

# **Lobbying and Political Corruption in Germany and the United States**

Legitimacy, Strategies, Influence and Integrity in Interest Intermediation

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# Contents

Acknowledgements	v
List of Tables	xii
List of Figures	xvi
List of Abbreviations	xvii
Executive Summary	xix
Kurzfassung	xxiii
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. The Struggle to Define the Acceptable . . . . .	1
1.2. State of Research . . . . .	3
1.3. Definitions . . . . .	5
1.4. Outline . . . . .	6
<b>2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1. Introduction: Distinguishing Lobbying from Corruption . . . . .	9
2.2. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Macro Level . . . . .	12
2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level . . . . .	18
2.4. Of Broken Belts and Greed . . . . .	43
<b>3. System Differences, Lobbying, and Corporations: Six Hypotheses about Corruption and Lobbying</b>	<b>47</b>
3.1. Introduction: Two Alternative Modes of Influence-Seeking . . . . .	47
3.2. System Differences . . . . .	48
3.3. Influence-Seeking Activities . . . . .	51
<b>4. Methodological Advancements and Limitations</b>	<b>55</b>
4.1. Introduction: Sampling and Elite Interviewing in Corruption Research in Two Advanced Democracies . . . . .	55
4.2. Response Rate and Methodological Design . . . . .	56
4.3. Elite Interviews as a Tool in Corruption and Interest Group Research	63
4.4. Operationalization . . . . .	64

<b>5. Corruption and Lobbying from a Comparative Perspective: Descriptive Evidence</b>	<b>71</b>
5.1. Introduction: Influence-Seeking Activities and Their Predictors . . . . .	71
5.2. Perceived Corruption . . . . .	71
5.3. Access, Informal Contacts, and Contributions . . . . .	78
5.4. Influence . . . . .	79
5.5. Company Characteristics . . . . .	80
5.6. Characteristics of Lobbyists . . . . .	84
<b>6. Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Mutually Exclusive Activities?</b>	<b>87</b>
6.1. Introduction: Lobbying-specific and Company-specific Causes of Corruption . . . . .	87
6.2. Multivariate Results . . . . .	90
6.3. Discussion . . . . .	96
6.4. The Complex Relationships of Lobbying and Corruption . . . . .	100
<b>7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence</b>	<b>103</b>
7.1. Introduction: Corporate Lobbying and Corporate Influence-Seeking	103
7.2. Which Companies Perform Better at Gaining Access? . . . . .	105
7.3. Strong Companies Lobby, Weak Companies Bribe? Determinants of Influence . . . . .	112
7.4. Which Companies Lobby Directly? . . . . .	120
7.5. Corruption and Corporate Lobbying Activities . . . . .	124
<b>8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption</b>	<b>131</b>
8.1. Introduction: Lobbyists' Differentiation and Definitions of Lobbying and Corruption . . . . .	131
8.2. How Lobbyists Define Corruption . . . . .	133
8.3. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying . . . . .	143
8.4. How Lobbyists Distinguish Between Lobbying and Corruption . . . . .	153
8.5. A Norm of integrity and Black Sheep . . . . .	163
<b>9. Conclusion</b>	<b>169</b>
9.1. Shedding Light on a Complex Relationship . . . . .	169
9.2. Distinguishing Between Lobbying and Corruption Based on Democratic Theory and Legitimate Exchanges . . . . .	170
9.3. The Empirical Relationship Between Lobbying and Corruption . . . . .	172
9.4. Standards and Perspectives of Lobbying Regulation . . . . .	175
9.5. Contributions to the Literature . . . . .	184
9.6. Limitations and Further Research . . . . .	186
9.7. Defining the Acceptable, Enforcing Transparency, Promoting Representation . . . . .	188

<b>A. Methodological Appendix</b>	<b>189</b>
A.1. Chapter 4 . . . . .	189
A.2. Chapter 5 . . . . .	196
A.3. Chapter 6 . . . . .	205
A.4. Chapter 7 . . . . .	271
A.5. Chapter 8 . . . . .	335
<b>B. Interview Documents</b>	<b>370</b>
B.1. Request Letters . . . . .	370
B.2. Questionnaires . . . . .	372
<b>C. Codebook</b>	<b>400</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>423</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>449</b>



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# List of Tables

2.1.	Theoretically expected sources of deviations and of corruption in the legislative branch . . . . .	40
2.2.	Theoretically expected sources of deviations and of corruption in the executive branch . . . . .	42
4.1.	Comparison of economic sectors in the sample and in the population	59
6.1.	Expected systemic, lobbying-specific and firm-specific causes of corruption . . . . .	88
6.2.	Interim findings . . . . .	97
7.1.	Binary logistic regression to predict financial contributions . . . . .	109
7.2.	Summary of findings of the quantitative analyses . . . . .	130
8.1.	Binary logistic regression to predict corruption (index) based on definitions of corruption . . . . .	143
8.2.	Binary logistic regression to predict corruption (index) on the basis of definitions of lobbying . . . . .	152
8.3.	Binary logistic regression to predict corruption (index) based on the distinction between lobbying and corruption . . . . .	164
A1.	T-Test to compare the sample means with the means in the population . . . . .	189
A2.	Effect of the interview mode on perceived corruption of parties, NGOs, and the index (ordered logistic regressions) . . . . .	190
A3.	Effect of the interview mode on perceived corruption of the administration, officials, MPs/legislators, and the legislature (binary logistic regressions) . . . . .	191
A4.	Effect of the interview mode on the perception of corruption of policy institutions, corruption of decision-makers (indices) and influence (OLS regressions) . . . . .	192
A5.	Effect of the interview mode on access (OLS regressions) . . . . .	193
A6.	Effect of the interview mode on financial contributions and the percentage of indirect lobbying . . . . .	194
A7.	Ordered averaged index . . . . .	196
A8.	Perceived corruption of parties . . . . .	197
A9.	Perceived corruption of NGOs . . . . .	197

*List of Tables*

A10.	Perceived corruption of officials (comparison) . . . . .	197
A11.	Perceived corruption of the officials (original variables) . . . . .	198
A12.	Perceived corruption of the administration . . . . .	198
A13.	Perceived corruption of MPs/legislators (comparison) . . . . .	198
A14.	Perceived corruption of MPs/legislators (original variables) . . . . .	199
A15.	Perceived corruption of Parliament/Legislature . . . . .	199
A16.	Descriptive statistics for perceived corruption of policy institutions and decision-makers (indices) . . . . .	199
A17.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict missing perception data	200
A18.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict missing perception data (continued) . . . . .	201
A19.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict missing access data .	202
A20.	Descriptive statistics for predictors and self-attributed influence .	203
A21.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict missing data of self- attributed influence and the percentage of indirect lobbying . . . . .	203
A22.	T-Test to compare the means of employees and revenues . . . . .	204
A23.	Ordered logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption	205
A24.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption in the legislature . . . . .	206
A25.	OLS regressions to predict perceived corruption . . . . .	207
A26.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption (index, control variables included) . . . . .	208
A27.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption in parties (control variables included) . . . . .	209
A28.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption in NGOs (control variables included) . . . . .	210
A29.	Binary logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption in administrations (control variables included) . . . . .	211
A30.	Binary logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption of officials (control variables included) . . . . .	212
A31.	Binary logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption of legislators (control variables included) . . . . .	213
A32.	Binary logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption in legislatures (control variables included) . . . . .	214
A33.	OLS regressions to predict the perception of corruption in policy institutions (control variables included) . . . . .	215
A34.	OLS regressions to predict the perception of corruption of decision- makers (control variables included) . . . . .	216
A35.	OLS regressions to predict the perception of corruption of decision- makers (control variables included; amended) . . . . .	217
A36.	Crosstable to identify empty cells: financial contributions (ordered logistic regressions) . . . . .	220
A37.	Crosstable to identify empty cells: country (ordered logistic regres- sions) . . . . .	221

A38.	VIF-Statistics (ordered logistic and OLS regressions) . . . . .	223
A39.	Crosstable to identify empty cells: financial contributions (binary logistic regressions) . . . . .	227
A40.	Crosstable to identify empty cells: country (binary logistic regressions) . . . . .	228
A41.	VIF-Statistics (binary logistic regressions) . . . . .	230
A42.	Binary logistic regressions used to compute the VIF for the ordered logistic regressions . . . . .	234
A43.	Amended binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of officials and of legislatures . . . . .	235
A44.	OLS-Regression to predict corruption of decision-makers with robust standard errors . . . . .	239
A45.	OLS regressions to predict corruption (Index) with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	241
A46.	OLS regressions to predict corruption (Index) with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	242
A47.	OLS regressions to predict corruption (Index) with interaction effects (M7 to M9) . . . . .	243
A48.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of parties with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	244
A49.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of parties with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	245
A50.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of parties with interaction effects (M7 to M9) . . . . .	246
A51.	OLS regressions to predict corruption of NGOs with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	247
A52.	OLS regressions to predict corruption of NGOs with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	248
A53.	OLS regressions to predict corruption of NGOs with interaction effects (M7 to M9) . . . . .	249
A54.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of officials with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	250
A55.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of officials with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	251
A56.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of officials with interaction effects (M7 to M9) . . . . .	252
A57.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of the administration with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	253
A58.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of the administration with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	254
A59.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of the administration with interaction effects (M7 to M9) . . . . .	255
A60.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of MPs/Legislators with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	256

*List of Tables*

A61.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of MPs/Legislators with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	257
A62.	Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of MPs/Legislators with interaction effects (M7 to M9) . . . . .	258
A63.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of the legislature with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	259
A64.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of the legislature with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	260
A65.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of the legislature with interaction effects (M7 to M9) . . . . .	261
A66.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of policy institutions with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	262
A67.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of policy institutions with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	263
A68.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of policy institutions with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	264
A69.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M1 to M3) . . . . .	265
A70.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M4 to M6) . . . . .	266
A71.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M7 to M9) . . . . .	267
A72.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M1 to M3; amended) . . . . .	268
A73.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M4 to M6; amended) . . . . .	269
A74.	Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M7 to M9; amended) . . . . .	270
A75.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch (amended; models 7 and 8) . . . . .	271
A76.	OLS-regressions to predict access to the executive branch and informal access (amended) . . . . .	273
A77.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the legislature (amended; models 1 and 2) . . . . .	274
A78.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the legislature (amended; models 3 and 4) . . . . .	275
A79.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch (amended; models 4 and 5) . . . . .	277
A80.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch (amended; models 7 and 8) . . . . .	278
A81.	Censored regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (amended models 1 and 2) . . . . .	280
A82.	Censored regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (fixed models 3 and 4) . . . . .	281

A83.	OLS-regressions to predict personal and institutional access to the legislature . . . . .	282
A84.	OLS-regressions to predict access to the executive branch and informal access . . . . .	283
A85.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the legislature (models 1 and 2) . . . . .	284
A86.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the legislature (models 3 and 4) . . . . .	285
A87.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch (models 5 and 6) . . . . .	287
A88.	OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch (models 7 and 8) . . . . .	288
A89.	OLS-regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (models 9 and 10) . . . . .	290
A90.	OLS-regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (models 11 and 12) . . . . .	292
A91.	Censored regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (models 1 and 2) . . . . .	293
A92.	Censored regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (models 3 and 4) . . . . .	294
A93.	OLS-regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (amended models 9 and 10) . . . . .	295
A94.	OLS-regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (amended models 11 and 12) . . . . .	297
A95.	Amended binary logistic regression to predict financial contributions with quadratic term . . . . .	333
A96.	Definitions of corruption by lobbyists . . . . .	335
A97.	Definitions of lobbying by lobbyists . . . . .	336
A98.	Distinction between lobbying and corruption by lobbyists . . . . .	336
A99.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of corruption . . . . .	337
A100.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of corruption (continued) . . . . .	338
A101.	Regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of corruption . . . . .	339
A102.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of lobbying . . . . .	340
A103.	Regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of lobbying . . . . .	341
A104.	Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by the distinction between lobbying and corruption . . . . .	342
A105.	Regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by the distinction between lobbying and corruption . . . . .	343

List of Tables

A106. Examples of definitions of corruption. <i>Table continues on the next page</i> . . . . .	344
A107. Examples of definitions of lobbying . . . . .	347
A108. Examples of distinctions. <i>Table continues on the next page</i> . . . . .	348
A109. Amended OLS model predicting corruption by definitions of lobbying	363
A110. Amended ordered logistic regression analysis to predict perceived corruption by definitions of lobbying . . . . .	364
A111. Amended binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of corruption . . . . .	367
A112. Amended binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of lobbying . . . . .	368
A113. Amended binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by the distinction between lobbying and corruption . . .	369

# List of Figures

4.1.	Mean comparison of the revenue in the sample and in the population	60
4.2.	Mean comparison of the number of employees in the sample and in the population . . . . .	61
5.1.	Percentages of perceived corruption . . . . .	73
5.2.	Means of perceived corruption . . . . .	74
5.3.	Percentage of perceived corruption (ordered variables) . . . . .	75
5.4.	Percentage of perceived corruption (binary variables) . . . . .	76
5.5.	Means of perceived corruption (metric variables) . . . . .	77
5.6.	Means of access and informal contacts . . . . .	79
5.7.	Share of companies making financial contributions . . . . .	79
5.8.	Means of self-attributed influence . . . . .	80
5.9.	Average number of employees and revenue (in billion US\$) . . . . .	81
5.10.	Means of company characteristics . . . . .	82
5.11.	Company characteristics (in percent) . . . . .	83
5.12.	The distribution of the gender among the interviewees . . . . .	84
5.13.	Role description of lobbyists . . . . .	85
6.1.	Predicted probability of corruption determined access to the executive branch . . . . .	90
6.2.	Marginal effects of the binary logistic regressions . . . . .	92
6.3.	OLS regression results to predict perceived corruption at policy institutions and of decision-makers . . . . .	95
7.1.	OLS regression results to predict access . . . . .	106
7.2.	Metric effects on financial contributions . . . . .	111
7.3.	OLS regression results to predict influence on the legislature . . . . .	115
7.4.	OLS regression results to predict influence on the executive branch . . . . .	117
7.5.	Censored regression to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying . . . . .	122
8.1.	Percentages of categorized definitions of corruption by lobbyists . . . . .	133
8.2.	Corruption predicted by the definitions of corruption . . . . .	142
8.3.	Percentages of categorized definitions of lobbying by lobbyists . . . . .	144
8.4.	Corruption predicted by definitions of lobbying . . . . .	151
8.5.	Percentages of categorized distinctions between lobbying and corruption by lobbyists . . . . .	154

List of Figures

8.6.	Corruption predicted by the distinction between lobbying and corruption . . . . .	162
A1.	Statistical Power Analysis . . . . .	195
A2.	Distribution of corruption of policy institutions and of decision-makers . . . . .	196
A3.	Different link functions (model: index) . . . . .	218
A4.	Different link functions (model: parties) . . . . .	219
A5.	Different link functions (model: NGOs) . . . . .	220
A6.	Ordered logistic regression diagnostics I (model: index) . . . . .	221
A7.	Ordered logistic regression diagnostics II (model: index) . . . . .	221
A8.	Ordered logistic regression diagnostics I (model: parties) . . . . .	222
A9.	Ordered logistic regression diagnostics II (model: parties) . . . . .	222
A10.	Ordered logistic regression diagnostics I (model: NGOs) . . . . .	223
A11.	Ordered logistic regression diagnostics II (model: NGOs) . . . . .	224
A12.	Binary logistic regression diagnostics (model: officials) . . . . .	225
A13.	Binary logistic regression diagnostics (model: administration) . . . . .	226
A14.	Binary logistic regression diagnostics (model: MPs/legislators) . . . . .	227
A15.	Binary logistic regression diagnostics (model: legislature) . . . . .	228
A16.	Cook's distance (binary logistic regressions) . . . . .	229
A17.	OLS regression diagnostics (model: policy institutions) . . . . .	231
A18.	OLS regression diagnostics (model: policy institutions) . . . . .	232
A19.	Cook's distance (OLS regressions) . . . . .	233
A20.	Amended binary logistic regression (model: Officials) . . . . .	236
A21.	Amended binary logistic regression (model: Legislatures) . . . . .	237
A22.	Cook's distances of the amended binary logistic regressions . . . . .	238
A23.	OLS regression diagnostics (model: policy institutions (amended)) . . . . .	240
A24.	Cook's Distance for regressions predicting access and contributions . . . . .	299
A25.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting personal access to legislators . . . . .	300
A26.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting institutional access to legislators . . . . .	301
A27.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting access to the executive branch . . . . .	302
A28.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting the use of informal strategies . . . . .	303
A29.	Regression diagnostics of the binary logistic regression predicting contributions . . . . .	304
A30.	Cook's Distance (OLS models predicting influence at the legislature) . . . . .	306
A31.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 1) . . . . .	307
A32.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 2) . . . . .	308

A33.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 3) . . . . .	309
A34.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 4) . . . . .	310
A35.	Cook's Distance (OLS models predicting influence at the executive branch) . . . . .	311
A36.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 5) . . . . .	312
A37.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 6) . . . . .	313
A38.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 7) . . . . .	314
A39.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 8) . . . . .	315
A40.	Cook's Distance (OLS models the percentage of indirect lobbying)	317
A41.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting indirect lobbying (model 9) . . . . .	318
A42.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting indirect lobbying (model 10) . . . . .	319
A43.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting indirect lobbying (model 11) . . . . .	320
A44.	Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting indirect lobbying (model 12) . . . . .	321
A45.	Cook's Distance (amended regression models predicting strategies)	322
A46.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting personal access to legislators . . . . .	323
A47.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting institutional access to legislators . . . . .	324
A48.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting access to the executive branch . . . . .	325
A49.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting the use of informal strategies . . . . .	326
A50.	Cook's Distance (amended OLS models predicting influence)	327
A51.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 2) . . . . .	328
A52.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 4) . . . . .	329
A53.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 6) . . . . .	330
A54.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 8) . . . . .	331
A55.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting the percentage of indirect lobbying . . . . .	332

*List of Figures*

A56.	Regression diagnostics of the binary logistic regression chapter 7 (amended) . . . . .	334
A57.	Cook's Distance for the OLS regressions . . . . .	351
A58.	Regression diagnostics: decision-makers . . . . .	352
A59.	Regression diagnostics: policy institutions . . . . .	353
A60.	Regression diagnostics: policy institutions . . . . .	355
A61.	Regression diagnostics: decision-makers . . . . .	356
A62.	Regression diagnostics: policy institutions . . . . .	357
A63.	Cook's Distance for the binary logistic regressions I . . . . .	359
A64.	Cook's Distance for the binary logistic regressions II . . . . .	360
A65.	Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting corruption by definitions of lobbying . . . . .	362
A66.	Cook's Distance of amended binary logistic regression models . . .	365
A67.	Cook's Distance (amended binary logistic regression models predicting corruption by the distinctions between lobbying and corruption) . . . . .	366

# List of Abbreviations

**b** unstandardized regression coefficient

**BEEPS** Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys

**c.p.** ceteris paribus

**CA** The State of California, United States of America

**CC** Control of Corruption Index

**CI** confidence interval

**CPI** Corruption Perceptions Index

**DV** dependent variable

**EU** European Union

**GCB** Global Corruption Barometer

**GDP** Gross domestic product (per capita)

**GSS** The General Social Survey

**HLOGA** Honest Leadership and Open Government Act

**LDA** The Lobbying Disclosure Act

**MN** The State of Minnesota, United States of America

**MPs** Members of Parliament

**N** number of observations

**n.s.** insignificant(ly); not significant

**NGO** Non-governmental organization

**NJ** The State of New Jersey, United States of America

*List of Abbreviations*

**OLS** Ordinary Least Squares Regression

**OR** Odds Ratio

**PAC** Political Action Committee

**RoC** risks of corruption

**RoD** risks of deviation

**SC** The State of South Carolina, United States of America

**se** standard error

**TI** Transparency International

**VIF** variance inflation factor

**WBES** World Business Environment Survey

**WGI** World Governance Indicators

# Executive Summary

The objective of this study is to provide theoretical and empirical guidance for sound lobbying regulation by assessing the relationship between democratically desired and undue influence. The distinction between lobbying and corruption as two ways of influence-seeking is right at the center of differentiating desired influence from undue influence. This study is the first to comprehensively examine the relationship between lobbying and corruption in two affluent democracies. The book pursues three aims. *Firstly*, the distinction between desired influence and undue influence is a question of democratic norms and values. Thus, the first step is to develop a democratic distinction between lobbying and corruption based on democratic theory. To do so, unambiguous conceptualizations of lobbying and corruption, both on the macro and the micro level, are necessary. *Secondly*, to understand the real-world relationship between lobbying and corruption, it is necessary to assess to what extent corruption is a problem in interest intermediation. If lobbying and corruption do not occur at the same time, it is not possible to investigate how they relate to each other. This concerns the *third* objective of this study. The empirical relationship between the two modes of influence-seeking can either be specified as mutually exclusive or mutually inclusive. The implications of whether they are exclusive or inclusive activities determine the means to fight undue influence and hence lay the ground for effective lobbying regulation. To achieve these aims, I use new data from 91 elite interviews with corporate lobbyists from the United States and Germany.

I argue that a theoretical distinction between lobbying and corruption needs to consider macro effects and micro effects of interest intermediation. Ideally, interest intermediation should improve representation. On the macro level, prerequisites for achieving equal representation are a sound interest group system giving each interest the chance to be represented (avoiding a *mobilization bias*) and to accessible institutions giving each group equal opportunities to represent their interests (avoiding an *agenda bias*). Both biases can inhibit equal representation of interests

## *Executive Summary*

by excluding some groups. The micro level refers to exchanges between lobbyists and policymakers that help them fulfill their duties. Policymakers' duties are making or contributing to informed decisions and translating political aims into universally binding rules. A lobbyist's duty is to represent interests in a meaningful and informative way. Undue influence could interfere with the performance of these duties and, if personal gain is involved, even lead to corruption.

The hypotheses refer to systemic, lobbying-specific, and company-specific causes of corruption. I argue that a cooperative style of policymaking, such as in Germany, inhibits corruption because of mutual control mechanisms. In contrast, I expect a majoritarian style of policymaking to facilitate corruption because it concentrates power in the hands of the executive leadership and increases competition among organized interests and legislators. The empirical results support this expectation. Turning to the hypotheses concerning the individual level, lobbying and corruption can be conceptualized as either mutually inclusive or exclusive activities. Concerning the former, shared prerequisites of lobbying and corruption can lead to a positive statistical relationship. Concerning the latter, corruption is attempted if lobbying is not successful. The results for the individual level are inconclusive.

Access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of corruption and the strongest predictor of influence through lobbying. Hence, better access increases the two types of influence. However, influence at the executive branch is negatively associated with corruption. This indicates that access is a prerequisite for both lobbying and corruption and that the choice between the two ways of seeking influence is made later, after access was granted. In contrast, better personal access to the legislature is rather negatively associated with corruption. The weaker relationship between contact with legislators and corruption indicates that public scrutiny and mutual controls are effective tools against corruption. Hence, there is no unambiguous empirical support for either the mutual-inclusiveness or the mutual-exclusiveness logic. It is more complex. Company-specific characteristics have no effect on corruption. However, more professionalized lobbying units of companies often lobby more successfully.

These findings have several implications for the regulation of influence-seeking. Generally, lobbying regulation should promote legitimate influence-seeking that improves representation and inhibits undue influence-seeking. More specifically, the aim of lobbying regulation should be to increase accountability through transparency. Legal restrictions are important, but interest groups should also adopt

more specific internal compliance guidelines encouraging ethical and responsible lobbying. Finally, the influence of lobbyists can be indirectly curbed by giving the government its brain back, that is, by strengthening the specialized units within the bureaucracy providing technical expertise and scientific services.



# Kurzfassung

Ziel dieser Studie ist es, Anhaltspunkte für eine sinnvolle Regulierung des Lobbyismus zu liefern. Diese Anhaltspunkte stammen aus einer theoretischen und empirische Unterscheidung zwischen demokratisch erwünschtem und demokratisch unerwünschtem politischen Einfluss durch Interessengruppen. Damit ist vorliegende Studie die erste, die das Verhältnis von Lobbying und Korruption in zwei wohlhabenden, stabilen, westlichen Demokratien umfassend untersucht. Das Buch verfolgt drei Ziele. *Erstens* nehme ich an, dass die Unterscheidung zwischen erwünschtem und unerwünschtem politischen Einfluss eine Frage der demokratischen Normen und Werte ist. Daher wird in einem ersten Schritt eine demokratietheoretische Unterscheidung zwischen Lobbying und Korruption entwickelt. Hierzu ist eine eindeutige konzeptuelle Abgrenzung zwischen Lobbying und Korruption, sowohl auf der Makro- als auch auf der Mikroebene, nötig. *Zweitens* ist es zunächst notwendig zu verstehen, in welchem Ausmaß Korruption überhaupt ein Problem im Interessenvermittlungssystem ist. Andernfalls ist es nicht möglich, empirische Zusammenhänge zwischen Lobbying und Korruption zu untersuchen. Letzteres ist das *dritte* Ziel der Studie. Das empirische Verhältnis zwischen den beiden Formen politischer Einflussnahme kann entweder als sich substituierend oder als sich komplementierend beschrieben werden. Die daraus resultierenden Implikationen geben Aufschluss über effektive und angemessene Lobbying-Regulierung. Die Datenbasis dieser Studie stammt aus 91 Elite-Interviews mit UnternehmerlobbyistInnen, durchgeführt in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und in Deutschland.

Eine umfassende theoretische Unterscheidung zwischen Lobbyismus und Korruption betrifft die Makro- und die Mikroebene der Interessenvermittlung. Das anvisierte Ziel der Interessenvermittlung sollte die Verbesserung der Repräsentationsleistung sein. Bezüglich der Makroebene ist die Voraussetzung Repräsentation zu bessern ein Interessengruppensystem, das jedem potenziellen Interesse die Möglichkeit gibt, vertreten zu werden. Dies würde einen Mobilisierungsbias verhindern. Zudem, müssen die Regierungsinstitutionen für alle Interessen gleichsam

zugänglich sein, um einen Agenda *bias* zu vermeiden. Beide Verzerrungen von Repräsentation könnten gleichberechtigte Interessenvertretung beeinträchtigen und somit Ungleichheiten erzeugen sowie bestimmte Gruppen von der Teilhabe ausschließen. Die Mikroebene bezieht sich auf den Austausch zwischen Lobbyisten und politischen Entscheidungsträgern. Die Kontakte sollten idealerweise dazu beitragen, sich gegenseitig bei der demokratischen Pflichterfüllung zu unterstützen. Die Aufgaben der politischen Entscheidungsträger bestehen darin, informierte Entscheidungen zu treffen bzw. dazu ihnen beizutragen und politische Ziele in allgemein verbindliche Regeln umzusetzen. Die Aufgaben der Lobbyisten sind die sinnvolle und informative Interessenvertretung. Demokratisch unerwünschte Einflussnahme könnte diese Pflichterfüllung eher erschweren und falls persönliche Vorteile daraus entstehen, sogar zu Korruption führen.

Die Hypothesen beziehen sich auf institutionelle, lobbyspezifische und firmenspezifische Ursachen von Korruption. Auf institutionelle Ebene erwarte ich, dass ein kooperativer Stil der Politikgestaltung, wie in Deutschland, Korruption aufgrund von gegenseitigen Kontrollmechanismen hemmt. Im Gegensatz dazu erwarte ich, dass ein majoritärer Politikstil Korruption begünstigt, weil er die Macht auf die Exekutive konzentriert und den Wettbewerb zwischen organisierten Interessen und Gesetzgebern verstärkt. Die empirischen Ergebnisse unterstützen diese Annahmen. Was die Hypothesen für die individuelle Ebene betrifft, so können Lobbying und Korruption entweder als Komplemente oder als Substitute definiert werden. In Bezug auf Ersteres können gemeinsame Voraussetzungen von Lobbying und Korruption sich gegenseitig befruchten. In Bezug auf Letzteres wäre Korruption dann ein probates Mittel, wenn Lobbying nicht zum Erfolg führt. Diesbezüglich sind die Ergebnisse nicht eindeutig.

Zugang zur Exekutive ist der stärkste Prädiktor für sowohl Korruption als auch Einflussnahme durch Lobbying. Ein besserer Zugang erhöht also beiden Arten von politischer Einflussnahme. Mehr Einfluss durch Lobbying dort korreliert jedoch negativ mit Korruption. Dies deutet also darauf hin, dass der Zugang die Voraussetzung für Einfluss durch Lobbying und Korruption ist und dass die Wahl zwischen den beiden Arten der Einflussnahme erst später, nachdem der Zugang gewährt wurde, stattfindet. Im Gegensatz dazu ist ein besserer persönlicher Zugang zur Legislative eher negativ mit Korruption assoziiert. Die schwächere Beziehung zwischen dem Kontakt mit Gesetzgebern und Korruption deutet darauf hin, dass die öffentliche Kontrolle und die gegenseitige Kontrolle wirksame Instrumente gegen

Korruption sind. Es gibt also weder eine eindeutige empirische Unterstützung für die komplementäre Logik noch für die Logik als Substitute. Allem Anschein nach, ist die Beziehung komplexer. Firmenspezifische Merkmale haben keinen Einfluss auf Korruption. Allerdings betreiben professionellere Lobbying-Einheiten von Unternehmen häufiger erfolgreiches Lobbying.

Diese Ergebnisse haben mehrere Implikationen für die Regulierung von politischer Einflussnahme. Generell sollte die Regulierung des Lobbyismus einerseits legitime Einflussnahme fördern, um die Repräsentationsleistung zu verbessern. Andererseits sollte es demokratisch unerwünschte Einflussnahme verhindern. Genauer gesagt, sollte das Ziel der Lobbying-Regulierung die Einführung von *Accountability* durch Transparenz sein. Zusätzlich zu den gesetzlichen Regelungen sollten Interessengruppen spezifischere interne Compliance Richtlinien einführen, die ethisches und verantwortungsvolles Lobbying fördern. Schließlich kann der Einfluss von Lobbyisten indirekt eingedämmt werden, indem man den wissenschaftlichen Dienst für Mitglieder des Bundestags und die MitarbeiterInnen in den Ministerien stärkt.



# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. The Struggle to Define the Acceptable

The case of Philipp Amthor brought illegitimate lobbying practices in Germany back into the spotlight. He had a paid job as a director of the US company August Intelligence and promoted, some say lobbied for, this company at the highest levels of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology – all alongside his duties as a Member of the *Bundestag*.<sup>1</sup> The scandal rekindled the debate about regulating 'moonlighting' (outside compensated employment), revolving doors, lobbying, and Members of Parliament in Germany. Similar scandals and the resulting discussions led to the adoption of new lobbying regulation in other countries (Bolleyer 2018), most prominently, the scandal around Jack Abramoff in the United States.

Such scandals revolve around the question of legitimate and illegitimate lobbying. In most democracies, lobbying is a constitutional right. Milbrath once argued that "[t]here seems to be no way, in fact, to curb or eliminate lobbying, without infringing on the right to petition" (Milbrath 1963, p. 13). The struggle to define where just political representation ends and undue influence begins is probably as old as lobbying itself. One cause of the difficulty to legally define undue influence is surely that the more affluent a democracy is, the more difficult it is to observe such influence (cf. Johnston 2014) and to assess its consequences. Countries have tried to regulate lobbying in several ways, ranging from almost no regulation, such as Germany, to strict regulation, such as the US (Chari, Hogan, and Murphy 2019). Often, regulation was a consequence of corruption in the interest intermediation sector (cf. Francesco and Trein 2020). However, until today, neither researchers nor policymakers have found an all-encompassing solution to the question of how to regulate lobbying. The objective of this study is getting closer to such a solution by assessing the relationship between democratically desired and undue influence.

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<sup>1</sup>For an overview of the scandal see Goldenberg 2020.

## 1. Introduction

The distinction between lobbying and corruption as the two ways of seeking influence (Campos and Giovannoni 2007) is right at the center of differentiating desired influence from undue influence. Thus far, the literature does not provide an unequivocal approach on how to do this. This study is the first to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between lobbying and corruption in two affluent democracies. With this book, I pursue three aims. *Firstly*, the distinction between desired influence and undue influence is a question of democratic norms and values. Thus, the first step is to develop a democratic distinction between lobbying and corruption based on democratic theory. To do so, unambiguous conceptualizations of lobbying and corruption, both on the macro and the micro level, are necessary. *Secondly*, to understand the real-world relationship between lobbying and corruption, it is necessary to assess the extent to which corruption is a problem in interest intermediation. If lobbying and corruption do not occur at the same time, it is not possible to investigate how they relate to each other. This concerns the *third* objective of this study. The empirical relationship between the two modes of influence-seeking can either be specified as mutually exclusive or as mutually inclusive. The implications of whether they are mutually inclusive or mutually exclusive determine the means to fight undue influence, which lays the ground for developing better lobbying regulations.

To pursue these aims, I use new data from 91 elite interviews with lobbyists of corporations in the United States and in Germany. The interviews combine elements of quantitative surveys with qualitative elements of semi-structured interviews. This approach has two advantages: It answers the call for more qualitative research on corruption (e.g., Andersson 2008, pp. 193–94), especially with regard to countries least affected by corruption (*ibid.*). And it allows me to triangulate for an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the two modes of influence-seeking: lobbying and corruption.

In terms of influence-seeking activities, corporations can choose between lobbying directly, lobbying indirectly via associations, and corruption. As rent-seekers (e.g., Appelbaum and Katz 1987; Krueger 1974; Posner 1975; Tullock 1967), they are likely to pursue the mode of influence-seeking that promises them the most profits – unlike associations, which are controlled by their members and do not directly benefit from any rents they might obtain for them and might therefore be more risk-averse. Hence, it is corporations rather than associations that have the options to lobby or to engage in corruption (or to delegate influence-seeking), which makes

corporate lobbyists the more suitable units of analysis in pursuing the objectives of this study.

## 1.2. State of Research

Although lobbying and corruption have inspired many public debates, research addressing both simultaneously is scarce. This is probably caused by the fact that there is little publicly accessible data on both lobbying and corruption. Gathering data, e.g., through interviews, is time-consuming and expensive. Still, there are some studies that overcame or circumvented these difficulties.

In one of the first studies on how lobbying possibly corrupts democracy, Etzioni criticizes the plutocracy in the United States. The author refers to the power of interest groups as inhibiting the principle of "one person, one vote" (Etzioni 1984, p. 3). He assumes that the system of Political Action Committees (PACs) leads to the abuse of the public office for private gain (*ibid.*, pp. 4–5). While the book is an important contribution to the problem of campaign funding in the US, it does not directly establish a link between actual corrupt behavior and campaign contributions. Two more recent studies tried to do that. Gokcekus and Sonan (2017) find that states with higher contributions to PACs have greater share convictions for corruption. Evertsson (2013) analyzes the relationship between electoral funding and corruption. She concludes that electoral funding often contradicts the principles of electoral laws, which are adopted to decriminalize private contributions. However, the decriminalization of private funding would not lead to a reduction of corruption (Evertsson 2013).

In addition to these studies focusing on money in politics and corruption, there are a few studies about the empirical relationship between lobbying and corruption. Campos and Giovannoni (2017 and 2007) investigate the relationship between lobbying (operationalized as membership of a lobbying group) and corruption (operationalized as the percentage of annual revenue used for bribes) in post-Soviet countries and transition economies. In the more recent study, the membership of a lobbying group does not correlate with paying bribes (p. 926) whereas the authors found a negative effect in 2007 (p. 15). Both studies show that lobbying is related to political influence while corruption is not. Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen (2009) compare 80 countries and find that influential firms pay fewer bribes and that large firms are more influential. Nugent and Sukiassyan (2009) find that in

## 1. Introduction

transition economies a membership in a business association is negatively associated with unofficial payments. In another analysis of cross-country data, Damania, Fredriksson, and Mani (2004) show that under conditions of political instability both lobbying and corruption intensify.

In addition to these empirical studies, there are essays developing models, mostly based on rent-seeking, on the choice between corruption and lobbying. Harstad and Svensson (2011) specify lobbying – changing the rules – and corruption – bending the rules – as two different modes of rent-seeking. They assume that in less developed countries corruption is the usual way of rent-seeking and that development can only change it into lobbying. Lambsdorff (2002) models lobbying as the economically superior form of rent-seeking because corruption creates monopolies and involves narrower interests harming social welfare. Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee (2019) develop a model based on fines for companies violating environmental regulations. The first alternative is lobbying for smaller fines. The second alternative is bribery to circumvent a fine. The authors conclude, first, that the choice whether to lobby or to bribe depends on the reaction of the inspector, and second, that the combination of lobbying and corruption increases environmental damage because it leads to both lower fines and their non-payment. Finally, Schnakenberg and Turner (2019) focus on the role of legislators to differentiate lobbying from corruption. They distinguish between sincere and corrupt politicians. Sincere politicians trigger lobbying whereas the latter trigger economic exchanges. According to the authors, corrupt legislators are difficult to identify because voters do not have enough information to vote them out of office.

Recently, the integrity and the ethics of lobbying has attracted some research. Barron and Skountridaki (2020) show that there is a growing awareness of integrity and responsible lobbying among a new generation of influence-seekers lobbying the European Union. In contrast, LaPira is more skeptical about lobbyists in the US: "the overwhelming majority of them do so [lobbying; F.G.] with integrity. Yet a small, but growing, set of bad apples threaten to spoil the bunch" (LaPira 2016, p. 244). Holyoke (2017) has employed the principal-agent framework to assess if lobbyists work ethically. According to the framework lobbyists – as agents – are responsible for not deviating too much from the ideal position of their employer, the principal. If they did, they would act unethically because they would fail to represent "collection of citizens" (Holyoke 2017, p. 286). The author finds that they

often deviate from these positions mostly because of pressures from policymakers or from other interest groups (ibid., p. 284).

### 1.3. Definitions

In this study, I employ several terms used ambiguously in the literature. I define key terms as follows:

*Interest groups* are organizations that advocate their political preferences in the political system without participating in general elections and without seeking government offices (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). This includes all associations with or without business interests, and with either individuals, companies, or other associations as members, as well as professional organizations and single companies (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). I use the terms interest groups and *organized interests* interchangeably with no preference.

The corruption of systems and individual corruption are two different concepts, as explained in more detail in chapter 2. In that chapter, I also explain the choice of the definitions. Referring to the macro level, I define *corruption* as *the intentional exclusion of groups that have a claim to be included* (cf. Warren 2004, p. 334; emphasis added). Referring to the micro level, I understand *corruption* as "behavior, which deviates from the formal duties of a [...] role because of private-regarding [...] pecuniary or status gains; or violates the rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (Nye 1967, p. 419).

I define *lobbying* as the submission of information and the signaling of political support or opposition to policymakers, thereby representing the interests of an interest group (cf. Schlozman and Tierney 1986, p. 6; Milbrath 1963, pp. 7–8). The motivation behind lobbying can be but does not have to be immediate influence. Some activities of lobbyists might not bring an instant effect but lay the ground for later activities aiming at direct influence. Hence, it does not contradict definitions focusing on influence, e.g., "if [...] actions; F.G.] are not accompanied by an intent to influence, there is no lobbying" (ibid., p. 7). Obviously, this definition is broad compared to other definitions of lobbying.<sup>2</sup> It does not only include direct influence-seeking but also more indirect concepts regarding influence such as *education of policymakers* that only intends to submit information – at least according to some

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<sup>2</sup>E.g., compared to the already broad definition of lobbying as "an effort used to influence public policy" (K. Godwin, E. Godwin, and Ainsworth 2013, p. 3). However, definitions that limit influence to the short-term are not suitable for the approach of this study.

## 1. Introduction

lobbyists (see chapter 8) – or financial contributions to PACs, parties or candidates. Furthermore, this definition also includes cases in which policymakers approach lobbyists rather than vice versa (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, p. 6). *Corporate lobbying* refers to lobbying of firms only.

When I speak of *influence-seeking activities*, I refer to both lobbying and corruption as two ways of seeking influence (Campos and Giovannoni 2007). I understand *policymakers* as all groups of individuals responsible for drafting and passing laws. Thus, it refers both legislators and bureaucrats drafting laws or providing expertise on them. *Decision-makers* refer to people who have the power to decide, either per decree or by voting upon a law.

### 1.4. Outline

In the next chapter, I develop a theoretical frame to distinguish between lobbying and corruption. I argue that an analytically useful distinction requires explanations that separate macro effects from micro effects. The distinction on the macro level is based on the literature on representation, constituting a democratic norm of the function of interest groups as intermediary organizations. On the individual level, I derive the duties of legislators and officials based on the democratic functions of the two branches of government in the context of policymaking. An exchange framework and arguments from the principal-agent theory provide causal mechanisms for how lobbyists can support the agents' performance their duties or incentivize agents to deviate from those duties. The theoretical framework is both applicable to corporate lobbying and to lobbying by associations.

In chapter 3, I introduce the hypotheses. They refer to systemic causes of corruption, lobbying-specific causes of corruption, and company-specific causes of corruption. Unlike the above-mentioned studies, I specify corruption as the consequences of lobbying or of company-specific characteristics. However, since lobbying and corruption can be specified as mutually inclusive or as mutually exclusive, the causal relationship between the two influence-seeking activities is bidirectional. Thus, the empirical strategy consists of three steps of triangulation, as described below.

Chapter 4 provides information about the methods applied in this study. The chapter describes how lobbyists were sampled in Germany and in the United States and explains the representativeness of the sub-samples. Furthermore, I address the strategy for recruiting lobbyists for the interviews and the web surveys. This study

is one of the first to use elite interviews for gathering individual data on corruption. I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the approach in this chapter as well.

Chapter 5 presents the data from the interviews with the lobbyists and compares them with representative citizen data. On average, lobbyists perceive less corruption than citizens. There only a few differences concerning perceptions of corruption and lobbying strategies. Most differences concern company characteristics.

The chapters 6 to 8 contain the empirical analyses. In chapter 6, I test the hypotheses derived in chapter 3. I assess if and to what extent corruption can be explained by lobbying and company characteristics. However, the conceptualization of lobbying and corruption as mutually exclusive or as mutually inclusive implies a bidirectional causal relationship. Thus, I predict lobbying by corruption controlling for company and lobbyist characteristics in chapter 7. The quantitative analyses yield mixed, partly contradictory results. Thus, I analyze quotes of lobbyists concerning lobbying, corruption, and the distinction between them in chapter 8. This triangulation serves two purposes: It allows me to control for systemic biases of a single empirical strategy and it contributes to a better understanding of the complex relationship between lobbying and corruption.

In the final chapter, I summarize the theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions of this study and discuss their implications. Most of the lobbyists take ethics and legitimacy seriously. Corruption does not seem to be a more severe problem in interest intermediation than elsewhere. However, there is evidence that it is not absent. Furthermore, the study identifies shared prerequisites of lobbying and corruption. The implications of this finding are particularly relevant for the regulation of lobbying. This does not only refer to greater transparency and the restriction of lobbying. I also advocate for incentives to reduce dependence on information by lobbyists as well as for supporting ethical lobbying in the interest groups' internal guidelines.



## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

### 2.1. Introduction: Distinguishing Lobbying from Corruption

One reason why it is often difficult to distinguish between lobbying and corruption from the outside is that while we know the outcome of a legislative process, we often have no insight into how a democratic decision was made. The black box of the decision-making process leaves space for imagination and interpretation. This is especially true if, e.g., the media or critics suspect organized interests to have influenced the decision-making process. If a decision does not match the preferred outcome (cf. Esaiasson et al. 2019), or if certain actors seem to benefit excessively from it, something strange or undue must be going on there – at least according to public prejudice or people skeptical of lobbying.

To be able to distinguish lobbying from corruption, it is first necessary to understand what constitutes corrupt behavior in interest intermediation.<sup>1</sup> I argue that the answer to this question differs for the macro and the micro level. Consequently, it is necessary to consider the institutions and practices that affect interest mediation in a political system separately from influence-seeking activities of single lobbyists because the interest group system is supposed to serve democratic decision-making, whereas single lobbyists naturally serve their interest group. Thus, it is not useful to apply the same standards.

At the macro level (see section 2.2), I refer to Easton's (1971) understanding of transmission belts. The logic of the transmission belt defines an ideal state of interest intermediation that improves representation and democratic decision-making. The opposite of that ideal is Warren's (2004) definition of corruption in a

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<sup>1</sup>This question is a variation of Mark Warren's (2004) puzzle "What Does Corruption in a Democracy Mean?".

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

democracy as the deliberate exclusion of citizens or groups from decisions and the decision-making process for the particular benefit of those included.

At the micro level (see section 2.3), I apply an exchange framework that distinguishes lobbying from corruption on the basis of duties and personal benefits (cf. Nye 1967). Focusing on lobbyists, legislators, and bureaucrats as the main actors of a policy process, I consider their roles and duties – roughly: policymaking for legislators and bureaucrats and interest transmission for lobbyists – and how these roles and duties might affect the actors’ mutual behavior. In an ideal state, exchanges among these actors help each actor to optimally perform their duty. In a corrupt state, the actors encourage each other to deviate from their duties in exchange for personal gains.

The understanding of interest groups as *transmission belts* (Easton 1971) that feed societal interests into the political system is the starting point of my argument. The ideal-type goal of an interest group system is to enhance representation and to contribute to better-informed decision making (ibid.). Representation is one key characteristic of democracies, which requires policymakers to act on behalf of the society, of those who delegated this power to them (Pitkin 1967). The mandate involves making decisions that contribute to the common good, i.e., that are in the interests of a society (ibid.). Democracies encourage such decisions because policymakers making bad or unpopular decisions can be voted out of office in the next election. Intermediary organizations, such as parties and interest groups, help bring such decisions about by transmitting expert information (Bouwen 2002) and information about the constituents (J. M. Hansen 1991) to decision-makers. Recent research has shown that this transmission belt function suggested by theory can be performed by interest groups and that these groups do have the potential to improve representation (Bevan and Rasmussen 2020; Carammia, Borghetto, and Bevan 2018; Flöthe and Rasmussen 2018; Pakull, Goldberg, and Bernhagen 2020; Rozbicka et al. 2021).

How well interest groups can perform the transmission belt function is not entirely up to them. Interest groups find themselves in different sets of institutions and interest group populations. Their environment inevitably influences how and to which extent they can aggregate interests and the strategies they can use in interacting with policy- and decision-makers and institutions. Therefore, the first question that needs to be discussed is whether the legislative and the executive branch as venues of policymaking facilitate effective interest intermediation. Two

## 2.1. Distinguishing Lobbying from Corruption

phases are important. Legislative chambers and the bureaucracy must, firstly, grant various interest groups access. And secondly, they have to consider the information transmitted by interest groups voicing preferences, concerns, or expertise.

If a sound transmission belt is the ideal state, the task is to identify and understand possible sources of deviations from the proper performance of this function. And it becomes apparent from the preceding paragraph that both – the characteristics of the interest group system and those of the institutions – affect the functioning of the transmission belt. Interest groups might impede its functioning by preventing certain societal groups from voicing their interests at all. Institutions can introduce such deviations by granting access only to specific interests, for example. To make it even more complex, these systemic characteristics inevitably affect personal exchanges between policymakers and citizens or lobbyists. If certain groups fail to organize, for example, it is much harder for policymakers to anticipate the interests of those unorganized groups. Likewise, there is no guarantee that decision-makers will appropriately consider interests that have been voiced. If they do not, the functioning of the transmission belt would be impeded even though all macro requirements are met (cf. Coleman 1990).

To summarize, sources of deviations from the performance of the transmission belt function can appear at the macro level, at the interest group system level, and at the institutional level. In accordance with the literature on the representative potential of interest groups, I call these deviations at the macro level *biases*. They can also appear at the micro level, during exchanges between lobbyists and policymakers. For easier comprehension, I use the term deviation rather than bias at the micro level.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: In the next section, I discuss the sources of biases in the interest group system and at institutions, focusing on *mobilization bias*, the fact that some groups might find it easier to form an interest group than others, and on *agenda bias*, the fact that some interests might be more likely to become salient. The basic assumption is that the larger the biases, the more likely it is that instead of transmitting interests into the political system, interest intermediation can manifest as corruption (cf. Warren 2004). Employing an exchange framework, I assess sources of deviations from the expected performance of formal duties caused by mutual interactions between policymakers and lobbyists in the second part of this chapter. The deviation from duties for personal benefits is a key element of corruption (e.g., Nye 1967, p. 419; Philp 1997, p. 458) and contradicts

## 2. *What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?*

the goal of contributing to good and informed democratic decision-making – the theoretical justification for lobbying. I discuss where and when exchanges that are necessary to represent interests are likely to be affected by corruption and how these can in turn affect the functioning of the transmission belt at the macro level.

### 2.2. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Macro Level

At the macro level, the equation of interest intermediation comprises three variables: citizens who somehow express their political desires so that the second variable, the intermediary organizations, can collect and articulate them in an aggregated manner vis-à-vis the third variable, government institutions. For an ideal performance of the transmission belt function the links between each of the three variables must be unbiased.

If the focus is on government institutions and the task is to identify sources of biases, the question is how these biases manifest. One theoretical extreme is the absence of biases. This ideal state would result in perfect representation. Governments would be aware of citizens' interests as they are fully intermediated by parties and interest groups as intermediary organizations (Burstein 1998). These organizations would take up the issues that are important to the citizens and communicate them to the government, which would then put the issues on its agenda. The other theoretical extreme is the conscious and intentional destruction of the links between citizens, intermediary organizations, and the government (Warren 2004). Warren refers to this violation as corruption "if [t]he excluded have a claim to inclusion that is both recognized and violated [... and] the exclusion normally benefits those included [...] and harms at least some of those excluded" (ibid., p. 334). Biases in the interest intermediation process can be possible sources of exclusion. The next paragraphs discuss the sources of biases and how they affect representation. In the final subsection, In the final subsection, I deal with the question of whether these biases constitute corruption.

A prerequisite of an unbiased interest intermediation system is that policymaking institutions have sufficient capacities to respond to each kind of interest voiced to them. The more partial they are (Rothstein and Teorell 2008), the more severe biases will inevitably be. However, it is not only unresponsive government institutions that can cause biases but also the interest group system. In its entirety, it

must mobilize societal interests equally and representatively (Lowery, Baumgartner, et al. 2015). What equality and representativeness means in this context is disputed. A minimum rule would be to have at least one group to represent the interest of each citizen, whereas a more comprehensive rule would require a group for each *potential* interest, which would mean that several interest groups per citizen might need to be formed (ibid., p. 1226; Truman 1951). The argument that interest group systems should not put some interests over others still holds whether a minimalist or a maximalist rule is applied. The choice of rule only affects the extent of the bias in empirical studies as a matter of operationalization.

Hence, the necessary conditions for the transmission belt to work are:

1. A government with sufficient capacities to listen to all interests voiced.
2. Equal chances to organize and to become a member of the interest group system.
3. A representative interest group system.

If biases impede the functioning of the transmission belt and if it is considered to function properly when these three necessary conditions are met, biases should be identifiable as deviations from them.

### **2.2.1. Sources of Bias in Institutions**

Bias at government institutions occurs if the work of the government or government decisions do not properly reflect the interests of the civil society. This kind of bias is widely referred to as *agenda bias* since the agendas of the interest groups and the agenda of the government differ (e.g., Kimball et al. 2012; cf. Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Such bias can be rooted in two critical stages of the policy process: the access phase and the phase when different interests prior to decision-making are weighed.

#### **Access and Openness to the Participation of Interest Groups**

The processing of political interests requires institutions with the capacities to listen to them, evaluate them, and to match them with the political aims of the decision-makers (Scharpf 1999; Scharpf 1970). A prerequisite for interest groups to make their voices heard is their adequate participation in the policy process, which requires loci of access. Institutions along the policy process must have enough ac-

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

cess points to ensure responsiveness to all political stakeholders (cf. Schmidt 2013, p. 7). If only certain groups can gain access, interests might be excluded, leading to biases in representation. Two possible sources of bias concern access. The first is insufficient access points. If there are too few, some political stakeholders are excluded. Of course, universal access would overwhelm governments (Lowery, Baumgartner, et al. 2015, p. 1216). Thus, access has to be granted to those who are affected by a policy and have a legitimate interest and to those who provide the necessary expertise for governments to make an informed decision. Furthermore, governments can artificially reduce the participation of interest groups. If committees do not invite certain groups or if deadlines for written testimonies are too short, groups that were not considered by the government or that do not have the resources to respond to deadlines quickly are *de facto* excluded, causing bias in the selection of participating interest groups (cf. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, p. 362).

A second source of access bias is *favoritism* (cf. *ibid.*, p. 358). If government institutions favor certain groups over others, maybe because they like to be surrounded by groups that share the position of the government, some societal groups are excluded from the policy process. This would lead to decisions that neglect concerns by those who might be negatively affected by the decisions. That said, access does not mean influence. There might be nothing wrong with a decision against the preferences of some constituents as long as there is the general belief that it intends to serve the common interest and welfare (Urbinati 2006, p. 37).

### **Weighing the Interests of Interest Groups**

Partiality in decision-making processes is another source of bias in institutions. Most decisions produce winners and losers (cf. Beetham 2013, p. 144). This conflict is inherent to policymaking. As elected representatives, policymakers have the mandate to pursue their political goals and to make decisions under conditions of ideological competition and different problem-solving approaches. The responsibility of the decision-making bodies is to respect the interests of the 'losers' and to craft compromises that keep the link between the citizens, the intermediary organizations, and government intact. If minor interests are neglected, inequality increases and representation deteriorates (cf. *ibid.*, p. 145; Williams 2000b, p. 67). Generally, policymakers are free to decide whether to listen to the expertise of interest groups or to rely on preferences of the constituency, even if the two are

## 2.2. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Macro Level

conflicting (Pitkin 1967, p. 222). Addressing issues policymakers deem pivotal to constituents is important (Urbinati 2011, p. 397). Thus, decisions do not need to please every societal group, but it must be explicable why a decision was made one way or another.

Partiality not only occurs if policymakers ignore some interests but also if their position is biased towards certain interests even before the policy process is initiated. Research by Culpepper (2015 and 2011) and Scott (1972, p. 28) suggests that initial policy positions tend to favor business interests over others due to their importance for prosperity. Even if non-business groups challenge proposals, they start with a disadvantage that is not equally distributed. The most extreme form of structural power is state capture, when political systems are no longer free to make decisions due to their dependence on some non-state actors that can blackmail the government. In such states, the representative link between citizens, intermediary organizations, and the government is severed. Here, the agenda bias is expected to be the largest since it is not civil society but single actors who determine government action.

### 2.2.2. Sources of Bias in the Interest Group System

In an ideal state, the transmission belt consists of an interest group system that collects political desires and expertise from the society, aggregates them, and transmits them to responsive decision-making institutions (Berry and Wilcox 2018; Dahl 1971; Easton 1971; Truman 1951; Williams 2000a). The failure of interest groups to adequately map the interests of the society is referred to as *mobilization bias* (Schattschneider 1960; cf. Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Mobilization bias may be present in all three stages of interest representation by intermediary organizations and interferes with the equal and representative intermediation of interests.

### The Collective Action Problem and Its Effect on Mobilization and Aggregation

Interest groups allow people to join forces to achieve a common goal (Baumgartner and Leech 1998) and to express their interests with a single voice (Dahl 1971). An interest group system should give each citizen the same chance to be represented in at least one group (Lowery, Baumgartner, et al. 2015, p. 1220; Mansbridge 1999, p. 634). However, Olson famously noted that not all societal interests have the

## 2. *What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?*

same chance to overcome the collective action problem, meaning that many groups fail to establish and maintain a group that represents them (Olson 1965; see also Berkhout and Hanegraaff 2019; Gray and Lowery 1996). These collective action problems make representation socially determined, while only universal representation would correspond to the democratic norm of inclusion (Grossmann 2012; Schattschneider 1960). The social determination of mobilization therefore violates the norm of equality within the interest group system. The resulting mobilization bias ultimately inhibits representation. Thus, the collective action problem can undermine two of the three necessary conditions of an unbiased interest group system.

### **The Transmission of Interests**

Further consequences of mobilization bias become evident in the transmission-of-interests phase. First, only mobilized groups can transmit their interests to the political system. All groups that fail to overcome the collective action problem are excluded right from the beginning.<sup>2</sup> The consequences of such an exclusion have been discussed in the previous paragraph.

Second, unorganized interests are excluded from the checks and balances among interest groups (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Dahl 1965; Truman 1951). The excluded cannot signal decision-makers if some interests are unfairly favored (Rothstein 2014, p. 743) or if decisions are made at the expense of minorities (Beetham 2013, pp. 144–5). This might increase the risk of partiality in decision-making.

Third, in addition to the traditional intermediation function, the mobilization of interests structures the political contest with interest groups supporting political ideas, parties, and candidates (Williams 2000b, p. 61; Ippolito and Walker 1980, p. 324) or trying to influence party manifestos (Klüver 2020). Exchanges between interest groups and parties or candidates improve the political actors' awareness of the issues important to a group, allowing them to trade pledges in exchange for electoral support (Allern, Aylott, and F. J. Christiansen 2007). This would indirectly contribute to responsiveness, however, again only to those interests that overcome the collective action problem with the same consequences as mentioned above.

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<sup>2</sup>At least from the transmission belt that refers to interest groups. If parties or candidates pick up on people's interests without the support of interest groups, their interests could still be represented by other institutions than interest groups.

It follows that, unlike agenda bias, mobilization bias can be at work in both the access-seeking phase and the decision-making phase. Groups that fail to overcome the collective action problem cannot gain access. As a consequence, they cannot transmit their interests and cannot keep other interest groups in check prior to decision-making. This undermines the equality of interest groups and the representativeness of the interest group system.

### 2.2.3. Biases and Corruption

Focusing on a macro perspective and starting from the democratic criterion of representation, this section argues that ideal lobbying improves the functioning of the representative link between decision-makers and citizens as a transmission belt. Biases impair or reverse this function. The yet unanswered question is if this impairment by biases constitutes corruption. Following Warren (2004), corruption is understood as intentional violation of equal inclusion of people that have a claim to be included, breaking the link between policymakers and society.

As the previous subsections have shown, the two biases in interest mediation, mobilization bias and agenda bias, do not necessarily lead to the conscious or intentional exclusion of groups. One exception is favoritism as the deliberate or at least negligent exclusion of certain interests in favor of privileged societal groups. Therefore, the transmission belt in political systems with rampant favoritism, e.g., in Latin America, should be considered corrupt (see also Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016). Another exception is state capture when special interests can force governments to decide in their favor. However, biases, whether introduced by institutions or the interest group system, do not *per se* cause corruption.

But how should these biases be evaluated? If representation is accepted as the decisive norm in interest intermediation (Easton 1971), a sound transmission belt can – in theory – produce perfect representation, whereas corruption destructs representational links. If biases reduce representational performance, they fall somewhere between ideal-type lobbying and corruption because they have the potential to introduce inequality, but probably not intentionally, and to benefit some groups over others (cf. Warren 2004). Although only the conscious creation of inequality is corrupt, the democratic consequences remain the same: severing or at least weakening the representational link between decision-makers and citizens. Thus, mobilization bias and agenda bias can have the same effects as corruption (Gold-

## *2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?*

berg 2018). Consequently, political systems should tackle these biases in the same way as they tackle corruption.

### **2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level**

In the previous section, I argued that lobbying and corruption should be distinguished by their consequences for the representational link between citizens and decision-makers. The focus was on interest group systems, on institutions, and their capacities to process societal interests. On the micro level, this rather abstract distinction is not applicable. In the aggregate, numerous individual actions of lobbyists do affect the representational link, but for distinguishing between lobbying and corruption on an individual level the focus must be on the behavior of lobbyists in exchange situations. Unlike interest group systems, which are supposed to give all parts of society a universal voice, lobbyists represent the specific interests of their group. Thus, equal representation cannot be the criterion for evaluating lobbyists.

The assessment of lobbyists' actions and whether they should be categorized as corrupt depends largely on the definition of corruption. One typical definition is "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (e.g., Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, p. 9). Applied to lobbyists, they are entrusted with the power to speak for their group and might abuse that power for private gain. Such abuse would involve extracting resources from their employers for their personal benefit. But this has nothing to do with the act of lobbying. It is simply professional misconduct by an employee regardless of the occupation. The above definition of corruption would also apply to an accountant who embezzled company funds or to politicians who abuse their public office for private gain. For example, ministers providing political patronage to certain public officials or parties to certain parliamentarians might constitute corruption, but it does not say anything about the politicians' relationship to lobbyists. The definition for distinguishing between lobbying and corruption in influence-seeking activities needs to capture the interaction between a lobbyist and policymakers.

A popular image of a clearly corrupt interaction between a lobbyist and a policymaker is exchanging a suitcase of money for influence. Such an exchange is one example of influence-seeking activities with corrupt intentions. However, not all

### 2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

exchanges between lobbyists and policymakers are corrupt, not even all *quid pro quos*. In a strict sense, the usual *modus operandi* of lobbying is a *quid pro quo* (cf. Berkhout 2013; Schlozman and Tierney 1986, p. 6). Lobbyists offer information about an issue or about the preferences of a constituency<sup>3</sup> and exchange that information for access to the policymakers who need it. Almost no one (except those who oppose lobbying in principle) would condemn such exchanges categorically. There are several differences between these two examples. The first is that the 'money case' situation is illegal. Secondly, transmitting information is a key element of a lobbyist's job description, whereas bribing is not. Employers might have hired the lobbyists for their communication skills (cf. Bernhagen 2019, p. 250) or their networks (LaPira and H. F. Thomas 2014). Bribes or other undue (but not necessarily illegal) financial incentives usually collide with the directives of the employer (cf. Holyoke 2017; see for example the code of conduct for members of the German Society for Policy Advice (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Politikberatung 2021)). Thus, a definition of corruption should exclude standard exchanges between lobbyists and policymakers but needs to include situations in which they deviate from their roles and responsibilities. One widely used definition that includes such behavior was developed by Nye, who regards corruption as a "behavior, which deviates from the formal duties of a [...] role because of private-regarding [...] pecuniary or status gains; or violates the rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (Nye 1967, p. 419).<sup>4</sup> This definition refers to both a supply side and a demand side and, thus, implicitly includes exchanges.

#### 2.3.1. Information Markets: The Exchange Logic of Influence-seeking Activities

In the previous section, I justified my use of Nye's definition of corruption by regarding the relationship between influence-seekers and their addressees as an exchange. This approach is not new. Scholars both of interest groups (e.g., Berkhout 2013; Hanegraaff and Bruycker 2020; Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2019; Klüver 2013;

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<sup>3</sup>The constituency of an interest group includes members and supporters in membership associations, supporters and contributors in non-membership organizations, and employees of companies if they lobby.

<sup>4</sup>I modified this definition slightly to apply it to lobbyists that do not hold a public office. The original definition refers to public roles only: "Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (Nye 1967, p. 419).

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

Mahoney 2004) and corruption (Della Porta 2002) apply exchange frameworks. Combining Nye's definition of corruption with an exchange framework provides a useful tool for distinguishing between lobbying and corruption (Goldberg 2018). In this section, I address the nature of the exchange in more detail.

Exchanges between policymakers and other political actors, such as lobbyists, do not represent a legally binding contract, leaving the partners without any formal means to sanction each other for violating the agreement. Rather, such an exchange is an informal agreement of collaboration expected to benefit both. Without a formal sanction mechanism, the risks involved in transactions between policymakers and government affairs managers are of a social rather than a legal nature.

Exchanges between lobbyists and policymakers create an *information market*. Lobbyists signal or promise policymakers the political support of the group whose interests they represent (Berkhout 2013, p. 234; Hanegraaff and Bruycker 2020, p. 528; Streeck and Schmitter 1985, p. 22) and seek access (Bouwen 2002; J. M. Hansen 1991) to supply information policymakers require (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hanegraaff and Bruycker 2020; J. M. Hansen 1991), to get the opportunity to represent the interests of a group (Bouwen 2002; Chalmers 2013), to exert influence (Ainsworth 1997; Austen-Smith 1993), or to obtain information, e.g., about future legislation (Baron 1995; Getz 2001; Heinz 1993, p. 384). There are three prerequisites for these exchanges to take place:

1. A demand of a policymaker (information and/or support) that can be met by a lobbyist, who gets information, influence, or at least access to the policymaker in return.
2. Mutual trust since there is no contract promising the return favor to be of useful value (J. M. Hansen 1991; Granovetter 1985).
3. The ability to socially sanction violations of the agreement since there is no contract providing legal remedies against force or fraud (Granovetter 1985).

*Concerning demand and supply:* Policymakers need information to competently draft legislation or to incorporate the preferences of the constituents (J. M. Hansen 1991) and to control the bureaucracy if they have delegated the policy drafting (Epstein and O'Halloran 1995; Hall and Miler 2008). This creates a demand for information, which I call an information market. Interest groups compete with goods that are valuable for a policymaker: expertise, knowledge about the constituents' preferences, and efficient transmission of information (J. M. Hansen 1991;

### 2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

cf. Bouwen 2002). Policymakers attach different weights to these aspects. Interest groups respond to these different weightings. Research has shown that lobbyists usually lobby policymakers who are not opposed to the interests of their group (e.g., Crombez 2002; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999). Thus, depending on the political preferences of policymakers, the chances of different groups to gain access to the policymaker might vary for each proposal. The market logic also implies that interest groups with highly specialized knowledge or interests (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Bouwen 2002), find it easier to gain access than those with more general interests. Likewise, highly aggregated interests that not only represent the interests of a large group but that might also be able to mobilize support of a large constituency, e.g., in corporatist systems or multilevel settings, are extremely attractive sources of information (e.g., Kohler-Koch, Kotzian, and Quittkat 2017). Besides interest groups with such unique characteristics, various interest groups with their individual positions and ties to constituents compete in the information market (Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999).

*Concerning trust:* Before interest groups can signal that they possess valuable information, they need to attract and secure the policymaker's attention. Interest groups can pursue two strategies to get on the radar of policymakers. The first is to make legitimate claim. If a group is a legitimate stakeholder, policymakers should open the door for them. In that case, they have one shot at building a relationship of trust (C. S. Thomas and Hrebenar 2009). The second strategy is to obtain references from the network. Recommendation or referral by a "trusted informant" (Granovetter 1985, p. 490), e.g., another lobbyist who already has a trusting relationship with the policymaker, provides assurance to the policymaker as the trusted informant vouches for the lobbyist (cf. *ibid.*, p. 490).

Paradoxically, trust is not only a door opener for exchanges but also increases the chance of misconduct. On the one hand, mutual trust increases the partners' confidence that they will not betray each other in an illegal (Lambsdorff 2002b, p. 21) or reputation-damaging exchange. An example would be an undisclosed conflict of interest if a lobbyist and a legislator became close friends and a decision that might benefit the lobbyist is pending. Here, both sides are more likely to engage in misconduct. On the other hand, some fraudulent transactions occur only because the partners have established mutual trust and one of them decides to betray the other (Granovetter 1985, p. 491). Jack Abramoff embezzled millions of dollars from American Indian interest groups. This would not have been possible

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

if he had not been trusted to use the money for their political purposes. To avoid unilateral misconduct, the compliant exchange partner needs the ability to sanction the deviant one.

*Concerning sanctions:* As just explained, if both partners of an exchange agree to engage in misconduct, trust can solve the prisoner's dilemma (Lambsdorff 2002b, p. 21). Legal considerations aside, such behavior is difficult to control. However, if only one partner violates the agreement, the other can sanction that partner socially even if his or her behavior is not illegal.

Information markets are usually not anonymous (cf. Granovetter 1985, p. 495). Organizations, their lobbyists, parties, politicians, and executive personnel know each other (e.g., Eggers and Hainmueller 2009; Faccio 2006; Granados and Knoke 2003; E. Lucas 2019). Their networks facilitate exchange, but once someone has been expelled, doors will be closed to them. This is especially true for lobbyists. A lobbyist's reputation determines their position within the network. Credible, competent, and peer-recommended representatives of interests supply policymakers with required information and can prove their trustworthiness. However, once their reputation is damaged they lose trust and access. Thus, lobbyists usually refrain from submitting information if they are not sure about the value of their information (Bernhagen and Bräuninger 2005; Hall and Deardorff 2006). The same applies to illegal or unethical behavior.

For policymakers, reputation is also important. Both in the executive and the legislative branch, reputation is an important aspect determining a policymaker's further career. Legislators usually want to be reelected. Scandals diminish this chance (Basinger 2013; Hamel and M. G. Miller 2019). Furthermore, parties and factions can sanction politicians involved in scandals internally, regardless of whether they seek reelection. The legislators and the heads of ministries and administrations control the public officials. Misconduct can be sanctioned both in court and internally, e.g., by denying black sheep the opportunity to climb the ranks of the hierarchy.

This way, political networks define a common standard of expected behavior (Granovetter 1985, p. 498). Their power to destroy the reputation of a member of the network constitutes a sanction mechanism that creates incentives for compliant behavior and reduces the risks of misconduct, even if it is not illegal.

Hence, exchanges in information markets foster the partners' mutual trust and increase their reputation if both have their demands satisfactorily met and if they comply with the standard of expected behavior. This makes relationships be-

tween lobbyists and policymakers self-sustaining (Ainsworth 1997; Granovetter 1985; Kranton 1996).

In the next sections, I derive possible sources of deviations from formal duties and then go on to discuss how exchange relationships between policymakers and lobbyist may facilitate or impede corruption.

### 2.3.2. Duties of Legislators

To determine whether legislators and elected representatives deviate from their duties, it is first necessary to specify what their duties are. Here, representation matters again, but not in terms of how representative a system is but how decision-makers can craft a link with their constituency.<sup>5</sup>

Elected officials' responsibility is to represent the essential interests of their constituents<sup>6</sup> (Mansbridge 1999, p. 630) and to deal with the issues important to them (Urbinati and Warren 2008, p. 397). To that end, representatives need to be responsive and accountable to their constituency (Pitkin 1967, p. 140). This does not necessarily require them to adopt the position of the constituents (Eulau et al. 1959, p. 750), but to pursue what they *think* is best for their constituency (ibid., p. 749). This requires policymakers to understand "which policies are good for the polity as a whole, which policies are good for a representative's constituents, and when the interests of various groups within the polity and constituency conflict" (Mansbridge 1999, p. 634). Legislators do not only perform their representation but also their decision-making role under such conditions. They transform citizens' numerous individual interests into collectively binding legislation. In this process, conflicts

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<sup>5</sup>This does not mean that representation is a unidirectional process. Representatives can also mobilize their constituents (Disch 2011; Urbinati and Warren 2008, p. 401). In this section, the focus is on the duties of the legislators. Thus, I concentrate on legislators as addressees of voiced interests and omit constituents as addressees of policymakers.

<sup>6</sup>There is no consensus on who the constituents actually are (see e.g., Eulau et al. 1959; Urbinati and Warren 2008, pp. 396–7). The same holds for the way representatives should represent their constituencies (Mansbridge 2003). I regard the constituency of each representative as a dynamic set of citizens that varies depending on the issue. Hence, decisions made by policymakers do not necessarily refer to the same constituency (cf. Eulau et al. 1959; Mansbridge 2003). I do not expect these dynamic factors to affect their formal duties as representative. Even if representatives disregard the interests of some constituents (Eulau et al. 1959, p. 749), they should understand the consequences of their decisions for the constituency. For the purpose of this study, the specific definition of constituency is irrelevant as it focuses on the role of information and expertise in determining the impact of policies on constituents and such information would naturally include information about the respective constituency.

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

between competing interests cannot be resolved. Rather the source of acceptance stems from "some form of legitimate decision" (Mansbridge 1999, p. 634).

From this, two formal duties can be derived:

- 1a. Being informed about the (conflicting) interests of the constituency.
- 2a. Being responsive as prerequisite of acquiring knowledge about the constituency.

Their prerequisites are:

- 1b. Being knowledgeable about different policy solutions considering the interests of the constituency.
- 2b. Having expertise as prerequisite of knowledge about policy solutions.

In section 2.3.5, I use these four points to demonstrate under which circumstances legislators become corrupt in the context of influence-seeking activities.

### 2.3.3. Duties of Executive Officials

The position of the bureaucracy in (semi-)presidential and parliamentary systems differs because of the separation of powers in the former and the merger of the executive and the legislative branches in the latter. Parliamentary systems delegate tasks to the bureaucracy more often (Eaton 2000). However, the core responsibilities of bureaucrats are the same. The relationship between legislative policymakers and the bureaucracy is often explained using the principal-agent framework (e.g., Lupia 2008; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). A bureaucrat's role is helping to achieve political goals defined by politicians in power. In presidential systems, this can be the congress, the president, and/or ministers. In parliamentary systems, it is usually the government and specifically the ministers (Strøm 2008, p. 65). In the context of policymaking, this help refers to policy formulation and policy implementation.

During the stage of *policy formulation*, legislative policymakers can entrust civil servants and other bureaucrats in the executive branch with drafting bills whose goals were defined by legislative policymakers to extend legislative capacities (cf. Truman 1951, p. 396). These bills can be proposals for new legislation, executive orders, or policies (Gelak 2009). The bureaucracies possess or acquire the expertise in their specific policy areas, and they have the legal expertise to translate a political goal into a universally binding law (D. H. McKay 2017, p. 271; Müller 2014, p. 143).

### 2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

The *policy implementation* phase determines how a policy works in practice. It is therefore important that the actions by the implementing officials (and, of course, the reaction by the individuals or organizations affected by that policy) are, again, consistent with the aims of a policy and – if they are not – that the implementation is adapted over time (Sabatier 1986).

Thus, bureaucrats contributing to policymaking have two duties:

1. During the policy formulation stage, bureaucrats draft bills (and other universally binding documents) that correspond to the goals of the legislative policymakers in power.
2. During the policy implementation stage, bureaucrats ensure that the laws work in practice according to their purpose.

Again, I will return to these points in section 2.3.5 to discuss under which circumstances bureaucrats become corrupt in the context of influence-seeking activities.

#### 2.3.4. Duties of Lobbyists

Unlike the groups in an interest group system, individual lobbyists are not responsible for contributing to a representative system. They are responsible for representing the interests of their employers (Holyoke 2017). This might be interests of a larger group of organizations or groups. But it might also be a very particular concern of a single company.

Such organizations have at least one common goal: *survival* (e.g., Lowery 2007, p. 46). Lobbyists serve as a liaison between the political system and their organization. Targeting policymakers, in-house lobbyists are responsible for defending or advancing the regulatory environment in the interest of their employers (cf. Holyoke 2017). At the very least, this means that they need to ensure that decision-makers are aware of these interests even if they choose to disregard them in the end. For membership organizations or non-government organizations (NGOs), ensuring survival also means motivating their members (or supporters) to continue to pay fees to the organization (Lowery 2007; Schmitter and Streeck 1999). This means that government affair managers might also need to organize events that generate publicity to satisfy their members or supporters. Addressing their employers, lobbyists need to communicate, some say translate, information from the political system to (or for) their organizations, so that they can anticipate possible changes or challenges (e.g., Baron 1995; Getz 2001; Heinz 1993, p. 384). Functioning as an early warning

## 2. *What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?*

system, lobbyists lay the ground for strategic decisions in response to changes in the regulatory environment.

To advance the interests of an organization, they must be voiced in a meaningful way (Lowery, Baumgartner, et al. 2015, p. 1225). To this end, lobbyists need to mobilize the interests within the organization and to find a compromise that suits all constituents, e.g., members or management (see also Heinz 1993, p. 375). However, for such a compromise to be of value for policymakers, it must be a goal that is politically achievable. Lobbyists face a trade-off between gaining access (see below) and responding to the preferences of the constituents (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). If a compromise is found, an organization must have a legitimate reason to make that political claim (Williams 2000a), or at least develop an argument that convinces policymakers of its legitimacy (Milbrath 1963, p. 141). For example, the position of an association of car manufacturers on hunting seasons might not be important (or even valuable) for a decision-maker. However, positions on battery technologies in vehicles should be. A lobbyist needs to gain access to responsible policymakers and be able to efficiently obtain, use and communicate valuable information (J. M. Hansen 1991, pp. 14–5; Rosenthal 2001, p. 180; Milbrath 1963, pp. 118–9, 142–3). If government affairs managers fail to gain access or to communicate effectively, the chances increase that the interest in question might be overlooked.

Lobbyists' ability to exert influence is not only limited by legal restrictions but also by ethical (Anastasiadis, Moon, and Humphreys 2018; Barron and Skountridaki 2020; Bauer and R. H. Gordon 2009) and internal constraints (cf. Anastasiadis, Moon, and Humphreys 2018, p. 213, Dahan, Hadani, and Schuler 2013, p. 370). As representatives of their organization they are often subject to internal compliance guidelines that control the activity of lobbyists. Laws and government codes of conduct further define acceptable behavior. Violations of these guidelines and codes might damage an organization's reputation and credibility. These consequences are likely to reduce its chances of being invited to discussions and of exerting influence.

Anticipating changes in the regulatory environment requires the ability to notice such developments, at the latest when the legislative proposal is officially announced (Rosenthal 2001, p. 65). However, it is desirable to get such information as early as possible to allow sufficient time to adjust to regulatory changes. This requires networks that provide lobbyists with information before their official announcement. The second skill lobbyists need is the ability to analyze (or at least prepare the

analysis of) the effects of a regulatory change on their organization or constituents (cf. Barron and Skountridaki 2020, pp. 15–7). This function of lobbyists as early warning system is a prerequisite for organizations to respond to changes before they become effective.

Thus, the formal duty of ensuring organizational survival can be split into two responsibilities for lobbyists:

1. Representing their organization's interests vis-à-vis decision-makers *by* appropriately communicating a legitimate position and/or an achievable goal.
2. 2. Translating political developments for their organization *by* acquiring information about regulatory changes and their effects on the organization or its constituents (e.g., members or management).

In the next section, I apply these duties to exchanges with legislators and bureaucrats to determine which typical situations between lobbyists and policymakers facilitate corruption.

### 2.3.5. Sources of Deviation and Corruption

An exchange between a lobbyist and a policymaker is corrupt if two conditions are met. Firstly, one of the two actors must deviate from one of their duties. Secondly, the non-compliant actor must personally benefit from the deviation (Nye 1967, p. 419). In the following I discuss possible sources of deviation from formal duties in typical situations of interest intermediation relying on strategies frequently used by lobbyists.<sup>7</sup>

Organizations have economic and/or political objectives. This is especially true for companies striving for profits. Thus, lobbyists work within the objectives of their employers. They are committed exclusively to their organization. Deviating from that commitment and hence their formal duty means they either fail to represent the interests of the organization, or they fail to communicate political developments to the organization. Possible misconduct ranges from misrepresenting interests (Johnston 2014, p. 199) and advancing personal interests at the expense of the employer (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, p. 357) to embezzlement (Johnston 2014, p. 199; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, pp. 8–13). While all these forms

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<sup>7</sup>I use the overview in Baumgartner and Leech 1998 (p. 152) as source for categories of typical lobbying strategies.

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

of misconduct justify terminating the lobbyist for cause, they do not necessarily constitute corruption unless the lobbyist personally benefits from these activities.

The duty of lobbyists is to work for the benefit of their organization rather than lining their own pockets. As employees, they should transfer gains associated with the job to their organization. Thus, all work products of government affairs managers, such as their networks, access to the right people, reputation, or favors should be passed on to the organization. In practice, it is difficult to differentiate, e.g., the whole concept of hiring former legislators or government officials rests on the assumption that they bring in their personal networks and access gaining skills. Trust as one prerequisite of a fruitful relationship between lobbyists and policy-makers tends to be interpersonal rather than group-specific (C. S. Thomas and Hrebenar 2009). Still, there is at least one clear indication that lobbyists deviate from their duties as representatives of an organization, namely if they receive reputational or financial benefits, e.g., to advance their career as in the Abramoff scandal.

Hence, lobbyists deviate from their formal duties *if they gain reputational or financial rewards at the monetary, operational, or reputational expense of the organization they represent.*

Before I address lobbyists' exchanges with legislators and executive personnel separately, I define the benefits from these two types of interaction together since they do not differ much in principle. The most obvious form of personal benefit is money or any other tangible or intangible benefit accepted in exchange for a service, e.g., a vote, a passage in a legislative or regulatory document. This benefit can be immediate, e.g., in the form of a check, or a long-term agreement, such as promising a financially rewarding position in the organization after the political career (revolving door) (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, p. 341), or a favor that can be called in at a later date.<sup>8</sup>

### Lobbyists and Legislators

Legislators need to make decisions based on what they believe is best for the common good and to translate political desires of their constituents<sup>9</sup> into universally

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<sup>8</sup>This list represents some typical examples and should not be seen as complete compendium of benefits policymakers might receive from corruption.

<sup>9</sup>The question of who elected representatives should be responsive to and who they should represent is disputed. The answer depends to a significant extent on what constitutes the constituency. Constituencies can be the whole society, the voters of a politician, or an even

### 2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

binding rules. If legislators allow undue influence, they deviate from their formal duties as defined above. Such undue influence can involve giving preference to certain constituents over others, giving certain constituents an unfair advantage (e.g., favoritism; cf. *ibid.*, p. 358), the intentional introduction of bias, e.g., through granting exclusive access, and the sale of decisions, e.g., votes (Snyder 1991) or access (cf. Austen-Smith 1995). These deviations cause biased responsiveness and biased perceptions about the preferences of the constituency. Such biases would affect the decision-making process and eventually lead to a decision based on biased information, which is likely to violate the norm of equality (cf. section 2.2 on the macro level above). A second source of deviation from formal duties are ill-informed decisions caused by incompetence. If legislators lack the ability to respond to the constituency or to acquire the necessary expertise to make a balanced and an informed decision, the result could be as bad as under undue influence.

Following this discussion and the duties described above, there are two main sources of deviation from formal duties for legislators:

1. Providing unfair advantages, e.g., selling votes, selling access, creating loopholes.
2. Incompetent decision- and policymaking due to insufficient or biased information.

Note that these deviations make legislators bad politicians, but they only count as corruption if the legislators personally benefit from them as described in the previous section. The following paragraphs briefly introduce possible sources of deviations from formal duties and possible sources of corruption in frequently used influence-seeking strategies.

*Gaining and granting access:* Access is a prerequisite for exchanges between lobbyists and policymakers (Goldberg 2018). Since the time legislators have available is limited, the strongest competition between interest groups takes place in this phase (Austen-Smith 1995). Lobbyists need to convince the targeted policymaker that they possess valuable and important information, not only about the group(s) they represent but also and especially – as indicated above – about the constituency

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more specific clientele. Thus, concepts that can be related to corruption, such as clientelism (Kurer 1993) or pork barrel politics (*ibid.*, p. 260; Chang and Golden 2007, p. 120; but see Rose-Ackerman 2008, p. 551) are not treated as deviations from formal duties here since defining what a constituency should be is beyond the scope of this chapter.

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

(Rosenthal 2001, p. 197). If they fail to gain access, they cannot perform their duty of transmitting the interests of their group.

Once access has been granted, research shows that lobbyists usually establish regular working relationships with a small number of policymakers (Heinz 1993) in lobbying enterprises (Ainsworth 1997), consistent with the expectation of self-sustaining exchange relationships (Granovetter 1985; Kranton 1996). If the working relationship is fruitful for each side, both are naturally interested in continuing it. This eases access for future exchanges. As discussed above, such self-sustaining relationships also facilitate misconduct. access can promote quid pro quos (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, p. 362), especially the more trustful a working relationship is because mutual trust reduces uncertainties in corrupt exchanges as well (Lambsdorff 2002b). Accordingly, the risk that legislators and/or lobbyists deviate from their duties increases. Lobbying enterprises can become vehicles of biased access that might unfairly favor certain groups over others. If they result in a personal advantage for the legislator, e.g., because she or he goes through the revolving door, the deviation from their formal duty constitutes corruption.

Managing access is the responsibility of the policymakers. They exclusively decide to whom they grant access (cf. Hanegraaff and Bruycker 2020, p. 527). If policymakers consciously grant access to a certain group and integrate information transmitted by that group into a wide range of other interests, seeking and granting access as prerequisite for exchanges contributes to the partners performing their formal duty. This is not the case if access is an intentionally exclusive affair. Finally, if access is for sale, or if granting exclusive access involves a personal benefit, policymakers engage in corruption. Lobbyists have a low risk of corruption since they have almost no power. They depend on the policymakers' responses to their requests for access. Needless to say, buying access, e.g., with bribes, is illegal although not necessarily corrupt under the applied definition since the lobbyist would not benefit personally from bribing policymakers (for access).

*Personal direct and informal contacts:* The actual exchange – required for policymakers and lobbyists to perform their duties – takes place after access has been successfully gained. The most important route for transmitting information are personal contacts (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Nownes and DeAlejandro 2009; Nownes 2006; Sühlsen and Hisschemöller 2014). Lobbyists seek personal contacts with legislators in various ways. They meet them at official meetings, in their office, or in restaurants. They also meet more informally at events dedicated to

### 2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

certain issues or set up phone calls. Depending on the statutory provisions, these contacts are disclosed to the public, maybe even the purpose of the meeting. The exact course of a discussion is not made public to avoid closing spaces for compromise (but see Harden and Kirkland 2021). Generally, these meetings focus on one (or more) of the following three subjects:

1. Directions and objectives of future legislation.
2. A currently discussed legislative proposal.
3. Voting behavior.

*Concerning future legislation:* Good lobbyists do not only respond to recent political developments, they also try to shape future policies. Research shows that lobbyists connect with political parties to influence their manifestos or candidate selection (e.g., Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Klüver 2020; Rasmussen and Lindeboom 2013; Wonka and Haunss 2020). In these cases, the risk of corruption is low. Firstly, formulating manifestos and electing candidates are highly institutionalized processes, which limits opportunities for individual intervention. Secondly, individual politicians might find it difficult to influence these processes unless they are in a leadership position. Thirdly, since the outcomes of such processes are often unclear or uncertain, the incentives to initiate an exchange are low because bribers would make a blind bid. Furthermore, getting impressions from different constituencies can even contribute to the agenda-setting process: The more interests are considered, the more likely a decision will be made that considers multiple constituencies. Yet, personal contacts, often lacking transparency, involve the possibility of quid pro quo arrangements that might personally benefit the lobbyist as well. For example, there are not only economic players who hire politicians, but governments or government departments also hire experts from the private sector.

*Concerning legislative proposals:* Working on current proposals is the situation with the most gray areas in terms of lobbying and corruption (see Goldberg 2018). Legislators can sponsor bills endorsed by interest groups (Fischer et al. 2019), or interest groups might provide them with information to be used in drafting or shaping proposals. Sponsoring a bill 'on behalf' of an interest group can be a deviation from legislators' duties if it contradicts the preferences of their constituency or if the bill introduces an unfair advantage for the group(s) endorsing the bill. This constitutes corruption only if the sponsoring earns the legislator a personal benefit

## 2. *What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?*

provided by the endorsing group(s). In such situations, corrupt quid pro quos are possible (cf. Schnakenberg and Turner 2019).

Drafting bills is an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, as argued above, information provided by interest groups can be essential for good policymaking. On the other hand, lobbyists have an information advantage they can unduly exploit. One form of undue influence is introducing partiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Partiality unfairly benefits certain groups over others and is thus democratically undesirable both at the macro-level (see section 2.2) and the micro-level. One extreme form of introducing partiality is lobbying for loopholes, the intentional inclusion of passages in which the letter does not represent the spirit of the law (Ostas 2009, p. 509; see also Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, pp. 349–51). Loopholes do not always violate the common good, e.g., if loopholes entail macroeconomic benefits. Thus, lobbyists must argue that a loophole they promote contributes to the common good to increase their chances of being heard (Rosenthal 2001, p. 197). It is up to the legislators to weigh these arguments. To this end, they need to take other alternatives into account as well. Thus, again, it is up to legislators to restrict undue interest group influence by being well-informed. If they fail to do so, they deviate from their duties. Such deviation does not make them corrupt. It merely indicates incompetence.

As discussed above, trust is central to a fruitful relationship between interest groups and policymakers (C. S. Thomas and Hrebendar 2009). Both sides are keen to supply and to obtain correct information, which they need to build a good reputation and make good decisions. If a lobbyist is considered incompetent, they will find it difficult to gain access. If a legislator is regarded as incompetent, they will find it harder to win the next election. In addition, legislators usually do not want to appear to be acting on behalf of individual interest groups. They tend to look for compromises between legitimate interests of a group and the desires of a constituency (Rosenthal 2001, p. 207). Furthermore, readings of a bill can reveal clauses that create biased effects and will therefore be removed or revised. Thus, lobbyists can never be sure about the outcome – regardless of whether they decide to bribe or to lobby a legislator (Lambsdorff 2002a). In view of these barriers and legislative control mechanisms, corruption does not seem to be a very attractive vehicle for seeking influence compared to lobbying. Rather, I expect lobbyists to prevent unfavorable legislation by "slow[ing] down or derail[ing] the legislation en route to passage" (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, p. 361), or to promote favor-

### 2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

able legislation by emphasizing positive effects of the adoption (Rosenthal 2001, p. 197), both for the group they represent and the constituents of the legislator.

*Concerning voting:* A legislator's vote is another step in the legislative process that allows a direct quid pro quo. Lobbyist can offer a bribe (or any other incentive) and 'buy' the vote of an elected representative (Lambsdorff 2002a; Snyder 1991). On the part of the policymaker this clearly constitutes corruption. On the part of the lobbyist, it is very likely a deviation from what their employer expects but since there is no obvious personal benefit for the lobbyist, their behavior is not necessarily corrupt.

The usefulness of purchasing a vote depends on a number of conditions. Firstly, one vote seldom determines whether a bill is passed or not. In turn, this means that the narrower the majorities are, the more important a single vote becomes and the more influential the purchase of a vote is. Secondly, the more legislators are bribed, the more likely the bribery is discovered. Thirdly, each further bribe increases the costs for the briber so that it might either exceed the costs of lobbying or even exceed the costs of adopting the policy (Lambsdorff 2002a). However, the purchase of a vote leads to a relatively certain outcome. It is a direct quid pro quo. This reduces the uncertainties of the investment. Thus, the usefulness of purchasing a vote varies. The certain outcome makes it a relatively attractive corrupt transaction.

*Written testimony and hearings:* Legislative committees invite written testimonies and hold public hearings. These hearings allow many interest groups to transmit their information. They can signal the position of the constituencies to policymakers (Truman 1951) and give feedback about flawed legislation (Celler 1958). The process is highly institutionalized. This significantly reduces the risk of corruption. Members of committees come from all parties. Committee members are (or become) usually experts in the policy area of the committee and hence qualified to control and weigh information provided by the interest groups. They are thus less likely to base their decisions on biased information or poor knowledge. The formal structure does not allow for personal benefits on either side. Thus, corruption and other forms of deviations from formal duties are less likely to affect written testimonies and hearings, not least because the exchange is less interactive, limiting the opportunities for the demand side to offer a clear quid pro quo.

*Financial contributions and favors:* Offering money and granting favors are influence-seeking methods that many people associate with lobbying. As a matter

## 2. *What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?*

of fact, financial scandals are the most conspicuous sort of scandals, ranging somewhere between unethical/illegal lobbying and corruption (Alemann 2002; Johnston 2014, pp. 191–200; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, pp. 352–57; Strickland 2019). Party and campaign contributions are supposed to signal political support. However, financial contributions often facilitate *quid pro quos*. Scholars agree that contributions buy access (e.g., Austen-Smith 1995; S. B. Gordon 2005; A. M. McKay 2018). If this is true, access might be biased towards those who can afford contributions. Furthermore, researchers studying Political Action Committees PACs suggest a relationship between the issues that are important to donors and the issues recipients are working on (e.g., Cahill and Tomashevskiy 2019; Esterling 2007; S. B. Gordon 2005; A. M. McKay 2018). This might reduce legislators' general responsiveness (Giger and Klüver 2016; Lindsey and Teles 2017; Schluter 2017). The same holds true for other pecuniary and valuable incentives, such as trips, favors (Nownes 2017, p. 7), or future career opportunities (Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen 2012; LaPira and H. F. Thomas 2017; Lazarus, A. M. McKay, and Herbel 2016). Legislators must be aware of the conflict of interest such courtesies or contributions might intentionally or unintentionally create. Responsible lobbyists consider such consequences and most interest groups follow a code of conduct to explicitly avoid creating conflicts of interest (cf. Holyoke 2017), so all they can lose is their reputation. For legislators, the consequences of a scandal are more severe. Once a conflict of interest is exposed, by definition at least one interest will lose. If it is not the interest of the constituency, it is the interest of the legislators. Even if all favors or donations are legal, in the first case legislators deviate from their duties by creating biases if they give in to the donor (Kubbe 2017; Nownes 2017). In the latter (desirable) case, they avoid becoming corrupt (not necessarily in a legal sense) but forego a personal benefit. Their reputation suffers in any case.

What follows from the discussion is that the responsibility for avoiding corruption, in formal terms, usually rests with the legislator. Lobbyists who deviate from their formal duties rarely benefit personally, which might make them bad lobbyists but not corrupt ones. However, lobbyists are still part of the equation. They should certainly be held accountable if they create conflicts of interest, if they lure legislators into gray areas between lobbying and corruption, or if they pave the way to corruption. But this professional misconduct should not be called corruption. That said, the consequences of such behavior do not differ very much from the consequences of corruption. If either misconduct or corruption is exposed, lobbyists

do not only face potential litigation but inevitably lose trust and reputation, which diminishes their opportunities for further influence-seeking activities.

### **Lobbyists and Executive Personnel**

Unlike legislators, executive personnel are not responsible for translating political goals into laws.<sup>10</sup> However, they need to provide expertise for the legislative function to perform its duties or even draft bills themselves. In doing so, they must be committed to the goal legislators define (D. H. McKay 2017, p. 271; Müller 2014, p. 143). This is true for both the policy formulation and the policy implementation phase. As drafters, bureaucrats might also source additional expertise from outside (which they should do if they lack sufficient knowledge).

In addition to these legislative services, bureaucrats also have executive functions. During the implementation phase, sources of breach of duty by bureaucrats are deviations from the original purpose of a policy and watering down a policy through inefficient controls or insufficient standards.<sup>11</sup> authorities have considerable influence on the practical implementation of a policy. If licenses are available for sale rather than being granted to those meeting certain standards and procedures,<sup>12</sup> the policy creates biased effects. All these practices cause the implementation to deviate from the original purpose of a law.

Summarizing the two previous paragraphs, there are two main sources of violation of formal duties by bureaucrats. Again, this misconduct constitutes corruption only if the bureaucrats benefit personally from it.

1. Providing unfair advantages, e.g., selling access or creating loopholes.
2. Undermining the policy goal of the legislator during the formulation or implementation phase.

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<sup>10</sup>Ministers in parliamentary democracies are often both legislators and executive personnel and can therefore violate their formal duties both as legislators and executive personnel.

<sup>11</sup>One example would be measuring pollution during the time of the year when it is lowest or at the least polluted place if the legislator's goal was to effectively reduce pollution. Another example would be auditors turning a blind eye on slush funds and only reviewing funds that appear in the official books (e.g., Wirecard scandal).

<sup>12</sup>One example would be a pharmaceutical company that pays for the approval of a drug by an agency instead of going through an approval process, including tests, studies, and analyses of the efficiency of the drug, etc., with an uncertain outcome (e.g., Vian 2007). Another example would be a bureaucrat recording manipulated pollution data of an industry in exchange for a bribe (e.g., Wilson and Damania 2005).

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

The following paragraphs discuss typical situations between lobbyists and bureaucrats.

*Gaining and granting access:* If in charge of drafting bills, bureaucrats need expert knowledge to draft effective legislation (Bouwen 2002). Compared to legislators, information about the constituency is less important because the goal and the direction of a policy has already been defined. Thus, access bias does not necessarily have negative consequences as long as the (technical) information provided by the interest groups is sufficient for effective legislation. Bureaucrats deviate from their formal duties if the information they acquire is insufficient or misunderstood. If they personally benefit from granting certain groups access, they also engage in corruption. Public officials and bureaucrats do not compete for campaign funding. Thus, there are no legal ways to donate money to the executive branch. Considering the potential costs of bribes in exchange for access, access is less likely to be 'for sale.' Lobbyists are not expected to become corrupt during the access seeking phase, since there is no direct or indirect personal benefit involved when seeking and gaining access.

*Personal direct and informal contacts:* If access is granted, lobbyists use personal contacts to executive staff to transmit information about a current legislative project. This can be used as background information to assess consequences of a legislation. However, bureaucrats can also use or copy whole passages and texts provided by lobbyists in original drafts (Speth 2006, p. 99; Truman 1951, p. 397). That said, neither lobbyists nor bureaucrats are neutral. Both have their own agenda, which might not correspond to the goals of the legislators (Brehm and Gates 1999; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Lobbyists can moderate, facilitate, or initiate deviations between the original purpose of a legislation and the first draft created by a bureaucrat. Like legislators, bureaucrats become corrupt if they gain a personal benefit in exchange for permitting others to exert influence. Similarly, the personal exchange between public officials and lobbyists can facilitate quid pro quos.

*Written testimony and hearings:* Departments and regulatory agencies hold public hearings and departments set deadlines for written testimony on proposed bills (Mahoney 2004, p. 446). As in legislative committees, these processes are highly formalized. The task for bureaucrats is to match the expertise and preferences voiced by interest groups with the goals set by the legislators. However, unlike in

### 2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

personal meetings, the risk of deviations from duties and of corruption is low for the same reasons as discussed above for the legislators.

*Shaping implementation:* The last chance for lobbyists to prevent or at least mitigate unfavorable legislation is the implementation phase. In many cases, policies leave considerable room for interpretation. The more they do, the more power the executive branch has. Lobbyists can try to shape the implementation and thereby try to influence how the executive branch uses its power. The duty of the bureaucrats is to ensure that policies work according to their legislative purpose. However, since bureaucrats control compliance but do not apply rules and regulations in 'real life,' they need practitioners, e.g., companies affected by regulation, to give feedback about the implementation and about (negative) consequences of policies (Celler 1958; Epstein and O'Halloran 1995; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). At this point, lobbyists can yield influence. At this point, lobbyists can exert influence. As indicated above, lobbyists are unlikely to engage in corruption themselves since they would not benefit personally from a favorable implementation. But they can create conflicts of interest by offering something of tangible or intangible value in exchange for such favorable implementation, which would constitute corruption on the part of the bureaucrats if they accept. Alternatively, lobbyists could simply encourage executive personnel to intentionally circumvent the original purpose of the bill during the implementation phase and thus cause them to deviate from their formal duties. Such a deviation would be less severe as it does not constitute corruption.

*Favors:* As just indicated, bureaucrats are not beyond conflicts of interest. Most countries regulate the offering of favors or other tangible and intangible personal benefits. Yet, in Western democracies public officials are one of the groups most likely to engage in corruption (e.g., Meier and Holbrock 1992; Schlesinger and Meier 2009; Seibel 1997). The apparent principal-agent-problem (Huber and Shipan 2011; Gailmard 2014; Lupia 2008) and the fact that a reputational penalty is not as costly for bureaucrats as for elected representatives make corruption hard to punish. Furthermore, the average bureaucrat earns a lot less than legislators or ministers. This makes them more susceptible to favors, such as tickets to a sports event, travel, or – again – career advancement opportunities by going through the revolving door (Gorsira et al. 2021; cf. Becker and Stigler 1974). Thus, bureaucrats' need for information and their susceptibility to personal incentives combined with control problems increase the chances of corruption. Since influence-seeking activities in

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

the executive branch are rarely transparent, the risk to lobbyists offering personal benefits is comparatively low. Such exchanges are always on the verge of corruption. That is why most countries prohibit courtesies.

It becomes clear that, in the executive branch, principal-agent-problems facilitate deviations from formal duties – bureaucrats and public officials who do not contribute to or support the defined goal of a legislative proposal – and corruption. Due to the lack of transparency, the bureaucracy faces less public scrutiny. Internal controls are de facto limited by the principals' asymmetric information (Brehm and Gates 1999; Gailmard 2014). In addition, exerting influence during the policy formulation and implementation phase in the executive branch is often obscure but effective. With the risk of exposure being low and potential benefits high, there are many incentives for lobbyists to seek influence in the executive branch. This holds true for both lobbying and corruption.

### 2.3.6. Risks of Deviations and Risks of Corruption

Based on the discussion above, this section summarizes possible risk of deviations (RoD) and risk of corruption RoC for situations that are typical for influence-seeking behavior. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide an overview of these risks. The categories *low*, *medium* and *high* are relative to each other and are meant to provide a snapshot of which strategies of lobbyists and which policymaking phases might be vulnerable to undesirable influence-seeking. Furthermore, RoD and RoC refer to the demand side, that is, to situations in which somebody *accepts* a bribe (or any other tangible or intangible incentive) and *agrees* to corruption. While the supply side that explicitly or implicitly opens the door for corrupt exchanges naturally shares responsibility, it is up to the demand side to decide whether a corrupt transaction takes place.

The table shows that the main entry points of corruption have different causes and sources. Regarding legislators, the representative and responsive functions are at the center of the arguments. If lobbyists intentionally or unintentionally get policymakers to disregard the interests of the constituents and enhance their lobbying with the provision of tangible or intangible personal incentives, they corrupt policymakers.

2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

Interest Group Strategy	Policymakers	Lobbyists
Gaining and granting access	<p><i>RoD: High</i></p> <p>Restricted or unevenly distributed access</p> <p><i>RoC: High</i></p> <p>Exchange of access and tangible or intangible benefits</p>	<p><i>RoD: Medium</i></p> <p>Failure to gain access</p> <p><i>RoC: Low</i></p> <p>Seeking or gaining access is not likely to benefit lobbyists personally</p>
Personal direct and informal contacts	<p>1) Future legislation</p> <p><i>RoD: Low</i></p> <p>Obtaining information that helps to prioritize important issues</p> <p><i>RoC: Low</i></p> <p>Few incentives for the supply side due to uncertain outcome</p> <p>2) Current proposals</p> <p><i>RoD: Medium</i></p> <p>Possible effect on the link between elected representatives and the constituency</p> <p><i>RoC: Low</i></p> <p>Few incentives for the supply side due to insecure outcome</p>	<p>1) Future legislation</p> <p><i>RoD: Low</i></p> <p>Personal contacts help to communicate interests and to obtain information</p> <p><i>RoC: Medium</i></p> <p>Quid pro quo</p> <p>2) Current proposals</p> <p><i>RoD: Medium</i></p> <p>Quid pro quo</p> <p><i>RoC: Medium</i></p> <p>Quid pro quo</p>

*Table continues on the next page*

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

Interest Group Strategy	Policymakers	Lobbyists
	3) Voting on a bill <i>RoD: Medium</i>	3) Voting on a bill <i>RoD: Low</i>
	Possible effect on the link between elected representatives and the constituency <i>RoC: High</i>	Transmission of information at a decisive stage <i>RoC: Low</i>
	'Selling' votes	Influencing voting behavior is not expected to benefit lobbyists personally
Written testimony and hearings	<i>RoD: Low</i> Broad range of information <i>RoC: Low</i>	<i>RoD: Low</i> Transmission of information about interests <i>RoC: Low</i>
	Institutionalization	No exchange character
Financial contributions and favors	<i>RoD: Medium</i> Possible effect on the link between elected representatives and the constituency <i>RoC: High</i>	<i>RoD: Medium</i> 'Buying' access vs. efficient use of funds; reputational/legal risk <i>RoC: Medium</i>
	'Selling' policy and/or agenda spaces	Quid pro quo

*Note:* RoD: risk of deviations; RoC: risk of corruption; relative categories based on the arguments above.

Table 2.1.: Theoretically expected sources of deviations and of corruption in the legislative branch

Regarding public officials or bureaucrats, the most notable deviation is failing to pursue the goal set by the legislators during the policy implementation or policy formulation phase (if formulation was delegated by the legislators). Lobbyists

### 2.3. Distinguishing Lobbying and Corruption at the Micro Level

can, intentionally or unintentionally, encourage deviations and corruption. It becomes evident that the problem in the executive branch stems from inferior control mechanisms. Hence, corruption in the executive branch often might not be very meaningful in a rational sense, but a welcome opportunity. Without any witnesses, there are no allegators. This applies to all influence-seeking activities addressing the executive branch and is due to the inherent agency problems of administrations and e.g., low public salaries that make bribes relatively valuable.

In the legislative branch, causes of corruption are more varied. Each step facilitates different combinations of deviations from public duties and corruption. I expect situations that offer possibilities for a direct quid pro quo with certain outcomes to be especially vulnerable to corruption, such as exchanging access or voting decisions for a personal benefit, or policies for a financial contribution. Such certainties cannot be offered by policymakers in the executive branch – except in terms of access.

Interest Group Strategy	Policymakers	Lobbyists
Gaining and granting access	<p><i>RoD: Low</i> Imbalanced access is not necessarily a problem <i>RoC: Low</i> Access is less likely to be 'for sale'</p>	<p><i>RoD: Medium</i> Failure to gain access  <i>RoC: Low</i> Seeking or gaining access is not likely to benefit lobbyists personally</p>
Personal direct and informal contacts	<p><i>RoD: High</i> Incorporating deviations from the original purpose of a policy <i>RoC: High</i> Prone to corruption; principal-agent-problem</p>	<p><i>RoD: Low</i> Personal contacts help to communicate interests and to obtain information <i>RoC: Medium</i> Quid pro quo</p>

*Table continues on the next page*

## 2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?

Interest Group Strategy	Policymakers	Lobbyists
Written testimony and hearings	<i>RoD: Low</i>	<i>RoD: Low</i>
	Broad range of information  <i>RoC: Low</i> Institutionalization	Transmission of information about interests  <i>RoC: Low</i> No exchange character
Shaping implementation	<i>RoD: High</i>	<i>RoC: Low</i>
	Failure to execute the policy in accordance with its goal  <i>RoC: High</i> Prone to corruption; principal-agent-problem	Reducing effects of unfavorable legislation  <i>RoC: Medium</i> Quid pro quo
Favors	<i>RoD: High</i>	<i>RoD: Medium</i>
	Incorporating deviations from the original purpose of a policy  <i>RoC: High</i> Prone to corruption; principal-agent-problem	Efficient use of funds; reputational/legal risk  <i>RoC: Medium</i> Quid pro quo

*Note:* RoD: risk of deviations; RoC: risk of corruption; relative categories based on the arguments above.

Table 2.2.: Theoretically expected sources of deviations and of corruption in the executive branch

The more certain an outcome, the more likely corruption is if an exchange perspective is applied. This holds for both branches of government studied. Not surprisingly, a second factor is the cost of a transaction that involves the potential risk of exposure. This cost correlates with the quality of any control mechanisms and the negative consequences if corruption is discovered. Therefore, highly institutionalized procedures such as hearings or the collection of written statements are very unlikely to attract corrupt behavior. The influence exercised is low because it is diluted over many participating actors. Furthermore, committees involve many

people who control each other. A potential briber would need to 'buy' a whole committee to secure a certain outcome. This makes the potential benefits uncertain and low and the costs high. The fewer people participate, the lower the costs are. Personal meetings – especially if the parties trust each other – provide a more fruitful setting for influence-seeking activities. Here the relative risk of corruption is higher and even more so if a legislator can promise a certain behavior, e.g., how they will vote.

These arguments highlight the responsibilities policymakers have when they face influence-seeking activities of interest groups (cf. Schnakenberg and Turner 2019). Lobbyists are rarely on the demand-side of a corrupt transaction. The most likely path for lobbyists to become corrupt are personal meetings in which policymakers can offer something to lobbyists, e.g., sensitive or insider information or a future post in government, in exchange for political support. However, I expect lobbyists to be mostly on the supply side, offering benefits in exchange for influence. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that these assessments indicate relative risks and that the data of this study shows that most lobbyists do not believe corruption to be a widespread means of seeking influence (see chapters 5 through 7).

## 2.4. **Of Broken Belts and Greed**

In this chapter, I have discussed lobbying and corruption as two modes of influence-seeking activities. To discriminate between these two and to assess their sources and consequences, I have argued that the macro and the micro level need to be considered (Coleman 1990).

Institutions such as the interest group system (e.g., corporatist/pluralist, population) and the access points of the branches of government (venues) determine how individual interest groups can gain access, transmit their information, and exert influence. The availability and distribution of access points determine which lobbyists can transmit information about the interests of their group. This means that these institutional characteristics directly affect the functioning of the transmission belt and, thus, representation. An uneven distribution of access and the consideration of partial interests create biases, and the more uneven and partial, the greater the biases. Mobilization bias occurs if certain interests in the interest group system dominate because some interests fail to overcome the collective action problem or are unable to survive. Agenda bias describes a situation in which the

## 2. *What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?*

government is systematically more responsive to certain interests, providing them with an advantage over others.

These biases have an effect at the macro and at the micro level. At the macro level, they are a necessary condition of corruption but do not invariably cause it. Applying Warren's (2004) definition of corruption in a democracy, these biases become corruption if they are introduced consciously, that is, if there is an intentional disturbance of the transmission belt. At the micro level, institutions determine when interest group competition takes place and how individual policymakers grant access. In pluralist systems, for example, the hard battle is for access (e.g., Streeck and Kenworthy 2003, p. 448; Truman 1951, p. 350). Corporatist systems facilitate access (Lowery, Baumgartner, et al. 2015, p. 1126; Streeck and Kenworthy 2003, p. 448) and the competition takes place at a later stage of the transmission belt. As interest groups mostly partner with policymakers who have similar positions (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Heinz 1993). Hence, biases in the interest group systems affect coalitions and support for certain policies as well.

Competition is one factor that can create incentives for corruption if it does not involve more peer control. At the micro level, I applied an exchange perspective. Anticipated advantages in the interest group competition, e.g., a bribe in exchange for access, can stimulate corrupt behavior. However, exchanges are not only of a corrupt nature. Information markets are the usual *modus operandi* transmitting information about interests. Thus, the concept of corruption used at the micro level should be applicable to exchanges. If policymakers or lobbyists deviate from their formal duties for personal benefit (cf. Nye 1967), lobbying turns into corruption. Lobbyists are more likely to unconsciously or unintentionally create incentives for corrupt behavior by policymakers but still can become corrupt themselves. However, if an influence-seeking activity requires the intent of generating personal benefits to count as corrupt, the barriers for corruption are relatively high. Policymakers who fail to respond to the needs of their constituency or who fail to draft laws benefiting the common good do not perform their duties properly but are far from being corrupt. The risk of corruption increases if situations allow a direct *quid pro quo* between the policymaker and the lobbyists and if internal and public control is weak. This is generally true for the executive branch, but especially for financial contributions and favors as well as for the competition for access. I expect highly institutionalized processes such as hearings to be less affected by corruption.

If access, legislation, or votes are 'for sale', biases towards those who cannot afford to buy them will, on aggregate, produce an unfair advantage that impedes the functioning of the transmission belt, which constitutes intentional misconduct or at least negligence. Here, corrupt behavior of individual lobbyists and policymakers manifests itself as corruption at a systemic level as well. The same holds for biases caused by lobbying but not corruption. If only certain groups gain access or if decisions favor only certain interests, the consequences of individual decisions are also reflected in the representation of groups. As bad as such bias may be, it does not corrupt representation as long as the bias is not caused by intent or negligence. Finally, there are some lobbying strategies that are not corrupt at the micro level but can result in corruption at the macro level. One example is lobbying for loopholes or favors. If groups manage to gain an exclusive and unjustifiable advantage from a rule, they harm the norm of impartiality at the expense of those not benefiting from it. Conversely, corruption can theoretically reduce biases at an aggregate level, for example in the hypothetical case of counterbalancing biased influence caused by lobbying with bribes or other incentives (cf. Brooks 1970). This is just an illustrative example and should not be interpreted as a recommendation of bribes as countermeasure for influence-seeking activities because once someone has engaged in corruption it becomes a habit (e.g., Ashforth and Anand 2003). Yet, it shows that influence-seeking activities do not have a clear effect on representation. The effect is highly contextual, which makes it difficult to assess the causes and consequences of lobbying and corruption.

For a sound interest intermediation system, two conditions can be derived from the arguments in this chapter. The first is institutions that enable an unbiased transmission of information about interests. The second is awareness of the consequences of influence-seeking activities. Lobbyists should pay attention to avoid creating conflicts of interest. Policymakers have both the legal and the moral obligation not to let potential personal benefits influence any decision they make. Furthermore, policymakers are responsible for restricting and maybe even denouncing undue political influence. Ultimately, they are the ones who make the decisions (cf. Schnakenberg and Turner 2019). Only if an interest group system, the sum of lobbyists' activities, and the responses of government institutions are unbiased, does the transmission belt work perfectly and decision-makers can claim to make best-informed decisions based on the desires of the constituencies and on expertise.

## *2. What Does Corruption in Interest Intermediation Mean?*

This chapter shows how important a carefully considered choice of definition is (cf. Kurer 2005). Applying Nye's definition, not everything that is illegal or unethical is corrupt. Yet, some actions that are not illegal can be corrupt. A juridical definition of corruption would reduce the distinction between corruption and lobbying to a legal dimension. Each legal influence-seeking activity would be lobbying and each illegal activity would be corruption. However, such definitions do not provide enough depth for an analysis of political corruption (Goldberg 2018; Pozsgai-Alvarez 2020, p. 434). Too broad a definition of corruption is not suitable either because it does not sufficiently discriminate between the two phenomena. Thus, students of corruption need to choose their definition based on the context and the epistemological interest (cf. Bussell 2015; Heywood 2017). An explicit definition is the prerequisite for knowledge to accumulate in this field (Heywood 2017; Kurer 2005).

# 3. System Differences, Lobbying, and Corporations: Six Hypotheses about Corruption and Lobbying

## 3.1. Introduction: Two Alternative Modes of Influence-Seeking

In this chapter, I develop the hypotheses that guide the empirical analyses. In the previous part of the book, I argue that institutions (see section 2.2) and the individual behavior of addressees of influence-seeking activities but also of the lobbyists themselves shape how influence is sought (see section 2.3). Hence, the hypotheses refer to both system differences (at a macro level) and the behavior of lobbyists (at an individual level).

The two modes of influence-seeking studied here are corruption and lobbying. The main interests of this study are how lobbying and corruption relate to each other and to what extent corruption is a problem in interest intermediation systems. Since most constitutions implicitly or explicitly allow lobbying (see, e.g., Arnim 1977; Milbrath 1963, p. 13), I presume that democratic institutions foster lobbying as the normal mode of influence-seeking. Corruption is the *alternative*. Thus, I expect corruption to be a consequence of previous successful or unsuccessful lobbying efforts. I explain this in more detail in section 3.3 below. Hence, the dependent variable is the prevalence of corruption. This stands in contrast to previous studies that predict lobbying activities on the basis of corruption (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009; Campos and Giovannoni 2007; Campos and Giovannoni 2017; Nugent and Sukiassyan 2009). My hypotheses refer to systemic causes

### *3. System Differences, Lobbying and Corporations*

of corruption, lobbying-specific causes of corruption, and company-specific causes of corruption.

## **3.2. System Differences**

In the previous chapter, I argue that institutions affect influence-seeking activities: The political system of a country determines how interest groups organize their lobbying and what mode of communication they choose. Studies have identified differences in lobbying styles between the US, European countries, and the EU (e.g. Hanegraaff, Poletti, and Beyers 2017; Mahoney 2004; Woll 2012). Although these studies provide descriptive evidence based on cultural (McGrath 2005a; C. S. Thomas and Hrebenar 2009) or institutional factors (Hanegraaff, Poletti, and Beyers 2017; Mahoney 2004; Woll 2012), they lack a theoretical explanation where these different styles come from (Kanol 2015). In the following, I discuss some theoretical mechanisms at work in different types of democratic systems which I expect to cause country-specific differences in influence-seeking activities. I focus on institutional rather than cultural aspects of lobbying since the former seem to dominate as a recent study has found (Hanegraaff, Poletti, and Beyers 2017).

### **Pluralism vs. Corporatism**

The first institutional difference is the distinction between pluralist and corporatist countries. Corporatist countries have a more collaborative style of policymaking. Interest groups and parties have a historically evolved and symbiotic relationship (Allern and Bale 2012; Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Streeck and Kenworthy 2003). As a consequence, interest groups find it comparatively easier to gain access to political decision-makers (Lowery, Baumgartner, et al. 2015, p. 1126; Streeck and Kenworthy 2003).

In contrast, pluralist systems are characterized by competition. Interest groups rely less on cooperation and tend to use more confrontational styles of communication (Hanegraaff, Poletti, and Beyers 2017; Lijphart 2012; A. M. McKay and Yackee 2007; Woll 2012). Consequently, the strength of an interest group plays a greater role because institutions do not facilitate for certain interests. Competition creates greater incentives for interest groups to bribe policymakers to gain an advantage (cf. Harstad and Svensson 2011). Fierce interest group competition also decreases their chances of survival (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Lowery, Gray, et al. 2012).

As explained in the previous chapter, the one goal that all organizations have in common is organizational survival. If survival is threatened, corruption could be the final attempt when all other solutions, e.g., lobbying, have failed. Furthermore, cooperation also implies mutual control. Hence, the risk of corruption is higher in corporatist systems whereas the possible gains are lower.

#### **Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism**

The second important distinction on the macro level is between presidentialism and parliamentarism. Presidential systems have two divergent effects on the prevalence of corruption. The separation of powers and the checks and balances<sup>1</sup> limit the power of individual institutions and increase mutual control (Verney 1992). This makes corruption less attractive and more difficult. However, presidential systems are more likely to face a political stalemate since each branch of government has the power to prevent policy change (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Stephenson 2015; cf. Verney 1992). While this does not necessarily lead to corruption – although corruption can be a cause of stalemates – it facilitates particularistic policymaking (Gerring and Thacker 2004, p. 322).

A second mechanism that facilitates corruption in presidential systems is the presence of multiple principals (*ibid.*, pp. 318, 325; Strøm 2008, p. 65). Bureaucratic chaos, mixed responsibilities, and unclear accountability make it difficult to detect and curb corruption.

Parliamentary systems tend to have institutions that mitigate corruption. Firstly, the merger of the executive and the legislative branch effectively dilutes their power, making such systems less vulnerable to particularistic policymaking (cf. Lederman, Loayza, and Soares 2005, p. 5). The high likelihood of coalition governments provides for additional checks and balances and separation of powers (Martin and Vanberg 2011; Verney 1992).

#### **Electoral Systems**

Electoral systems have a direct effect both on the party system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and on party competition (Duverger 1963). Both factors affect the preva-

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<sup>1</sup>The theoretically expected separation of powers and checks and balances is disputed in empirical research. In the context of research on corruption see the overview by Stephenson 2015, p. 124. The worse checks and balances work (compared to the US-style ideal type of checks and balances), the more vulnerable a country is to corruption (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005, p. 586).

### *3. System Differences, Lobbying and Corporations*

lence of corruption (Chang and Golden 2007; Charron 2011; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003). Two-party systems allow for mutual control and provide direct electoral benefits if a candidate of the rival party is accused of misconduct (Nichols 2011). In multi-party systems, the losses of a corrupt party or candidate do not translate into direct benefits because any gains will be shared by the other parties. However, the more proportional a system is, the more likely it is that a marginal gain produces additional seats (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). Such potential gains increase mutual control.

In addition, greater party competition reduces corruption as political actors holding power rotate (Broms, Dahlström, and Fazekas 2019; Gerring and Thacker 2004, p. 321) and makes it more difficult to gain control over particularistic outcomes (Adams, Grofman, and Merrill 2005; Gerring and Thacker 2004). These factors make it more difficult to establish corrupt relationships.

#### **Different Styles of Policymaking**

These institutional differences can be subsumed under a majoritarian vs. a consensus-oriented style of policymaking (Gerring and Thacker 2008; Lijphart 2012; specifically related to corruption: Gerring and Thacker 2004; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003). Cooperative policymaking and proportional systems dilute the power of individual political actors and their potential gains and establish mechanisms of mutual control. Theory predicts majority systems to have advantages in mutual control, such as the separation of powers in presidential systems or two-party systems. However, these institutional powers often have negative side effects that can facilitate corruption, e.g., the concentration of power in presidents' hands (Lijphart 2012, p. 107) or limited party competition. This leads to the first hypothesis that countries with a consensus-oriented style of policymaking should be less affected by corruption:

H1: Corruption in the interest intermediation system is more widespread in countries with a majoritarian style of policymaking.

This implies that presidential systems should be more vulnerable to corruption than parliamentary systems, whereas consensus models of democracy should be least vulnerable to corruption (cf. Gerring and Thacker 2004; Lijphart 2012).

### 3.3. Influence-Seeking Activities

At the micro level, studies on corruption and lobbying present two contradictory conceptualizations of the relationship between these two modes of influence-seeking. The first conceptualization postulates a mutually inclusive relationship. The second one views lobbying and corruption as mutually exclusive. According to the first, lobbyists who lobby more are also more involved in corruption. From a complementary perspective, lobbyists who lobby more are less involved in corruption. In the remainder of this chapter I discuss possible causal mechanisms of the relationship between lobbying and corruption. The hypotheses refer to the typical exchange situations described in section 2.3. Note that due to the different logics H2 and H5 are formulated as counterhypotheses.

#### 3.3.1. Lobbying and Corruption as Mutually Inclusive Activities

Trust facilitates exchanges of any kind. It is the prerequisite of access (Goldberg 2018). Furthermore, trust is related to the reliability and credibility of information provided by lobbyists and by policymakers (Granovetter 1985). Concerning corruption as one mode of influence-seeking, trust lowers the risks of exposure, reducing the transaction costs and making it more attractive to potential corrupt actors (Lambsdorff 2002b). Concerning lobbying as the other mode of influence-seeking, addressees of advocacy need to trust that the information provided by a lobbyist is correct (Bouwen 2002; J. M. Hansen 1991). The more often exchanges take place, the higher the trust between the bargainers is. Accordingly, trustful relationships resulting from lobbying do not only facilitate further interest representation but also corruption. Thus, once access is established and occasional exchanges occur, the access can also be used for corrupt transactions (Damania, Fredriksson, and Mani 2004<sup>2</sup>).

Besides trust, internal or public control is another factor affecting the probability of corrupt exchanges, as I argue in section 2.3. Transparency rules serve as a control mechanism at the macro level. At the micro level, I expect two mechanisms to be at work that make lobbying and corruption mutually inclusive activities. Firstly, access or contacts outside official channels, e.g., at events or during travels, attract less public scrutiny. This increases the chance that corrupt exchanges remain

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<sup>2</sup>The empirical support for the argument in this study is limited to politically unstable countries.

### *3. System Differences, Lobbying and Corporations*

undiscovered. Secondly, if personal ties between policymakers become too close or amicable, the lines between formal duties and informal expectations can blur (Goldberg 2018, p. 206). This increases the chance of deviations from duties or the (unintentional) creation of conflicts of interest and hence corruption (Kubbe 2017, p. 261). In such cases, seeking access leads to more intimate relationships that can provide fruitful ground for corruption.

These two arguments lead to the first hypothesis on the micro level:

H2: Lobbyists with better access to policymakers are more involved in corruption.

The third driver of corruption in context of influence-seeking activities are situations that allow for a direct quid pro quo exchanges (cf. Becker and Posner 2019, p. 73). One of the influence-seeking strategies that allow for a quid pro quo are financial contributions (Etzioni 1984, pp. 59–62, Evertsson 2013; cf. section 2.3.5). Most corruption scandals in developed democracies involve party or candidate financing (e.g. Alemann 2002; Johnston 2014, pp. 191–200, Kubbe 2017, p. 266). The contributions are means to buy access (A. M. McKay 2018) and are often perceived as means to buy decisions or influence (cf. Gokcekus and Sonan 2017; Etzioni 1984; but see A. M. McKay 2012 and Fowler, Garro, and Spenkuch 2020). Lambsdorff (2002a) argues that such contributions can be conceptualized as rent-seeking and that the decision falls between spending money on lobbying (lower risks but unknown outcome) or on bribes (higher risks but certain outcome) (see also Harstad and Svensson 2011). Hence, the security of the outcome of lobbying-related quid pro quo transactions, such as possibly financial contributions, make it attractive to use them as opposed to other influence-seeking strategies, leading to H3:

H3: Lobbyists with regular donations to parties, politics-related organizations or candidates, are more involved in corruption.

### 3.3.2. Lobbying and Corruption as Mutually Exclusive Activities

The second conceptualization postulates an inverse relationship between lobbying and corruption, that is, higher levels of lobbying are expected to be associated with lower levels of corruption.

Open channels between decision-makers and lobbyists do not only facilitate undesirable influence-seeking activities but are also a prerequisite for advocacy. Seeking and gaining access to decision-makers is part of a lobbyist's job description. Multiple access points allow for more transmission of information about interests. As indicated in section 2.3.1, repeated exchanges create social standards of behavior (Granovetter 1985, p. 498). The multiple negative consequences of lost reputation enforce these standards. Thus, a political system that allows participation through granting access can have three effects on corruption: Firstly, by opening spaces of influence it reduces incentives for non-compliant influence-seeking activities. Secondly, openness leads to exchanges that establish social norms. Thirdly, the more actors have access, the better mutual control is and the more likely it is that participants expose corruption.

Applied to an individual level, this means that more access should be associated with lower levels of corruption. This leads to the counterhypothesis of H2:

H4: Lobbyists with better access to policymakers are less involved in corruption.

The costs and benefits of a transaction are the main forces shaping exchanges. For lobbyists, success means gaining political influence and the benefits are largest for the most successful lobbyists. Thus, successful lobbying makes corruption obsolete, not least because corruption also involves higher risks.

While access is only the chance to be heard, influence also includes the capacity to steer a decision into the desired direction. If policymakers are responsive to the interests of lobbying companies, bribes (or other forms of political corruption) do not produce additional (or only marginal) benefits (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009, p. 2). Such efforts become attractive only if decision-makers refuse to consider the interests of their constituents (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009; Campos and Giovannoni 2007). Hence, lobbyists who already exert influence are not expected to have incentives to engage in corruption:

### *3. System Differences, Lobbying and Corporations*

H5: Influential lobbyists are less involved in corruption.

#### **3.3.3. Company Size**

Corruption becomes more expensive if companies are wealthy (Harstad and Svensson 2011). Furthermore, the more taxes a company pays, and the more people it employs, the more it can expect its interests to be anticipated, considered, and even regulatorily favored by the government without proactive lobbying (Culpepper 2015; Culpepper 2011). Conversely, small companies can neither count on their economic impact nor can they assume that the government always has an eye on their needs. For them, a small bribe can be more promising than trying to influence politicians or hoping that their associations sort things out, especially since smaller companies tend to find it difficult to keep up with all political developments and to adapt to new regulations (Harstad and Svensson 2011). Hence, small bribes would be a means for them to compensate for their lack of influence and their patience to wait for an industry-wide regulation, whereas large companies can rely on their economic weight and agility.

Secondly, larger companies have more professional legal (cf. Holyoke 2017) and government affairs departments (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Drope and W. L. Hansen 2006; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994). Internal compliance directives, their enforcement, and a good understanding of politics and its values encourage lobbyists to comply with the legal and social norms of politics. This makes corruption riskier and costlier due to possible sanctions by the employer or by political peers. Because of greater professionalization in large companies and fewer organizational incentives, I expect lobbyists of large companies to be less involved in corruption:

H6: Lobbyists of larger companies are less involved in corruption.

## 4. Methodological Advancements and Limitations

### 4.1. Introduction: Sampling and Elite Interviewing in Corruption Research in Two Advanced Democracies

Ninety-one semi-structured elite interviews with in-house government affairs managers or other executive staff (partly) responsible for lobbying build the data set for this study. The semi-structured interviews combine the benefits of standardized surveys and qualitative interviews (see section 4.2). Elite interviews have become a frequently used method in interest group research (e.g., Baumgartner, Berry, et al. 2009; Bruycker and Beyers 2019; Pakull, Goldberg, and Bernhagen 2020). However, corruption researchers complain about a lack of in-depth evidence, which elite interviews can provide (e.g., Andersson 2008; Heywood 2015, p. 146; Trapnell 2015). Indeed, expert interviews have been used to assess how much countries are affected by corruption. However, they mostly produce macro scores such as the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI). This study uses the interview data for micro analyses. Thus, it is a new approach within the *corruption reputation* domain (Huberts, Lasthuizen, and Peeters 2006, p. 270). The interviews shed light on a highly specialized and inaccessible environment (R. J. Thomas 1993). Instead of referring to the prevalence of corruption in a whole country, they open policy processes for research and provide information about the prevalence of corruption in such processes. The focus of this study is particularly on the interest intermediation sector and on influence-seeking activities.

To test the hypotheses exhibited in the previous chapter, I carried out the interviews in two countries. This is a different application as employed in previous studies that used large-N data sets of generic studies covering many countries around

#### 4. Methodological Advancements and Limitations

the globe, e.g., by the World Bank or Transparency International. My narrower approach allows me to, firstly, include more lobbying-specific variables that are not included in generic questionnaires. Secondly, it allows me to analyze corruption in two established democracies where it is not as widely accepted as in unstable systems or post-Soviet countries (Andersson 2008, p. 194).

Germany, as typical case (Seawright and Gerring 2008) of a system with a consensus-oriented style of policymaking, has a strong corporatism and a parliamentary system with a fusion of powers between the executive and the legislative branch at the top level of government (Lijphart 2012). It has a competitive multi-party system (Caramani 2014) and its governments have comprised various parties and coalitions over the decades (Rudzio 2019, p. 194). The US is a typical case (Seawright and Gerring 2008) of a system with a majoritarian style of policymaking with a stable two-party (Caramani 2014, p. 224) and a presidential system (Lijphart 2012). In addition to that, it is a pluralist system that is known for its competitiveness among interest groups (K. Godwin, E. Godwin, and Ainsworth 2013, pp. 26–8). Finally, both countries have similar indices of corruption. Germany ranks ninth with a score of 80 (on a scale from 0 to 100) in the CPI. The US is on 23rd place of 180 countries with a score of 69 (Transparency International 2019, p. 2). The Control of Corruption Index (CC) of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) indicates similar positions. With a score of 1.86 (on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5; 95.19 percentile) and 1.22 (84.62 percentile; The World Bank 2019a)<sup>1</sup>, respectively, Germany and the US are both in the top quintile of countries least affected by corruption.

## 4.2. Response Rate and Methodological Design

Between April 2018 and August 2018, I carried out 26 interviews in the US (response rate: 6.48 percent). It is a random sample of companies registered in the lobbying registers of New Jersey (NJ), Minnesota (MN), South Carolina (SC), and California (CA).<sup>2</sup> I selected these states to approximate a representative sample of states based on quotas of interest group competition and interest group impact (Nownes and Freeman 1998), regulation of lobbying (Newmark 2005), legislative professionalization (Squire 2007), and varying levels corruption (Glaeser and Saks

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<sup>1</sup>Data: The World Bank 2019b.

<sup>2</sup>N (NJ): 11; N (MN): 8; N (SC): 4; N (CA): 4.

2006; Schlesinger and Meier 2009). I excluded subsidiaries if the parent company appeared in one of the registers because usually the parent company is responsible for the lobbying efforts of the whole group. I left out companies that outsourced all their lobbying. If a company was listed in multiple registers, I only approached one of its lobbyists.

The German sample – 65 cases<sup>3</sup>, a response rate of 22.81 percent, which is acceptable given the generally low return in elite interviews (Bednar and Westphal 2006; Gorden 1987; R. J. Thomas 1993) – is a random selection from the largest 500 companies in terms of revenue and employees (cf. Drope and W. L. Hansen 2006, p. 4; Kim 2008). Since there is no lobbying register in Germany, I relied on the largest companies because they are more likely to lobby independently or in addition to associations (e.g. Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Chen, Parsley, and Yang 2015; Drope and W. L. Hansen 2006). I excluded companies without any indication of in-house government affairs managers and companies without subsidiaries if the parent company was in the sample. Interviewed lobbyists mostly focus on federal-level politics with some also being responsible for European or state-level influence-seeking.

In Germany, the most important government level is the federal level. Since the last federalism reform, regional, educational, cultural, and to some extent fiscal policy are the only policy areas where state-level governments can act independently (Rudzio 2019, p. 304). Thus, federal-level lobbyists are very important for understanding influence-seeking activities in Germany. In the United States, I focused on lobbyists registered at the state level. There were three reasons for this: Firstly, corruption in the US varies among the states (Glaeser and Saks 2006; Meier and Holbrock 1992; Schlesinger and Meier 2009). A focus on Washington D.C. lobbyists would be biased towards a D.C.-style of politics. Secondly, US states have considerable power and more freedom to make decisions than in Germany (Gerring and Thacker 2008). Thus, they are important venues of policymaking. And thirdly, given that corporate elites are hard to win for research (Bednar and Westphal 2006), I expected state-level lobbyists to be more responsive. Unfortunately, this has not proven true as the response rate indicates. I carried out the German interviews between October 2019 and January 2020.

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<sup>3</sup>In both countries, the size of the population and the response rate determine the number of observations (N).

#### 4. Methodological Advancements and Limitations

Each lobbyist of a sampled company identified through research in the registers or through other online sources received a letter asking for participation (H. J. Rubin and I. S. Rubin 2012, pp. 79–81). I followed up with either an email or a phone call if no email address could be researched. If I had not found any contact data, the letter asked the addressee to mail or call back if they were interested in participating. If I had not even identified an addressee, I wrote a generic letter asking for it to be redirected to colleagues in charge of government affairs (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2014, pp. 418–21). The letters explicitly asked for a face-to-face interview and additionally offered a phone interview or the web surveys as alternatives. Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2014, p. 427–8) recommend not to allow simultaneous selection of response options. As it complicates the choice it can cause delays that make addressees forget about the inquiry. However, since the recruitment was a two-step process with the request letter announcing a subsequent contact, I think that the concerns raised by the authors do not apply in this case.

One advantage of the sampling approach of the study is that the characteristics of the two country subsamples can be compared to characteristics of the population. In the German case, the CIO Top 500<sup>4</sup> provides information about each company listed on their site. The public information correlates strongly with the information provided by the lobbyists.<sup>5</sup> Thus, there is no reason to presume specific biases within the CIO data. In the further course, I use revenue, the number of employees, and information about the economic sector coded according to the ISIC scheme (European Union 2016) to compare the characteristics of the sample with the characteristics of the population. I used a similar approach for the American subsample. For each company listed in one of the lobbying registers, I gathered information on these characteristics<sup>6</sup> from the database D&B Hoovers.<sup>7</sup>

Considering the economic sectors, the revenue, and the number of employees, the German sample is almost unbiased and can be considered representative (see figures 4.1 and 4.2 as well as the table 4.1). The differences are statistically insignificant (see t-test in table A1 in appendix A.1). There is a slight trend that companies in the sample are larger. One reason could be that professionalized and better staffed

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<sup>4</sup><https://www.cio.de/top500> as of January 2019; last visited on 10/24/2020.

<sup>5</sup>Pearson's R (Revenue): 0.97; Pearson's R (Employees): 0.76.

<sup>6</sup>Pearson's R (Revenue): 0.83; Pearson's R (Employees): 0.98.

<sup>7</sup><https://www.dnb.com/products/marketing-sales/dnb-hoovers.html> as of April 2018, last visited on 10/24/2020.

## 4.2. Response Rate and Methodological Design

	US		GER	
	Share sample	Share population	Share sample	Share population
Mining and quarrying	.08	.02	.03	.02
Manufacturing	.12	.21	.52	.52
Electricity and gas	.12	.15	.15	.11
Water, sewage, waste, remediation	.00	.01	.02	.00
Construction	.15	.02	.02	.02
Wholesale/retail	.09	.06	.06	.15
Transport and storage	.04	.04	.03	.05
Accommodation and food service	.00	.01	0	0
Information and communication	.04	.05	.05	.04
Financial and insurance	.15	.24	.02	.02
Real estate	.04	.01	.00	.00
Professional, scientific, technical	.08	.06	.03	.02
Administrative and support service	.00	.02	.00	.00
Health	.08	.07	.03	.02
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation	.00	.03	.02	0
Other	.00	.01	.00	.00
N	26	401	65	285

*Note:* Based on categorizations of the original data sources, coded by European Union 2016 (ISIC).

Table 4.1.: Comparison of economic sectors in the sample and in the population

government affairs units might have more capacities to participate in research. Another reason could be that smaller companies might not lobby directly at all.

In the American sample, the general pattern of distribution of companies across economic sectors can also be found in the sample. The manufacturing and the financial sectors are slightly underrepresented, whereas the construction sector is slightly overrepresented. The sample is also biased towards smaller companies. Companies from NJ are oversampled whereas companies from SC and CA are undersampled. In contrast to German lobbyists, American lobbyists often referred to corporate policies that prohibit participation in research and often stated a lack of resources to participate.

Figure A1 in appendix A.1 presents the statistical power for the number of observations of the sample as a whole as well as for the country subsamples. It shows that there might be a problem with small effect sizes due to the low N in the American subsample. The interpretation of effects is adjusted accordingly. I explain this in

#### 4. Methodological Advancements and Limitations



Figure 4.1.: Mean comparison of the revenue in the sample and in the population

more detail in the introductions of chapters 6 and 7. Mainly, the adjustment refers to the interpretation of effects even if they are not significant (cf. the critiques on the use of p-values, especially in studies with a low N in (sub)samples (Halsey et al. 2015)).

I employed the mixed-method design to maximize the response rate (Dillman, Phelps, et al. 2009; Leeuw 2005). The base questionnaire was the face-to-face interview (Leeuw 2005, p. 248). As outlined above, providing a choice between a semi-structured phone interview, a semi-structured face-to-face interview, and a web survey should attract more respondents (Leeuw 2009, p. 118) than no choice. Besides the general sensitivity of the research topic, I expected two further factors to adversely affect the response rate: Firstly, as elite managers lobbyists are short of time (Bednar and Westphal 2006; cf. Dahan, Hadani, and Schuler 2013). A web survey may be a more flexible option if they wish to participate but do not have much time. Secondly, the anonymity of a web survey could motivate lobbyists who have concerns about talking about such a sensitive topic directly (Leeuw 2005). The respondents' choice of method also accounts for different personal characteristics, e.g., some prefer the web survey as a more anonymous and others the personal interview as a more trustful mode (ibid.).

The interviews comprised five phases, combining the advantages of both semi-structured and standardized interviews (cf. Leech et al. 2013; see the questionnaires in appendix B). The first part of the interview started with open-ended (in the web survey partly close-ended) questions about the role of the interviewee in the company (inspired by Dür and Mateo 2016) and the business environment (taken




Figure 4.2.: Mean comparison of the number of employees in the sample and in the population

from the World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS)), followed by a standardized survey part largely with questions from Nownes and DeAlejandro 2009. The third part consisted of qualitative questions about the decision to lobby independently and the role of public opinion before another standardized part asked for perceptions of corruption (cf. Transparency International 2016b; Transparency International 2013c), revenue, and the number of employees. In the last part, I asked the lobbyists to define lobbying and corruption and to mention characteristics that distinguish one from the other. To ensure that the close-ended questions in the web survey were as close as possible to the open-ended questions, I used an intermediate coding template (see full codebook in appendix C) to standardize any probes to increase reliability (Berry 2002, p. 681; H. J. Rubin and I. S. Rubin 2012, p. 119).

For the face-to-face and computer-assisted phone interviews identical questionnaires were used. I tried to reduce effects that are phone-specific (Leeuw 2009, p. 117). E.g., the interviewees were given time to think before they answered the question and I indicated when I was taking longer notes during the interview. Ahead of the interview I sent the template of the standardized part for the face-to-face interviews to interviewees who opted for a phone interview. While this approach made it easier for the respondents to follow, it increased the similarities of the two modes (cf. Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2014, pp. 406–8).

#### 4. *Methodological Advancements and Limitations*

The web survey used the same structure, the same wording, and the same scales (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2014, pp. 404–6, 410–1). I only replaced open-ended questions with close-ended ones. The response categories were the same as in the intermediate coding scheme for the open-ended questions. The close-ended batteries had a very similar visual appearance as the standardized part of the paper questionnaire interviewees were asked to complete (*ibid.*, pp. 406–8). However, in the web survey fewer questions appeared per screen. Logical units, e.g., lobbying strategies addressing the executive branch, remained in a single battery without page break.

Although I applied the above criteria for mixed-method designs, the different types of surveys can still cause artifacts. Face-to-face and phone interviews are susceptible to interviewer impact. This is especially true for the sensitive questions (Leeuw 2009, p. 115), which might lead to underreporting of levels of corruption (Agerberg 2020; Kraay and Murrell 2016) or an under- or overreporting of influence (Dür 2008, pp. 565–6; Lyons, A. M. McKay, and Reifler 2020). But at least this effect is constant for all these surveys since only one interviewer conducted the interviews.

Another difference is that answers in the web surveys are shorter and less precise. This is likely to be due to the participants being more impatient (Leeuw 2009, p. 117) and the lack of opportunity to include follow-up questions if the respondent had not answered the original question completely or if the answer was unclear. Hence, it is not surprising that it took participants about 20 minutes to complete the web survey whereas the personal interviews – regardless of whether conducted by phone or face-to-face – took between 25 minutes and an hour.

In the US, web surveys and personal interviews are evenly distributed. Thirteen respondents took the web survey (50 percent). Nine interviews (34.6 percent) were conducted by phone. Four lobbyists were interviewed directly (15.4 percent). In Germany, the in-person interview was the preferred mode (44, 67.7 percent), followed by the phone interview (14, 21.5 percent). Five respondents (7.7 percent) filled in the web survey. The remaining two cases preferred to answer only a few questions via email (3.1 percent). However, these two cases have missing values on each of the variables used in the quantitative analyses and are therefore excluded.

To assess possible biases introduced by the interview mode, I regressed the different dependent variables I use in this book on the different modes, controlled for

country. The interview mode does not affect the outcome variables<sup>8</sup> (see tables A3 to A4 in appendix A.1).

### 4.3. Elite Interviews as a Tool in Corruption and Interest Group Research

Researchers use expert and elite interviews when they seek access to information that is not publicly available or only to a very limited extent. Obtaining reliable and valid data is one of the most difficult challenges in research on both corruption and lobbying (e.g., Andersson 2008; Leech 2020). Combined with a semi-structured interviewing approach, elite interviews allow researchers to develop an understanding of the data and they facilitate the gathering of data that would be impossible to obtain with standardized surveys alone (Leech et al. 2013).

Expert interviews are very common in corruption research. The widely used CPI, for example, is an aggregation of expert surveys. For analyses at the micro level, however, elite interviews are – to my knowledge – a new tool. Qualitative insight is scarce but considered useful in studies on corruption (Andersson 2008; Heywood 2015, p. 146; Trapnell 2015). In interest group research, semi-structured elite interviews have become more common recently (see, e.g., Baumgartner, Berry, et al. 2009; Bruycker and Beyers 2019; Pakull, Goldberg, and Bernhagen 2020).

A larger set of interviews does not only allow quantitative inference, it also enables cross-validation of information provided in individual interviews (Goldberg and Hildebrandt 2020; Berry 2002, p. 680). E.g., instead of defining corruption before asking questions about corruption, I let the respondents define it so that their answers would not be biased by my definition. The semi-structured nature of the interview allowed me to ask interviewees to define corruption after they answered the close-ended question, allowing me to control for different conceptions of corruption and gather qualitative data about the definition of corruption in the context of influence-seeking activities (see chapter 8; cf. Langseth 2006, p. 15). Elite interviews also allowed me to speak with people who are affected by corruption, either directly or indirectly (ibid., p. 15). Lobbyists who know about corrupt influence-seeking activities are better positioned to talk about them than people who have

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<sup>8</sup>A full check of measurement invariance based on structural equation models and confirmatory factor analyses (Hox, Leeuw, and Zijlmans 2015) is not possible due to the low number of observations.

#### *4. Methodological Advancements and Limitations*

never seen such attempts. But even if they do not know about corruption, the negative reputation lobbying has makes them victims of undue influence-seeking as well. Finally, lobbyists know the political process and can indicate in which phase corruption might be likely.

Of course, the approach also has some drawbacks. Like every method, semi-structured interviews have their limitations. Biases in the response behavior are unavoidable (see section 4.2). The term corruption is still a red flag in many countries and people engaged in corruption are highly unlikely to take part in studies on corruption. The methodological gain of not having to rely on public opinion data or expert data that might be biased by scandals or rumors comes at the cost of introducing a social desirability bias, e.g., by underreporting corruption to improve the image of lobbying or by under- or overreporting influence (Agerberg 2020; Dür 2008; Lyons, A. M. McKay, and Reifler 2020). Thus, it can be assumed that the reported level of corruption does not fully reflect the actual incident rate (cf. W. L. Miller 2006, p. 177). Furthermore, biases that are inherent to qualitative interviewing, such as interviewer effects that become larger the more interviews are fielded, also need to be considered (Leeuw 2009). The same holds true for underreporting of undesired events in the context of influence-seeking (Kraay and Murrell 2016) and biases introduced by the political interests of the interviewee (Agerberg 2020).

### **4.4. Operationalization**

This section provides information about all variables used in the quantitative analyses in chapters 6 and 7. I transform some of these variables into indices that are explained in more detail in 5, where I also present the descriptive statistics for the central variables. This chapter focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the operationalizations as well as on the sources that inspired the measurements.

#### **4.4.1. Variables in Chapter 6 – Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Mutually Exclusive?**

In chapter 6, I examine the empirical relationship between lobbying and corruption. The following paragraphs explain how I operationalized the different characteristics of lobbying and the extent of corruption in the interest intermediation system.

I asked interviewees about both experienced and perceived corruption. Only three companies (3.3 percent) reported that they observed someone making an illegal payment to get things done,<sup>9</sup> all of them in the U.S. (11.54 percent of the interviewed companies there). While this is an important figure, it cannot be analyzed statistically due to the low number of incidents and no variation in Germany.

### The Dependent Variable: Corruption

Since experienced corruption is barely reported, I rely on lobbyists' perception of how corrupt their everyday political working environment is. While perception-based measures of corruption<sup>10</sup> are likely to be biased (see the discussion above), lobbyists as experts of politics know better if and to what extent politics – and especially the interest intermediation sector – might be corrupt, at least better than the broader public (cf. Hollyer 2018, p. 111). Their greater expertise should be reflected in the numbers, showing that they exaggerate corruption to a lesser extent than citizens (W. L. Miller 2006, p. 177). Thus, the dependent variables *perceived corruption* measure to what extent the interviewed lobbyists believe decision-makers or decision-making bodies to be involved in or to be affected by corruption. Or, put differently, it proxies corruption in the interest intermediation sector. It does *not* proxy corruption of individual lobbyists or the interviewees.

I asked the interviewees to what extent they believe that certain groups of individuals<sup>11</sup> or more abstract organizations or institutions<sup>12</sup> are involved in or affected by corruption. The questions, adapted from TI's Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)<sup>13</sup> (Transparency International 2017; Transparency International 2013a), could be answered on a five point scale ranging from "None of them" to "All of them." Due to low variation and/or multi-modal distributions, most variables were

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<sup>9</sup>Question "Has your company ever observed that someone paid an illegal payment to get things done?", adapted from Seligson 2006.

<sup>10</sup>Perception indices of governance and of corruption have been subject of much criticism (e.g. Andersson and Heywood 2009; Gisselquist 2014; Hollyer 2018). However, most of the critics refer to aggregated or macro indices, but see Agerberg 2020 and Kraay and Murrell 2016.

<sup>11</sup>State government officials/*Beamte*, Legislators/*Bundestagsabgeordnete* (Members of Parliament). Question: "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?"

<sup>12</sup>Public Officials/Administration/*Verwaltung*, Legislature/*Bundestag*, Parties, NGOs. Question: "To what extent do you see the following organizations [...] to be affected by corruption?"

<sup>13</sup>The original scales were four-point scales: "None of them," "Some of them," "Most of them," "All of them," and from "Not at all corrupt" to "Extremely corrupt." I stretched them to five-point scales with the middle category "Many of them" to avoid too many different scales in the interview.

#### 4. Methodological Advancements and Limitations

recoded into binary<sup>14</sup> or ordinal<sup>15</sup> variables. I present the recoded variables and constructed indices in chapter 5.

Using perception-based measures has several limitations. Firstly, perception-based measures do not correspond to real incidents although there is some correlation (Olken 2009; Seligson 2006<sup>16</sup>). Reported rates of perceived corruption should therefore be interpreted relative to each other but not in absolute terms. Secondly, as already stated, in Western democracies, people tend to exaggerate the prevalence of corruption (W. L. Miller 2006, p. 177). However, it can be assumed that lobbyists as expert exaggerate less than citizens who do not work in politics. Thirdly, sensitive questions are likely to produce underestimations of undesired outcomes due to favorability or social desirability (Tourangeau and Yan 2007). This can be expected to occur for perceptions of corruption as well (Agerberg 2020; Kraay and Murrell 2016). Thus, there is a combination of mechanisms that might lead to an under- or overperception of corruption. Since this is the first study using perception measures of elites, it is unclear where these perception scores exactly stand. The descriptive statistics in the next chapter suggest that lobbyists perceive less corruption than the general public and that lobbyists' perception might be closer to real incidents (Seligson 2006).

The tables A2 to A4 in appendix A.1 indicate that the dependent variables are not affected by the interview mode.

#### The Independent Variables: Lobbying and Company Characteristics

I measure *access* (H2 & H4) on a five-point scale from "Never" to "Constantly."<sup>17</sup> The variables indicate how often lobbyists have access to different decision-makers (taken from Nownes and DeAlejandro 2009). I distinguish between three types of access (cf. section 2.3.5). The first is an index of personal contacts with legislators and their staff.<sup>18</sup> The variable *personal access to legislators*, indicates how well lobbyists can access legislators via individual channels. The second kind of access I

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<sup>14</sup>Perception of corruption yes/no.

<sup>15</sup>"No perception," "A few of them," "Many of them or more."

<sup>16</sup>Note, however, that these findings are limited to developing countries.

<sup>17</sup>Question: "As you probably know, lobbyists use many different techniques to try to influence what goes on in state government. Below you will find a list of such techniques. Looking at the list, please tell me how often you use each technique."

<sup>18</sup>Items: "Meeting personally with state legislators," "Meeting personally with legislative staff."

consider is *institutional access to the legislature*.<sup>19</sup> It measures how often lobbyists take part in formalized ways of participation such as hearings. Finally *access to the executive branch* contains information about the frequency of targeting executive bodies.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to these rather formal access points, I also use a variable for more informal access practices. They are operationalized as an index consisting of the frequencies of informal contacts to decision-makers<sup>21</sup> (e.g., coincidentally during travels or events; informal direct contacts via mobile phone, etc.).

There are several possibilities how companies can make *financial contributions* to political actors. In the United States, the contributions covered in the surveys are contributions to PACs and to 501(c) organizations. In Germany, it is contributions to parties and party sponsoring. The contributions vary in terms of their transparency and their official purpose. Yet, the potential conflicts of interest can be a consequence of either form of financial contribution. Thus, I combined frequently used contributions in an index.<sup>22</sup> Only few companies in the sample still contribute financially to parties or candidates. Due to the low variation, I dichotomized this index.<sup>23</sup>

I distinguish between *influence* on the legislative<sup>24</sup> and influence on the executive branch<sup>25</sup> (H5). I asked the lobbyists to indicate how influential they regard themselves in different venues when a new regulation affecting their company is discussed<sup>26</sup> (adapted from the WBES, see also Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009). The scale ranges from 1 'Never influential' to 5 'Very influential.' Note that this variable serves merely as a proxy because high status lobbyists tend to overrate their influence (Lyons, A. M. McKay, and Reifler 2020). Some of this can be

<sup>19</sup>Items: "Testifying at legislative committee hearings," "Submitting written testimony to legislative committees," "Submitting written comments on proposed rules and regulations" (US only).

<sup>20</sup>Items: "Meeting personally with executive agency personnel," "Taking part in regulatory negotiations."

<sup>21</sup>Items: "Informal contacts with legislators," "Informal contacts with legislative staff," "Informal contacts with the chief executive." In the US, the chief executive refers to governors. In Germany, it refers to the chancellor.

<sup>22</sup>Items (US): "Contributions to PACs," "Contributions to 501 (c);" Items (GER): "Contributions to parties," "Party sponsoring".

<sup>23</sup>Financial contributions yes/no.

<sup>24</sup>Items: US: Legislature; GER: *Bundestag*

<sup>25</sup>Items: US: Executive; GER (Index): Government, Ministries.

<sup>26</sup>Question: When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your business, how much influence does your company typically have [...] to try to influence the content of that law, rule, regulation or decree?

#### 4. Methodological Advancements and Limitations

partialed out by including a dummy indicating whether a lobbyist is a professional lobbyist as done in chapter 7 (see below).

The size of the company (H6) is operationalized by its revenue and its number of employees (Campos and Giovannoni 2017, p. 296). In statistical models, I use logarithmized transformations of the variables because of the skewness of the distributions.

I include control variables that are frequently used in studies of corporate lobbying as well as in the above-mentioned studies. One of these control variables is the percentage of indirect lobbying. It serves as a proxy for the professionalization and resources of a government affairs unit and it is used to test the assumption that only companies lobbying independently can use their lobbying channels for corrupt activities. As an economic control variable, I include the economic situation of the company on a three-point scale: "bad," "moderate," "good" (question taken from European Union 2016). Furthermore, I use a variable indicating if the company belongs to the manufacturing industry sector. A more detailed coding of the economic sector is not possible as the group frequencies are too small. The perception of corruption also depends on many individual factors (e.g., Dong, Dulleck, and Torgler 2012; Swamy et al. 2001). The only available variable on an individual rather than a company level is the gender of the interviewee. Thus, gender serves as a proxy for various person-specific characteristics.

#### 4.4.2. Additional Variables in Chapter 7 – Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence

In chapter 7, I analyze determinants of corporate lobbying and corporate influence. The operationalizations of these dependent variables, access and financial contributions, influence and indirect lobbying, have been explained in the previous section. However, the models in chapter 7 introduce additional independent variables. Tables A2 to A5 in appendix A.1 indicate that there are no biases caused by different interview modes.

The first additional control variable is the *age* of the firm by the year 2018. The age counts the years since the company was founded. Secondly, the variable *conflictual policy areas* indicates on a five-point scale to what extent there is disagreement over fundamental policy goals among the actors within a policy area (Nownes and

Freeman 1998).<sup>27</sup> Thirdly, *Competitive: Problems* is a binary variable indicating whether competition is one of the top three obstacles for a company (adapted from the WBES 2017).<sup>28</sup> Finally, *Government affairs manager: yes* " indicates if an interviewee is a professional lobbyist, e.g., responsible or mainly responsible for lobbying only or representative of a lobbying unit, as opposed to, e.g., a public affairs manager who also has some interest representation tasks or a CEO. I coded this variable from a question about the role and responsibility of the interviewee (taken from a previous research project, *Agendas and Interest Groups (AIG)*<sup>29</sup>; cf. Pakull, Goldberg, and Bernhagen 2020).<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Wording: "Generally, the policy area(s) I/We work in is (are) marked by intense conflict or disagreement over fundamental policy goals."

<sup>28</sup>Wording: "What are the three biggest obstacles for your company?"

<sup>29</sup><https://agendasandinterestgroups.org/>

<sup>30</sup>Wording: "First I'd like to know a little bit about you and your office. How would you describe your role and your responsibilities in the company? How are you organized here in terms of people and units that are involved in public affairs and advocacy?"



# 5. Corruption and Lobbying from a Comparative Perspective: Descriptive Evidence

## 5.1. Introduction: Influence-Seeking Activities and Their Predictors

In the previous chapter, I introduced the variables used in this study. In this chapter, I present the distributions of these variables grouped by country. Where possible and meaningful, I compare the figures from the two subsamples with numbers for the population or from the literature. I show that there are noteworthy differences between lobbyists' and citizens' perceptions of corruption, which might indicate that lobbyists as experts have a more nuanced view on politics in the interest intermediation sector (cf. section 4.3). Furthermore, this chapter shows that there are no considerable lobbying-related differences between German and American lobbyists. Finally, the figures about companies and interviewees contain information about the sample and the two country-specific subsamples, such as means and patterns of missing values.

Note that I also present some descriptive statistics in chapter 8. However, they refer to categorized statements of lobbyists and, thus, rather belong to a qualitative approach. For this reason, I describe them separately from variables used in the chapters focusing on quantitative examinations.

## 5.2. Perceived Corruption

Observations of illegal payments were reported by just three companies in the American subsample (11.54 percent of the interviewees in the US) and none of the

companies in the German subsample. Because of the lack of empirical variation regarding experienced corruption, I rely on perception-based data to analyze the relationship between lobbying and corruption. As discussed in the previous chapter, perception data can be biased. Comparing different independent data sources (see below) and adding qualitative information (see chapter 8) can help to assess possible biases (Agerberg 2020).

### 5.2.1. Comparison with Citizen Surveys

To better understand what the levels of lobbyists' perception of corruption mean, I compare the data collected from the elite interviews with representative citizen surveys from the United States and Germany (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). The comparative data refer to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2016 for Germany (Transparency International 2016b), the General Social Survey (GSS) 2016<sup>1</sup> for the US (The General Social Survey 2016b) and the GCB 2013<sup>2</sup> covering both countries. Researchers often presume that citizens perceive corruption as a more severe problem than it actually is (Heywood 2015, p. 138; W. L. Miller 2006, p. 177). I expect lobbyists as specialists in their area to exaggerate less (cf. section 4.4). However, the data presented below does not generally confirm this expectation.

For 2016, comparative<sup>3</sup> data is available for politicians<sup>4</sup> and officials.<sup>5</sup> For easier presentation and comparability, I dichotomized the variables. *Not corrupt* means that respondents indicated that none of the politicians and none of the officials are corrupt, whereas *corrupt* means that respondents indicated that at least a few of them are corrupt. The 2013 data shows the means of five-point-scales ranging from *not at all corrupt* to *extremely corrupt*. For the present study, the literal translations of wordings are slightly different (see questionnaires in appendix B) for two reasons: firstly, to focus on state level lobbyists in the US and on federal level lobbyists in Germany, and secondly, to consider the different positions and respon-

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<sup>1</sup>Data sources: The General Social Survey 2016a; Transparency International 2016a.

<sup>2</sup>Data source: Transparency International 2013b.

<sup>3</sup>Note that perception data vary over time so that this comparison is only an approximation using the closest data available. I cannot exclude that differences became smaller or bigger between 2013, 2016, summer 2018 – time of the US interviews – and early 2020, when I finished the last German interview.

<sup>4</sup>Original wordings: *politicians* in the US questionnaire; *Bundestagsabgeordnete* (Members of Parliament) in the German questionnaire.

<sup>5</sup>Original wordings: (*government administrators* in the US questionnaire; *government officials* in the German questionnaire).




Figure 5.1.: Percentages of perceived corruption

sibilities of the executive branches in the government systems of the two countries. The first set of variables refers to individuals. In the US questionnaire, these are *members of the state legislature* and *state government officials*. In the German questionnaire, these are *Bundestagsabgeordnete* and *Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter in Ministerien und Behörden* (staff of ministries and agencies). The second set of variables refers to institutions or organizations. The American questionnaire inquired about perceived corruption of *parties*<sup>6</sup>, *public officials* generally, the *legislature*, and *NGOs*. The German questionnaire inquired about perceived corruption of *parties*, the *administration*, the *Bundestag* (Parliament) and *NGOs*. Figure 5.1 shows the comparison of perceptions referring to individuals. Figure 5.2 shows the comparison of perceptions referring to organizations and institutions.<sup>7</sup> Even if the data should be interpreted with caution because of the different question wordings, the differences are hard to ignore.

The graphs show two patterns. German lobbyists perceive *Bundestagsabgeordnete* to be more corrupt than citizens do. 24 percent of the German lobbyists think that politicians are not involved in corruption. 47.5 percent of German citizens indicate the same. In the United States, 98.2 percent of the citizens think that at least a few of the politicians are corrupt. 87 percent of the lobbyists indicate the same.

The perceptions of corruption concerning officials follow a similar pattern. A quarter of the lobbyists (US: 23 percent; GER: 25 percent) and 40.8 percent of the

<sup>6</sup>Index of Democrats' and Republicans' affectedness by corruption.

<sup>7</sup>In the original questionnaire, *Public Officials* refers to the bureaucracy rather than officials as groups of individuals.

## 5. Corruption and Lobbying from a Comparative Perspective




Figure 5.2.: Means of perceived corruption

German citizens do not think that at least some government officials are corrupt. In the American survey, 97.8 percent of the citizen respondents believe officials to be involved in corruption. Interestingly, German lobbyist are more skeptical than the citizens. This contradicts the expectation that lobbyists generally perceive corruption to be less widespread – at least in Germany. One reason for this might be that lobbyists hesitate to say none of the politicians are corrupt since they often indicated that there are black sheep in every profession. According to the interviewees, this might also apply to lobbyists' perceptions of MPs (see chapter 8). With regard to organizations and institutions, the patterns in the US and Germany are similar.

These perception patterns correspond to previous studies. It is not surprising that parties have a relatively negative image. Many corruption scandals in Western democracies involve parties, or party and candidate financing (e.g. Alemann 2002; Johnston 2014, pp. 191–200). In contrast to perception data referring to individuals, the data referring to institutions and organizations confirm the expectation that the levels of perceived corruption are lower among lobbyists than among citizens (Heywood 2015, p. 138; W. L. Miller 2006, p. 177). This corroborates a study based on experience data showing that larger companies – which are also more likely to employ lobbyists – have less experience with corruption (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009).




Figure 5.3.: Percentage of perceived corruption (ordered variables)

### 5.2.2. Lobbyists' Perception of Corruption

This section takes a closer look at all perception-based variables, their distributions, and missing values. Missing values are due to the sensitivity of questions about corruption. Depending on the question, three (legislators; 11.54 percent; table A13 in appendix A.2) to five (parties; 19.23; table A8) of the American lobbyists refused to answer. The German subset has ten missing values for all corruption variables (15.38 percent.). The share of missing values in the US subsample is slightly higher compared to the American citizen survey. German interviewees refused to answer less often than respondents in the German citizen survey (see tables A10 and A13 in appendix A.2). The occurrence of missing values in both countries is not associated with sample characteristics and, thus, does not affect the interpretation of the results (see tables A17 and A18 in appendix A.2<sup>8</sup>). After a list-wise deletion of missing values, the number of cases is still large enough to generate sufficient variance (Jenkins and Quintana-Ascencio 2020).<sup>9</sup>

As described in the previous chapter, I use six different perception-based variables and three indices to operationalize corruption: four referring to institutions and organizations, such as legislatures, administrations, parties, and NGOs; two referring to groups of individuals, such as public legislators and public officials;

<sup>8</sup>Analyses of missing data are only made for variables that are dependent variables in chapters 6 or 7.

<sup>9</sup>A minimum N of eight cases is required to find patterns in the data and a minimum of 25 cases is enough to generate sufficient variance for statistical analyses (Jenkins and Quintana-Ascencio 2020).

## 5. Corruption and Lobbying from a Comparative Perspective




Figure 5.4.: Percentage of perceived corruption (binary variables)

an additive index *policy institutions* that is composed of institutions that usually participate in policymaking, namely the administration and the legislatures; an additive index *decision-makers* including groups of individuals who draft or vote on policies, namely legislators and public officials; and, finally, an averaged *index* of the two individual and the two institutional variables, recoded into an ordered categorical variable because the share of cases indicating high levels of perceived corruption is too small. The groups are empirically determined to have at least 10 percent of the cases. Cases that indicate no perception on all four variables received the value 1. Cases with an averaged score of greater than 1 but lower than 2 received the value 2. And all cases with an averaged score of greater or equal 2 received the value 3 (see the frequency tables of the original variables in appendix A.2). The original scales of all corruption variables range from 1 to 5.

The levels of perceived corruption vary between the countries. Figure 5.4 presents the percentages for variables that have been recoded into ordinal categorical variables with three scale points.

Taking all single indicators together (index), perceptions in the United States seem more polarized (see figure 5.3). Compared to their German counterparts, more American lobbyists perceive no corruption (13 percent) and more American lobbyists think that the different actors and institutions are at least a little bit affected by corruption (83 percent). In the German subsample, the middle category *less than a little bit affected* is the most common (51 percent), whereas only 11 percent think that there is no corruption and 38 percent think that there is at




Figure 5.5.: Means of perceived corruption (metric variables)

least a little bit of corruption. Regarding organizations, the figure shows a similar pattern for parties.

German lobbyists perceive NGOs more negatively than Americans. Only 16 percent of the German lobbyists rate NGOs as not affected by corruption, whereas about a third of their US counterparts do (29 percent).

Figure 5.4 shows percentages of the binary-coded indicators of perceived corruption. Differences are considerably smaller compared to the ordered categorical variables. There are no noteworthy differences concerning officials, administrations, and MPs/legislators. The only difference concerns the legislatures, which American lobbyists rate more skeptically. 76 percent think that the legislature is at least a little bit affected by corruption. 58 percent of the German lobbyists think the same.

Finally, figure 5.5 presents the means for the two metric index variables policy institutions and decision-makers.<sup>10</sup> The levels of perceived corruption are low in both countries with a mean between two and three, given a scale center of five. Yet, concerning both policy institutions and decision-makers, US lobbyists are more skeptical. The differences are statistically insignificant.

Summarizing the findings in this section, American lobbyists tend to perceive similar levels of corruption or more than German lobbyists, except for NGOs. This corresponds to the expectation of H1 that levels of corruption are higher in countries with a majoritarian style of policymaking. In both countries, lobbyists think that legislators and the legislative process are comparatively little affected by corruption

<sup>10</sup>Possible range 1–9, empirical range 1–5 (policy institutions) and 1–4 (decision-makers). Figure A2 in appendix A.2 presents the distributions of the two variables.

– only American NGOs are rated more positively. Unsurprisingly, parties have a bad image. Less than a fifth of the respondents in either country believe parties not to be affected by corruption. Only for German NGOs the figure is lower. Noteworthy is the evidence that only 13 percent of the US interviewees and 11 percent of the German interviewees perceive no corruption at all. A vast majority of lobbyists think that corruption is at least to some extent a problem in interest intermediation and politics.

### 5.3. Access, Informal Contacts, and Contributions

This section shows the distributions of the lobbying-related variables that are the main predictors in the next chapter (cf. hypotheses H2 through H4). Some of the variables are dependent variables in chapter 7. All variables are originally measured on five-point scales ranging from *never* using this lobbying technique to *constantly* using it.

Figure 5.6 presents the data for different types of access. There are no statistical differences regarding typical kinds of access between the two countries. Yet, there is a small tendency for German companies to have more access. In both countries, personal contacts with legislators and their staff is the most frequently used access point, followed by access to the executive branch – meeting personally with agency personnel or taking part in regulatory negotiations. Institutional access – via committees, hearings, or written statements – is least frequent. One reason might be that testimonies have to be invited by committees or other responsible institutions and that they often invite a similar set of interest groups (Grossmann 2012, p. 155). There is a bias in the missing data concerning access to the executive branch. Companies with more employees are less likely to have missing data on this variable (see table A19 in appendix A.2). Informal lobbying strategies, such as calling legislators on their mobile phones or approaching them at events or on a train, are employed least often by lobbyists from either country.

Figure 5.7 shows the percentages of American companies that at least *seldom*<sup>11</sup> contribute to PACs or 501(c) organizations and of German companies that at least *seldom* donate to or sponsor parties. I dichotomized the variable because of a lack of empirical variation. It confirms the expectation that money is more important in US politics than in German politics. 79 percent of the American companies studied

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<sup>11</sup>Value 2 on the five-point scale.




Figure 5.6.: Means of access and informal contacts




Figure 5.7.: Share of companies making financial contributions

contribute either to PACs or to 501(c) organizations. In contrast, only 39 percent of the German companies donate to parties or engage in party sponsoring.

To summarize, there are no considerable differences between the activities of American and German lobbyists. Only money seems to play a greater role in the United States.

## 5.4. Influence

The two variables measuring influence have two purposes in this study. Firstly, they serve as the main predictors of corruption in the next chapter (H5). Sec-

## 5. Corruption and Lobbying from a Comparative Perspective




Figure 5.8.: Means of self-attributed influence

only, they serve as dependent variables in chapter 7. *Influence on the legislation* means influence on the state legislatures in the US and influence on the *Bundestag* (parliament) in Germany. For the German subsample, *influence at the executive branch* is measured as an index of influence on the government and influence on the ministries. The US item refers only to the executive branch (original wording; see section 4.4).

There are no significant inter-country differences concerning the self-attributed influence on the two branches of government studied. On average, companies in both countries rate their influence as moderate on a five-point scale from *never influential* to *very influential*. US companies in the sample view themselves as more influential vis-à-vis the legislature, whereas German companies in the sample see themselves more influential vis-à-vis the executive branch. This difference could be expected given the fusion of powers of the executive and the legislative branch in parliamentary systems and the outstanding role of the government. However, this trend lies within the range of statistical uncertainty.

Companies with fewer employees are less likely to have answered the questions on influence (see table A21 in appendix A.2). Thus, models containing variables measuring influence do not proportionally represent such companies.

### 5.5. Company Characteristics

Company characteristics are important in chapters 6 and 7. In the previous chapter, some company characteristics serve as control variable to partial out company




Figure 5.9.: Average number of employees and revenue (in billion US\$)

specifics from lobbying strategies. Corporate lobbying is not independent of company characteristics (e.g., Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Marshall and Bernhagen 2017). For example, companies are affected by regulation and characteristics of different policy areas. Thus, it is important to check for such mechanisms that affect lobbying behavior.

Figure 5.9 shows the average *company size* (H6) in terms of revenue and the number of employees, grouped by country. There are two important messages in this figure. The first is a *methodological* one. In the previous chapter, I show that the differences between the samples and the populations are significant only concerning the number of employees in the US subsample. The test logic there was one of comparing a sample with a population. The comparison in this figure follows the logic of a comparison of two independent samples. The correlation between the interview data and external data sources – a Pearson’s R of 0.76 for employees and a Pearson’s R of 0.97 for revenue in the sample compared to the US as a whole with a Pearson’s R of 0.98 for employees and a Pearson’s R of 0.83 for revenue – proves high enough for the test in chapter 4 to seem trustworthy. The second message refers to *inter-country differences*. German companies are – on average – larger. They have significantly more employees and higher revenues (by tendency

## 5. Corruption and Lobbying from a Comparative Perspective




Figure 5.10.: Means of company characteristics

but not statistically different; see table A22 in appendix A.2). The two variables operationalizing company size do not have any missing values.

On average, US companies *lobby more directly* (see figure 5.10). However, the difference is statistically insignificant. In both countries, companies leave the lobbying on the majority of issues (at least partly) to associations and groups. For German companies, the figure stands at 60.16 percent. For US companies, it stands at 51.28 percent. Five interviewees did not indicate the share of issues on which they lobby indirectly. The occurrence of missing values cannot be predicted by company characteristics (see table A21 in appendix A.2). Thus, it should not affect the generalizability of the results. Indirect lobbying is a control variable in chapter 6 and a main predictor as well as dependent variable in chapter 7.

German companies in the sample are significantly older than US companies (see figure 5.10). By the year 2018, the average *age* of a German company in the sample was 85.23 years. On average, US companies were almost 40 years younger (43.19 years since foundation). Company age is a control variable in chapter 7. It does not have any missing values.

The third metric for company characteristics is the degree to which there is *conflict within the policy area(s)* a company operates in. German lobbyists in the sample think of their policy areas as more conflictual than their American colleagues




Figure 5.11.: Company characteristics (in percent)

(see figure 5.10). On the five-point scale, German lobbyists' mean is 3.92. The figure for US lobbyists stands at 3.12. The variable has four missing values.

Turning to the dichotomous or ordered categorical variables, most companies in the sample describe their *economic situation* as moderate or good (see figure 5.11). 43 percent of the US companies fall into each of these two categories. In contrast, 29 percent of German companies consider themselves to be in a bad and only 27 percent in a good situation. This variable has six missing values.

Most of the lobbying units or lobbyists – if only one person is responsible for interest representation – work with a *fixed yearly budget*, which they can use for events, business travels, and other lobbying-related activities. About a quarter (25 percent in the German subsample, 29 percent in the US subsample; see figure 5.11) have no fixed budget. This can either mean that their budgets are flexible or part of a greater budget, e.g., for corporate communications. Alternatively, the approval of a financial department or a compliance unit is required for their activities. The yearly budget, together with the role description (see below) indicates the professionalization of lobbying within a company. Four interviewees refused to respond to this question.

## 5. Corruption and Lobbying from a Comparative Perspective




Figure 5.12.: The distribution of the gender among the interviewees

More than half of the companies in the German subset of the data comes from the *manufacturing sector* (51 percent; see figure 5.11). This applies to only 15 percent of the US companies in the sample (for a complete overview of the branches, see table 4.1 in chapter 4). 14 percent of the German and 23 percent of the US companies in the sample see *competition* as one of the top three economic or political obstacles. Competition can reduce corruption if it implies mutual control (cf. Bliss and Tella 1997). But it can also create incentives for corruption if it provides companies with a competitive advantage. There are six missing values on this variable.

### 5.6. Characteristics of Lobbyists

Characteristics of lobbyists serve as control variables both in chapters 6 and 7. They control partly for response biases or empirical patterns that can be caused by personality traits or experiences. The two individual variables available are the gender of the interviewee and the job description.

About a fifth of the lobbyists are *female* (see figure 5.12). In the German subsample, 77 percent of the lobbyists are men. In the American subsample, this figure stands at 81 percent. This confirms a recent study by LaPira et al. (2019) showing that women are underrepresented in the interest intermediation sector. The number of female corporate lobbyists even seems to be lower than the share of women at lobbying companies or associations (LaPira, Marchetti, and H. F. Thomas 2019). The gender variable does not have missing values.




Figure 5.13.: Role description of lobbyists

A lower share of women in the domain of interest intermediation is not just a noteworthy empirical figure (cf. Junk, Romeijn, and Rasmussen 2020). It can be expected to have real world implications. There might be gender differences in tolerating and engaging in corruption (Swamy et al. 2001, for a short overview see also Alexander 2018, pp. 54–8). Accordingly, this could affect the relationship between corruption and lobbying as the two modes of influence-seeking. Regarding lobbying, there are several aspects to be considered, e.g., whether there are more women needed to substantially represent women’s interests or at least the work primarily done by women, e.g., in the health care sector, and whether gender affects the lobbying strategies chosen or the influence exerted. However, the latter concern does not seem to be supported by research – at least not in the United States (Bath, Gayvert-Owen, and Nownes 2005; J. C. Lucas and Hyde 2012).

Most lobbyists interviewed are professional full-time lobbyists. 79 percent of the German interviewees describe their *role* as Government Affairs Manager or with another name for the same tasks. The second most frequently stated role of people charged with lobbying tasks was Public Affairs Manager (11 percent). In the US subsample, the definitions of the roles are broader. Half of the interviewees described themselves as Government Affairs Manager. About a quarter (23) were Legal Affairs Managers with interest representation responsibilities. 12 percent were

## *5. Corruption and Lobbying from a Comparative Perspective*

Executives, such as CEOs or Directors. Further roles, subsumed under ‘Other,’ include project managers, community managers, and similar jobs that required them to register in the lobbying databases of the US states. There is one missing value.

## 6. Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Mutually Exclusive Activities?

### 6.1. Introduction: Lobbying-specific and Company-specific Causes of Corruption

Drawing the line between lobbying and corruption is not easy. Scandals have proven this many times, e.g., the case of Jack Abramoff, which led to the adoption of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) in the United States, addressing the shortcomings of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) (Lunenburg and Spitzer 2009), or the case of Philipp Amthor, which spurred the introduction of the first mandatory transparency regulation on lobbying in Germany (Bundestag 2021). In chapter 2, I proposed a theoretical distinction on both a macro and a micro level. This chapter is the first of three addressing the relationship between corruption and lobbying empirically. Based on the theoretical discussions in the first part of this book, I developed six hypotheses in chapter 3 concerning macro as well as micro mechanisms of corruption in interest intermediation. I test these hypotheses throughout the next parts of this study. The results imply that it is important to address both macro and micro dynamics in interest intermediation to paint a full picture of undue influence-seeking activities. This should be reflected in regulation controlling lobbying. I address the implications in more detail in chapter 9.

The hypotheses can be grouped into three major classes: systemic causes of corruption, lobbying-specific causes of corruption, and company-specific causes of corruption. *Systemic causes* refer to characteristics of political systems and policy-making that can facilitate or impede corruption (see table 6.1). Lobbying, I argue,

6. Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Exclusive Activities?

<b>System differences</b>	
<i>H1</i> : Corruption in the interest intermediation system is more widespread in countries with a majoritarian style of policy-making.	
<b>Mutually inclusive</b>	<b>Mutually exclusive</b>
<i>H2</i> : Lobbyists with better access to policymakers are more involved in corruption.	<i>H4</i> : Lobbyists with better access to policymakers are less involved in corruption.
<i>H3</i> : Lobbyists with regular donations to parties, politics-related organizations or candidates, are more involved in corruption.	<i>H5</i> : Influential lobbyists are less involved in corruption.
<b>Company Size</b>	
<i>H6</i> : Lobbyists of larger companies are less involved in corruption.	

Table 6.1.: Expected systemic, lobbying-specific and firm-specific causes of corruption

can do both. The theoretical expectations for *lobbying-specific causes* reasoned that lobbying and corruption can be mutually inclusive activities, assuming that the means of lobbying and the means of corruption are similar, resulting in a positive statistical association. On the other hand, corruption and lobbying can also be mutually exclusive, assuming that individuals succeeding in lobbying do not need to engage in corruption and vice versa. This direction of thought postulates a negative relationship between lobbying and corruption. Finally, *firm-specific characteristics* refer to internal regulations and compliance requirements that penalize corruption and make it less likely. Table 6.1 presents the hypotheses from chapter 3.

The descriptive statistics in the previous chapter indicated small system differences regarding perceptions of corruption, most notable in the three indices. Multivariate analyses are used to check if the differences result from macro effects, such as institutional arrangements, or if lobbying- or company-specific characteristics are more important. For this purpose, I employ binary logistic, ordered logistic, and ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to test the hypotheses.<sup>1</sup> Because of the relatively small number of observations in the United States, the number of predictors in multivariate models is limited. Thus, it is not possible to test all main

<sup>1</sup>The reported interpretations are based on extensive robustness checks (regression diagnostics in appendix A.3, further models in chapter 7, and non-linear effects caused by missing specifications of interactions in appendix A.3).

### 6.1. Lobbying-specific and Company-specific Causes of Corruption

predictors and control variables at the same time (Green 1991; Cohen 1988). My empirical strategy, hence, is to test all main predictors in one go (reported in the following section) and to subsequently combine them in a hypothesis-by-hypothesis approach with control variables (see tables A26 through A28 in appendix A.3). To ensure comparability, missing values within the same models, including models with control variables, are deleted listwise so that the models contain the same cases.


I interpret results as substantial if they meet one of the following two conditions. Firstly, consistent with the academic standard, I interpret effects that have a probability of error of less than five percent if the direction of the effect proves robust. In this context a robust direction means that in any model with the same dependent variable the unstandardized regression coefficient (b) must be larger than its standard error (se). The second condition allows a probability of error of less than ten percent if there are at least two further models in which the same effect becomes significant at the 90 percent level of significance and if the direction of the effect is constant in all models. The latter, less conservative rule is owed to the small number of cases in the US subsample and the resulting possibility of insufficient statistical power (cf. chapter 4; Halsey et al. 2015) as well as to larger standard errors because of country variations.<sup>2</sup> In the discussion, I also refer to effects that follow a clear pattern regardless of their significance. However, if hypotheses are supported by tendencies only, I do not treat them as statistically confirmed. Rather, tendencies should be explored further in future research. All reported models are subject to extensive regression diagnostics (see appendix A.3). If there are assumptions to report, I do so at the end of each section below. If there are violations of model assumptions to report, I do so at the end of each section below. The results are presented in section 6.2 and discussed in section 6.3.

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<sup>2</sup>Models with interactions in appendix A.3 test for country variations. They confirm country variation at least partly. Thus, standard errors are likely higher compared to single country models.

## 6.2. Multivariate Results

### 6.2.1. Index and Organizations



*Note:* Not = not affected by corruption; little = a little bit affected by corruption; >little = more than a little bit affected by corruption.

Figure 6.1.: Predicted probability of corruption determined access to the executive branch

Considering the ordinal index of corruption based on the corruption of parties and NGOs, the country dummy<sup>3</sup> and the frequency of access to the executive branch<sup>4</sup> are the only significant determinants. German lobbyists perceive more corruption of NGOs compared to their American counterparts (logit: 1.63).

Figure 6.1 (see the full table A24 in appendix A.3) presents the predicted probability of corruption dependent on the frequency of access to the executive branch.<sup>5</sup> Lobbyists with better access to the executive branch are more likely to perceive corruption of parties as well as to perceive corruption as a problem generally, *ceteris paribus* (c.p.). Without access to the executive branch, lobbyists have a predicted probability of about 40 percent of belonging to the group that does not perceive

<sup>3</sup>Index:  $p < .05$ ; Parties: n.s. ( $b > se$ ); NGOs:  $p < .05$ .

<sup>4</sup>Index:  $p < .01$ ; Parties:  $p < .1$ ; NGOs: n.s.

<sup>5</sup>Predicted probabilities indicate the probability to belong to one group – different perceptions of corruption in this case – depending on a (metric) predictor. Since there are three possible outcomes, variables have a significant effect if the curves are more or less point-symmetric considering all three plots of the models, e.g., if the curve falls in the first plot, has an inverse U-shape in the second plot and rises in the third plot. Furthermore, the terminal points of the curves should not be too close to each other. Below, I use marginal effects to present predictors of the binary logistic regressions. Marginal effects are more common but not that useful for ordered logistic regressions since the rate of change is more difficult to interpret if there are more than two outcomes.

any corruption at all. With constant access, they have a chance of about 55 percent of belonging to the group thinking that corruption is more than a little problem. Finally, lobbyists on the scale mean have the highest probability of belonging to the middle group with a predicted score of about .60. The curves for corruption of parties are flatter and at a lower level but follow a similar pattern. The effect of access to the executive branch on the perception of corruption of parties becomes insignificant when control variables are introduced (see table A27 in appendix A.3).

Personal and institutional access to the legislature, informal strategies, financial contributions, influence, and company size have no explanatory power in any of the ordered logistic models.

The regression diagnostics for the ordered logistic models showed no severe violation of model assumptions A.3). Thus, the models reported below seem trustworthy.

### 6.2.2. Policymakers in the Legislature and the Executive Branch

The perceptions of corruption concerning officials, the administration, MPs/legislators and the legislature do not significantly differ between the two system.

Figure 6.2 shows the marginal effects of personal access to legislators and access to the executive branch on perceived corruption.<sup>6</sup> These two variables are robust according to the above-mentioned conditions. Firstly, personal access to legislators has a negative effect on corruption ratings in all four models.<sup>7</sup> This indicates that lobbyists who have better personal access to legislators perceive officials significantly as less corrupt, c.p. One unit increase in personal access to legislators reduces the chances by more than fifty percent that a lobbyist rates officials as affected by corruption.<sup>8</sup> Compared to lobbyists who do not have any personal access at all, lobbyists with constant access are approximately 36 times less likely to think of officials as corrupt. The effect size is similar for legislators but not significant.


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<sup>6</sup>The marginal effects indicate rates of changes in the dependent variable determined by the predictor. Therefore, they are useful for interpreting effects in binary logistic regressions. The higher the marginal effect, the greater the likelihood that a lobbyist indicates perceived corruption. Effects are significant at the 95 percent significance level if their confidence interval (CI) does not cross zero (indicated by the dashed line).

<sup>7</sup>Model officials:  $b = -0.897$ ,  $p < .1$ ; Model administration:  $b = -0.013$ , n.s.; model MPs/legislators:  $b = -0.948$ , n.s. ( $b > se$ ); model legislature:  $b = -0.446$ , n.s. ( $b > se$ ).

<sup>8</sup>Odds Ratio (OR) = 0.408; for the whole scale:  $0.408^{5-1} = 0.028$ ; additive inverse:  $\frac{1}{0.028} = 36.213$ .

6. Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Exclusive Activities?



*Note:* DV: Perceived corruption of Officials/Administrations/MPs or Legislators/Legislature. Per. access to l. = Personal access to legislators; Access to exe = Access to the executive branch.

Figure 6.2.: Marginal effects of the binary logistic regressions

Secondly, access to the executive branch has the reverse effect. In all models, the effect is positive, *c.p.*<sup>9</sup> Lobbyists with more frequent access to the executive branch are more likely to indicate a perception of corruption. A one unit increase in the access scale leads to an about 5 times higher chance of rating officials as corrupt.<sup>10</sup> For administrations this effect is slightly weaker.<sup>11</sup>

The negative effect of the use of informal lobbying strategies in the model analyzing perceived corruption of officials<sup>12</sup> is not robust if control variables are included (see table A31 in appendix A.3). Institutional access, financial contributions, influence, and company size<sup>13</sup> do not have effects.

The binary logistic regressions predicting perceived corruption of officials and the legislature suffer from model violations. To maintain the best possible comparability, I decided against reporting the amended models because the results do not differ substantially. The amended models can be found in table A43 in appendix A.3.

### 6.2.3. Policy Institutions and Decision-makers

Figure 6.3 (see the full table A25 in appendix A.3) shows the unstandardized coefficients of the predictors in the models predicting corruption at policy institutions and of decision-makers. Firstly, perceived corruption of policy institutions and decision-makers is not associated with system differences. The effect is negative but insignificant in each model. Secondly, lobbyists with better institutional access perceive less corruption.<sup>14</sup> The negative effect is significant in the amended model only.

Thirdly, access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of perceived corruption in the OLS regression models.<sup>15</sup> A lobbyist with constant access to the executive branch is almost three quarters more likely than a lobbyist without access

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<sup>9</sup>Model officials:  $b = 1.676$ ,  $p < .01$ ; Model administration:  $b = 1.39$ ,  $p < .05$ ; model MPs/legislators:  $b = 0.689$ , *n.s.* ( $b > se$ ); model legislature:  $b = 0.522$ , *n.s.* ( $b > se$ ).

<sup>10</sup>OR: 5.344; OR<sup>4</sup>: 815.295.

<sup>11</sup>OR 4.015; OR<sup>4</sup>: 259.853.

<sup>12</sup> $b = 0.875$ ,  $p < .1$ .

<sup>13</sup>The positive effect of the number of employees predicting perceived corruption of the administration becomes significant in the model including control variables (see table A29 in appendix A.3).

<sup>14</sup> $b = -0.355$ ,  $p < .05$ .

<sup>15</sup>Model policy institutions:  $b = 0.336$ , *n.s.* ( $b > se$ ); model decision-makers:  $b = 0.505$ ,  $p < .01$ ; amended model decision-makers;  $b = 0.693$ ,  $p < .001$ .

## 6. Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Exclusive Activities?

to rate decision-makers as corrupt, c.p.<sup>16</sup> Increased perceptions of corruption seem to be caused by more influence on the legislation.<sup>17</sup> This effect is significant in the amended model only. Furthermore, the use of informal strategies is significant at the 90 percent level. However, the negative effect is not robust.

Finally, personal access to legislators, financial contributions, influence on the executive branch, and company size do not predict perceived corruption in the OLS regression models.

The OLS model analyzing perceived corruption of decision-makers shows substantial violation of model assumptions. Thus, there are two models analyzing perceived corruption of decision-makers: one with all cases and one excluding cases that cause problems.


### 6.2.4. Control Variables

Only a few of the control variables have explanatory power (see tables A26 to A34 in appendix A.3) and none of them in every model. More indirect lobbying increases the overall perception of corruption (index; see table A26). In most models, companies that perform better, that is, that are in a healthier financial position, perceive less corruption. Companies in the manufacturing sector rate MPs and legislators as less affected by corruption (see table A31). Finally, female lobbyists tend to perceive more corruption. These effects only reach the 90 percent significance level in the model predicting corruption of parties.

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<sup>16</sup>Empirical range of the DV: 1–4; maximum effect of access to the executive branch:  $5-1*0.693 = 2.772$ .

<sup>17</sup>Model policy institutions:  $b = 0.054$ , n.s.; model decision-makers:  $b = 0.208$ , n.s. ( $b > se$ ); amended model decision-makers:  $b = 0.304$ ,  $p < .05$ .



Note: Thin line: 90% sig. level; bold line: 95% sig. level.

Figure 6.3.: OLS regression results to predict perceived corruption at policy institutions and of decision-makers

### 6.3. Discussion

The models perform better for groups of individuals, officials, and legislators, than for institutions, administration, and the legislature, or organizations, parties, and NGOs. This might indicate that the lobbyists in this study generally trust the institutions but see the problem rather in individual behavior. Similarly, corruption of parties and NGOs, which are seen as most affected by corruption, cannot be explained by systemic, lobbying-specific, or company specific characteristics. The models predict corruption at the executive branch better than corruption at the legislature. However, most of the mechanisms do not show considerable differences between the two branches.

Controlled for all main predictors, German lobbyists – as typical cases of lobbyists in systems with a consensus-oriented style of policymaking (H1) – perceive less corruption than American lobbyists. The coefficient for the country dummy is negative in all models but one. German lobbyists only rate NGOs as more corrupt compared to American lobbyists. However, the negative differences are insignificant. The coefficient of the dummy is larger than its standard error in all models except officials and MPs/legislators. Yet, H1 is statistically not supported. However, the findings indicate that institutions matter, maybe even more than lobbying regulation. Firstly, the decentralization of power in consensus-oriented policy-making systems could mitigate corruption by improving control and accountability (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Lederman, Loayza, and Soares 2005). Secondly, this could be explained by the way institutions affect trust. Leach and Sabatier (2005) have shown that collaboration increases trust and facilitates policymaking. This trust could, in turn, negatively affect perceptions of corruption.

Another plausible explanation refers to the two countries specifically rather than the mode of policymaking. Lobbying regulation might matter only if it is effective. Regulation shapes the conditions under which interest groups organize their influence-seeking activities. Although regulation is stricter in the United States Chari, Hogan, and Murphy 2019, much is done to avoid transparency (Drutman 2016). Legal restrictions might be toothless tigers if mandatory registration can be circumvented with other legal means, such as the use of strategies or personnel that do not have to be disclosed, e.g., donating to 501(c) organizations in the US, party sponsoring in Germany, or relying on attorneys. I address the role of money in more detail in a paragraph below.

	<b>Mutually exclu- sive</b>	<b>Mutually inclu- sive</b>	<b>Inconclusive/ No relationship</b>
Predictors: lobbying characteristics			
<b>Corruption/ In- fluence</b>	Executive branch (US only)	Legislature	Executive branch (GER only)
<b>Formal access</b>	Legislature	Executive branch	–
<b>Informal access</b>	Both branches (US only)	Both branches (GER only)	–
<b>Institutional ac- cess</b>	–	–	Both branches
<b>Contributions</b>	Both branches (GER only)	Both branches (US only)	–
Predictors: company characteristics			
<b>Company size</b>	–	–	Both branches

*Note:* Formal access refers to access to the executive branch or personal access to legislators in the respective branches.

Table 6.2.: Interim findings

For an overview of the results regarding the hypotheses of corruption and lobbying as mutually exclusive or inclusive activities, see table 6.2.<sup>18</sup> The support for the access hypotheses is mixed. Even though H2 and H4 are counterhypotheses, neither of them is fully supported. Better access to the legislature, no matter whether personally or institutionally, generally reduces perceptions of corruption. This corresponds to H4 stating that more is negatively associated with perceived corruption, supporting a mutually-exclusive logic. However, access to the executive branch is positively associated with corruption, supporting the mutually-inclusive logic (H2). Access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of corruption. To make things even more complicated, the use of informal access strategies has different effects. If lobbyists use informal access strategies more often, they rate officials as more corrupt but decision-makers generally as less corrupt. There might be several reasons for these results.

Firstly, the contradictory effects do not exclude each other (obviously). Having access to the legislature may be sufficient for lobbyists. Research has shown that the legislative branch is the most important venue for American lobbyists (A. M.

<sup>18</sup>The system dummy does not contribute to an understanding of whether lobbying and corruption are mutually exclusive or inclusive.

## 6. Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Exclusive Activities?

McKay 2011). Members of the legislature can serve as multipliers, especially if they have official functions in committees or central functions in their parties. This way, information or interests can spread within the political system. This may make them an attractive venue for lobbying. However, politicians control each other and are furthermore controlled by the public via the media and elections. Thus, attempting to bribe a politician carries severe risks. If legislators accept a bribe (or other forms of political corruption), their chances of reelection decrease considerably should they be exposed (Basinger 2013). Thus, there might be a high threshold for politicians to accept a bribe. And even if the bribe is rejected, lobbyists indicated that the loss of their credibility both isolates the lobbyist and their employer from any further political participation (see chapter 8). At the other end of the equation, lobbyists who bribe only a single or a few legislators cannot be sure about the outcome (Goldberg 2018; Harstad and Svensson 2011). This decreases the expected utility of the bribe. Thus, it seems plausible that both legislators and lobbyists opt against corruption even if they had the opportunity.

Secondly, access to the bureaucracy is the type of access lobbyists seek most often in Germany because of the fusion of powers of the executive and the legislative branch (Marshall and Bernhagen 2017; Speth 2006). The positive association corresponds to a myriad of concepts and results that explain why the bureaucracy is especially prone to corruption (e.g. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016 for an overview, van Klaveren 1999 for the US and Wolf 2014, p. 36 for Germany). In the context of interest intermediation, this does not seem to be different. Public officials do not run for office and are not subject to as much public control as politicians. Due to information asymmetries within bureaucracies it is difficult to monitor all employees and processes (Huber and Shipan 2011; Lupia 2008). Thus, the risk of exposure might be lower. Furthermore, bureaucrats, here in the context of policymaking, can make certain promises that make *quid pro quo* attractive, such as including a certain passage into a draft of a bill or leaking confidential information. Compared to the legislative branch, corrupt exchanges in the executive branch seem more attractive from a rational perspective. The results indicate that both sides might engage in corruption. Both the univariate distribution compared to the citizenry and the effect of frequent contact with the bureaucracy show higher levels of perceived corruption than usual.

Thirdly, models with interactions (see e.g., tables A58 and A64 in appendix A.3) suggest that consequences of informal access vary across systems. American lobby-

ists with frequent informal access tend to perceive less corruption, whereas German lobbyists tend to perceive more corruption. Although the interaction effects are not significant, they might indicate why the models in this chapter show different mechanisms regarding informal strategies. One reason might be that informal or even private contacts are more common<sup>19</sup> in pluralist systems where interest group participation is less institutionalized. If informality is an accepted mode rather than a shady form of contacting policymakers, corruption should be less often seen as a consequence of such contacts.

Because of these manifold different mechanisms, neither H2 nor H4 can be supported. Consequences of different types of access seem more nuanced than a general effect of access.

Curiously, the effects of influence tend to be inverse to the effect of access. More legislative influence leads to significantly higher perceptions of corruption of decision-makers, while the effect is insignificant in other models. More influence on the executive branch, in contrast, leads to lower perceptions of corruption in most models, although the effect is insignificant. The tendency in the executive branch hints at corruption and lobbying being mutually exclusive, especially if the weaker control mechanisms in administrations compared to the legislative branch discussed in the previous paragraph prove to be true. However, American lobbyists significantly<sup>20</sup> perceive less corruption of the legislature whereas German lobbyists perceive more corruption (see table A65 in appendix A.3). The latter result corresponds to the findings of legislative influence. Thus, H5 cannot be confirmed or only partly for American lobbyists influencing the executive branch.

Making financial contributions does not seem to be associated with higher levels of corruption. Yet, interesting patterns emerge if system differences are investigated in more detail. Despite the low statistical power of the model, the results show that American lobbyists perceive significantly more party corruption if they contribute more, in contrast to their German counterparts, who perceive less corruption (see A49 in appendix A.3<sup>21</sup>). This corroborates the findings of Gokcekus and Sonan (2017) and can be interpreted in three ways.

Firstly, in many companies, especially in large ones, compliance units control lobbyists (cf. Anastasiadis, Moon, and Humphreys 2018). In the end, it is these

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<sup>19</sup>Not necessarily more often as figure 5.6 indicates.

<sup>20</sup>90 percent level of significance.

<sup>21</sup>This trend can also be found in the model for policy institutions in table A67 in appendix A.3.

## 6. *Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Exclusive Activities?*

units that decide on contributions, not the lobbyist. This control mechanism can make corruption more difficult to perceive as donations are often legally approved.

Secondly, many American lobbyists think that money creates ethical problems in US politics, whereas at least some German lobbyists defend contributions as genuine political support (cf. Evertsson 2013). This will be addressed in more detail in chapter 8.

Thirdly, whereas in US politics money tends to play a more and more important role (Gokcekus and Sonan 2017, p. 363<sup>22</sup>), many German companies stopped making contributions (for an overview see Knight 2019; also, this was confirmed by some lobbyists in the interviews). This trend might also reflect many lobbyists' views that money is a problem in politics. Taking these findings together, H3 is not confirmed. More financial contributions are not universally associated with more corruption.

H6, stating that lobbyists of larger companies are less involved in corruption, does not find empirical support. The two effects of the number of employees<sup>23</sup> are not robust and contradictory. Thus, company size is not an important predictor of corruption. Of course, the size of a company affects other aspects of interest intermediation. Larger companies have economic weight and thus might be more influential without even having to lobby (structural power; cf. Culpepper 2011; Culpepper 2015). They usually have larger government affairs units that allow them to use more channels simultaneously, which grants them better access, provides for a wider covering of issues and better influence (see next chapter). Some of these factors show that company size becomes irrelevant if these explanations are included in models.

### 6.4. The Complex Relationships of Lobbying and Corruption

In the light of ongoing discussions about how to regulate lobbyists to prevent undue influence and of frequent scandals, the central question of research on lobbying and corruption is if the two reinforce each other or if they are mutually exclusive. The

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<sup>22</sup>In the year of the interviews in the United States, the 2018 midterms were the most 'expensive' elections ever. The presidential elections of 2020 saw a slight decrease in contributions to PACs (Open Secrets 2020).

<sup>23</sup>Positive in the model "index", but not significant if control variables are included. Negative in the model "administration" but only if control variables are included.

answer to this puzzle is a prerequisite for designing effective regulation, both with respect to lobbyists and legislators and to public officials involved in the policy process. This puzzle also inspired this chapter.

I tested three sets of hypotheses that contain expected theoretical mechanisms between lobbying and corruption. The first concerns macro differences of political systems. I expected lower rates of corruption in systems with a consensus-oriented style of policymaking as opposed to systems with a majoritarian style of policymaking. There is a clear trend supporting this hypothesis, although the effect is not significant in every model. Lobbyists from Germany generally perceive less corruption, *c.p.*, than their American counterparts. This indicates that systems with a consensus-oriented style of policymaking are less affected by corruption.

Turning to the micro level, I argued that channels opened by lobbyists can be used for corrupt transactions. According to the hypothesis that lobbying and corruption are mutually inclusive, corrupt exchanges and exchanges in the context of lobbying can facilitate each other. In terms of the mutual exclusiveness logic, the counterhypothesis expects the opposite effect because lobbyists who already have access might not need to engage in corruption to achieve their goals. The results provide evidence for both alternatives. Better access to the executive branch is associated with more corruption, better access to the legislature with less corruption. Hence, this chapter cannot provide a clear answer to the question whether lobbying and corruption are mutually exclusive or inclusive. Rather it indicates that there are more specific logics behind different kinds of access. The same holds for influence, although the picture is less clear. American lobbyists seem to follow an either/or logic: The more influence they have, the less corruption they perceive – even though the effects indicating this are not very robust. Depending on the dependent variable, German lobbyists with more influence sometimes perceive more and sometimes less corruption. The causes of that could not be explored within the scope of this study.

The effect of money could not be completely disentangled either. There are some signs that the effect of money in politics is country-specific. Contributions seem to have a negative impact on US politics in the context of corruption but not on German politics. There is no general corrupting effect of contributions to parties, organizations, or politicians.

The few interaction effects that were found indicate – despite their weak statistical power (see figure A1 in appendix A.1) – that combining macro and micro factors

## *6. Lobbying and Corruption: Mutually Inclusive or Exclusive Activities?*

to explain corruption can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the practice. This suggests that lobbying regulation restricting lobbyists and legislators is not the only means to curb corruption. Rather, institutional characteristics can also be designed to facilitate advocacy by appropriate means. This will be addressed in more detail when I discuss possible avenues for regulation in chapter 9.

To conclude this chapter, I finally turn to the limitations. Three caveats limit the empirical generalizability of the results. Firstly, whereas the results can be considered as representative for German lobbyists, the US subsample is biased towards smaller companies and in favor of companies in NJ at the cost of companies in SC and CA. Since company size does not seem to play a role, the undersampling of large companies does not necessarily affect the results. However, they might be affected by unknown macro effects of New Jersey. Secondly, the statistical analyses refer to perceived corruption rather than experienced corruption, since none of the German companies reported illegitimate practices. Perception data, as discussed in chapter 4, usually overestimates rates of corruption, although lobbyists can be expected to exaggerate less (see also chapter 5). One consequence of using perception data is that it remains unclear if higher perceptions indicate that at least a marginal share of lobbyists use corrupt means to pursue their interests. Thirdly, a non-response bias of lobbyists involved in corruption should be expected. This would affect reported corruption but can also have an effect on perceived corruption.

# 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence

## 7.1. Introduction: Corporate Lobbying and Corporate Influence-Seeking

The analysis of corruption in the previous chapter focuses on lobbying-specific variables and company size. Previous research has shown that lobbying itself is not independent of company characteristics (see, e.g., Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Drope and W. L. Hansen 2006; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994). Expecting company characteristics to indirectly affect the relationship between lobbying and corruption, I will now analyze the lobbying-specific determinants that predicted corruption in the previous chapter, specifically access and financial contributions in section 7.2, self-attributed influence in section 7.3, and the decision to lobby indirectly in section 7.4.

Conceptualizing lobbying and corruption as mutually inclusive or exclusive activities implies a bidirectional relationship. In chapter 6, I predicted corruption with lobbying. To account for the bidirectionality, corruption is now introduced as a predictor of lobbying. This is also the dominant approach in existing studies (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009; Campos and Giovannoni 2007; Campos and Giovannoni 2017). Treating dependent and independent variables as interchangeable is generally inconsistent with a theory-guided or deductive research paradigm. This study is an exception for two reasons: The first is the theoretical framing of corruption and lobbying as two ways of seeking influence. A conception of these activities as mutually inclusive or exclusive always requires a counterpart. Thus, a model explaining one without the other would be incomplete in the context of this study. The second reason is the exchange approach pursued in this study. Exchanges are always at least bidirectional. Without a partner who has the option

## 7. *Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence*

to agree or disagree, there is no exchange. In an ideal data set, there would be a variable indicating if lobbyists opt for either corruption or lobbying as a means of influence-seeking. However, due to social desirability biases, legal restrictions (especially in the US), and various other obvious methodological problems with such a question, this is not feasible.

As a result, the models in this chapter do not disregard the causal mechanisms expressed in the hypotheses. Rather, they help to generate evidence for these hypotheses by combining different empirical strategies (triangulation).

This chapter builds on the literature at the intersection of interest group and corruption research (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009; Campos and Giovannoni 2007; Campos and Giovannoni 2017). The models are inspired by these studies and enhanced by more lobbying-specific factors. The differences between the studies are addressed in more detail in the introductions to the sections 7.3 and 7.4. In addition, there are two general differences: Firstly, the previous studies used a representative sample of companies from a larger set of transition economies or Eastern European countries. This book uses a sample comprising only actively lobbying companies from two affluent democracies as a representative sample of whole countries. Thus, the samples are not directly comparable. Secondly, because of its focus on influence-seeking, some variables in this chapter are more precisely operationalized. On the positive side, I use more specific operationalizations of lobbying-related variables. On the negative side, this impedes comparability. Thus, the findings of this study do not contradict or confirm previous studies. Rather, they extend current knowledge by a new set of countries and a more in-depth analysis.

Similar to chapter 6, significant effects are interpreted as well as effects that show clear tendencies, e.g., if unstandardized regression coefficients are constantly larger than their standard errors. I indicate if interpretations refer to insignificant effects. Usually, I refer to them as tendencies. I chose this approach because of a possible lack of statistical power for the US part of the sample and higher standard errors due to including both countries in a single analysis (cf. chapter 4; Halsey et al. 2015).

## 7.2. Which Companies Perform Better at Gaining Access?

The focus in this section is on access and financial contributions as means of lobbying or lobbying-related activities. As explained in chapter 3 and partly confirmed empirically in chapter 6 for corruption, access is a prerequisite of both corruption and lobbying (see also Goldberg 2018). This section empirically examines access in the context of lobbying. Whereas the previous chapter focuses on lobbying-specific determinants to explain corruption, this section highlights the role of company characteristics and characteristics of lobbyists to explain lobbying. With that strategy, I triangulate findings from chapter 6 to better understand if and when lobbying and corruption are mutually exclusive or inclusive.

### 7.2.1. Results

Professionalization is the best predictor of access regardless of the addressee (see figure 7.1<sup>1</sup>). In all models except for informal access, professional government affairs managers have better access than lobbyists, whose main job is different, e.g., Head of Corporate Communications. This also applies to companies that more often lobby directly. Further effects vary between the models.

US companies maintain better contacts with legislators (see also table A75 in appendix A.4). On average, personal access to legislators is 0.691 scale units lower for German companies. Companies with more employees have better personal access to the legislature. Lobbyists said they were talking frequently to the representatives of districts where their companies have large operations. Companies operating within more conflictual policy areas also maintain contacts with legislators more often. This model explains 45.2 percent of the variation of personal access to legislators.

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<sup>1</sup>The presented results refer to models in which – in addition to the listwise deletion of missing values – cases leading to violations of regression assumptions are excluded. In the model with the DV *personal access to legislators* four cases are removed, in the model with the DV *institutional access to the legislature* one case, in the model with the DVs *access to the executive branch* and *use of informal lobbying strategies* two cases each (see appendix A.4). The results are similar. Some of the significant variables in the presented models are significant at the 90 percent significance level in the original models only (see appendix A.4). Only the effect of "Sector: Manufacturing" in the model analyzing *institutional access to the legislature* becomes insignificant.

## 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence



*Note:* Pct. = Percentage; Govt. = Government.

Figure 7.1.: OLS regression results to predict access

## 7.2. Which Companies Perform Better at Gaining Access?

Bar for the effect of variables indicating professionalization of lobbying, institutional access to the legislature has different predictors than personal access to that branch. Companies with higher revenues more often participate in hearings or issue written statements. The negative effect of female lobbyists is surprising and might not be substantially meaningful because of possible response biases. However, it should be explored in further research to rule out possible discrimination (cf. Junk, Romeijn, and Rasmussen 2020). Generally, the lower adjusted R squared of 0.361 shows that there are fewer company-level predictors for institutional access than for personal access to the legislature.

The models predicting access to the executive branch and to the legislature (see also table A76 in appendix A.4) show different effects for company size. Higher revenues lead to better access, a higher number of employees to less access. These effects are significant at the 90 percent significance level only.<sup>2</sup> In addition to professionalization, operating in conflictual policy areas makes companies seek access to the executive branch more often. With an adjusted R squared of 0.329 the model explains access to the executive branch approximately as well as personal access to the legislature.

Predicting informal access is most difficult with company-level predictors. The model explains 15.4 percent of the variance only. It seems as if it is predominantly struggling companies that seek informal access. Compared to companies in moderate or good shape, companies describing their business situation as bad use informal contacts more often by about one half scale point. German lobbyists tend to report fewer informal contacts compared to US lobbyists; companies with a fixed yearly budget for lobbying tend to indicate more informal contacts than those without one. However, these effects are significant at the 90 percent level only.

Finally, figure 7.2 and table 7.1<sup>3</sup> show the prediction of financial contributions. Unsurprisingly, German companies are far<sup>4</sup> less likely to donate to or to sponsor parties and candidates compared to US companies. Companies with more employees are more likely to make contributions than companies with a smaller workforce. Older corporations are less likely to do so than younger ones. This implies that companies that already have gained access over the years do not need to 'buy ac-

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<sup>2</sup>The effect of revenues is significant in the model containing all cases.

<sup>3</sup>The first column shows the results of the original model. The second column shows the results for models without cases that lead to violations of regression assumptions. The presented numbers in the running text refer to the second.

<sup>4</sup>Odds Ratio (OR) = 0.0004864; additive inverse:  $\frac{1}{0.0004864} = 2055.922$ .

## 7. *Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence*

cess' anymore. Government affairs units with a regular yearly budget are less likely to donate money to PACs, parties, or candidates than those without a fixed budget.<sup>5</sup> Professional lobbyists are more likely to make contributions than those who have other responsibilities in addition to lobbying and/or no fixed yearly budget; female lobbyists are less likely to do so than male ones. While the first finding implies different logics of professionalization, again, the second should be addressed in more detail in future studies. Finally, companies describing their business situation as moderate are more likely to make financial contributions than companies in bad business shape. This effect does not hold for companies in a good business situation.

### 7.2.2. **Mechanisms of Corporate Access**

Access to the executive branch is the most important predictor of corruption as analyzed in 6. There, I focus on lobbying-specific characteristics with only some additional company traits. In this section, I have explored in more detail which company characteristics promote better access. Company size is no predictor of access to the executive branch *per se*. Larger companies in terms of revenue enjoy better access. Larger companies in terms of workforce have less access.

The executive branch converts political will and expert information into bills. In policy areas that are particularly marked by conflict, expert information becomes even more important. It can either be used to dilute the political will by influencing the technical execution of a law if it is unfavorable – choosing to address the executive venue (cf. Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Mazey and Richardson 2001) for counteractive lobbying at the executive branch, so to speak (cf. Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Austen-Smith and Wright 1996). Or, it can provide the technical expertise to promote a more favorable law (cf. Hall and Deardorff 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that companies that experience conflicts in the policy areas affecting their operations are more active at the executive branch. The same seems to be true for personal access to the legislature, although in a later stage of the policy cycle and probably less with technical expertise but with information about expected consequences or political preferences of the company.

Furthermore, the findings indicate that groups lobbying more directly and more professionally have better access. Both is intuitive and consistent with existing

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<sup>5</sup>OR = 0.0015; additive inverse:  $\frac{1}{OR} = 645.619$ .

7.2. Which Companies Perform Better at Gaining Access?

Table 7.1.: Binary logistic regression to predict financial contributions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Contributions	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-4.372** (1.443)	-7.628*** (2.308)
Revenue (ln)	-0.104 (0.294)	0.651 (0.590)
Employees (ln)	0.534 (0.315)	1.014* (0.510)
Age	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.032* (0.013)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.266 (0.755)	-0.656 (1.145)
Situation: Moderate	1.581* (0.739)	2.497* (1.082)
Situation: Good	-0.676 (0.530)	-1.032 (0.683)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.083 (0.333)	0.455 (0.467)
Competitive: Problem	1.106 (0.952)	
Fixed yearly budget: yes	-3.564** (1.326)	-6.470** (2.306)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.014)
Government affairs manager: yes	3.328* (1.388)	6.046** (2.200)
Gender: Female	-2.292* (1.042)	-5.918** (2.093)
Constant	0.120 (2.844)	-1.982 (4.073)
Observations	75	72
Log Likelihood	-32.373	-22.128
Akaike Inf. Crit.	92.746	70.255

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

## 7. *Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence*

findings by studies on access (e.g., Binderkrantz, P. M. Christiansen, and Pedersen 2015; Alves 2020). More indirect lobbying means more delegation to associations seeking access and influence. More time spent on lobbying results in better networks and more access points.

These findings suggest an indirect relationship between certain company characteristics and corruption. Companies that employ professional lobbyists and that are affected by policy areas with a lot of conflict have the kinds of access that are most closely associated with perceived corruption.

In contrast to policymakers in the executive branch, legislators need to take care of their constituencies. This might be the reason why large employers enjoy better access to them. Such companies are valuable contacts for politicians, especially for district representatives. Large companies are important for regional prosperity but also as political organizations. A company whose representatives feel it is well represented might inspire a feeling of being heard among its employees as well. This is good publicity for the representative and might improve their chances for reelection. As with the executive branch, professional lobbyists enjoy better access to the legislature than other lobbyists.

I found in chapter 6 that lobbyists with better institutional access to the legislature perceive less corruption of decision-makers. Testifying in committees or submitting written statements is mainly done by professional lobbyists and companies that generate higher revenues. It is not surprising that companies with professionalized lobbying units and greater economic impact are invited to sessions of committees or to submit written testimonies. However, there is no reason to assume that these mechanisms moderate effects on perceived corruption.

Informal access and financial contributions show some system variation in the perception of corruption (see chapter 6). Both is more common in the USA. Apart from that, there is non-robust evidence that German lobbyists with better informal access perceive more corruption, whereas US lobbyists with informal access perceive less. Companies that are in a bad business situation seek informal contacts. It is reasonable to assume that those are especially inclined to use corruption as a last resort if lobbying does not help anymore. Yet, statistical uncertainty is too high to draw a definite conclusion.

7.2. Which Companies Perform Better at Gaining Access?




Figure 7.2.: Metric effects on financial contributions

## 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence

The opposite trend is true for financial contributions. German companies donating to parties perceive less corruption whereas US companies perceive more. Companies with more employees are more likely to make contributions.<sup>6</sup> Older companies are less likely to donate to PACs, parties, or candidates than younger ones. Further predictors are statistically or theoretically inconclusive. Apart from the statistical uncertainty, there is also causal uncertainty in this case. Contributions might corrupt policymaking. But companies might also stop making contributions because of corruption.

Are there any company characteristics that might indirectly predict corruption? No, not in general terms. The results support findings from the previous chapter that lobbyists rate corruption in the executive and the legislative branch differently. access to both branches is determined by the level of professionalization of government affairs units and conflicts in the policy areas in which companies operate. So, it is not variables behind access but the contact with the branches itself that determines the level of (perceived) corruption. Indirectly, revenue and the size of the workforce can affect corruption because they predict different types of access. Yet, they have no direct effect on perceived corruption as shown in chapter 6. These results, especially for the number of employees, are contingent upon the regression coefficient being independent from the US sample, in which companies with fewer employees are underrepresented (see table A21 in chapter 5).

### 7.3. Strong Companies Lobby, Weak Companies Bribe? Determinants of Influence

Following the finding of Bennedsen et al. that *strong companies lobby and weak companies bribe* (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009), I compare the determinants of corruption with determinants of influence in this section. Campos and Giovannoni (2007 and 2017) found that more corrupt companies are less likely to be members of an association and that corrupt companies perceive themselves as neither more nor less influential compared to compliant companies. Bennedsen et al. (2009) found that larger companies are more influential but less involved in corruption. In that study, there was also no causal effect of corruption on influ-

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<sup>6</sup>The result that larger companies do not contribute more to PACs is consistent with findings from past studies on corporate contributions (e.g. Boies 1989; Masters and Baysinger 1985).

ence. These results refer to countries with economies in transition and to Eastern European countries.

There are several differences between this book and the three papers mentioned above. This study uses a data set with a smaller number of cases and only two countries. While the dependent variable, self-attributed influence, is operationalized identically, there are some differences regarding the operationalizations of the predictors. The proxies I use, apart from the age of a company, differ from the proxies used in the previous studies.

The country dummy captures *institutional differences* such as the government system (cf. Campos and Giovannoni 2007; see all operationalizations in more detail in section 4.4). The ordered index of perceptions of corruption proxies the extent to which lobbyists see corruption as a problem in interest intermediation. This variable targets a different locus of corruption than the questions whether corruption is a threat to the growth of a company (as used in Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009) or about the amount of money spent on bribes (as used in *ibid.*) or gifts to public officials (as used in Campos and Giovannoni 2017). All operationalizations have methodological advantages and disadvantages. In section 4.4, I argue that the perception data that explicitly refers to the interest intermediation system is a valid proxy for corruption in the context of lobbying. Unlike the World Bank data that was used in the above-mentioned studies, this perception index is based on expert knowledge of lobbyists. The variable *number of competitors* (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009) is replaced by a dummy indicating whether competition is one of the top three business obstacles. Instead of the large companies indices of the World Bank, I refer to revenue and the number of employees. Finally, the economic sector is measured by one dummy for the manufacturing sector because the cases do not create enough variation for more than one dummy.<sup>7</sup>

Since this chapter focuses on company-level predictors, I added additional variables containing information about the professionalization of lobbying in a company and about the business environment. The first additional variable is the degree to which lobbyists indicated that the policy area(s) in which the company operates are marked by *conflict*, followed by the *business situation* and a dummy indicating

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<sup>7</sup>Further independent variables (private firm, foreign owned and exporting firm dummies) are not excluded due to missing availability. The lobbying dummy is not applicable in this study because all interviewees lobby. The GINI coefficient and the GDP per capita as macro variables are not meaningful in this study because both the USA and Germany are wealthy countries. The same holds for the closed list dummy because neither Germany nor the USA have pure closed list election systems (cf. Campos and Giovannoni 2017).

## 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence

whether the company has a *fixed yearly budget* for lobbying. Two further dummies indicate whether the interviewee is a professional *government affairs manager* and the *gender* of the interviewee.

### 7.3.1. Results

Figure 7.3 presents the results of the OLS regression predicting *influence on the legislature*.<sup>8</sup> includes variables used in the previous studies on lobbying and corruption and model 3 (M3) includes further lobbying-specific, lobbyist-specific, and company-specific variables. None of the models perform well. M1 does not explain more variance than the arithmetic mean (see also tables A77 and A85 in appendix A.4). The inclusion of more variables improves the models considerably, explaining up to 34.8 percent of the variation.<sup>9</sup>

Generally, the effect of corruption seems to be positive. Lobbyists who consider corruption to be at least a little problem are more influential by 0.72 scale units than those who do not perceive corruption as a problem at all. A one scale unit increase in corruption of decision-makers raises the influence of companies by 0.34. Yet, the negative effect of lobbyists who consider corruption to be less than a little problem casts doubt on the linearity of the effect.<sup>10</sup> However, the difference to lobbyists who perceive no corruption is insignificant in the models analyzing influence on the legislature.

Access does not predict influence. Even though personal access to legislators has a positive effect in model 4 (M4), the effect is too weak and not robust enough to merit interpretation. The only significant strategy is the use of informal types


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<sup>8</sup>In addition to the listwise exclusion of missing cases, I excluded one further case in the models predicting influence on the legislature (model with categorical corruption variable; M1 and M3), four cases in the model with the metric corruption (M2 and M4) variables as well as three in the model predicting influence on the executive branch (model with categorical corruption variable; M1 and M3) and two in the model with the metric corruption variable (M2 and M4) because of violations of regression assumptions (see appendix A.4). The effect of corruption of decision-makers in M2 and M4 are not significant ( $b > se$ ) in the original models. In M3 the significance level of *Govt. affairs manager: yes* drops to 90 percent. In M3 (executive branch) *Corruption: >A little bit* ( $b > se$ ), *Use of informal strategies* ( $b > se$ ), *Financial contributions* (same sign) and *Situation: Moderate* ( $b > se$ ) become insignificant. The same holds for the effect of corruption of decision-makers in M2 and M4 for the models analyzing influence on the legislature (same sign).

<sup>9</sup>M2 and M4 use a different metric operationalization of corruption. The table for the fixed and the original model can be found in appendix A.4.

<sup>10</sup>Often, such lobbyists said that there are some black sheep as in every profession but that there is no general problem.

### 7.3. Strong Companies Lobby, Weak Companies Bribe?



*Note:* Pct. = Percentage; Cor. = Corruption; Pers. access to leg. = Personal access to legislators; Inst. access to leg. = Institutional access to the legislature; exe. = executive branch; Use of informal strat. = Use of informal lobbying strategies; Govt. = Government. In M1 and M3 the ordinal corruption variable is included, in M2 and M4 the metric corruption variable is included.

Figure 7.3.: OLS regression results to predict influence on the legislature

## 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence

of access. The more often companies use informal strategies, the more influence they exert. The same holds for professional lobbyists: If interviewees indicated that they are mainly responsible for lobbying, they are more influential. However, this effect is significant at the 90 percent level in M3 only and insignificant in M4. The company size does not seem to be important.

The models 5 through 8 analyzing *influence at the executive branch* follow the same logic concerning the variable selection (see figure 7.4). The more restricted model performs better than for legislative influence but with adjusted R squares of around 0.08 it still does not explain much of the variation (see tables A79 and A87 in appendix A.4). The only significant predictor is revenue. The higher a company's revenue, the more influence lobbyists have. This effect disappears as soon as I introduce additional variables.

The models improve considerably through the additional variables. The effect of revenue becomes insignificant. The adjusted R squared climbs to 0.576 (table A79 in appendix A.4) with a lowest explanation of variance of 43.3 percent (table A88 in appendix A.4).

The effects of the ordered corruption index (M5 through M8) are similar to the models analyzing influence on the legislature. This provides further evidence that the effect of corruption is not linear. The influence of lobbyists perceiving corruption as less than a little problem is 0.505 scale units lower than that of lobbyists who do not perceive any corruption at all. However, compared to the latter, lobbyists perceiving at least a little bit of corruption rate themselves as more influential by 0.427 scale units. The sign of the metric corruption variable has changed to negative (see M7 and M8 and table A80 in appendix A.4) and the effect has become insignificant.<sup>11</sup>

The frequency of access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of being influential there. Lobbyists with constant access – compared to lobbyists without access – are more than more influential by 2.5 units, c.p. This can explain half of the influence-scale. The use of informal strategies proves helpful in exerting influence, as it was the case with the legislature.<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, financial contributions reduce influence.


Companies considering their business situation to be moderate have more influence at the executive branch whereas companies in a good situation have less.

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<sup>11</sup> $b > se$

<sup>12</sup>Not significantly so in M8 and in the models with all cases.

### 7.3. Strong Companies Lobby, Weak Companies Bribe?



*Note:* Pct. = Percentage; Cor. = Corruption; Pers. access to leg. = Personal access to legislators; Inst. access to leg. = Institutional access to the legislature; exe. = executive branch; Use of informal strat. = Use of informal lobbying strategies; Govt. = Government. In M5 and M7 the ordinal corruption variable is included, in M6 and M8 the metric corruption variable is included.

Figure 7.4.: OLS regression results to predict influence on the executive branch

## 7. *Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence*

Female lobbyists perceive themselves as less influential at the executive branch than their male counterparts.

### 7.3.2. **Predicting Influence**

This section provides two important insights into the relationship between corruption and influence. The first relates to the predictions of influence on the basis of corruption. Concerning both government branches, it is the lobbyists considering corruption as at least a little problem who see themselves as more influential. This is also true for the metric variable in the models analyzing influence at the legislature. The second relates to factors that predict both influence and corruption.

Secondly, it is striking that the models predicting corruption at different branches of government and those predicting influence at different branches of government work in a similar way. In both analyses, the mechanisms for the legislature are considerably harder to predict. This might have to do with the dilution of power within the legislature. Individual legislators are – as theoretically expected (cf. chapter 2) – rarely powerful enough to determine policy outcomes. In chapter 6, influence on the legislature generally tends to increase corruption, albeit insignificantly.

Comparing the predictors of legislative corruption and influence on the legislature, that is, the predictors of the two modes of influence under investigation, there are further notable similarities and differences. US lobbyists tend to perceive more corruption and influence. In all models the regression coefficients are negative and their absolute values are mostly larger than their standard errors. Both ways of influence-seeking have a positive effect on each other.

Access works differently. Access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of corruption at the legislative branch. Yet, it cannot predict influence at the legislature. Access to legislators, whether personal or institutional, reduces the perception of corruption, but personal access increases influence. Informal access increases influence but has an inconclusive effect on corruption. Thus, these analyses also fail to provide clear evidence on whether lobbying and corruption are mutually exclusive or inclusive activities, although the direct positive statistical association persists.

There are more similarities regarding the executive branch. Access to the executive branch and informal lobbying strategies increase scores of both corruption and influence. Being in a moderate business situation as a company or being a woman as an interviewee generates lower corruption and influence scores than being in a bad

business situation or a man, respectively. Interestingly, corruption has a positive effect on influence – at least considering the categorical index. However, influence at the executive branch has a weak and insignificant but constantly negative effect on corruption. From a methodological perspective, this shows that the models do not seem to be redundant and that the models partial out differently. From a substantive perspective, it shows that the mutual-exclusiveness logic is unidirectional. Influential lobbyists do not need corruption. However, corruption might help to exert influence. The positive effect of access confirms the theoretical expectation that access is a prerequisite for both influence-seeking activities (cf. Goldberg 2018).

This section shows that lobbying-specific characteristics are more important for exerting influence than company characteristics. Although companies' economic weight might be a door-opener, access is the crucial good lobbyists have. Companies that have a government affairs unit with professional lobbyists are also more likely to be influential.

In addition to the findings on the relationship of corruption and lobbying there are also some insights concerning corporate political influence. That access precedes influence is partly confirmed in this study (cf. Baumgartner, Berry, et al. 2009; Mahoney 2007). Access to the executive branch substantially increases influence at the executive branch. The fact that the executive branch is often the place where policies are drafted confirms Klüver's findings (2013) that lobbying as early in the policy cycle as possible promises the best influence on policy outcomes. However, it is not possible to finally conclude if influence at the executive branch also means that lobbyist think that they have influence on the policy finally adopted. Personal access to legislators tends to increase influence at the legislature. However, it is not statistically significant. Institutional access to the legislature does not predict influence.<sup>13</sup> The use of informal strategies helps to exert influence both at the legislative and the executive branch. Additionally, moderately healthy companies seem to be more influential whereas companies in good shape are rather less influential. This might have to do with the fact that struggling companies that are not completely doomed receive most government support. Yet, this is only speculation, which should be addressed in further research. Existing research has found that economic power plays a role (e.g., Klüver 2013). Yet, this role is still not completely understood. The missing effect of company size supports studies that found no gen-

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<sup>13</sup>Neither does conflict, which differs from the findings of Mahoney (2007) as well as Baumgartner et al. (2009) but confirms Klüver's results (2013). Note that this can be a consequence of different operationalization of the predictor and the DV.

## 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence

eral advantage of the wealthy and economically mighty (cf. Baumgartner, Berry, et al. 2009). Unsurprisingly, lobbyists who spend more or all of their time lobbying are also more influential. This can be explained by their professionalization and the time spent on building and using networks. Finally, female lobbyists tend to be less influential. Unless this is an artifact of a biased response scheme, e.g., that male lobbyists systematically see themselves as more influential, this suggests that interest intermediation processes are somehow discriminatory. With the available data, it is not possible to distinguish between a possible response bias and the true effect, unfortunately.

### 7.4. Which Companies Lobby Directly?

In their studies analyzing lobbying, corruption, and political influence, Campos and Giovannoni (2017 and 2007) proxied lobbying as membership in a trade association because a direct measure of direct or indirect lobbying was not available (Campos and Giovannoni 2017, p. 924; Campos and Giovannoni 2007, pp. 5–6). The analysis in this section uses a direct measure of direct lobbying: the percentages of the topics lobbyists pursue directly and via associations, respectively.<sup>14</sup>

Percentages are truncated on the left and on the right side and can cause model misspecifications if a standard linear regression is employed (Long 1997, pp. 187–216; Cameron and Trivedi 2013, pp. 128–35). Thus, I use a censored regression model. It is a special type of tobit regression (Tobin 1958) allowing a dependent variable censored on both sides (Henningsen 2010, p. 2) such as in the case of percentages.<sup>15</sup> The variable selection follows the same logic as in the previous section.

Figure 7.5 shows the results of the censored regressions (see also tables A81 and A82 in appendix A.4).<sup>16</sup> Model 9 and 11, again, show variables used in the studies of (2009) and Campos and Giovannoni (2007 and 2017). Models 10 and 12 include the additional variables introduced above. The first two models include the ordered categorical corruption index as predictor. The latter two include the metric index of corruption of decision-makers.

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<sup>14</sup>Original wording: Please estimate the percentage of topics you lobby through the trade association and the percentage of topics you lobby directly (see questionnaires in appendix B).

<sup>15</sup>Tables A89 and A90 in appendix A.4 show the results for OLS regressions.

<sup>16</sup>The presented models are the amended models again. The regression diagnosis shows one problematic case (see appendix A.4). The effect of *Corruption*: <A little bit becomes insignificant (b > se)

### 7.4.1. Results

The models do not explain much of the variation. Companies that perceive less than a little bit of corruption more often lobby indirectly. This finding is significant in M11 only but the positive sign persists in all models. This effect is not linear as the negative sign for companies that perceive at least a little bit of corruption indicates. This effect is negative and insignificant in all models. All this refers to the reference category of lobbyists who perceive no corruption. The metric corruption index does not predict direct lobbying.

Companies that rate themselves as more influential at the executive branch tend to lobby more directly. This effect is significant at no more than the 90 percent level. Furthermore, companies belonging to the manufacturing sector lobby more indirectly. The remaining variables do not predict direct lobbying.

### 7.4.2. Causes of Direct Lobbying

Lobbyists' perceptions of corruption proxy the occurrence of corruption in the interest intermediation system. I use this proxy to predict the share of direct lobbying to better understand the relationship between corruption and lobbying.

Companies that perceive less than a little bit of corruption delegate lobbying more often to associations, a mechanism similarly found by Campos and Giovannoni (2007). Further effects found by the authors, e.g., that older companies and larger companies lobby more than younger and smaller ones, could not be confirmed in this study. This difference is presumably caused by the different sampling strategies. Bennedsen et al. (2009) and Campos and Giovannoni (2007 and 2017) use representative samples of populations including all companies in a given country whereas the sample in this study consists of a population of actively lobbying companies only. Furthermore, the data for this book relates more specifically to corruption in the interest intermediation sector. This comes at the cost of the variables used here not being directly comparable to the operationalizations of corruption in the other studies.

## 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence



*Note:* Infl. = Influence. In M9 and M11 the ordinal corruption variable is included, in M10 and M12 the metric corruption variable is included.

Figure 7.5.: Censored regression to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying

The results also contradict findings from previous research, e.g., that larger companies (e.g., Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994; Boies 1989), companies operating in conflictual policy areas (e.g., Bruycker 2017<sup>17</sup>), and companies experiencing business problems (Lowery and Gray 1998; Aizenberg and Hanegraaff 2020) lobby more often directly.<sup>18</sup>

The significant effect as well as the sign of the metric index indicate that companies that perceive more corruption delegate lobbying more to associations. This would indicate a mutual-exclusiveness logic. However, the effect is not linear and weak so that this finding should not be viewed as conclusive.

This section provides evidence that the assumption that strong companies tend to lobby more whereas weak companies tend to engage more in corruption cannot be confirmed by this study. In democracies with a well-developed and institutionalized interest group intermediation system, this mutual-exclusiveness logic is not as clear as in Eastern European countries (Campos and Giovannoni 2017) or in transition economies (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009; Campos and Giovannoni 2007). There is evidence that companies lobby less directly if they perceive corruption as a problem. Yet, this has nothing to do with other company characteristics referring to *strength*, such as the number of employees or revenue. However, this difference might be caused by different sampling strategies. The sampling used in the present studies truncates *weak* companies since it contains only actively lobbying companies. In this sample of rather *strong* companies, the variation of *strength* does not explain differences in the choice of the two modes of influence-seeking. Furthermore, it seems that other company characteristics than strength matter more, e.g., companies from the manufacturing sector lobby more indirectly whereas the two variables measuring professionalization – a fixed yearly budget and professional lobbyists – tend to increase direct lobbying. However, the latter two effects are not significant and should be addressed in further studies.

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<sup>17</sup>There are further issue characteristics determining the decision to lobby independently that could not be considered in the chapter. For an overview, see Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2019.

<sup>18</sup>I have not controlled for the organizations' capacity to convert multiple, possibly diverging, interests into an association's position that represents all members (Lowery and Gray 1998; Aizenberg and Hanegraaff 2020; Chalmers 2020).

## 7.5. Corruption and Corporate Lobbying Activities

Two questions inspired this chapter: First, are *lobbying- or company-specific characteristics* more important to understand influence-seeking? Second, are lobbying and corruption *mutually inclusive or mutually exclusive*? To answer the second question – the main research interest – this chapter has undertaken the second of three steps of a triangulation addressing it.

### 7.5.1. Lobbying-specific or Company-specific Characteristics?

Company specifics are important determinants of the choice of strategies and the quality *access*. Concerning *influence*, the question is not easy to answer. Lobbying-specific characteristics provide a larger variety of factors that can lead to influence. This is especially true for the executive branch. However, factors that are not lobbying-specific explain more of the variance. Taken together, there are *more* lobbying-specific factors, but *stronger* company-specific factors explaining influence.

Concerning the decision to *lobby directly*, it is mostly company characteristics that explain whether companies lobby on their own or delegate it to association. Influence is also associated with direct lobbying. However, the causal order could also be reverse, e.g., that more direct lobbying leads to more influence. The fact that company characteristics are more important is not surprising. Once companies decide to lobby directly, this leads to the installation of a professional lobbying unit, which, in turn, might lead to better access and influence. Once the unit operates, direct lobbying and access are mutually dependent.

### 7.5.2. Mutually Exclusive or Inclusive Activities? Revisited

To triangulate whether lobbying and corruption are mutually inclusive or exclusive activities I have analyzed predictors of access in a first step. Access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of corruption. Better access there leads to more perceived corruption indicating a *mutually inclusive* relationship between lobbying corruption. Higher revenues, professional lobbyists, and more direct lobbying make access easier. The latter reduces perceptions of corruption. This indicates different logics between access and the decision to lobby independently. Whereas access is a prerequisite for both influence and corruption (Goldberg 2018) and thus for being

able to observe corruption in the interest intermediation system, the decision to lobby alone might be affected by corruption, as the results of section 7.4 indicate. Consequently, if companies think that integrity in the interest-intermediation system is high, they do not fear negative consequences, e.g., from the public, when they lobby. If this proves to be true, there would be a *mutual-exclusiveness* logic at work.

Personal access to legislators insignificantly reduces the perception of corruption in the legislature and has no effect on corruption elsewhere. Institutional access to legislators significantly reduces the corruption of decision-makers. These trends point weakly at a *mutual-exclusiveness* logic. Personal access, firstly, is determined by the number of employees, which has no effect on corruption. German lobbyists have less access but also reported a lower perception of corruption. Finally, government affairs managers enjoy better access. The effects predicting institutional access are completely different from those predicting corruption except for direct lobbying, which predicts both. More direct lobbying increases the chance to appear in hearings or to submit written statements and reduces the perception of corruption, which supports a mutual-exclusiveness logic concerning the legislative branch.

German lobbyists are both less likely to seek personal access and to perceive corruption. This system difference does not really provide any information about the relationship between corruption and lobbying. However, it might be important concerning informal strategies and financial contributions. The former tend to reduce perceptions of corruption in the US but to increase them in Germany. For the latter the opposite is true. Both strategies are more common in the United States. Thus, employing such influence-seeking activities might have to do with the image of money in politics and informal practices in political systems. As a result, this would not universally support or reject a mutual-exclusiveness or -inclusiveness logic. Thus, the findings concerning informal access and financial contributions are *inconclusive*.

For influence at the executive branch and corruption of the executive branch the empirical results show differences and similarities as well. In both cases, access to the executive branch is the driving factor. Another lobbying strategy that has a positive effect on both is the use of informal access. Companies in a good business situation perceive less corruption and rate themselves as less influential. The same holds for female interviewees. Thus far, the similarities indicate a *mutually inclu-*

## 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence

*sive* relationship. Further variables show no systemic pattern contributing to an understanding of whether both ways of influence-seeking reinforce or replace each other, except for one. The puzzle with influence and corruption at the executive branch is that predictors indicate a mutually inclusive or a non-relationship. But the independent variables of central interest – influence on corruption and vice versa – show different mechanisms. Lobbyists with less influence insignificantly but constantly perceive less corruption. However, lobbyists who perceive more corruption see themselves as more influential, clearly indicating a *mutual-exclusiveness* logic. Hence, the results concerning influence at the executive branch are *inconclusive*.

Unfortunately, the results for the legislature are inconclusive as well. Here, the relationship between influence at the legislative branch and the perception of corruption at the legislative branch support a *mutual-inclusiveness* logic. In both chapters, influence and corruption have a positive statistical association. However, person-based access has a negative effect on the perception of corruption and a positive but insignificant effect on influence. This indicates a *mutual-exclusiveness* logic. All further variables show no clear differences or similarities, which suggests that there is no causal relationship between lobbying and corruption concerning influence-seeking at the legislative branch.

### 7.5.3. Concluding Remarks

This chapter provides further evidence that the relationship between lobbying and corruption cannot simply be classified as mutually inclusive or exclusive. It is far more complex. Table 7.2 extends the summary of findings from chapter 6 and presents an overview of the results of the previous two chapters.<sup>19</sup> Note that this refers to the overall tendencies and that single coefficients in some models might not confirm these patterns.

Most importantly, this study finds direct and significant statistical associations between lobbying and corruption. However, these relationships do not follow unambiguous patterns. Concerning the executive branch, there is strong evidence that influential lobbyists do not believe corruption to be a necessary – or even possible – way of influence-seeking. Likewise, more corruption would be attempted only if

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<sup>19</sup>German and female lobbyists tend to have a negative effect on both corruption and lobbying. However, these variables cannot explain lobbying- or company-specific characteristics in the case of the system dummy or are subject to a response bias in the case of gender. *Government Affairs Manager: yes* is absent because it was not used in the models in chapter 6.

they fail to exert influence. Concerning the legislature, the mechanism is different. Here, the only plausible explanation of the positive association is that corruption leads to influence. This contradicts the hypothesized direction and any of the other lobbying-specific results, e.g., for access. One reason could be that the variance of influence remaining when access is partialled out is exerted influence regardless of the mode of influence-seeking, that is, lobbying or corruption. In any case, the puzzling result should be addressed in further research.

Company characteristics do not contribute much to an understanding of whether corruption and lobbying are mutually inclusive or exclusive. The only similarity – that companies in a moderate situation see themselves as more influential and perceive more corruption than other companies, – is plausible if a do-or-die-strategy is assumed. However, it is also likely, maybe even more likely, that unobserved factors causing the business situation are the true factors behind this effect.

Lobbying-specific characteristics shed some light on the relationship between lobbying and corruption. Lobbyists engaging frequently with the executive branch are more influential but also perceive more corruption. This corresponds to findings that influence on venues within the executive branch also promise influence on policy outcomes (Klüver 2013) and that the executive branch is the typical venue of corruption (e.g. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016 for an overview, van Klaveren 1999 for the US and Wolf 2014, p. 36 for Germany). The legislative branch is subject to greater public and mutual control, which makes it harder to corrupt somebody. Furthermore, many legislators must be bribed to affect an outcome. This might indicate why there is the weak and negative association between lobbying the legislature and corruption. However, the weak positive association between legislative influence and corruption raises new questions and contradicts the theoretical expectations. To rule out measurement errors or uncontrolled variables behind that effect, this association should be investigated in further research.

The present study adds new and different results to the literature on lobbying and corruption. However, these differences to previous studies should not be overinterpreted. Firstly, the studies use different operationalizations. Latent constructs are operationalized differently. Secondly, the contexts in which variables were gathered differ. The World Bank surveys are omnibuses with many different questions. The questionnaire for this study was specifically designed for expert interviews with lobbyists. Thus, I could include more lobbying-specific variables. And interview effects are different compared to omnibus surveys. Thirdly, in contrast to existing stud-

## *7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence*

ies, my sample consists of actively lobbying companies only and omits politically inactive companies or companies that lobby only via memberships in associations. Thus, being a weak company refers to a different set of companies. The companies in my study still belong to the top companies in the respective country. And finally and most importantly, I use a different selection of countries. Whereas Bennedsen et al. (2009) and Campos and Giovannoni (2007 and 2017) analyzed lobbying and corruption in transition economies and Eastern European countries, the number of countries in the present study is lower and the countries both wealthier and longer established democracies. Thus, the results do not supersede existing results, they add to them.

Given that most of these models originally suffer from cases violating model assumptions, the 'law-like' relationship that linear regressions suggest should be rejected here. It indicates that there are some extreme cases that do not fit a linear relationship. However, this is likely to reflect the reality. Corruption is an extreme incident. Thus, extreme cases are not surprising. As explained in chapter 4, extreme positions can range from the general and total negation of corruption as a problem in interest intermediation to a perception that corruption is everywhere. Thus, the results reflect what some interviews already hinted at. The fact that they cannot be generalized to cover all extreme cases does not impede the general implications of this study.

Apart from that, this chapter contributes to different strands of research on lobbying. Firstly, the determinants of corporate access: Companies experiencing conflict in the policy areas they usually work in are more likely to seek and gain access. The same holds for lobbyists working in a professionalized government affairs unit. Finally, larger employers find it easier to gain personal access to legislators. Furthermore, the results indicate system differences between the US and Germany, especially concerning informal contacts and financial contributions. Due to the low number of observations from the United States, system differences should be addressed in further research.

The second contribution concerns the determinants of (self-attributed) influence. Unsurprisingly, the most important predictor of influence is access. However, I show that not all kinds of access are of similar value. In addition to personal access to each of the government branches, informal contacts can explain influence at both branches, institutional access does not explain influence at all. Companies experiencing some business problems perceive themselves as more influential. The

same holds for professional lobbyists. In addition to these common predictors in interest group research I show that corruption can also predict influence. However, the effect is not linear and different for the executive and the legislative branches. The perception of a lot of corruption tends to increase self-attributed influence. The specific mechanism is explored in chapter 8 and should be addressed in future research.

Thirdly, the determinants of indirect lobbying: This study could not thoroughly explain the decision to lobby independently. Accordingly, none of the predictors that explain direct lobbying in Washington or the European Union can be confirmed for lobbying in the American states or in Berlin. In the models presented in this chapter, corruption – at least as an ordered variable – is the strongest predictor of delegating lobbying to an association. The evidence is partly robust only and should be explored further. Moreover, manufacturing companies lobby more indirectly, whereas companies with a professional lobbying unit tend to lobby more directly.

These results are contingent on the absence of response biases that over- or underestimate self-attributed influence or of some form of self-justification concerning professional lobbyists. The same, of course, holds for differences that the gender variable implies. The biases in the perception of corruption should not affect the interpretation of models concerning the two branches of government since the biases can be expected to be constant across both of them.

## 7. Corporate Lobbying Activities and Corporate Influence

	Mutually exclu- sive	Mutually inclu- sive	Inconclusive/ No relationship
Direct comparisons			
<b>Corruption/ In- fluence</b>	Executive branch	Legislature	–
<b>Corruption/ Lobbying</b>	Independent branches	of –	–
Predictors: company characteristics			
<b>Company size</b>	–	–	Both branches
<b>Age</b>	–	–	Both branches
<b>Sector</b>	–	–	Both branches
<b>Business situa- tion</b>	–	Both branches ("Moderate" situation only)	Both branches ("Good" situa- tion only)
<b>Conflict</b>	–	–	Both branches
<b>Competition</b>	–	–	Both branches
<b>yearly budget</b>	–	–	Both branches
Predictors: lobbying characteristics			
<b>Formal access</b>	Legislature	Executive branch	–
<b>Informal access</b>	Both branches (US only)	Both branches (GER only)	–
<b>Institutional ac- cess</b>	–	–	Both branches
<b>Contributions</b>	Both branches (GER only)	Both branches (US only)	–

*Note:* Formal access refers to access to the executive branch or personal access to legislators in the respective branches. Corruption/ Influence refers to the mutual empirical relationships in the models for the respective branches in chapters 6 and 7. Corruption/ Lobbying refers to section 7.4.

Table 7.2.: Summary of findings of the quantitative analyses

# 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

## 8.1. Introduction: Lobbyists' Differentiation and Definitions of Lobbying and Corruption

The quantitative empirical analyses have provided mixed evidence for the hypotheses so far. Accordingly, there is also mixed evidence on whether corruption and lobbying as two ways of seeking influence are mutually exclusive, mutually inclusive, or if they have no relationship at all. This chapter presents quotes of lobbyists to explain some of the inconsistencies in the quantitative results and to assess how lobbyists define corruption (section 8.2) and lobbying (section 8.3) and how they distinguish between lobbying and corruption (section 8.4).<sup>1</sup> This is the third and last step of triangulating for a comprehensive interpretation of the data.

In addition to the contributions to the quantitative analysis of this study, the qualitative data from lobbyists show if the theoretical approach of this study is applicable to real-world situations. The theoretical approach relies on an exchange framework and distinguishes corruption from lobbying as a deviation from formal duties for personal gain (see chapter 2).

Furthermore, the chapter shows that the call for more qualitative research on corruption (Heywood 2015, p. 146; Trapnell 2015) is justified. Combining qualitative and quantitative data helps to address some caveats of the quantitative approaches. This is especially true if researchers apply perception-based measures (cf. section 4.4). The results indicate that the lobbyists' conceptualizations of lobbying and corruption affect how they perceive corruption.

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<sup>1</sup>Note that the instructions to define corruption and to distinguish between lobbying and corruption appeared in the web survey only. They were the last two items in that questionnaire. In the personal interview, I raised them as prompts, in most cases after the batteries on perceived corruption as last questions of the interview (last page of the questionnaires in appendix B) or if interviewees asked what I understood as corruption or lobbying.

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

I coded the three broader topics – the definition of corruption, the definition of lobbying, and the distinction between them – inductively (Roulston 2014, p. 305; cf. Krippendorff 2013). In a first step, I gathered all statements from the transcripts or the notes referring to one of these three topics. The lengths of these statements range from single clauses to whole paragraphs. In a second step, I classified statements by assigning codes to them for each distinct aspect so that each statement was coded at least once. Statements addressing several aspects were assigned several codes. Thus, an ID can occur more than once. Thirdly, once all statements were coded, I collapsed duplicate or very similar codes into one. In total, two rounds of revision were necessary to arrive at theoretically distinct categories without duplicates (Roulston 2014, p. 305, cf. Krippendorff 2013).<sup>2</sup>

The reported quotes are representative for the categories. Differences between statements regard the loci, the means, the aims, and the initiators of corruption and lobbying. That way, it is possible to analyze if there are corruption-specific or lobbying-specific characteristics to the respective exchanges. The categories allow me to analyze if different conceptions of how to define or to distinguish between lobbying and corruption affect lobbyists' perception of corruption. To make the nominal categories usable in a regression predicting perceptions of corruption, I dichotomized the categories. The value *1* means that the category applies to the statement of the lobbyist (see tables A96 to A98 in appendix A.5).

This chapter presents models for the three index-variables. The first is the ordered *index* of all corruption variables. The second is the metric index *policy institutions*, referring to institutions. Finally, the third is the metric index *corruption of decision-makers*, referring to individuals. I have selected these three variables because they show all mechanisms. The results for individual variables can be found in appendix A.5. The sections in this chapter proceed as follows: In the first part, I provide an overview of the most frequently mentioned definitions of and ways to distinguish between lobbying and corruption. In the second part, I show how different conceptualizations affect the perceptions of corruption. The models contain the most frequently mentioned categories of statements.

Note that the American interviews were not recorded due to the moderate response to the study. Recording the interviewees should not be another reason deterring them from participating. I gathered the quotes from US lobbyists from notes taken during the computer assisted phone interviews or during the face-to-

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<sup>2</sup>Since the author was the only coder, an assessment of the reliability is not feasible.




Figure 8.1.: Percentages of categorized definitions of corruption by lobbyists

face interviews. Most German interviewees allowed recordings. Just two of them refused to be taped. Data from the web survey is not affected by the refusal of or consent to a recording. For ease of presentation, I translated the German quotes. The original statements are in the footnotes.

## 8.2. How Lobbyists Define Corruption

Following Nye (1967), I defined corruption as "behavior, which deviates from the formal duties of a [...] role because of private-regarding [...] pecuniary or status gains; or violates the rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (Nye 1967, p. 419). The definitions of the interviewed lobbyists<sup>3</sup> refer to different aspects of this definition but also add new characteristics tailored to influence-seeking activities.

### 8.2.1. Different Definitions of Corruption

Figure 8.1 shows some country differences regarding the definition of corruption. To some extent, the lower number of observations explains the smaller variance in the American subsample. Almost three quarters of the answers by American lobbyists fall into three categories: *illegal*, *quid pro quo* and *private gain*. The

<sup>3</sup>Original wording: "Coming to the last two questions, I am interested in how you distinguish between lobbying and corruption. How would you define corruption?"

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

modal category of German lobbyists is obtaining an *unfair advantage*, followed by 'buying' something from legislators or officials and *legal* definitions in third place.

### Legal Definitions

Defining corruption based on applicable law is – together with two further definitions – the most frequently mentioned way to define corruption among American lobbyists and the third most frequently one among German lobbyists. 23 percent of the former and 12 percent of the latter define corruption in legal terms. In total, these are 15 percent of the interviewees.

Legal definitions are pragmatic because they determine what is allowed and what is not. They are easier to identify and easier to apply compared to moral or ethical standards because laws are codified:

you have to stick to the legal definition. You could talk about morality. But you have to stick with the law of the state. You can make contributions as a corporation and as an individual. It has to be in the area where legislation takes place. First, lobbyists must register. Second, a lobbyist must keep an account of his expenditure (entertainment, meals, transportation) that must be accurate (ID: 2600).

Or, how one German lobbyist puts it simply:

Just as the criminal law in Germany says (ID: 2780).<sup>4</sup>

Legal definitions do not take system differences into account. In Germany, e.g., anti-bribery laws are relatively loose concerning legislators (Hough 2013, pp. 100–5, Wolf 2008) but relatively strict with regard to officials, and there are no restrictions on (direct) lobbying (Chari, Hogan, and Murphy 2019). Thus, relying on a legal definition in the context of interest intermediation would give German lobbyists much more room for maneuver than their American counterparts. This might also explain why fewer German than American lobbyists rely on a legal definition. Generally, the majority of lobbyists thinks that corruption in interest intermediation goes beyond the definition of the law. There are also clear statements that a legal definition is not enough:

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<sup>4</sup>Original wording: "So wie das in Deutschland geltendes Strafrecht ist".

There is a criminal definition but, in my opinion, it must be more than a simple *quid pro quo*. In politics, we need to set stricter standards. Even the appearance that a politician or a government official adjusts their activity on the basis of this (a *quid pro quo*; F.G.; ID: 3016).<sup>5</sup>

Finally, legal definitions also correspond poorly to the definition of Nye (1967). Furthermore, legality is not applicable to theoretical frameworks because it does not follow causal mechanisms (cf. Goldberg 2018; Pozsgai-Alvarez 2020). It cannot help to understand by whom, how, and why corruption was initiated. Hence, it is also not useful for explaining the occurrence of corruption and its relationship to other concepts, such as lobbying.

The subsequent definitions of corruption employ a broader and hence stricter approach compared to the legal one and are analytically more useful.

### Quid Pro Quo

Definitions based on a *quid pro quo* are the second most common in the whole sample (21 percent) as well as in the German subsample (20 percent). And it is the most common definition in the American subsample (23 percent). They correspond well to the exchange approach in this study because they highlight mutually beneficial transfers between lobbyists and policymakers.

Generally, the logic of the exchange in the interest intermediation sector is not different from other corrupt transactions. However, the examples below show which goods of material or immaterial value could be exchanged:

[Corruption; F.G.] would be exchanging something of value directly for a political decision (ID: 1100).

For me, corruption is where money or a service that has a certain [...] minimum value is exchanged for [...] direct [...] statements or actions by politicians (ID: 2766).<sup>6</sup>

Something of value and services cover a broad range of offered tangible and intangible incentives, of course. Most statements in this category refer to favors

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<sup>5</sup>Es gibt eine strafrechtliche Definition aber es muss meiner Ansicht nach mehr sein als eine einfache Gegenleistung. In der Politik muss man strengere Maßgaben setzen. Bereits der Anschein, dass ein Politiker oder ein Regierungsbeamter seine Aktivität anhand dessen (einer Gegenleistung; F.G.) ausrichten.

<sup>6</sup>Korruption ist für mich da wo Geld oder eine Leistung, die [...] einen Mindestwert [...] hat gegen direkte [...] Aussagen oder Taten von Politikern und eingetauscht werden.

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

or gifts traded for something needed that a policymaker can offer. The latter can vary as well. In the first statement it refers directly to a political outcome. In the second statement, it also might be a politician praising a company without exerting a direct influence on the outcome. The first statement, however, refers to influencing regulation or at least to refraining from regulation, that is, to impact on universally binding rules.

According to this definition, both lobbyists and policymakers can initiate corruption: lobbyists by offering something, policymakers by demanding something (cf. Johnston 2012, p. 340). The definition highlights the basic mechanisms of the exchange character of corruption. It might be legal to exchange goods or services. However, such exchanges are likely to lead to violations of duties, as explained in chapter 2. That is the case if legislators, e.g., sell their votes or access to lobbyists, or if they enact legal loopholes in exchange for a favor (see section 2.3.5). The same, except selling votes, holds for officials and decision-makers in the executive branch. Furthermore, they can become corrupt if they accept something of value in exchange for undermining the policy goals of the legislature in favor of a company. Hence, a quid pro quo conceptualization of corruption also covers both branches of government.

### **Unfair Advantage or *Vorteilsnahme***

Providing or receiving an unfair advantage is the modal category in the complete sample (24 percent) as well as in the German subsample (29 percent) and ranks fourth in the US subsample (12 percent). *Vorteilsnahme* is the German legal term for accepting an advantage and it is a statutory offense if the beneficiaries are elected representatives or public officials. Thus, definitions emphasizing this aspect have a legal component in Germany.<sup>7</sup>

Corruption is using unfair or underhanded influence to convince a decision-maker to act on your behalf without regard to public interest or broader policy concerns (ID: 1879).

Corruption is [...] where financial benefits, whether of material value, i.e., cash or in other material form, are granted without any contractual customer relationship with the intention of making someone perform

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<sup>7</sup>Germany is not the only system that has such a statute. E.g., it is also a criminal act for EU officers and legislators.

what is, in this case, essentially a political or legal service that he or she would not perform without such payment. In other words, it is making a decision against one's better judgement because one has been promised or already received a benefit (ID: 2853).<sup>8</sup>

These two quotes emphasize the use of unfair or underhanded means to influence a policymaker's decision. By allowing their decisions to be influenced in such a way, policymakers violate their duty to act in the best interest of a constituency (or the legislature in the case of officials). This violation of formal duties breaks the link between the constituency and the elected (Goldberg 2018; Warren 2004).

Obtaining an unfair advantage or result that is not available to others through pecuniary or other means (ID: 1453).

When I promise something to that person, a financial incentive or other things, an advantage, which then leads to the desired result (ID: 2832).<sup>9</sup>

In these quotes, the interviewees highlight the exclusivity of unfair advantages, which leads to an exclusion of others (cf. Warren 2004).

Again, these examples imply an exchange relationship and are applicable to both branches of government. In contrast to a mere quid pro quo definition, unfair advantages indicate that there is a victim: A person or group is being excluded or neglected. In addition, this definition implies that both sides of the corrupt transaction know that their behavior is undue or unjust. There is an awareness of doing something wrong and an intention to act corruptly for personal gain.

## Bribes

Bribes are possibly the oldest form of corruption (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2020). Often, the term is used as a synonym. Thus, it is not surprising that 9 percent of the lobbyists also came up with bribery as definition of corruption (US: 8 percent; Germany: 9 percent). Definitions based on bribery are the sixth most frequently mentioned ones in the sample and rank fifths in each of the subsamples.

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<sup>8</sup>Korruption ist [...], wo finanzielle Vorteile, sei es jetzt materiell, also bar oder in anderer materieller Form, gewährt werden, ohne, dass ist es eine vertragliche Kundenbeziehung gibt und wo jemand dazu gebracht werden soll, eine [...] in diesem Fall im Wesentlichen eine politische oder juristische Leistung zu erbringen, die er oder sie ohne diese Zahlung nicht erbringen würde. Also, dass man eine Entscheidung sozusagen wider besseren Wissens fällt, weil man eine Vergünstigung versprochen oder schon bekommen hat.

<sup>9</sup>Wenn ich demjenigen etwas verspreche, einen finanziellen Anreiz oder andere Dinge, Vorteilnahme, die dann zu dem gewünschten Ergebnis führen.

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

Corruption is bribery [...] to give advantage to [the] company (ID: 1098).

[Corruption is; F.G.] bribery, offering and accepting bribes, getting someone to use the power entrusted to them for their own benefit (ID: 2719).<sup>10</sup>

The second definition is a little narrower. *Entrusted power* refers to elected representatives or public officials. The first statement also includes private-to-private bribes if at least one company gains an advantage from it. Yet, bribes are only one specific form of corruption. Thus, it is difficult to compare bribery with conceptualizations of exchanges or deviations from duties. Rather, it is one means of providing incentives for deviations from formal duties.

### Private Gain

The focus on private gain is integral to the probably most often used definition of corruption: the abuse of public office for private gain. The widespread application of this definition is not least caused by the fact that it is used by the World Bank and Transparency International (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2020, pp. 435–6). However, it focuses on one side only, namely, on those benefiting from corruption. As the first two examples below show, this can be decision-makers or lobbyists in the context of interest intermediation. Yet, some interviewees extended the original definition so that it applies to both sides. This is the case in the third example below. The last example puts private gain in the context of adequacy.

Defining corruption with reference to *private gain* is the fifth most frequently mentioned definition in the sample (12 percent), among the top three in the US subsample (23 percent) and sixth in the German subsample (8 percent). In terms of content, it is close to the definitions based on an unfair advantage but with less emphasis on the gain than on the abuse of a role:

Corruption is abusing the public's trust for your own personal benefit (ID: 2137).

Public trust refers to officials or legislators because lobbyists are entrusted by their company (or association) but not by the public. Hence, the definition implies that decision-making power coming with a public position can be (ab)used to extract personal profit.

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<sup>10</sup>Bestechung, Bestechlichkeit, jemanden dazu zu bewegen, seine ihm anvertraute Macht zum eigenen Nutzen zu verwenden.

When an individual tries to influence public policy for private gain (ID: 1785).

In this definition, gains are not pursued by the official or legislator but by the lobbyist. Here, profit is not extracted by the one who *gets* corrupted. Rather, it is pursued by the one *intending* to corrupt. In the context of interest intermediation, this means lobbyists trying to convince legislators or officials, e.g., to pass a law that benefits the company or the lobbyist personally.

For me, corruption would be obtaining a personal gain by shaping a political measure by nudging a political measure a little more into a desired direction. The political actor would gain a personal advantage, for example, by getting a suitcase of money, or expensive wine, or pleasure trips, or a supervisory board seat or whatever. And in return he would practically, for an association, an NGO, whoever, promote some political measure, whatever that is (ID: 3023).<sup>11</sup>

In this statement, the lobbyists take both sides of a transaction into account. Their private gain motivates legislators or officials to produce favorable political outcomes or at least to promote the political goals of the company.

Corruption occurs when [...] funds are made available that are not causally related to an order, a public contract, a contract, or other things, but only serve the private benefit of individuals and exceed [...] a normal level, such as a [...] coffee or [a] meal (ID: 3073).<sup>12</sup>

This definition contains two contextual factors. The first is money that is not related to a working relationship. The second is appropriateness. Some lobbyists indicated that paying for a cup of coffee worth 5 dollars or gifting a book on the

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<sup>11</sup>Korruption wäre für mich einen persönlicher Vorteil erreichen durch die Ausgestaltung einer politischen Maßnahme in eine gewünschte Richtung. Der politische Akteur würde einen persönlichen Vorteil erlangen, z.B. dadurch, dass er einen Geldkoffer bekommt, oder teure Weinpräsentier, oder Lustreisen, oder in einen Aufsichtsrat kommt oder keine Ahnung was. Und würde praktisch im Gegenzug, für einen Verband, eine NGO, wen auch immer, irgendeine politische Maßnahme, welche auch immer das ist, irgendwie befördern.

<sup>12</sup>Korruption findet dann statt, wenn [...] Mittel zur Verfügung gestellt werden, die nicht kausal mit einem Auftrag, einem öffentlichen Auftrag, einem Vertrag, oder anderen Dingen zusammenhängen, sondern nur der privaten Begünstigungen von Einzelpersonen dienen und über ein [...] normales Maß, wie [...] einen Kaffee [...] oder [ein] Essen hinausgehen.

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

history of the company worth 15 dollars should be allowed and not considered corruption. The problem would be providing something of *inappropriate* value. Often mentioned examples were treating someone to a lobster dinner at a starred restaurant or to a holiday. Additionally, some indicated that appropriateness depends on the position of the decision-maker. A dinner with a minister, so some interviewees said, would of course be a different affair – financially – than a dinner with an official. Lobbyists addressing appropriateness also stated that it is difficult to define a general monetary threshold.

The discussion about appropriateness shows the the dilemma of defining corruption in terms of private gain. Decisions, e.g., can favor only certain or even single companies exclusively. However, as discussed in chapter 2, this does not necessarily mean that the decision is undue or even corrupt. In addition to the mere quid-pro-quo definition and similarly to the unfair-advantage definition, it indicates some form of inappropriateness, either of an action or the value of a gift or hospitality. Furthermore, it implies an exchange, an ill-motivated decision – or deviation from a formal duty – in exchange for somebody's enrichment. It is applicable to both branches of government as the examples provided by the lobbyists show.

### **Corruption is More than Punishable Offenses**

Most lobbyists think that actions can constitute corruption without being punishable offenses. Apart from the legal definition, the reported statements share the concept of an exchange that usually benefits both sides. Corruption in the context of interest intermediation, according to the surveyed lobbyists, is a favor of material or immaterial value for a legislator or an official in exchange for a political concession. On a more detailed level, the statements of the lobbyist vary regarding the value of a favor or who exactly benefits from corruption. Mostly, lobbyists are seen as the hypothetical initiators of corruption who want something from a political decision-maker. Less often, lobbyists think of decision-makers as rent-seekers who initiate corruption.

This corresponds to the argument of chapter 2 that lobbying regulation should also cover legislators and officials because they are the ones who are frequently targeted by corrupt influence-seekers and decide whether to get involved (see also Ainsworth 1993).

Most of the lobbyists' definitions also correspond to the definition of corruption by Nye (1967), although they have based their definitions mostly on real-world

situations rather than theoretical concepts (cf. chapter 2). Accordingly, they have not described corruption as deviation from duties. However, the real-world examples lobbyists described do in most cases lead to violations of duties as explained in chapter 2. Furthermore, most definitions involved private-regarding benefits. Thus, they can be integrated into Nye's (1967) framework.

The definitions of corruption as such do not distinguish between lobbying and corruption. However, as the next section shows, they explain differences in the perception of corruption in the interest intermediation sector.

### 8.2.2. Predicting Corruption Based on its Definition

Figure 8.2 and table 8.1 show that lobbyists applying a legal definition systematically perceive corruption as less of a problem than lobbyists applying one of the broader definitions.<sup>13</sup> This finding has three implications. Firstly, it shows that most interviewees believe that there are few illegal irregularities in the context of lobbying because lobbyists who apply such a legal definition do not think that there are many illegal activities in interest intermediation – at least not corrupt ones.

Secondly, it indicates that there are gray areas between unambiguously corrupt or illegal activities and unambiguously sound lobbying (cf. Goldberg 2018). Furthermore, the finding implies that activities in gray areas of the interest intermediation sector are more widespread than illegal behavior. This underlines *the struggle of defining the acceptable*. To shed some light on the gray and to distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable, researchers and eventually policymakers firstly need to identify what these activities are (cf. *ibid.*), then assess their democratic consequences, and finally adjust the regulation. The discussion about the pecuniary value of favors or hospitality demonstrates how difficult such adjustments are. And even if new regulations are adopted, it is possible – or even likely – that new gray areas emerge.

Thirdly, the results from this simple regression highlight the importance of the definition of corruption. Different conceptualizations do not only impair the accumulation of scientific knowledge within corruption research. Definitions also have real-world implications as the effect of the legality dummy suggests: If lobbyists apply legal rather than democratic standards and do what the law permits them to

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<sup>13</sup>This holds regardless of the operationalization of corruption (see chapter 4), except for parties (see tables A99 to A101 in appendix A.5). The effect of a legal definition on the index of corruption is significant at the 90 percent level only.

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption




Figure 8.2.: Corruption predicted by the definitions of corruption

do instead of what they should do or their colleagues expect them to do, problems arise on two levels. Firstly, from a democratic-theory perspective, lobbyists' actions can – directly or consequentially, consciously or accidentally – prompt biased decision-making (Rothstein 2014), excluding people who should be included (Warren 2004). This would also harm the function of interest groups as transmission belts to improve representation (see chapter 2). Secondly, such lobbyists might violate mutual social expectations (cf. Granovetter 1985) and isolate themselves from colleagues or decision-makers. This could impair the transmission belt function, too, because certain interests would not be represented anymore, at least if there is a legitimate claim to be voiced (cf. Lowery, Baumgartner, et al. 2015, p. 1225). It could also dilute (justified) ethical standards of responsible lobbying (cf. Barron and Skountridaki 2020), or it could harm the employer's reputation or its political representation. Thus, it is advisable for companies or associations with government affairs units to set internal standards of lobbying, in addition to the legal statutes.

Lobbyists who define corruption with a focus on *private gain* tend to perceive more corruption in two models (90 percent significance level, *policy institutions* and *legislature*, see also table A100 in appendix A.5). The sign is positive in all models.

This indicates that lobbyists condemn private-regarding benefit seeking in interest intermediation and highlights the importance of integrity.

Table 8.1.: Binary logistic regression to predict corruption (index) based on definitions of corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Index
Illegal	-1.248 (0.661)
Quid pro quo	0.060 (0.566)
Unfair adv.	-0.423 (0.522)
Buying votes etc.	-0.798 (0.631)
Private gain	1.010 (0.770)
Observations	78
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

### 8.3. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying

In the introduction to this book, I define *lobbying* as the submission of information and the signaling of political support or opposition to policymakers. As with the definition of corruption, this definition shall cover different activities at different branches of government that directly, indirectly, in the short-term, or in the long term affect policymaking. In accordance with this broad approach, the lobbyists' definitions of lobbying show a variety of conceptualizations. Very few of them refer to influence-seeking. Most lobbyists rather applied a more passive or reserved definition. These definitions are not exhaustive, but they indicate which part of their jobs lobbyists consider central.

Note that the question about the definition of lobbying does not appear in any of the questionnaires. It was a prompt in *all* personal interviews. Where possible, I coded the definitions of lobbying on the basis of the answers to the question about

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption




Figure 8.3.: Percentages of categorized definitions of lobbying by lobbyists

the distinction between lobbying and corruption if they contained a definition or conception of lobbying.

### 8.3.1. Different Definitions of Lobbying

Figure 8.3 shows that there are substantial country differences regarding the conceptualization of lobbying and corruption. More than half of the German lobbyists define lobbying just as interest representation (*having a voice*). A third defines it as the mere provision of *information*. US lobbyists rather focus on terms such as *education* or on democratic benefits. I address the individual categorizations and the country differences in more detail in the following paragraphs.

#### Having a Voice, Advocacy, and Interest Representation

More than half of the German lobbyists (54 percent, 42 percent of the whole sample) mentioned that they understand lobbying as *having a voice*, simply as advocacy, or as the representation of interests. It is the modal category in the German subsample and in the whole sample. 12 percent of the interviewed US lobbyists defined lobbying in the same way. It is the fourth most frequently mentioned definition in the American subsample.

Key in lobbying is providing information and have a voice (ID: 1785).

Lobbying is fundamentally about telling your story and having your story heard (ID: 1879).

These two definitions highlight two aspects: the provision of information (see below) and being heard. Often lobbyists claimed to have a constitutional right to represent their interests to policymakers (cf. Milbrath 1963, p. 13). This right legitimizes lobbying as an act of interest representation. But it does not guarantee influence.

Lobbying is the representation of legitimate interests, regardless of the institution (ID: 2791).<sup>14</sup>

This lobbyist adds legitimacy as another criterion of lobbying, indicating that it is not about representing any interests but only those that are justified and urgent (cf. Williams 2000a). In fact, this implies a pre-prioritization of certain issues within interest groups.

Lobbying is the representation of interests of companies or groups of companies and associations in politics and administration, that is, in ministries, the legislature, and the government (ID: 2916).<sup>15</sup>

This definition highlights different venues within the legislative and the executive branch that can be addressed by lobbyists. Interestingly, none of the lobbyists mentioned the judicial branch.

All these definitions are rather descriptive in character. They define lobbying with its purpose, almost tautologically. Analytically, this is not very helpful because it does not say how or for which purpose interests are represented. However, it can be seen as a conservative approach that only refers to a communicative act but not to its causes or consequences.

### **Providing Information**

Definitions focusing on information are the second most frequently mentioned category in both subsamples and the whole sample (31 percent). 19 percent of the US and 35 percent of the German lobbyists defined lobbying as the provision of information or similarly:

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<sup>14</sup>Lobbying ist die Vertretung legitimer Interessen, unabhängig von der Institution.

<sup>15</sup>Lobbying ist die Interessensvertretung von Unternehmen beziehungsweise Unternehmensgruppen, Verbänden, bei eben Politik und Verwaltung, also Ministerien, beim Gesetzgeber letztendlich, und der Regierung.

## 8. *How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption*

Lobbying [...] is [...] advocat[ing] your organization's interests and providing factual information to policymakers to help them understand the issues at hand (ID: 2137).

Our mission is to provide correct and objective information for the person who has to make this decision or decides about this proposed law (ID: 2853).<sup>16</sup>

Both definitions specify the information provided. The first puts the emphasis on the interests of the organization and implies that it is or might be a particular interest. The second emphasizes that provided information should be correct and helpful (cf. J. M. Hansen 1991, pp. 14–5; Rosenthal 2001, p. 180; Milbrath 1963, pp. 118–9, 142–3).

What these definitions have in common is that the knowledge lobbyists possess is contextual. They cannot represent just any interests because they do not know about everything. Furthermore, they cannot represent just any interest because they cannot justifiably claim to represent everything legitimately. Linked to integrity in interest intermediation and corruption, lying (see also table A106 with further definitions of corruption in appendix A.5) would be a clear deviation from the duties of lobbyists (see chapter 2). However, it is unlikely to be linked to corruption because there would be no personal benefit for the lobbyist.

Moreover, these definitions consider the positive consequences of lobbying only, e.g., disseminating knowledge that leads to better political decision. These lobbyists do not talk about the motivation behind lobbying, which might also lead to partiality.

### **Influence-seeking**

Interestingly, German lobbyists are not very hesitant to admit that they seek influence. Definitions referring to influence are the third most frequently mentioned category in Germany at 14 percent (11 percent of the sample). The following quote is from the only US lobbyist who mentioned influence, albeit indirectly.

Lobbying is making sure laws and regulations actually work well (first) and making sure they're written so they work well for you individually (second) (ID: 1054).

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<sup>16</sup>Wir nehmen hier für uns in Anspruch eben das korrekte und sachliche Darstellen zur Information desjenigen, der diese Entscheidung oder dieses Gesetzesvorhaben dann da zu fällen hat.

Working towards the creation of a congruent, consistent, and supportive legal framework (ID: 2787).<sup>17</sup>

These lobbyists – the first one from the American subsample, the second one from the German one – openly state that the aim of lobbying is making sure that laws meet or even support the needs of the companies and that they are generally 'okay.' This refers to influencing without using the word. Other German lobbyists disclose their ambitions to exert influence even more bluntly:

Lobbying is a communicative activity at the interface between politics and various interest groups that aims to influence political decisions (ID: 3023).<sup>18</sup>

Yet, such open statements do not indicate that seeking influence is bad or inappropriate. As opposed to the previous two categories of definitions of lobbying, this category adds an aim or even a consequence of it. It provides a reason why interest groups lobby (cf. Lowery 2007) and makes it explicit that they are not altruistic.

However, some lobbyists reject the notion that lobbying is about exerting influence:

[W]e try to explain. Whether someone uses this explanation for their political or legislative work is completely up to them. In this respect, [...] I would also say that political lobbying is not about exerting influence but about the transfer of knowledge (ID: 2705).<sup>19</sup>

[Lobbying is; F.G.] contact with political decision-makers and communication of objectivity. I think that many lobbyists see it differently, they see it also as influencing, but that would not be my idea of lobbying (ID: 2940).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Hinwirkung auf die Schaffung von kongruenten, konsistenten und unterstützenden gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen.

<sup>18</sup>Lobbying ist eine kommunikative Tätigkeit an der Schnittstelle von Politik und verschiedensten Interessengruppen, die darauf abzielt, Einfluss auf politische Entscheidungen zu nehmen.

<sup>19</sup>[W]ir versuchen zu erklären. Ob jemand am Ende dann diese Erklärung für seine politische oder gesetzgeberische Arbeit nutzt, ist vollkommen ihm selbst überlassen.. Insofern würde ich [...] auch sagen, politische Interessenvertretung ist keine Einflussnahme, sondern Wissenstransfer.

<sup>20</sup>[Lobbying ist; F.G.] Kontakt zu politischen Entscheidern und Übermittlung von Sachlichkeit. Ich glaube, dass viele Lobbyisten das anders sehen, die sehen das auch unter Beeinflussung, das wäre aber nicht das, was ich mir vorstelle.

## 8. *How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption*

The definition of lobbying as influence and its criticism do not exclude each other. These lobbyists seem to refer to different aspects of influence. The first refer to the very nature of lobbying. Companies, but also associations, invest many resources in politics. They would not do so if they did not expect a benefit from it. The most obvious benefit is contributing to a regulatory environment that allows companies to do business – nothing more, nothing less.

The kind of influence the latter two interviewees talked about might refer to partiality. Influence should not be used to create loopholes, to gain advantages over competitors, or to blackmail policymakers (Goldberg 2018), e.g., by threatening to cut jobs unless the government provides tax relief. These lobbyists seem to distance themselves from such practices. However, they would not lobby if they did not expect any benefit for their company. And in most cases, besides receiving early warning about planned policy changes (see chapter 2), these benefits manifest in a regulatory environment that at least does not harm the operations of the company.

### **Creating Access**

Some lobbyists – 8 percent in the sample, 9 percent of the German, 4 percent of the American lobbyists – reduce the definition of their work to the prerequisite of influence: creating access.

Lobbying is creating access (ID: 1456).

We are in constant dialogue with these members of parliament. Even if we have nothing to decide at the moment (ID: 2735).<sup>21</sup>

These definitions (see also the last quote by ID 1940 in the category influence above) emphasize finding and creating but also maintaining the right contacts that can be used when needed. The approach does not inform about the reasons why lobbyists require access, how they use it, or what difference good access makes. Thus, it seems to be an incomplete or shortened understanding of lobbying, or an understanding that highlights only one part of it. Hence, from an analytical perspective, it is not as valuable as other definitions of lobbying.

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<sup>21</sup>Wir sind mit diesen Abgeordneten ständig im Gespräch. Auch wenn wir gar nichts zu entscheiden haben im Augenblick.

## Education

In contrast to the understanding of lobbying as a means of providing information, lobbying as *education* is a concept supported predominantly by US interviewees. 23 of the American lobbyists defined lobbying as education, whereas only one interviewee in Germany did.

Lobbying is education about your industry, unintended consequences, and packaging the information in a concise, cogent way to make your point (ID: 1468).

As with information, the education approach does not imply a reaction of policymakers. Hence, it is not a definition that corresponds to the exchange approach in this study. Education is a stronger concept than information. Lobbyists who educate expect the information provided to be an added value for the policymakers. The information category rather refers to a *take-it-or-leave-it* understanding of the provided expertise, leaving it entirely up to the policymaker whether to make use of the information or not.

## Supporting Candidates and Policymakers

Understanding lobbying as political support for candidates or policymakers is a view stated by American lobbyists only. 15 of them mentioned one of the two examples below or a similar definition of lobbying:

Lobbying is the fact that you can support your candidate that can implement a law (ID: 2724).

Lobbying is the use of time and money to provide elected and government officials with the resources to do their job in an informed and efficient way (ID: 2141).

These definitions highlight the democratic value of lobbying. The first one refers to backing politicians with similar views on politics to pursue common policy goals. The second one, in accordance with the transmission belt logic, refers to lobbying as contributing to efficient and informed decision-making (cf. J. M. Hansen 1991, pp. 13–5). This understanding of lobbying applies especially to the US context and the US way of policymaking. In contrast to parliamentary democracies, where government parties dominate, it emphasizes the role of individual candidates and elected officials.

### **From Being Heard to Exerting Influence**

From a rational perspective, lobbyists want to have their interests considered, at least in the long term. Even though some practitioners might disagree, having one's voice heard does constitute some form of (minor) influence – not necessarily on a political outcome, but at least on the decision-making process. The same holds for education and political support. Lobbying is expensive. Investments in political ideas, political personnel, be it candidates or lobbyists, would not be made without expecting any direct or indirect material benefit. This brings us back to Milbrath's belief that without influence there is no lobbying (Milbrath 1963, p. 7). The differences lie in the immediacy or directness of attempts to exert influence.

The definitions of lobbying provide three insights into the relationship of influence and corruption. Firstly, none of these definitions indicate that the lobbyists' reported self-understanding is even close to undue influence-seeking activities, let alone corruption. Secondly, instead, they often emphasize the democratic benefit of lobbying, such as provision of information, education, and political support. Apart from the definition referring to influence, lobbyists tend to avoid talking about practices, causes, and consequences that might hint at any form of partiality or violation of values of integrity. This leads to the third point.

Lobbyists' articulated understanding of lobbying sometimes reads like a plea for the profession. This was similarly found in a recent study by Barron and Skountridaki (2020). Most lobbyists seem to comply with legal and ethical standards (Barron and Skountridaki 2020, p. 22; Milbrath 1963, p. 140). And it is important to them that most people believe that this is the dominant behavior in the interest intermediation system. However, this might lead to a negation of what appear to be rare problems, e.g., in the context of financial scandals or of loopholes. Thus, it is likely and understandable that they omit parts of their work that might give any impression of unjustified influence, or put differently, that they avoid talking about influence-seeking because of its negative public image.

### **8.3.2. Predicting Corruption Based on Definitions of Lobbying**

The results presented in figure 8.4 and table 8.2 show that lobbyists' definition of lobbying is related to their perception of corruption. Lobbyists, primarily from the US, who define lobbying as education are more likely to see corruption as a




Figure 8.4.: Corruption predicted by definitions of lobbying

problem in interest intermediation than lobbyists using other definitions. This effect is not robust in all models and significant at the 90 percent level only (see tables A102, A103 and A109 in appendix A.5). In contrast, lobbyists, primarily from Germany, who employ a mere *having-your-voice-heard* definition, perceive significantly less corruption.<sup>22</sup> Finally, lobbyists indicating that lobbying is all about providing information see corruption more often as a problem. This effect is significant for index variables only. Lobbying definitions emphasizing *political support*, which might be least associated with influence and creating *access* and which serves only to build and maintain contacts, have no effect on the perception of corruption.

Interestingly, the two positive effects of *education* and *information* are based on a unidirectional understanding of lobbying: the provision of knowledge or expertise by lobbyists to policymakers. Education is the more vigorous activity and the more active provision of information, whereas simply providing information is an

<sup>22</sup>This effect is no cause of the variant distribution between the countries (see table A111 in appendix A.5). It is insignificant in models with the dependent variables *Administration*, *MPs/Legislators* and *NGOs* (see tables A102, A103 and A111 in appendix A.5).

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

Table 8.2.: Binary logistic regression to predict corruption (index) on the basis of definitions of lobbying

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Index
Access	0.271 (0.921)
Support	-0.028 (1.289)
Informing	0.688 (0.528)
Voice	-1.347** (0.506)
Influence	-0.138 (0.750)
Observations	78

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

offer that policymakers can take up or not. However, it does not involve any expectation on the part of the lobbyist. This is different with *having my voice heard*. Here, lobbyists define an entitlement to representation. Hence, lobbyists who demand more from policymakers are less likely to believe that they are involved in corruption.

One reason for this could be that there is mutual trust in the other's integrity between lobbyists and policymakers and a belief in a fair political system in accordance with the theoretical expectation of the transmission belt. The more unidirectional approaches could imply that lobbyists feel the outcome of interest intermediation is not in their hands. This corresponds to existing research showing that personal characteristics, e.g., trust, and institutions shape perceptions of corruption (e.g. Kubbe 2018). This might also hold for lobbyists.

The causal directions of these effects probably go both ways. Higher perceptions of corruption could induce lobbyists to try and whitewash their colleagues by providing a reserved definition of lobbying. However, the opposite could also be true. Lobbyist could choose a reserved definition because they believe that everything is in order. This data cannot distinguish between one mechanism and the other. Thus, it is difficult to draw meaning from the results. Maybe, the insignificant

effects are more important. Influencing, the lobbying approach most subject to public prejudice, is unrelated to perceptions of corruption.

## 8.4. How Lobbyists Distinguish Between Lobbying and Corruption

In chapter 2, I argue that sound lobbying improves representation whereas the conscious introduction of biases for particular and one-sided gains turns lobbying into corruption. This argument is based on normative assumptions about the transmission belt and the resulting implication concerning the individual behavior of lobbyists. However, unlike policymakers, lobbyists are not held accountable by the public. They have a responsibility vis-à-vis their employer. Ultimately, it is the policymakers who determine the extent of legitimate and undue influence. Lobbyists are held accountable only indirectly, when their behavior reflects badly on their organization.

This section explores how lobbyists distinguish between lobbying and corruption. Thus far, the definitions of lobbying and corruption provided by the lobbyists have shown that perceptions of corruption are not independent of how influence-seeking activities are defined. Yet, they could not tell us more about whether lobbying and corruption are mutually exclusive or inclusive activities.

I asked lobbyists *how they distinguish between lobbying and corruption*<sup>23</sup> and coded their answers into 17 categories. It was usually the last question posed to the interviewees. If multiple categories applied to one statement, I assigned it up to four codes. Four was the maximum number of categories assigned to one answer.

### 8.4.1. Different Distinctions Between Lobbying and Corruption

Figure 8.5 shows the top five of the most frequently mentioned distinction criteria. All of them were stated by at least ten percent of the lobbyists. The explanations range from *not the same at all...*

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<sup>23</sup>Original Wording: And finally, how would you distinguish between lobbying and corruption?

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption




Figure 8.5.: Percentages of categorized distinctions between lobbying and corruption by lobbyists

[It is] not the same at all. Lobbying is not illegal, lobbying is creating access. [It is about] how to gain access or how to be in a role to advocate or educate [and about] convincing legislators by arguments (ID: 1456).

It simply has nothing to do with each other. Corruption is behavior that is unacceptable and prohibited. And lobbying is a behavior that is democratically necessary and desired, which normally has nothing to do with each other in terms of the measures taken. In most of the cases of corruption that I have witnessed in the political sphere, that I would call corruption, lobbyists were not even involved. So, I would really have a strict... I wouldn't even make a distinction because they are two separate issues. But then, of course, you can also achieve political goals with the means of corruption. But that is not lobbying, it is corruption. I would always define lobbying narrowly as legitimate, legally compliant representation of interests. Anything that is no longer in compliance with the law are then corruption or criminal offenses (ID: 2797).<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup>Es hat halt einfach nichts miteinander zu tun. Korruption ist ein Verhalten, was nicht hinnehmbar und verboten ist. Und Lobbying ist ein Verhalten, was demokratisch notwendig und gewünscht ist, was auch in den Maßnahmen im Normalfall auch nichts miteinander zu tun hat. Die meisten Fälle von Korruption, die ich mitgekriegt habe, die ich als Korruption bezeichnet würde, da waren Lobbyisten noch nicht Mal involviert im politischen Bereich. Da würde ich wirklich eine strikte... also noch nicht mal eine Trennung vollziehen, weil es einfach zwei un-

... to *not distinct at all*:

The line is not distinct. [...] There is a lobbyist who purchased a deal for the tax committee designed to get a special favor. I have been a state legislator for 12 years [...]. In the 80s, lobbyists would take us out for dinner, just because we were legislators. Now it is illegal. I think that everything depends on how you do lobbying. They [lobbying and corruption; F.G.] are not distinct (ID: 1871).

This opinion is a clear minority view mentioned by only one interviewee. Most of the lobbyist indicated that there are differences. The majority tried to define criteria that differentiate lobbying from corruption.

### A Legal Distinction

As with corruption, an impulse by many lobbyists was to apply a legal criterion. About a fourth of the sample – 23 percent (27 percent in the American, 22 percent in the German subsample) – differentiated lobbying from corruption in legal terms. It is the modal distinction in the US subsample, the second most frequent one in the German subsample, and the second most frequent one in the complete sample.

Corruption is outside of the law, lobbying is within the law. Corruption is always found out [and there is] serious penalty on corruption (ID: 2169).

The line is where criminal law begins. As long as it is legal, it doesn't matter. Everyone must decide for themselves, knowing that in the public someone else might see it differently, being aware of the consequences (ID: 3039).<sup>25</sup>

This distinction is the most obvious but the least helpful one from an analytical perspective (Goldberg 2018). Actually, it is a non-distinction because it does not

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terschiedlichen Themen sind. Aber man kann dann natürlich mit den Mitteln der Korruption politische Ziele auch erreichen. Das ist dann aber kein Lobbying, sondern Korruption. Ich würde Lobbying immer begrenzt definieren als legitime, gesetzeskonforme, Interessenvertretung. Alles, was nicht mehr gesetzeskonform ist, ist dann Korruption oder Straftatbestände (sic!).

<sup>25</sup>Die Grenze ist da, wo das Strafrecht beginnt. Wenn es legal ist, ist es egal. Das muss jeder für sich selbst wissen, wissend, dass in der Öffentlichkeit das jemand anders findet, der Konsequenz bewusst sein.

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

contain any information about the origin of the statutes. To draw the line between legality and illegality, policymakers must have followed certain democratic standards of what kind of influence-seeking is acceptable and what is unacceptable – mostly inspired by scandals, e.g., Abramoff or Amthor. The same holds for future legislation or reforms.

### A Distinction Based on *Quid Pro Quo*

A distinction based on *quid pro quo* is the modal category in the complete sample (27 percent) and the German subsample (31 percent) while ranking second in the American subsample (19 percent). Such *quid pro quo* situations were described more generally...

One's action should not be exchanged for some other action or inaction (ID: 1468).

... or more specifically. Here, in the context of financial contributions or money:

Contribution is only corrupt if you do that because you want the legislator to do something specific (ID: 1775).

[C]learly when you say that money is flowing in connection with certain decisions, especially when there are no objective reasons for the cash flows (ID: 3061).<sup>26</sup>

These three distinctions argue that as soon as lobbyists demand something for what they offer, be it contributions or information, lobbying becomes corruption (cf. Johnston 2012, p. 339). They highlight the exchange character that both corruption and lobbying have. They also imply that expectations matter (see also the discussion on lobbying defined as influence above). Lobbyists who simply expect to be heard or to gain access (cf. campaign contributions as mean to gain access, A. M. McKay 2018) do not engage in corruption at all, according to this view. This would contradict the reasoning of H3 that financial contributions are positively related to corruption (cf. Etzioni 1984, pp. 59–62; Evertsson 2013). Only expectations of exerting direct influence on an outcome in exchange for, e.g., contributions or information, would constitute corruption.

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<sup>26</sup>[G]anz klar dann, wenn man sagt, es fließen Gelder, die gekoppelt sind an bestimmte Entscheidungen, vor allem, wenn die sachlich nicht geboten sind.

This interpretation is supported by another statement in the context of gifts or hospitality at events or meetings:

We also make sure that we never hold events specifically for politicians, but always include other customers, so that they are part of a group to avoid this individual nature. At the end of the day, gifts are very individual gestures. And we want to avoid the impression of exerting influence on individual persons (ID: 3013).<sup>27</sup>

This is a statement of a lobbyist from one of the few companies that have not completely banned gifts. Transparency and openness should prevent gifts from serving as a quid pro quo. And the circumstances under which the gift was presented should make clear that there are no expectations connected to the gift.

### **A Distinction Based on Unfair Advantages**

When lobbyists defined corruption as providing or receiving an unfair advantage, they defined such an advantage as a distinguishing characteristic. This distinction is the fourth most frequently mentioned one in the sample (15 percent). In the US subsample, it rank second at 19 percent. 14 percent of the German lobbyists named unfair advantages as a distinguishing criterion, the fifth most frequently mentioned category in that subsample. The following statement shows representatively what lobbyists understand as unfair advantage:

Lobbying, or educating, is simply that: educating. One might ask for a particular result, but at the end of the day, if I've given someone accurate and truthful information, and they make the wrong decision, that's not something I can control. Corruption goes much further by enticing the decision-maker with something of value (whatever that is) that normally wouldn't be part of the equation and gives the provider of that value an unfair advantage (ID: 1453).

This quote implies two criteria that turn lobbying into corruption. First, lobbyists take control. Obtaining an unfair advantage also means obtaining control over the

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<sup>27</sup>Wir schauen auch, dass wir nie Veranstaltungen gezielt für Politiker machen, sondern eben auch für andere Kunden, dass die also nur eine Gruppe sind, um da eben auch diesen individuellen Charakter zu vermeiden. Geschenke sind eben tatsächlich im Zweifelsfall sehr individuell. Und wir wollen eben vermeiden, dass wir den Eindruck erwecken auf individuelle Personen Einfluss auszuüben.

## 8. *How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption*

decision of the policymaker. Second, lobbyists entice policymakers with something that goes beyond information or support. The unfair advantage is exchanged for something of value that is not a typical good or service lobbyists provide.

The distinction based on unfair advantage is one real-world example of the theoretical distinction made in chapter 2. In exchange for personal gain, policymakers hand control over their duties and responsibilities to non-elected actors, here lobbyists. Voters as agents in the delegation chain of representative systems are replaced by private actors. This opens the door to partial and particularistic decision-making and impedes representation. As a result, transmission belt ceases to function properly.

### **A Distinction Based on Buying Outcomes**

The purchase of votes or decisions is the classic prejudice in the context of lobbying and corruption. The picture of suitcases of cash being traded for influence has inspired research on the effects on money in politics (e.g., Schluter 2017; Etzioni 1984) but also popular books with scientific backgrounds (e.g. Buck and Blankschaen 2017; Lessig 2015). Hence, it is not surprising that 10 percent of the interviewed lobbyists (8 percent in the US, 11 percent in Germany) also mentioned selling votes or decisions as a criterion distinguishing corruption from lobbying.

Money is not the only currency. Politicians also need to consider their career after their mandate ends. Many of them (want to) become lobbyists, too (Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen 2012; LaPira and H. F. Thomas 2017; Lazarus, A. M. McKay, and Herbel 2016). Hence, the prospect of a new job in the interest intermediation sector can also entice decision-makers to engage in corruption.

Lobbying is about persuasion, not subversion. [...] Most laws get a lot better if interested parties are involved in the drafting because the laws are then less likely to blow up things they didn't intend to blow up. It becomes corruption only if you buy the judgment of the official, directly or indirectly (ID: 1054).

Money does have a massive influence on the outcome. [There is a f]uzzy line between what is legal and what should be illegal. On the other hand, you've got to do it [contributions; F.G.]. It is not buying an outcome, it is buying access. As long as it is access, it is not corruption [...] (ID: 1067).

The first quote, again, implies that it is not only money that can buy votes in a direct exchange. The *indirect* purchase of judgments can refer to the revolving door as a promise for the future, as outlined above, or other, less observable incentives. The second statement differentiates lobbying from corruption by the intention for which money or other incentives are used. If, e.g., campaign contributions buy access (A. M. McKay 2018), there is nothing wrong with it according to this lobbyist. However, money and other incentives should not be used to buy outcomes, such as votes or decisions.

### A Distinction Based on Private Gain

The distinction based on private gain is also closely related to the corresponding definition of corruption. Lobbying turns into corruption, so 12 percent of the interviewees (15 percent in the US subsample, 11 percent in the German one) said, if policymakers extract gains from lobbyists. Usually, this is possible because of their position within the decision-making process.

True lobbyists are highly regulated. People that go outside this regulation [are corrupt and] some legislators might want favors for personal gain. Lobbyists should say 'no' but some do that (ID: 1407).

As soon as I realize that a personal interest of a public official could be abused to make a decision, the point is reached where I say that I have to differentiate between a political decision and a person who can make a political decision and [obtain; F.G.] an advantage, [...] through a [financial; F.G.] benefit or otherwise (ID: 2857).<sup>28</sup>

These distinctions shift the perspective from the *supply side* that focuses on lobbyists offering something to policymakers connected to an expectation to the *demand side*, where policymakers want something for their attention (cf. Johnston 2012, p. 340). As these two statements indicate, undue expectations of policymakers can range from favors in exchange for access to favors in exchange for influence. In any case, they would put a price tag on a service they are democratically obliged to do and be paid for by the taxpayer.

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<sup>28</sup>Sobald ich erkenne, dass ein persönliches Interesse eines Amtsträgers missbraucht werden könnte, um eine Entscheidung zu treffen, ist der Punkt erreicht, wo ich sage, ich muss differenzieren zwischen einer politischen Entscheidung und einer Person, die eine politische Entscheidung treffen kann und sich einen Vorteil [verschafft; F.G.], [...] durch eine [finanzielle; F.G.] Zuwendung oder Sonstiges.

### **The Subject of the Exchange Matters**

This section makes clear that it is not trivial for lobbyists to always and clearly differentiate their everyday work, lobbying, from corruption. Distinctions range from not the same at all to not distinct at all. However, most of the lobbyists attempted to name criteria where lobbying ends and where corruption begins. Interestingly, all these distinctions imply an exchange between lobbyists and policymakers, which fits in well with the theoretical approach of this study.

The first factor that is implicitly important in all distinctions – except the legal one, which will not be addressed further because it is not useful analytically – are *expectations*. If lobbyists provide information, financial contributions, or even gifts and favors, these goods should not be connected to an expectation regarding influence or even outcomes. The only expectation lobbyists should have is to be granted access. Likewise, policymakers should grant lobbyists access independent of any business courtesy (cf. Johnston 2012, p. 340). They should not put a price tag on their time, votes, or decisions (cf. Schnakenberg and Turner 2019). If policymakers explicitly or implicitly seem to sell access or influence, they also break the delegation chain between their constituency and themselves. Hence, expectations of material benefits or influence and outcomes in the context of lobbying involve a substantial risk of corruption.

The second important factor are *private benefits*. These can relate to both sides. Most lobbyists described the private benefit of companies as unfair advantage. Unfair advantages can take many forms, such as exclusive access, biased influence, or even biased outcomes, e.g., legal loopholes. This does not mean that private benefits are always mutual. Even if the lobbyist does not have bad intentions, she or he might still be enticed by policymakers to provide private-regarding benefits and vice versa. A well-meant gesture still can cause a conflict of interest or be intentionally abused by those who receive or witness it.

And finally, there is a third factor that moderates the relationship between expectations and private benefits: *the appropriateness of behavior*. Naturally, behavior and its appropriateness are highly contextual and based on social norms and standards. This makes it hard to capture. This is the reason why there is no coded category that refers to such statements. They are hard to define. Still, the question of the appropriateness of a gift or hospitality in terms of monetary value bothered many lobbyists, as the following statements show:

#### 8.4. How Lobbyists Distinguish Between Lobbying and Corruption

Reporting requirements are high. I have a rule of thumb: I don't buy nothing of value for anybody, not even a cup of coffee (ID: 2226).

This quote is a radical view adopted by many US lobbyists because transparency rules are strict. The situation is different for lobbyists in Germany, where there are no such rules:

We do not consider providing gifts or entertaining people a problem. But there must always be a clear business connection [...] accounting for at least two-thirds of the value. [...] ticket for a soccer game would not have a business connection. It must actually be connected with an [...] information event, a site visit, etc. (ID: 2981).<sup>29</sup>

If you now invite people to an event without a specific topic, there are many who do not come because they say that, in their view, this is problematic from a compliance perspective. So in this respect, I would always say that there must be a connection to the topic, and if the lunch serves the official exchange of opinions on a draft law or on an issue – it is quite possible that the issue comes from the ministry itself – and we say okay, let's meet for lunch, then you can combine one with the other, then I think that is still justifiable (ID: 2728).<sup>30</sup>

What becomes clear is that the same gesture in different contexts can have different effects. Lobbyists need to be aware of conflicts of interest they can create, intentionally or accidentally. Policymakers need to be aware that they might be exposed to undue influence-seeking, even if the counterpart does not mean it in that way. The value of gifts, favors, or whatever might be offered to politicians is just one example. The *appropriateness of behavior* is largely determined by the

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<sup>29</sup>Wir haben kein Problem damit, Geschenke zu machen oder Personen einzuladen. Aber es muss immer [...] mindestens zu zwei Dritteln einen klaren Geschäftsbezug haben. [...] E]ine Einladung [...] zum Fußballspiel hätte jetzt keinen Geschäftsbezug. Das muss dann tatsächlich mit einer [...] einer Informationsveranstaltung, einer Standortbesichtigung, et cetera, verbunden sein.

<sup>30</sup>[W]enn Sie jetzt zu einer Veranstaltung einladen [...] ohne thematischen Aufhänger [...] gibt es viele, die nicht kommen, weil sie sagen, das ist aus unserer Sicht [...] compliancemäßig problematisch. [...] Also insofern würde ich immer sagen, es muss [...] ein inhaltlicher Bezug dabei sein und wenn das Mittagessen eben dem dienstlichen Austausch [...] zu einem Gesetzentwurf oder zu einem Anliegen [dient] – kann ja auch durchaus sein, dass das Anliegen vom Ministerium selber kommt – [...] und wir sagen okay, lass uns doch mal zum Mittagessen treffen, dann kann man das eine mit dem anderen verknüpfen, dann halte ich das wie gesagt noch für vertretbar.

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption




Figure 8.6.: Corruption predicted by the distinction between lobbying and corruption

responsibilities lobbyists and policymakers have. Nye (1967) would call them duties. Both lobbyists and policymakers have to pursue the goals defined in their job descriptions – the representation of constituencies and making and adopting universally binding laws in the case of policymakers, interest representation in the case of lobbyists. However, in pursuing their goals they also carry mutual responsibility (cf. Granovetter 1985). The best working relationship between lobbyists and policymakers is for each to pursue their goals without enticing the other to violate their duties.

### 8.4.2. Predicting Corruption Based on its Distinction from Lobbying

Figure 8.6 and table 8.3 show that only one distinction criterion provided by lobbyists is systematically associated with perceptions of corruption: the *quid-pro-quo* criterion. Lobbyists who define the distinction as quid pro quo perceive more corruption. This effect is constantly positive in all models but not significant at the

95 percent level in the models with corruption of MPs/legislators, the legislature, decision-makers, and NGOs (see tables A104 and A105 in appendix A.5).<sup>31</sup>

The quid-pro-quo distinctions are those mostly focusing on a demand by lobbyists. Hence, interest representatives who think that lobbyists should not be too demanding in exchanges with policymakers are also those who think that more people in the interest intermediation sector are involved in corruption. There are two possible mechanisms behind this. Again, note that the causal direction of this statistical relationship could go in both directions.

Firstly, demands by lobbyists could be prevalent in the interest intermediation sector and corrupting it. The more lobbyists would demand something in exchange for their services, e.g., providing information, the more they might open the door for corruption. Secondly, lobbyists use this distinction because they have seen expectations leading to corruption. In that case, the quid-pro-quo distinction would be caused by the perceived corruption. Both interpretations lead to the same conclusion: As soon as lobbyists demand something for providing their goods or services, ranging from information to financial contributions, the likelihood of corruption increases – either because policymakers need that information or contribution and are willing to offer something in exchange, or because these demands create conflicts of interest that might be perceived as or even constitute corruption.

## 8.5. A Norm of integrity and Black Sheep

This chapter has two functions in this study. Firstly, it has tested if the theory developed in chapter 2 can be applied to real-world situations and as a result help to analyze influence-seeking behavior for its integrity and to deduce regulatory recommendations. Secondly, it should help to gain a better understanding of the empirical findings in chapter 6.

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<sup>31</sup>The model excluding influential cases suffers from identification problems or perfect separation and does not show effects of the quid pro quo variable that can be interpreted (see table A113 in appendix A.5).

Table 8.3.: Binary logistic regression to predict corruption (index) based on the distinction between lobbying and corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Index
Legal	0.750 (0.556)
Quid pro quo	1.098* (0.553)
Unfair adv.	0.307 (0.654)
Buying outcomes	0.715 (0.719)
Private gain	-0.268 (0.679)
Observations	78

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

### **Exchanges, Duties, and their Relationship to Lobbying and Corruption**

Most of the categories derived from the lobbyists' definitions of corruption and lobbying as well as their distinctions between the two correspond well to the theoretical approach of this paper. Lobbyists provided real-world examples of arguments from chapter 2 or their examples had at least implicitly a similar underlying logic. Regarding future studies analyzing corruption in the interest intermediation sector or the integrity of lobbyists, this proves that an exchange framework is a useful analytic tool. Furthermore, normative assumptions provided by the literature on representation and on the intermediary function of interest groups (transmission belt) help to define how influence-seeking in democracies would ideally look like. Combined with a definition of corruption that can incorporate these democratic norms, such as Nye's with its focus on duties, a conceptual distinction between lobbying and corruption is feasible.

Moreover, this chapter shows that the conceptual distinction developed in chapter 2 is applicable to real-world phenomena. From the presented statements of lobbyists three factors emerge that, taken together, indicate when the line between lobbying and corruption is crossed: expectations, either of lobbyists or of policymakers, concerning personal benefits that are considered inappropriate. This is the

empirical manifestation of a private-regarding benefit-seeking by deviating from formal duties (cf. Nye 1967, p. 419).

Furthermore, most lobbyists share the opinion that a legal distinction between corruption and lobbying is insufficient (see chapter 2 and Goldberg 2018). The regression results indicate this as well. Lobbyists applying a legal definition see corruption as a problem to a lesser extent than lobbyists who apply a broader definition of corruption. Laws do not tell right from wrong. Laws are manifestations of past considerations of what is right or wrong. Hence, lobbying regulations need to be constantly monitored. I address what this means for regulations generally and regulations in the US and in Germany more specifically in chapter 9.

Apart from the legal statutes, the factor *appropriateness of behavior* also holds lobbyists and policymakers accountable. In accordance with the theoretical expectations (Granovetter 1985), mutual control is as necessary as good laws. One way to achieve this was described by a German lobbyist:

[I] know so many lobbyists [...]. There is no money involved. And quite the opposite: if you started to make shady deals, your name would immediately be mud. Once you somehow act disreputably, you are not only fired by your employer, but you are politically [...] ruined. The worst thing here is to be politically ruined and not be considered reputable (ID: 3158).<sup>32</sup>

The fact that lobbyists and policymakers control each other is, in addition to all statistics reported throughout this study, another indicator that the majority of interest representatives and citizen representatives put emphasis on integrity.

### **Mutually Exclusive or Inclusive Activities? Re-Visited**

Several quotes throughout this chapter suggest that sometimes lobbying can turn into corruption by just a single change in behavior, e.g., combining the provision of information with a clear expectation or not, or demanding a certain decision in exchange for a financial contribution or not. Such distinctions show that lobbying and corruption can share the same prerequisites. This indicates qualitative support for

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<sup>32</sup>[I]ch kenne so viele Lobbyisten [...]. Da ist gar kein Geld im Spiel. Und ganz im Gegenteil: wenn Sie anfangen würden, unseriös zu arbeiten, dann wären Sie sofort verbrannt. Wenn Sie einmal irgendwie nicht seriös agieren, dann sind Sie nicht nur da, wo Sie beschäftigt sind, ihren Job los, sondern Sie sind politisch [...] verbrannt. Das Schlimmste ist hier politisch verbrannt zu sein und als nicht seriös so gelten.

## 8. How Lobbyists Define Lobbying and Corruption

a *mutually inclusive* relationship between lobbying and corruption. The qualitative data, does not provide any support for a *mutually exclusive* relationship.

It is undisputed that lobbyists talk to people in power. Only people with power can abuse it. On the other hand, only people with power can use it to do good. Thus, lobbyists should not be accused of influencing people in power. However, with power comes responsibility. Power needs to be restricted and so should be the influence of third parties on it. Both the qualitative data and the quantitative figures indicate that it is just a minuscule minority of lobbyists and policymakers who engage in corrupt transaction. However, internal and legal regulations are required to keep it that way and to make corruption as costly as possible. They are also necessary to keep gray areas as small as possible as the following statement from a German lobbyist shows:

[F]or example, if I accept something worth more than 40 euros or 30 euros, which could be a pen, I report it to my supervisor [...]. [W]e have very strict regulations, which I think is very good because a lot has happened in this gray area where you can't tell exactly what is or isn't a bribe (ID: 2736).<sup>33</sup>

Implications for legal and internal regulations based on the tendency that, if at all, lobbying and corruption share prerequisites that might facilitate both legitimate and undue influence-seeking are discussed in more detail in chapter 9.

### Concluding Remarks

As the last part of the empirical study of this book, I triangulated the quantitative results from the previous two chapters with qualitative data. I used lobbyists' definitions of lobbying and corruption and their distinction between them to see, firstly, if the theoretical approach of this study corresponds to a real-world understanding of influence-seeking, and secondly, if the qualitative data makes the mixed results regarding the question whether lobbying and corruption are mutually exclusive or inclusive activities more plausible.

Taking all results together, I conclude that corruption is only a minor problem in the interest intermediation sector. This contradicts the prejudice that lobbyists

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<sup>33</sup>[W]enn ich beispielsweise etwas annehme, was mehr als 40 Euro oder 30 Euro wert ist, das kann ein Kugelschreiber sein, dann melde ich das meinem Vorgesetzten [...]. [W]ir haben da sehr strenge Vorschriften [...], was ich sehr gut finde, weil gerade in diesem Graubereich, wo man nicht so genau weiß, ist das schon Bestechung oder ist es das nicht, passiert halt sehr viel.

are corrupting democratic decision-making. There are some shared prerequisites of corruption and lobbying that require regulatory attention. These are discussed in the next chapter. However, the results also suggest that corruption is not absent in the interest intermediation sector. Most lobbyists think that there are some black sheep both on the side of policymakers and of interest representatives trying to abuse their positions for private gain. Since these are often people in power, even little corruption can have severe (democratic) consequences. Thus, the fact that there is not much corruption is not necessarily a relief if it involves influential people.

Yet, the negative image of lobbyists and lobbying does not seem to be justified. Most lobbyists stress the importance of integrity in the interest intermediation sector. Furthermore, most of them apply stricter ethical and democratic standards than the legal status. And generally, there is a belief that most of their colleagues share such a view. Thus, the empirical results of this book are summed up in this quote of an American lobbyist:

Wherever there are human beings there is the potential for corruption, people making bad choices and choosing to do the wrong thing. To think there is more corruption in lobbying than any other profession is ignorant and simple-minded thinking. [...] Lobbying has become a slang term with negative connotations [...]. Elected officials and staff lack the time and resources to be experts on all issues, they need to and have a right to hear from all sides of an issue who are more well-versed and experienced, so they then can feel they are making informed decisions on public policy. [...] [S]pending time and money to educate elected officials and staff at all levels of government is hardly corrupt. The vast, vast majority of people I have seen in that business do their jobs with integrity and obey the law (ID: 1448).



## 9. Conclusion

### 9.1. Shedding Light on a Complex Relationship

Inspired by the ongoing search for effective and prudent lobbying regulation and by reoccurring scandals in the interest intermediation sector, I conducted this study pursuing three aims. The first was to develop a distinction between lobbying and corruption based on democratic theory and the concept of legitimate exchanges. Legal distinctions are mere interpretations of norms. They do not set norms. Neither can the definition of democratically sound norm be concluded from its legal interpretation (Goldberg 2018). What is required is a distinction based on the democratic mission of interest intermediation, which is mainly to improve representation. Throughout this study, I treated lobbying and corruption as two modes of seeking influence (Campos and Giovannoni 2007). I understand lobbying broadly as the submission of information and the signaling of political support or opposition to policymakers, thereby representing the interests of a certain group or a company. Corruption is defined as "behavior, which deviates from the formal duties of a [...] role because of private-regarding [...] pecuniary or status gains; or violates the rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (Nye 1967, p. 419).

For lobbying to perform its representative function, certain conditions on both the macro and the micro level must be met. On the macro level these are a sound interest group system offering all interests the chance to be represented (avoiding a *mobilization bias*) and accessible institutions granting every group equal opportunity to represent their interests (avoiding an *agenda bias*). Both biases can impede equal representation of interests by excluding (cf. Warren 2004) some (latent) groups (cf. Truman 1951). The micro level condition is that exchanges between lobbyists and policymakers help both sides to fulfill their duties rather than encourage deviations from them. Policymakers, in the context of this study, are legislators and bureaucrats with responsibilities in a policy cycle, e.g., voting upon laws or

## 9. Conclusion

drafting them. Their duties are to translating political aims into universally binding rules and contributing to informed decisions, respectively. I define the duties of lobbyists as representing interests in a meaningful and informative way.

The second aim was to assess the extent to which corruption is a problem in the interest intermediation sector. I did this by surveying lobbyists' perceptions of corruption of political organizations, institutions, and policymakers. Most lobbyists see them as not or only little affected by or involved in corruption.

And finally, the third aim was to understand the relationship between corruption and lobbying. The theoretical expectations allow two different conceptualizations. The first expects lobbying and corruption to be mutually inclusive ways of influence-seeking. The second conceptualizes lobbying and corruption as mutually exclusive activities. In search of evidence for one (or both) of these conceptualizations I pursued a threefold empirical strategy. In chapter 6, I predicted corruption on the basis of lobbying- and company-specific characteristics. In chapter 7, I assessed the extent to which company- and lobbyist-specific characteristics but also corruption determine lobbying. The analyses yield mixed results in terms of whether the two activities are mutually exclusive or inclusive. To better understand the mixed evidence from these quantitative analyses, in chapter 8 I supplemented them with quotes from lobbyists defining corruption and lobbying. Furthermore, I asked lobbyists how they distinguish between lobbying and corruption. The distinctions vary from *not distinct at all* to *not the same at all*. The chapter shows that the interpretation of the results is dependent on the conceptualization of corruption. Lobbyists employing a narrow definition of corruption, e.g., only in legal terms, also think of corruption as a less severe problem. Yet, there is much gray area. And within that gray area, lobbying and corruption seem to be mutually inclusive rather than exclusive.

## 9.2. Distinguishing Between Lobbying and Corruption Based on Democratic Theory and Legitimate Exchanges

The theoretical discussion in chapter 2 starts from the ideal state of interest groups functioning as transmission belts feeding societal interests into the political system (Easton 1971). The transmission belt function is a positive view on the conse-

quences of lobbying. Based on Warren (2004), I derived a negative view on the consequences of lobbying, namely the conscious exclusion of some groups in favor of those included. I connected these two extremes using the literature on representation. Easton's view of interest groups as intermediary organizations highlights the potential of lobbying to improve representation, whereas the introduction of inequality or partiality impedes representation (cf. Rothstein 2014).

There are two biases that harm equal representation. The first is *mobilization bias*. Only certain groups overcome the collective action problem (Olson 1965), the interest group system is biased because some interests are not represented by it. The second is *agenda bias*. If only certain groups are able to address their interests vis-à-vis the government, the government agenda is likely to be biased. This bias indicates partiality in terms of access to institutions, which results in inequalities concerning the interests that are considered by policymakers. These two biases compromise the ideal functioning of interest groups as transmission belts and violate the norm of equal representation. However, they constitute corruption only if they are consciously introduced or if groups are consciously excluded from participation (Warren 2004), e.g., through favoritism.

A sound interest group system and accessible institutions are prerequisites of democratically desirable lobbying. In the end however, it is individual actions of lobbyists and policymakers that determine the consequences of interest intermediation. Thus, I argue to consider both the macro and the micro level when analyzing the legitimacy of lobbying.

On the micro level, I refer to an exchange framework (Granovetter 1985) to assess when lobbying turns into corruption. An exchange framework is suitable because both researchers on lobbying (e.g., Berkhout 2013; Hanegraaff and Bruycker 2020; Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2019; Klüver 2013; Mahoney 2004) and researchers on corruption (Della Porta 2002) have used it to conceptualize the two influence-seeking activities (cf. Goldberg 2018). I derived the distinction between legitimate exchanges/lobbying and undue exchanges/corruption from Nye's (1967) definition of corruption focusing on a deviation from duties for private-regarding benefits. I defined duties by referring to arguments from the literature on representation as well as to arguments from the principal-agent framework. Lobbyists and policymakers can help each other fulfill their respective duties. In that case, representation is improved. However, lobbyists and policymakers can also encourage each other to

deviate from their duties, which impedes representation. If such deviation comes with a personal gain for one or both of them, lobbying turns into corruption.

### 9.3. The Empirical Relationship Between Lobbying and Corruption

Chapter 5 shows that lobbyists perceive less corruption than the public. Most lobbyists think that corruption is no severe problem in interest intermediation. However, only a minority of the interviewees reported no perception of corruption at all. The figures do not say how many lobbyists or policymakers are corrupt because they only reflect perceived corruption. Yet, they indicate the extent to which lobbyists think that interest intermediation is affected by corruption.

The explanation of patterns of perceived corruption proceeded in three steps. The first step concerns the macro level and looks at the effects of institutions. The second and third steps concern the micro level, focusing on lobbyists' understanding of corruption and how that affects their perception (step 2) and on how lobbying practices and company characteristics relate to corruption (step 3).

#### 9.3.1. The Macro Level: Styles of Policymaking

This study shows that institutions matter. I distinguish between a majoritarian style of policymaking and a cooperative style (chapter 3). I chose the United States as a typical case for the former and Germany as a typical case for the latter. The institutional differences affecting influence-seeking concern the organization of interest intermediation (pluralist vs. corporatist), the government system (presidentialism vs. parliamentarism), and the electoral system. I argue that a cooperative style of policymaking and proportional electoral systems dilute political influence, reduce the probability of particularistic benefits, and establish mechanisms of mutual control. This raises the risks and reduces the rewards of corruption. In contrast, I expect systems with a majoritarian style of policymaking to facilitate corruption because power is centered around executive leaders, there is less party competition, and more competition between interest groups.

The reported differences are too small to be statistically significant, most likely because of a lack of statistical power in the American subsample. Yet, the trend is unambiguous. In all models, German lobbyists reported lower rates of perceived

corruption. The only exception concerns NGOs, where German lobbyists perceive more corruption. Thus, I conclude that a cooperative style of policymaking impedes corruption. Yet, further research should check the robustness of these findings.

Moreover, German lobbyists, on average, report less access and less influence than their American counterparts. There is no difference concerning the amount of direct lobbying as opposed to lobbying via associations. Thus, the different styles of policymaking seem to affect both types of influence-seeking. The mechanisms of how they moderate lobbying activities is not central to this study and should be addressed in another study.

### 9.3.2. The Micro Level: When Does Lobbying Turn Into Corruption?

Most lobbyists described the distinction between lobbying and corruption in remarkably similar ways. They imply two necessary conditions separating lobbying from corruption. The first is *expectations*. The provision of information, financial contributions, and even gifts or favors must not come with an expectation of influence. The only thing lobbyists can legitimately expect is access to policymakers or policymaking institutions. The same holds for policymakers. Their granting of access, time, or even influence must not carry the implicit or explicit expectation of receiving contributions or favors, let alone bribes. Any price tag on their time, their voting behavior, or decisions is democratically harmful. This holds even if policymakers' time merely appears to be for sale.

The second necessary condition is *private gain*. If there is no immediate or indirect private-regarding benefit, influence-seeking might be illegitimate, but it is not necessarily corrupt. Private-regarding benefits do not only refer to suitcases of money or lavish hotel accommodation, but can take many forms, such as exclusive access, patronage, or particularistic outcomes, e.g., legal loopholes.

Summing up, most lobbyists describe corruption as an exchange that involves expectations from one or both sides connected to a private benefit favoring one or both sides. This corresponds well to the exchange approach and the conceptualization of corruption as deviation from duties for private-regarding benefits (cf. chapter 2).

In addition to these two necessary conditions, there is a third contextual criterion that lobbyists frequently mentioned and that is hard to measure: (material)

## 9. Conclusion

*appropriateness.* The appropriateness of gifts or hospitality is especially important in the context of conflicts of interest. Largely, it is determined by the hierarchical positions of the involved actors. One and the same gesture can have different effects in different contexts. Lobbyists need to be aware of conflicts of interest they can create, intentionally or accidentally. Policymakers need to be aware that they might be exposed to undue influence-seeking, even if the counterpart does not act with intent. Strict rules on gifts and hospitality, such as in the US (Clark and Nolan 2009) reduce the likelihood of conflicts of interest.

### 9.3.3. The Micro Level: Are Lobbying and Corruption Mutually Exclusive or Mutually Inclusive?

The findings regarding the empirical relationship between corruption and lobbying are ambiguous. They vary for different lobbying characteristics but also within government branches. Access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of corruption and the strongest predictor of influence through lobbying. Hence, better access increases the two types of influence. However, influence at the executive branch is negatively associated with corruption. This indicates that access is a prerequisite for both of them and that the choice between the two ways of seeking influence happens later, after access has been granted. Then, lobbyists who are already influential do not need corruption, if perception is a valid proxy for the occurrence of corruption, while those who are not influential might be inclined to use corruption.

Regarding the legislature, the relationship is reversed. Better personal access to the legislature tends to be negatively associated with perceived corruption, whereas more influence at the legislature goes hand in hand with an increased perception of corruption there, suggesting a mutually inclusive relationship between lobbying and corruption. The weaker relationship between contact with legislators and corruption indicates that public scrutiny and mutual controls are effective tools against corruption. Furthermore, to affect outcomes, many legislators would need to be bribed. This is both risky and expensive and provides no certainty whether the desired outcome will be achieved. The positive effect of legislative influence on corruption is puzzling. From a rational perspective, there is no need for lobbyists to engage in corruption if they are already influential. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that, in two affluent democracies, influence via corruption lays

the ground for further influence via lobbying. Thus, this finding contradicts theoretical expectations and should be addressed in further research to check if it is substantial or an artifact of measurement errors or uncontrolled variables.

Institutional access to the legislature, such as testifying in hearings or submitting written testimonies, and most company characteristics are unrelated to influence through lobbying or corruption and, furthermore, do not seem to affect their relationship. The effects of informal access and financial contributions vary by political system. Informal access seems to lead to higher perceptions of corruption in Germany and lower perceptions in the US. The opposite was found for financial contributions, corroborating the results of Gokcekus and Sonan (2017). These differences are likely to be country specific rather than caused by a majoritarian and a cooperative style of policymaking.

## 9.4. Standards and Perspectives of Lobbying Regulation

The empirical findings of the study highlight the importance of lobbying regulations, be it to avoid conflicts of interest as far as possible (Kubbe 2017, p. 259; see the discussion on appropriateness) or to prevent lobbyists and policymakers from intentionally or accidentally becoming corrupt (Ainsworth 1997; see also Francesco and Trein 2020). Yet, as discussed above, the micro-level prerequisites for democratically useful lobbying are sound interest group systems and accessible institutions.

### 9.4.1. Two Ways to Combat Corruption on the Macro Level: Incentivizing an Unbiased Interest Group System and Accessible Institutions

In chapter 2, I have identified the *mobilization bias* and the *agenda bias* as possible sources of inequality in representation on a macro level. Intentionally introduced inequalities for the benefit certain groups lead to corruption (Warren 2004; cf. Rothstein 2014). Thus, reducing these biases also prevents the corruption of democracy as defined in this study.

### Mobilization Bias

The term *mobilization bias* describes the unequal chance of latent interests to form a group that represents them. If only certain interests have the capacity to organize effectively, biases in the interest group system are inevitable. An unbiased interest group system will remain wishful thinking (Lowery, Baumgartner, et al. 2015). However, it should still define the ideal state and serve as a long-term goal. The less biased an interest group system is, the less likely equal representation is compromised.

Research indicates that not all groups benefit equally from US federal politics. Lindsey and Teles (2017), e.g., show that the wealthier interests are earning more rents compared to less wealthy societal groups. What is needed to counteract this, they argue, is, firstly, a better mobilization of the public to raise policymakers' attention to specific issues; secondly, that policymakers have enough information from multiple sides to determine the best policy solution; and thirdly, that policies are formulated by institutions which do not give privileged access to financially and organizationally advanced actors (Lindsey and Teles 2017, p. 153). Furthermore, as one of the first studies on this topic, recent research from Mexico has shown that wealthier people are stronger supporters of organizations advocating particularistic outcomes than low-income citizens (Palmer-Rubin, Garay, and Poertner 2021). Members of such organizations would have two advantages. Firstly, they are more likely to overcome the collective action problem because they have the material means to provide incentives to join the organization (Olson 1965). Secondly, if such organizations achieve particularistic benefits through lobbying (Lindsey and Teles 2017), they have even more resources to provide further incentives for organizational participation (cf. Palmer-Rubin, Garay, and Poertner 2021, p. 135), creating a vicious cycle of unequal mobilization.

To reduce such or less serious biases, Lindsey and Teles (2017) suggest subsidizing less wealthy groups. Practically, this would mean a government intervention in the mobilization bias. This idea is not new. In corporatist countries, governments have supported the foundation of groups, especially labor groups (Streeck and Kenworthy 2003, pp. 446–7). However, Lindsey and Teles (2017) define a new conflict. It is not the traditional labor vs. business dichotomy mediated by the government but the conflict between the powerful groups and the disadvantaged groups (cf. Schattschneider 1960), a more general, maybe more modern and volatile dichotomy

of societal conflict and one that would disappear as soon as an equilibrium, that is equality, in interest intermediation is achieved.

There are two crucial questions about this approach. Firstly, how to identify disadvantaged interests? Of course, groups can register and appear on the radar then. But what if most disadvantaged interests have not yet formed groups to represent them? Government support for disadvantaged interests, hence, needs to foster a flourishing civil society and reduce the collective action problem as much as possible. In addition to financial support for newly founded groups, governments aiming for a sound interest group system should raise the social capital to encourage political involvement (cf. Putnam 2000) and, thus, promoting the formation of groups. Once groups are established and stable so that they can register, it is easier to monitor the distribution of power.

### **Agenda Bias**

*Agenda bias* describes the unequal chances of interest groups to attract government attention. The favoring of certain interests over others is the second source of bias eventually leading to the corruption of democracy. There are two sources of agenda bias: too few access points and favoritism. Institutions and policymakers are responsible for preventing agenda bias.

The number of access points is not only determined by the time policymakers devote to organized interests. There are several ways to introduce interests into a political process. The first and most obvious is the *direct contact* with policymakers, who should consider different interests when they define the aims of a law, draft a law, or vote upon a bill. Another one are *institutional hearings* as a formal way of allowing different interests to make their voices heard. Finally, there are *platforms* gathering different versions of draft laws and positions from each interest group seeking to submit its opinion on an issue (see below). These three instruments should generate a sufficient number and range of access points so that each stakeholder can voice their interest. The prerequisite, of course, is that all institutions are open to all interest groups.

However, all these instruments can suffer from favoritism. E.g., if policymakers choose to listen to certain interests only and neglect others, the neglected ones are – at least by that policymaker – excluded from interest representation (cf. Lindsey and Teles 2017, p. 153). This does not mean that each policymaker must listen to every interest. But the legislative and the executive branch as institutions

## 9. Conclusion

need to consider all interests of political stakeholders. The exclusion of interest groups from direct contact with policymakers, hearings, or platforms inevitably leads to inequality. If there is an institutional will to exclude certain interests, such as in the case of favoritism, this exclusion is difficult to prevent. However, transparency regulations help to at least hold somebody or even whole institutions accountable (see below). This could discourage future favoritism. The same holds for institutions serving particularistic interests.

### 9.4.2. Four Ways to Combat Corruption on the Micro Level

Preventing and curbing the corruption of individuals in the context of interest intermediation can be facilitated by several means. In the following, I address the four most important ones: firstly, strengthening accountability by increasing transparency, secondly, increasing the risks related to corruption through effective prosecution and convictions, thirdly, reducing policymakers' dependencies on lobbyists, and finally, promoting ethical responsibility and awareness.

#### Transparency

Recently, many researchers have argued in favor of more transparency (e.g. Barron and Skountridaki 2020; Drutman and Mahoney 2017; Holman and Luneburg 2012; Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2019; Keeling, Feeney, and Hogan 2017; H. F. Thomas and LaPira 2017, specifically in the context of corporate lobbying; Mithani 2019). Reservations about transparency because it might complicate compromises have not proven true (Harden and Kirkland 2021). Transparency enables mutual and external control. If lobbyists and policymakers can control each other or can be controlled by the public, it is riskier to extract private benefits from conflicts of interest transparency or from exchanges with policymakers. *Quid pro quos* can be exposed and conflicts of interest, which are not always avoidable, monitored. Another benefit of increased transparency in policymaking is that legal loopholes might be identified before they are enacted or to at least hold somebody accountable if they are discovered only after the fact (see also Drutman and Mahoney 2017; Johnston 2012). Finally, transparency has the potential to increase trust in the lobbying profession by eliminating the opacity and secrecy associated with it (Anastasiadis, Moon, and Humphreys 2018, p. 213). It is not only scientists who

call for greater transparency but also a growing number of lobbyists (ibid.; Barron and Skountridaki 2020, p. 22).

Following the results in this study, transparency requirements should not be limited to the legislature. Access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of both corruption and influence through lobbying. In addition, the executive is subject to less public scrutiny than the legislative branch. Lastly, mutual control within bureaucracies is weaker because of information asymmetries (Gailmard 2014; Lupia 2008). Thus, the introduction of accountability by increasing transparency is especially important for the executive branch.

A useful transparency register, firstly, must be *complete*. Completeness means that every person representing interests, regardless of the addressed government branch, must register with their name and client(s). There are several sweeping exemptions from registration, e.g., for lobbyists who do not spend more than 50 percent of their time lobbying, or attorneys invoking attorney-client privilege. Such exemptions reduce the effectiveness of registers and can lead to abuses of such exemptions (Chari, Hogan, and Murphy 2019; Holman and Luneburg 2012; Keeling, Feeney, and Hogan 2017).

There are two instruments for ensuring complete registers. The first is a legal obligation. However, legal obligations always include exemptions (e.g., Public Disclosure Commission 2021). Thus, some researchers argue in favor of a voluntary registration in combination with serious disadvantages for those opting out. Drutman and Mahoney (2017) assume that lobbyists voluntarily register if legislators and their staffers ask them to do so. I propose obliging policymakers to talk to registered lobbyists only. Rather than forcing lobbyists to register, the codes of conduct for policymakers and their personnel should require transparency on their part by disclosing all contacts with organized interests (see also H. F. Thomas and LaPira 2017, p. 212).

A positive by-product of a complete lobby register is transparency concerning the revolving door as policymakers who have become lobbyists would also appear in the register. Former officeholders who went through the revolving door represent a considerable section of the lobbying profession. Transparency might be even more effective than longer cooling-off periods that seem "to drive lobbyists into the shadows" (ibid., p. 212).

A complete lobbying register should also disclose all financial contributions directly or indirectly related to political organizations or candidates. The disclosure

## 9. Conclusion

should be independent of the way organizations contribute, e.g., via constructs, such as PACs or 501(c) organizations, or as (party) sponsoring, such as in Germany.

Secondly, a useful lobbying register must be *enlightening*. A plain list of lobbyists might create the appearance of transparency, but it is not transparent. To enable effective control, a register needs to disclose who lobbyists have met and the purpose of the meeting (Holman and Luneburg 2012, p. 100). Furthermore, Drutman and Mahoney (2017) suggest the inclusion of position papers of organized interests and the email conversation related to the legislative proposals (see also *ibid.*). Without such detailed information, it is not possible to link contacts of policymakers or decisions to lobbyists and there would be no chance of controlling possible conflicts of interest or *quid pro quos*. Full transparency is also helpful for legislators. It would empower policymakers to quickly map different positions on an issue and to compare different facts and their interpretations (Drutman and Mahoney 2017; Lindsey and Teles 2017, p. 153).

Thirdly, a useful lobbyist register must be *searchable* (Holman and Luneburg 2012, pp. 100–1). Information does not help if it is not accessible. Thus, the database should be publicly available. The best solution would be a website administered by a single government agency (*ibid.*, pp. 100–1).

The United States – at least on the federal level – have incrementally improved their regulation in terms of transparency (cf. Holman and Luneburg 2012; Luneburg and Spitzer 2009; Milbrath 1963; Zeller 1948). Exemptions, e.g., with regard to the percentage of time spent lobbying, have been removed by the latest reforms. Still, to improve control and reduce spaces of corruption, the accessibility and the extent of information provided by the disclosure database should be improved. In terms of financial transparency, the United States still have a long way to go. Indeed, the US have tried to impose stricter rules. However, this only increased efforts to find legal channels circumventing these rules (Nichols 2011), e.g., *dark money* (Drutman 2016). Dark money refers to non-traceable contributions – mostly to 501(c) groups or super PACs. The greatest weakness in the regulation of 501(c) organizations is the *primary purpose* clause. Primary purpose means that groups have to spend at least 50 percent of their money to "further the common good and general welfare of the people of the community (such as by bringing about civic betterment and social improvements)" (Internal Revenue Service 2019). This room for interpretation allows for activities that are informally related to elections. Amending the regulation of dark money can take two routes. The government could either loosen

the rules to make anonymous spending less attractive and thereby increase public control, or it could continue to follow the, thus far, unsuccessful path of tightening the rules, e.g., by increasing the penalties on any form of direct and indirect donation not being publicly disclosed. The extreme of loosening the rules would in effect legalize direct (corporate) donations. This would make PACs, super PACs, and some 501(c) organizations obsolete. By tightening the rules and increasing penalties, violators could be forced to forfeit their right to political participation, similar to people losing the right to vote when they have committed certain crimes. Organized interests or corporations guilty of illegal campaign financing could be banned from contacting legislators or officials or from installing PACs or 501(c) groups anymore. Generally, the role of private money in the US could be reduced by the introduction of (partly) public funding (Schluter 2017, p. 187).

Apart from requiring the disclosure of direct donations to political parties, German lobbying regulation is still in its infancy. Until the law introducing a mandatory register in 2021, the only register was a voluntary list open to associations only. It is a prerequisite to get invited to hearings and to obtain a door pass to the *Bundestag*. Because of its restriction to associations, it does not represent the reality of the interest intermediation sector in Berlin anymore (Schwaneck 2019, p. 90). Thus, German lobbying regulation failed to meet any of the criteria mentioned above. If this changes with the new register should be evaluated once it is introduced and accessible. At least some *Länder* have adopted transparency regulation over the last few years.<sup>1</sup>

Of course, lobbyists are more inclined to try and avoid registration if the bureaucratic burden becomes too great. However, since a government agency should be responsible for maintaining the database, apart from the initial registration, it could – in cooperation with the staffers of the policymakers – also bear most of the bureaucratic burden, e.g., linking meetings, statements, and email conversations to issues (see also section 9.4.2 below).

### **Criminal Jurisdiction**

Thus far, I have only discussed transparency rules designed to make the influence of lobbyists observable. However, I argued in chapter 2 that, for the most part, it is policymakers who determine the extent of that influence. Thus, a regulation of lobbying focusing on lobbyists only would be insufficient. Policymakers are free to

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<sup>1</sup>Rhineland-Palatinate in 2011, Brandenburg in 2013, Saxony-Anhalt in 2015.

## 9. Conclusion

decide what information to use, whom to trust, and what information to neglect in the performance of their duties, e.g., formulating policy goals or converting policy goals into legislative proposals. Furthermore, I argued that exchanges are not corrupt as long as no private-regarding benefit is involved. Thus, regulating policymakers in the context of interest intermediation means preventing them from extracting private rents from their position.

In terms of the prosecution of corruption, the United States have been leading international efforts to combat corruption for several years. This is also reflected in a "well crafted and enforced" (Johnston 2012, pp. 336–8) legal framework. Thus, the next crucial step in the US consists of promoting accountability (ibid.), e.g., e.g., by improving transparency and reregulating political funding.

The case is different in Germany. Legal enforcement is very effective (Hough 2013, p. 105). Especially civil servants must obey strict rules (Wolf 2014, pp. 21–2). However, German politicians are not civil servants. The rules for Members of the *Bundestag* looser and rarely lead to sentences despite some (legal) corruption (Wolf 2008). Members of the *Bundestag* become corrupt in legal terms only if they demand, agree to, or accept an unjustified advantage while exercising their mandate. This statute goes further than the previous anti-bribery act that only prohibited selling votes (cf. ibid.). However, it is still subject to criticism. Firstly, deferred advantages are not covered by the law (Kubiciel and Hoven 2014, pp. 346–7). Secondly, activities are punishable only if Members of the *Bundestag* are exercising their mandate (ibid., p. 348). This requires a causal link between an advantage and an activity performed as a representative (ibid., p. 348). Finally, the term *unjustified advantage* implies that whether accepting it is illegal or not is determined by its social appropriateness. Furthermore, donations are always considered appropriate (ibid., pp. 351–4). These caveats make illegal corruption hard to prove in court – as the case of Philip Amthor indicates.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in addition to providing for full accountability through the introduction of a lobbying register, Germany must further develop the legal framework regulating conflicts of interest, e.g., caused by outside earnings (Geys and Mause 2012), and bribery of Members of the *Bundestag*.

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<sup>2</sup>Note that this is not an argument favoring a conviction. Amthor was acquitted and has not violated any legal statutes. They have been amended as a consequence of the scandal. However, it shows how difficult it is to bring such obvious conflicts of interest to court to determine whether there was undue influence.

### **Internal Corporate Compliance and Transparency Guidelines**

In addition to the general legal restrictions, it is advisable for interest groups to establish internal control regimes or at least adopt codes of conduct. Most large corporations already have compliance units that control the expenditure of government affairs units and check for possible conflicts of interest. Internal guidelines can be better adapted to the realities of interest groups and define stricter rules for sensitive situations (Anastasiadis, Moon, and Humphreys 2018, p. 213). However, compliance rules should not be regarded as a substitute but an addition to legal requirements to prevent compliance rules from being used as a means of avoiding public scrutiny (ibid., p. 213; Lock and Seele 2016, p. 418).

Furthermore, interest groups can decide to increase transparency at their own initiative if the legislature fails to do so (cf. Barron and Skountridaki 2020, p. 22). This does not only indicate ethical awareness but also allows lobbying to be monitored externally (see discussion on the utility of transparency above). Greater transparency also facilitates internal control and keeps unnecessary costs down (Coates IV 2012, Dahan, Hadani, and Schuler 2013, p. 374). Through this form of self-regulation, interest groups should establish standards of *deliberative lobbying* based on "discourse, transparency, and accountability; aim[ing] to resolve public issues" (Lock and Seele 2016, p. 418). In addition to deliberately allowing the public to control their lobbyists, such a standard also increases the legitimacy of the influence (ibid., p. 423).

### **Giving the Government Its Brain Back**

Another mechanism for preventing undue influence is to "give the government back its brain" (Lindsey and Teles 2017, p. 153). As argued in chapter 2, one of the duties of legislators and bureaucrats is to make well-informed decisions and to draft technically sound proposals, respectively. The availability of more scientific services for policymakers and decision-makers would make them less dependent on information provided by lobbyists. This applies especially to the executive branch, since lobbyists seem to approach the bureaucracy at least as often as the legislature (see chapters 5 through 7).

There are two ways to achieve more informational independence from lobbyists. Firstly, governments could cooperate more closely with independent scientific institutes or universities. Secondly, the government could bolster scientific expertise

## 9. Conclusion

within the bureaucracy by installing specialized units gathering information and providing scientific services. Of course, the implementation of the second suggestion would substantially increase government size, which conflicts with Republican democratic traditions (cf. Stokes 2002, p. 28). Republican traditions often implicitly accept inequalities concerning policy outcomes if there are theoretically equal chances to participate in the policy process. If these implicit consequences are to be eliminated, a larger government is one way of achieving that.

### 9.5. Contributions to the Literature

This study contributes to the literature on interest groups and on corruption theoretically, empirically, and methodologically. In chapter 2, I reviewed the causes and consequences of the mobilization bias – caused by the collective action problem (Olson 1965) – caused by the chorus in pluralist heaven singing with an upper-class accent (Schattschneider 1960) – and embedded them in a theoretical context of representation (Beetham 2013; Easton 1971; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Urbinati 2011; Williams 2000b). The argument provides a common theoretical basis for research on both biases and the representative potential of interest groups (e.g., Bevan and Rasmussen 2020; Carammia, Borghetto, and Bevan 2018; Flöthe and Rasmussen 2018; Pakull, Goldberg, and Bernhagen 2020; Rozbicka et al. 2021; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). In doing so, I also developed a theoretical framework on how to distinguish between legitimate influence-seeking, e.g., lobbying, and undue influence, e.g., activities introducing biases or activities constituting corruption.

The empirical approach of this study adds to five strands of the literature. Firstly, it is – to my knowledge – the fifth comparative study looking into the empirical relationship between lobbying and corruption (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009; Campos and Giovannoni 2007; Campos and Giovannoni 2017; Nugent and Sukiassyan 2009; for theoretical models and discussions see Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee 2019; Goldberg 2018; Harstad and Svensson 2011; Kaufmann and Vicente 2011; Schnakenberg and Turner 2019; Snyder 1991). All these studies found no or a negative correlation between lobbying and corruption. However, that strand of research refers to economies in transition or to Eastern European countries. This is the first study analyzing the relationship of corruption and lobbying in two more affluent democracies. The strong evidence for a relationship following a mutual-

exclusiveness logic is not as clear as in transition economies. This might have to do with the fact that in affluent democracies corruption is more difficult to conceptualize and to identify (Johnston 2014). Secondly, this study provides further evidence for the effect of institutions on corruption (for an overview, see Treisman 2007). Comparing two established and stable democracies and, thus, holding the effects of democratization almost constant, I find further evidence that decentralized institutions perform better at curbing corruption (Gerring and Thacker 2004). More specifically, a cooperative style of policymaking generally dilutes influence better. This concerns influence through both lobbying and corruption.

Thirdly, this study adds to the literature on corporate lobbying (e.g., Aizenberg and Hanegraaff 2020; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Drope and W. L. Hansen 2006; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994) by analyzing company- and lobbyist-specific determinants of it. The data from the elite interviews suggest that company-specific characteristics are less important than previous studies indicated. Rather, the professionalization of lobbying within corporations seems to determine the lobbying strategies and influence. Furthermore, it is one of the first studies analyzing corporate lobbying in Germany (Polk 2020).

Fourthly, the book provides further evidence of the growing importance of responsible or ethical lobbying (e.g., Anastasiadis, Moon, and Humphreys 2018; Barron and Skountridaki 2020; Dahan, Hadani, and Schuler 2013; Lock and Seele 2016; McGrath 2005b). Many lobbyists indicate that it is not only lobbyists who have developed an increased awareness of legitimacy, but also that policymakers demand responsible and ethical lobbying by lobbyists. However, fifthly, this demand is not yet reflected in the lobbying regulation of the two countries under investigation (e.g., Chari, Hogan, and Murphy 2019; Drutman and Mahoney 2017; Holman and Luneburg 2012; LaPira and Holyoke 2017; Molina 2019). The study of the integrity and legitimacy of lobbying provides evidence that good lobbying regulation is not the only but an important way to prevent undue influence. Internal compliance guidelines and codes of conduct encourage ethical and responsible lobbying as well.

Furthermore, this study has shown that elite interviews can be a useful tool for analyzing corruption (cf. Andersson 2008; Heywood 2015, p. 146; Trapnell 2015). They help to gather context-specific data on corruption, which in my case refers to the relationship between lobbying and corruption. However, interviews might be also useful to analyze gateways of corruption within administrations, to name one example. Furthermore, qualitative interviews facilitate the identification of

mechanisms of corruption. This approach seems especially promising for assessing causal mechanisms or interdependencies with concepts that are related to corruption, such as patronage, nepotism, or conflicts of interest (cf. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, pp. 8–9). However, researchers need to be aware of the pitfalls of elite interviewing in the context of corruption as such interviews are prone to sample and response biases. Regarding the former, the sensitivity of the topic might deter those who know about or are involved in corruption from participating (Duncan 2006). Regarding the latter, the sensitivity of the topic might result in an under- or overreporting of corruption, possibly dependent on the political interests of the interviewee (Agerberg 2020).

### 9.6. Limitations and Further Research

The above-mentioned caveats of elite interviews apply to this study as well. Lobbyists, e.g., might be inclined to underreport corruption to create the impression of a corruption-free interest intermediation system. Thus, the reported corruption is likely to represent a lower bound. In addition, it is likely, almost inevitable, that lobbyists knowing about corruption or being involved in it refrained from participating in this study. With the present data, I cannot assess the extent or the consequences of these biases.

Concerning the generalizability of the results, the German subsample does not significantly differ from the original population of companies, the top 500 in terms of revenue and number of employees. This does not apply to the American subsample, where smaller companies are overrepresented. Furthermore, there are some deviations concerning the distribution of companies across states and economic sectors. Therefore, the results are subject to the consequences of these biases.

Another limitation is that the data provides only some information about how the lobbyists have come to their perception of corruption. Illegal payments were observed by just three companies, all of them in the US. Thus, it is not possible to assess the exact extent of corruption in the interest intermediation sector. The data does not provide insights into how many of the lobbyists or policymakers are involved in corruption. The perception-based data only proxy corruption in the interest intermediation system. Neither does the data show which form of corruption is most prevalent in the interest intermediation sector. This is not least caused

by the fact that corruption in affluent democracies is difficult to observe (Johnston 2014). Further research should address some of the mentioned limitations.

Methodologically, biases caused by sensitive questions should be assessed in the context of corruption and similar topics. If researchers know the sources of biases, they can adapt the framing of their research to avoid, e.g., red flag words or use proxies that are less sensitive. By the same token, researchers of corruption should continue to seek valid micro-level measurements of corruption. This also applies to the measurement of influence through lobbying. Self-attributed influence is prone to similar biases. The alternatives, e.g., preference attainment, rely on outside data and are not available in every country. Better operationalizations and proxies can also be useful to distinguish between corruption and related or similar concepts.

Turning to the gaps in empirical research, further research should consider the experiences of associations as well. As pointed out in chapter 2, disadvantaged groups that typically do not have the resources of business groups and companies might have different views and experiences of biases and power in interest group systems and hence might perceive levels of integrity in political systems differently. For the same reason, it is a continuing task of interest group scholars to map interest group populations to identify mobilization biases. The big empirical and methodological challenge in determining the extent of mobilization biases is to identify diffuse interests that failed to overcome the collective action problem.

More research projects are needed to better understand connections between the private and politics, e.g., moonlighting, revolving doors, lobbying, and corruption. This study showed that, in addition to cross-country analyses, elite interviews are a useful tool for this kind of research. Future similar endeavors should include interviews with politicians, maybe retired or retiring politicians, since they are not concerned about reelection and might thus be willing to speak more openly about illegitimate practices. Bureaucrats in federal or state ministries might also be able to shed light on the obscurities in this research field. However, they might have legal reservations to participate. Furthermore, more research about the consequences of lobbying regulation and compliance is needed.

Finally, the present study refers to data from the United States and Germany as typical cases of a majoritarian and a cooperative style of policymaking. To differentiate country effects from system effects, it is desirable to conduct similar studies in more countries. This does not only refer to affluent democracies, where elite interviews seem especially promising, but also to developing countries or tran-

sition economies to better understand the complex relationship between lobbying and corruption.

## 9.7. Defining the Acceptable, Enforcing Transparency, Promoting Representation

There is a fine line between curbing corruption and impeding interest intermediation in affluent democracies, such as the United States and Germany. Apparently, the vast majority of influence-seeking activities are sound and possibly even democratically desirable. Corruption seems to be as common in the interest intermediation sector as elsewhere, if not less. This is not only ensured by lobbying regulation, at least in the US, but also by an increased awareness of integrity and ethical lobbying on the part of lobbyists and policymakers. However, lobbyists indicate that there are some black sheep, both among policymakers and lobbyists, who might abuse their power. Hence, lobbying must be monitored. The best way to do this is by increasing accountability through transparency. Legally defining whether a lobbyist is allowed to buy a legislator a cup of coffee or not can prevent conflicts of interest. However, this has nothing to do with improving representation. Mere public scrutiny, the ability to monitor possible conflicts of interest, can provide incentives for lobbyists and decision-makers to make sure that efforts to exert influence do not violate democratic principles of representation. Another way to deter undue influence is to improve scientific expertise within government institutions by installing specialized units. Finally, interest groups should introduce more group-specific compliance guidelines in addition to legal restrictions of lobbying and obligations of transparency.

Influence-seeking for particularistic outcomes cannot be prevented by anti-lobbying regimes. Nor should it. Anti-lobbying regulation would imply that lobbying is inherently undesirable or even harmful. I argue that internal and legal regulation should support legitimate lobbying improving representation by discouraging undue influence-seeking. In legal or compliance terms, this is a complicated quest. However, this struggle of defining the acceptable is no reason not to embark on it.

# A. Methodological Appendix

## A.1. Chapter 4

### A.1.1. Appendix 4A: T-Tests and Prediction of Missing Values

	Mean (Sample)	Mean (Population)	Delta	p
Revenue (GER)	14.72	7.45	7.27	0.12
Employees (GER)	47924	31194	16730	0.17
Revenue (US)	6.57	17.55	-10.98	0.01
Employees (US)	5618	29765	-24147	0.00

*Note:* Revenue in billion USD, 8 missing values for revenues in US population data. Data sources: US: D&B Hoovers; GER: CIO500.

Table A1.: T-Test to compare the sample means with the means in the population

Table A2.: Effect of the interview mode on perceived corruption of parties, NGOs, and the index (ordered logistic regressions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Parties (1)	NGOs (2)	Index (3)
Web Survey	0.522 (0.646)	0.317 (0.664)	-0.233 (0.692)
Phone Interview	0.529 (0.636)	0.671 (0.598)	-0.350 (0.633)
Country: Germany	-0.505 (0.591)	0.719 (0.585)	-1.953** (0.712)
Observations	76	76	78
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Table A3.: Effect of the interview mode on perceived corruption of the administration, officials, MPs/legislators, and the legislature (binary logistic regressions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Administration <i>logistic</i> (1)	Officials <i>logistic</i> (2)	MPs <i>logistic</i> (3)	Legislature <i>OLS</i> (4)
Web Survey	0.491 (0.841)	-0.077 (0.844)	0.393 (0.943)	-0.220 (0.317)
Phone Interview	0.108 (0.714)	-0.712 (0.693)	-0.361 (0.725)	-0.518 (0.263)
Country: Germany	0.061 (0.710)	-0.504 (0.744)	-0.638 (0.806)	-0.045 (0.274)
Constant	0.956 (0.728)	1.718* (0.782)	1.843* (0.838)	3.760*** (0.286)
Observations	77	76	78	87
R <sup>2</sup>				0.047
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>				0.013
Log Likelihood	-42.811	-40.869	-38.663	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	93.622	89.738	85.326	

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A4.: Effect of the interview mode on the perception of corruption of policy institutions, corruption of decision-makers (indices) and influence (OLS regressions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Policy Institutions (1)	Decision-makers (2)	Influence (Legislature) (3)	Influence (Index) (4)
Web Survey	0.262 (0.411)	-0.063 (0.289)	0.007 (0.323)	-0.367 (0.324)
Phone Interview	-0.105 (0.374)	0.068 (0.261)	-0.339 (0.270)	-0.214 (0.270)
Country: Germany	-0.552 (0.366)	-0.402 (0.254)	-0.093 (0.282)	0.081 (0.283)
Constant	3.036*** (0.378)	2.783*** (0.264)	3.074*** (0.294)	3.011*** (0.295)
Observations	76	77	85	85
R <sup>2</sup>	0.068	0.045	0.024	0.032
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.029	0.006	-0.012	-0.003

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A5.: Effect of the interview mode on access (OLS regressions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pers. (1)	Inst. (2)	Exe. (3)	Info. (4)
Web Survey	-0.220 (0.317)	0.073 (0.284)	-0.573* (0.250)	-0.064 (0.271)
Phone Interview	-0.518 (0.263)	-0.453 (0.237)	-0.571** (0.208)	-0.188 (0.230)
Country: Germany	-0.045 (0.274)	0.221 (0.248)	-0.029 (0.218)	-0.159 (0.238)
Constant	3.760*** (0.286)	2.551*** (0.259)	3.164*** (0.228)	2.534*** (0.247)
Observations	87	86	85	85
R <sup>2</sup>	0.047	0.068	0.126	0.012
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.034	0.094	-0.024
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

Table A6.: Effect of the interview mode on financial contributions and the percentage of indirect lobbying

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Contr. <i>logistic</i>	Indirect lobbying <i>OLS</i> <i>Censored</i>	
Web Survey	0.077 (0.736)	9.993 (10.679)	13.858 (12.515)
Phone Interview	0.457 (0.585)	0.430 (9.127)	0.784 (12.182)
Mail Survey		41.395 (30.934)	
Country: Germany	-1.734* (0.676)	13.505 (9.928)	12.972 (11.715)
Constant	1.170 (0.700)	45.100*** (10.116)	44.564*** (11.934)
Observations	86	80	71
R <sup>2</sup>		0.048	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		-0.002	
Log Likelihood	-53.345		- 312.006
Akaike Inf. Crit.	114.690		

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

### A.1.2. Appendix 4B: Statistical Power Analysis




Figure A1.: Statistical Power Analysis

## A.2. Chapter 5

### A.2.1. Appendix 5A




Figure A2.: Distribution of corruption of policy institutions and of decision-makers

	USA	GER	Total
Not at all affected	11.54	9.23	9.89
Less than a little bit affected	3.85	43.08	31.87
At least a little bit affected	73.08	32.31	43.96
Missing	11.54	15.38	14.29
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table A7.: Ordered averaged index

	USA	GER	Total
1 Not at all corrupt	11.54	15.38	14.29
1.5	3.85	3.08	3.30
2	26.92	44.62	39.56
2.5	7.69	0.00	2.20
3	26.92	20.00	21.98
3.5	3.85	0.00	1.10
4	0.00	1.54	1.10
4.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
5 Extremely corrupt	0.00	0.00	0.00
Missing	19.23	15.38	16.48
Total	100.00	0.00	100.00

Table A8.: Perceived corruption of parties

	USA	GER	Total
1 Not at all corrupt	23.08	13.85	16.48
1.5	0.00	1.54	1.10
2	34.62	40.00	38.46
2.5	0.00	1.54	1.10
3	19.23	20.00	19.78
3.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
4	3.85	6.15	5.49
4.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
5 Extremely corrupt	0.00	1.54	1.10
Missing	19.23	15.38	16.48
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table A9.: Perceived corruption of NGOs

	USA	GER	GSS16	GCB16
None of them	19.23	21.54	2.10	32.00
At least few of them	65.38	63.08	94.30	47.00
Missing	15.38	15.38	3.60	21.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table A10.: Perceived corruption of officials (comparison)

Appendix

	USA	GER	Total
1 None of them	19.23	21.54	20.88
2 Some of them	65.38	1.54	1.10
3 Many of them	0.00	0.00	0.00
4 Most of them	0.00	0.00	0.00
5 All of them	0.00	0.00	0.00
Missing	15.38	58.46	60.44
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table A11.: Perceived corruption of the officials (original variables)

	USA	GER	Total
1 Not at all corrupt	15.38	21.54	19.78
1.5	0.00	3.08	2.20
2	42.31	49.23	47.25
2.5	0.00	1.54	1.10
3	23.08	9.23	13.19
3.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
4	0.00	0.00	0.00
4.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
5 Extremely corrupt	0.00	0.00	0.00
Missing	19.23	15.38	16.48
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table A12.: Perceived corruption of the administration

	USA	GER	GSS16	GCB16
None of them	11.54	20.00	1.70	38.00
At least few of them	76.92	64.62	95.40	42.00
Missing	11.54	15.38	2.90	20.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table A13.: Perceived corruption of MPs/legislators (comparison)

	USA	GER	Total
1 None of them	11.54	20.00	17.58
1.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
2 Some of them	65.38	55.38	58.24
2.5	0.00	3.08	2.20
3 Many of them	11.54	6.15	7.69
3.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
4 Most of them	0.00	0.00	0.00
4.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
5 All of them	0.00	0.00	0.00
Missing	11.54	15.38	14.29
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table A14.: Perceived corruption of MPs/legislators (original variables)

	USA	GER	Total
1 Not at all corrupt	19.23	35.38	30.77
1.5	0.00	1.54	1.10
2	38.46	41.54	40.66
2.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
3	23.08	6.15	10.99
3.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
4	0.00	0.00	0.00
4.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
5 Extremely corrupt	0.00	0.00	0.00
Missing	19.23	15.38	16.48
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table A15.: Perceived corruption of Parliament/Legislature

	Mean:	US	GER	SD:	US	GER	Min.	Max.
Policy Institutions	2.67	3.14	2.49	1.21	1.39	1.10	1.00	5.00
Decision-Makers	2.50	2.77	2.39	0.85	0.87	0.82	1.00	4.00

Table A16.: Descriptive statistics for perceived corruption of policy institutions and decision-makers (indices)

Table A17.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict missing perception data

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Index (1)	Parties (2)	NGOs (3)	Officials (4)	Admin. (5)	MPs/Leg. (6)	Legis. (7)
Country: Germany	0.465 (0.918)	-0.354 (0.772)	-0.354 (0.772)	0.174 (0.846)	-0.354 (0.772)	0.465 (0.918)	-0.354 (0.772)
Revenue (ext.) (ln)	-0.023 (0.092)	-0.009 (0.090)	-0.009 (0.090)	-0.017 (0.090)	-0.009 (0.090)	-0.023 (0.092)	-0.009 (0.090)
Employees (ext.) (ln)	-0.020 (0.146)	0.025 (0.135)	0.025 (0.135)	-0.033 (0.139)	0.025 (0.135)	-0.020 (0.146)	0.025 (0.135)
Constant	-1.980 (1.055)	-1.591 (0.986)	-1.591 (0.986)	-1.568 (0.990)	-1.591 (0.986)	-1.980 (1.055)	-1.591 (0.986)
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	91	91
Log Likelihood	-37.139	-40.617	-40.617	-38.986	-40.617	-37.139	-40.617
Akaike Inf. Crit.	82.278	89.234	89.234	85.973	89.234	82.278	89.234

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A18.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict missing perception data (continued)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Policy Institutions	Decision-makers
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	−0.354 (0.772)	0.174 (0.846)
Revenue (ext.) (ln)	−0.009 (0.090)	−0.017 (0.090)
Employees (ext.) (ln)	0.025 (0.135)	−0.033 (0.139)
Constant	−1.591 (0.986)	−1.568 (0.990)
Observations	91	91
Log Likelihood	−40.617	−38.986
Akaike Inf. Crit.	89.234	85.973
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A19.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict missing access data

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Pers. Acc. to L. (1)	Inst. Acc. to L. (2)	Exe. (3)	Info. (4)	Contributions (5)
Country: Germany	0.911 (1.484)	1.054 (1.469)	1.140 (1.330)	1.077 (1.331)	1.054 (1.469)
Revenue (ext.) (ln)	0.283 (0.232)	0.126 (0.165)	0.184 (0.162)	0.144 (0.156)	0.126 (0.165)
Employees (ext.) (ln)	-0.350 (0.250)	-0.426 (0.238)	-0.429* (0.219)	-0.384 (0.214)	-0.426 (0.238)
Constant	-1.019 (1.656)	-0.340 (1.399)	-0.127 (1.326)	-0.411 (1.319)	-0.340 (1.399)
Observations	91	91	91	91	91
Log Likelihood	-15.044	-17.402	-19.908	-20.329	-17.402
Akaike Inf. Crit.	38.088	42.803	47.815	48.658	42.803

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Personal access to legislators	3.56	0.96	1.00	5.00
Institutional access to the legislation	2.62	0.87	1.00	4.67
Access to the executive branch	2.89	0.79	1.00	4.50
Use of informal lobbying strategies	2.36	0.80	1.00	4.00
Influence on the legislation	2.93	0.96	1.00	5.00
Influence on the executive branch	2.94	0.97	1.00	5.00
Revenue (ln)	1.22	2.25	-6.91	5.71
Employees (ln)	8.51	2.26	0.69	12.07
Age	73.22	52.65	3.00	262.00
Confictual Policy Area	3.69	1.13	1.00	5.00
Percentage of indirect lobbying	58.16	30.57	0.00	100.00

Table A20.: Descriptive statistics for predictors and self-attributed influence

Table A21.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict missing data of self-attributed influence and the percentage of indirect lobbying

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislature (1)	Executive branch (2)	Indirect lobbying (3)
Country: Germany	1.140 (1.330)	1.140 (1.330)	-1.695 (0.894)
Revenue (ext.) (ln)	0.184 (0.162)	0.184 (0.162)	0.040 (0.125)
Employees (ext.) (ln)	-0.429* (0.219)	-0.429* (0.219)	-0.150 (0.165)
Constant	-0.127 (1.326)	-0.127 (1.326)	0.055 (1.135)
Observations	91	91	91
Log Likelihood	-19.908	-19.908	-27.690
Akaike Inf. Crit.	47.815	47.815	63.381

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Appendix

	US	GER	Delta	p
Revenue	9.76	19.39	-9.63	0.20
Employees	5742	27190	-21448	0.00

*Note:* Revenue in billion USD

Table A22.: T-Test to compare the means of employees and revenues

## A.3. Chapter 6

## A.3.1. Appendix 6A: Regression Tables

Table A23.: Ordered logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Index (1)	Parties (2)	NGOs (3)
Country: Germany	-2.260*	-0.813	1.630*
	(0.963)	(0.748)	(0.776)
Personal access to legislators	-0.152	-0.147	-0.031
	(0.426)	(0.362)	(0.368)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.681	-0.247	-0.499
	(0.479)	(0.394)	(0.404)
Access to the executive branch	1.481**	0.723	0.110
	(0.522)	(0.433)	(0.419)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.079	-0.187	0.450
	(0.401)	(0.343)	(0.339)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.235	0.101	0.559
	(0.611)	(0.548)	(0.556)
Influence at the legislature	0.540	0.121	-0.279
	(0.468)	(0.400)	(0.415)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.657	-0.607	0.082
	(0.534)	(0.465)	(0.462)
Revenue (ln)	-0.287	0.044	-0.126
	(0.239)	(0.191)	(0.195)
Employees (ln)	0.103	0.026	-0.160
	(0.232)	(0.210)	(0.209)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A24.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption in the legislature

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Officials	Administration	MPs/Legislators	Legislature
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.819 (1.056)	-2.000 (1.235)	-0.504 (1.293)	-1.038 (0.876)
Personal access to legislators	-0.897 (0.532)	-0.013 (0.529)	-0.948 (0.582)	-0.446 (0.439)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.091 (0.556)	-0.259 (0.519)	0.155 (0.600)	0.266 (0.453)
Access to the executive branch	1.676** (0.634)	1.390* (0.593)	0.689 (0.603)	0.522 (0.472)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.875 (0.491)	0.031 (0.457)	0.425 (0.480)	-0.275 (0.372)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.262 (0.747)	-0.722 (0.730)	0.683 (0.843)	-0.156 (0.618)
Influence at the legislature	0.080 (0.656)	-0.767 (0.641)	0.816 (0.649)	0.015 (0.448)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.496 (0.699)	-0.004 (0.670)	-0.966 (0.740)	0.141 (0.511)
Revenue (ln)	0.086 (0.322)	0.571 (0.385)	-0.222 (0.377)	-0.220 (0.239)
Employees (ln)	-0.028 (0.349)	-0.540 (0.400)	-0.188 (0.382)	0.067 (0.247)
Constant	-0.492 (3.301)	6.356 (3.800)	4.286 (3.909)	0.763 (2.296)
Observations	70	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-31.565	-30.523	-28.021	-41.923
Akaike Inf. Crit.	85.129	83.046	78.042	105.846

Note:

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A25.: OLS regressions to predict perceived corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Policy institutions	Decision-makers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.642 (0.433)	-0.401 (0.288)	-0.240 (0.234)
Personal access to legislators	-0.112 (0.218)	-0.236 (0.145)	-0.063 (0.121)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.151 (0.237)	-0.035 (0.157)	-0.355* (0.138)
Access to the executive branch	0.336 (0.250)	0.505** (0.166)	0.693*** (0.138)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.134 (0.196)	0.123 (0.130)	-0.245 (0.123)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.103 (0.329)	-0.027 (0.218)	0.167 (0.183)
Influence at the legislature	0.054 (0.232)	0.208 (0.155)	0.304* (0.129)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.054 (0.267)	-0.250 (0.178)	-0.129 (0.150)
Revenue (ln)	-0.012 (0.119)	-0.035 (0.079)	0.004 (0.064)
Employees (ln)	-0.017 (0.130)	0.028 (0.086)	-0.009 (0.070)
Constant	3.471** (1.198)	1.883* (0.796)	2.018** (0.644)
Observations	70	70	66
R <sup>2</sup>	0.119	0.216	0.405
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.031	0.083	0.297

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

## A.3.2. Appendix 6B: Models with Control Variables

Table A26.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption (index, control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-3.381*** (1.023)	-3.428*** (1.011)	-3.292*** (0.979)	-2.934** (1.042)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-0.190 (0.381)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	-0.559 (0.490)			
Access to exe.	1.252* (0.493)			
Use of informal strat.		-0.152 (0.337)		
Contributions (yes/no)		-0.278 (0.581)		
Influence (legislature)			0.447 (0.449)	
Influence (exe.)			-0.359 (0.476)	
Revenue (ln)				-0.114 (0.234)
Employees (ln)				-0.032 (0.201)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.010 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)
Situation: Moderate	-1.014 (0.560)	-0.936 (0.566)	-1.025 (0.554)	-0.890 (0.557)
Situation: Good	-0.713 (0.453)	-0.707 (0.442)	-0.764 (0.459)	-0.602 (0.438)
Sector: Manufacturing	-0.431 (0.557)	-0.142 (0.527)	-0.110 (0.545)	-0.022 (0.565)
Gender: Female	0.437 (0.790)	0.823 (0.681)	0.840 (0.656)	0.900 (0.657)
Observations	70	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A27.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption in parties (control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Parties			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	−0.944 (0.656)	−1.060 (0.672)	−0.940 (0.639)	−0.953 (0.758)
Pers. acc. to leg.	−0.491 (0.335)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	0.075 (0.402)			
Access to exe.	0.280 (0.421)			
Use of informal strat.		−0.501 (0.312)		
Contributions (yes/no)		0.370 (0.543)		
Influence (legislature)			0.134 (0.414)	
Influence (exe.)			−0.519 (0.478)	
Revenue (ln)				0.081 (0.181)
Employees (ln)				−0.117 (0.190)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
Situation: Moderate	−0.550 (0.475)	−0.744 (0.504)	−0.435 (0.485)	−0.643 (0.488)
Situation: Good	−0.331 (0.402)	−0.395 (0.414)	−0.481 (0.429)	−0.289 (0.400)
Sector: Manufacturing	−0.036 (0.524)	0.061 (0.519)	0.153 (0.543)	−0.080 (0.522)
Gender: Female	1.341 (0.687)	1.231 (0.629)	1.058 (0.613)	1.166 (0.624)
Observations	70	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A28.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption in NGOs (control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	NGOs			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.445 (0.655)	-0.471 (0.683)	-0.519 (0.635)	0.185 (0.738)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-0.370 (0.353)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	0.036 (0.443)			
Access to exe.	-0.069 (0.439)			
Use of informal strat.		-0.182 (0.315)		
Contributions (yes/no)		0.422 (0.550)		
Influence (legislature)			0.142 (0.418)	
Influence (exe.)			-0.648 (0.485)	
Revenue (ln)				-0.056 (0.186)
Employees (ln)				-0.273 (0.199)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.012 (0.009)	0.014 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)	0.015 (0.008)
Situation: Moderate	-1.424** (0.514)	-1.548** (0.525)	-1.255* (0.526)	-1.411** (0.530)
Situation: Good	-1.566*** (0.455)	-1.545*** (0.462)	-1.808*** (0.500)	-1.565*** (0.458)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.708 (0.542)	0.635 (0.522)	0.982 (0.576)	0.881 (0.543)
Gender: Female	0.418 (0.652)	0.312 (0.594)	0.161 (0.581)	0.363 (0.602)
Observations	70	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A29.: Binary logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption in administrations (control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Officials			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-1.099 (0.860)	-1.005 (0.859)	-0.865 (0.784)	-0.924 (0.957)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-0.605 (0.483)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	-0.255 (0.598)			
Access to exe.	1.809** (0.620)			
Use of informal strat.		0.363 (0.377)		
Contributions (yes/no)		-0.390 (0.687)		
Influence (legislature)			0.157 (0.504)	
Influence (exe.)			-0.171 (0.572)	
Revenue (ln)				0.344 (0.281)
Employees (ln)				-0.356 (0.296)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)
Situation: Moderate	-0.628 (0.631)	-0.271 (0.552)	-0.380 (0.553)	-0.578 (0.581)
Situation: Good	-0.954 (0.562)	-0.724 (0.524)	-0.845 (0.547)	-0.801 (0.514)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.396 (0.729)	0.578 (0.654)	0.694 (0.699)	0.570 (0.667)
Gender: Female	-1.446 (0.883)	-1.155 (0.688)	-1.060 (0.668)	-0.897 (0.679)
Constant	-0.087 (1.815)	1.332 (1.367)	1.952 (1.345)	4.672 (2.498)
Observations	70	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-29.650	-35.076	-35.587	-34.685
Akaike Inf. Crit.	79.301	88.153	89.173	87.371

Note:

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A30.: Binary logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption of officials (control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Administration			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-1.721 (0.964)	-1.586 (0.944)	-1.474 (0.943)	-1.425 (1.122)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-0.404 (0.451)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	-0.153 (0.538)			
Access to exe.	1.503* (0.590)			
Use of informal strat.		-0.095 (0.395)		
Contributions (yes/no)		-0.608 (0.663)		
Influence (legislature)			-0.661 (0.537)	
Influence (exe.)			0.736 (0.610)	
Revenue (ln)				0.575 (0.320)
Employees (ln)				-0.668* (0.334)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.015 (0.012)	0.008 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)
Situation: Moderate	-1.107 (0.686)	-0.667 (0.617)	-0.782 (0.632)	-1.097 (0.668)
Situation: Good	-0.154 (0.537)	-0.158 (0.510)	0.105 (0.529)	-0.111 (0.518)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.062 (0.697)	0.304 (0.637)	0.072 (0.681)	0.256 (0.679)
Gender: Female	0.159 (0.917)	0.093 (0.772)	0.428 (0.784)	0.506 (0.782)
Constant	-0.571 (1.919)	2.481 (1.509)	1.671 (1.414)	7.093* (2.974)
Observations	70	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-31.092	-34.973	-34.600	-32.876
Akaike Inf. Crit.	82.185	87.945	87.200	83.753

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A31.: Binary logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption of legislators (control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	MPs/Legislators			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-1.844 (1.239)	-1.525 (1.267)	-1.895 (1.230)	-1.063 (1.299)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-1.160 (0.613)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	0.491 (0.606)			
Access to exe.	0.881 (0.626)			
Use of informal strat.		-0.349 (0.437)		
Contributions (yes/no)		0.527 (0.759)		
Influence (legislature)			0.741 (0.622)	
Influence (exe.)			-0.554 (0.622)	
Revenue (ln)				0.165 (0.370)
Employees (ln)				-0.461 (0.369)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.022 (0.014)	0.021 (0.013)	0.020 (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)
Situation: Moderate	-0.952 (0.715)	-1.063 (0.697)	-0.865 (0.673)	-0.947 (0.679)
Situation: Good	-0.489 (0.601)	-0.566 (0.575)	-0.777 (0.627)	-0.527 (0.581)
Sector: Manufacturing	-1.994* (0.851)	-1.968* (0.836)	-1.824* (0.864)	-1.782* (0.860)
Gender: Female	-0.098 (0.902)	-0.229 (0.804)	-0.455 (0.787)	-0.421 (0.777)
Constant	3.347 (2.482)	3.282 (1.933)	2.490 (1.728)	6.362 (3.299)
Observations	70	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-25.273	-27.571	-27.383	-26.979
Akaike Inf. Crit.	70.546	73.142	72.767	71.958

Note:

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A32.: Binary logistic regressions to predict the perception of corruption in legislatures (control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Legislatures			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-1.427 (0.787)	-1.576 (0.831)	-1.389 (0.769)	-1.027 (0.836)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-0.410 (0.390)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	-0.084 (0.476)			
Access to exe.	0.772 (0.476)			
Use of informal strat.		-0.387 (0.338)		
Contributions (yes/no)		-0.151 (0.592)		
Influence (legislature)			0.045 (0.445)	
Influence (exe.)			0.061 (0.491)	
Revenue (ln)				-0.030 (0.232)
Employees (ln)				-0.130 (0.226)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.001 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.0005 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)
Situation: Moderate	-0.506 (0.534)	-0.502 (0.535)	-0.472 (0.521)	-0.403 (0.528)
Situation: Good	-0.494 (0.443)	-0.568 (0.449)	-0.427 (0.460)	-0.441 (0.433)
Sector: Manufacturing	-0.449 (0.583)	-0.254 (0.550)	-0.364 (0.574)	-0.203 (0.564)
Gender: Female	-0.473 (0.726)	-0.400 (0.643)	-0.393 (0.621)	-0.334 (0.625)
Constant	1.332 (1.570)	3.012* (1.351)	1.516 (1.205)	2.728 (1.869)
Observations	70	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-41.381	-42.454	-43.148	-42.753
Akaike Inf. Crit.	102.762	102.908	104.296	103.507

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A33.: OLS regressions to predict the perception of corruption in policy institutions (control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Policy Institutions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.808*	-0.932*	-0.821*	-0.692
	(0.348)	(0.360)	(0.350)	(0.396)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-0.241			
	(0.181)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	-0.086			
	(0.231)			
Access to exe.	0.316			
	(0.232)			
Use of informal strat.		-0.275		
		(0.169)		
Contributions (yes/no)		-0.077		
		(0.295)		
Influence (legislature)			0.066	
			(0.228)	
Influence (exe.)			-0.133	
			(0.257)	
Revenue (ln)				0.029
				(0.105)
Employees (ln)				-0.093
				(0.111)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Situation: Moderate	-0.282	-0.306	-0.255	-0.282
	(0.263)	(0.269)	(0.274)	(0.274)
Situation: Good	-0.404	-0.446	-0.415	-0.367
	(0.221)	(0.224)	(0.240)	(0.223)
Sector: Manufacturing	-0.040	0.050	0.041	0.029
	(0.298)	(0.286)	(0.307)	(0.295)
Gender: Female	0.349	0.362	0.332	0.389
	(0.357)	(0.320)	(0.324)	(0.325)
Constant	3.165***	3.755***	3.151***	3.607***
	(0.769)	(0.606)	(0.602)	(0.888)
Observations	70	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.188	0.180	0.145	0.154
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.066	0.073	0.033	0.043

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A34.: OLS regressions to predict the perception of corruption of decision-makers (control variables included)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Decision-makers			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.621*	-0.574*	-0.578*	-0.539
	(0.236)	(0.265)	(0.249)	(0.285)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-0.169			
	(0.123)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	-0.052			
	(0.157)			
Access to exe.	0.474**			
	(0.157)			
Use of informal strat.		0.012		
		(0.124)		
Contributions (yes/no)		0.010		
		(0.217)		
Influence (legislature)			0.210	
			(0.162)	
Influence (exe.)			-0.184	
			(0.183)	
Revenue (ln)				0.042
				(0.076)
Employees (ln)				-0.062
				(0.080)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Situation: Moderate	-0.199	-0.166	-0.180	-0.185
	(0.178)	(0.198)	(0.195)	(0.197)
Situation: Good	-0.300*	-0.265	-0.318	-0.271
	(0.150)	(0.165)	(0.171)	(0.161)
Sector: Manufacturing	-0.008	0.066	0.125	0.077
	(0.202)	(0.210)	(0.218)	(0.213)
Gender: Female	-0.129	-0.066	-0.082	-0.043
	(0.242)	(0.236)	(0.230)	(0.234)
Constant	2.168***	2.757***	2.712***	3.240***
	(0.522)	(0.445)	(0.427)	(0.639)
Observations	70	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.248	0.109	0.133	0.117
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.136	-0.008	0.019	0.001

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A35.: OLS regressions to predict the perception of corruption of decision-makers (control variables included; amended)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Decision-makers			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.349 (0.214)	-0.369 (0.256)	-0.376 (0.240)	-0.344 (0.278)
Pers. acc. to leg.	-0.087 (0.109)			
Inst. acc. to leg.	-0.299* (0.148)			
Access to exe.	0.672*** (0.145)			
Use of informal strat.		-0.135 (0.124)		
Contributions (yes/no)		0.036 (0.209)		
Influence (legislature)			0.224 (0.155)	
Influence (exe.)			-0.119 (0.177)	
Revenue (ln)				0.027 (0.072)
Employees (ln)				-0.042 (0.076)
Pct. of indirect lobbying	-0.0002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.0001 (0.003)	-0.00002 (0.003)
Situation: Moderate	0.120 (0.169)	0.092 (0.198)	0.058 (0.194)	0.075 (0.202)
Situation: Good	-0.127 (0.136)	-0.146 (0.158)	-0.139 (0.168)	-0.130 (0.158)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.036 (0.180)	0.229 (0.205)	0.211 (0.206)	0.189 (0.207)
Gender: Female	-0.290 (0.220)	-0.009 (0.227)	-0.035 (0.222)	-0.017 (0.229)
Constant	2.044*** (0.458)	3.085*** (0.427)	2.447*** (0.419)	3.060*** (0.608)
Observations	66	66	66	66
R <sup>2</sup>	0.330	0.085	0.107	0.070
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.223	-0.044	-0.019	-0.060

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

### A.3.3. Appendix 6C: Regression Diagnostics

#### Ordered Logistic Regressions

To analyze deviations from model assumptions in the ordered logistic regressions, I rely on surrogate residuals, which proved superior to other methods in diagnostics for this kind of model (Greenwell et al. 2018). Surrogate residuals come from a fictional continuous variable that inherits the distribution of the original ordinal scale, extended by bootstrapping (*ibid.*).

**Misspecification of the Link, Heteroscedasticity, and Mean Structure:** Figures A3 through A5 display the QQ-plots for the three ordered logistic models with different estimation methods. Deviations from the diagonal indicate heteroscedasticity. This can be caused either by a misspecified model or by unobserved heterogeneity. The figures indicate few deviations for probit, logistic, and loglog models and more deviations for cloglog models. Thus, it is reasonable to maintain the logistic link.




Figure A3.: Different link functions (model: index)

A further test for heteroscedasticity is plotting residuals against the values of the independent variables (see first two rows of figures A6 through A9<sup>1</sup>). The variance

<sup>1</sup>The first two rows look slightly different although they have identical x- and y-axes. To avoid testing two assumptions with the same computed surrogates, I computed the residuals twice with different resamples of the data (Greenwell et al. 2018).




Figure A4.: Different link functions (model: parties)

not systematically in- or decrease across the values of the predictors. There seems to be no problematic correlation in any of the plots. Hence, this visual inspection indicates homoscedasticity as well.

Similarly, misspecified mean structures can be found by plotting surrogate residuals against the values of the predictors. A misspecified mean structure would be indicated by a steadily in- or decreasing Loess line or by an asymmetric distribution of the data. Neither is the case in the presented graphs.

**Linearity and Proportionality:** To check if effects are linear, I divided the samples in two equally large subsamples. A violation of the linearity assumption would show in the difference of the residuals from both subsamples being systematically greater or lower than zero. As soon as the Loess line follows a line  $y = 0$  or curves around that line, linearity and proportionality can be assumed. Generally, this holds for all presented models. Single outliers sometimes cause a deviation at the end of the curves. The variables employees and revenue show some disproportionality. Models amended after the extensive robustness checks do not show meaningful changes in the regression coefficients or their standard errors. Because of the low number of observations, this diagnostic is not based on the full models but on models with the single metric predictor to be tested for a linear effect.

Furthermore, the sample size and the distribution of cases can affect the estimation. Empty cells or cells with a very low share of observations can bias the




Figure A5.: Different link functions (model: NGOs)

regression parameters (Urban and Mayerl 2018, p. 420). To check for possible problems, I cross-tabulated the two non-metric predictors against the dependent variables (see tables A36 and A37). The tables show no empty-cell problems.

Contr.	Index			Parties			NGOs		
	not	little	>little	not	little	>little	not	litte	>little
No	0.5	0.52	0.46	0.58	0.49	0.48	0.5	0.47	0.54
Yes	0.5	0.48	0.54	0.42	0.51	0.52	0.5	0.53	0.46
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table A36.: Crosstable to identify empty cells: financial contributions (ordered logistic regressions)

**Multicollinearity:** Multiple intercepts, as in ordered logistic regressions, make it difficult to compute VIF (variance inflation factors) since they need a single intercept to be computed. I circumvented this problem by estimating the same models but with binary outcome variables. Since the distributions are very similar, the multicollinearity of the predictors in these models are highly associated with those in the non-amended models. The VIFs are presented in table A38 (see the regression results in table A42). There is no variance inflation, which would be indicated by scores greater than or equal to 8, and, hence, there is no multicollinearity problem.




Figure A6.: Ordered logistic regression diagnostics I (model: index)

Country	Index			Parties			NGOs		
	not	little	>little	not	little	>little	not	little	>little
USA	0.25	0.03	0.49	0.17	0.21	0.43	0.36	0.25	0.25
GER	0.75	0.97	0.51	0.83	0.79	0.57	0.64	0.75	0.75
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table A37.: Crosstable to identify empty cells: country (ordered logistic regressions)




Figure A7.: Ordered logistic regression diagnostics II (model: index)

Appendix




Figure A8.: Ordered logistic regression diagnostics I (model: parties)




Figure A9.: Ordered logistic regression diagnostics II (model: parties)

	Index	Parties	NGOs	P. I.	D.-m.	D.-m. (amended)
Germany	1.92	1.84	1.92	1.72	1.72	1.73
Per. Access to l.	1.61	2.15	2.08	2.17	2.17	2.30
Ins. Access to l.	2.62	2.42	2.09	2.14	2.14	2.48
Access to exe	2.56	2.05	1.76	1.85	1.85	1.88
Inf. access	1.85	1.33	1.32	1.35	1.35	1.65
Contributions	1.41	1.30	1.52	1.40	1.40	1.43
Infl. (Leg)	4.21	3.33	1.97	2.73	2.73	2.71
Infl. (Exe)	5.81	4.14	2.51	3.35	3.35	3.35
Revenue	6.30	5.94	4.06	3.38	3.38	3.27
Employees	5.06	5.15	4.10	3.68	3.68	3.59

Table A38.: VIF-Statistics (ordered logistic and OLS regressions)




Figure A10.: Ordered logistic regression diagnostics I (model: NGOs)

Appendix




Figure A11.: Ordered logistic regression diagnostics II (model: NGOs)

## Binary Logistic Regressions




Figure A12.: Binary logistic regression diagnostics (model: officials)

The regression diagnostics for the binary logistic regressions test for violations of model assumptions concerning linearity, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and outliers/influential cases (cf. Urban and Mayerl 2018).

**Linearity:** Figures A12 through A15 show if the estimated metric predictors have linear effects on the estimated logits. There are single knees in some of the Loess lines in the medium range of logits, but most of them do not mark global inflection points of the trends of the curves. Thus, the plots do not signal severe violations of the assumption of linearity.

In addition to non-linear effects, empty cells of combinations of dependent variables and non-metric variables can be a further cause of biased estimators. There-




Figure A13.: Binary logistic regression diagnostics (model: administration)

fore, I cross-tabulated the dependent variables with all dichotomous predictors (see tables A39 and A40). There are no cells with very low percentages of cases. Thus, empty cells do not affect the estimation.




Figure A14.: Binary logistic regression diagnostics (model: MPs/legislators)

Contr.	Officials		Admin.		MPs		Leg.	
	few	none	few	none	few	none	few	none
No	0.53	0.51	0.44	0.54	0.64	0.48	0.54	0.5
Yes	0.47	0.49	0.56	0.46	0.36	0.52	0.46	0.5
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table A39.: Crosstable to identify empty cells: financial contributions (binary logistic regressions)




Figure A15.: Binary logistic regression diagnostics (model: legislature)

Country	Officials		Admin.		MPs		Leg.	
	few	none	few	none	few	none	few	none
USA	0.18	0.25	0.12	0.26	0.07	0.27	0.12	0.3
GER	0.82	0.75	0.88	0.74	0.93	0.73	0.88	0.7
	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table A40.: Crosstable to identify empty cells: country (binary logistic regressions)

**Outliers:** I use Cook's distance to analyze outliers (see figure A16). In the amended models, I excluded single outliers as well as grouped outliers with relatively high distance scores. Outliers were excluded iteratively one after another. In the model analyzing officials, I excluded case number 4 firstly and case number 15 (not displayed in the presented plot) secondly. I did not remove any cases from the model analyzing the administration since there are many influential cases but no single outliers. In the model analyzing MPs and legislators, I removed case number 15 in the first round and later cases number 50, 49, and 60 iteratively.




Figure A16.: Cook's distance (binary logistic regressions)

I did not specify an amended model analyzing the legislatures since the top three outliers do not have high distance scores. Table A43 below presents the results of the amended models with the other dependent variables.<sup>2</sup> There are

<sup>2</sup>Due to inflational standard errors, the country dummy was removed from the amended model predicting corruption of MPs/legislators.

no substantial differences between the amended and the non-amended models. To maintain comparability, I interpret the non-amended models in chapter 6.

**Multicollinearity:** Table A41 shows the VIFs for each of the binary logistic estimations. Values well below 8 indicate that there is no problem of multicollinearity in the regression models.

	Officials	Administration	MPs/Leg	Legislature
Germany	1.75	1.92	1.27	1.51
Per. Access to l.	2.43	2.14	1.80	2.14
Ins. Access to l.	2.27	2.15	2.40	2.14
Access to exe	2.00	1.96	1.89	1.79
Inf. access	1.39	1.25	1.53	1.29
Contributions	1.42	1.31	1.48	1.37
Infl. (Leg)	4.47	4.35	3.49	2.68
Infl. (Exe)	5.00	4.35	4.51	3.25
Revenue	6.15	6.62	2.97	2.82
Employees	5.43	5.61	3.02	3.12

Table A41.: VIF-Statistics (binary logistic regressions)

### OLS Regressions

In this section, I analyze the OLS regression with respect to the BLUE-criteria (P. Bruce and A. Bruce 2020; Urban and Mayerl 2018). Figures A17 and A18 show the results of the diagnostics concerning linearity, normality, homoscedasticity, and independence of residual terms. In addition to the visual inspection, I apply a thumb rule of the standard deviations to identify problematic residuals.

The regression diagnostic plots of the amended model analyzing corruption of decision-makers can be found in figures A20 through A23 below.

**Linearity:** The visual test for linearity refers to the plot in the first column and the first row in the presented figures.

Linearity can be assumed if there is no pattern between the fitted values and the residuals, that is, if the Loess line more or less follows the x-axis and if it does not have a clear pattern. Both criteria apply to both models, although there is a small downward tendency in the latter model. However, this tendency is likely to be caused by the few cases with higher fitted values that are near zero.




Figure A17.: OLS regression diagnostics (model: policy institutions)

**Gaussian Distribution of Residuals:** The QQ-plot shows no violation of the normality assumption for the model analyzing corruption of policy institutions. Yet, there are systematic violations of the Gaussian distribution of residuals in the second OLS model analyzing corruption of decision-makers. This violation is not fixed by removing outliers (cf. figure A23 below). Thus, I specified OLS regressions with robust standard errors (see table A44 below). The results are essentially the same. To maintain comparability, I interpret the models using normal standard errors in chapter 6.

**Heteroscedasticity:** The tests for heteroscedasticity refer to the plot in the first column and the second row in figures A17 and A18.

Concerning heteroscedasticity, the same assumption introduced for the ordered logistic regression holds here. Both models show no in- or decrease in the variance




Figure A18.: OLS regression diagnostics (model: policy institutions)

of residuals across the fitted values (see the bottom left plots). Hence, homoscedasticity can be assumed.

**Independence of Residual Terms and Outliers:** I used Cook's distance to identify influential cases (see figure A19). I did not exclude any of the cases in the first model analyzing policy institutions since the three peaks are close to each other and have relatively low distance scores. In the decision-maker model, I excluded case number 50 as a single peak and subsequently the cases number 49, 30, and 28 (see figure A23 below). The results of the amended models analyzing decision-makers are reported in table A35 above.

The last plot of the figures A17 and A18 allow for a visual inspection of the independence of residual terms. The Loess line crossing zero and following no obvious pattern indicates that the residuals are independent.




Figure A19.: Cook's distance (OLS regressions)

**Multicollinearity:** Table A38 above (section on ordered logistic regression) containing the VIFs does not indicate multicollinearity.

### A.3.4. Appendix 6D: Amended Regression Models

#### Ordered Logistic Regressions

Table A42.: Binary logistic regressions used to compute the VIF for the ordered logistic regressions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Index	Parties	NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	−0.115 (1.316)	−0.932 (1.237)	1.405 (0.927)
Personal access to legislators	−0.556 (0.680)	0.194 (0.552)	0.170 (0.504)
Institutional access to the legislature	−0.863 (0.734)	−0.417 (0.573)	−0.345 (0.538)
Access to the executive branch	1.474* (0.752)	1.220 (0.623)	0.012 (0.570)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	1.467* (0.718)	−0.104 (0.497)	0.205 (0.423)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.277 (0.965)	0.468 (0.776)	0.655 (0.770)
Influence at the legislature	0.664 (0.812)	−0.318 (0.612)	−0.423 (0.485)
Influence at the executive branch	−1.564 (0.933)	−0.513 (0.682)	−0.321 (0.558)
Revenue (ln)	0.380 (0.456)	0.326 (0.388)	0.001 (0.289)
Employees (ln)	−0.404 (0.463)	−0.398 (0.404)	−0.168 (0.329)
Constant	4.877 (4.585)	5.016 (3.802)	3.677 (3.100)
Observations	76	74	74
Log Likelihood	−20.603	−28.576	−32.498
Akaike Inf. Crit.	63.207	79.153	86.995
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

## Binary Logistic Regressions

Table A43.: Amended binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of officials and of legislatures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Officials (1)	MPs/Legislatures (2)
Country: Germany	-3.816 (2.004)	
Personal access to legislators	-1.082 (0.555)	-0.915 (0.830)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.264 (0.607)	0.030 (0.729)
Access to the executive branch	1.327 (0.714)	0.020 (0.818)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.854 (0.541)	-0.696 (0.669)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.925 (0.869)	-0.414 (1.033)
Influence at the legislature	0.546 (0.747)	1.058 (0.830)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.874 (0.815)	0.918 (1.055)
Revenue (ln)	0.511 (0.397)	-0.626 (0.529)
Employees (ln)	-0.126 (0.384)	-0.499 (0.497)
Constant	3.917 (4.003)	7.764 (5.283)
Observations	68	66
Log Likelihood	-27.427	-18.171
Akaike Inf. Crit.	76.853	56.342

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Appendix




Figure A20.: Amended binary logistic regression (model: Officials)




Figure A21.: Amended binary logistic regression (model: Legislatures)




Figure A22.: Cook's distances of the amended binary logistic regressions

## OLS Regressions

Table A44.: OLS-Regression to predict corruption of decision-makers with robust standard errors

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Decision-makers	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-0.309 (0.282)	-0.195 (0.218)
Personal access to legislators	-0.183 (0.142)	-0.054 (0.112)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.130 (0.154)	-0.390** (0.128)
Access to the executive branch	0.607*** (0.163)	0.694*** (0.129)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.020 (0.128)	-0.267* (0.115)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.041 (0.214)	0.176 (0.170)
Influence at the legislature	0.215 (0.151)	0.300* (0.120)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.260 (0.174)	-0.136 (0.140)
Revenue (ln)	-0.035 (0.077)	0.022 (0.060)
Employees (ln)	0.032 (0.085)	-0.018 (0.065)
Constant	1.828* (0.780)	2.217*** (0.599)
Observations	70	66

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Appendix




Figure A23.: OLS regression diagnostics (model: policy institutions (amended))

## A.3.5. Appendix 6E: Interaction Models

Table A45.: OLS regressions to predict corruption (Index) with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-3.981 (3.453)	-0.869 (3.704)	5.277 (4.126)
Personal access to legislators	-0.607 (0.946)	-0.160 (0.426)	-0.146 (0.439)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.686 (0.480)	-0.179 (1.392)	-0.601 (0.484)
Access to the executive branch	1.491** (0.520)	1.478** (0.524)	4.352* (1.760)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.092 (0.402)	0.071 (0.402)	0.042 (0.412)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.257 (0.613)	-0.207 (0.616)	-0.334 (0.598)
Influence at the legislature	0.528 (0.463)	0.544 (0.470)	0.530 (0.486)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.632 (0.533)	-0.635 (0.537)	-0.481 (0.552)
Revenue (ln)	-0.304 (0.243)	-0.316 (0.251)	-0.463 (0.274)
Employees (ln)	0.119 (0.235)	0.112 (0.236)	0.191 (0.254)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	0.501 (0.937)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		-0.528 (1.382)	
Germany*Access to exe.			-3.123 (1.799)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A46.: OLS regressions to predict corruption (Index) with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-7.064 (3.746)	0.472 (1.455)	-10.302* (5.153)
Personal access to legislators	-0.066 (0.429)	-0.129 (0.419)	-0.178 (0.435)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.767 (0.488)	-0.569 (0.473)	-0.721 (0.486)
Access to the executive branch	1.592** (0.529)	1.401** (0.497)	1.444** (0.517)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-1.504 (1.165)	0.037 (0.411)	0.108 (0.405)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.215 (0.617)	3.160 (1.778)	-0.375 (0.622)
Influence at the legislature	0.514 (0.445)	0.515 (0.483)	-1.395 (1.217)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.671 (0.522)	-0.591 (0.541)	-0.842 (0.559)
Revenue (ln)	-0.290 (0.250)	-0.372 (0.252)	-0.344 (0.276)
Employees (ln)	0.067 (0.232)	0.158 (0.244)	0.201 (0.260)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	1.790 (1.202)		
Germany*Contributions		-3.746* (1.888)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			2.375 (1.331)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A47.: OLS regressions to predict corruption (Index) with interaction effects (M7 to M9)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-8.419 (4.969)	-2.299* (1.043)	-6.528 (4.768)
Personal access to legislators	-0.106 (0.431)	-0.156 (0.429)	-0.188 (0.432)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.686 (0.482)	-0.677 (0.481)	-0.635 (0.483)
Access to the executive branch	1.392** (0.507)	1.481** (0.522)	1.453** (0.520)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.090 (0.409)	0.078 (0.401)	-0.0001 (0.410)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.320 (0.608)	-0.242 (0.614)	-0.325 (0.620)
Influence at the legislature	0.442 (0.474)	0.544 (0.469)	0.591 (0.467)
Influence at the executive branch	-2.323 (1.352)	-0.664 (0.539)	-0.616 (0.542)
Revenue (ln)	-0.380 (0.276)	-0.310 (0.329)	-0.288 (0.265)
Employees (ln)	0.203 (0.259)	0.101 (0.233)	-0.318 (0.547)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	1.959 (1.441)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		0.037 (0.363)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			0.514 (0.538)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A48.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of parties with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.063 (2.039)	1.507 (2.544)	-1.962 (2.483)
Personal access to legislators	-0.006 (0.506)	-0.198 (0.367)	-0.110 (0.369)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.237 (0.394)	0.510 (0.885)	-0.281 (0.401)
Access to the executive branch	0.724 (0.433)	0.721 (0.437)	0.427 (0.751)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.206 (0.347)	-0.228 (0.347)	-0.162 (0.346)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.119 (0.549)	0.178 (0.555)	0.116 (0.550)
Influence at the legislature	0.119 (0.400)	0.110 (0.401)	0.107 (0.401)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.621 (0.468)	-0.550 (0.472)	-0.641 (0.471)
Revenue (ln)	0.054 (0.193)	-0.034 (0.209)	0.064 (0.196)
Employees (ln)	0.018 (0.210)	0.035 (0.211)	0.017 (0.211)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	-0.215 (0.544)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		-0.841 (0.883)	
Germany*Access to exe.			0.398 (0.818)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A49.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of parties with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-2.837 (1.901)	1.407 (1.351)	-1.392 (1.917)
Personal access to legislators	-0.031 (0.377)	-0.055 (0.370)	-0.135 (0.364)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.316 (0.401)	-0.161 (0.406)	-0.253 (0.394)
Access to the executive branch	0.754 (0.435)	0.651 (0.449)	0.704 (0.436)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.827 (0.644)	-0.266 (0.351)	-0.170 (0.347)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.126 (0.554)	2.585 (1.367)	0.087 (0.551)
Influence at the legislature	0.151 (0.400)	0.062 (0.410)	0.002 (0.538)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.619 (0.465)	-0.552 (0.476)	-0.634 (0.473)
Revenue (ln)	0.064 (0.192)	-0.043 (0.198)	0.043 (0.191)
Employees (ln)	-0.015 (0.212)	0.057 (0.213)	0.036 (0.212)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	0.819 (0.693)		
Germany*Contributions		-2.942* (1.468)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			0.194 (0.591)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A50.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of parties with interaction effects (M7 to M9)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-1.636 (2.150)	-1.068 (0.801)	-0.319 (2.530)
Personal access to legislators	-0.116 (0.369)	-0.209 (0.369)	-0.140 (0.363)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.254 (0.394)	-0.186 (0.401)	-0.264 (0.402)
Access to the executive branch	0.694 (0.438)	0.739 (0.433)	0.730 (0.434)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.174 (0.345)	-0.204 (0.345)	-0.174 (0.349)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.088 (0.551)	0.041 (0.556)	0.116 (0.552)
Influence at the legislature	0.111 (0.401)	0.149 (0.403)	0.117 (0.400)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.820 (0.698)	-0.670 (0.474)	-0.618 (0.468)
Revenue (ln)	0.039 (0.192)	-0.038 (0.212)	0.038 (0.193)
Employees (ln)	0.044 (0.215)	0.016 (0.210)	0.066 (0.286)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	0.280 (0.684)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		0.245 (0.269)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			-0.062 (0.301)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A51.: OLS regressions to predict corruption of NGOs with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	NGOs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	3.455 (2.039)	2.084 (2.489)	2.443 (2.477)
Personal access to legislators	0.306 (0.504)	-0.042 (0.373)	-0.056 (0.375)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.488 (0.405)	-0.354 (0.856)	-0.477 (0.409)
Access to the executive branch	0.138 (0.421)	0.112 (0.419)	0.322 (0.744)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.404 (0.344)	0.444 (0.340)	0.437 (0.341)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.612 (0.561)	0.578 (0.564)	0.545 (0.558)
Influence at the legislature	-0.273 (0.422)	-0.279 (0.415)	-0.265 (0.419)
Influence at the executive branch	0.051 (0.471)	0.092 (0.466)	0.103 (0.468)
Revenue (ln)	-0.111 (0.196)	-0.142 (0.211)	-0.144 (0.202)
Employees (ln)	-0.180 (0.209)	-0.158 (0.209)	-0.153 (0.209)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	-0.528 (0.541)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		-0.163 (0.850)	
Germany*Access to exe.			-0.282 (0.814)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A52.: OLS regressions to predict corruption of NGOs with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	NGOs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.576 (1.784)	1.365 (1.284)	0.376 (1.858)
Personal access to legislators	0.128 (0.394)	-0.040 (0.370)	0.004 (0.373)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.604 (0.417)	-0.518 (0.411)	-0.516 (0.406)
Access to the executive branch	0.088 (0.424)	0.125 (0.423)	0.050 (0.427)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.252 (0.610)	0.458 (0.340)	0.505 (0.348)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.627 (0.562)	0.264 (1.270)	0.535 (0.557)
Influence at the legislature	-0.245 (0.407)	-0.273 (0.415)	-0.575 (0.568)
Influence at the executive branch	0.083 (0.455)	0.076 (0.463)	0.041 (0.460)
Revenue (ln)	-0.089 (0.199)	-0.118 (0.198)	-0.135 (0.197)
Employees (ln)	-0.217 (0.216)	-0.165 (0.210)	-0.134 (0.213)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	0.921 (0.676)		
Germany*Contributions		0.360 (1.392)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			0.442 (0.596)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A53.: OLS regressions to predict corruption of NGOs with interaction effects (M7 to M9)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	NGOs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	1.286 (1.985)	1.609* (0.809)	2.995 (2.508)
Personal access to legislators	-0.018 (0.375)	-0.035 (0.371)	-0.013 (0.370)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.500 (0.405)	-0.493 (0.409)	-0.552 (0.416)
Access to the executive branch	0.094 (0.428)	0.112 (0.419)	0.126 (0.421)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.460 (0.344)	0.450 (0.339)	0.474 (0.342)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.556 (0.556)	0.553 (0.560)	0.615 (0.565)
Influence at the legislature	-0.284 (0.415)	-0.277 (0.415)	-0.289 (0.416)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.010 (0.672)	0.075 (0.468)	0.056 (0.465)
Revenue (ln)	-0.130 (0.196)	-0.136 (0.222)	-0.134 (0.195)
Employees (ln)	-0.152 (0.213)	-0.161 (0.209)	-0.055 (0.276)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	0.121 (0.641)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		0.025 (0.271)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			-0.171 (0.297)
Observations	70	70	70

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A54.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of officials with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Officials		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	1.668 (2.961)	-3.277 (4.179)	3.596 (4.094)
Personal access to legislators	-0.341 (0.826)	-0.911 (0.538)	-1.001 (0.554)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.093 (0.561)	-0.752 (1.487)	0.262 (0.583)
Access to the executive branch	1.739** (0.651)	1.648** (0.629)	3.207* (1.616)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.857 (0.497)	0.884 (0.490)	0.799 (0.491)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.105 (0.769)	-0.388 (0.780)	-0.345 (0.762)
Influence at the legislature	0.033 (0.677)	0.146 (0.660)	-0.017 (0.673)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.509 (0.721)	-0.579 (0.713)	-0.319 (0.725)
Revenue (ln)	0.138 (0.335)	0.139 (0.329)	0.049 (0.339)
Employees (ln)	-0.074 (0.363)	-0.015 (0.343)	0.004 (0.360)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	-0.742 (0.841)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		0.927 (1.499)	
Germany*Access to exe.			-1.850 (1.674)
Constant	-1.985 (3.710)	1.726 (4.919)	-4.332 (4.870)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-31.173	-31.370	-30.835
Akaike Inf. Crit.	86.345	86.740	85.671

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A55.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of officials with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Officials		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.749 (2.894)	-0.885 (1.832)	-2.765 (3.249)
Personal access to legislators	-0.899 (0.538)	-0.903 (0.547)	-0.883 (0.530)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.092 (0.557)	0.088 (0.559)	0.099 (0.554)
Access to the executive branch	1.676** (0.635)	1.683* (0.655)	1.622* (0.635)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.902 (1.157)	0.875 (0.491)	0.905 (0.489)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.260 (0.750)	-0.336 (1.841)	-0.397 (0.783)
Influence at the legislature	0.080 (0.657)	0.082 (0.658)	-0.340 (0.904)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.498 (0.704)	-0.501 (0.709)	-0.592 (0.694)
Revenue (ln)	0.086 (0.323)	0.088 (0.327)	0.106 (0.326)
Employees (ln)	-0.028 (0.349)	-0.029 (0.349)	0.003 (0.352)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	-0.031 (1.204)		
Germany*Contributions		0.088 (1.998)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			0.597 (0.918)
Constant	-0.547 (3.937)	-0.412 (3.772)	0.954 (4.121)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-31.564	-31.564	-31.339
Akaike Inf. Crit.	87.129	87.127	86.679

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A56.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of officials with interaction effects (M7 to M9)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Officials		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-1.409 (2.962)	-1.081 (1.054)	-2.071 (3.686)
Personal access to legislators	-0.886 (0.533)	-1.030 (0.560)	-0.927 (0.541)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.096 (0.556)	0.164 (0.566)	0.125 (0.565)
Access to the executive branch	1.647* (0.647)	1.640** (0.627)	1.640* (0.637)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.880 (0.492)	0.857 (0.495)	0.857 (0.494)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.303 (0.773)	-0.433 (0.782)	-0.329 (0.772)
Influence at the legislature	0.081 (0.654)	0.215 (0.662)	0.127 (0.665)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.663 (1.041)	-0.658 (0.714)	-0.528 (0.702)
Revenue (ln)	0.084 (0.322)	-0.039 (0.342)	0.128 (0.349)
Employees (ln)	-0.016 (0.353)	-0.048 (0.345)	-0.160 (0.517)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	0.199 (0.925)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		0.346 (0.356)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			0.152 (0.427)
Constant	-0.072 (3.864)	0.129 (3.289)	0.634 (4.633)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-31.541	-31.075	-31.500
Akaike Inf. Crit.	87.083	86.150	87.000

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A57.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of the administration with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Administration		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-1.672 (3.601)	-2.003 (4.335)	1.507 (4.101)
Personal access to legislators	0.065 (0.968)	-0.013 (0.529)	-0.097 (0.557)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.259 (0.520)	-0.260 (1.585)	-0.124 (0.541)
Access to the executive branch	1.393* (0.595)	1.390* (0.602)	2.729 (1.714)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.029 (0.457)	0.031 (0.457)	-0.002 (0.463)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.708 (0.745)	-0.722 (0.749)	-0.813 (0.730)
Influence at the legislature	-0.777 (0.652)	-0.767 (0.655)	-0.875 (0.682)
Influence at the executive branch	0.001 (0.674)	-0.004 (0.679)	0.165 (0.721)
Revenue (ln)	0.576 (0.388)	0.571 (0.387)	0.542 (0.398)
Employees (ln)	-0.544 (0.403)	-0.540 (0.402)	-0.514 (0.407)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	-0.095 (0.981)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		0.001 (1.624)	
Germany*Access to exe.			-1.538 (1.777)
Constant	6.121 (4.490)	6.359 (5.286)	3.116 (5.204)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-30.518	-30.523	-30.094
Akaike Inf. Crit.	85.037	85.046	84.188

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A58.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of the administration with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Administration		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-8.712 (5.312)	-0.317 (2.043)	-7.989 (5.721)
Personal access to legislators	0.089 (0.533)	0.102 (0.539)	-0.001 (0.529)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.418 (0.536)	-0.195 (0.522)	-0.249 (0.518)
Access to the executive branch	1.537* (0.611)	1.236* (0.602)	1.366* (0.591)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-2.033 (1.564)	0.040 (0.466)	0.127 (0.461)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.842 (0.766)	1.233 (2.074)	-0.900 (0.760)
Influence at the legislature	-0.555 (0.625)	-0.830 (0.664)	-1.993 (1.307)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.315 (0.695)	0.139 (0.703)	-0.380 (0.716)
Revenue (ln)	0.722 (0.437)	0.517 (0.389)	0.688 (0.409)
Employees (ln)	-0.677 (0.431)	-0.528 (0.406)	-0.550 (0.397)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	2.382 (1.654)		
Germany*Contributions		-2.227 (2.199)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			1.616 (1.430)
Constant	13.304 (6.871)	4.381 (4.241)	11.999 (6.893)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-29.091	-30.008	-29.648
Akaike Inf. Crit.	82.182	84.016	83.296

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A59.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of the administration with interaction effects (M7 to M9)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Administration		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	−8.165 (6.070)	−2.589 (1.330)	−9.133 (6.890)
Personal access to legislators	−0.009 (0.536)	−0.216 (0.567)	−0.159 (0.559)
Institutional access to the legislature	−0.186 (0.523)	−0.155 (0.534)	−0.128 (0.534)
Access to the executive branch	1.227* (0.604)	1.365* (0.590)	1.295* (0.590)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.048 (0.464)	−0.015 (0.462)	−0.050 (0.470)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	−0.947 (0.750)	−0.926 (0.763)	−0.889 (0.746)
Influence at the legislature	−0.873 (0.659)	−0.608 (0.640)	−0.618 (0.650)
Influence at the executive branch	−1.669 (1.639)	−0.230 (0.686)	−0.118 (0.682)
Revenue (ln)	0.595 (0.399)	0.174 (0.494)	0.729 (0.409)
Employees (ln)	−0.490 (0.402)	−0.574 (0.404)	−1.305 (0.841)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	1.894 (1.754)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		0.734 (0.533)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			0.841 (0.773)
Constant	11.968 (7.021)	7.591 (4.003)	13.094 (7.753)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	−29.711	−29.240	−29.531
Akaike Inf. Crit.	83.422	82.481	83.063

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A60.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of MPs/Legislators with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	MPs/Legislators		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.802 (5.934)	-2.070 (6.814)	44.332 (5,529.469)
Personal access to legislators	-1.017 (1.467)	-0.939 (0.585)	-1.037 (0.616)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.154 (0.600)	-0.356 (2.258)	0.478 (0.629)
Access to the executive branch	0.692 (0.605)	0.706 (0.604)	27.350 (3,686.312)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.428 (0.483)	0.427 (0.479)	0.394 (0.500)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.684 (0.843)	0.662 (0.846)	0.167 (0.833)
Influence at the legislature	0.811 (0.657)	0.801 (0.654)	0.834 (0.697)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.962 (0.746)	-0.972 (0.745)	-0.693 (0.793)
Revenue (ln)	-0.225 (0.384)	-0.206 (0.386)	-0.370 (0.439)
Employees (ln)	-0.186 (0.384)	-0.186 (0.381)	-0.112 (0.402)
Germany*Per. acc. to l.	0.076 (1.480)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		0.528 (2.230)	
Germany*Access to exe.			-27.291 (3,686.312)
Constant	4.535 (6.246)	5.741 (7.381)	-40.238 (5,529.470)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-28.020	-27.991	-25.680
Akaike Inf. Crit.	80.039	79.982	75.359

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A61.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of MPs/Legislators with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	MPs/Legislators		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-1.612 (4.387)	2.250 (1.854)	-9.704 (8.757)
Personal access to legislators	-0.925 (0.586)	-0.959 (0.583)	-1.016 (0.596)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.148 (0.599)	0.390 (0.611)	0.233 (0.594)
Access to the executive branch	0.702 (0.601)	0.275 (0.622)	0.521 (0.605)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.052 (1.450)	0.392 (0.502)	0.439 (0.474)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.690 (0.840)	18.748 (1,559.464)	0.470 (0.849)
Influence at the legislature	0.780 (0.658)	0.844 (0.702)	-1.441 (2.045)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.934 (0.747)	-0.800 (0.776)	-1.147 (0.741)
Revenue (ln)	-0.229 (0.383)	-0.378 (0.402)	-0.215 (0.387)
Employees (ln)	-0.187 (0.382)	-0.133 (0.404)	-0.166 (0.385)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	0.399 (1.457)		
Germany*Contributions		-18.584 (1,559.464)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			2.570 (2.220)
Constant	5.247 (5.410)	1.659 (4.150)	13.493 (9.747)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-27.981	-26.189	-27.160
Akaike Inf. Crit.	79.963	76.379	78.320

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A62.: Ordered logistic regressions to predict corruption of MPs/Legislators with interaction effects (M7 to M9)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	MPs/Legislators		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	−63.158 (7,282.989)	−0.357 (1.480)	−1.494 (8.262)
Personal access to legislators	−0.913 (0.592)	−0.934 (0.584)	−0.954 (0.586)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.216 (0.603)	0.145 (0.602)	0.165 (0.606)
Access to the executive branch	0.560 (0.593)	0.678 (0.606)	0.688 (0.602)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.442 (0.486)	0.433 (0.484)	0.418 (0.482)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.578 (0.824)	0.698 (0.846)	0.670 (0.849)
Influence at the legislature	0.618 (0.682)	0.813 (0.653)	0.820 (0.648)
Influence at the executive branch	−16.581 (1,820.747)	−0.949 (0.747)	−0.970 (0.741)
Revenue (ln)	−0.272 (0.421)	−0.151 (0.504)	−0.210 (0.391)
Employees (ln)	−0.147 (0.395)	−0.183 (0.384)	−0.295 (0.971)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	15.897 (1,820.747)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		−0.106 (0.517)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			0.112 (0.922)
Constant	66.452 (7,282.989)	4.108 (4.014)	5.224 (8.783)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	−27.404	−28.001	−28.013
Akaike Inf. Crit.	78.808	80.002	80.025

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A63.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of the legislature with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislature		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-4.314 (3.473)	-4.323 (4.142)	-1.603 (2.932)
Personal access to legislators	-1.176 (0.868)	-0.412 (0.448)	-0.432 (0.444)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.238 (0.453)	-0.848 (1.432)	0.251 (0.459)
Access to the executive branch	0.565 (0.475)	0.550 (0.470)	0.363 (0.917)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.220 (0.377)	-0.249 (0.371)	-0.263 (0.376)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.192 (0.624)	-0.219 (0.624)	-0.140 (0.625)
Influence at the legislature	-0.010 (0.444)	-0.009 (0.448)	0.006 (0.448)
Influence at the executive branch	0.176 (0.512)	0.109 (0.517)	0.127 (0.515)
Revenue (ln)	-0.287 (0.257)	-0.159 (0.252)	-0.212 (0.242)
Employees (ln)	0.102 (0.253)	0.053 (0.245)	0.061 (0.249)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	0.894 (0.886)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		1.169 (1.408)	
Germany*Access to exe.			0.203 (0.998)
Constant	3.047 (3.412)	3.839 (4.449)	1.265 (3.381)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-41.338	-41.526	-41.902
Akaike Inf. Crit.	106.675	107.053	107.805

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A64.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of the legislature with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislature		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-7.802 (4.745)	0.236 (1.520)	-3.229 (2.837)
Personal access to legislators	-0.308 (0.451)	-0.408 (0.434)	-0.448 (0.440)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.140 (0.459)	0.335 (0.455)	0.263 (0.452)
Access to the executive branch	0.697 (0.494)	0.422 (0.475)	0.473 (0.475)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-2.311 (1.409)	-0.308 (0.379)	-0.231 (0.375)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.129 (0.630)	1.328 (1.641)	-0.232 (0.630)
Influence at the legislature	0.096 (0.456)	-0.016 (0.461)	-0.452 (0.717)
Influence at the executive branch	0.021 (0.528)	0.220 (0.526)	0.038 (0.521)
Revenue (ln)	-0.207 (0.264)	-0.274 (0.248)	-0.231 (0.248)
Employees (ln)	0.025 (0.251)	0.093 (0.251)	0.105 (0.255)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	2.329 (1.447)		
Germany*Contributions		-1.683 (1.746)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			0.679 (0.811)
Constant	6.609 (4.836)	-0.661 (2.701)	2.388 (3.171)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-39.749	-41.485	-41.542
Akaike Inf. Crit.	103.498	106.970	107.085

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A65.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of the legislature with interaction effects (M7 to M9)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Legislature		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-11.853 (6.124)	-1.680 (1.076)	-9.058 (6.293)
Personal access to legislators	-0.413 (0.461)	-0.558 (0.464)	-0.588 (0.473)
Institutional access to the legislature	0.402 (0.473)	0.339 (0.460)	0.425 (0.471)
Access to the executive branch	0.312 (0.489)	0.542 (0.473)	0.462 (0.476)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.247 (0.386)	-0.300 (0.372)	-0.383 (0.382)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.361 (0.635)	-0.247 (0.629)	-0.332 (0.635)
Influence at the legislature	-0.284 (0.502)	0.054 (0.451)	0.063 (0.458)
Influence at the executive branch	-2.616 (1.589)	0.041 (0.522)	0.190 (0.533)
Revenue (ln)	-0.369 (0.304)	-0.502 (0.374)	-0.174 (0.298)
Employees (ln)	0.258 (0.298)	0.036 (0.247)	-0.704 (0.729)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	3.305 (1.757)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		0.504 (0.421)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			0.941 (0.700)
Constant	9.497 (6.222)	1.707 (2.467)	7.427 (6.714)
Observations	70	70	70
Log Likelihood	-39.012	-41.042	-40.161
Akaike Inf. Crit.	102.025	106.083	104.322

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A66.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of policy institutions with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Policy Institutions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.679 (1.200)	-0.826 (1.500)	-1.365 (1.454)
Personal access to legislators	-0.119 (0.312)	-0.108 (0.222)	-0.090 (0.223)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.151 (0.239)	-0.211 (0.529)	-0.173 (0.242)
Access to the executive branch	0.336 (0.252)	0.335 (0.252)	0.144 (0.445)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.133 (0.200)	-0.132 (0.199)	-0.118 (0.200)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.105 (0.333)	-0.111 (0.336)	-0.094 (0.331)
Influence at the legislature	0.054 (0.234)	0.054 (0.234)	0.046 (0.234)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.054 (0.270)	-0.058 (0.271)	-0.078 (0.273)
Revenue (ln)	-0.013 (0.121)	-0.007 (0.128)	0.001 (0.122)
Employees (ln)	-0.017 (0.132)	-0.018 (0.131)	-0.025 (0.132)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	0.011 (0.326)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		0.068 (0.526)	
Germany*Access to exe.			0.257 (0.493)
Constant	3.490* (1.344)	3.629* (1.727)	4.075* (1.672)
Observations	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.119	0.119	0.123
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.048	-0.048	-0.044
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Table A67.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of policy institutions with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Policy Institutions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-1.626 (1.033)	0.399 (0.770)	-1.495 (1.102)
Personal access to legislators	-0.058 (0.224)	-0.067 (0.217)	-0.102 (0.219)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.188 (0.239)	-0.094 (0.236)	-0.156 (0.237)
Access to the executive branch	0.344 (0.250)	0.275 (0.250)	0.305 (0.254)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.448 (0.358)	-0.167 (0.195)	-0.103 (0.200)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.089 (0.329)	1.046 (0.778)	-0.131 (0.331)
Influence at the legislature	0.076 (0.233)	0.026 (0.230)	-0.126 (0.316)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.059 (0.267)	-0.012 (0.265)	-0.091 (0.272)
Revenue (ln)	-0.006 (0.119)	-0.050 (0.119)	-0.013 (0.119)
Employees (ln)	-0.036 (0.131)	-0.0004 (0.129)	-0.0001 (0.132)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	0.410 (0.391)		
Germany*Contributions		-1.369 (0.842)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			0.285 (0.339)
Constant	4.212** (1.390)	2.331 (1.374)	3.974** (1.341)
Observations	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.135	0.157	0.129
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.029	-0.003	-0.036

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A68.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of policy institutions with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Policy Institutions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-2.157 (1.198)	-0.793 (0.460)	-1.523 (1.467)
Personal access to legislators	-0.073 (0.218)	-0.155 (0.222)	-0.132 (0.221)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.151 (0.235)	-0.114 (0.240)	-0.120 (0.243)
Access to the executive branch	0.278 (0.252)	0.338 (0.250)	0.322 (0.252)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.092 (0.197)	-0.135 (0.196)	-0.148 (0.198)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.142 (0.327)	-0.152 (0.332)	-0.139 (0.335)
Influence at the legislature	0.054 (0.231)	0.080 (0.234)	0.069 (0.235)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.480 (0.411)	-0.098 (0.271)	-0.048 (0.269)
Revenue (ln)	-0.024 (0.118)	-0.065 (0.131)	-0.002 (0.121)
Employees (ln)	0.017 (0.131)	-0.026 (0.130)	-0.089 (0.174)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	0.528 (0.389)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		0.154 (0.157)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			0.109 (0.174)
Constant	4.339** (1.351)	3.638** (1.210)	3.997** (1.466)
Observations	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.146	0.133	0.125
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.016	-0.031	-0.041
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Table A69.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M1 to M3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Decision-makers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	0.187 (0.794)	-0.178 (0.997)	1.015 (0.949)
Personal access to legislators	-0.120 (0.206)	-0.241 (0.147)	-0.280 (0.146)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.031 (0.158)	0.038 (0.352)	0.008 (0.158)
Access to the executive branch	0.505** (0.167)	0.505** (0.168)	0.879** (0.290)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.107 (0.132)	0.119 (0.132)	0.090 (0.131)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.008 (0.221)	-0.019 (0.223)	-0.046 (0.216)
Influence at the legislature	0.205 (0.155)	0.208 (0.156)	0.224 (0.153)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.253 (0.178)	-0.245 (0.180)	-0.202 (0.178)
Revenue (ln)	-0.027 (0.080)	-0.042 (0.085)	-0.061 (0.080)
Employees (ln)	0.022 (0.087)	0.029 (0.087)	0.043 (0.086)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	-0.171 (0.215)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		-0.082 (0.350)	
Germany*Access to exe.			-0.503 (0.322)
Constant	1.574 (0.889)	1.692 (1.148)	0.700 (1.091)
Observations	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.224	0.217	0.248
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.077	0.068	0.105

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A70.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M4 to M6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Decision-makers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.196 (0.693)	-0.058 (0.521)	-1.156 (0.730)
Personal access to legislators	-0.247 (0.150)	-0.221 (0.147)	-0.227 (0.145)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.027 (0.160)	-0.016 (0.160)	-0.040 (0.157)
Access to the executive branch	0.503** (0.168)	0.485** (0.169)	0.478** (0.168)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.188 (0.240)	0.112 (0.132)	0.150 (0.132)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.030 (0.220)	0.351 (0.526)	-0.052 (0.219)
Influence at the legislature	0.203 (0.156)	0.198 (0.155)	0.048 (0.209)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.249 (0.179)	-0.236 (0.179)	-0.283 (0.180)
Revenue (ln)	-0.037 (0.080)	-0.048 (0.081)	-0.036 (0.079)
Employees (ln)	0.032 (0.088)	0.034 (0.087)	0.043 (0.087)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	-0.085 (0.262)		
Germany*Contributions		-0.451 (0.570)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			0.253 (0.224)
Constant	1.729 (0.932)	1.507 (0.929)	2.329* (0.888)
Observations	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.217	0.224	0.233
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.069	0.077	0.087

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A71.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M7 to M9)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Decision-makers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.275 (0.809)	-0.392 (0.308)	-0.262 (0.978)
Personal access to legislators	-0.239 (0.147)	-0.233 (0.149)	-0.233 (0.148)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.035 (0.159)	-0.037 (0.161)	-0.040 (0.162)
Access to the executive branch	0.510** (0.170)	0.505** (0.168)	0.507** (0.168)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.119 (0.133)	0.123 (0.132)	0.125 (0.132)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.024 (0.221)	-0.024 (0.223)	-0.022 (0.224)
Influence at the legislature	0.208 (0.156)	0.206 (0.157)	0.205 (0.157)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.215 (0.278)	-0.247 (0.182)	-0.251 (0.179)
Revenue (ln)	-0.034 (0.080)	-0.032 (0.087)	-0.037 (0.080)
Employees (ln)	0.026 (0.089)	0.029 (0.087)	0.040 (0.116)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	-0.044 (0.263)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		-0.009 (0.105)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			-0.017 (0.116)
Constant	1.811 (0.912)	1.873* (0.811)	1.800 (0.978)
Observations	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.216	0.216	0.216
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.068	0.067	0.068

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A72.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M1 to M3; amended)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Decision-makers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	0.260 (0.639)	0.377 (0.809)	0.956 (0.765)
Personal access to legislators	0.036 (0.168)	-0.073 (0.122)	-0.103 (0.121)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.350* (0.138)	-0.157 (0.284)	-0.314* (0.138)
Access to the executive branch	0.693*** (0.138)	0.695*** (0.139)	1.006*** (0.234)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	-0.257* (0.125)	-0.258* (0.125)	-0.271* (0.123)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	0.185 (0.184)	0.190 (0.185)	0.141 (0.181)
Influence at the legislature	0.300* (0.130)	0.307* (0.130)	0.318* (0.128)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.132 (0.151)	-0.114 (0.152)	-0.086 (0.150)
Revenue (ln)	0.011 (0.065)	-0.015 (0.069)	-0.020 (0.065)
Employees (ln)	-0.014 (0.071)	-0.007 (0.070)	0.004 (0.070)
Germany*Per. acc. to l..	-0.146 (0.173)		
Germany*Inst. acc. to l.		-0.225 (0.283)	
Germany*Access to exe.			-0.426 (0.260)
Constant	1.754* (0.718)	1.492 (0.923)	1.016 (0.881)
Observations	66	66	66
R <sup>2</sup>	0.413	0.412	0.434
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.293	0.293	0.318

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A73.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M4 to M6; amended)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Decision-makers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.196 (0.693)	-0.058 (0.521)	-1.156 (0.730)
Personal access to legislators	-0.247 (0.150)	-0.221 (0.147)	-0.227 (0.145)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.027 (0.160)	-0.016 (0.160)	-0.040 (0.157)
Access to the executive branch	0.503** (0.168)	0.485** (0.169)	0.478** (0.168)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.188 (0.240)	0.112 (0.132)	0.150 (0.132)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.030 (0.220)	0.351 (0.526)	-0.052 (0.219)
Influence at the legislature	0.203 (0.156)	0.198 (0.155)	0.048 (0.209)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.249 (0.179)	-0.236 (0.179)	-0.283 (0.180)
Revenue (ln)	-0.037 (0.080)	-0.048 (0.081)	-0.036 (0.079)
Employees (ln)	0.032 (0.088)	0.034 (0.087)	0.043 (0.087)
Germany*Use of informal strat.	-0.085 (0.262)		
Germany*Contributions		-0.451 (0.570)	
Germany*Infl. (Leg)			0.253 (0.224)
Constant	1.729 (0.932)	1.507 (0.929)	2.329* (0.888)
Observations	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.217	0.224	0.233
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.069	0.077	0.087

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A74.: Binary logistic regressions to predict corruption of decision-makers with interaction effects (M7 to M9; amended)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Decision-makers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country: Germany	-0.275 (0.809)	-0.392 (0.308)	-0.262 (0.978)
Personal access to legislators	-0.239 (0.147)	-0.233 (0.149)	-0.233 (0.148)
Institutional access to the legislature	-0.035 (0.159)	-0.037 (0.161)	-0.040 (0.162)
Access to the executive branch	0.510** (0.170)	0.505** (0.168)	0.507** (0.168)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.119 (0.133)	0.123 (0.132)	0.125 (0.132)
Financial contributions (yes/no)	-0.024 (0.221)	-0.024 (0.223)	-0.022 (0.224)
Influence at the legislature	0.208 (0.156)	0.206 (0.157)	0.205 (0.157)
Influence at the executive branch	-0.215 (0.278)	-0.247 (0.182)	-0.251 (0.179)
Revenue (ln)	-0.034 (0.080)	-0.032 (0.087)	-0.037 (0.080)
Employees (ln)	0.026 (0.089)	0.029 (0.087)	0.040 (0.116)
Germany*Inf. (exe)	-0.044 (0.263)		
Germany*Revenue (ln)		-0.009 (0.105)	
Germany*Employees (ln)			-0.017 (0.116)
Constant	1.811 (0.912)	1.873* (0.811)	1.800 (0.978)
Observations	70	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.216	0.216	0.216
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.068	0.067	0.068

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

## A.4. Chapter 7

### A.4.1. Appendix 7A: Regression Tables (models reported in the chapter)

Table A75.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive banch  
(amended; models 7 and 8)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Pers. (1)	Inst. (2)
Country: Germany	−0.691* (0.285)	−0.044 (0.271)
Revenue (ln)	0.010 (0.091)	0.189** (0.067)
Employees (ln)	0.210* (0.083)	−0.098 (0.068)
Age	−0.0003 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.032 (0.193)	−0.386* (0.188)
Situation: Moderate	−0.113 (0.175)	−0.180 (0.169)
Situation: Good	−0.260 (0.142)	−0.166 (0.137)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.230* (0.089)	0.002 (0.086)
Competitive: Problem	−0.379 (0.244)	−0.112 (0.243)
Fixed yearly budget: yes	0.293 (0.263)	0.208 (0.239)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	−0.004 (0.003)	−0.008** (0.003)
Government affairs manager: yes	0.913** (0.285)	0.639* (0.268)

Appendix

Gender: Female	0.163 (0.219)	-0.323 (0.219)
Constant	0.650 (0.857)	3.529*** (0.625)
Observations	71	74
R <sup>2</sup>	0.554	0.475
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.452	0.361
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A76.: OLS-regressions to predict access to the executive branch and informal access (amended)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Exe.	Info
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	−0.388 (0.233)	−0.837* (0.316)
Revenue (ln)	0.111 (0.058)	0.054 (0.094)
Employees (ln)	−0.106 (0.059)	0.065 (0.091)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.273 (0.165)	−0.036 (0.210)
Situation: Moderate	−0.038 (0.150)	−0.483* (0.190)
Situation: Good	−0.098 (0.120)	−0.387* (0.154)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.151* (0.072)	0.079 (0.098)
Competitive: Problem	−0.416 (0.210)	−0.220 (0.271)
Fixed yearly budget: yes	−0.407 (0.226)	0.545 (0.275)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	−0.008** (0.002)	0.0004 (0.003)
Government affairs manager: yes	1.048*** (0.248)	0.277 (0.303)
Gender: Female	−0.140 (0.184)	0.058 (0.241)
Constant	3.346*** (0.539)	1.432 (0.948)
Observations	73	73
R <sup>2</sup>	0.450	0.307
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.329	0.154

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A77.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the legislature (amended; models 1 and 2)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Influence at legislature	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-0.029 (0.365)	-0.471 (0.334)
Revenue (ln)	0.156 (0.093)	0.254* (0.100)
Employees (ln)	0.011 (0.099)	-0.049 (0.106)
Age	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Corruption: A little bit	-0.201 (0.321)	
Corruption: >A little bit	0.472 (0.250)	
Corruption of decision-makers		0.338* (0.152)
Competition: Problem	0.003 (0.327)	-0.035 (0.311)
Sector: Manufacturing	-0.008 (0.278)	-0.019 (0.262)
Constant	3.019*** (0.785)	3.004** (0.981)
Observations	69	66
R <sup>2</sup>	0.159	0.236
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.031	0.129
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A78.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the legislature (amended; models 3 and 4)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Influence at legislature	
	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.007 (0.403)	-0.479 (0.365)
Revenue (ln)	0.009 (0.095)	0.146 (0.112)
Employees (ln)	0.029 (0.101)	-0.063 (0.118)
Age	-0.0004 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Corruption: <A little bit	-0.493 (0.301)	
Corruption: At least a little bit	0.720** (0.236)	
Corruption of decision-makers		0.340* (0.159)
Competition: Problem	-0.123 (0.329)	0.101 (0.325)
Sector: Manufacturing	-0.194 (0.257)	-0.097 (0.241)
Personal access to legislators	0.149 (0.171)	0.248 (0.170)
Institutional access to legislature	0.149 (0.227)	0.207 (0.212)
Access to the executive branch	0.084 (0.212)	-0.038 (0.218)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.313 (0.165)	0.359* (0.154)
Financial contributions: yes	-0.176 (0.288)	-0.013 (0.259)
Situation: Moderate	0.363 (0.252)	0.106 (0.228)
Situation: Good	-0.161 (0.184)	-0.159 (0.176)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.052 (0.114)	-0.011 (0.117)

Appendix

Fixed yearly budget: yes	0.110 (0.332)	-0.211 (0.328)
Government affairs manager: yes	0.713 (0.363)	0.384 (0.350)
Gender: Female	-0.438 (0.297)	-0.182 (0.293)
Constant	0.287 (1.039)	0.627 (1.246)
Observations	69	66
R <sup>2</sup>	0.507	0.539
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.302	0.348
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A79.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch  
(amended; models 4 and 5)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Influence at the executive branch	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-0.055 (0.346)	-0.132 (0.323)
Revenue (ln)	0.200* (0.091)	0.189* (0.089)
Employees (ln)	-0.043 (0.094)	-0.026 (0.092)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Corruption: <A little bit	-0.074 (0.304)	
Corruption: At least little bit	0.215 (0.238)	
Corruption of decision-makers		0.087 (0.147)
Competition: Problem	-0.173 (0.310)	-0.189 (0.308)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.401 (0.267)	0.446 (0.257)
Constant	3.410*** (0.746)	3.086*** (0.848)
Observations	67	68
R <sup>2</sup>	0.202	0.194
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.076	0.085

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A80.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch  
(amended; models 7 and 8)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Influence at the executive branch	
	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.266 (0.304)	-0.403 (0.304)
Revenue (ln)	0.073 (0.074)	0.065 (0.077)
Employees (ln)	0.071 (0.078)	0.084 (0.080)
Age	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Corruption: <A little bit	-0.505* (0.228)	
Corruption: At least a little bit	0.427* (0.179)	
Corruption of decision-makers		-0.127 (0.120)
Competition: Problem	-0.063 (0.249)	0.016 (0.263)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.253 (0.200)	0.362 (0.205)
Personal access to legislators	0.079 (0.132)	0.119 (0.139)
Institutional access to legislature	0.040 (0.175)	-0.008 (0.175)
Access to the executive branch	0.544** (0.164)	0.642*** (0.168)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.256* (0.125)	0.116 (0.119)
Financial contributions: yes	-0.502* (0.224)	-0.428 (0.225)
Situation: Moderate	0.553** (0.199)	0.459* (0.200)
Situation: Good	-0.582*** (0.144)	-0.588*** (0.150)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.021 (0.086)	-0.013 (0.089)

Fixed yearly budget: yes	0.030 (0.252)	0.070 (0.262)
Government affairs manager: yes	0.394 (0.274)	0.294 (0.286)
Gender: Female	-0.868*** (0.247)	-0.848** (0.259)
Constant	-0.120 (0.793)	0.162 (0.866)
Observations	67	68
R <sup>2</sup>	0.705	0.659
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.576	0.524
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Appendix

Table A81.: Censored regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying  
(amended models 1 and 2)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of indirect lobbying	
Country: Germany	-2.385 (12.247)	3.404 (13.481)
Infl.: Legislature	4.327 (6.692)	7.553 (6.771)
Infl.: Exe. branch	-13.781 (7.119)	-11.749 (7.382)
Revenue (ln)	3.985 (3.97)	5.41 (3.967)
Employees (ln)	-3.368 (3.95)	-3.87 (3.919)
Age	-0.037 (0.085)	-0.066 (0.087)
Corruption: <A little bit	17.073 (10.159)	21.828* (10.318)
Corruption: At least a little bit	-9.797 (8.37)	-13.081 (8.241)
Competition: Problem	-3.661 (11.25)	3.03 (11.803)
Sector: Manufacturing	20.002* (9.282)	21.506* (9.129)
Situation: Moderate		7.758 (8.23)
Situation: Good		3.563 (7.221)
Conflictual Policy Areas		-0.689 (4.14)
Fixed yearly budget: yes		-16.715 (11.328)
Government affairs manager: yes		-16.491 (13.337)
Gender: Female		4.842 (10.231)
Constant	101.852* (30.206)	109.533 (32.728)
Observations	69	69
Log-likelihood:	-296.8662	-293.9342

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A82.: Censored regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (fixed models 3 and 4)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of indirect lobbying	
Country: Germany	-1.287 (11.986)	3.257 (13.525)
Infl.: Legislature	2.487 (6.683)	5.03 (6.875)
Infl.: Exe. branch	-13.274 (7.257)	-11.982 (7.685)
Revenue (ln)	4.277 (3.931)	5.71 (4.012)
Employees (ln)	-3.968 (3.964)	-4.766 (3.999)
Age	-0.032 (0.087)	-0.032 (0.089)
Corruption of decision-makers	2.943 (5.288)	4.005 (5.349)
Competition: Problem	-3.257 (11.546)	2.512 (12.217)
Sector: Manufacturing	18.31 (9.367)	19.016* (9.339)
Situation: Moderate		6.092 (8.445)
Situation: Good		0.717 (7.442)
Conflictual Policy Areas		-0.525 (4.279)
Fixed yearly budget: yes		-16.092 (11.698)
Government affairs manager: yes		-12.07 (13.594)
Gender: Female		5.311 (10.518)
Constant	108.473* (33.083)	117.738 (36.425)
Observations	69	69
Log-likelihood:	-298.2369	-296.1000

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

### A.4.2. Appendix 7B: Regression Tables (non-amended models)

Table A83.: OLS-regressions to predict personal and institutional access to the legislature

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Pers. (1)	Inst. (2)
Country: Germany	-0.496 (0.316)	-0.134 (0.282)
Revenue (ln)	-0.015 (0.079)	0.183* (0.070)
Employees (ln)	0.161* (0.080)	-0.111 (0.071)
Age	-0.0003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.049 (0.219)	-0.324 (0.195)
Situation: Moderate	-0.153 (0.198)	-0.181 (0.177)
Situation: Good	-0.165 (0.160)	-0.134 (0.143)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.174 (0.097)	0.058 (0.087)
Competitive: Problem	-0.471 (0.285)	-0.099 (0.254)
Fixed yearly budget: yes	0.477 (0.280)	0.162 (0.250)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.008* (0.003)
Government affairs manager: yes	0.591 (0.314)	0.702* (0.280)
Gender: Female	0.120 (0.247)	-0.486* (0.220)
Constant	1.509* (0.733)	3.432*** (0.654)
Observations	75	75
R <sup>2</sup>	0.395	0.433
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.266	0.312

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A84.: OLS-regressions to predict access to the executive branch and informal access

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Exe. (1)	Info (2)
Country: Germany	-0.266 (0.268)	-0.623 (0.315)
Revenue (ln)	0.140* (0.067)	0.072 (0.079)
Employees (ln)	-0.112 (0.068)	-0.003 (0.080)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.094 (0.186)	0.023 (0.218)
Situation: Moderate	-0.078 (0.168)	-0.414* (0.198)
Situation: Good	-0.042 (0.136)	-0.317 (0.160)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.149 (0.083)	-0.006 (0.097)
Competitive: Problem	-0.435 (0.242)	-0.232 (0.284)
Fixed yearly budget: yes	0.038 (0.238)	0.389 (0.279)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Government affairs manager: yes	0.612* (0.266)	0.239 (0.313)
Gender: Female	-0.001 (0.210)	0.024 (0.246)
Constant	3.189*** (0.622)	2.416** (0.731)
Observations	75	75
R <sup>2</sup>	0.300	0.225
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.151	0.060

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A85.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the legislature (models 1 and 2)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Influence at legislature	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-0.039 (0.363)	-0.205 (0.347)
Revenue (ln)	0.153 (0.092)	0.129 (0.092)
Employees (ln)	0.012 (0.098)	0.047 (0.099)
Age	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Corruption: A little bit	-0.137 (0.303)	
Corruption: >A little bit	0.429 (0.239)	
Corruption of decision-makers		0.136 (0.155)
Competition: Problem	0.009 (0.325)	-0.021 (0.332)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.022 (0.273)	0.090 (0.273)
Constant	2.966*** (0.777)	2.472** (0.902)
Observations	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.154	0.118
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.027	0.002
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A86.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the legislature (models 3 and 4)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Influence at legislature	
	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.034 (0.416)	-0.277 (0.413)
Revenue (ln)	0.024 (0.097)	-0.006 (0.101)
Employees (ln)	0.011 (0.104)	0.059 (0.107)
Age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Corruption: <A little bit	-0.344 (0.302)	
Corruption: At least a little bit	0.563* (0.231)	
Corruption of decision-makers		0.034 (0.162)
Competition: Problem	-0.070 (0.338)	-0.036 (0.357)
Sector: Manufacturing	-0.156 (0.265)	-0.028 (0.270)
Personal access to legislators	0.183 (0.175)	0.238 (0.184)
Institutional access to legislature	0.019 (0.225)	0.074 (0.232)
Access to the executive branch	0.192 (0.212)	0.206 (0.225)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.193 (0.160)	0.086 (0.161)
Financial contributions: yes	-0.010 (0.286)	-0.117 (0.296)
Situation: Moderate	0.204 (0.247)	0.255 (0.257)
Situation: Good	-0.212 (0.188)	-0.142 (0.198)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.017 (0.116)	0.005 (0.121)

Appendix

Fixed yearly budget: yes	0.210 (0.339)	0.131 (0.354)
Government affairs manager: yes	0.651 (0.373)	0.572 (0.389)
Gender: Female	-0.424 (0.307)	-0.396 (0.322)
Constant	0.526 (1.066)	0.249 (1.160)
Observations	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.464	0.399
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.245	0.171
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A87.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch (models 5 and 6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Influence at the executive branch	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-0.062 (0.340)	-0.126 (0.319)
Revenue (ln)	0.193* (0.086)	0.183* (0.085)
Employees (ln)	-0.039 (0.092)	-0.025 (0.091)
Age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Corruption: <A little bit	-0.035 (0.284)	
Corruption: At least a little bit	0.165 (0.224)	
Corruption of decision-makers		0.066 (0.143)
Competition: Problem	-0.172 (0.305)	-0.186 (0.305)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.386 (0.256)	0.411 (0.251)
Constant	3.365*** (0.727)	3.142*** (0.829)
Observations	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.202	0.197
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.082	0.091

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A88.: OLS-regressions to predict influence at the executive branch (models 7 and 8)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Influence at the executive branch	
	(3)	(4)
Country: Germany	-0.243 (0.346)	-0.360 (0.329)
Revenue (ln)	0.057 (0.081)	0.041 (0.080)
Employees (ln)	0.008 (0.087)	0.033 (0.085)
Age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	0.001 (0.003)	0.0005 (0.003)
Corruption: <A little bit	-0.402 (0.251)	
Corruption: At least a little bit	0.279 (0.192)	
Corruption of decision-makers		-0.181 (0.130)
Competition: Problem	-0.082 (0.282)	-0.021 (0.285)
Sector: Manufacturing	0.202 (0.221)	0.275 (0.216)
Personal access to legislators	0.144 (0.146)	0.149 (0.147)
Institutional access to legislature	-0.042 (0.187)	-0.009 (0.185)
Access to the executive branch	0.485** (0.176)	0.538** (0.179)
Use of informal lobbying strategies	0.198 (0.133)	0.147 (0.128)
Financial contributions: yes	-0.196 (0.238)	-0.241 (0.236)
Situation: Moderate	0.222 (0.206)	0.239 (0.205)
Situation: Good	-0.478** (0.157)	-0.474** (0.158)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.019 (0.097)	0.005 (0.097)

Fixed yearly budget: yes	0.139 (0.282)	0.120 (0.282)
Government affairs manager: yes	0.337 (0.311)	0.291 (0.310)
Gender: Female	-0.487 (0.255)	-0.509 (0.256)
Constant	0.479 (0.888)	0.686 (0.924)
Observations	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.600	0.589
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.436	0.433
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A89.: OLS-regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (models 9 and 10)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of indirect lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-0.907 (11.474)	0.567 (13.717)
Infl.: Legislature	5.431 (6.349)	7.580 (6.894)
Infl.: Exe. branch	-10.889 (6.676)	-9.615 (7.492)
Revenue (ln)	0.897 (3.033)	1.049 (3.299)
Employees (ln)	-0.075 (3.124)	0.560 (3.313)
Age	-0.016 (0.080)	-0.037 (0.088)
Corruption: <A little bit	13.643 (9.442)	16.675 (10.296)
Corruption: At least a little bit	-10.146 (7.708)	-12.607 (8.205)
Competition: Problem	-2.434 (10.352)	0.486 (11.915)
Sector: Manufacturing	18.160* (8.672)	19.870* (9.130)
Situation: Moderate		5.349 (8.291)
Situation: Good		2.133 (7.315)
Conflictual Policy Areas		2.047 (4.018)
Fixed yearly budget: yes		-11.219 (11.259)
Government affairs manager: yes		-9.142 (13.334)
Gender: Female		1.155 (10.387)

Constant	63.519* (27.397)	52.751 (31.518)
Observations	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.132	0.179
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.016	-0.069
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A90.: OLS-regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (models 11 and 12)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of indirect lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	1.147 (11.011)	1.152 (13.577)
Infl.: Legislature	3.583 (6.295)	5.256 (6.915)
Infl.: Exe. branch	-10.167 (6.737)	-9.858 (7.695)
Revenue (ln)	1.178 (3.023)	1.481 (3.329)
Employees (ln)	-0.589 (3.150)	-0.311 (3.363)
Age	-0.012 (0.081)	-0.024 (0.089)
Corruption of decision-makers	1.792 (4.930)	2.291 (5.331)
Competition: Problem	-1.950 (10.557)	-0.137 (12.194)
Sector: Manufacturing	16.530 (8.707)	17.785 (9.258)
Situation: Moderate		4.000 (8.419)
Situation: Good		-0.696 (7.432)
Conflictual Policy Areas		2.231 (4.100)
Fixed yearly budget: yes		-10.337 (11.457)
Government affairs manager: yes		-5.128 (13.435)
Gender: Female		0.870 (10.504)
Constant	69.891* (30.379)	62.462 (35.430)
Observations	70	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.094	0.128
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.042	-0.114

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A91.: Censored regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (models 1 and 2)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of indirect lobbying	
Country: Germany	0.529 (12.282)	3.149 (13.898)
Infl.: Legislature	4.733 (6.78)	7.399 (6.98)
Infl.: Exe. branch	-12.388 (7.16)	-10.824 (7.596)
Revenue (ln)	0.389 (3.305)	0.642 (3.397)
Employees (ln)	0.03 (3.367)	0.77 (3.384)
Age	-0.03 (0.086)	-0.056 (0.09)
Corruption: <A little bit	16.862 (10.31)	20.399 (10.617)
Corruption: At least a little bit	-11.837 (8.395)	-14.894 (8.462)
Competition: Problem	0.077 (11.163)	3.901 (12.159)
Sector: Manufacturing	20.505* (9.41)	22.303* (9.402)
Situation: Moderate		6.196 (8.449)
Situation: Good		2.823 (7.435)
Conflictual Policy Areas		1.924 (4.083)
Fixed yearly budget: yes		-12.383 (11.489)
Government affairs manager: yes		-12.415 (13.604)
Gender: Female		3.042 (10.51)
Constant	67.115* (30.206)	55.373 (32.728)
Observations	70	70
Log-likelihood:	-302.5143	-300.5758
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A92.: Censored regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (models 3 and 4)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of indirect lobbying	
Country: Germany	2.911 (11.905)	4.104 (13.915)
Infl.: Legislature	2.511 (6.789)	4.536 (7.073)
Infl.: Exe. branch	-11.634 (7.298)	-11.029 (7.894)
Revenue (ln)	0.674 (3.327)	1.101 (3.469)
Employees (ln)	-0.524 (3.43)	-0.21 (3.472)
Age	-0.025 (0.088)	-0.025 (0.092)
Corruption of decision-makers	2.675 (5.371)	3.346 (5.498)
Competition: Problem	0.616 (11.495)	3.162 (12.569)
Sector: Manufacturing	18.495 (9.516)	19.631* (9.605)
Situation: Moderate		4.714 (8.664)
Situation: Good		-0.216 (7.647)
Conflictual Policy Areas		2.137 (4.211)
Fixed yearly budget: yes		-11.475 (11.825)
Government affairs manager: yes		-7.768 (13.829)
Gender: Female		2.963 (10.763)
Constant	73.586* (33.083)	65.292 (36.425)
Observations	70	70
Log-likelihood:	-304.0145	-302.6867
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A93.: OLS-regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying  
(amended models 9 and 10)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of indirect lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-3.775 (11.426)	0.843 (13.308)
Infl.: Legislature	4.984 (6.258)	7.643 (6.688)
Infl.: Exe. branch	-12.255 (6.624)	-10.450 (7.280)
Revenue (ln)	4.392 (3.636)	5.452 (3.839)
Employees (ln)	-3.390 (3.651)	-3.745 (3.824)
Age	-0.024 (0.079)	-0.047 (0.085)
Corruption: <A little bit	14.004 (9.300)	18.211 (10.016)
Corruption: At least little bit	-8.213 (7.676)	-10.997 (7.997)
Competition: Problem	-6.104 (10.424)	-0.341 (11.566)
Sector: Manufacturing	17.679* (8.545)	19.056* (8.866)
Situation: Moderate		6.819 (8.074)
Situation: Good		2.889 (7.106)
Conflictual Policy Areas		-0.393 (4.071)
Fixed yearly budget: yes		-15.301 (11.098)
Government affairs manager: yes		-12.971 (13.067)
Gender: Female		2.887 (10.111)

Appendix

Constant	97.694** (33.745)	103.409* (39.113)
Observations	69	69
R <sup>2</sup>	0.153	0.224
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	-0.015
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A94.: OLS-regressions to predict the percentage of indirect lobbying (amended models 11 and 12)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of indirect lobbying	
	(1)	(2)
Country: Germany	-2.944 (11.069)	0.390 (13.197)
Infl.: Legislature	3.495 (6.188)	5.619 (6.721)
Infl.: Exe. branch	-11.769 (6.685)	-10.713 (7.489)
Revenue (ln)	4.648 (3.565)	5.712 (3.837)
Employees (ln)	-3.918 (3.627)	-4.525 (3.861)
Age	-0.020 (0.080)	-0.033 (0.087)
Corruption of decision-makers	2.111 (4.849)	2.956 (5.189)
Competition: Problem	-5.721 (10.595)	-0.748 (11.852)
Sector: Manufacturing	16.338 (8.559)	17.114 (9.001)
Situation: Moderate		5.281 (8.204)
Situation: Good		0.246 (7.236)
Conflictual Policy Areas		-0.242 (4.163)
Fixed yearly budget: yes		-14.674 (11.331)
Government affairs manager: yes		-9.101 (13.197)
Gender: Female		3.135 (10.266)
Constant	103.866** (35.550)	111.306* (41.868)
Observations	69	69
R <sup>2</sup>	0.119	0.173
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.015	-0.061

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

### A.4.3. Appendix 7C: Regression Diagnostics

The criteria and the method for the regression diagnostics for the OLS regressions and the binary logistic regression predicting financial contributions are the same as explained in the appendix of chapter 6 above. The diagnostic plots for the amended models can be found below. I presented and interpreted the results of the amended models in chapter 6. The results for the non-amended models can be found in tables A83 through A92 above.

#### Access and Contributions

Figures A24 through A29 present the plots of the regression diagnostics for the models analyzing access and contributions.

*Personal access to the legislature:* Cases 1, 18, 53, and 4 were identified as influential cases (Cook's distance) or as violating the normality assumption of residuals (see figure A25). I excluded these cases in the amended models.

*Institutional access to the legislature:* Case 75 was identified as a too influential case (Cook's distance). I have not rated the deviations from regression assumptions presented in figure A25 as too severe to exclude other cases than case 75. Further deviating residuals lie within or almost within the thumb rule of about two standard deviations.


*Access to the executive branch:* Cases 53 and 81 were identified as influential cases (Cook's distance). The remaining cases are not single outliers in the residual plots and do not exceed a deviation of two standard deviations much (see figure A27).

*Use of informal strategies:* Cases 1 and 4 were identified as influential cases (Cook's distance). The remaining cases are not single outliers in the residual plots and do not exceed a deviation of two standard deviations much (see figure A28).

*Financial contributions:* Cases 10, 58 and 14<sup>3</sup> were iteratively identified as influential cases (Cook's distance). There were no variables violating the linearity assumption (see figure A25).

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<sup>3</sup>It became influential after cases 10 and 58 were excluded (see also the diagnostics for the amended results in appendix A45).



*Note:* First plot in first row: personal access to the legislature; second plot in the first row: institutional access to the legislature; first plot in the second row: access to the executive branch; second plot in the second row: Use of informal strategies; third row: contributions.

Figure A24.: Cook's Distance for regressions predicting access and contributions

Appendix




Figure A25.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting personal access to legislators




Figure A26.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting institutional access to legislators

Appendix




Figure A27.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting access to the executive branch




Figure A28.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting the use of informal strategies




Figure A29.: Regression diagnostics of the binary logistic regression predicting contributions

## Influence


Figures A30 through A39 present the plots of the regression diagnostics for the models analyzing influence. To maintain the nested structure of the models, the diagnostics are based on the models with additional variables. Identifying and removing problematic cases from them also improved the narrower models (see below).

*Influence at the legislature:* In M2, case 40 was identified as too influential (see figure A30). No further problematic cases were detected (see figure A33). In M4, case 50 has considerable but no problematic influence on the regression but also appears in various residual plots (see figure A34). After removing case 50, case 49 led to similar problems and was removed as well. The same holds for case 5. After removing this, case 1 became too influential and, hence, was removed eventually.

*Influence at the executive branch:* In M6, cases 1 and 40 were identified as too influential (see figure A35) and as residual outliers (see figure A36). After removing them, case 87 appeared as residual outlier. There is still one case clearly deviating from the normal distribution. However, as only the top three of the cases influencing deviations from the normality assumption are numbered – and those are nearer to the diagonal line (see figure A51 below) – case 87 is the last one to be excluded.

In M8, cases 10 and 87 appear as outliers again (see figure A39). These are the only two problematic cases.

Appendix



*Note:* First plot in first row: M1; second plot in the first row: M3; first plot in the second row: M2; second plot in the second row: M4.

Figure A30.: Cook's Distance (OLS models predicting influence at the legislature)




Figure A31.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 1)

Appendix




Figure A32.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 2)




Figure A33.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 3)

Appendix





Figure A34.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 4)



*Note:* First plot in first row: M5; second plot in the first row: M6; first plot in the second row: M7; second plot in the second row: M8.

Figure A35.: Cook's Distance (OLS models predicting influence at the executive branch)

Appendix




Figure A36.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 5)




Figure A37.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 6)

Appendix




Figure A38.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 7)




Figure A39.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 8)

### **Indirect Lobbying**

Similar to the models analyzing influence, the more comprehensive models are relevant for diagnostics to maintain the nested structure. The models presented in section 7.4 and above are the non-amended ones. The similar results for the non-amended models are presented in tables A83 through A92 above.

In M6 and in M8 case 1 is too influential. There are no further problematic cases.




Figure A40.: Cook's Distance (OLS models the percentage of indirect lobbying)

Appendix




Figure A41.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting indirect lobbying (model 9)




Figure A42.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting indirect lobbying (model 10)

Appendix




Figure A43.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting indirect lobbying (model 11)




Figure A44.: Regression diagnostics of the OLS model predicting indirect lobbying (model 12)

### A.4.4. Appendix 7D: Amended Regression Models

#### OLS Regressions




Figure A45.: Cook's Distance (amended regression models predicting strategies)




Figure A46.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting personal access to legislators

Appendix




Figure A47.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting institutional access to legislators




Figure A48.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting access to the executive branch

Appendix




Figure A49.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting the use of informal strategies




Figure A50.: Cook's Distance (amended OLS models predicting influence)

Appendix




Figure A51.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 2)




Figure A52.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting influence at the legislature (model 4)

Appendix




Figure A53.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 6)




Figure A54.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting influence at the executive branch (model 8)

Appendix




Figure A55.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting the percentage of indirect lobbying

Table A95.: Amended binary logistic regression to predict financial contributions with quadratic term

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Contributions
Country: Germany	-7.720*** (2.288)
Revenue (ln)	0.665 (0.587)
Employees (ln)	0.965* (0.492)
Age	-0.031* (0.013)
Sector: Manufacturing	-0.373 (1.216)
Situation: Moderate	2.341* (1.082)
Situation: Good	-1.082 (0.697)
Conflictual Policy Areas	0.479 (0.479)
Competitive: Problem	-5.661* (2.381)
Fixed yearly budget: yes	-0.047 (0.065)
Percentage of indirect lobbying	0.0004 (0.001)
Percentage of indirect lobbying <sup>2</sup>	5.677** (2.146)
Government affairs manager: yes	-5.774** (2.055)
Gender: Female	-1.508 (4.037)
Observations	72
Log Likelihood	-21.913
Akaike Inf. Crit.	71.826

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Binary Logistic Regression




Figure A56.: Regression diagnostics of the binary logistic regression chapter 7 (amended)

## A.5. Chapter 8

### A.5.1. Appendix 8A: Univariate Tables of Definitions and Distinctions

	USA: 0	USA: 1	GER: 0	GER: 1	Total: 0	Total: 1
Illegal influence	77	23	88	12	85	15
Infl outside of rules	96	4	98	2	98	2
Quid pro quo	77	23	80	20	79	21
Against compliance	100	0	98	2	99	1
Lying/manipulation	96	4	94	6	95	5
Unethical behavior	92	8	98	2	97	3
Incompetency	100	0	98	2	99	1
Embezzlement	100	0	97	3	98	2
Conflict of interest	96	4	95	5	96	4
Unfair advantage	88	12	71	29	76	24
Kickbacks	100	0	98	2	99	1
Illegal contributions	96	4	83	17	87	13
Bribery	92	8	91	9	91	9
Private gain	77	23	92	8	88	12
Introducing bias	96	4	100	0	99	1

Table A96.: Definitions of corruption by lobbyists

Appendix

	USA: 0	USA: 1	GER: 0	GER: 1	Total: 0	Total: 1
Persuasion	96	4	98	2	98	2
Education	77	23	98	2	92	8
Creating access	96	4	91	9	92	8
Trust	96	4	98	2	98	2
Supporting	85	15	100	0	96	4
Informing	81	19	65	35	69	31
Voice	88	12	46	54	58	42
Influence	96	4	86	14	89	11
Mngt of knowledge	100	0	97	3	98	2
Translating politics	100	0	97	3	98	2
Translating economy	100	0	98	2	99	1
Mngt of stakeholders	100	0	98	2	99	1

Table A97.: Definitions of lobbying by lobbyists

	USA: 0	USA: 1	GER: 0	GER: 1	Total: 0	Total: 1
No distinction	96	4	100	0	99	1
Legal	73	27	78	22	77	23
Quid pro quo	81	19	69	31	73	27
Transparency	92	8	94	6	93	7
Moral	100	0	92	8	95	5
Service in return	100	0	91	9	93	7
Unfair advantage	81	19	86	14	85	15
Buying outcomes	92	8	89	11	90	10
Money	96	4	100	0	99	1
Private gain	85	15	89	11	88	12
Illegitimacy	100	0	94	6	96	4
Clientelism	100	0	98	2	99	1
Fraud-based	100	0	97	3	98	2
Support	100	0	94	6	96	4
Pressure	100	0	94	6	96	4

Table A98.: Distinction between lobbying and corruption by lobbyists

### A.5.2. Appendix 8B: Perceptions of corruption predicted by different conceptions of lobbying and corruption

Table A99.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Officials	Administration
	(1)	(2)
Illegal	-2.874*** (0.828)	-1.640* (0.778)
Quid pro quo	0.840 (0.819)	0.817 (0.790)
Unfair adv.	-0.706 (0.666)	-0.590 (0.649)
Buying outcomes	0.566 (0.960)	-0.583 (0.770)
Private gain	1.478 (1.114)	1.717 (1.207)
Constant	1.499** (0.519)	1.413** (0.509)
Observations	77	76
Log Likelihood	-35.024	-37.553
Akaike Inf. Crit.	82.048	87.106
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A100.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of corruption (continued)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	MPs/Legislators	Legislature
	(1)	(2)
Legal	-2.563** (0.802)	-1.582* (0.732)
Quid pro quo	0.454 (0.784)	0.908 (0.672)
Unfair adv.	-0.781 (0.717)	-0.440 (0.570)
Buying outcomes	1.191 (1.199)	-0.164 (0.721)
Private gain	2.071 (1.297)	1.598 (0.942)
Constant	1.768** (0.561)	0.563 (0.430)
Observations	78	76
Log Likelihood	-32.358	-45.494
Akaike Inf. Crit.	76.717	102.987
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A101.: Regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	D-M	P. I.	Parties	NGOs
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>ordered</i> <i>logistic</i>	<i>ordered</i> <i>logistic</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Legal	-0.892* (0.384)	-1.016*** (0.252)	-0.999 (0.648)	-1.809** (0.631)
Quid pro quo	0.078 (0.338)	0.205 (0.221)	0.035 (0.543)	0.037 (0.535)
Unfair adv.	-0.416 (0.318)	-0.249 (0.208)	-0.614 (0.516)	0.019 (0.507)
Buying outcomes	-0.365 (0.413)	0.035 (0.271)	0.577 (0.698)	0.580 (0.692)
Private gain	0.517 (0.407)	0.451 (0.267)	0.912 (0.663)	0.750 (0.645)
Constant	2.885*** (0.240)	2.603*** (0.155)		
Observations	76	77	76	76
R <sup>2</sup>	0.108	0.207		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.044	0.151		
Residual Std. Error	1.185 (df = 70)	0.781 (df = 71)		

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A102.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of lobbying

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Officials (1)	Administration (2)	MPs/Legislators (3)	Legislature (4)
Education	-0.397 (1.238)	0.268 (1.206)	-0.097 (1.213)	-0.398 (0.958)
Access	13.838 (1,696.735)	-1.341 (1.552)	14.594 (1,366.340)	-1.304 (1.533)
Support	1.038 (0.743)	-0.471 (0.645)	0.783 (0.735)	-0.023 (0.576)
Informing	-1.729** (0.652)	-1.138 (0.626)	-0.919 (0.625)	-1.405* (0.553)
Voice	0.668 (1.187)	1.185 (1.157)	0.563 (1.157)	-0.460 (0.793)
Influence	1.691** (0.561)	1.812** (0.560)	1.496** (0.524)	1.327** (0.479)
Observations	77	76	78	76
Log Likelihood	-35.739	-38.475	-36.266	-46.315
Akaike Inf. Crit.	83.479	88.949	84.533	104.629

Note: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A103.: Regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of lobbying

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	D-M <i>OLS</i> (1)	P. I. <i>OLS</i> (2)	Parties <i>ordered logistic</i> (3)	NGOs <i>ordered logistic</i> (4)
Education	0.949 (0.530)	0.421 (0.333)		0.689 (0.913)
Access	0.055 (0.504)	-0.137 (0.338)	0.526 (0.796)	0.473 (0.798)
Support	-0.323 (0.906)	-0.140 (0.604)	-0.477 (1.772)	-1.060 (1.632)
Informing	-0.057 (0.307)	0.347 (0.205)	-0.390 (0.505)	0.347 (0.494)
Voice	-0.691* (0.297)	-0.577** (0.199)	-1.001* (0.504)	-0.339 (0.489)
Influence	0.041 (0.429)	0.048 (0.288)	0.480 (0.719)	-0.519 (0.676)
Constant	2.906*** (0.248)	2.582*** (0.166)		
Observations	76	77	76	76
R <sup>2</sup>	0.137	0.205		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.062	0.137		

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table A104.: Binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by the distinction between lobbying and corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Officials (1)	Administration (2)	MPs/Legislators (3)	Legislature (4)
Legal	-0.377 (0.628)	0.511 (0.699)	0.153 (0.704)	0.089 (0.611)
Quid pro quo	2.391* (1.082)	2.490* (1.099)	1.965 (1.092)	1.263 (0.649)
Unfair adv.	-0.072 (0.805)	-0.366 (0.843)	-0.024 (0.893)	-0.090 (0.728)
Buying outcomes	1.109 (1.148)	1.275 (1.142)	-0.005 (0.926)	0.937 (0.891)
Private gain	0.575 (0.888)	-0.004 (0.808)	-0.876 (0.771)	-0.889 (0.741)
Constant	0.653 (0.440)	0.555 (0.438)	1.127* (0.476)	0.246 (0.408)
Observations	77	76	78	76
Log Likelihood	-37.559	-36.580	-35.863	-46.062
Akaike Inf. Crit.	87.118	85.159	83.726	104.124

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A105.: Regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by the distinction between lobbying and corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	D-M <i>OLS</i> (1)	P. I. <i>OLS</i> (2)	Parties <i>ordered logistic</i> (3)	NGOs <i>ordered logistic</i> (4)
Legal	0.037 (0.350)	-0.0002 (0.236)	-0.213 (0.564)	-0.165 (0.546)
Quid pro quo	0.625 (0.324)	0.545* (0.223)	2.025*** (0.576)	0.631 (0.508)
Unfair adv.	-0.288 (0.393)	-0.069 (0.260)	-1.221 (0.653)	-0.341 (0.606)
Buying outcomes	0.090 (0.445)	0.100 (0.307)	0.159 (0.698)	0.162 (0.658)
Private gain	-0.282 (0.430)	-0.007 (0.297)	0.031 (0.706)	0.558 (0.669)
Constant	2.557*** (0.237)	2.343*** (0.163)		
Observations	76	77	76	76
R <sup>2</sup>	0.063	0.083		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.004	0.019		

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

### A.5.3. Appendix 8C: Examples of Unquoted Categories

To supplement the categories defined in the codebook in appendix C in terms of reliability, this appendix shows examples for each code that had no example citation throughout the chapter. Note that a single answer can have multiple codes.

#### Definitions of Corruption

	US example	German example
Influence outside of the rules	Trying to influence outside of the rules for other players (ID: 1442)	–
Breaking compliance rules	–	Korruption bedeutet für uns, wenn wir gegen unsere sehr strengen und bereits vor Jahren eingeführten Compliance Regeln verstoßen (ID: 2990).
Lying/manipulation/fraud	Corruption is cheating (ID: 1054).	Das hat diesen manipulativen Hintergrund, wo Sie dann natürlich einen geldwerten oder wie auch immer gearteten Vorteil Ihrem Gesprächspartner versprechen, den auch entsprechend einlösen (ID: 3085).
Unethical behavior	Litigation for personal gains; unethical behavior (ID: 1407)	Es [Korruption; F.G.] ist [...] versuchte Interessensdurchsetzung mit illegalen, illegitimen, moralisch verwerflichen Mitteln (ID: 2710).

Table A106.: Examples of definitions of corruption. *Table continues on the next page*

	US example	German example
Incompetency	–	Ich verstehe unter Korruption [...], dass jemand sein Fachgebiet nicht ausreichend versteht und die Auswirkungen seines Handelns nicht ausreichend versteht [...] und deswegen von anderen interessierten Parteien zu bestimmten Entscheidungen gebracht wird, die er sonst so nicht gefällt hätte, wenn er volle Konsequenz seiner Entscheidung erfasst hätte (ID: 2923).
Blackmail	–	[Es] kommt ab und an sicherlich [vor], [dass] vielleicht sogar ein erpressendes Element [dabei ist], [...] man geht zu einem Bundestagsabgeordneten und sagt, wir haben unseren Standort, [...] halten [Sie] uns die und die Regulierung vom Leib, sonst müssen wir irgendwie zumachen. (ID: 2742)

*Examples of definitions of corruption (continued). Table continues on the next page*

	US example	German example
Conflict of interest	Corruption usually involves [...] conflicts of interest (ID: 2226).	Korruption ist ja letztendlich, wenn [...] aus speziellen Interessen spezieller Vertreter [von Ministerien...] sich dann letztendlich Studien von irgendwelchen [...] Organisationen bezahlen lassen [und dann] so eine gegenseitige Symbiose [entsteht] (ID: 2767).
Kickbacks	–	Korruption ist der klassische Fall, Erlangung von öffentlichen Aufträgen (ID: 2739).
Introducing bias	It's introducing bias into the system that subverts the judgment of an official (ID: 1054).	–

*Examples of definitions of corruption (continued)*

## Definitions of Lobbying

	US example	German example
Persuasion	Lobbying is about persuasion, not subversion (ID: 1054).	Lobbying ist das Vertreten von Interessen und in manchem Fällen auch überzeugen (ID: 3091).
Building trust	It [lobbying; F.G.] is also about building a good rapport and trust with the individuals who make public policy determinations (ID: 1468).	Lobbying [...] sind [...] die richtigen Zugänge, ein guter Ruf und solide Argumente (ID: 2742).
Management of knowledge	–	Für mich ist das [Lobbying; F.G.] immer das Stichwort Wissensmanagement (ID: 2705).
Translation of economic into political information	–	Übermittlung of the political idea to the political [stakeholders; F.G.] (ID: 3015; <i>Original mixed language; F.G.</i> ).
Translation of political into economic information	–	Zum anderen ist eine der meist unterschätzten Funktionen von Lobbying die Positionierung politischer Prozesse ins Unternehmen hinein (ID: 2725).
Management of stakeholders	–	Lobbying ist Stakeholdermangement, Positionierung und Beeinflussung (ID: 2736).

Table A107.: Examples of definitions of lobbying

### Distinction Between Lobbying and Corruption

	US example	German example
Transparency-based	Lobbying is public and fully transparent activities that involves no personal incentive or gain for the individuals involved (ID: 1715)	So etwas wie Partei-spenden oder Sponsoring oder sowas, solange es öffentlich ausgewiesen ist und der Leistung auch eine wahrnehmbare Gegenleistung gegenüber[steht] [...], dann ist das für mich keine Korruption. Korruption fängt dann [an], [...] wenn es Geldflüsse gibt, die [nicht] transparent veröffentlicht werden. [...] Oder eben Sponsoringleistungen oder Ähnliches, wo wirklich dann verschwiegen wird, wer da Sponsor ist. Das ist das ist für mich Korruption (ID: 2728).
Moral distinction	–	Also einmal finde ich, wenn es um Gegenleistungen geht, aber auch wenn das moralisch zweifelhaft ist (ID: 2759).
As soon as money is involved	Corruption is [if] you can account [for that] it goes back to money. [...] You should get the money out of politics (ID: 1724).	–

Table A108.: Examples of distinctions. *Table continues on the next page*

	US example	German example
Illegitimate behavior	–	Ich würde schon sagen, dass die Illegitimität [...] im Vordergrund und damit ja auch zum Ausdruck bringen, dass weit im Vorfeld der Illegalität das endet (ID: 2889).
Clientelism	–	Der Unterschied ist, dass ich nicht den Anspruch habe, für das große Ganze da zu sein. Und dass mir das auch nicht geglaubt werden würde und dass es auch nicht meine Rolle ist, für das große Ganze zu entscheiden. (ID: 3004)
Fraud-based	–	Korruption [ist...] zu lügen, um Profit zu machen (ID: 2940).
Democratic functions	–	[Wir] gucken da schon auch drauf, dass wir da nicht übergebürrlich Wahlkampfhilfe leisten beziehungsweise [...] einen Kandidaten übergebürrlich unterstützen (ID: 3007).
Pressure	–	Ich sag mal ein Geschenk ist quasi ein portabler Vorteil, der ja auch eine andere Nachhaltigkeit hat und ein Geschenk, ich sage mal, induziert in gewisser Weise, wenn Sie das Ding angucken, das Sie dafür eine Gegenleistung erbringen könnten (ID: 2736).

*Examples of distinctions (continued)*

#### **A.5.4. Appendix 8E: Regression Diagnostics**

I employed the standards of regression diagnostics explained in appendix A.3. The diagnostics for the models that needed amendments can be found in figures A65 through A67 below. Overall, the amended models do not show substantial differences. I address differences in more detail in the following subsections.

##### **OLS Regressions**

Note that the QQ-plot is not very meaningful. The step-like pattern is caused by the nominal independent variable.

The outlier plot (see figure A57) shows two outliers in the first plot in the second row: cases 29 and 30. After removing them, there are no further outliers. The results of the amended model (see table A109 below) are not considerably different from the non-amended model.

I refrained from excluding further outliers although there are some outliers in some of the models. However, since the regressions are rather descriptive than inferential, the models are amended in the case of severe violations only.




Figure A57.: Cook's Distance for the OLS regressions

*Note:* First column: corruption of decision-makers; second column: corruption of policy institutions; first row: definitions of corruption; second row: definitions of lobbying; third row: distinction.

### Definitions of Corruption




Figure A58.: Regression diagnostics: decision-makers








Figure A59.: Regression diagnostics: policy institutions

### Definitions of Lobbying






Figure A60.: Regression diagnostics: policy institutions

Distinction




Figure A61.: Regression diagnostics: decision-makers




Figure A62.: Regression diagnostics: policy institutions

## Binary Logistic Regressions

The diagnostics for the binary logistic regressions focus on outliers only. There can be no violations of the linearity assumptions because there are no metric indicators included. Empty cells cannot occur because only categories of the independent variable with scores in both countries were selected.

Three models show potentially problematic outliers. All models but the first one in the first column in figure A63 are affected by them. Both models in the second row, corruption of the administration and of officials analyzed by the definition of lobbying, show problematic cases. Similarly, all models in the first column in figure A64 and the model in the middle of the second column suffer from outliers.

I removed all outliers iteratively. The results of the logistic regression with the definitions of corruption do not differ substantially (see table A111 below). The same holds for models including the definitions of lobbying (table A112). In the latter, the variable *voice* has inflated standard errors indicating identification problems or perfect separation. Since this variable is not interpreted in detail, I refrained from making further tests.

When influential cases are excluded from the binary logistic regressions analyzing corruption based on the distinction between lobbying and corruption provided by lobbyists, standard errors of the originally significant variable *quid pro quo* inflate. This indicates identification problems or problems of perfect separation. Since such problems with the present data only seem to occur when cases are deleted and variance is reduced, the problems are likely to be caused by too few cases in the US combined with larger standard errors because of the country comparison. Thus, I refrained from making further tests.




Figure A63.: Cook's Distance for the binary logistic regressions I

*Note:* First column: corruption of officials; second column: corruption of the administration; first row: definitions of corruption; second row: definitions of lobbying; third row: distinction.

Appendix




Figure A64.: Cook's Distance for the binary logistic regressions II

*Note:* First column: corruption of MPs/legislators; second column: corruption of the legislature; first row: definitions of corruption; second row: definitions of lobbying; third row: distinction.

### Ordered Logistic Regressions

The test statistics for the ordered logistic regression reported in chapter 6 do not apply here because the models in this chapter have no metric predictors. Thus, there are no applicable regression diagnostics for the reported ordered logistic models.

However, below I specified a model in which I predict corruption on the basis of definitions of lobbying including a country dummy because the variable *informing* is extremely country variant. The results do not change when the country dummy is included (see table A110).

### A.5.5. Appendix 8F: Amended Regression Models OLS Regressions




Figure A65.: Regression diagnostics of the amended OLS model predicting corruption by definitions of lobbying

Table A109.: Amended OLS model predicting corruption by definitions of lobbying

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Decision-makers	
Education	0.602 (0.548)
Access	0.011 (0.494)
Informing	-0.069 (0.301)
Voice	-0.725* (0.291)
Influence	0.009 (0.421)
Constant	2.957*** (0.244)
Observations	74
R <sup>2</sup>	0.119
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.054


*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

## Ordered logistic regression

Table A110.: Amended ordered logistic regression analysis to predict perceived corruption by definitions of lobbying

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Index
Country	-2.171** (0.781)
Access	0.797 (0.967)
Support	-1.485 (1.443)
Informing	1.166* (0.576)
Voice	-0.654 (0.568)
Influence	0.140 (0.758)
Observations	78
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

### Binary logistic regressions



*Note:* The first row refers to predicting corruption by its definitions. The second and third row refers to models predicting corruption by definitions of lobbying.

Figure A66.: Cook's Distance of amended binary logistic regression models

## Appendix




Figure A67.: Cook's Distance (amended binary logistic regression models predicting corruption by the distinctions between lobbying and corruption)

*Note:* I have not excluded cases 92 and 94 in the second plot in the first row because the exclusion would lead to more severe influential cases eventually ending up in too few cases due to iterative exclusion.

Table A111.: Amended binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Administration	MPs/Legislature
	(1)	(2)
Legal	-1.465 (0.836)	-2.439** (0.933)
Quid pro quo	0.737 (0.785)	0.528 (0.792)
Unfair adv.	-0.694 (0.677)	-0.864 (0.769)
Buying votes etc.	-0.600 (0.770)	18.133 (3,365.603)
Private gain	17.759 (1,928.393)	19.206 (2,977.568)
Constant	1.437** (0.526)	1.655** (0.588)
Observations	75	74
Log Likelihood	-34.914	-26.993
Akaike Inf. Crit.	81.827	65.985
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A112.: Amended binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by definitions of lobbying

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Officials (1)	Administration (2)	MPs/Legislators (3)	Legislature (4)
Country	16.588 (2,644.236)	17.156 (2,636.934)	16.918 (2,659.673)	-0.398 (0.958)
Access	16.392 (4,612.202)	-19.686 (6,522.639)	16.918 (3,761.345)	
Support	0.532 (0.762)	-0.641 (0.686)	0.224 (0.747)	-0.023 (0.576)
Informing	-1.541* (0.660)	-0.978 (0.646)	-0.749 (0.638)	-1.405* (0.553)
Voice	16.976 (2,073.946)	17.616 (2,106.433)	17.083 (2,151.050)	-0.460 (0.793)
Influence	1.642** (0.572)	1.761** (0.572)	1.503** (0.534)	1.327** (0.479)
Observations	74	73	76	74
Log Likelihood	-31.174	-31.390	-31.247	-44.928
Akaike Inf. Crit.	74.349	74.780	74.494	99.857

Note:

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A113.: Amended binary logistic regression analyses to predict perceived corruption by the distinction between lobbying and corruption

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Officials	Administration	Legislature
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Legal	-0.822 (0.622)	0.519 (0.708)	-0.362 (0.728)
Quid pro quo		17.884 (1,404.668)	
Unfair adv.	0.347 (0.873)	0.133 (0.955)	17.013 (1,962.549)
Buying votes etc.	16.263 (1,396.825)	1.305 (1.153)	-0.352 (0.933)
Private gain	0.112 (0.890)	0.045 (0.816)	-1.146 (0.760)
Constant	1.249** (0.425)	0.481 (0.443)	1.624*** (0.472)
Observations	74	75	74
Log Likelihood	-36.508	-32.729	-32.244
Akaike Inf. Crit.	83.017	77.459	74.487

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

# B. Interview Documents

## B.1. Request Letters

### B.1.1. US Request Letter



#### REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW

[Date]

[Name]  
[Address 1]  
[Address 2]

Dear [lobbyist],

I am writing to request an interview in connection with a study about how state lobbyists and representatives of smaller firms perceive corruption as a problem in the American states and Germany. The research, of which the American part is supported by the German-American Fulbright Commission, aims to help political scientists to better understand the relationship between advocacy and the perception of corruption.

To estimate the levels of advocacy and perceived corruption, I interview 60 to 80 firm representatives and lobbyists in each of the two countries. Your company has been randomly selected from a database of active lobbying firms in [state].

The interview should last about an hour. During the survey, I will ask you about your role in the company, your business environment, your company's government relations, and your perceived corruption. I will not tape the survey. This conversation can take place at your office or wherever is convenient for you. I am in [state] between [date] and [date]. Alternatively, we can do the interview on the phone or you chose to fill in a web survey.

I will call your office soon to see if a meeting or phone call would be possible, or if you would like to take part in the web survey. Thank you in advance for considering my request. Your perspective would be of great help to me. If you would like to contact me directly, I can be reached at [phone number] or [email address].

Sincerely,

Felix Goldberg  
(University of Stuttgart, Visiting Scholar at Rutgers University)

*Please note: If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you can reach the Rutgers University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at (848) 932-0150 or [humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu](mailto:humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu).*

## B.1.2. German Request Letter



Universität Stuttgart

Felix Goldberg, M.A.

Institut für Sozialwissenschaften  
Abt. SOWI I Politische Systeme  
und Politische Soziologie

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SOWI I, Breitscheidstraße 2, 70174 Stuttgart

Telefon  
0711 / 685 83434  
Telefax  
0711 / 685 82333  
E-Mail  
felix.goldberg@  
sowi.uni-stuttgart.de  
Datum  
07.10.2019

Interview zu Lobbying und der Integrität in der deutschen Politik

Sehr geehrte(r) [Name],

In diesem Schreiben bitte ich Sie um ein Interview im Zusammenhang mit meinem Forschungsprojekt. Meine Dissertation ist eine vergleichende Studie des Lobbyings in Deutschland und den USA. Konkret geht es um Ihre Wahrnehmung der Integrität von Lobbying und Politik in der Bundesrepublik. Nicht zuletzt aufgrund des negativen Images des Lobbyings in der Gesellschaft ist Ziel der Arbeit Lobbying von nicht legitimen Arten der Einflussnahme, z.B. Korruption, abzugrenzen.

Die Feldphase in den USA fand im Sommer 2018 im Rahmen eines durch die deutsche Fulbright-Kommission geförderten Forschungsaufenthalts an der Rutgers University in New Jersey statt. In diesem Herbst komplettiere ich die Studie mit den Interviews in Deutschland. Insgesamt führe ich in beiden Ländern Interviews mit Vertretern aus den Bereichen Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Government Affairs und Management in 80 bis 120 Firmen. Ihr Unternehmen wurde dabei zufällig aus einer Liste der 500 größten Unternehmen in Deutschland ausgewählt.

Das Interview dauert etwa 25-40 Minuten. Ich würde Sie zu Ihrer Rolle in Ihrem Unternehmen, über die wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen und die Regierungsbeziehungen Ihres Unternehmens befragen. Zudem interessiert mich, in welchem Ausmaß Sie Korruption als ein Problem in der deutschen Politik wahrnehmen. Das Gespräch könnte in Ihrem Büro, an einem anderen Ort Ihrer Wahl oder per Telefon/Skype stattfinden. Alternativ kann ich Ihnen einen Link zu einer Online-Befragung zukommen lassen. Das Ausfüllen des Online-Fragebogens dauert ca. 15-30 Minuten. Sollten Sie sich für eine Teilnahme entscheiden, werden alle Antworten anonymisiert und ausschließlich so verwendet, dass keine Rückschlüsse auf Sie oder Ihr Unternehmen gezogen werden können.

Ich bin bis Jahresende montags bis mittwochs in [Ort]. Ich werde Sie oder Ihr Sekretariat demnächst [per Mail/per Telefon] ([E-Mail/Telefonnummer]) kontaktieren, um zu erfragen ob Sie für ein Interview oder für die Online-Befragung zur Verfügung stehen. Ich bedanke mich im Voraus dafür, dass Sie meine Anfrage in Betracht ziehen. Ihr Beitrag wäre äußerst wertvoll für die Forschung. Wenn Sie vorab mit mir in Kontakt treten möchten, können Sie das gerne unter oben angegebenen Kontaktdaten tun.

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Felix Goldberg



## B.2. Questionnaires

### B.2.1. US Questionnaire

EvaSys	New Jersey Paper	
Rutgers University	Felix Goldberg, M.A.	
Political Science Department	Lobbying and Perceived Corruption	
1500		

Mark as shown:      Please use a ball-point pen or a thin felt tip. This form will be processed automatically.

Correction:      Please follow the examples shown on the left hand side to help optimize the reading results.

**Role of interviewee and the company**

First I'd like to know a little bit about you and your office. How would you describe your role and your responsibilities in the company? How are you organized here in terms of people and units that are involved in public affairs and advocacy?

**What is the yearly budget for public affairs and advocacy in your company?**

Are you member of a trading group? Yes  No

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EvaSys	New Jersey Paper	
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**Business Environment**

How would you describe the current general situation of your company?

How do you expect the situation of your company to develop in the future?

What are the three biggest obstacles for your company?

	Never      Seldom      Sometimes      Often      Constantly
How often would you assume that firms in New Jersey are confronted with challenges related to illegitimate business practices, irregular payments and corruption?	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Has your company ever observed that someone paid an illegal payment to get things done?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> No
---	------------------------------	-----------------------------

How can the state government help you with the obstacles you mentioned above?

**Advocacy**

Are you engaged in advocacy on state level or do you have any contact to state agencies, committees or politicians on state level in New Jersey?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> No
--	------------------------------	-----------------------------

*IF PREVIOUS QUESTION = YES GO TO PAGE 3 - ELSE CONTINUE WITH NEXT QUESTION*

Are you engaged in advocacy on local level or do you have any contact to local agencies, committees or politicians on local level in New Jersey?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> No
--	------------------------------	-----------------------------

*IF PREVIOUS QUESTION = YES GO TO PAGE 7 - ELSE GO TO PAGE 11*



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

Please indicate for the following statements if you Strongly disagree, Disagree in most cases, Tend to disagree, Tend to agree, Agree in most cases or Strongly agree.

**Please think of your experiences with state level officials and politicians in New Jersey.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree/disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Government officials' interpretations of the laws and regulations affecting this establishment are consistent and predictable.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
In case of important changes in laws or policies affecting my company's operations the government takes into account concerns voiced either by me or by my business association.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Generally, the policy area(s) I/We work in is (are) marked by intense conflict or disagreement over fundamental policy goals.	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Please indicate for the following organizations if they are never cooperative, seldom cooperative, sometimes cooperative, often cooperative, or constantly cooperative.

	Never cooperative	Seldom cooperative	Sometimes cooperative	Often cooperative	Constantly cooperative	No interaction
When you interact with the state executive agencies, how would you characterize these interactions?	<input type="checkbox"/>					
When you interact with the state legislative committees, how would you characterize these interactions?	<input type="checkbox"/>					

	Not important at all				Very important
More generally, in your interactions with the public sector, how important are personal contacts and/or relationships to get things done?	<input type="checkbox"/>				



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

As you probably know, companies and/or lobbyists use many different techniques to try to influence what goes on in state government in New Jersey. Below you will find a list of such techniques. Looking at the list, please tell me how often you use each technique.

	Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Often	Constantly
Meeting personally with state legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Meeting personally with state legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Helping to draft legislation	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Doing favors for legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Doing favors for legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Testifying at legislative committee hearings	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Submitting written testimony to legislative committees	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Engaging in informal contacts with state legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Engaging in informal contacts with state legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Making gifts to state legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Making gifts to state legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Serving on advisory committees and/or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Providing travel for state legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Providing travel for state legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Meeting personally with the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Meeting personally with members of the governor's staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Interacting with liaison offices within the governor's office	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Doing favors for the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Doing favors for members of the governor's staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Doing favors for executive agency personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Meeting personally with executive agency personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Helping to draft regulations, rules, or guidelines	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Testifying at executive agency hearings	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Submitting written comments on proposed rules and regulations	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Engaging in informal contacts with the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Engaging in informal contacts with members of the governor's staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Informally contacting executive agency officials <b>after</b> the notice of a pending rule or regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Informally contacting executive agency officials <b>prior</b> to the notice of a pending rule or regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Taking part in regulatory negotiations	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Making gifts to the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Seeking permits from executive agencies	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Providing travel for the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Providing travel for members of the governor's staff	<input type="checkbox"/>				



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

	Never	Sometimes	Frequently	Often	Constantly
Talking with people from the media	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Issuing press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Entering into coalitions with other organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Contributions to Political Action Committees	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Contributions to 501(c) groups	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Looking at the list, please indicate now how effective you think each technique is in helping you achieve your goals.

	Not at all effective			Very effective
Meeting personally with state legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meeting personally with state legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Helping to draft legislation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Doing favors for legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Doing favors for legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Testifying at legislative committee hearings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Submitting written testimony to legislative committees	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Engaging in informal contacts with state legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Engaging in informal contacts with state legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Making gifts to state legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Making gifts to state legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Serving on advisory committees and/or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Providing travel for state legislators	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Providing travel for state legislative staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



Advocacy [Fortsetzung]

	<i>Not at all effective</i>		<i>Very effective</i>	
Meeting personally with the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meeting personally with members of the governor's staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interacting with liaison offices within the governor's office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Doing favors for the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Doing favors for members of the governor's staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Doing favors for executive agency personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meeting personally with executive agency personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Helping to draft regulations, rules, or guidelines	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Testifying at executive agency hearings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Submitting written comments on proposed rules and regulations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Engaging in informal contacts with the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Engaging in informal contacts with members of the governor's staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informally contacting executive agency officials <b>after</b> the notice of a pending rule or regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informally contacting executive agency officials <b>prior</b> to the notice of a pending rule or regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Taking part in regulatory negotiations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Making gifts to the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Seeking permits from executive agencies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Providing travel for the governor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Providing travel for members of the governor's staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Talking with people from the media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Issuing press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Entering into coalitions with other organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Contributions to Political Action Committees	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Contributions to 501(c) groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your business, how much influence does your company typically have at the state level of government in New Jersey to try to influence the content of that law, rule, regulation or decree?

	<i>Never influential</i>		<i>Very influential</i>	
Executive	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Legislature	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ministry	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Regulatory Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



**Advocacy**

Please indicate for the following statements if you Strongly disagree, Disagree in most cases, Tend to disagree, Tend to agree, Agree in most cases or Strongly agree.

**Please think of your experiences with local officials and local politicians in New Jersey.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree/disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Elected officials' interpretations of the laws and regulations affecting this establishment are consistent and predictable.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
In case of important changes in laws or policies affecting my company's operations the local government takes into account concerns voiced either by me or by my business association.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Generally, the policy area(s) I/We work in is (are) marked by intense conflict or disagreement over fundamental policy goals.	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Please indicate for the following organizations if they are never cooperative, seldom cooperative, sometimes cooperative, often cooperative, or constantly cooperative.

	Never cooperative	Seldom cooperative	Sometimes cooperative	Often cooperative	Constantly cooperative	No interaction
When you interact with the local executive agencies, how would you characterize these interactions?	<input type="checkbox"/>					
When you interact with the local committees, how would you characterize these interactions?	<input type="checkbox"/>					

	Not important at all				Very important
More generally, in your interactions with the public sector, how important are personal contacts and/or relationships to get things done?	<input type="checkbox"/>				



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

As you probably know, companies and/or lobbyists use many different techniques to try to influence what goes on in local governments in New Jersey. Below you will find a list of such techniques. Looking at the list, please tell me how often you use each technique.

	Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Often	Constantly
Meeting personally with elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Helping to draft local legislation	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Doing favors for elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Testifying at committee hearings	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Submitting written testimony to committees	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Engaging in informal contacts with elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Making gifts to elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Serving on advisory committees and/or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Providing travel for elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>					
Doing favors for executive agency personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Meeting personally with executive agency personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Helping to draft regulations, rules, or guidelines	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Testifying at executive agency hearings	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Submitting written comments on proposed rules and regulations	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Informally contacting executive agency officials <b>after</b> the notice of a pending rule or regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Informally contacting executive agency officials <b>prior</b> to the notice of a pending rule or regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Taking part in regulatory negotiations	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Seeking permits from executive agencies	<input type="checkbox"/>				
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>					
Talking with people from the media	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Issuing press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Entering into coalitions with other organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Contributions to Political Action Committees	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Contributions to 501(c) groups	<input type="checkbox"/>				



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

Looking at the list, please indicate how effective you think each technique is in helping you achieve your goals.

	<i>Not at all effective</i>		<i>Very effective</i>	
Meeting personally with elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Helping to draft local legislation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Doing favors for elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Testifying at committee hearings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Submitting written testimony to committees	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Engaging in informal contacts with elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Making gifts to elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Serving on advisory committees and/or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Providing travel for elected officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Doing favors for executive agency personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meeting personally with executive agency personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Helping to draft regulations, rules, or guidelines	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Testifying at executive agency hearings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Submitting written comments on proposed rules and regulations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informally contacting executive agency officials after the notice of a pending rule or regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informally contacting executive agency officials prior to the notice of a pending rule or regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Taking part in regulatory negotiations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Seeking permits from executive agencies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Talking with people from the media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Issuing press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Entering into coalitions with other organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Contributions to Political Action Committees	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Contributions to 501(c) groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your business, how much influence does your company typically have at the local levels of government in New Jersey to try to influence the content of that law, rule, regulation or decree?

	<i>Never influential</i>		<i>Very influential</i>	
Executive	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Legislature	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Regulatory Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



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**Advocacy**

ONLY ASK IF STATE LEVEL ADVOCACY = YES - ELSE SKIP QUESTION

Are you engaged in advocacy on local level or do you have any contact to local agencies, committees or politicians on local level in New Jersey? Yes  No

ONLY ASK IF COMPANY IS MEMBER - ELSE SKIP PAGE

You told me that your company is member of a trade association.

Under which circumstances do you lobby through the trade association and under which circumstances do you lobby directly?

Please estimate the percentage of topics you lobby through the trade association and the percentage of topics you lobby directly.

How do you voice your interest in the trading group?



**Advocacy**

Sometimes the policy interests of a company may differ from the public interest. How do you deal with situations in which your interests are not popular?

Please estimate the percentage of cases when your interest does not match the public interests, compared with the percentage of cases when your interest matches the public interest.

If your company faces a political problem that needs to be solved quickly, how do you proceed?

Please estimate the percentage of topics for which you need a quick solution, compared with the percentage of topics you can attend to via the usual policy process.



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**Information**

Please write down your company's revenues of the last year.

Please write down your company's profits of the last year.

Please write down your company's number of employees last year.

**Perceptions**

Coming to the last two questions, I would like to know your personal thoughts on the spread of corruption in New Jersey. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?

	None	Some of them	Many of them	Most of them	All of them
The governor	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Members of the state legislature	<input type="checkbox"/>				
State government officials	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Local government officials	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Tax officials	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Business executives	<input type="checkbox"/>				

To what extent do you see the following organizations in New Jersey to be affected by corruption?

	Not at all corrupt			Extremely corrupt
Democrats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Republicans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Public officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Legislature	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Business/private sector	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Military	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Those are all the questions I have had for you. Thank you very much for your time!



## B.2.2. German Questionnaire

EvaSys	
Universität Stuttgart - Forschung und Lehre	Felix Goldberg
Institut für Sozialwissenschaften	Lobbying und Integrität in der Politik II

Bitte so markieren:     Bitte verwenden Sie einen Kugelschreiber oder nicht zu starken Filzstift. Dieser Fragebogen wird maschinell erfasst.  
Korrektur:     Bitte beachten Sie im Interesse einer optimalen Datenerfassung die links gegebenen Hinweise beim Ausfüllen.

### Role and Budget

Zu Beginn würde ich gerne etwas über Sie und Ihre Rolle im Unternehmen erfahren. Wie würden Sie Ihre Rolle und Ihre Zuständigkeiten beschreiben? Welche Einheiten beschäftigen sich mit Public Affairs und Regierungsbeziehungen und wie viele Mitarbeiter arbeiten dort jeweils?

Wie hoch ist das jährliche Budget für Public Affairs und Regierungsbeziehungen? (In Euro)

### Membership

Sind Sie Mitglied in einem oder mehreren Verbänden? Ja  Nein



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**Business Environment**

Wie würden Sie die aktuelle generelle Situation Ihres Unternehmens beschreiben?

Und wie erwarten Sie, dass sich die Situation in Zukunft entwickelt?

Welche sind die drei größten Hindernisse für Ihr Unternehmen?

	<i>Nie</i> <i>Selten</i> <i>Manchmal</i> <i>Häufig</i> <i>Ständig</i>
Wie häufig denken Sie, dass Unternehmen in Deutschland mit Problemen durch illegitimen Wirtschaftspraktiken wie irregulären Zahlungen oder Korruption ausgesetzt sind?	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Haben Sie oder jemand aus Ihrem Unternehmen jemals beobachtet, dass jemand eine illegale Zahlung vorgenommen hat, um in einer Sache voranzukommen?	Ja <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Nein
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Wie könnte die Politik Ihnen bei den oben genannten Hindernissen helfen?

**Advocacy**

Pflegen Sie Regierungsbeziehungen auf Bundesebene oder unterhalten Sie Kontakte zu Bundesministerien, Behörden oder Politikern auf Bundesebene?	Ja <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Nein
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FALLS 4.1 = JA, GEHE AUF SEITE 3 - FALLS NEIN, FAHRE MIT 4.2 FORT

Pflegen Sie Regierungsbeziehungen auf Landesebene oder haben Kontakte zu Landesministerien oder Behörden und Politikern auf Landes- oder kommunaler Ebene?	Ja <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Nein
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FALLS 4.2 = JA, GEHE ZU SEITE 7; FALLS NEIN, GEHE ZU SEITE 13



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

Bitte geben Sie bei den nachfolgenden Aussagen an, ob Sie ihnen überhaupt nicht zustimmen, nicht zustimmen, weder noch, zustimmen oder voll und ganz zustimmen.

**Bitte denken Sie an Ihre Erfahrungen auf Bundesebene.**

	<i>Stimme überhaupt nicht zu</i>	<i>Stimme nicht zu</i>	<i>Weder noch</i>	<i>Stimme zu</i>	<i>Stimme voll und ganz zu</i>
Die Interpretationen von Gesetzen und Richtlinien, die Ihr Unternehmen betreffen, sind seitens Behördenmitarbeitern und Politikern konsistent und berechenbar.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wenn wichtige Änderungen von Gesetzen oder Richtlinien anstehen, berücksichtigt die Politik Sorgen, die von Ihrem Unternehmen oder Ihrem Interessenverband geäußert werden.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Grundsätzlich sind die Politikfelder, in denen Ihr Unternehmen tätig ist, durch Konflikte oder Uneinigkeit bezüglich der politischen Ausgestaltung gekennzeichnet.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Bitte geben Sie für die nachfolgenden Organisationen an, ob sie nie kooperativ, selten kooperativ, manchmal kooperativ, häufig kooperativ, oder immer kooperativ sind.

	<i>Nie kooperativ</i>	<i>Manchmal kooperativ</i>	<i>Selten kooperativ</i>	<i>Häufig kooperativ</i>	<i>Immer kooperativ</i>	<i>Kein Kontakt</i>
Wenn Sie mit den Bundesministerien und Bundesbehörden in Kontakt stehen, wie charakterisieren Sie diesen Kontakt?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wenn Sie mit den Ausschüssen im Bundestag in Kontakt stehen, wie charakterisieren Sie diesen Kontakt?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	<i>Überhaupt nicht wichtig</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<i>Sehr wichtig</i>
Ganz allgemein bei Ihren Kontakten in den öffentlichen Sektor, wie wichtig sind persönliche Kontakte oder Beziehungen, um in einer Sache voranzukommen?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



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**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

Wie Sie wahrscheinlich wissen, nutzen Interessenvertreterinnen und Interessenvertreter eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Mittel, um auf Regierungshandeln und Gesetzgebung Einfluss zu nehmen. Nachfolgend finden Sie eine solche Liste. Bitte geben Sie an, wie häufig Sie diese Mittel nutzen.

		Nie	Selten	Manchmal	Häufig	Ständig
Persönliche Treffen mit Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Persönliche Treffen mit Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern von Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Unterstützung bei der Formulierung von Gesetzesentwürfen	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Erdigung von Gefallen für Mandatsträgerinnen und Mandatsträgern (und/oder deren Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern)	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Teilnahme an Anhörungen von Bundestagsausschüssen	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Versand von schriftlichen Stellungnahmen an Bundestagsausschüsse	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Informelle Kontakte zu Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Informelle Kontakte zu Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern von Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Berufungen in beratende Komitee oder runde Tische	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Übernahme von Reisekosten von Mandatsträgerinnen und Mandatsträgern (und/oder deren Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern)	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Veranstaltung von parlamentarischen Abenden bzw. Frühstück (und ähnliche Veranstaltungen)	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Einladungen an Bundestagsabgeordnete zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Einladungen an Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter von Bundestagsabgeordneten zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>					
<hr/>						
Persönliche Treffen mit der Bundeskanzlerin	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Persönliche Treffen mit Bundesministerinnen und Bundesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Persönliche Treffen mit Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in den Bundesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Versand von schriftlichen Stellungnahmen zu Gesetzen und Richtlinien	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Informelle Kontakte mit der Bundeskanzlerin	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Informelle Kontakte mit Bundesministerinnen oder Bundesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Informelle Kontakte in die Bundesministerien <b>nach</b> der Ankündigung eines neuen Gesetzentwurfs	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Informelle Kontakte in die Bundesministerien <b>vor</b> der Ankündigung eines neuen Gesetzentwurfs	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Teilnahme an Beratungen zur Umsetzung von Gesetzen	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Geschenke an Mandatsträgerinnen und Mandatsträgern (und/oder deren Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern)	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Ersuchen von Genehmigungen von Ämtern und Behörden	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Einladungen an die Bundeskanzlerin zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Einladungen an Bundesministerinnen und Bundesminister zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Einladungen an die Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in den Bundesministerien zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>					



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

	<i>Nie</i>	<i>Selten</i>	<i>Manchmal</i>	<i>Häufig</i>	<i>Ständig</i>
Kontakt zu Medien	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Veröffentlichung von Pressemitteilungen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Die Bildung von Koalitionen oder Bündnissen mit anderen Organisationen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Parteispenden	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Parteiensponsoring	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Bitte geben Sie nun an, für wie effektiv Sie die Mittel halten, wenn es um die Erreichung Ihrer Ziele geht.

	<i>Überhaupt nicht effektiv</i>				<i>Sehr effektiv</i>
Persönliche Treffen mit Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Persönliche Treffen mit Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern von Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unterstützung bei der Formulierung von Gesetzesentwürfen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Mandatsträgerinnen und Mandatsträgern (und/oder deren Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Teilnahme an Anhörungen von Bundestagsausschüssen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Versand von schriftlichen Stellungnahmen an Bundestagsausschüsse	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte zu Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte zu Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern von Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Bundestagsabgeordnete	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter von Bundestagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Berufungen in beratende Komiteen oder runde Tische	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten von Mandatsträgerinnen und Mandatsträgern (und/oder deren Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Veranstaltung von parlamentarischen Abenden bzw. Frühstück (und ähnliche Veranstaltungen)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Einladungen an Bundestagsabgeordnete zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Einladungen an Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter von Bundestagsabgeordneten zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



Advocacy [Fortsetzung]

	Überhaupt nicht effektiv		Sehr effektiv	
Persönliche Treffen mit der Bundeskanzlerin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Persönliche Treffen mit Bundesministerinnen und Bundesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Persönliche Treffen mit Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in den Bundesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Versand von schriftlichen Stellungnahmen zu Gesetzen und Richtlinien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte mit der Bundeskanzlerin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte mit Bundesministerinnen oder Bundesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte in die Bundesministerien <b>nach</b> der Ankündigung eines neuen Gesetzentwurfs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte in die Bundesministerien <b>vor</b> der Ankündigung eines neuen Gesetzentwurfs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Teilnahme an Beratungen zur Umsetzung von Gesetzen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Mandatsträgerinnen und Mandatsträgern (und/oder deren Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ersuchen von Genehmigungen von Ämtern und Behörden	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Einladungen an die Bundeskanzlerin zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Einladungen an Bundesministerinnen und Bundesminister zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Einladungen an die Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in den Bundesministerien zu thematischen Veranstaltungen Ihres Unternehmens	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>				
Kontakt zu Medien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Veröffentlichung von Pressemitteilungen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Die Bildung von Koalitionen oder Bündnissen mit anderen Organisationen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Parteispenden	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Parteiansponsoring	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Wenn auf Bundesebene ein neues Gesetz oder eine neue Richtlinie diskutiert wird, das oder die substanzielle Auswirkungen auf Ihr Unternehmen haben könnte, wie groß würden Sie Ihren Einfluss auf dieses Gesetz einschätzen?

	Nie einflussreich		Sehr einflussreich	
Bundesregierung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bundestag	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bundesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bundesrat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Behörden und Ämter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

Bitte geben Sie bei den nachfolgenden Aussagen an, ob Sie ihnen überhaupt nicht zustimmen, nicht zustimmen, weder noch, zustimmen oder voll und ganz zustimmen.

**Bitte denken Sie an Ihre Erfahrungen auf Landes- und kommunaler Ebene.**

	<i>Stimme überhaupt nicht zu</i>	<i>Stimme nicht zu</i>	<i>Weder noch</i>	<i>Stimme zu</i>	<i>Stimme voll und ganz zu</i>
Die Interpretationen von Gesetzen und Richtlinien, die Ihr Unternehmen betreffen, sind seitens Behördenmitarbeitern und Politikern konsistent und berechenbar	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wenn wichtige Änderungen von Gesetzen oder Richtlinien anstehen, berücksichtigt die Landes- und Lokalpolitik Sorgen, die von Ihrem Unternehmen oder Ihrem Interessenverband geäußert werden	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Grundsätzlich sind die Politikfelder, in denen Ihr Unternehmen tätig ist, durch Konflikte oder Uneinigkeit bezüglich der politischen Ausgestaltung gekennzeichnet	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Bitte geben Sie für die nachfolgenden Organisationen an, ob sie nie kooperativ, selten kooperativ, manchmal kooperativ, häufig kooperativ, oder immer kooperativ sind.

	<i>Nie kooperativ</i>	<i>Selten kooperativ</i>	<i>Manchmal kooperativ</i>	<i>Häufig kooperativ</i>	<i>Immer kooperativ</i>	<i>Kein Kontakt</i>
Wenn Sie mit lokalen Behörden oder Ämtern in Kontakt stehen, wie charakterisieren Sie diesen Kontakt?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wenn sie mit Ausschüssen in Landtagen in Kontakt stehen, wie charakterisieren Sie diesen Kontakt?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	<i>Überhaupt nicht wichtig</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<i>Sehr wichtig</i>
Ganz allgemein bei Ihren Kontakten in den öffentlichen Sektor, wie wichtig sind persönliche Kontakte oder Beziehungen, um in einer Sache voranzukommen?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>




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**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

Wie Sie wahrscheinlich wissen nutzen Interessenvertreterinnen und Interessenvertreter eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Mittel, um auf politisches Handeln und Gesetzgebung Einfluss zu nehmen. Nachfolgend finden Sie eine solche Liste. Bitte geben Sie an wie häufig Sie diese Mittel benutzen.

	Nie	Manchmal Selten	Häufig	Ständig
Persönliche Treffen mit Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Persönliche Treffen mit Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politikern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unterstützung bei der Formulierung von Gesetzesentwürfen auf Landesebene	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Landtagsabgeordnete	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter von Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politikern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Teilnahme an Anhörungen von Landtagsausschüssen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Versand von schriftlichen Stellungnahmen an Landtagsausschüsse	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte zu Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte zu Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politikern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Landtagsabgeordnete	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter von Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politiker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten von Landtagabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten von Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern von Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten von Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politiker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



Advocacy [Fortsetzung]

	Nie	Selten	Manchmal	Häufig	Ständig
Persönliche Treffen mit Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Persönliche Treffen mit Landesministerinnen oder Landesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Persönliche Treffen mit Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in den Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Erledigung von Gefallen für Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Erledigung von Gefallen für Landesministerinnen oder Landesminister	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Erledigung von Gefallen für Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter in den Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Teilnahme an Anhörungen in Landesausschüssen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Informelle Kontakte mit Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Informelle Kontakte mit Landesministerinnen oder Landesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Informelle Kontakte in die Landesministerien <b>nach</b> der Ankündigung eines neuen Gesetzentwurfs	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Informelle Kontakte in die Landesministerien <b>vor</b> der Ankündigung eines neuen Gesetzentwurfs	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Teilnahme an Beratungen zur Umsetzung von Gesetzen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Geschenke an Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Geschenke an Landesministerinnen oder Landesminister	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Geschenke an Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in den Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Übernahme von Reisekosten für Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Übernahme von Reisekosten für Landesministerinnen oder Landesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Übernahme von Reisekosten für Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter in den Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Kontakt zu Medien	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Veröffentlichung von Pressemitteilungen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Die Bildung von Koalitionen oder Bündnissen mit anderen Organisationen	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Parteispenden	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Parteiensponsoring	<input type="checkbox"/>				



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

Bitte geben Sie nun an, für wie effektiv Sie diese Mittel halten, wenn es um die Erreichung Ihrer Ziele geht.

	<i>Überhaupt nicht effektiv</i>		<i>Sehr effektiv</i>		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Persönliche Treffen mit Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Persönliche Treffen mit Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politikern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unterstützung bei der Formulierung von Gesetzesentwürfen auf Landesebene	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Landtagsabgeordnete	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter von Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Teilnahme an Anhörungen von Landtagsausschüssen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Versand von schriftlichen Stellungnahmen an Landtagsausschüsse	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte zu Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte zu Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern von Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte zu Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politikern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Landtagsabgeordnete	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter von Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politiker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Berufungen an beratende Komiteen oder runde Tische	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten von Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten von Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern von Landtagsabgeordneten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten von Bürgermeisterinnen, Bürgermeistern und Lokalpolitikerinnen und -politiker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



Advocacy [Fortsetzung]

	<i>Überhaupt nicht effektiv</i>		<i>Sehr effektiv</i>		
Persönliche Treffen mit Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Persönliche Treffen mit Landesministerinnen oder Landesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Persönliche Treffen mit Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in den Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Landesministerinnen oder Landesminister	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Erladigung von Gefallen für Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter in den Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Teilnahme an Anhörungen in Landesausschüssen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte mit Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte mit Landesministerinnen oder Landesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte in die Landesministerien <b>nach</b> der Ankündigung eines neuen Gesetzentwurfs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informelle Kontakte in die Landesministerien <b>vor</b> der Ankündigung eines neuen Gesetzentwurfs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Teilnahme an Beratungen zur Umsetzung von Gesetzen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Landesministerinnen oder Landesminister	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geschenke an Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in den Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten für Ministerpräsidentinnen oder Ministerpräsidenten	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten für Landesministerinnen oder Landesministern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Übernahme von Reisekosten für Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter in den Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>					
Kontakt zu Medien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Veröffentlichung von Pressemitteilungen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Die Bildung von Koalitionen oder Bündnissen mit anderen Organisationen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Parteispenden	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Parteiansponsoring	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



**Advocacy [Fortsetzung]**

Wenn auf Landes- oder auf kommunaler Ebene ein neues Gesetz oder eine neue Richtlinie diskutiert wird, das oder die substanzielle Auswirkungen auf Ihr Unternehmen haben könnte, wie groß würden Sie Ihren Einfluss auf dieses Gesetz einschätzen?

	<i>Nie einflussreich</i>		<i>Sehr einflussreich</i>		
Landesregierung	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Landtag	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Landesministerien	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bürgermeisterinnen und Bürgermeister	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Behörden und Ämter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



**Associations**

**NUR FRAGEN FALLS 4.1 = JA - SONST ÜBERSPRINGEN**  
Pflegen Sie Regierungsbeziehungen auf Landesebene oder haben Kontakte zu Landesministerien oder Behörden und Politikern auf Landes- oder kommunaler Ebene?

Ja

Nein

**NUR FRAGEN FALLS 2.1 = JA - SONST ÜBERSPRINGEN**  
Sie haben angegeben, dass Ihr Unternehmen Mitglied in einem oder mehreren Verbänden ist.

Unter welchen Umständen lassen Sie Ihre Interessen durch den oder die Verbände vertreten und unter welchen Umständen vertreten Sie Ihre Interessen selbst?

Bitte schätzen Sie den Anteil der Themen, bei denen ein Verband die Interessenvertretung für Sie übernimmt.

Wie machen Sie Ihre Interessen innerhalb des Verbandes oder der Verbände geltend?



EvaSys	
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
**Public**

Manchmal unterscheiden sich wahrscheinlich Ihre Interessen von denen der breiteren Öffentlichkeit. Wie gehen Sie mit Situationen um, in denen Ihre Interessen unpopulär sind?

Bitte schätzen Sie den Anteil der Themen, bei denen sich Ihre Interessen nicht mit denen der breiteren Öffentlichkeit decken.

Wenn Ihr Unternehmen ein Problem identifiziert, das politisch schnell gelöst werden muss, wie gehen Sie vor?

Bitte schätzen Sie den Anteil der Themen, die eine schnelle Lösung erfordern.



EvaSys	
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**Information**

Bitte tragen Sie hier den Umsatz des vergangenen Jahres in Euro ein.

Bitte tragen Sie hier den Gewinn des vergangenen Jahres in Euro ein.

Bitte tragen Sie hier die Zahl der Mitarbeiter in Ihrem Unternehmen ein.

**Perception**

Nun würde ich gerne von Ihnen erfahren, wie Ihre persönliche Wahrnehmung der Verbreitung von Korruption in Deutschland ist. Wie stark sind die nachfolgenden Personengruppen Ihrer Meinung nach in korrupte Aktivitäten involviert?

	Keiner	Wenige	Viele	Die meisten	Alle
Bundeskanzlerinnen und Bundeskanzler	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Bundesministerinnen und Bundesminister	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Bundestagsabgeordnete	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter in Ministerien und Behörden	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Lokalpolitiker	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Steuerbeamte	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Geschäftsführer und Unternehmer	<input type="checkbox"/>				

In welchem Ausmaß meinen Sie, dass die nachfolgenden Organisationen in Deutschland von Korruption betroffen sind?

	Überhaupt nicht korrupt				Extrem korrupt
Parteien	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Die Verwaltung	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Der Bundestag	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Die Wirtschaft	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Die Medien	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Das Militär	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen	<input type="checkbox"/>				



EvaSys	
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**Perception [Fortsetzung]**

Kommen wir zu den letzten beiden Fragen. Mich interessiert, wie Sie zwischen Lobbying und Korruption unterscheiden würden. Wie würden Sie Korruption definieren?

Und wie würden Sie zwischen Lobbying und Korruption unterscheiden?

Das waren alle Fragen, die ich an Sie hatte. Vielen Dank für Ihr Interesse und vor allem für Ihre Zeit.



# C. Codebook

## Dissertation Codebook

Last updated 14 September 2021

### Part I – Variables from the elite interviews.

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
ID	<i>Company-ID</i>	Unique company identifier.	String numbers only. [no missing values]	numeric 4.0	created
country	<i>Country</i>	Country identifier.	0 = USA 1 = Germany [no missing values]	numeric 1.0	created
mode	<i>Interview mode</i>	Chosen mode of interview by respondent.  Email datasets are incomplete and not part of quantitative analyses.	1 = web questionnaire 2 = face to face interview 3 = CAPI 4 = email [no missing values]	numeric 1.0	created
transcript	<i>Transcript</i>	Indicates if a transcript exists.	0 = memory protocol/notes on questionnaire 1 = transcript (face to face interviews and CAPI) 2 = original web survey [no missing values]	numeric 1.0	created
role	<i>Role of the interviewee in the company (string)</i>	Describes the role in the company and the responsibilities of the interviewee.	String only.	string	all questionnaires

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
role_num	<i>Role of the interviewee in the company (categorized)</i>	<p>Indicates the role in the company and the responsibilities of the interviewee.</p> <p>If responsibilities are shared or the interviewee has multiple responsibilities, Government Affairs Manager is coded if government affairs is one of them.</p> <p>Coded from <i>role</i>.</p> <p>Other contains such as Permitting &amp; External Affairs, Community Development Manager, Project Manager and investment banker</p>	<p>1 = Government Affairs Manager</p> <p>2 = Public Affairs Manager</p> <p>3 = CEO, Managing Director, and similar executive leadership functions</p> <p>4 = Hired Gun</p> <p>5 = Legal Affairs/Compliance Manager/Counsel</p> <p>6 = Other</p> <p>-99 = not indicated [missing]</p>	numeric 3.0	created
sex	<i>Gender</i>	Indicates the gender of the interviewee	<p>0 = male</p> <p>1 = female</p> <p>[no missing values]</p>	numeric 1.0	created
budget_01	<i>Yearly budget for advocacy (dichotomized)</i>	<p>Indicates if company has a dedicated budget for public affairs/lobbying/government relations.</p> <p>Coded from budget_string.</p>	<p>0 = Company has no dedicated yearly budget for lobbying</p> <p>1 = Company has a dedicated yearly budget for lobbying</p> <p>-99 = not indicated [missing]</p>	numeric 3.0	created
budget_string	<i>Yearly budget for advocacies (string)</i>	Indicates the annual budget (incl. offices, staff, etc.) available in the unit responsible for advocacy.	String only.	string	all questionnaires
env_c	<i>Current business situation of the company</i>	Indicates how the current general business situation of the company is, e.g. stable or rather insecure.	String only.	string	all questionnaires

Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
env_c_cat	<i>Current business situation of the company (categorized)</i>	Indicates how the current general business situation of the company is.  Coded from env_c.	1 = bad 2 = moderate 3 = good  -99 = not indicated [missing]	numeric 3.0	created
obst_string	<i>Three biggest obstacles</i>	Indicates the three biggest political and/or economic obstacles for the company.	String only.	string	CAPI and face to face questionnaire
obst1; obst2; obst3	<i>Biggest to third biggest obstacle</i>	Indicates the biggest political and/or economic obstacles for the company.	String only.	string	web questionnaire
obst1_cat ; obst2_cat ; obst3_cat ; obst4_cat ; obst5_cat	<i>Biggest obstacles 1 to 5 (categorized)</i>	Indicates the biggest political and/or economic obstacles for the company chronologically after how they were mentioned.  Coded from <i>obst1</i> , <i>obst2</i> , <i>obst3</i> or <i>obst_string</i> if indicated.  If the same category could be assigned to different indicated obstacles, it was assigned once only.  Missing values occur if question was not answered or if no code could be assigned on the basis of the response.	1 = energy policy 2 = climate policy 3 = economy 4 = trade 5 = infrastructure 6 = transportation 7 = telecommunication 8 = customer protection 9 = health 10 = taxes 11 = pharmaceutical regulation 12 = security/safety 13 = finance 14 = bureaucracy/strict regulation 15 = competition/the market 16 = skilled worker shortage 17 = subsidy politics 18 = chemical regulation 19 = R&D/technology 20 = political influence 21 = commodities 22 = residing 23 = building permits 24 = supply chain (in global context)	numeric 3.0	created

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
			25 = bad image/public opinion 26 = 'digitalization' 27 = immigration 28 = recycling and circle economy 29 = availability and price of resources 30 = regulation of labor 31 = demographic change 32 = data protection 33 = food safety 34 = environmental regulation 35 = consumer climate 36 = regulatory heterogeneity 37 = mobility 38 = agriculture 39 = internal problems 40 = political instability in democracies 41 = foreign influence 42 = defense 43 = Corona  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = not codable/not indicated [missing]		
irregular	<i>Perceived confrontation with illegitimate business practices</i>	Perceived confrontation of the company with illegitimate business practices, irregular payments, and corruption.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -88 = not asked [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	all questionnaires

Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
observe	<i>Observed illegal payment</i>	Indicates if the company has ever observed that someone paid an illegal payment.	0 = No 1 = Yes  -88 = not asked [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
h_conf	<i>Policy area(s) marked by conflict</i>	Indicates to what extent the interviewee thinks that the policy area(s) the company is active in are marked by intense conflict or disagreement over fundamental policy goals at the local/state (US) or federal level (GER).	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Neither agree/disagree 4 = Agree 5 = Strongly agree  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
hs_psl	<i>Strategy: Meeting personally with legislators</i>	Indicates how often the company meets personally with legislators.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
hs_pss	<i>Strategy: Meeting personally with legislative staff</i>	Indicates how often the company meets personally members of the staff of legislators.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
hs_ch	<i>Strategy: Testifying at committee hearings</i>	Indicates how often the company testifies at committee hearings.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
hs_lc	<i>Strategy: Written testimony to legislative committees</i>	Indicates how often the company provides written testimony.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
hs_isl	<i>Strategy: Informal contacts with legislators</i>	Indicates how often the company engages in informal contacts with legislators.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
hs_iss	<i>Strategy: Informal contacts with legislative staff</i>	Indicates how often the company engages in informal contacts with members of the staff of legislators.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires

Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
hs_peg	<i>Strategy: Meeting personally with executive agency personnel</i>	Indicates how often the company meets personally with executive agency personnel.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
hs_cpr	<i>Strategy: Written comments on bills</i>	Indicates how often the company writes comments on bills.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
hs_rne	<i>Strategy: Regulatory negotiations</i>	Indicates how often the company takes part in regulatory negotiations.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	all questionnaires
hs_pac	<i>Strategy: Contributions to PACs</i>	Indicates how often then company contributes to Political Action Committees (PACs).  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	US only: all questionnaires

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
hs_contr	<i>Strategy: Contributions to parties</i>	Indicates how often then company contributes to political parties.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	GER only: all questionnaires
hs_501	<i>Strategy: Contributions to 501 (c)</i>	Indicates how often then company contributes to 501 (c) organizations.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	US only: all questionnaires
hs_spon	<i>Strategy: Party sponsoring</i>	Indicates how often then company sponsors events of political parties or similar.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	GER only: all questionnaires
h_inf_e	<i>Influence: Executive</i>	Perceived influence at the executive branch.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never influential [...] 5 = Very influential  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	US only: all questionnaires

Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
h_inf_g	<i>Influence: Government</i>	Perceived influence at the government at the federal level.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never influential [...] 5 = Very influential  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	GER only: all questionnaires
h_inf_l	<i>Influence: Legislature</i>	Perceived influence at the legislature.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never influential [...] 5 = Very influential  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	all questionnaires
h_inf_m	<i>Influence: Ministries</i>	Perceived influence at ministries at the federal level.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never influential [...] 5 = Very influential  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	GER only: all questionnaires
h_inf_b	<i>Influence: Bundesrat</i>	Perceived influence at the <i>Bundesrat</i> .  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Never influential [...] 5 = Very influential  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	GER only: all questionnaires
h_inf_i	<i>Influence: Executive (Index)</i>	Perceived influence at the (political) executive.  Index of <i>h_inf_e</i> , <i>h_inf_g</i> , and <i>h_inf_m</i> . Condition: at least one valid value on one of these variables.	1 = Never influential [...] 5 = Very influential  System-missing if condition is not met.	numeric 3.1	created

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
ldir_perc	<i>Percentage of lobbying via associations</i>	Indicates the share of lobbying via associations	Percentage value. -77 = filtered [missing] -88 = not asked [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 4.1	all questionnaires
revenues	<i>Revenue (string)</i>	Revenue of the company in the previous year.	String only	string	all questionnaires
revenues_num	<i>Revenue (original currency)</i>	Revenue of the company in the previous year in Billion US\$ (US) or € (GER).	Integer values only. -99 = not indicated [missing]	numeric 7.4	coded from revenues
revenues_USD	<i>Revenue (USD)</i>	Revenue of the company in the previous year in Billion US\$. EUR were converted US\$ with a rounded exchange rate as of 08/04/2020.	Integer values only. -99 = not indicated [missing]	numeric 8.4	coded from revenues and revenues_num
rev_ex	<i>External source (revenue)</i>	Indicates if the revenue was coded from an external source.	0 = No 1 = Yes [no missing values]	numeric 1.0	created
employees_string	<i>Employee count (string)</i>	Number of employees at the time of the interview.	String only.	string	all questionnaires
employees	<i>Employee count</i>	Number of employees in the state (US) or federal republic (GER) at the time of the interview.	Integer values only. [no missing values]	numeric 6.0	created
emp_ex	<i>External source (employees)</i>	Indicates if the employee count was coded from an external source.	0 = No 1 = Yes [no missing values]	numeric 1.0	created
ISIC_A1	<i>ISIC Section</i>	Indicates the Business Sector of the company according the ISIC Sections. Full description.  [See ISIC Codebook Revision 4]	[See ISIC Codebook Revision 4] [no missing values]	string	created

## Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
ISIC_A2	<i>ISIC Section (letter only)</i>	Indicates the Business Sector of the company according to the ISIC Sections. Section letter only.  [See ISIC Codebook Revision 4]	[See ISIC Codebook Revision 4] [no missing values]	string	created
ISIC_B	<i>ISIC Division</i>	Indicates the Business Sector of the company according to the ISIC Divisions.  [See ISIC Codebook Revision 4]	[See ISIC Codebook Revision 4] [no missing values]	string	created
age	<i>Age of Company (by 2018)</i>	Indicates the age of the company by the year 2018.	Integers only [no missing values]	numeric 3.0	created
c_mps	<i>Perceived Corruption: Legislators</i>	Indicates how many of the legislators the interviewee perceives as corrupt.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = None 2 = Some of them 3 = Many of them 4 = Most of them 5 = All of them  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	all questionnaires
c_min	<i>Perceived Corruption: Ministers</i>	Indicates how many of the ministers the interviewee perceives as corrupt.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = None 2 = Some of them 3 = Many of them 4 = Most of them 5 = All of them  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	GER only: all questionnaires

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
c_state	<i>Perceived Corruption: State government (US) or federal government (GER) officials</i>	Indicates how many of the government officials the interviewee perceives as corrupt.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = None 2 = Some of them 3 = Many of them 4 = Most of them 5 = All of them  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	all questionnaires
c_dem	<i>Affected by Corruption: Democrats</i>	Indicates to what extent the interviewee perceived the Democratic party to be affected by corruption.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	US only: all questionnaires
c_rep	<i>Affected by Corruption: Republicans</i>	Indicates to what extent the interviewee perceived the Republican party to be affected by corruption.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.0	US only: all questionnaires
c_party	<i>Affected by Corruption: Parties</i>	Indicates to what extent the interviewee perceived the political parties to be affected by corruption.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	GER: all questionnaires; US: Coded from c_rep and c_dem

## Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
c_public	<i>Affected by Corruption: Public Officials (US) or Administration (GER)</i>	Indicates to what extent the interviewee perceived the public officials (US) or the administration (GER) to be affected by corruption.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	all questionnaires
c_legislature	<i>Affected by Corruption: Legislature</i>	Indicates to what extent the interviewee perceived the legislature to be affected by corruption.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	all questionnaires
c_ngo	<i>Affected by Corruption: NGOs</i>	Indicates to what extent the interviewee perceived the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to be affected by corruption.  Face to face or CAPI respondents could choose half scale steps if they indicated that they want to do so.	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.1	all questionnaires
def_c	<i>Definition of corruption</i>	Definition of corruption provided by the interviewees.	String only.	string	all questionnaires, transcript, coded from distinct0

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
def_c_num1 to def_c_num3 to	<i>Definition of corruption (numeric)</i>	Definition of corruption provided by the interviewees (numeric).	1 = Illegal influence/breaking laws 2 = Influence outside of the rules 3 = quid pro quo 4 = breaking compliance rules 5 = lying/manipulation/fraud 6 = unethical behavior 7 = incompetency 8 = blackmail 9 = conflict of interest 10 = unfair advantage/ <i>Vorteilsnahme</i> 11 = kickbacks 12 = illegal (campaign) contributions/buying opinions and decisions 13 = bribery 14 = personal enrichment/private gain 16 = introducing bias  -99 = not codable [missing value]	numeric 3.0	Coded from def_c
def_l	<i>Definition of lobbying</i>	Definition of lobbying provided by the interviewees.	String only.	String	US: coded from distinct0;  GER: face to face and CAPI questionnaires only, transcript

Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
def_1_num1 to def_1_num3	<i>Definition of lobbying (numeric)</i>	Definition of lobbying provided by the interviewees (numeric).	2 = persuasion 3 = education 4 = creating access 5 = building trust 6 = support candidates/policymakers 7 = providing information 8 = having a voice/advocacy/interest representation 9 = influence-seeking 10 = management of knowledge 11 = translation of economic into political information 12 = translation of political into economic information into the company 13 = management of stakeholders	numeric 3.0	Coded from def_1
distinct0	<i>Distinction between corruption and lobbying (cues)</i>	Discussion of the distinction between lobbying and corruption provided by the interviewees.	String only.	string	US: all questionnaires; GER: CAPI, web questionnaire
distinct	<i>Distinction between corruption and lobbying (GER only)</i>	Discussion of the distinction between lobbying and corruption provided by the interviewees.	String only.	string	GER only: transcript

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source(s)
distinct_nu m1  distinct_nu m4	<i>Distinction between corruption and lobbying (categorized)</i>	Categorizes the distinction between lobbying and corruption.	0 = no distinction 1 = legal distinction 3 = quid pro quo 5 = transparency-based 6 = moral distinction 7 = a clear service in return 10 = unfair advantage 11 = buying votes/decisions/governmental jobs/etc. 12 = as soon as money is involved it is corruption 13 = personal enrichment/private gain 14 = illegitimate behavior 15 = clientelism 17 = fraud 18 = democratic functions 19 = pressure  -99 = not codable [missing value]	numeric 3.0	coded from distinct0, distinct, def_c and def_l

#### Part II – Variables from or based on external data sources

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
ho_rev	<i>Revenue (D&amp;B Hoovers)</i>	Revenue of the company in the previous year in Billion US\$.	Integer values only.  System-missing if not indicated or German company.	numeric 6.4	D&B Hoovers (US only)
ho_emp	<i>Employee count (D&amp;B Hoovers)</i>	Number of employees according to D&B Hoovers.	Integer values only.  System-missing if not indicated or German company.	numeric 5.0	D&B Hoovers
ho_sector	<i>Business Sector (D&amp;B Hoovers)</i>	Indicates the business sector according to D&B Hoovers.	String only.	string	D&B Hoovers

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
ci_rev	<i>Revenue (CIO)</i>	Revenue of the company in the previous year in Billion €.	Integer values only.  System-missing if not indicated or American company.	numeric 40.3	CIO 500
ci_emp	<i>Employee count (CIO)</i>	Number of employees according to CIO.	Integer values only.  System-missing if not indicated or American company.	numeric 6.0	CIO 500
ci_sector	<i>Business Sector (CIO)</i>	Indicates the business sector according to CIO.	String only.	string	CIO 500
ext_ISIC_A1	<i>ISIC Section (Hoovers/CIO)</i>	Indicates the Business Sector of the company according to the ISIC Sections. Full description.  [See ISIC Codebook Revision 4]	[See ISIC Codebook Revision 4] [no missing values]	string	coded from ho_sector and ci_sector
ext_ISIC_A2	<i>ISIC Section (Hoovers/CIO) (letter only)</i>	Indicates the Business Sector of the company according to the ISIC Sections. Section letter only.  [See ISIC Codebook Revision 4]	[See ISIC Codebook Revision 4] [no missing values]	string	coded from ho_sector and ci_sector
ext_ISIC_B	<i>ISIC Division (Hoovers/CIO)</i>	Indicates the Business Sector of the company according to the ISIC Divisions.  [See ISIC Codebook Revision 4]	[See ISIC Codebook Revision 4] [no missing values]	string	coded from ho_sector and ci_sector

### Part III – Indices and Recoded Variables

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
c_mps01	<i>Perceived Corruption: Legislators (dichotomized)</i>	Dichotomized <i>c_mps</i> .	0 = none of them 1 = at least few of them  -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 2.0	Created

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
c_mps 123	<i>Perceived Corruption: Legislators (ordered)</i>	Ordinally recoded <i>c_mps</i> .	0 = none of them 1 = few of them 2 = more than few of them  -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 2.0	Created
c_part US	<i>Affected by Corruption: US Parties</i>	Averaged additive index of <i>c_rep</i> and <i>c_dem</i> .	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 3.1	Created: US only
c_party- comp	<i>Affected by Corruption: Parties (both countries)</i>	Average additive index of <i>c_party</i> and <i>c_partUS</i> .	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 3.1	Created
c_party 01	<i>Affected by Corruption: Parties (both countries) (dichotomized)</i>	Dichotomized <i>c_party-comp</i> .	0 = not affected by corruption 1 = affected by corruption  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 2.0	Created
c_party 123	<i>Affected by Corruption: Parties (both countries) (ordered)</i>	Ordinally recoded <i>c_party-comp</i> .	0 = not affected 1 = a little bit 2 = more than a little bit  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 2.0	Created
c_state 01	<i>Perceived Corruption: State government (US) or federal government (GER) officials (dichotomized)</i>	Dichotomized <i>c_state</i> .	0 = none of them 1 = at least few of them  -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 2.0	Created

Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
c_public01	<i>Affected by Corruption: Public Officials (US) or Administration (GER) (dichotomized)</i>	Dichotomized <i>c_public</i> .	0 = not affected by corruption 1 = affected by corruption  -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 2.0	Created
c_ngo01	<i>Affected by Corruption: NGOs (dichotomized)</i>	Dichotomized <i>c_ngo</i> .	0 = not affected by corruption 1 = affected by corruption  -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 2.0	Created
c_ngo123	<i>Affected by Corruption: NGOs (ordered)</i>	Ordinally recoded <i>c_ngo</i> .	0 = not affected 1 = a little bit 2 = more than a little bit  -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 2.0	Created
c_legislature01	<i>Affected by Corruption: Legislature (dichotomized)</i>	Dichotomized <i>c_legislature</i> .	0 = not affected by corruption 1 = affected by corruption  -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 2.0	Created
c_leg123	<i>Affected by Corruption: Legislature (ordered)</i>	Ordinally recoded <i>c_legislature</i> .	0 = not affected 1 = a little bit 2 = more than a little bit  -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 2.0	Created
c_legind	<i>Corruption of decision-makers</i>	Averaged additive index of <i>c_min</i> , <i>c_mps</i> , and <i>c_state</i> .	1 = None 2 = Some of them 3 = Many of them 4 = Most of them 5 = All of them  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 3.2	Created

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
c_legorg	<i>Corruption of policy institutions</i>	Averaged additive index of <i>c_public</i> and <i>c_legislature</i> .	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 3.2	Created
corruption	<i>Corruption Index</i>	Averaged additive index of <i>c_min</i> , <i>c_mps</i> , <i>c_state</i> , <i>c_public</i> and <i>c_legislature</i> .	1 = Not at all corrupt [...] 5 = Extremely corrupt  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 3.2	Created
c01	<i>Corruption Index (dichotomized)</i>	Dichotomized <i>corruption</i> .	0 = no corruption 1 = corruption  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 2.0	Created
c123	<i>Corruption Index (ordered)</i>	Ordinally recoded <i>corruption</i> .	0 = not affected 1 = less than a little bit 2 = at least a little bit  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 2.0	Created
x_persl	<i>Strategy: Personal contact with legislators and their staff</i>	Averaged additive index of <i>hs_psl</i> and <i>hs_pss</i> .	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 3.2	Created

Appendix

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
x_leg2	<i>Strategy: Institutional contact with the legislature</i>	Averaged additive index of <i>hs_ch</i> , <i>h_lc</i> and <i>hs_cpr</i> .	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 3.2	Created
x_exe	<i>Strategy: Personal contact with the executive branch</i>	Averaged additive index of <i>hs_pep</i> , <i>hs_rne</i> .	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 3.2	Created
x_info	<i>Strategy: Informal lobbying strategies</i>	Averaged additive index of <i>hs_isl</i> , <i>hs_iss</i> , and <i>hs_ihe</i> .	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Constantly  -77 = filtered [missing] -99 = refused to answer [missing]	numeric 3.2	Created
x_con	<i>Financial contributions (yes/no)</i>	Dichotomized index of <i>hs_pac</i> , <i>hs_contr</i> , <i>hs_501</i> , and <i>hs_spon</i>	0 = no 1 = yes  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 2.0	Created
rev_ln	<i>Revenue (USD) logarithmized</i>	Logarithmized <i>revenues_USD</i> .	Numeric values only.  System missing for missing values on the original variables.	numeric 8.2	Created
emp_ln	<i>Employee count logarithmized</i>	Logarithmized <i>employees</i> .	Numeric values only. [no missing values]	numeric 8.2	Created

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
industry	<i>Economic sector: Industry</i>	Indicates of the economic sector of the company is industry.	0 = no 1 = yes  [no missing values]	numeric 2.0	Coded from ISIC_A2
role01	<i>Government Affairs Manager</i>	Indicates if the interviewee's role is government affairs manager or similar.	0 = no 1 = yes  [no missing values]	numeric 2.0	Coded from role_num
competitive	<i>Top 3 obstacle: competition</i>	Indicates whether competition is one of the top three obstacles for the company.	0 = no 1 = yes  [no missing values]	numeric 2.0	Coded from obst1_cat to obst5_cat
dl01 to dl16	<i>Definition of corruption (dummy)</i>	Definition of corruption provided by the interviewees (dichotomous).  12 dummies indicating if the interviewee defined lobbying in the above-mentioned categories.	0 = definition not indicated 1 = definition indicated  -99 = not codable [missing]	numeric 2.0	Coded from def_c_num1 to def_c_num3
dl02 to dl13	<i>Definition of lobbying (dummy)</i>	Definition of lobbying provided by the interviewees (dichotomous).  12 dummies indicating if the interviewee defined lobbying in the above-mentioned categories.	0 = definition not indicated 1 = definition indicated  -99 = not codable [missing]	numeric 2.0	Coded from def_l_num1 to def_l_num3
dl00 to dl19	<i>Distinction between corruption and lobbying (dummy)</i>	Dichotomous categorization of the distinction between lobbying and corruption provided by the interviewees based on the categories mentioned above.	0 = distinction not indicated 1 = distinction indicated  -99 = not codable [missing]	numeric 2.0	Coded from distinct_num1 to distinct_num4
ci_rev_ln	<i>Revenue (CIO) (logarithmized)</i>	Logarithmized <i>ci_rev_ln</i> .	Numeric values only.  No missing values.	numeric 8.2	Created

Variable name	Variable label	Definition	Values and coding	Format	Source
ci_emp_ ln	<i>Employee count (CIO) (logarith- mized)</i>	Logarithmized <i>ci_emp_ln</i> .	Numeric values only.  No missing values.	numeric 8.2	Created

**Part IV – Links to External Codebooks and Sources:**

- CIO 500: <https://www.cio.de/top500>, retrieved 12/28/2018
- D&B Hoovers: <https://www.dnb.com/products/marketing-sales/dnb-hoovers.html>, retrieved 08/03/2020
- ISIC: [https://unstats.un.org/unsd/classifications/Econ/Download/In%20Text/ISIC\\_Rev\\_4\\_publication\\_English.pdf](https://unstats.un.org/unsd/classifications/Econ/Download/In%20Text/ISIC_Rev_4_publication_English.pdf), retrieved 08/05/2020

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# Index

- 501(c) organization, 67, 78, 79, 96, 180, 181
- Abramoff, Jack, 1, 21, 87, 156
- accepting advantage, *see* unfair advantage
- access, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19–22, 26, 28–30, 32, 34–36, 41, 43–45, 48, 51–53, 66–68, 78, 91, 93, 97–101, 103, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 119, 124–128, 136, 148, 151, 154, 156, 158–160, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177
- corporate, 78, 128
- executive branch, 67, 78, 90, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 101, 105, 107, 108, 116, 118, 119, 124, 125, 174, 179
- informal, 67, 97–99, 105, 107, 110, 116, 118, 125, 175
- institutional, 78
- legislature, 66, 67, 91, 97, 101, 105, 107, 108, 110, 114, 118, 119, 125, 128, 174, 175
- accountability, 23, 34, 49, 96, 153, 165, 178, 179, 182, 183, 188
- Amthor, Philip, 1, 87, 156, 182
- bias, 11–14, 17, 29, 34, 35, 43–45, 142, 153, 160, 171, 184
- access, 14, 30, 34, 36
- agenda, 11, 13, 15, 17, 43, 169, 171, 175, 177
- mobilization, 11, 15–17, 43, 169, 171, 175, 176, 184, 187
- response, 62–64, 68, 72, 84, 102, 107, 120, 126, 129, 186
- sample, 57–59, 78, 102
- social desirability, 64, 104
- blackmail, 15, 18, 21, 148
- bribe, 3, 4, 19, 30–33, 35, 36, 38, 41, 43–45, 48, 52–54, 98, 112, 113, 127, 134, 137, 138, 166, 173, 174, 182
- bribery, *see* bribe
- campaign funding, *see* contributions
- clientelism, 29
- collective action problem, 16, 17, 43, 171, 176, 177, 184, 187
- compliance, 26, 37, 54, 83, 88, 99, 161, 183, 185, 187, 188
- conflict of interest, 21, 34, 37, 45, 52, 67, 160, 161, 163, 174, 175, 178, 180, 182, 183, 186, 188
- contributions, 34, 100, 181
- campaign, 3, 6, 34, 36, 67, 78, 96, 156, 159, 181
- corporate, 112, 181
- financial, 3, 6, 34, 41, 44, 52, 67, 68, 91, 93, 94, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 125, 128, 156, 160, 163, 165, 175, 179
- party, 6, 34, 52, 67, 74, 78, 79, 101, 107, 108, 112, 181, 182
- corporatism, 21, 43, 44, 48, 49, 56, 172, 176
- dark money, 180
- donations, *see* contributions

## INDEX

- embezzlement, *see* blackmail, 27
- favoritism, 14, 17, 29, 171, 177, 178
- fraud, 20, 21
- impartiality, 12, 14–16, 32, 43, 45, 146, 148, 150, 158, 171
- information  
    asymmetry, 37, 38, 179  
    market, 20–22, 44
- integrity, 4, 125, 143, 146, 150, 152, 163–165, 167, 185, 187, 188
- loophole, 29, 32, 35, 45, 136, 148, 150, 160, 173, 178
- moonlighting, 1, 187
- nepotism, 186
- outside earnings, *see* moonlighting
- PAC, *see* Political Action Committee
- parliamentarism, 24, 35, 49, 50, 56, 80, 149, 172
- parliamentary system, *see* parliamentarism
- partiality, *see* impartiality
- party  
    competition, 49, 50, 172  
    financing, 52  
    manifesto, 16  
    sponsoring, 67, 78, 79, 96, 107, 180  
    system, 49, 50, 56
- patronage, 18, 173, 186
- pluralism, 43, 44, 48, 56, 99, 172, 184
- policy  
    change, 49  
    cycle, 108, 119, 169  
    formulation, 20, 24, 25, 35, 38, 40  
    implementation, 24, 25, 35, 38, 40  
    process, 10, 13–15, 101, 184
- Political Action Committee, 3, 6, 34, 67, 78, 79, 100, 108, 112, 180, 181
- population  
    interest group, 10, 43, 187  
    sampling, 57, 58, 71, 81, 121, 186
- pork barrel, 29
- presidential system, *see* presidentialism
- presidentialism, 24, 49, 50, 56, 172
- principal agent-theory, *see* principal-agent framework
- principal-agent framework, 4, 6, 24, 171
- principal-agent-problem, *see* information
- quid pro quo, 19, 30–34, 36, 41, 44, 52, 98, 133, 135, 156, 157, 162, 163, 178, 180
- representation, 1, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12–18, 23, 43, 45, 171, 184  
    constituency, 23, 29, 33  
    interest, 5, 11–13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 27, 51, 83  
    sample, 6, 7, 72, 84, 102, 112
- representativeness, *see* representation
- responsiveness, 12, 14–16, 23, 24, 28, 29, 34, 38, 44, 53
- revolving door, 1, 28, 30, 37, 159, 179, 187
- sampling, *see* population
- semi-presidentialism, *see* presidentialism
- state capture, 15, 17
- Super PAC, *see* Political Action Committee
- transmission belt, 9–13, 15–17, 43–45, 142, 149, 152, 153, 158, 164, 170, 171
- transparency, 7, 31, 38, 51, 67, 87, 96, 157, 161, 178–183, 188  
    register, 179
- unfair advantage, 29, 31, 35, 45, 134, 136–138, 140, 157, 158, 160, 182
- Vorteilsnahme, *see* unfair advantage