vasilopoulos et al. (2018) show, the attitudinal consequences of anger felt in threatening situations can be completely different. This cannot be explicitly modelled in the present study, but the measurement of perceived threat will account for this emotional aspect of perceived threat.

A specific reading of the motivated social cognition model of conservatism might also serve as theoretical justification for a negative interaction between security threat and authoritarianism or right-wing ideology (e.g. Jost et al. 2003; Jost et al. 2007; Thórisdóttir & Jost 2011). These arguments focus on the moderating role of ideology (see the right part of Figure 4).

According to Nail et al. (2009), so-called reactive liberals adopt more conservative positions when they feel threatened. In contrast, conservatives "tend to feel chronically under threat [...]. Thus, they might be less reactive to specific situational threats than liberals" (Nail et al. 2009: 901). In this perspective, liberals are particularly sensitive to conditions of threat and tend to support more authoritarian policy positions. Authoritarians do not feel a need to change their existing policy preferences. Thus, the antiterrorism policy attitudes of the more and less liberal or the non-authoritarians are expected to converge in the presence of perceived security threat.

In a similar vein, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) argue that normal times are always threatening for authoritarians. As they already support hawkish policies in the absence of threat, these citizens are not likely to alter their policy preferences in response to a particular threat. In other words, the more authoritarian the beliefs, the less the impact of security threats on these policy orientations. Non-authoritarians, however, react to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In addition, it is not clear what mode of decision individuals resort to when threats do not create a truly new situation, but when individuals have already get used to these conditions for some time. This question could be addressed with the help of panel data, for example.

threatening situations in expressing more support for policies fighting against these threats.


Several studies provide empirical evidence in favour of the expected interaction between perceived threat and authoritarianism (or conservative or right-wing positions): Hetherington and Suhay (2011) examine data from two surveys conducted in the United States. They find that those scoring low in authoritarianism adopt more restrictive antiterrorism policy positions (e.g. support of warrantless wiretapping, support of the use of torture) when they feel threatened. Authoritarians, however, do not become significantly more supportive of these policies in times of threat. Hetherington and Weiler (2010) equally focus on the U.S. population and show that the effect of authoritarianism on support for different policies limiting civil liberties decreases as perceived threat increases. When levels of threat are very high, the policy preferences of authoritarians and non-authoritarians do not significantly differ from each other. Malhotra and Popp (2012) conduct a survey experiment in the U.S. They find that threat perceptions are significantly related to preferences for anti-terrorism policies and that threatened Democrats, in particular, drive this relationship.

Vasilopoulos et al. (2018) find a negative interaction between fear and left-right scale in assessing the conditional impact of fear and anger on a broad range of authoritarian policy preferences in France. Finally, Nail et al. (2009) focus on dependent variables other than support of anti-terrorism policies (e.g. in-group favouritism). They show that experimentally induced threat causes liberals to become more conservative in their policy preferences.

## 4.5. Expectations about a Positive Interaction between Perceived Liberty Threat and Authoritarianism

An interaction between perceived threat and authoritarian beliefs is also theoretically plausible when it comes to liberty threats. The consequences of this kind of perceived threat have so far played no role in research. Therefore, the above considerations must be transferred to this type of threat. Arguments about an interplay between liberty threat and authoritarianism are supported by the fact that an interaction between ideology and threat has already observed in the context of different threats (e.g. Stellmacher & Petzel 2005; Stenner 2005). I expect a positive interaction between perceived liberty threat and authoritarianism to be relevant for support of different anti-terrorism policy proposals (see Figure 5 with two sides of the interaction between threat and authoritarianism).

#### Figure 5: A Positive Interaction between Perceived Liberty Threat and Authoritarianism



As outlined above, some researchers suggest that threat – as a situational variable – activates different attitudinal consequences of threat depending on one's ideological beliefs. In particular, if threats to liberty are involved, the scenario of an attitude polarization is very plausible (Feldman & Stenner 1997: 761–762): Once these threats are perceived, non-authoritarians tend to advocate liberal policies (and reject more government intervention in the domain of domestic policy). Authoritarians, by contrast, do not change their preferences for more restrictive and severe government policies in response to liberty threats. This means that the more people perceive threats to liberty, the stronger the influence of (differences in) authoritarian beliefs on support of anti-terrorism policies will be. This argument focuses on threat as a situational variable and its moderating role.

The hypothesis of a positive interaction between perceived threats to liberty and authoritarian beliefs can also be based on the argument that particular types of threats are only relevant for people with certain ideological beliefs. This argument focuses on the moderating role of ideology. The negative effect of perceived threat to liberty on attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies discussed above is probably particularly pronounced among people scoring low on authoritarianism. These individuals are supposed to attach high importance to goals such as liberty and non-conformity (as value priorities opposed to those of authoritarians). Therefore, perceived threats of these goals should clearly relate to opposition towards anti-terrorism policies among non-authoritarians but not among authoritarians.

According to this perspective, authoritarians do not feel concerned by potential civil liberties restrictions while non-authoritarians do. Thus, in a situation of perceived liberty threats, non-authoritarians/liberals are particularly motivated to defend their ideological positions on the issue of anti-terrorism policies. In other words, the less authoritarian convictions one holds, the more negative the effect of perceived threats to liberty.

One might argue that the impact of authoritarianism diminishes with increasing perceptions of liberty threat, expecting a negative interaction between authoritarianism and perceived liberty threat. After all, for those scoring high in authoritarianism, these threats may not represent a situation in which their beliefs are activated. However, for a weaker effect to occur, these threats should not activate the beliefs of non-authoritarians to a particular degree – which is not very plausible.

Furthermore, one can argue that authoritarians do not attach high importance to liberty but rather to goals such as order, security, or conformity (see above). A perceived threat to liberty would not jeopardize these goals. Therefore, the more authoritarian the beliefs, the weaker the effect of perceived threats could be. This expectation is plausible if one considers this kind of threat to be irrelevant to authoritarians. However, it is unlikely that the analyses will show a negative interaction for the following reason: As stated above, perceptions of liberty threat are supposed to have a negative impact on people's support of anti-terrorism policies. Therefore, an attenuating negative influence should be expected, which would mean that – statistically speaking – one should observe a positive interaction effect.

### 4.6. Further Considerations

It will be shown in the empirical part of this study if these hypotheses on an interplay between threat and authoritarianism help to explain people's attitudes towards antiterrorism policies. However, a remark on other possible relationships is necessary at this point of my study.

In addition to these models of interaction, mediating processes are also conceivable in the relationship between threat, authoritarianism and support of anti-terrorism policies, which, however, are not examined here. On the one hand, there are reasons to expect authoritarian tendencies to develop in situations of threat (e.g. Hetherington & Suhay 2011: 547), which in turn result in stronger support for anti-terrorism policies. In this perspective, the relationship between perceived threat and attitudes towards antiterrorism policies is mediated by authoritarian dispositions. This is a possible scenario. However, it is only conceivable as a process over a longer period of time, since authoritarian dispositions are regarded as relatively stable fundamental beliefs that hardly change after their formation at a young age. Therefore, a cross-sectional study of this mediating process is not appropriate. Further analyses with a longitudinal design could provide information about the existence of these processes.

Yet another approach suggests that perceived threat mediates the effect of authoritarian dispositions on different kinds of attitudes such as prejudice against groups (Cohrs & Ibler 2009) or support of policies directed at specific minorities (Canetti et al. 2009; Dunwoody & McFarland 2017). Following these studies, those scoring high in authoritarianism are more sensitive to threats than those scoring low in authoritarianism, because their worldview makes them more likely to react to threats (e.g. Dunwoody & McFarland 2017). The perceptions of threat then result in preferences for policies capable of eliminating supposed threats. Although this mediation is plausible, an adequate analysis of these relationships would imply a detailed investigation of the antecedents of perceived threat, which is not the focus of this study.

## 5. Data and Measurement

In this chapter, I will provide extensive information about the survey data used to test the theoretical expectations set out above and about the context of the survey.<sup>13</sup> I will also describe how the key concepts in this study (support of a broad range of anti-terrorism policies, perceived threat, and authoritarianism) and the control variables are measured.

#### 5.1. Survey Data

My analyses are based on data from a national telephone survey on civil liberties and support of anti-terrorism policies in Germany. The survey was part of a research project entitled "Conditional support for civil liberties and preferences for domestic security policies among citizens in Germany." The project was run at the Institute for Social Sciences of the University of Stuttgart, directed by the author of the present study, and funded by the German Research Foundation DFG (grant number: 270157613). I will refer to the survey as "Support for Civil Liberties (CIVLIB), 2016" when indicating the data source of the models presented below.

The survey was fielded by forsa<sup>14</sup> and attained a response rate of 22 per cent (AAPOR, RR 1<sup>15</sup>). This is in the usual range of response rates of Random-Digit Dialing surveys in Germany fielded in the last years. 2004 computer assisted telephone interviews were conducted between April 12 and June 7, 2016. The target population consisted of persons of the age of 18 and older living in private households in Germany.

In a dual frame design, randomly generated and listed numbers from mobile phones and landline connections were randomly selected (30 per cent mobile phones and 70 per cent landline connections). In a second step, the target persons from households with landline connections were randomly selected by means of the next-birthday method. The average interview lasted 26 minutes, item nonresponse was very low for the ques-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The analyses in this study were performed using Stata 15 (2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The LINK Institut für Markt- und Sozialforschung was engaged to conduct the survey. After the takeover of the LINK Institute's survey division by forsa.main the project was continued by forsa from April 1, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> American Association for Public Opinion Research (2011). Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys (7th ed.).

tions analysed in this study. 32 per cent of the interviews have been conducted with mobile phones, 68 per cent via landline connections. There are no significant differences in the average interview duration between landline and mobile phone interviews.

Table 2 compares selected socio-demographic metrics collected by the survey with metrics from the official statistics. The results show that the (weighted) sample represents a good approximation of the total population. Most of the following analyses will be based on weighted data. The weight is based on the combined characteristics gender, age, and East/West Germany, and on the federal state's share of the country's population. It balances design-related differences in the selection probabilities and corrects for non-responses and incomplete responses.

	Official Statistics	CATI	CATI weighted
Age groups in % (18+)	Statistisches Bundesamt 2015		
* ` `	(Statistisches Jahrbuch)		
18-25	9.2	6.3	9.2
25-40	21.8	18.7	21.9
40-60	36.6	41.4	36.3
60-65	7.5	10.2	9.9
65+	24.8	23.5	22.7
	Statistisches Bundesamt 2015		
Gender in %	(Genesis.destatis.de)		
male	49.3	50.2	48.4
female	50.7	49.8	51.6
	Statistisches Bundesamt 2015		
Federal States	(Statistisches Jahrbuch)		
1 Baden-Württemberg	13.0	13.3	13.1
2 Bavaria	15.5	16.4	15.6
3 Berlin	4.3	5.1	4.3
4 Brandenburg	3.1	3.2	3.1
5 Bremen	0.8	0.8	0.8
6 Hamburg	2.2	2.2	2.2
7 Hesse	7.5	7.3	7.5
8 Mecklenburg-West Pomerania	2.0	2	2
9 Lower Saxony	9.6	9.8	9.6
10 North Rhine-Westphalia	21.6	21.4	21.6
11 Rhineland-Palatinate	4.9	4.5	4.9
12 Saarland	1.3	1.2	1.3
13 Saxony	5.1	5.1	5.1
14 Saxony-Anhalt	2.9	2.7	2.8
15 Schleswig-Holstein	3.5	3	3.5
16 Thuringia	2.7	2.4	2.7

Table 2: Surveyed Socio-Demographics in Comparison with Official Statistics

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; sources of the official statistics are listed in the References.

#### 5.2. Issues and Events during the Survey Period

There is good reason to believe that events and discussions about certain issues during the survey period have the potential to influence the surveyed attitudes of the respondents. This applies to the salience of issues in the population, but possibly also to the general direction of assessments related to political and social issues. Empirical evidence from studies in various fields of research justifies this belief. Election research, for example, has observed effects that events have on attitudes towards parties or the government (e.g. Bytzek 2011). Findings from communications research and studies on agenda setting show that events and issues (covered by the media) might affect people's judgement (e.g. Schildkraut & Muschert 2013 with an overview).

The analysis of perceived threat as a determinant of attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies needs to take the attitudinal consequences of terrorist attacks (e.g. Kossowska et al. 2011) and of major updates of the corresponding legislation during the study period into account (see works on the potential influence of policies on policy attitudes, e.g. Soss & Schram 2007).

Events and issues in connection with terrorism and anti-terror policies during the study period (April 12 – June 7, 2016) were reviewed for prominent cases of which respondents may have been more aware than of others and which may therefore have played a greater role in their judgement. For this purpose the contents of two national daily newspapers (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) were filtered for the keywords "terrorism", "domestic security", "crime", and "civil liberties", starting one week before the beginning of the survey period and ending at the same time as the field study (April 5 – June 7, 2016).<sup>16</sup>

To come straight to the most important result, there was no major terrorist attack in Germany or Europe and the Bundestag did not pass any anti-terror policies during this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> A comprehensive analysis of events and issues covered by the media is not the purpose of this study and would have been based on a less limited selection of media for the research (two print media). Evidently, the chosen approach allows the identification of important events and issues, but does not provide an encompassing picture of all discussions in times marked by a highly fragmented media audience e.g. Cacciatore et al. (2015: 18).

period. However, the keyword search generated a picture of the relevant issues dominating at that time, which is presented below.

Reports about an increasing number of Islamists representing a threat to public safety in Germany, about investigations following earlier attacks in Paris and Brussels, and about a religiously motivated attack on a Sikh temple in Essen committed by adolescents confirm the presence of the terrorist threat. The papers also reported about fighting and attacks by the IS and the Taliban in countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. Acts of terrorism and violence by representatives of the extreme right were another major issue, with the papers focusing on new questions in connection with the ongoing NSU trial. There were also reports about attacks on refugee hostels committed by extreme right groups. Crime threat was covered in articles discussing the assaults in Cologne in the night of December 31, 2015 or reporting rising number of burglaries.

The papers also explored the refugee question, repeatedly reporting on the numbers of refugees flowing into the country, the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, and the potential lifting of border controls. What is relevant in the context of the present study is the worry that terrorists might enter the country in the guise of refugees, which was repeatedly expressed and reported in the press.

Both papers discussed various aspects of government measures against terrorism. This includes proposals of additional anti-terror measures (e.g. employing the Bundeswehr to ensure domestic security, expansion of video surveillance) that were no longer pursued by the legislative authority. They also reported about the cabinet bill for a new anti-terror package, which was passed only after the end of the study period (see chapter 2.2 above), and about the introduction of new anti-terrorism policies in neighbouring countries (France, Poland) and of a new EU directive about the retention of passenger data records.

Finally, the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court with regard to the Federal Criminal Police Office Act represents an important event potentially affecting people's attitudes to anti-terror measures: on April 20, 2016 many parts of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act of 2009 were declared unconstitutional. While the Court did not revoke the Federal Criminal Police Office's general right to surveillance within the limits of the law, it established strict conditions to ensure the protection of privacy (Süddeutsche.de 2016).

# 5.3. Measuring and Describing Support of Anti-Terrorism Policy Proposals in Germany

After having reviewed the broad range of anti-terrorism policies in the focus of this study in chapter 2.3, the present subchapter focuses on the measurement of attitudes towards these policies and on the levels of support for these measures. In line with many previous studies, the analysed policy positions are briefly presented to the survey respondents, but neither individual instruments nor the specific design of certain measures (e.g. data retention) are described in detail.


This approach prevents the assessment of policy positions from hanging on parameters that relate to specific regulations or details. This has several reasons: First, the approach is consistent with findings from attitudes research, according to which political issues are not at the centre of people's interests and that people are unable or unwilling to consider all details of such programmes (e.g. Sniderman et al. 2001). Second, with regard to policy measures that have already been implemented, the format of the survey does not permit the unabridged presentation of the highly complex legal texts.

The following items represent the operationalisations of the policy proposals introduced above (for more detailed information on these variables see Table A-1 in the Appendix). The items are presented immediately after the introductory question (the short version used in Figures and Tables is given in parentheses): "Which of the following measures should government agencies be allowed to use in order to fight terrorism? Please evaluate these proposals...".

- To torture a suspect if it is a means to obtain information about planned terrorist attacks (torture of suspects)
- To detain terror suspects preventively for several days, even without any concrete evidence that they committed offences (preventive detention)
- To prevent people from leaving the country if they are suspected of joining a terrorist group abroad (no country leave)

- To subject people of certain external characteristics or backgrounds to tighter controls (racial profiling)
- To search the home of terror suspects without a warrant (home search)
- To record personal information and fingerprints of suspects in a database and to fight terrorism (database)
- To monitor telephone calls and online activities of suspects without a warrant (surveillance of communication)
- To make professions of sympathy for terrorists in social networks a punishable offence (control social networks)
- To ban public speeches containing professions of sympathy for terrorists (ban public speech)
- To ban all demonstrations and strikes when there is an imminent threat of terrorism (no demonstrations if threat)

#### Figure 6: Mean Support of Antiterrorism Policy Proposal, 2016



Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.

Notes:

Figure 6 shows the mean support for each proposal on a 0-10 scale. It reveals that the assessments of the individual proposals differ considerably. The analyses performed later will need to determine whether the relevance of perceived threat for these attitudes follows a similar pattern.

The most severe proposal, which supports the torture of suspects as a means of extracting information about planned attacks, finds the least average approval (1.64) This is in line with previous results (e.g. Brooks & Manza 2013: 102). Nearly five percent of the respondents fully agree with this position, while just over 67 percent do not agree with it at all (values not included in the table). Average approval of racial profiling is also very low (3.15). The proposals with low approval ratings would clearly violate the right to physical integrity and the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination.

The preventive detention of terror suspects (5.24), the ban of demonstrations if there is a terrorist threat (5.25), and the suggested monitoring of communication (5.69) and home search of terror suspects (6.02) have medium average approval ratings. With the exception of the ban of demonstrations, all proposals target suspects and thus a narrow circle of people.

Respondents expressed relatively broad approval, on average, for the punishment of professions of sympathy for terrorists in social networks (6.77) and in public speeches (7.23), although neither proposal reflects current legislation. The proposal to store data on suspects in a database and the proposal to prevent people suspected of intending to join terrorists groups abroad from leaving the country received the highest average approval ratings. Both policies have been implemented at least in part, both score low on severity, and both target the narrow group of terrorist suspects.

Even though attitudes to individual policies are in some cases closely related (see Table A-5), they will be analysed separately below, for the following reasons: First, the proposals or implemented policies are independent, hence it is neither desirable nor meaningful to study a pattern of attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies – e.g. in the form of an aggregate index. Second, the focus of the study is the connections between perceived threat and attitudes to various anti-terrorism policies. This includes the question of whether there are similar relationships between threat and policy attitudes across differ-


ent kinds of programs. Any differences might be lost if attitudes to different policies would be combined in an aggregate metric. The empirical analysis will need to pay special attention to the absence or presence of consistent connections across the various models.


#### 5.4. Measuring Perceived Threat

The measure of perceived threat used in this study is based on a set of questions asking whether respondents feared several kinds of threat to personal safety and security in the context of crime and terrorism (see Table 3 and Table A-2 in the Appendix). This way of measuring perceptions of threat is similar to the approach used in many other studies. Survey participants indicated on a seven-point scale how afraid they were of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack, of terrorist attacks happening in Germany, of becoming a victim of domestic burglary, and of becoming a victim of assault. To measure perceived threat to personal liberty, respondents were asked whether they were afraid of their privacy being infringed by government surveillance. One could argue that this measurement of threat to personal liberty is limited as it does not consider different dimensions of liberties. However, the privacy of a person is closely linked to other freedoms and can be threatened in many ways (e.g. Westin 1970; Solove 2011).

These measures of perceived threat have been tested and compared with other question and response formats in cognitive interviews (e.g. Beatty & Willis 2007; Lenzner et al. 2016) conducted in preparation of the main survey. One important result of these interviews was that alternative question wordings focusing on "feelings of threat" and on "perceived risks" were observed to result in a more distant perception of threat. Pretest participants raised concerns about the personal relevance of the different forms of threats when alternative formats were tested. Some researchers use an individual's perceived likelihood of further terrorist attacks as a measure of perceived terrorist threat (Gadarian 2010: 473). As this measure focuses on an individual's predictions rather than on his/her perceptions of the present, it was not employed in this study.

Finally, the following points have to be made concerning survey design and question order in this study: First, it is possible that a question on perceived threat leads to an increased level of threat among respondents. Second, such a question can serve as a stimulus fostering attitudes towards antiterrorism policies as it makes these threats more salient to (some) respondents. Therefore, this question is asked in the last part of the questionnaire, after relevant attitudes on antiterrorism policies, political trust, authoritarian dispositions etc. As Hetherington and Suhay (2011: 551) point out, it seems unlikely that supporters of torture or other curtailments of civil liberties to fight terrorism, will, as a result of their policy attitudes surveyed before, perceive a heightened level of threat.





Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.

A comparative look at the mean responses to the different threat questions (see Figure 7) shows that people are most afraid of terrorist attacks happening in Germany (mean response of 5.91, items rescaled from 0 to 10), this is followed by the fear of becoming a victim of domestic burglary and by the fear of privacy infringements. People are least concerned of personal terrorist threat and of the threat of becoming a victim of an assault. Thus, it is not personal but sociotropic threat from terrorism that is most common among respondents. Another observation deserves closer attention: fears of privacy infringements exist among a considerable part of the population. Thus, concerns about violations of personal liberties have to be taken seriously in research on the attitudinal consequences of perceived threat.

As Table 3 shows, the different perceptions of security threat are strongly correlated with each other. Contrary to what might have been expected from the ample literature on liberty and security as counterparts, the different perceptions of security threat and the perception of threat to privacy by government infringements are positively correlated. Apparently, people who feel threatened might not separate between threat from very different sources. However, as these correlations are at a low level, perceived security and liberty threats can be considered separately in further analyses.

A principal component analysis shows the one-dimensionality of the different perceptions of security threat (see column entitled EFA in Table 4), with an eigenvalue of the single factor of 2.84 and 57 per cent of explained variance. The factor loadings are all above .75, indicating that each of the four threat items contribute to this factor of perceived security threat.

To further test if it is indicated to combine these items into one scale, a Mokken analysis is performed (e.g. Mokken 1971; Hardouin et al. 2011). Mokken scaling is a nonparametric probabilistic scaling technique similar to Gutmann scaling (van Schuur 2003). It can be applied to dichotomous and polytomous items. Mokken scaling can fit data that might fail to fit in factor analysis procedures (e.g. van der Heijden et al. 2003). Loevinger's coefficient H for one-dimensionality of the entire scale reaches .55, indicating a strong scale (Mokken 1971). The reliability of the scale is good with a Cronbach's alpha of .81. All four items fit clearly on the scale ( $H_i$ -scores for each item between .50 and .56).

Are you afraid of	Victim terrorist attack	Terrorist attack Germany	Victim burglary	Victim assault	Privacy infringement
becoming a victim of a terrorist attack?	1	.56**	.40**	.58**	.17**
terrorist attacks happening in Germany?		1	.43**	.49**	.13**
becoming a victim of domestic burglary?			1	.60**	.11**
becoming a victim of assault?				1	.16**
your privacy being infringed?					1

### **Table 3: Correlations between Perceived Threat Variables**

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data;<sup>\*\*</sup> =  $p \le 0.01$ .

# **Table 4: Dimensionality of Perceived Security Threat**

	EFA	Mokken
Are you afraid of	Factor Loadings	Coef. (Hi)
(seven-point scale, rescaled from 0 to 10)		
becoming a victim of a terrorist attack?	.80	.56
terrorist attacks happening in Germany?	.78	.54
becoming a victim of domestic burglary?	.76	.51
becoming a victim of assault?	.85	.50
Cronbach's a / Coef. (H) Scale		.81 / .55
N	1,998	2004

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data; N = valid cases. EFA (exploratory factor analysis): Explained variance, eigenvalue: 57%, 2.84; KMO: .75. PCA, oblimin.

The literature on this topic often distinguishes between personal and sociotropic threat. However, the analyses presented above do not provide empirical support for the respondents' differentiation between these two dimensions of threat. To test whether this result can be attributed to the use of only one item on sociotropic threat, another principal component analysis was conducted with an additional item. This item measures an individual's assessment of the current security situation in Germany on a scale from very insecure to very secure. In its reversed form, it can serve as a measure of perceived sociotropic threat. The analysis still produces a one-dimensional factor solution, but with weak factor loadings of the item added for test purposes (data not shown here). In the light of these results, the four items presented in Table 4 are combined to an additive index of perceived security threat. A rather slight and positive correlation of .18 (Pearson's r correlation coefficient, N = 1,993) between this index and the perception of liberty threat can be reported.

## 5.5. Measuring Authoritarianism

The issue of an adequate mesurement of authoritarianism merits closer attention as it is related to results on the relationship between this disposition and threat and as there is a continuing debate around different ways of measuring authoritarianism. The dispute primarily focuses on the dimensionality of authoritarian beliefs and on the danger of tautological explanations inherent in some measures of authoritarianism. After a short review of the debate and of existing measures the scale used in this study will be closely inspected.

Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) not only theoretically reframed the nature and consequences of authoritarianism. He also proposed a new scale to measure right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) – as a revision of the F-scale developed by Adorno et al. (1950). The RWA scale consists of 34 covarying items intended to tap the three subdimensions of authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism. The RWA scale can be considered as "the most widely used measure" of authoritarian beliefs (Hetherington & Weiler 2010: 47). The scale and its shortened or slightly modified versions are frequently employed in authoritarianism research.

Critical discussions of the RWA scale mainly revolve around two issues. First, a misfit is observed between the dimensionality of the construct and the measure: Altemeyer distinguishes between three facets of authoritarianism but develops a one-dimensional RWA scale with several items that measure several subdimensions simultaneously<sup>17</sup> (e.g. Funke 2005; Dunwoody & Funke 2016). In particular, it has been emphasised on several occasions that the scale is not balanced and contains a lot of items tapping conventional and conservative beliefs – leading to the problem of content overlap between authoritarianism as measured by the RWA scale and conservative ideology (e.g. Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005; van Hiel et al. 2007).

Second, many items of the scale are at a low level of abstraction and measure orientations towards particular groups, authorities or moral questions of the time the scale was developed. As a result, the scale is not only context-dependent but tautological with the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See Funke (2005: 200) with an illustrative example of such an item in the scale tapping all three subdimensions.

dependent variables in many investigations on the consequences of authoritarianism. This is an important criticism of the RWA scale that has been repeatedly made (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005; Dunwoody & Funke 2016). For instance, Stenner (2005: 22) notices that the scale is "hopelessly tautological with the dependent variable it purpots to explain".

In the following, several alternative scales have been developed to measure authoritarianism – slightly modifying or completely revising Altemeyer's RWA scale: The scale developed by Petzel et al. (1997) constitutes a very short nine-item measure of authoritarianism often used in studies conducted in Germany (e.g. Lüdemann 2001). However, it faces the problem of tautology described above as it contains several items tapping orientations towards specific political issues or groups. The same applies for two alternative scales accounting for three subdimensions of authoritarianism: the RWA<sup>3</sup>D scale developed by Funke (2005) and the authoritarianism-traditionalism-conservatism (ACT) scale constructed by Duckitt et al. (2010).

A different approach to the issue is adopted by Feldman (2003). He theoretically argues that the relative priority given to social conformity on the one hand or autonomy on the other is at the basis of authoritarianism. Consequently, he develops a social conformity-autonomy (SCA) scale, with 17 items forming a one-dimensional measure. The items of the SCA scale and also the Child Rearing Values (CRV) measures used by Feldman and Stenner (1997) and Stenner (2005) tap relatively abstract orientations as these authors address the problem of tautology described above. However, these instruments are not employed here as they are narrow measures of authoritarianism focusing on one value dimension underlying authoritarianism rather than on the broad character of authoritarianism an beliefs described by Altemeyer (1981).

The measure of authoritarianism used in this study is based on the KSA-3 short scale developed by Beierlein et al. (2014) with a reduced number of items (see Table A-2 in the Appendix for full question wording and descriptives). The existing authoritarianism scales employed in Germany were used as a starting point for the development of a new instrument. The two weaknesses of existing measures of authoritarianism discussed above were addressed. The KSA-3 short scale is designed to measure the pattern of au-

thoritarianism and to distinguish between the three subdimensions of authoritarian aggression, submission, and conventionalism. The scale contains items that are not context-dependent and not suspected to measure those attitudinal consequences that are frequently explained by authoritarian beliefs.

The reliability and validity of the scale have been tested in online pilot samples (see Beierlein et al. 2014 on the logic of construction and the empirical tests of this scale). Several items used are similar to those retained in the more comprehensive aggressionsubmission-conventionalism (ASC) scale recently developed by Dunwoody and Funke (2016) and tested among U.S. participants. For the sake of brevity, which is an important advantage of the measurement instrument used in this study, it does not contain positive and negative items to balance response behavior.

To help respondents consider the whole range of the response scale of each item and to reduce the number of biased responses, the interviewer in the survey "Support for Civil Liberties" had the possibility to add information on the authoritarianism question. She was allowed to supplement the question introduction by the following information: "These topics are often occupied by parties with distinct positions. There is, however, a variety of opinions on these topics. This variety is what the scientists of this study are interested in."

To assess whether the items of the KSA-3 used in this study adequately measure the construct of authoritarianism, several analyses are conducted. It will be examined whether it is acceptable to use a one-dimensional measure of authoritarianism in subsequent analyses. Table 5 displays the results of a principal component analysis. In this analysis, one factor of authoritarianism emerges with an eigenvalue of 3.03 and 43 per cent of explained variance (the eigenvalues of other possible factors are below 1). The factor loadings are not very high but do not vary considerably (between .64 and .69), indicating that each of the seven items contributes equally to the factor.

## **Table 5: Dimensionality of Authoritarianism**

	EFA	Mokken
What do you think of the following statements?	Factor Loadings	Coef. (Hi)
A1: Society should act against Do-nothings	.64	.33
A2: Trouble-makers unwanted in society	.65	.36
A3: Social rules should be enforced	.66	.33
S1: Leave important decisions in society to leaders.	.66	.34
S2: We should be grateful for leaders	.65	.33
C1: Good practices should not be questioned.	.65	.33
C2: It is always the best to do things the conventional way	.69	.36
Cronbach's a / Coef. (H) Scale		.78 / .34
N	1,875	2,004

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data; N = valid cases. EFA: Explained variance, eigenvalue: 43%, 3.03; KMO: .83. PCA, oblimin.

### Table 6: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Authoritarianism: Model Comparison

	Μ	lodels
Fit indices and factor loadings	1 higher-order dimension	One dimension
	3 first-order dimensions	
Chi <sup>2</sup>	35.79	48.15
df	11	12
Significance	.00	.00
AIC	64774.721	64785.08
BIC	64907.594	64912.42
CFI	0.991	0.987
TLI	0.984	0.978
SRMR	0.018	0.021
RMSEA (p-close)	0.035 (0.975)	0.040 (0.908)
Factor loadings (first order: A)	.60; .64; .61	
Factor loadings (first order: S)	.74; .73	
Factor loadings (first order: C)	.62; .67	
Factor loadings (higher-order – A; S; C)	.85; .73; .98	

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; covariations between factors in a three-dimensional model (same fit indices as in model with higher-order dimension): .62; .83; .71 (A-S; A-C; S-C); estimation method: maximum likelihood (results do not differ largely if ml with missing values – mlmv – is conducted); N=1,875.

In a second step, Mokken analysis is performed to further test whether it is appropriate to combine these items into one scale of authoritarianism (right column of Table 5). All the items fit on one scale. H<sub>i</sub>-scores for each item are rather low but still acceptable – between .33 and .36. Loevinger's coefficient H for the entire scale is .34 and thus above the threshold of H < .30 for weak scales (Mokken 1971). The reliability of the scale is acceptable with a Cronbach's alpha of .78.

In a final step, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) are conducted with two goals in view. First, a CFA of a single factor including all the items presented in Table 5 serves to test the fit of the one-dimensional measure of authoritarianism. Second, CFA are conducted to compare different models. The fit indices of this model showing one factor of authoritarianism are presented in the right column of Table 6. In keeping with similar approaches introducing a method factor to account for similarities in question wording (e.g. Funke 2005), correlations of error terms were allowed in two instances (between A1 and A2 and between S1 and S2).

To assess the fit of the model, a series of fit indices is considered as recommended in the literature on structural equation modelling (Bentler & Bonett 1980; Bentler 1990; Kenny et al. 2014). The one-dimensional model fits the data with a low RMSEA = .040 and  $p_{close} = .91$  (e.g. Browne & Cudeck 1992), SRMR=.021, CFI = .987 and TLI = .978 (e.g. Hu & Bentler 1999 with details on different indices and suggestions of a combination of fit indices). Chi<sup>2</sup> is significant, and the ratio between chi<sup>2</sup> and degrees of freedom is 4.02, and thus slightly above the threshold of 3 for a good fit of the model (Kline 2011). This result is acceptable, as we know that this kind of information is affected by the sample size and that chi<sup>2</sup> tends to become significant for models with a very high number of cases (Kenny 2015).

Existing research points to particularities of authoritarian subdimensions that tend to be overlooked if the focus of research solely is on the overarching construct of authoritarianism (e.g. Dunwoody & Funke 2016). This might not only be important concerning the distribution of authoritarian beliefs, but also when it comes to the relationships between these beliefs and anti-terrorism attitudes and to their interplay with perceived threat. Therefore, an additional CFA is conducted to assess whether a measurement model with one higher-order dimension of authoritarianism and three first-order dimensions (authoritarian aggression, submission, conventionalism) fits the data. As Dunwoody and Funke (2016: 572) argue, "without validation that these three factors hold together statistically, explanations based on these three factors are tenuous at best". The fit indices displayed in the left column of Table 6 indicate good fit for the second-order model with three subdimensions and are thus in line with previous work on subdimensions of authoritarianism (e.g. Funke 2005).

Finally, the one-dimensional model presented above is compared with this model (e.g. Bentler & Bonett 1980). Chi<sup>2</sup>-difference-test and an evaluation of the fit indices of both models show that the model with three primary factors loading onto a second-order factor of authoritarianism slightly fits better than the model with one factor. As a result, the measure of authoritarianism included in subsequent analyses should reflect this multi-dimensional structure of the data. However, Table 6 equally shows that the loadings of the three subdimensions on the higher-order factor of authoritarianism are high and that there are significant covariations between the first-order factors. This result points to a coherent structure of authoritarian beliefs and supports the use of a one-dimensional measure of authoritarianism. Therefore, this approach will be pursued in the following analyses, but not without testing the relevance of the three subdimensions of authoritarianism.

The above theoretical expectations about the interaction between security threat and authoritarianism refer to two variables that are thought to be related to each other but are clearly separable. Indeed, although the two variables are correlated (Pearson's r = .36, N = 1,873), they can still be considered as separate variables. For instance, it is possible that a part of those scoring low (high) in authoritarianism feel strongly (weakly) threatened by terrorism and crime. Perceptions of liberty threat and authoritarianism are only very slightly correlated (Pearson's r = .05, N = 1,874).

## 5.6. Controls

In the following empirical analyses, it should be ruled out that the influence of perceived threat fails to be correctly estimated, because alternative relationships are not controlled. Therefore, other factors being important in the literature on perceived threat and attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies are considered in the model. Particular attention should be paid here to those variables that may be the cause both of perceived threat to liberty or security and of the policy attitudes examined here. With the controls introduced below, so-called back-door paths to causation between perceived threat and attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies are closed. In doing so, potential biases in the analysis are avoided (e.g. Morgan & Winship 2007).

### Policy Effectiveness

When people evaluate different proposals of anti-terrorism policies, they probably consider the performance of government policies in this area. The perceived effectiveness of domestic security policies, in particular, can be an important decision criterion for the evaluation of these policies.

If measures in this policy area are not perceived as effective because, for example, they cannot prevent crimes or terrorist attacks, then proposed policies in this area are likely to be rated less positively (e.g. Trüdinger & Steckermeier 2017: 425–426). In addition, security measures perceived as effective can also reduce people's feelings of security threat. In order to control these relationships and thus close possible back-door paths, perceptions of policy effectiveness in the area of domestic security are taken into account in the subsequent models.

Perceived policy effectiveness in the area of domestic security is measured using an additive index of two strongly correlating variables with Cronbach's alpha of .57. These variables reflect the respondents' answers to the questions as to whether government security measures can prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the number of crimes in Germany. The index thus refers to the effectiveness of security measures in the fight against terrorism and crime as two important aspects of domestic security policy.

### Political Trust

Both theoretical arguments and empirical findings support the claim that political trust takes on great importance when it comes to the willingness to trade civil liberties for personal security or to support different kinds of anti-terrorism policies. However, one can formulate conflicting expectations about the consequences of political trust for the policy attitudes examined here. Since a detailed discussion of these expectations is not the focus of this study, I will only briefly outline them here.

Political trust implies the expectation that political institutions and actors will not abuse their power, even if they are not constantly scrutinized (Gamson 1968). Hence, political trust can make it easier for citizens to accept policies, especially if the consequences of these policies are perceived as risky or even disadvantageous (e.g. Hetherington 2006; Gabriel & Trüdinger 2011). In this perspective, political trust positively relates to support of anti-terrorism policies. Supporting these policies might be a risky proposition, in particular when citizens associate these measures with potential restrictions of civil liberties (Trüdinger & Steckermeier 2017: 422). In this case, political trust – in the sense of an expectation of good intentions on the part of political institutions – increases the likelihood of approval of these policies. The results from Davis and Silver (2004) correspond to this argument: they find that political trust increases the willingness of the American population to give up civil liberties for security measures. Similar relationships are reported in a study from Denemark (2012) with data from six countries.

However, it is also plausible that political trust implies less support for anti-terrorism policies. First, trustful citizens tend to have confidence in the laws and rules as they are currently designed. People with high levels of political trust might therefore reject additional and stricter anti-terrorism laws. Second, political trust in Germany is directed towards the institutions of a democratic system. Accordingly, it probably implies a defense of democratic values and scepticism towards policies that challenge these values (Trüdinger 2018: 81). Regarding the empirical findings, Trüdinger (2018) observes a negative relationship between political trust and attitudes towards different dimensions of anti-terrorism measures in Germany.

At the same time, one should draw attention to potential relationships between political trust and the threat perceptions examined here. Those individuals who have faith in political actors and institutions might perceive a lower level of security threat. Trustful people have confidence in the competencies of political decision-makers and believe that the relevant political institutions can provide individual and collective security. Political trust implies that the political institutions' intentions are viewed positively. Therefore, trustful people expect the government and other political institutions to respect and protect their personal rights and liberties. In consequence, they might be less likely to perceive liberty threats.

To measure political trust, I make use of a question about trust in the following five institutions in Germany: the German Bundestag, the Federal Government, the legal system, the police, and the Federal Constitutional Court. A factor analysis of the responses concerning these institutions suggests a single dimension of political trust (eigenvalue of 3.0; 61 per cent of variance explained by this factor). This result is consistent with other findings (e.g. Sønderskov & Dinesen 2016). Accordingly, all five measures were combined to an additive index of political trust, with a reliability of Cronbach's alpha of .84.

#### Social Trust

As a fundamental attitude towards fellow citizens, social trust is based on the belief that people in relationships of trust will not be harmed or even benefit in some way from these relationships (Gambetta 1988: 217). As social trust is about valuing people's intentions positively, it is regarded as a basis for functioning cooperative relationships and as an aid to problems of collective action (e.g. Zmerli & Newton 2008: 706). Social trust can be expected to have a negative effect on certain types of perceived threat and on support of anti-terrorism policies.<sup>18</sup>

First, it is plausible that trustful people feel less threatened by eventual terrorist attacks or crimes because they are less likely to expect other people to harm them. Second, as they do not expect other people to harm them, trusting people are less likely to support

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> It must be added that these expectations refer to generalized social trust, which goes beyond an attitude towards known persons and differs from participatory or personalized trust. An overview of different conceptualizations of trust can be found, for example, in Uslaner (2002).

anti-terrorism policies (e.g. Davis & Silver 2004: 31). These policies are directed against terrorist acts as "an ultimate expression of bad intentions". In this sense, social trust can make anti-terrorism interventions obsolete from the public's viewpoint (Trüdinger 2018: 95). In particular, social trust seems to reduce support of those government measures that directly affect certain people (e.g. suspects). Based on these considerations, I will consider social trust as a control variable in the analysis. The following question is used as an instrument for measuring social trust: Do you believe most people can be trusted or do you think that you can't be careful enough in dealing with other people? Although based on one item, this measurement of social trust is considered as reliable and robust. It has also been shown that most people in Western societies do not think of people they know but can give a general answer to this question (Delhey et al. 2011). Accordingly, this widespread measure will be used in the subsequent analyses.

## Left-right Position

The positioning of an individual on the left-right dimension is considered a central expression of ideological beliefs in European countries. Anyone investigating the relationships between different forms of threat and ideology and their effects on domestic security policy attitudes must therefore also examine the relationships between ideological left-right orientations and these attitudes.

The axis with the poles left and right spans a space in which individuals and political actors locate themselves within existing political lines of conflict (e.g. Knutsen 1995). Ideological ideas on the left-right dimension are regarded as a kind of super-issue in which orientations towards a multitude of political issues are condensed (e.g. Arian & Shamir 1983: 139). They are an important reference for individual attitudes towards many different policies. Perhaps it is therefore less authoritarian orientations but rather ideological beliefs on the left-right dimension that are relevant antecedents of different attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies.

However, a large number of meanings are linked to the left-right axis. It is unlikely that positions on government interventions in the domain of domestic security are core elements of the left-right dimension. Rather, positions on the relationship between the state

and the market as well as on social change represent central meanings of the left-right dimension according to the current state of research (e.g. Trüdinger & Bollow 2011). From this point of view, no strong relationships between left-right positions and the support of different anti-terrorism policies could be expected. I will test these different expectations below. Ideological left-right orientations are measured by an individual's self-placement on the left-right axis.

### Demographic Factors

Effects of formal education, age and gender on attitudes towards anti-terror policies and threat perceptions are also theoretically plausible. Therefore, these control variables will be briefly introduced here and then taken into account in the following empirical models.

*Education:* One might expect education to be associated with reduced support of antiterrorism policies. Some insights into this relationship can be gained from early studies on tolerance and civil liberties, for educational effects on individual commitment to civil liberties have already been widely discussed. For instance, formal education can lead to higher support of civil liberties through cognitive sophistication, knowledge of democratic values and rules, and through encounters with diversity and difference (e.g. Bobo & Licari 1989; Vogt 1997).<sup>19</sup>

On the basis of the above considerations, one could expect a negative influence of education on support of anti-terrorism policies because educated people are more opposed to measures that would challenge civil liberties. It is equally plausible that educated people are better informed about existing measures and therefore do not support additional policy proposals in this domain. While Mondak and Hurwitz (2012: 208), for example, provide empirical evidence for the argument of a negative relationship between education and support of anti-terrorism initiatives, Davis (2007: 78) does not find a significant relation between these variables in his analyses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> The relationships are complex and it remains unclear which processes might be responsible for a connection between formal education and support for civil liberties. However, this cannot be discussed further here. Several authors consider direct educational effects to be theoretically unlikely and refer to conflicting empirical findings e.g. Jackman (1978); Sullivan et al. (1993).

As regards individual responses to possible threats, education is argued to be associated with lower levels of perceived threat, as people with higher levels of education tend to perceive fewer risks and dangers (e.g. Brück & Müller 2010). For instance, the level of education can influence people's way of dealing with information on the probability of terrorist attacks or crimes (e.g. Huddy et al. 2005: 595 with further explanations).

To measure the respondent's formal education, I refer to a question about the highest level of formal education that has been successfully completed by the respondent. Five levels of formal education are indicated, ranging from "finished school without certificate" to "higher qualification, entitling holders to study at a university". Information on a university's degree (or a degree of a university of applied sciences) was retrieved from another question about the respondent's vocational qualifications. Respondents with such a degree were assigned to the sixth level of the education variable. If possible, open answers about other school leaving or academic certificates were recoded and assigned to the given response options (detailed information on the education variable is provided in Table A-4).

*Age:* I include the age of respondents (calculated on the basis of respondents' year of birth) in the following models as it is plausibly related with preferences of personal liberty or security on the one hand and perceived threat to liberty and security on the other hand. For instance, it has been shown in earlier studies that older people are less committed to democratic norms than younger people (e.g. Stouffer 1955; Nunn et al. 1978). On the other hand, older individuals may be less willing to support anti-terrorism policies, for example because they prefer to preserve the existing system (which has established guarantees of civil liberties). The results of several studies are in line with the expectation that older people are more likely to support different anti-terrorism measures (e.g. Davis 2007; Pietsch & Fiebig 2011; Gibson 2013). However, it is also conceivable that age does not play a role in the following models because the associated ideological beliefs or value priorities are considered as separate variables.


Furthermore, it is suggested that older people tend to feel threatened by different factors because they feel more vulnerable (e.g. Davis 2007: 76). While Huddy et al. (2005: 599) do not find age to be a determinant of perceptions of terrorist threat, other authors show

that age is a good predictor for concerns about terrorism and crime (e.g. Brück & Müller 2010).

*Gender:* In several early studies on political tolerance, it was stated that women are less committed to civil liberties than men (e.g. Stouffer 1955; Nunn et al. 1978). It is questionable, however, whether the theoretical justifications for this statement continue to apply. For example, these studies highlighted the lack of opportunities for women to encounter diversity. A contrary argument would be that women are more moderate in their policy positions and therefore less in favour of strict anti-terrorism measures than men. Recent analyses of support for civil liberties or domestic security policies often do not find significant differences in these attitudes between women and men (e.g. Pietsch & Fiebig 2011), or report inconsistent effects of gender on attitudes towards different anti-terrorism measures (e.g. Trüdinger 2018). Finally, on the basis of previous studies, it can be expected that women are more likely to react to threats than men (e.g. Lerner et al. 2003). Based on these considerations, the directly surveyed gender of the interviewees serves as a control variable in the following analyses.

At the end of this chapter, Figure 8 gives an overview of the model underlying the subsequent analyses. In this illustration, the arrows indicate expected effects. These expectations are based on theoretical considerations. However, it is clear that, strictly speaking, no causal model can be tested with the available cross-sectional data.





Notes: Own illustration including both sides of a possible interaction between perceived threats and authoritarianism.

# 6. Analysis

To test the hypotheses outlined above, the analysis proceeds in the following steps: In a first step, OLS regressions are performed. First, these models focus only on perceived liberty threat and perceived security threat as the main independent variables. Then, they include authoritarianism to consider the independent and additive effects of threat and authoritarianism on support for different anti-terrorism policy proposals. A third group of regression models contains the interactions between perceptions of threat and authoritarianism. Finally, the models are complemented by the control variables presented above. I will present these different types of models for each of the ten dependent variables, namely attitudes towards ten different anti-terrorism policy proposals.

In a second step of the analysis, I will take a closer look at my findings on the interaction effects of perceived threats and authoritarianism on support of anti-terrorism policy. In particular, the inspection and illustration of these effects will focus on conditional marginal effects. In a third step, the relationships between the other factors included in the models and support of the ten different anti-terrorism policy proposals will be closely examined. In a forth step, I will report findings from regression diagnostics and additional tests or validations of the results (e.g. tests for multicollinearity). In the final step of the analysis, the interaction effects are examined in detail using recommended diagnostics and estimates (e.g. Hainmueller et al. 2018).

## 6.1. Results of Regression Models

In this subchapter, I present the results of different OLS regressions to assess the consequences of perceived threats for people's attitudes towards different anti-terrorism policies. The regression models in Table 7 include perceptions of security threat and of liberty threat as independent variables in the focus of this study. They indicate that there are clear relationships between these perceptions and the policy attitudes examined here. The direction of these relationships is as expected. The higher the level of concern about security threats, the more people support anti-terrorism policies such as a preventive detention of suspects. The stronger people's perceptions of liberty threat, the less people support these policies.

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	.22**	.40**	.32**	.45**	.52**	.31**	.54**	.28**	.27**	.46**
threat	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Perceived liberty	05	15**	12**	03	22**	19**	34**	12**	12**	12**
threat	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Constant	.84**	$4.06^{**}$	$6.56^{**}$	1.22**	$4.60^{**}$	7.74 <sup>**</sup>	$4.68^{**}$	5.99**	$6.50^{**}$	3.70**
	(.15)	(.17)	(.16)	(.16)	(.18)	(.13)	(.18)	(.17)	(.17)	(.19)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.03	.08	.06	.11	.13	.11	.17	.04	.04	.09
Ν	1,982	1,989	1,986	1,992	1,989	1,988	1,989	1,981	1,984	1,986

Table 7: Regressions of Perceived Threats on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; OLS-regressions;  $** = p \le 0.01$ ,  $* = p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

## Table 8: Regressions of Perceived Threats and Authoritarianism on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	.07**	.26**	.25**	.30**	.32**	.21**	.35**	.09**	.15**	.24**
threat	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Perceived liberty	02	10**	10**	01	17**	17**	30**	06**	08**	08**
threat	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Authoritarianism	.40**	.44**	.24**	.42**	.58**	.28**	.53**	.55**	.36**	.65**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Constant	37*	2.61**	5.77**	03	2.73**	6.89**	3.04**	4.23**	5.27**	1.64**
	(.18)	(.22)	(.21)	(.20)	(.23)	(.16)	(.22)	(.21)	(.22)	(.22)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.10	.14	.08	.16	.20	.15	.24	.14	.08	.20
Ν	1,865	1,870	1,870	1,871	1,871	1,870	1,869	1,866	1,867	1,868

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; OLS-regressions; \*\* =  $p \le 0.01$ , \* =  $p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

In particular, perceived security threat appears to play an important role in people's support of a broad range of anti-terrorism policies. For instance, each one-unit increase in the level of perceived security threat on the ten-point scale is associated with an increase of 0.54 on the ten-point scale indicating approval of surveilling the communication of suspects. The association between perceived liberty threat and anti-terrorism policy attitudes is less pronounced. However, we have to keep in mind that a single item focussing on privacy violations is used as indicator for perceived liberty threat. While these threat perceptions do not play a role for attitudes towards torture and racial profiling, they are negatively associated with attitudes towards a large number of other anti-terrorism policies such as communication surveillance or house searches of suspects.

Even if the amount of declared variance in these models is not very large, up to 17 percent of the variance in anti-terrorism policy attitudes can be explained by the two different kinds of perceived threat. One observation remains to be highlighted: The effects of the two types of threat are not mutually exclusive. Thus, a strong link between perceived security threat and support of a particular anti-terrorism policy proposal does not imply a weak relationship between support of this proposal and perceived liberty threat.

The second type of regression models additionally includes authoritarian dispositions, which are regarded as important antecedents of anti-terrorism policy attitudes. The results presented in Table 8 serve to illustrate the independent and additive effects of perceived threat and authoritarianism on these policy attitudes. Authoritarianism is positively and strongly related to support of anti-terrorism policies. Additionally, including authoritarianism in the model considerably improves the amount of explained variance of each of the ten models. These results are known from numerous other studies in this field (e.g. Cohrs et al. 2005; Kossowska et al. 2011).

Most importantly, the effects of perceived threats to security and liberty persist, even if they are less pronounced than in the models focussing exclusively on perceptions of threat. In addition, it can be reported that the independent and additive influence of perceived threats on the different anti-terrorism policy attitudes also remains in the model supplemented with control variables, albeit slightly weakened (Table A-6 in the Appendix). The role played by different control variables will be discussed in more detail in a separate subchapter, but we can already observe that perceived threats are very important as predictors of anti-terrorism policy attitudes compared to these other variables.

The third type of regression models displayed in Table 9 presents the interaction effects between perceived threats and authoritarianism. Two interaction terms were added, namely the product of perceived security threat and authoritarianism on the one hand, and the product of perceived liberty threat and authoritarianism on the other hand.<sup>20</sup> These models serve to test whether the influence of perceived threats on support of different anti-terrorism policy proposals is related to the extent to which an individual holds authoritarian beliefs - and whether the influence of authoritarian beliefs is related to an individual's level of perceived threats. On the one hand, it was expected that perceptions of threat would either be more important for people with authoritarian beliefs (and less important for non-authoritarians), or that authoritarian dispositions would be more important for people with high levels of perceived threats (and less important for people with low levels of perceived threats). Alternatively, it was expected that perceived threats would be less important for authoritarians (and more important for nonauthoritarians), or that authoritarian dispositions would be less important for people with high levels of perceived threats (and more important for people with low levels of perceived threats).

In the case of both security threats and liberty threats, interaction effects can be observed. In almost all of the models, the t-statistics of at least one of the two interaction terms show statistical significance for the interaction of the average effects of perceived threats and authoritarianism. When it comes to perceived security threats, this is the case with regressions on attitudes towards seven out of ten anti-terrorism policy proposals; with perceived liberty threats, it is just under half of the models.

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$  In an intermediate step, models with only one interaction (perceived security threat x authoritarianism; perceived liberty threat x authoritarianism) were computed. The interaction effects in these models (see Tables A-7 and A-8 in the Appendix) are similar to the effects in those models considering both interactions.

# Table 9: Regressions of Perceived Threats, Authoritarianism, and Their Interactions on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	02	.49**	.56**	.17*	.41**	.43**	.54**	.18*	.32**	.39**
threat	(.06)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.05)	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)
Perceived liberty	15**	13*	16**	09	31**	29**	45**	13*	09	12*
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarianism	.20**	.62**	.48**	.23**	.54**	.37**	.57**	$.58^{**}$	.51**	.74**
	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Perceived sec. threat	.02	05**	07**	.03*	02	05**	04**	02	04*	03*
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.03**	.01	.01	.02	.03**	.03**	.03**	.01	.00	.01
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Constant	.56	$1.80^{**}$	4.75**	.83*	2.94**	6.55**	2.91**	4.10**	4.63**	1.25**
	(.33)	(.39)	(.37)	(.37)	(.41)	(.29)	(.39)	(.38)	(.39)	(.40)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.10	.14	.10	.16	.21	.16	.24	.14	.08	.20
Ν	1,865	1,870	1,870	1,871	1,871	1,870	1,869	1,866	1,867	1,868

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; OLS-regressions; \*\* =  $p \le 0.01$ , \* =  $p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

Adding the interaction terms minimally increases the explanatory power of several models. Joint F-tests comparing the models in Table 8 with the models including both interactions (Table 9) support the existence of interaction effects between perceived threats and authoritarianism (see Table A-9 in the Appendix) in most of the models.<sup>21</sup> For a large majority of the anti-terrorism policy attitudes studied here, the null hypothesis that both interaction terms do not have any effect on support of a policy is rejected. Only when it comes to support of controlling social networks and of demonstration bans in the case of a terrorist threat, the tests do not support model specifications including interactions between perceived threats and authoritarianism. Overall, however, it is important to take into account these interactions for a better understanding of how people evaluate anti-terrorism policies.

As these interaction effects are complex, I will illustrate them in detail in the next subchapter. Until then, we note that the interaction between perceived security threat and authoritarianism is negative if it turns to be significant. This result thus seems to fit the expectation that the influence of authoritarian beliefs on anti-terrorism policy attitudes will weaken the more people feel threatened in their security. Also, the importance of perceived security threats seems to decrease the stronger people's authoritarian beliefs are. As an exception, the regression on attitudes towards racial profiling establishes a slightly positive interaction. I will discuss this observation at a later stage of my analysis. When it comes to perceived liberty threats, a positive interaction between threat and authoritarianism can be observed. Thus, it seems to be the case that the less authoritarian convictions one holds, the more negative the effect of perceived threats to liberty.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Comparisons of models with and without interaction effects containing control variables yield similar results, usually with slightly lower F-values. The results of these tests are shown in the right column of Table A-9 in the Appendix). They indicate that the null hypothesis that both interactions do not have any effect on policy support cannot be rejected in the models on support for public speech bans and on home search.

The fourth type of regression models presented in Table 10 not only contains interactions between perceptions of threat and authoritarianism but also the control variables presented above to avoid potential biases in the analyses. Controlling for these attitudinal and socio-demographic factors does not considerably alter the results concerning the role of threat and authoritarianism. Perceptions of threat still interact with authoritarianism in their effects on anti-terrorism policy attitudes.

Furthermore, the results show that there are models in which the interactions between both kinds of threat and authoritarianism are important for an adequate assessment of attitudes towards anti-terrorism policy proposals. These are the models explaining attitudes towards a database with information on suspects and towards activities consisting in monitoring the communication of suspects.

The interaction between perceived security threat and authoritarianism alone has a significant effect on attitudes towards the following measures: preventive detention, bans on leaving the country, racial profiling, and public speech bans. On the other hand, exclusive effects of the interaction between liberty threat and authoritarianism – and no significant effects of the interaction between security threat and authoritarianism – can be observed in the models focusing on support of torture and of home search. Considering the interactions between threats and authoritarianism does not help to understand the support of social network controls and of demonstration bans. As seen, these relationships remain stable even under control of other theoretically relevant factors such as education or political trust. In chapter 6.3, I will describe how each of these controls is linked to the support of anti-terrorist policies. In the next subchapter, I will have a closer look at the (moderating) role of perceived threats and authoritarianism and describe the effects of their interaction in more detail.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> My analyses in this study are usually based on weighted data. Thus, the distribution of important sociodemographic factors in the survey data comes close to that of the target population, and thus relevant conclusions can be better applied to public opinion of this target population. However, since a few of the following tests cannot be calculated with weighted data, the models with interactions and control variables are also shown for unweighted data in Table A-10. The patterns are similar, in some cases the relationships between authoritarianism, threat and anti-terrorism policies are even more pronounced.

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	06	.38**	.56**	.12	.26**	.36**	.45**	.15*	.29**	.28**
threat	(.06)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Perceived liberty	17**	14*	15**	09	31**	28**	<b>-</b> .41 <sup>**</sup>	10	07	05
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarianism	.16*	.56**	.44**	.14	.47**	.33**	.56**	.55**	$.50^{**}$	.74**
	(.07)	(.09)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.06)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Perceived sec. threat	.02	04**	07**	.03*	01	04**	04**	02	03*	03
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.03**	.01	.01	.01	.03*	.03**	.02*	.01	.00	.00
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	.06*	$.10^{**}$	.11**	.15**	.12**	.11**	$.09^{*}$	.18**	.18**	.15**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	14**	15**	.03	15**	12**	05	15**	06	<b>-</b> .10 <sup>*</sup>	08
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Social trust	13**	05	03	09**	15**	04	14**	00	.03	04
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.12**	.12**	.01	.30**	.04	.06	.06	.01	.04	01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.03	01	02	09	28**	04	19**	09*	10	19**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	00	01*	01**	00	01	.00	00	.01**
a 1 5 1	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	44**	.38*	20	47**	.64**	.21	.70**	.01	.12	1.04**
<b>G</b>	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.12)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	2.25**	2.46**	4.27**	1.52**	5.63**	6.56**	4.74**	3.69**	4.23**	.90
	(.51)	(.62)	(.60)	(.56)	(.64)	(.46)	(.61)	(.61)	(.62)	(.64)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.15	.15	.10	.22	.25	.17	.28	.14	.10	.23
Ν	1,771	1,775	1,774	1,775	1,775	1,774	1,774	1,771	1,773	1,774

# Table 10: Regressions of Perceived Threats, Authoritarianism, Their Interactions, and Controls on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016;  $** = p \le 0.01$ ,  $* = p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

# 6.2. Visualization of Interaction Effects


Conditional marginal effects plots will serve to illustrate in this subchapter if and how perceived threats interact with authoritarian beliefs in shaping anti-terrorism policy attitudes. These plots show the marginal effect of the independent variable in the focus of attention for each value of the moderator (e.g. Brambor et al. 2005) – the effects of other independent variables are held constant.


First, I focus on the interaction between perceptions of security threat and authoritarianism. Since all interactions are symmetric (e.g. Berry et al. 2012: 653) and since I have formulated expectations of both threat and authoritarianism as moderators, I will show both the marginal effects of security threat and of authoritarianism.

As observed above, threat and authoritarianism interact negatively with each other in most cases. Plots on the conditional marginal effects of perceived security threat and authoritarianism on support of exit bans in Figure 9 serve to illustrate this negative interaction. The conditional effects of security threat and authoritarianism on attitudes towards preventive detention, communication monitoring, speech bans and towards a database with information on suspects exhibit similar patterns (the conditional marginal effects plots for each dependent variable are reported in the Appendix in Figures A-1 to A-4).

The continuous line in the upper plot shows the effect of a marginal change in perceived security threat on support of exit bans for suspects at different levels of authoritarianism (dashed lines: 95 per cent confidence intervals). The plot clearly illustrates that with increasing levels of authoritarianism, the magnitude of the coefficient of perceived security threat decreases.

# Figure 9: Plots of Interaction Effects of Perceived Security Threat and Authoritarianism on Support of Exit Bans







Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.

The result is in line with the expectation that the less (more) authoritarian the beliefs, the stronger (weaker) the impact of perceived security threats on attitudes towards interdicting suspects to leave the country. One can even observe that a marginal increase in perceived security threat increases support for the policy in question only among people with low to moderate levels of authoritarianism. It seems that those high in authoritarianism do not react to security threats when judging anti-terrorism policies as they already feel threatened in normal times and already tend to support authoritarian positions on domestic security policies. This finding is in line with the arguments of Hetherington and Suhay (2011) and Nail et al. (2009), for example, on specific functions of ideology that have been outlined in the motivated social cognition model. Ideological orientations of authoritarians already serve as a kind of "protective shield" against uncertainties and dangers of life. In contrast, the support of anti-terrorism policies by non-authoritarians or moderate authoritarians then constitutes a situational defence against threats.

The effect of a marginal change in authoritarianism on support of exit bans at different levels of security threat is exhibited in the lower part of Figure 9. With increasing levels of perceived security threat, the positive influence of authoritarianism decreases. It even vanishes among authoritarians with more than seven points on a RWA-scale from 0 to 10. Thus, these results suggest that perceived security threat is an important situational stimulus in the expression of authoritarian ideological beliefs. Under conditions of security threat, differences in support of a broad range of anti-terrorism policies between authoritarians and non-authoritarians disappear. According to the theory of affective intelligence, this is because non-authoritarian citizens are less reliant on their convictions in threatening situations (e.g. Marcus et al. 2005: 952).


In the models explaining attitudes towards home search, social network control and demonstration bans, the conditional marginal effects plots, the interaction effect between perceived security threat and authoritarianism is weak and insignificant. However, the marginal effects plots reveal the same directions of the conditional effects as in Figure 9 but with clearly attenuated relationships (see Figures A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix). When it comes to the support of torture and of racial profiling, I have reported weak and partly insignificant interaction effects of security threat and authoritarianism on these attitudes (see Figures A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix). The plots show in detail that the positive effects of perceived security threat on these attitudes increase with increasing levels of authoritarianism. At the same time, the positive effects of authoritarianism are more pronounced among people with increased levels of security threat. Thus, in the case of torture and racial profiling, security threat activates the consequences of authoritarianism with regard to the support of harsher policies. Futhermore, it seems that security threats are an important motive for authoritarians to support these policies.

The presence of these positive interaction effects could be explained by the nature of the two policies. Both the use of torture to obtain information about planned attacks and racial profiling are very severe policies, which extremly challenge civil liberties. It is therefore plausible that threats would not lead to increased support for harsher policies among non-authoritarians, because the threshold for approving these policies is very high. This argument is in line with the interpretation of similar findings offered by Dunwoody and McFarland (2017: 102) that, in situations of threat, high authoritarians are more prone toward extremist actions than non-authoritarians.

In the second part of this subchapter, I describe in detail the interaction between perceived liberty threat and authoritarianism. As noted above, this interaction turns out to be positive if the relationship between liberty threat (authoritarianism) and antiterrorism policy support varies according to the respondent's level of authoritarianism (liberty threat). Plots on the conditional marginal effects of perceived liberty threat and authoritarianism on support of a database with information on suspects are shown in Figure 10.

These plots serve as an illustrative example, as one can observe similar conditional effects of liberty threat and authoritarianism on support of communication monitoring, torture, and home search. The conditional effects of these variables on attitudes towards preventive detention, exit bans, racial profiling, and towards social network control are weaker but show similar patterns (see Figures A-3 and A-4 in the Appendix).

## Figure 10: Plots of Interaction Effects of Perceived Liberty Threat and Authoritarianism on Support of a Database



Notes:

Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.

In contrast, they are virtually non-existent in the models predicting support of speech bans and of demonstration bans upon terrorist threat. It appears that privacy concerns hardly play a role in the evaluation of policies focussing on these public rights, and that there are no variations of these relationships among people with different levels of authoritarian beliefs.

The upper part of Figure 10 shows that the positive marginal effect of authoritarianism on support of a database becomes stronger with increased levels of perceived liberty threat. This result fits well with the expectation that in situations of perceived liberty threats, the differences between authoritarians and non-authoritarians in support of such a policy are particularly marked. The latter are particularly motivated to reject this measure if they worry that restrictions on civil liberties might occur. These reactions can thus be interpreted as worldview defense and are equally in line with a specific reading of ideology as motivated social cognition.

The lower part of Figure 10 illustrates that the less authoritarian convictions one holds, the more negative the effect of perceived threats to liberty. For those high in authoritarianism, on the other hand, these threats are irrelevant when it comes to evaluating the policy in question. This result not only shows that non-authoritarians are particularly sensitive to issues affecting liberties and are more likely to take related feelings of threat into account. Again, those high in authoritarianism do not react to threats, which is not surprising in the case of this type of threat (as authoritarians feel more concerned about security threats than about liberty threats). However, the result again fits with the theoretical expectation outlined in chapter 4 that authoritarians already feel threatened in normal times and do not show particular reactions in threatening situations.

Thus, in case of those policies related to questions of privacy and government interference (e.g. home search, the establishment of a database, and communication monitoring), it is important to consider the interaction between perceived liberty threat and authoritarianism to understand how people evaluate these policies.

## 6.3. Other Factors Related to the Support of Anti-Terrorism Policies

Besides perceived threats and authoritarian dispositions, other factors such as political trust are involved when people evaluate anti-terrorism policies (see Table 10). These factors served as control variables in the models shown above. In this subchapter, I will describe how each of these controls is related to the support of anti-terrorism policies.

The perceived policy effectiveness, which has been little explored to date as a predictor of domestic security policy attitudes, is clearly related to the support of almost all of the policy proposals presented here. People who believe domestic security measures in Germany to be effective in reducing crime and terrorism tend to have higher levels of support for a broad range of anti-terrorism policy proposals. This means that whether additional and harsher measures are desired is linked to people's perception that these policies can actually improve the country's security situation.

Political trust is negatively associated with support of anti-terrorism policies in several models. The greater people's trust in political institutions, the lower the support of policies such as torture or preventive detention of suspects, of racial profiling and home search without a warrant, or of surveillance of communication. According to these results, political trust does not increase the willingness of people to give up civil liberties for security measures. On the contrary, political trust correlates with scepticism towards policies that might challenge democratic values. Political trust is particularly important when measures with a high potential of violating personal rights are involved, while it is nearly irrelevant when people judge measures affecting public liberties such as the right to demonstrate.

Social trust is also related with attitudes towards several anti-terrorism policies. If there is a substantial relationship between social trust and anti-terrorism policy attitudes, social trust diminishes support of these policies. This result corresponds to the expectations formulated above: As people who trust their fellow citizens do not accuse them of bad intentions in terms of terrorist activities or crimes, they do not see the need for policies intended to protect them from these activities. Decisions for or against harsh measures against suspects are particularly related to social trust. In the case of social trust, differences in the characteristics of the anti-terrorist measures assessed by the public again play a role in the importance of an explanatory factor.

Ideological beliefs of people measured by their self-placement on the left-right dimension are relevant predictors of anti-terrorism policy attitudes in several cases. The further individuals locate themselves to the right of the ideological spectrum, the more they support torture, preventive detention of suspects, and racial profiling. Thus, it appears that ideological beliefs focusing on the protection of individual liberties on the one hand and on maintenance of security and order on the other hand are captured by the leftright axis. Alternatively, one could argue that other contents of the left-right axis like the idea of equality are relevant for the evaluation of anti-terrorism policies, which for example seems to apply to the case of racial profiling. However, it should be emphasized that the strong effects of authoritarianism persist even when ideological beliefs on the left-right dimension are taken into account.

Among the demographic explanations, education is associated with reduced support of a few anti-terrorism policies such as searching the home of suspects without a warrant, surveilling the communication of suspects, or banning demonstrations upon a threat of terrorism. This direction of the relationship thus reflects the arguments from a long tradition of research on civil liberties. However, the association between formal education and sceptical attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies is not outstanding.

Age is a socio-demographic background factor that influences these policy attitudes only in some cases. Since one cannot necessarily expect linear age effects, models with squared age variables were also tested (data not shown). However, these did not provide any additional information. It is possible that age does not play an important role in the models discussed here because these models not only include age but also ideological beliefs. The latter might be associated with age and possibly reduce age effects.

Finally, the effects of gender on attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies are inconsistent. In line with the argumentation above, women appear to be less favourable of severe measures such as torture of suspects or racial profiling than men. At the same time, they are more supportive of other policies (e.g. home search, surveilling the communication of suspects, banning demonstrations upon a threat) than men. Overall, including these controls improves the amounts of explained variance in the models for several anti-terrorism policy attitudes. These include, for example, support for torture of suspects, preventive detention, racial profiling, home searches without warrants, and of communications monitoring. However, it should equally be noted that the explanatory power of certain models – i.e. on support of travel bans and public speech bans, or on support of controlling social networks, for example – can hardly be improved by the attitudinal and socio-demographic control variables. This suggests that perceived threats, authoritarianism and their interactions are decisive for understanding the public's support of these policies.

## 6.4. Regression Diagnostics and Validations

In order to assess the results obtained, I will carry out several model tests in this subchapter. Regression diagnostics will be performed to show whether the data meet the conditions for modelling OLS regressions and to show how robust the results of the OLS models predicting anti-terrorism policy attitudes are. Further analyses examine to what extent the findings on the consequences of perceived threats prevail in alternative modelling.

Multicollinearity in linear regression models arises if one or several predictors are highly correlated and near perfect linear functions of other independent variables. When multicollinearity is present, coefficient estimates might become unstable and standard errors of the regression coefficients might be inflated. To test for collinearity among the independent variables included in the models with interaction effects specified above, variance inflation factors for these variables were computed.

The VIF values of the variables in all of these models are rather low, suggesting that the main results of this study are not distorted due to multicollinearity.<sup>23</sup> Table A-11 in the Appendix shows the VIF and tolerance values for the regression on support of communication monitoring. This model serves as an illustrative example, and it has to be noted that the models of the other dependent variables have similar mean VIF values.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The highest VIF values are reported for those variables involved in interaction terms, and for the interaction effects. However, that is no reason for concern as high correlations between variables and the product of these variables are to be expected.

One of the key assumptions for OLS regression is that the variance of residuals is homoscedastic or constant. If this is not the case and the error variance is heteroscedastic, the standard errors of the coefficients may be incorrectly estimated. To address potential problems due to heteroscedasticity, the models are additionally calculated with robust standard errors (see Table A-12 in the Appendix).<sup>24</sup> There are no marked deviations in the reported standard errors of our central variables compared to the analyses above – the main patterns of results on perceptions of threat, authoritarianism, and their interactions appear to be stable Some values lose significance, but these are usually of lesser magnitude.

If the residuals of a regression model follow a normal or an approximate normal distribution, valid inferences from regression results can be made and the results concerning the t-values do not risk to be biased. To check the normality of residuals in the models presented above, several graphical instruments are used. A kernel density plot displays a kind of histogram of residuals. A standardized normal probability plot serves to check for non-normality in the middle range of data, while a quintile-normal plot serves to check for non-normality in the extremes of the data.

While the residuals are normally distributed in the majority of our models, a non-normal distribution of the residuals can be observed in a few models. In particular, this concerns the model predicting support of torture, but also the model predicting support of a database with information on terrorism suspects. Figures A-5 and A-6 show examples of graphical checks for two models: While the plots visualizing residuals in the regression on attitudes towards torture detect non-normality, the graphs plotting the residuals of the regression on support of demonstration bans show an approximate normal distribution. In general, the findings of this section of regression diagnostics are acceptable, and the models shown above can be considered robust in the case of a large sample.<sup>25</sup>

A linear regression is appropriate when the relationships between the dependent variable and the predictors are linear. For this regression is based on the assumption of a lin-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> The Breusch-Pagan test often used to detect heteroscedasticity is not very informative for large samples. Graphs plotting the residuals against the predicted values suggest the possible presence of heteroscedasticity in several models.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Simulations have shown that in the case of non-normality, distortions of the p-values are unlikely if the sample is large: Lumley et al. (2002).

ear relationship between these variables. To check linearity in multiple regressions, I investigate the relationship between the key predictors and the respective dependent variables using augmented components plus residual plots (these tests do not allow the use of weighted data). A lowess curve is added to the regression line indicating the optimal fit of the data. If the smoothed lowess line hardly and rarely deviates from the regression line, one can speak of a linear relationship.

These tests are conducted for the key predictors in the models shown above, namely perceived threats and authoritarianism. As the interaction models are inspected in detail below, I focus on the models without interaction terms. The assessments show no clear violation of the assumption of linearity in these models. Figures A-7 and A-8 contain graphical tests of the regressions on support of preventive detention and on support of public speech bans.

Already about two thirds of the respondents completely disagree with the proposal of torturing suspects as a means to get information about planned terrorist attacks. Given the skewed distribution of answers to this item, it should be examined to what extent the findings on the relationships between threat and attitudes towards torture persist in alternative modelling. Therefore, as a further test, a logistic regression was performed to predict the probability of a clear rejection of torture. As Table A-13 shows, security threat is only weakly associated with a clear rejection of torture. Both the coefficient of security threat and the interaction between security threat and authoritarianism are not significant. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, is an important factor shaping attitudes towards torture. As in linear regression, the interaction between liberty threat and authoritarianism also plays a role. As the model predicts the probability of clearly rejecting torture, this interaction now turns out to be negative. Thus, the results of the logistic regression correspond to the findings described above.

As reported, the influence of ideological orientations on the left-right dimension was controlled in the models shown above. As one could observe, these orientations are linked to certain anti-terrorism policy attitudes. At the same time, left-right orientations equally relate to authoritarianism and perceptions of security and liberty threat. If the interactions between left-right orientations and threats are actually relevant (and not the interactions between authoritarianism and threats), the previous models might be biased (Hetherington & Suhay 2011: 553). To exclude possible distortions of these models, I examine whether the results change when interaction terms between perceived threats (security threat, liberty threat) and left-right placement are added.

It turns out that the above reported effects of threats, authoritarianism and their interactions are very robust. Only in one case, one of the effects weakens considerably: in the model predicting support of communication monitoring the interaction between perceived security threat and authoritarianism becomes weaker. Both interactions in this model become insignificant. Therefore, this model is shown in Table A-14. Only in two cases, the interplay between left-right orientation and perceived threats is relevant for better understanding citizens' support of anti-terrorism policies (with security threat in the model of support of communication monitoring, with liberty threat in the case of support for torture).

As Table A-14 shows, the further to the right individuals are positioned on the left-right dimension, the less important perceived security threats become for their attitudes towards communication surveillance among suspects. Overall, however, it emerges that authoritarian beliefs and not ideological orientations on the left-right dimension are decisive factors that can influence attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies in interaction with threat perceptions. This is an important finding because several of the theoretical arguments for these relationships discussed in previous chapters could also apply to left-right ideological orientations.

In their influential study on people's willingness to trade off civil liberties for security in the United States, Davis and Silver (2004) point to an interaction between threat and political trust. They argue that "high levels of perceived threat among those who are more trusting of government may create a greater willingness to adopt a prosecurity position than what would be expected based on their level of trust alone" (Davis & Silver 2004: 30). However, they do not examine attitudes towards particular policies separately, and in contrast to the present study, they find a positive relationship between political trust (or, more precisely: trust in government) and broad support for security measures. Nevertheless, possible distortions in the above models due to a disregarded interaction between threat and political trust should be ruled out. Additional tests show that including such an interaction in the models does not change the nature of the effects of threat and authoritarianism. Furthermore, it is almost irrelevant for attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies in Germany (data not reported here).

One of the anti-terrorism attitudes studied refers to exit bans for people suspected of joining a terrorist group abroad. In this case, it can be examined if the results are affected by whether people perceive this measure as an established law or as a proposal. For it is possible that threat perceptions may above all be related to demands for new and additional policies, but do not necessarily increase support for established law. A question later in the questionnaire allows me to determine whether respondents were aware of the existence of a law on this subject. Nearly 60 percent of the respondents were informed about the existence of a law allowing authorities to issue such travel bans. Table A-15 shows that there are virtually no differences in the results for the two groups (informed/not informed). Distinguishing between proposal and implemented policy is therefore not necessary in this case.

Finally, it was examined whether the results described above would also be confirmed if factor scores were used instead of additive indices to measure security threat and authoritarianism. The use of additive indices is widespread, but it is sometimes argued that only factor scores can adequately reflect the relative weights of the individual elements of a factor. Accordingly, the different models were calculated with the factor scores of security threat perceptions and authoritarianism. Again, the interaction effects are clearly visible. Overall, the results are similar to those discussed above (data not reported here), which again demonstrates the robustness of the models.

#### 6.5. Detailed Inspection of Interaction Effects

According to the diagnostics and tests of the previous section, the results of the regression models on the relationships between perceived threats and support of anti-terrorism policies are very robust. In the present chapter, I will closely inspect the interaction effects of perceived threats and authoritarianism described above as it must be examined if the expected interactions are really linear and for which ranges of the examined attitudes substantive results can be reported. For this purpose, I can apply diagnostic tools for interaction models that have been made available by Hainmueller and his colleagues (2018).<sup>26</sup>

In a first step, Linear Interaction Diagnostic (LID) plots (Hainmueller et al. 2018: 168– 170) are used to test whether the conditional relationships between the examined policy attitudes, perceived threats and authoritarianism are adequately modelled by linear interactions. After all, the assumption of a linear interaction effect (LIE) states that the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable can only change linearly with the moderator at a constant rate given by  $\beta$  (Hainmueller et al. 2018: 164).

In twoway scatterplots of the raw data, attitudes towards the different anti-terrorism policies are first plotted against perceptions of threat at three different levels of authoritarianism (for this purpose, three groups of roughly equal size were formed). Given the symmetry of interactions, plots on the relationships between authoritarianism and policy support are also considered (at three levels of perceived threats). In each graph, a LO-ESS fit curve is added to detect deviations from linear relationships. First, I will present the results concerning perceptions of security threat and then the findings concerning perceptions of liberty threat. As it is not possible to visualize all relationships, I only report general tendencies and examples to illustrate the results.

As expected from the results of the regression models, the LID plots for three levels of authoritarianism show moderate connections between perceived security threats and support of different anti-terrorism policies. At the same time, only minor deviations from a linear fit can be detected. The LOESS fit curves oscillate slightly at most where

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The calculations are performed using the STATA package ,interflex', provided by Yiqing Yu, Jens Hainmueller, Jonathan Mummulo and Licheng Liu.

the association between perceived security threat and policy attitudes is weak – for instance, when it comes to support of social network controls (see the upper part of Figure A-9). The plots illustrate that, if there are differences between the three levels of authoritarianism, the influence of security threat perceptions is weaker among respondents with strongly held authoritarian beliefs. This finding corresponds to the negative interaction between security threat and authoritarianism in the regression models. The plots in Figure A-10 visualize these relationships using the example of support of exit bans for terror suspects.

Authoritarianism and anti-terrorism policy support are strongly related, as the respective plots show for respondents with three different levels of perceived security threat. Again, the LOESS fit curves do not indicate strong deviations from linearity. However, one can partly observe a ceiling of the authoritarian influence in case of a strong security threat (see, for example, the lower part of Figure A-9). Differences between the levels of perceived threat are not as pronounced as the differences shown above between respondents with low, medium and high levels of authoritarianism. However, they are clearly visible in those cases where the regressions shown above clearly indicate negative interactions (see Figure A-10).

Focusing on the relationships between liberty threat and support of different antiterrorism policies at three levels of authoritarianism, the LID plots show a weak but existing relationship between liberty threat and support of the policies examined. LO-ESS fit curves show that linear modelling is adequate. If the relationship between policy support and liberty threat varies depending on the level of authoritarianism, then one can observe that the more authoritarian the beliefs, the less perceptions of liberty threat play a role.

For instance, LID plots on support of a database on suspects and on support of communication monitoring (Figures A-11 and A-12) illustrate these findings. In contrast, the linear relationships between authoritarianism and support of the policies studied hardly vary at different levels of perceived threat to liberty. Minor and acceptable deviations from a linear regression line can be observed. Again, the plots illustrate a ceiling effect at high levels of authoritarianism. This effect is most evident among those respondents who perceive little threat to their liberties (as Figure A-12 illustrates). Overall, the LID plots show that it is adequate to model linear interactions with the available data.

To further assess whether a linear perspective on the interaction between perceived threats and authoritarianism is appropriate, the conditional marginal effects from standard linear interaction models can be compared with marginal effects from binning estimators. The use of bins implies that a continuous moderator is divided into several groups of roughly equal size. The binning estimator is "flexible as it jointly fits the interaction components of the standard model to each bin separately, thereby relaxing the LIE assumption" (Hainmueller et al. 2018: 171 with more detailed information on this approach). It allows the conditional marginal effects to vary freely across the bins. Thus, the binning estimators can point to nonlinear or nonmonotonic relationships if they are located far off the line from the standard linear model.

Figures A-13 and A-14 focus on the interaction between security threat and authoritarianism. They present the conditional marginal effects of security threat (left columns) and of authoritarianism (right columns) from binning estimators using three bins. To show the distribution of the moderators and to be able to detect potential problems of common support in the data, I add histograms at the bottom of the plots (Hainmueller et al. 2018: 187).

First, there is no blatant violation of the linearity assumption. The three bins are well distributed over the range of the moderator, both in the case of authoritarian beliefs and perceptions of security threat. However, there are relatively few cases at the margins of the distribution, so the effects in these areas should be considered carefully (when it comes to the effects of security threat among people with extremely authoritarian beliefs, in particular).

Considering the graphs in the left column, one can observe that, in many cases, the influence of security threat clearly decreases at higher levels of authoritarianism in particular. However, the binning estimators sometimes indicate a higher marginal effect of security threat among people with medium levels of authoritarianism than among people with low levels of authoritarianism. For instance, if the regression model on support of home searches did not yield a significant interaction effect, it is probably because security threat is less related to the support of this policy among people with low and high levels of authoritarianism than among the middle group. This result suggests that for people with pronounced (or rather extreme) ideological beliefs, other factors such as threat perceptions are less important than their ideological positions when evaluating policies. Considering perceived security threat as a moderator (right columns of Figures A-13 and A-14), the graphs confirm that, in many cases, the effect of authoritarianism diminishes with increased levels of perceived security threat. For instance, the LIE assumption clearly applies to the marginal effect of authoritarianism on support of a database on suspects (see Figure A-14, right column at the top).

The conditional marginal effects of liberty threat and authoritarianism from binning estimators are shown in Figures A-15 and A-16. There are no marked deviations from the standard linear model. However, these figures show once again that the interactions between liberty threat and authoritarianism do not play a major role in citizens' attitudes towards most of the anti-terrorism policies examined here. If the negative effect of liberty threat on anti-terrorism policy support diminishes with increased authoritarianism (e.g. in case of attitudes towards home search), the binning estimation illustrates that these threats have a particularly negative effect on people with very low levels of authoritarianism.

A second strategy for testing standard linear interaction models is to compare the conditional marginal effects of these models with Kernel smoothing estimators of marginal effects. The underlying Kernel regression allows the conditional effect of the independent variable (e.g. perceived security threat) and of the covariates to vary freely across the range of the moderator (e.g. authoritarianism). This method not only helps to uncover nonlinear interactions but also "to guard against misspecification bias with respect to the covariates" (Hainmueller et al. 2018: 174 with more detailed information on this approach). The Kernel smoothed estimates of the marginal effects of perceived threats and authoritarianism on support of anti-terrorism policies are displayed in Figures A-17 to A-20 in the Appendix. These figures show that, in most cases, the smoothed estimates are not too far off from those from the linear interaction model. The following findings are noteworthy: First, it can be observed that estimates often suggest non-linearity precisely at the margins of the moderator's distribution. In these cases, there are few responses, and the effects might be increasingly imprecisely estimated (e.g.for people holding extremely authoritarian beliefs). Second, nonlinear patterns are observable in the models predicting support of home searching activities. Third, in a vast majority of the analyses and for a broad range of data, however, the assumption of a linear interaction effect holds.

#### 7. Findings on the Attitudinal Consequences of Different Dimensions of Threat and Authoritarianism

The theoretical debates on attributes and consequences of different threats and different dimensions of authoritarianism are very intense. Against the background of these debates, I examine in this chapter how different dimensions of perceived threat and of authoritarian beliefs are associated with the anti-terrorism policy attitudes. After all, it is possible that only specific kinds of perceived threats or particular aspects of the authoritarian syndrome are causing the results shown above. I will first focus on different kinds of threat before explaining how three subdimensions of authoritarianism are linked to the policy attitudes studied.

#### 7.1. Subdimensions of Threat

#### \*Security Threats or a Terror Exception?

Many studies on attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies focus on the consequences of perceived terrorist threats. As outlined above, there are enough reasons for expecting a positive relationship between these perceptions of threat and support of anti-terrorism policies. In order to check whether terrorist threat alone (without crime threat) increases the support of the investigated policies, I computed models with perceived terrorist threat as only one dimension of possible security threat perceptions (see Table A-16).

Compared to the effects of perceived security threat discussed above, the coefficients of perceived terrorist threat and of the interactions between terrorist threat and authoritarianism are only slightly weaker (models without interactions are not shown here). This can be observed in the model on support of exit bans, for example. In combination with authoritarianism, threat perceptions directed exclusively at the perils of terrorism are already sufficient to raise public support for anti-terrorist measures.

I have argued above that other types of security threats can also be associated with demands for anti-terrorist government action. Now, however, it must be empirically examined whether only perceived terrorist threats are decisive in these contexts, or whether crime threat is also related to support of anti-terrorism policies. Table A-17 shows models including perceived crime threat instead of the index of security threat employed above.

Although the effects of crime threat are weaker than those of the broader variable of security threat, they are still present. It can also be observed that the patterns of interaction between threat and authoritarianism do not change significantly. These are remarkable findings, as the proposals were placed very clearly in the context of a fight against terrorism, both in the public debate and in the survey. This was the case, for example, for the legislation enabling authorities to ban the departure of people suspected of joining a terrorist group abroad. These results suggest that a broad range of security threats other than threats from terrorism might also play a role for citizens' anti-terrorism policy attitudes.

#### \*The Importance of Personal Threat

While the relevance of perceived societal threat for citizens' policy attitudes is repeatedly emphasized, the effects of personal threat are generally less considered or regarded as being of minor importance (see chapter 3.2). However, I have argued above that personal threat may well imply heightened support for anti-terrorism policies – for example, because perceptions of one's own vulnerability can have considerable attitudinal consequences (as set out in TMT studies, for example).

The empirical findings presented so far suggest that perceived personal security threat is associated with increased support of anti-terrorism policies, since the measurement of threat used in the analyses above contains several items on personal threat. In order to test the effects of perceptions of personal threat alone, additional models with perceived personal security threat as independent variable were calculated. Therefore, an index of three items was computed, excluding the item "Are you afraid of terrorist attacks happening in Germany?". The results are documented in Table A-18 in the Appendix. The relationships between security threat, authoritarianism and anti-terrorism policy attitudes remain almost unchanged when the focus is solely on personal threat and are only slightly weaker in a few cases. This is an important result, because it shows that the effects of personal threat on support of domestic security policies must not be underestimated.

#### \*Liberty Threat and Security Threat

As I noted above, the relationships between perceptions of liberty threat and attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies of citizens as a whole are somewhat less pronounced than the associations between security threat and these policy attitudes. Interactions with authoritarian beliefs have also been observed less frequently in the case of perceptions of liberty threat. There might be substantial reasons for this result, or the findings might be due to the fact that these perceptions were measured with only one (specific) item.

In order to compare the consequences of the two types of threat examined here, additional models were calculated on the basis of the analyses in Table 10. In these additional models, only one variable on perceived personal terrorist threat instead of an index of perceived security threat was taken into account. This allows the effects of one item for each of the two threat types to be compared. The results of these analyses are illustrated in Table A-19.

The coefficients of perceived personal terrorist threat are somewhat lower than those of the index of perceived security threat, and the interactions of this item with authoritarianism also weaken to some extent (for example, in the model concerning support of preventive detention). However, the patterns of relationships between security threat, authoritarianism and the examined policy attitudes remain approximately the same. Overall, it can be noted that perceptions of security threat are somewhat more important than perceptions of liberty threat, even when the analyses focus on only one specific aspect of security threat – namely perceived personal terrorist threat. These observations again underline the robustness of the previous results.

#### 7.2. Subdimensions of Authoritarianism

As shown so far in this study, authoritarianism is fundamental to the understanding of support for a broad range of anti-terrorism measures, which is consistent with research on the far-reaching attitudinal consequences of authoritarianism. However, numerous authors also point to the multifaceted nature of syndromes of authoritarianism. It is possible that only certain facets of authoritarian beliefs are associated with the policy attitudes under study. I will examine this in more detail in this subchapter.

In current research on the dimensionality of authoritarian beliefs, Funke (2005: 198), for example, points to an "inconsistency between multifaceted theory and one-dimensional measurement" in the work of Altemeyer on right-wing authoritarianism. Altemeyer (1996: 6) conceives authoritarianism as a "covariation of three attitudinal clusters in a person", namely authoritarian aggression, submission, and conventionalism. However, he proposes a one-dimensional measurement of authoritarianism and introduces a one-dimensional RWA scale. New approaches to the study of authoritarianism not only theoretically discuss that these three dimensions represent different positions on the ways in which individual autonomy is to be subordinated to collective authority and order (Duckitt et al. 2010: 705). Their empirical findings also point to the validity and predictive utility of a multidimensional approach to the study of authoritarianism (Duckitt & Bizumic 2013: 841).

Dimensionality analyses of the present study have shown that a one-dimensional measurement of authoritarianism fits the data used and that a measurement with three subscales does not achieve significantly better results. At the same time, however, the three subdimensions mentioned above are discernible in the analyses in chapter 5.5. It is important to perform separate analyses for these subdimensions, since the three subdimensions of authoritarianism may relate differently to perceived threats and towards antiterrorism policy attitudes. This is a probable scenario for the following reasons:

First, different attitudinal consequences of the three subdimension of authoritarianism would be empirically possible, because the associations between the three subscales are not extremely high. Additive indices of authoritarian aggression and submission correlate with .42, indices of aggression and conventionalism correlate with .51. The correla-

tions between the additive indices of authoritarian submission and conventionalism are roughly of the same size with .44.

Second, one can theoretically expect differences in the policy consequences of the three aspects of authoritarianism. For example, authoritarian aggression "favouring the use of strict, tough, harsh, punitive, coercive social control [...] to violation of social rules and laws" (Duckitt et al. 2010: 690) could be more strongly associated with support for anti-terrorism policies than other subdimensions. Postures "favouring uncritical, respectful, obedient, submissive support for existing societal or group authorities and institutions" (Duckitt et al. 2010: 690) are attributed to the subdimension of authoritarian submission, which can also motivate the acceptance of domestic security policies. However, conventionalism in particular might only be of minor importance for support of anti-terrorism policies, since it is based on beliefs "favouring traditional, old fashioned social norms, values, and morality" (Duckitt et al. 2010: 691). These are possibly less associated with the policies examined (e.g. Dunwoody & Funke 2016).

Results on the interplay between threat and authoritarian beliefs may equally depend on the subdimension of authoritarianism considered in the respective analysis. For instance, when Feldman (2003) investigates whether or not authoritarian reactions are activated, he already states that conventionalism (as the expression of conservatism) rather plays a subordinate role in the interaction with threat. Furthermore, Duckitt et al. (2010: 708) suggest that the three subdimensions of authoritarianism may be related to different types of threats.

To check my results in the light of this debate, I compare the above models including the one-dimensional measurement of authoritarianism with those models that contain only one sub-dimension of authoritarianism (see Tables 10 and A-20 to A-22). I can also compare the three models containing authoritarian aggression, submission, and conventionalism with each other. Since there are considerable associations between the three subdimensions of authoritarian beliefs, I do not discuss a model comprising all of the three clusters of authoritarianism. As authoritarian beliefs are said to be important antecedents of anti-terrorism policy support, the benefit of multidimensional approaches to authoritarianism would be questioned if there were no substantial differences in the predictive values of sub-dimensional measures of authoritarianism. One must keep in mind, however, that the findings discussed below apply to one particular measurement of authoritarianism.

The models in Table A-20 comprise authoritarian aggression as one subdimension of authoritarianism. It can be observed that these orientations are less related to the antiterrorism policy attitudes examined here than the one-dimensional measure of the entire authoritarian syndrome. However, these relationships are only slightly weaker. The coefficients of the interactions with perceived threat are also less pronounced (the interactions between liberty threat and authoritarian aggression, in particular), but the directions of these relationships remain the same. Thus, authoritarian aggression cannot be considered as a substitute for the entire range of authoritarian beliefs in studies on support of anti-terrrorism policies.

A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the subdimension of authoritarian submission (see Table A-21). Obviously, the impact of authoritarian beliefs and of the interaction terms is considerably weakened. While the pattern of interaction between security threat perceptions and authoritarian beliefs is still apparent, the interaction between liberty threat perceptions and authoritarian beliefs almost completely disappears when the analyses focus on authoritarian submission.

Finally, the models in Table A-22 include authoritarian conventionalism as the third subdimension of authoritarianism. The relationships between this dimension of authoritarian beliefs and anti-terrorism policy attitudes are considerably weaker than the corresponding relationships involving a one-dimensional measurement of authoritarianism. These results appear to be in line with the findings from Dunwoody and Funke (2016: 586). The interactions between threat perceptions and authoritarian beliefs, however, are still visible. The interaction between perceived liberty threat and authoritarianism, in particular, is hardly weaker.

Overall, these findings suggest the following: It is not a particular subdimension of authoritarian beliefs that counts for the understanding of attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies. The whole syndrome of authoritarianism is associated with these policy attitudes. To date, there have been relatively few findings on this issue, but it is precisely in interaction with perceived threats that the importance of considering the whole syndrome of right-wing authoritarianism becomes apparent. While the interactions between certain subsets of security threats and authoritarianism do not differ considerably from the interactions involving a broader account of security threats, the focus on specific sub-dimensions of authoritarianism produces changes in these interactions.

As an additional result, it can be noted that the relevance of several controls changes when the models only contain one particular sub-dimension of authoritarianism. For instance, the connections between political trust and support of several anti-terrorism policies are much weaker in the models with authoritarian aggression than in the basic models. The (negative) associations between education and support for several antiterrorism policies, on the other hand, are more pronounced in those models only containing authoritarian submission or authoritarian conventionalism instead of a measure of the entire authoritarian syndrome. Overall, the results in this subchapter have demonstrated the importance of discussing different approaches to the concept and measurement of authoritarianism in studies focusing on threat, authoritarian beliefs, and related policy attitudes.

#### 8. Conclusion

One of the two key messages of this study is that threat perceptions considerably shape attitudes towards a broad range of anti-terrorism policies in Germany. So far, this has not yet been shown in such breadth and detail for this country. While perceived security threats tend to increase support for these policies, perceived liberty threats tend to lower support for these policies. This is an important finding because it demonstrates that people's subjective view on possible threats in our world may well have policy consequences. These might originate in the citizens' attitudes, as they provide more or less favourable conditions for the policymaking of political actors.

People do not like to find themselves in threatening situations. The present study suggests that the approval or rejection of policies in the domain of domestic security, but most likely also in other policy domains, is motivated by a "human desire" to neutralize potential threats. To understand these relationships, arguments and findings from psychological theories should still be more integrated into research on political attitudes and behaviour.

At the same time, the analyses of this study show that different types of threat perceptions are related to anti-terrorism policy preferences. First, in addition to perceived terrorist threats, other security concerns can also foster support of far-reaching antiterrorism measures, as examined here using the example of perceived crime threat. Thus, different kinds of threat perceptions can shape attitudes towards policies that were not specifically designed to address these different threats. In other words, the consequences of feelings of (security) threat might extend to a wide range of policy preferences.

Second, and this observation is particularly noteworthy, citizens who perceive their liberties to be threatened tend to be more sceptical about government intervention in order to fight terrorism. Perceived liberty threats have almost completely been neglected in previous research on support of domestic security policies. However, threats to liberty are of relevance to citizens in Germany. According to my data, the average level of perceived privacy threat is higher than the average level of perceived personal threat related to a terrorist attack. Ignoring threats to freedom as an issue can become a problem especially when the strong focus on security threats dominates public debates and debates on the consequences of suggested or implemented policies. Further analyses should be carried out to clarify which dimensions of liberty threat matter for citizens' attitudes towards anti-terrorism policies and towards other kinds of security policies. There is also still a lack of country comparisons, which systematically examine whether citizens in Germany are particularly sensitive to liberty threats or policies challenging civil liberties, as is often claimed with regard to the country's history.

Third, the results of this study let me underline the importance of personal threat. Existing studies often highlight the effects of sociotropic threats on anti-terrorism policy attitudes, at least because of the scope and social relevance of these threats. However, my findings show that the effects of personal threats on anti-terrorism policy attitudes should not be underestimated. Overall, this work clearly demonstrates that it is useful to distinguish between different dimensions of threat perceptions in their influence on policy attitudes. This conclusion is in line with other recent work on the consequences of threats (e.g. Spruyt & van der Noll 2017; Landmann et al. 2019). However, there is also a limit to the results of the present study: with the available data it is not possible to distinguish between different feelings triggered by the perceived threats and to investigate their consequences more closely. The article by Marcus et al. (2019) suggests that people's anger and fears as possible responses to threats might have different consequences for people's policy attitudes.

The second key message is that the policy consequences of perceived threat analysed in this study can only be understood if the interaction between citizens' (non-)authoritarian beliefs and their perceptions of threat is taken into account. The influence of perceived threats on support of a large part of the anti-terrorism policy proposals examined here is associated with the extent to which people hold authoritarian beliefs – and the influence of authoritarian beliefs is related to individuals' perceptions of threat. For instance, the less authoritarian convictions one holds, the more negative the effect of perceived liberty threat on support of a database with information on suspects – a positive interaction between perceptions of liberty threat and authoritarian beliefs.

When it comes to security threat, the findings of a negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism do not fit with the argument that authoritarians are particularly sensitive to threatening stimuli and that threat activates attitudinal expressions of this posture related to political issues (e.g. Feldman & Stenner 1997). On the contrary, the present results are in line with those studies stating that non-authoritarians or people from the ideological left might be more likely to react to perceived threats in altering their views and becoming supportive of harsher policies (e.g. Hetherington & Weiler 2010). Thus, my analyses can show relationships in German public opinion that have so far only been observed in other countries such as the United States or France (e.g. Vasilopoulos et al. 2018).

Further research should pay special attention to the policy attitudes of nonauthoritarians, that is, people who rather tend to reject conformity and the submission to authorities and social order. For in times of perceived threat, their reactions to antiterrorism policy proposals can differ greatly from their reactions in non-threatening situations. Overall, the example of authoritarianism shows that expressions of stable ideological positions and the ways they translate into particular policy preferences can be of great variability. At the same time, as the present study suggests, these ideological postures play an important role in defining how people think about political issues and what policy preferences they have.

Two important results of my study are not directly related to the consequences of perceived threat, but are nevertheless worth mentioning. They shed new light on previous findings: First, if the population perceives security policies being effective in both preventing terrorist incidents and reducing crime records, this consistently increases support for a broad range of anti-terrorism policies. These perceptions of policy effectiveness have so far received little attention in studies on policy preferences. However, the results show that this type of performance evaluation can be an important reason for people to evaluate newly proposed policies positively or negatively.

Second, the results of this study show that there are considerable differences in the way people evaluate particular policies. The characteristics of these measures certainly have a part to play here. This can be observed not only with regard to the respective level of support, but also in the fact that several factors such as social trust are only important for the assessment of particular anti-terrorism policies.

Overall, the present study shows that perceived threats – as a situational and subjective element – can shape public opinion on policies, even if further research on individuallevel changes of perceived threat and their relationships with support of civil liberties infringements remains to be done. The results highlight the importance of media reports and political discourse on potential security threats being appropriate and not alarmist (Hetherington & Suhay 2011: 557–558). After all, dynamics of security threats do well have the potential to shift the political balance between freedom and security in a democratic country's political culture.

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#### Table A-1: Descriptives of the Dependent Variables

	Mean	SD	SK	KT	Ν
Attitudes Towards Antiterrorism Policies					
Which of the following measures should government agencies be allowed to use in order to fight terrorism? Please evaluate these proposals (seven-point scale from ,completely agree' to 'completely disagree')					
To torture a suspect if it is a means to obtain information about planned terrorist attacks	1.64	2.88	1.75	4.93	1,993
To detain terror suspects preventively for several days, even without any concrete evidence that they committed offences	5.24	3.52	09	1.70	1,998
To prevent people from leaving the country if they are suspected to join a terrorist group abroad.	7.51	3.26	-1.13	2.97	1,997
To subject people of certain external characteristics or back- grounds to reinforced controls.	3.15	3.34	.76	2.33	2,003
To search the home of terror suspects without a warrant.	6.02	3.80	42	1.66	2,000
To record personal information and fingerprints of suspects in a database and to fight terrorism.	8.35	2.60	-1.69	5.10	1,998
To monitor telephone calls and online activities of suspects with- out a warrant.	5.69	3.75	29	1.61	2,000
Which of the following measures should government agencies be additionally allowed to use in order to fight terrorism? Please evaluate these proposals again					
To sentence professions of sympathy for terrorists in social net- works.	6.77	3.40	71	2.21	1,991
To ban public speeches with professions of sympathy for terror- ists.	7.23	3.38	94	2.51	1,995
To ban all demonstrations and strikes upon a threat of terrorism.	5.25	3.73	07	1.55	1,997

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data; SD = standard deviation; SK = skewness; KT = kurtosis; N = valid cases; items rescaled from 0 to 10.

	Mean	SD	SK	KT	N
Perceived Threat					
Are you afraid of (seven-point scale)					
becoming a victim of a terrorist attack?	3.29	3.10	.74	2.49	2,004
terrorist attacks happening in Germany?	5.91	2.95	26	2.09	1,999
becoming a victim of domestic burglary?	4.88	3.32	.07	1.78	2,003
becoming a victim of assault?	3.95	3.11	.46	2.12	2,004
your privacy being infringed by government surveillance?	4.14	3.09	.31	2.03	1,999
Perceived security threat (additive index)	4.51	2.48	.33	2.40	1,998
Authoritarianism					
What do you think of the following statements? (seven-point scale from 'completely agree' to 'completely disagree')					
A1: Society should act against Do-nothings with all force.	5.15	3.36	01	1.81	1,975
A2: Trouble-makers should distinctly feel that they are un- wanted in society	6.22	3.29	40	1.93	1,976
A3: Social rules should be enforced without any compassion.	4.64	3.26	.12	1.92	1,972
S1: People should leave important decisions in society to leaders.	3.35	2.94	.55	2.33	1,996
S2: We should be grateful for leaders that tell us exactly what we shall do and how.	3.32	3.07	.61	2.35	1,984
C1: Good practices should not be questioned.	4.57	3.28	.18	1.91	1,958
C2: It is always the best to do things the conventional way.	3.53	3.04	.52	2.32	1,978
Authoritarianism (additive index)	4.42	2.09	.17	2.57	1,875

#### Table A-2: Descriptives of the Main Independent Variables

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data; SD = standard deviation; SK = skewness; KT = kurtosis; N = valid cases; items rescaled from 0 to 10.

Table A	A-3: Des	criptives	of	Controls
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	Mean/ Share	SD	SK	KT	N
Policy Effectiveness					
Can domestic security measures not prevent at all, rather not prevent, rather prevent, or definitely prevent terrorist attacks in Germany?	5.88	2.47	16	2.71	1,993
Can domestic security measures not reduce at all, rather not reduce, rather reduce, or definitely reduce the number of crimes in Germany?	6.29	2.45	13	2.51	1,992
Policy effectiveness (additive index)	6.09	2.07	08	2.84	1,984
Political Trust					
And how much do you personally trust each of the following institu- tions? (Seven-point scale from 'do not trust at all' to 'completely trust') What about					
the German Bundestag?	5.12	2.57	29	2.43	1,999
the Federal Government?	4.99	2.67	22	2.32	2,000
the legal system?	6.07	2.45	52	2.83	1,997
the police?	6.85	2.27	68	3.14	1,999
the Federal Constitutional Court?	6.76	2.61	67	2.83	1,987
Political trust (additive index)	5.96	1.97	50	2.90	1,974
Social Trust					
Generally speaking, do you believe most people can be trusted or do you think that you can't be careful enough in dealing with other people? (Seven-point scale from 'you can't be careful enough' to 'most people can be trusted')	4.96	2.62	21	2.42	1,997
Left-Right Self-Placement					
In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?	4.60	1.83	.00	4.28	1,952
Age					
Calculated from the respondent's year of birth: Please tell me: In what year were you born?	49.98	17.74	.04	2.09	1,987
Gender					
Are you male (0)? Female (1)?	51.63	-	-	-	2,004
Education					
What is the highest level of education you have successfully com- pleted? (Scale from 0 to 5) Finished school without school leaving certificate, lowest formal qualification of Germany's tripartite secondary school system, after 8 or 9 years of schooling, intermediary secondary qualification, after 10 years of schooling, certificate fulfilling entrance requirements to study at a university of applied science, higher qualification, entitling holders to study at a university, higher education (at least Bachelor's degree from a university of applied sciences)	3.24	1.53	08	1.53	1,977

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data; SD = standard deviation; SK = skewness; KT = kurtosis; N = valid cases; attitudinal items rescaled from 0 to 10.

	Construction of the education variable					
Initial question	Was ist der höchste allgemeinbildende Schulabschluss, den Sie erreicht haben?	What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?				
Response categories in German and English language	• Schule beendet ohne Abschluss	<ul> <li>Finished school without school leaving certificate</li> </ul>				
	• Volks-/Hauptschulabschluss bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule mit Ab- schluss 8. oder 9. Klasse	• Lowest formal qualification of Germany's tripartite secondary school system, after 8 or 9 years of schooling				
	• Mittlere Reife, Realschulabschluss bzw. Polytechn. Oberschule mit Ab- schluss 10. Klasse	• Intermediary secondary qualifica- tion, after 10 years of schooling				
	• Fachhochschulreife (Abschluss einer Fachoberschule etc.)	• Certificate fulfilling entrance re- quirements to study at a university of applied science				
	• Abitur bzw. Erweiterte Oberschule mit Abschluss 12. Klasse (Hochschulreife)	• Higher qualification, entitling holders to study at a university				
	• Anderen Schulabschluss, und zwar: (kodiert, wenn möglich)	• Another school leaving certificate, namely: (recoded if possible)				
Missing values	• Noch Schülerin oder Schüler (N = 6)	Still at school				
	• Verweigert	• Refused				
	• Weiß nicht	• Don't know				
Additional information from the following question	Welche beruflichen Ausbildungsab- schlüsse und Studienabschlüsse haben Sie? Sie können mehrere Antworten geben.	What vocational training and universi- ty degrees have you completed? You can choose several answers.				
Relevant responses for the category "higher education" ("other" recoded if possible)	• Hochschulabschluss, mindestens Bachelor an einer Fachhochschule	• Higher education, at least Bachelor's degree from a university of applied sciences				

#### Table A-4: Detailed Information about the Education Variable

Torture of suspects	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Preventive detention	.26 <sup>**</sup> 1,988	1								
No country leave	.12 <sup>**</sup> 1,986	.28 <sup>**</sup> 1,992	1							
Racial profiling	.35 <sup>**</sup> 1,992	.33 <sup>**</sup> 1,997	.20 <sup>**</sup> 1,996	1						
Home search	.27 <sup>**</sup> 1,990	.45 <sup>**</sup> 1,994	.30 <sup>**</sup> 1,993	.38 <sup>**</sup> 1,999	1					
Database on suspects	.19 <sup>**</sup> 1,988	.38 <sup>**</sup> 1,992	.35** 1,991	.28 <sup>**</sup> 1,997	.46 <sup>**</sup> 1,995	1				
Surveillance of communication	.27 <sup>**</sup> 1,989	.43 <sup>**</sup> 1,994	.31 <sup>**</sup> 1,993	.32 <sup>**</sup> 1,999	.64 <sup>**</sup> 1,996	.45 <sup>**</sup> 1,994	1			
Control of social networks	.15 <sup>**</sup> 1,982	.28 <sup>**</sup> 1,986	.28 <sup>**</sup> 1,984	.21** 1,990	.31** 1,988	.26 <sup>**</sup> 1,986	.32 <sup>**</sup> 1,988	1		
Ban public speech	.15 <sup>**</sup> 1,984	.31** 1,990	.27** 1,988	.22 <sup>**</sup> 1,994	.32 <sup>**</sup> 1,991	.33 <sup>**</sup> 1,989	.29** 1,992	.49 <sup>**</sup> 1,984	1	
No demonstrations if threat	.17 <sup>**</sup> 1,986	.32** 1,992	.23** 1,990	.23** 1,996	.36** 1,993	.29** 1,991	.37** 1,993	.36** 1,984	.38** 1,989	1

#### Table A-5: Correlations between Evaluations of Anti-Terrorism Policy Proposals

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; Pearson's r; weighted data; <sup>\*\*</sup> =  $p \le 0.01$ .

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	.05	.19**	.25**	.26**	.22**	.17**	.27**	.06	.12**	.15**
threat	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Perceived liberty	04	<b>-</b> .11 <sup>**</sup>	<b>-</b> .11 <sup>**</sup>	02	<b>-</b> .19 <sup>**</sup>	17**	31**	05*	08**	08**
threat	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Authoritarianism	.37**	.42**	.19**	.33**	.53**	.25**	.49**	.51**	.34**	.60**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Policy effectiveness	$.07^{*}$	$.10^{*}$	.12**	.15**	.12**	.12**	.10**	.18**	.18**	.15**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	13**	15**	.03	14**	12**	04	14**	06	<b>-</b> .10 <sup>*</sup>	09
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Social trust	13**	05	03	09**	15***	04	14**	00	.02	04
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.12**	.12**	.01	.30**	.04	.06	.06	.01	.04	01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.03	02	03	09	28**	05	20**	10	10	19**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	.00	01*	01**	00	01 <sup>*</sup>	.00	00	.01**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	40**	.38*	20	45**	.66**	.23*	.72**	.02	.11	1.03**
	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.12)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	1.21	3.07**	5.39**	.60	5.28**	6.86**	5.02**	3.87**	4.96**	1.55**
	(.41)	(.51)	(.49)	(.46)	(.52)	(.37)	(.50)	(.50)	(.51)	(.52)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.15	.15	.09	.22	.25	.17	.28	.14	.09	.22
Ν	1,771	1,775	1,774	1,775	1,775	1,774	1,774	1,771	1,773	1,774

# Table A-6: Regression of Perceived Threats and Authoritarianism on Anti-<br/>Terrorism Policy Attitudes (with Controls)

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016;  $^{**} = p \le 0.01$ ,  $^* = p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

# Table A-7: Regression of Perceived Security Threat, Authoritarianism, and Their Interaction on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	04	.48**	.55**	.16*	.39**	.40**	.51**	.17*	.31**	.38**
threat	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)
Perceived liberty	02	10**	10**	01	17**	16**	29**	06**	07**	07**
threat	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Authoritarianism	.29**	.65**	.53**	.29**	.64**	.46**	.68**	.63**	.52**	$.78^{**}$
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)
Perceived sec. threat	.02*	05**	06**	.03*	01	04**	03*	02	03*	03*
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Constant	.10	$1.68^{**}$	4.52**	.57	2.45**	6.10**	2.37**	3.87**	4.59**	$1.08^{**}$
	(.30)	(.35)	(.33)	(.33)	(.36)	(.26)	(.35)	(.34)	(.35)	(.36)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.10	.14	.09	.16	.20	.16	.24	.14	.08	.20
Ν	1,865	1,870	1,870	1,871	1,871	1,870	1,869	1,866	1,867	1,868

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; OLS-regressions; \*\* =  $p \le 0.01$ , \* =  $p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

# Table A-8: Regression of Perceived Liberty Threat, Authoritarianism, and Their Interaction on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	$.07^{*}$	.25**	.25**	.30**	.31**	.21**	.35**	$.08^*$	.15**	.24**
threat	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Perceived liberty	16**	11	13*	10	30**	27**	43**	12*	07	11
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarianism	.27**	.43**	.22**	.34**	.46**	.18**	.41**	$.50^{**}$	.37**	.62**
	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Perceived lib. threat	.03**	.00	.01	.02*	.03*	.02**	.03**	.01	.00	.01
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Constant	.26	2.63**	5.87**	.38	3.30**	7.34**	3.62**	4.47**	5.23**	$1.77^{**}$
	(.26)	(.31)	(.30)	(.29)	(.32)	(.23)	(.31)	(.30)	(.31)	(.32)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.10	.14	.08	.16	.21	.15	.24	.14	.08	.20
Ν	1,865	1,870	1,870	1,871	1,871	1,870	1,869	1,866	1,867	1,868

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; OLS-regressions; \*\* =  $p \le 0.01$ , \* =  $p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

	Model 1: Regression of Perceived Threats and Au- thoritarianism on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes	Model 1a: Regression of Perceived Threats, Authori- tarianism and Controls on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes
	Model 2: Regression of Perceived Threats, Authori- tarianism, and Their Interactions on Anti- Terrorism Policy Attitudes	Model 2a: Regression of Perceived Threats, Authori- tarianism, Their Interactions, and Controls on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes
	F-values	F-values
Torture of suspects	6.84**	6.75**
Preventive detention	5.96**	3.49*
No country leave	12.20**	11.24**
Racial profiling	3.94*	3.96*
Home search	4.06**	2.45
Database on suspects	13.00**	10.06**
Surveillance of	7.66**	4.93**
communication Control of social	1.77	1.19
networks Ban public speech	3.12*	2.85
No demonstrations if threat	2.36	1.83

#### Table A-9: Model Comparisons with F-Tests

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016;  $^{**} = p \le 0.01$ ,  $^* = p \le 0.05$ ; weighted data.

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	12	.41**	.53**	.16*	.32**	.35**	.41**	.23**	.34**	.39**
threat	(.06)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Perceived liberty	14**	12*	14*	06	34**	27**	43**	<b>-</b> .11 <sup>*</sup>	12*	10
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarianism	.10	.58**	.46**	.19*	.46**	.33**	$.50^{**}$	.56**	.53**	.74**
	(.07)	(.09)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.06)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Perceived sec. threat	.04**	04**	06**	.02	02	04**	03*	03*	05**	05**
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.03**	.01	.01	.02	.04**	.03**	.03*	.01	.01	.01
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	.05	.12**	.11**	.14**	$.10^{*}$	.12**	$.10^{**}$	.15**	.17**	.12**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	13**	16**	.04	15**	12**	02	14**	07	08	05
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Social trust	10**	04	01	<b>-</b> .11 <sup>**</sup>	12**	05*	<b>-</b> .11 <sup>**</sup>	03	02	06
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.18**	.11*	02	.31**	.07	.09**	$.09^{*}$	.01	.03	.03
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.03	02	.01	04	24**	05	18**	<b>-</b> .11*	09	21**
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	00	01	01	00	00	.00	.00	.01**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	49**	.36*	24	38**	.63**	$.28^{*}$	.72**	.19	.12	.91**
	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.12)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	1.95**	1.89**	4.05**	.87	4.81**	6.19**	4.36**	3.91**	4.36**	.76
	(.51)	(.62)	(.60)	(.57)	(.64)	(.46)	(.62)	(.62)	(.62)	(.64)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.16	.17	.10	.23	.25	.18	.28	.14	.11	.23
Ν	1,771	1,775	1,774	1,775	1,775	1,774	1,774	1,771	1,773	1,774

#### Table A-10: Regression of Perceived Threats, Authoritarianism, and Their Interactions on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes II (with Controls, Unweighted)

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016;  $^{**} = p \le 0.01$ ,  $^* = p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses.

Table A-11:	Regression	<b>Diagnostics:</b>	Multicollinearity	Checks
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	Surveillance of communication			
	VIF	Tolerance (1/VIF)		
Perceived sec. threat	11.88	0.08		
x authoritarianism Perceived lib. threat x authoritarianism	7.00	0.14		
Perceived security	6.22	0.16		
threat Authoritarianism	5.65	0.18		
Perceived liberty	5.60	0.18		
threat				
Political trust	1.25	0.80		
Social trust	1.23	0.81		
Education	1.18	0.84		
Policy effectiveness	1.12	0.89		
Left-right placement	1.09	0.92		
Gender: female	1.09	0.92		
Age	1.07	0.94		
Mean VIF	3.70			

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data; this table shows the VIF and tolerance values for the regression of the main independent variables and controls on support of surveillance of communication (the models for the other dependent variables have very similar VIF values).

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	06	.38**	.56**	.12	.26**	.36**	.45**	.15	.29**	.28**
threat	(.07)	(.10)	(.10)	(.08)	(.09)	(.07)	(.09)	(.10)	(.11)	(.09)
Perceived liberty	17**	14*	15**	09	31**	28**	<b>-</b> .41 <sup>**</sup>	10	07	05
threat	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.07)
Authoritarianism	.16	.56**	.44**	.14	.47**	.33**	.56**	.55**	$.50^{**}$	.74**
	(.09)	(.10)	(.10)	(.09)	(.10)	(.07)	(.09)	(.09)	(.12)	(.10)
Perceived sec. threat	.02	04*	07**	.03*	01	04**	04*	02	03	03
x authoritarianism	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)
Perceived lib. threat	.03*	.01	.01	.01	.03*	.03*	.02	.01	.00	.00
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	.06	$.10^{*}$	.11**	.15**	.12*	.11**	.09*	$.18^{**}$	$.18^{**}$	.15**
	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Political trust	14**	15**	.03	15**	12*	05	15**	06	10	08
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Social trust	13**	05	03	09**	15**	04	14**	00	.03	04
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Left-right placement	.12*	.12*	.01	.30**	.04	.06	.06	.01	.04	01
	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Education	.03	01	02	09	28**	04	19**	09	10	19**
	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	00	01	01**	00	01	.00	00	.01*
	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)
Gender: Female	44**	.38*	20	47**	.64**	.21	$.70^{**}$	.01	.12	$1.04^{**}$
	(.15)	(.19)	(.18)	(.16)	(.19)	(.14)	(.18)	(.18)	(.19)	(.19)
Constant	2.25**	2.46**	4.27**	1.52**	5.63**	6.56**	4.74**	3.69**	4.23**	.90
	(.66)	(.77)	(.81)	(.63)	(.74)	(.55)	(.73)	(.73)	(.83)	(.72)
R <sup>2</sup>	.16	.15	.10	.22	.25	.18	.29	.15	.10	.23
Ν	1,771	1,775	1,774	1,775	1,775	1,774	1,774	1,771	1,773	1,774

# Table A-12: Regression of Perceived Threats, Authoritarianism, Their Interactions, and Controls on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes (Robust Standard Errors)

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016;  $^{**} = p \le 0.01$ ,  $^* = p \le 0.05$ ; robust standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

	Coef.	Robust	Exp(B)
		SEs	
Perceived security threat	11	.07	.89
Perceived liberty threat	.16**	.05	1.17
Authoritarianism	27**	.07	.76
Perceived sec. threat x authoritarianism	.01	.01	1.01
Perceived lib. threat x authoritarianism	02*	.01	.98
Policy effectiveness	07*	.03	.93
Political trust	.09**	.04	1.09
Social trust	.08**	.03	1.09
Left-right placement	12**	.04	.89
Education	03	.05	.97
Age	.01**	.00	1.01
Gender: Female	.29*	.14	1.33
Constant	1.37	.56	3.95
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.11	
Ν		1,771	

## Table A-13: Logistic Regression of Perceived Threats, Authoritarianism, andTheir Interactions on Clear Rejection of Torture

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016;  $** = p \le 0.01$ ,  $* = p \le 0.05$ ; weighted data; clear rejection of torture: "completely disagree" coded as 1, other valid responses coded as 0; constant in the case of exp(B) displays baseline odds.

	Coefficients	VIF	Tolerance
			(1/VIF)
Perceived security threat	.70**	10.47	0.10
	(.10)		
Perceived liberty threat	43***	9.91	0.10
	(.08)		
Authoritarianism	.53**	5.70	0.18
	(.09)		
Perceived security threat	03	12.43	0.08
x authoritarianism	(.01)		
Perceived liberty threat	.02	7.32	0.14
x authoritarianism	(.01)		
Policy effectiveness	.09*	1.13	0.89
	(.04)		
Political trust	16**	1.25	0.80
	(.04)		
Social trust	13***	1.24	0.80
	(.03)		
Left-right placement	.33***	5.44	0.18
	(.10)		
Perceived security threat	07**	12.18	0.08
x left-right placement	(.02)		
Perceived liberty threat	.01	8.42	0.12
x left-right placement	(.01)		
Education	18***	1.19	0.84
	(.05)		
Age	01	1.07	0.93
-	(.00)		
Gender: Female	.71**	1.09	0.92
	(.16)		
Constant	3.66**		
	(.71)		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.29		
-		Mean VIF:	
N	1,774	5.63	

#### Table A-14: Regression on Support of Surveillance of Communication (with Interactions between Left-Right Orientation and Perceived Threats)

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016;  $^{**} = p \le 0.01$ ,  $^* = p \le 0.05$ ; standard errors in parentheses; weighted data.

	Informed	Not informed
	about the existence	about the existence
	of a law on this subject	of a law on this subject
uthoritarianism erceived sec. threat authoritarianism erceived lib. threat authoritarianism olicy effectiveness olitical trust ecial trust eft-right placement ducation ge	.60**	.51**
	(.10)	(.12)
Perceived liberty threat	19**	11
	(.08)	(.09)
Authoritarianism	.35**	.56**
	(.11)	(.14)
Perceived sec. threat	07**	06**
x authoritarianism	(.02)	(.02)
Perceived lib. threat	.02	.00
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.02)
Policy effectiveness	.11*	.10
	(.05)	(.06)
Political trust	.09	04
	(.05)	(.07)
Social trust	03	02
	(.04)	(.05)
Left-right placement	.01	.01
	(.06)	(.07)
Education	.02	08
	(.07)	(.08)
Age	.01	01
	(.01)	(.01)
Gender: Female	25	01
	(.19)	(.25)
Constant	3.81**	4.81**
	(.78)	(.94)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.09	.10
N	1,046	728

### Table A-15: Regressions on Support of Travel Bans for Terrorist Suspects for Respondents with and without Policy Knowledge

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	06	.40**	.48**	.10	.26**	.36**	.36**	.08	.25**	.24**
threat	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Perceived liberty	16**	14*	14*	08	30**	27**	40**	09	06	04
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarianism	.15*	.55**	.41**	$.17^{*}$	.47**	.33**	.54**	$.50^{**}$	.48**	.73**
	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)
Perceived sec. threat	.03*	04**	05**	.03*	01	04**	03*	01	03*	02
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.03**	.01	.01	.01	$.02^{*}$	.02**	.02	.01	.00	.00
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	$.06^{*}$	$.10^{*}$	.11**	.15**	.12**	.11**	$.10^{*}$	$.18^{**}$	.18**	.15**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	14**	15***	.03	16**	13**	05	15**	07	<b>-</b> .10 <sup>*</sup>	09
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Social trust	13**	05	04	10**	15**	05	15**	01	.02	05
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.12**	.12**	.02	.31**	.04	$.06^{*}$	.07	.01	.04	00
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.03	02	03	09	28**	04	20***	10	10	19**
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	.00	01	01**	00	01	.00	00	.01**
~ 1 5 1	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	45**	.32*	20	46**	.62**	.17	.71**	.02	.11	1.04**
<b>a</b>	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.12)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	2.21**	2.31**	4.49**	1.43**	5.56**	6.49**	4.94**	3.95**	4.31**	.99
A 1' D2	(.50)	(.61)	(.59)	(.56)	(.62)	(.45)	(.60)	(.60)	(.61)	(.63)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.15	.16	.09	.22	.25	.18	.28	.14	.10	.23
Ν	1,771	1,775	1,774	1,775	1,775	1,774	1,774	1,771	1,773	1,774

## Table A-16: Perceived Terrorist Threat and Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes (with Liberty Threat, Interactions, and Controls)

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	05	.18**	.37**	.05	.13*	.19**	.30**	.14*	.18**	.18**
threat	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)
Perceived liberty	<b>-</b> .17 <sup>**</sup>	13*	14*	09	30**	27**	<b>-</b> .41 <sup>**</sup>	10	07	05
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarianism	.21**	.53**	.39**	.18*	.47**	.29**	.54**	.57**	.47**	.72**
	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Perceived sec. threat	.01	02	05**	.03*	00	02*	03**	02	02	02
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.03**	.01	.01	.02	.03*	.02**	.03*	.01	.00	.00
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	$.07^{*}$	$.10^{*}$	.11**	.15**	.12**	.12**	$.10^{**}$	$.18^{**}$	.18**	.15**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	14**	<b>-</b> .17 <sup>**</sup>	.02	15**	13**	06	15**	07	<b>-</b> .10 <sup>*</sup>	09
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Social trust	14**	07*	03	<b>-</b> .10 <sup>**</sup>	16**	05*	14**	00	.02	05
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.12**	.13**	.02	.30**	.05	$.07^{*}$	.06	.01	.04	00
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.03	02	03	10	29**	05	20***	09	10	19**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	00	01*	02**	00	01*	.00	00	.01**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	41**	.51**	08	37**	.75**	.31	.81**	.05	.19	1.11**
	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.12)	(.16)	(.15)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	2.16**	3.12**	4.95**	$1.77^{**}$	6.05**	7.16**	5.25**	3.71**	4.59**	1.23*
	(.49)	(.62)	(.58)	(.55)	(.62)	(.45)	(.59)	(.59)	(.60)	(.62)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.15	.14	.08	.21	.24	.16	.27	.14	.09	.22
Ν	1,773	1,776	1,776	1,777	1,777	1,776	1,776	1,773	1,775	1,776

# Table A-17: Perceived Crime Threat and Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes (with Liberty Threat, Interactions, and Controls)

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	06	.28**	.47**	.09	.21**	.27**	.39**	.16*	.28**	.27**
threat	(.06)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)
Perceived liberty	17**	13*	14*	08	30**	27**	<b>-</b> .41 <sup>**</sup>	10	07	05
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarianism	.18**	.52**	.39**	$.18^{*}$	.47**	.30**	.54**	.55**	$.50^{**}$	.74**
	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Perceived sec. threat	.02	03*	06**	.03*	01	03**	03*	02	04**	03*
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.03**	.01	.01	.01	.03*	.02**	$.02^{*}$	.01	.00	.00
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	$.07^{*}$	$.10^{*}$	.11**	.15**	.12**	.11**	.10**	$.18^{**}$	.18**	.15**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	14**	16**	.03	15***	13**	05	15**	07	<b>-</b> .10 <sup>*</sup>	08
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Social trust	13**	06	03	10**	15***	05*	14**	00	.02	05
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.12**	.12**	.02	.30**	.04	$.07^{*}$	.06	.01	.04	01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.03	02	02	09	28**	04	19**	09	09	18**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	00	01*	01**	00	01	.00	00	.01**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	43**	.44**	14	43**	.69**	.26*	.74**	.03	.15	1.06**
_	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.12)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	2.20**	2.88**	4.74**	1.61**	5.84**	6.96**	5.03**	3.73**	4.34**	.99
	(.49)	(.61)	(.58)	(.55)	(.62)	(.44)	(.59)	(.59)	(.61)	(.62)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.15	.14	.09	.21	.24	.16	.28	.14	.10	.22
Ν	1,773	1,776	1,776	1,777	1,777	1,776	1,776	1,773	1,775	1,776

## Table A-18: Perceived Personal Threat and Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes (with Interactions and Controls)

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	05	.28**	.34**	.07	.19**	.24**	.28**	.07	.27**	.26**
threat	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Perceived liberty	16**	12*	12*	07	29**	26**	38**	09	06	04
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarianism	.20**	.49**	.32**	.26**	.49**	.27**	.52**	.51**	.48**	.72**
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Perceived sec. threat	.02*	03*	04**	.02	01	03**	03*	01	04**	03*
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.02**	.00	.01	.01	$.02^{*}$	.02**	.02	.01	.00	01
x authoritarianism	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	.06*	.10**	.12**	.16**	.13**	.12**	.11**	$.18^{**}$	$.18^{**}$	.16**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	14**	16**	.02	16**	13***	05	16**	07	10*	08
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Social trust	13**	06	05	11**	16***	05*	16**	01	.01	05
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.12**	.13**	.03	.32**	.05	$.07^{*}$	.08	.01	.04	.00
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.03	02	03	09	28**	05	20**	10	10	19**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	.00	01	01**	00	01	.00	.00	.02**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	45**	.39*	12	38**	$.70^{**}$	.25*	$.78^{**}$	.04	.15	1.05**
	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.12)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	$2.08^{**}$	2.96**	5.30**	$1.50^{**}$	5.87**	7.14**	5.41**	4.03**	4.49**	1.11
	(.47)	(.58)	(.60)	(.53)	(.59)	(.43)	(.57)	(.57)	(.58)	(.59)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.15	.15	.08	.20	.24	.16	.27	.14	.10	.22
Ν	1,773	1,776	1,776	1,777	1,777	1,776	1,776	1,773	1,775	1,776

### Table A-19: Perceived Personal Terrorist Threat, Liberty Threat and Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes (with Interactions and Controls)

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	.06	.35**	.47**	.17*	.30**	.36**	.45**	.11	.18*	.34**
threat	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Perceived liberty	10*	08	10	09	30**	23**	39**	05	02	02
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Authoritarian	.19**	.46**	.37**	.05	.38**	.32**	.43**	.44**	.41**	.58**
aggression	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Perceived sec. threat	.00	03*	04**	.02	01	03**	03*	01	01	03*
x authorit. aggression	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.01	.00	.00	.01	$.02^{*}$	.01	.02	.00	01	01
x authorit. aggression	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	.09**	$.10^{*}$	.11**	.17**	.13**	.12**	.11**	.16**	.19**	.17**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	08**	08	.06	<b>-</b> .10 <sup>*</sup>	05	01	08	.01	05	.01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Social trust	13**	04	02	09**	14**	04	<b>-</b> .14 <sup>**</sup>	.00	.04	05
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.13**	.11**	01	.31**	.04	.05	.06	.00	.02	01
<b>P1</b>	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	01	08	04	13	31**	05	22**	15**	12*	25**
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Age	01**	00	00	01	01*	00	00	.01	.00	.02**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	44 <sup>**</sup>	.41**	17	51**	.60**	.23*	.67**	.04	.13	.96**
0	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.11)	(.15)	(.15)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	1.26*	1.91**	4.19**	1.27*	4.92**	6.01**	4.13**	3.06**	3.88**	.21
	(.52)	(.63)	(.60)	(.57)	(.64)	(.45)	(.61)	(.61)	(.62)	(.64) 22
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.13	.14	.09	.21	.24	.18	.28	.15	.11	.22
Ν	1,814	1,818	1,815	1,818	1,818	1,817	1,817	1,814	1,815	1,816

## Table A-20: Regression of Perceived Threats, Authoritarian Aggression, and Their Interactions on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes


	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	.08	.36**	.43**	.31**	.36**	.32**	.45**	.21**	.32**	.30**
threat	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Perceived liberty	12**	12**	15**	07	24**	20**	35**	08*	<b>-</b> .11 <sup>**</sup>	08*
threat	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Authoritarian	.04	.32**	.19**	.12*	.23**	$.18^{**}$	.31**	.21**	.24**	.40**
submission	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Perceived sec. threat	.01	03**	04**	.00	01	03**	03*	01	04**	02
x authorit. submission	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	$.02^{*}$	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01	.00
x authorit. submission	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	$.08^{**}$	.12**	.14**	.16**	.14**	.13**	.12**	.21**	.20**	$.18^{**}$
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	13**	14**	.05	15***	09*	02	12**	03	08	09
	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Social trust	<b>-</b> .16 <sup>**</sup>	$08^{*}$	05	12**	19**	07**	19**	05	01	09**
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.15**	.15**	.03	.32**	.08	$.08^*$	$.09^{*}$	.05	.06	.05
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	04	14**	09	<b>-</b> .14 <sup>**</sup>	38**	10**	28**	23**	19**	31**
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Age	<b>-</b> .01 <sup>**</sup>	.00	.00	01	01	00	00	$.01^{*}$	.00	.02**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	52**	.29	29*	58**	.44**	.17	.57**	09	.02	$.87^{**}$
	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.11)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	2.45**	3.57**	5.36**	1.53**	6.31**	$7.08^{**}$	5.69**	4.85**	5.39**	2.47**
	(.44)	(.54)	(.51)	(.48)	(.56)	(.39)	(.53)	(.53)	(.54)	(.56)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.12	.12	.09	.21	.20	.15	.24	.09	.07	.18
Ν	1,853	1,857	1,855	1,858	1,855	1,855	1,856	1,851	1,855	1,856

### Table A-21: Regression of Perceived Threats, Authoritarian Submission, and Their Interactions on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

	Torture of suspects	Preventive detention	No country leave	Racial profiling	Home search	Database on suspects	Surveillance of communication	Control of social networks	Ban public speech	No demonstrations if threat
Perceived security	.00	.36**	.44**	.18**	.30**	.30**	.44**	.24**	.29**	.24**
threat	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Perceived liberty	15**	23**	14**	05	29**	28**	40**	13**	<b>-</b> .11 <sup>**</sup>	08
threat	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Authoritarian	02	.20**	.24**	.06	.18**	.08	.23**	.29**	.23**	.32**
conventionalism	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Perceived sec. threat	.02*	02*	04**	.03**	.00	02*	02	02*	02*	00
x authorit. convent.	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Perceived lib. threat	.02**	.02**	.01	.00	.02	.02**	.02	.01	.00	00
x authorit. convent.	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Policy effectiveness	.10**	.12**	.13**	.17**	.15**	.14**	.14**	.22**	.21**	.19**
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Political trust	12**	11**	.06	13**	07	02	09*	01	05	04
a	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Social trust	15**	08*	04	11**	17**	06*	17**	04	.00	08*
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Left-right placement	.16**	.14**	.02	.32**	.08	.08**	.09*	.04	.05	.06
	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	01	08	06	11*	35**	08*	27**	16**	15**	25**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Age	01**	00	.00	01*	01	00	01	.00	.00	.01**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender: Female	50**	.26	25	55**	.50**	.13	.60**	08	.03	.92**
0 4 4	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.14)	(.16)	(.12)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Constant	2.41**	3.77**	5.12**	1.46**	6.26**	7.34**	5.69**	4.38**	5.09**	2.12**
A.J. D2	(.46)	(.57)	(.54)	(.50)	(.58)	(.41)	(.56)	(.55)	(.56)	(.59)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.12	.08	.22	.22	.15	.25	.11	.07	.18
Ν	1,823	1,826	1,824	1,827	1,826	1,825	1,825	1,821	1,823	1,826


# Table A-22: Regression of Perceived Threats, Authoritarian Conventionalism, and Their Interactions on Anti-Terrorism Policy Attitudes

### Figure A-1: Marginal Effect Plots Visualizing the Interaction between Security Threat and Authoritarianism I




Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.

### Figure A-2: Marginal Effect Plots Visualizing the Interaction between Security Threat and Authoritarianism II




Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.

### Figure A-3: Marginal Effect Plots Visualizing the Interaction between Liberty Threat and Authoritarianism I





Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.

#### Figure A-4: Marginal Effect Plots Visualizing the Interaction between Liberty Threat and Authoritarianism II





Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.





Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.





Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.





Figure A-7: Graphical Assessment of the Linearity Assumption: Regression on the Support of Preventive Detention of Suspects


Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; augmented component plus residual plots.



# Figure A-8: Graphical Assessment of the Linearity Assumption: Regression on the Support of Public Speech Bans


Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; augmented component plus residual plots.

Figure A-9: Linear Interaction Diagnostic Plots – Support of Social Network Controls




Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; linear interaction diagnostic plots with LOESS fit curves; the points indicate the distribution of attitudes towards social network controls on a scale from 0 to 10. Upper part of the figure: three levels of authoritarianism; levels of perceived security threat (0-10) on the x-axis. Lower part of the figure: three levels of perceived security threat; levels of authoritarianism (0-10) on the x-axis.

Figure A-10: Linear Interaction Diagnostic Plots – Support of Country Exit Bans



Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; linear interaction diagnostic plots with LOESS fit curves; the points indicate the distribution of attitudes towards country exit bans on a scale from 0 to 10. Upper part of the figure: three levels of authoritarianism; levels of perceived security threat (0-10) on the x-axis. Lower part of the figure: three levels of perceived security threat; levels of authoritarianism (0-10) on the x-axis.





Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; linear interaction diagnostic plots with LOESS fit curves; the points indicate the distribution of attitudes towards a database on suspects on a scale from 0 to 10. Upper part of the figure: three levels of authoritarianism; levels of perceived liberty threat (0-10) on the x-axis. Lower part of the figure: three levels of perceived liberty threat; levels of authoritarianism (0-10) on the x-axis.




Figure A-12: Linear Interaction Diagnostic Plots – Support of Communication Monitoring

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; linear interaction diagnostic plots with LOESS fit curves; the points indicate the distribution of attitudes towards communication monitoring of suspects on a scale from 0 to 10. Upper part of the figure: three levels of authoritarianism; levels of perceived liberty threat (0-10) on the x-axis. Lower part of the figure: three levels of perceived liberty threat; levels of authoritarianism (0-10) on the x-axis.




Figure A-13: Marginal Effects Plots with Binning Estimators, Security Threat I

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.




Figure A-14: Marginal Effects Plots with Binning Estimators, Security Threat II

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.




Figure A-15: Marginal Effects Plots with Binning Estimators, Liberty Threat I

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.






Figure A-16: Marginal Effects Plots with Binning Estimators, Liberty Threat II


Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016; weighted data.





Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016.





Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016.




Figure A-19: Kernel Smoothed Marginal Effects Estimates, Liberty Threat I

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016.




Figure A-20: Kernel Smoothed Marginal Effects Estimates, Liberty Threat II

Notes: Data source: DFG project "Support for Civil Liberties" (CIVLIB), 2016.

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