Space Production by Migrants in Urban Villages in China: The Case of Beijing

Vorgelegt von

M.Arch. Shiyu Yang

aus Sichuan, V.R. China

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Acknowledgements

Abstract

China's rapid urbanisation is characterised by an influx of migrants into urban centres and sprawl of urban areas toward the suburbs. Along with the urbanisation process, the urban village, as the informal settlement resulting from dualism in China's land and *hukou* system, has been an object of research since the first decade of this century. Its developing mechanisms, spatiality and approaches to its upgrading and redevelopment has been well studied. However, while urban villages have been acknowledged as migrants' enclaves, too little attention has been paid to the impact of migrants' activities on space in urban villages and vice versa. The potential heterogeneity embedded within migrants and their decision-making and everyday lives remain largely examined.

The key research question of the thesis is how migrants shape urban villages in China, and specifically in Beijing, through their social production of space. The thesis examines what role migrants play in the process of shaping informality embodied in the development of urban villages, what migrants' everyday lives are like, and how the process of migration is reflected in space in urban villages. In addition, it also seeks to understand the applicability of Henri Lefebvre's theory of space production to the analysis of space production in China, specifically in the case of informal settlements.

The thesis adopts grounded theory method with a design of case study approach. Shigezhuang village and Dongxindian village in Beijing, which accommodated migrant groups with different demographic profiles, were chosen as study cases for in-depth research, and a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods were employed to collect and analyse data.

Three aspects of space have been observed in the process of space production in urban villages, corresponding with the spatial triad conceptualised by Lefebvre, including: 1) representations of space – the space of governance and negotiation; 2) spatial practices – the space of everyday life; and 3) spaces of representations – the space of two-directional linkage. The space of governance and negotiation is conceived by different levels of government and the rentier class of indigenous villagers. While migrants are not the initial producers of the logic and forms of knowledge, institutional spaces are produced in response to migration. The space, with its character of 'organised informality', exerts controls over migrants but is also contested and resisted by them. The space of everyday life is the physical basis of space production. It has been found that spatial practices in urban villages were correlated with migrant profiles and migrants' influence on the physical aspect takes place indirectly. Individual migrants also produce space through their daily routines and their connections to the urban routes. The space of two directional linkage is lived through migrants' imagining of the urban destination and their memory of places of origin. As individuals, households, and members of a *tongxiang* community, migrants

self-stage in the arrival urban villages through spaces of representation, while straddling the rural and urban to maximise living qualities and minimise risks.

The thesis implies that Lefebvre's theory of space production can be applied to explain empirical studies in the context of China in its post-economic-reform era, where and when a high level of decentralisation and flexibility in governance can be observed. It also acknowledges heterogeneity of urban villages and migrants and highlights the critical role that migrants play in producing social space in urban villages in China. The thesis suggests that, in addition to housing, migrants' employment conditions and their limited access to urban social infrastructure corresponding with the *hukou* system are of research significance.

Zusammenfassung

Die rasante Urbanisierung Chinas ist gekennzeichnet durch den Zustrom von Zuwanderern in die städtischen Zentren und die Ausbreitung der städtischen Gebiete ins Umland. Parallel zum Urbanisierungsprozess ist das urbane Dorf (*urban village*) als informelle Siedlung ein Resultat des Dualismus des Land- und *Hukou*-Systems in China und seit Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts Gegenstand der Forschung. Die Entstehungsmechanismen, die räumliche Ausdehnung und die Ansätze für Aufwertung und Umgestaltung von *urban villages* sind weitgehend untersucht. Während jedoch urbane Dörfer anerkannt sind als Enklaven für Zuwanderer, wurden den Auswirkungen der Aktivitäten von Zuwanderern auf den Raum in urbanen Dörfern und umgekehrt zu wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Die mögliche Heterogenität von Zuwanderern, ihre Entscheidungsfindung und ihr Alltagsleben wurden bisher kaum untersucht.

Die zentrale Forschungsfrage der Dissertation ist, wie Zuwanderer urbane Dörfer in China und speziell in Peking durch ihre soziale Raumproduktion gestalten. Die Dissertation untersucht dabei, welche Rolle Zuwanderer bei der Gestaltung der Informalität spielen, die in der Entwicklung urbaner Dörfer zum Ausdruck kommt, wie der Alltag von Zuwanderern aussieht und wie sich der Prozess der Migration räumlich in urbanen Dörfern widerspiegelt. Darüber hinaus wird versucht, die Anwendbarkeit von Henri Lefebvres Theorie der Raumproduktion auf die Analyse der Raumproduktion in China zu überprüfen, insbesondere im Fall der informellen Siedlungen.

In der Dissertation wird die Methode der 'Grounded Theory' mit einem Fallstudienansatz angewandt. Die Dörfer Shigezhuang und Dongxindian in Peking wurden als Fallbeispiele für eine eingehende Untersuchung ausgewählt aufgrund ihres unterschiedlichen demografischen Profils der Gruppe der Zuwanderer. Eine Mischung aus qualitativen und quantitativen Forschungsmethoden wurde zur Datenerhebung und -analyse eingesetzt.

Bei der Produktion des Raumes in urbanen Dörfern wurden drei Aspekte des Raums beobachtet, die der von Lefebvre konzeptualisierten raumbezogenen Triade entsprechen, darunter: 1) die Repräsentationen des Raums – der Raum von Governance und Aushandlung; 2) die räumliche Praxis – der Raum des Alltagslebens; und 3) die Räume der Repräsentation – der Raum der wechselseitigen Verbindung. Der Raum von Governance und Aushandlung wird von verschiedenen Regierungsebenen und der Gruppe der Grundbesitzer der einheimischen Dorfbewohner gestaltet. Die Zuwanderer sind zwar nicht die ursprünglichen Produzenten der Logik und der Formen des Wissens, aber die institutionellen Räume werden als Reaktion auf die Migration geschaffen. Der Raum mit seinem Charakter der 'organisierten Informalität' übt Kontrolle über die Zuwanderer aus, wird aber

auch von ihnen angefochten und bekämpft. Der Raum des täglichen Lebens ist die physische Grundlage der Raumproduktion. Es wurde festgestellt, dass räumliche Praxen in urbanen Dörfern mit den Profilen von Zuwanderern korrelieren und der Einfluss der Zuwanderer auf den physischen Aspekt indirekt erfolgt. Einzelne Zuwanderer produzieren auch Raum durch ihre täglichen Routinen und ihre Verbindungen zu den städtischen Wegen. Der Raum der wechselseitigen Verknüpfung wird durch die Vorstellungen der Zuwanderer vom städtischen Zielort und ihre Erinnerung an die Herkunftsorte gelebt. Als Einzelpersonen, Haushalte und Mitglieder einer *Tongxiang*-Gemeinschaft stellen sich die Zuwanderer in den ankommenden urbanen Dörfern durch Räume der Repräsentation dar, während sie sich zwischen dem ländlichen und dem städtischen Raum bewegen, um die Lebensqualität zu maximieren und die Risiken zu minimieren.

Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit zeigen, dass Lefebvres Theorie der Raumproduktion auch empirisch auf den Kontext Chinas in seiner Post-Wirtschaftsreform-Ära mit angewandt werden kann. Hier lässt sich ein hohes Maß an Dezentralisierung und Flexibilität in der Verwaltung beobachten. Außerdem wird eine Heterogenität der urbanen Dörfer und der Zuwanderer festgestellt und eine entscheidende Rolle der Zuwanderer bei der Schaffung von sozialem Raum in urbanen Dörfern in China hervorgehoben. Die Dissertation legt nahe, dass neben der Wohnsituation auch die Arbeitsbedingungen der Zuwander und ihre mit dem *Hukou* verbundenen eingeschränkten Zugang zum städtischen Sozialsystem von Bedeutung sind. Darüber hinaus werden politische Implikationen sowohl für die Aufnahme- als auch für die Herkunftsgebiete der Zuwanderer aufgezeigt.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

China has experienced rapid urbanisation in recent decades. The process has been characterised by an influx of population into urban centres, and the sprawl of urban areas towards the suburbs. During the process of urban expansion, big cities like Beijing and Shenzhen have witnessed the emergence of urban villages, which is a phenomenon specific to modern China. While farmland is requisitioned by the government for urban development, the residential core of rural villages is often left undeveloped, due to the high cost of compensation for villagers' resettlement. This developing mechanism, together with the dualistic land system in China, leads to a dualism in landscape and spatial structure: rural land is surrounded by urban land, resulting in the formation of what have come to be called urban villages (Chen *et al.*, 2011; Tong *et al.*, 2012).   The urban village has been an object of research since the first decade of this century, and many researchers have conducted in-depth research into its developing mechanisms, including the stakeholders involved and the source of the informality that lies behind the development of the urban village (see, for example, He *et al.*, 2010; Herrle *et al.*, 2014; Tian, 2008; Wang *et al.*, 2009; Wu *et al.*, 2013), its spatiality (e.g. Hao *et al.*, 2013; Kochan, 2015), and, in particular, approaches to upgrading and redevelopment (e.g. Altrock & Schoon, 2011; Chen, 2004; Li *et al.*, 2014; Lin *et al.*, 2014; Liu & Wong, 2018; Wei & Yan, 2005). It should be noted that, due to the economic and political openness and dynamics of cities in the Pearl River Delta, more studies geographically focus on cities like Shenzhen and Guangzhou (see Altrock & Schoon, 2011; Chung, 2013; Li & Li, 2011; Li *et al.*, 2014; Lin *et al.*, 2014; Ma, 2006), while urban villages in Beijing receive less attention (see some studies on Beijing's urban villages, for example, Liu & Wong, 2018; Zheng *et al.*, 2009).

Meanwhile, the population in big cities is growing rapidly, due to the inflow of migrants from rural areas and smaller cities. These domestic migrants come to cities like Beijing for the enhanced opportunities to find employment they offer (Liu *et al.*, 2010; Zheng *et al.*, 2009). According to the Report on Floating Population in China (2014), by the end of 2013, there were 245 million domestic migrants in China, accounting for one-sixth of the total population. A majority (80%) of these migrants are rural-to-urban migrants, while the rest are urban-to-urban migrants. Prior to the economic reform in China in the early 1980s, people were bound to the place where they were born by the household registration system – *hukou* – and were thus excluded from the employment opportunities and other social resources in places other than their hometowns. The opening-up has given rise to migration throughout the country, and the effects associated with this have attracted considerable interest (see some early but foundational work, such as, Fan, 2004; Solinger, 1999). Research into this topic has examined migrants' socio-spatial patterns and their attachment to and engagement with their places of origin as

well as their urban destinations (see, for example, Fan *et al.*, 2011; Liu *et al.*, 2018; Saunders, 2011), and has taken notice of the ever-increasing inequality that accompanies migration caused because of the *hukou* system (Liu, 2005; Lo & Jiang, 2006) and the inferior social status of migrants (Du *et al.*, 2017; Huang & Yi, 2015; Wong *et al.*, 2007; Wu & Webster, 2010). In most of the research, migrants have been synonymous with rural migrants and have been stereotyped as a marginalised group characterised by substandard educational backgrounds, limited financial resources, and usually also bad behaviour. The potential heterogeneity embedded within this group remains largely unexamined.

The urban village, with its low cost of living and prime location, has typically proved attractive to migrants as a place to settle in their receiving cities. Indigenous[1] villagers, who are local to these urban villages, develop houses on the rural land and rent out rooms to the migrants. As summarised in an earlier paper (Yang & van Oostrum, 2020), "urban villages provide migrants with affordable housing (He *et al.*, 2010; Wang *et al.*, 2009; Wu *et al.*, 2013; Zheng *et al.*, 2009), an urban environment that meets their employment needs (Liu *et al.*, 2018; Ma & Xiang, 1998) and social institutions that assist them in their transition to the city (Leaf & Anderson, 2007; Zhang *et al.*, 2003)". In most urban villages, the population of migrants is much larger than that of indigenous villagers, and migrants constitute the largest group in the villages, which has been discussed in studies on urban villages in cities or areas such as Beijing (see, for example, Feng, 2010; Li, 2011; Zheng *et al.*, 2009) and Pearl River Delta (Herrle *et al.*, 2014). Therefore, urban villages have been identified as migrant enclaves (Friedmann, 2005; He *et al.*, 2010; Liu *et al.*, 2018; Wu, 2016).

Nevertheless, while acknowledging that migrants make up a large portion of the total population in urban villages, not many scholars have investigated migrants' decision-making and everyday lives, neither from a collective perspective nor from an individual perspective. One of the very few studies focused on Zhejiang village in Beijing and was conducted by Zhang (2001), who succeeded in long-term tracing of the everyday lives of migrants, including their power and relationships, and their decision-making processed with regard to evictions. The remaining studies on migrants in urban villages usually examine the issue from a top-down, institutional perspective (see, for example, He *et al.*, 2010; Zheng *et al.*, 2009). Some researchers (see, for example, Xue & Huang, 2008) have investigated how the special regulation system impacts migrants' activities, for example in the informal sectors in which they are employed. Qian and He (2012) have discussed the disempowerment and structural marginality of migrants as a social group, reflecting on the concept of 'right to

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[1] Researchers studying urban villages employ the term 'indigenous' to refer to the household registration (*hukou*) status of local villagers (see, for example, Du *et al.*, 2017; He, 2014; Liu *et al.*, 2014; Zhang *et al.*, 2003).

the city' and have pointed out that currently in China, the discourse on empowering rural migrants is mainly focused on the hope of a piecemeal adjustment of existing institutions. Other researchers have criticised the spatiality of urban villages as 'chaotic', 'unplanned', 'congested' and 'substandard' (Chung, 2010; Tian, 2008), and have attributed this situation to the informality caused by China's dualistic land system and the rent-seeking decisions of villagers pursuing maximum profits from assigned housing plots (Ma, 2006; Wu *et al.*, 2013).

As a group, migrants are often seen to be only passively reacting to the space produced by the institutions and indigenous villagers, and their contribution to the production of place, regardless of its proactive or reactive character, has often been overlooked. Far too little attention has been paid to the impact of migrants' activities on space in urban villages and vice versa, not to mention the fact that most redevelopment strategies for urban villages do not consider migrants to be a stakeholder group. Negotiations that take place among key stakeholders, such as indigenous villagers, government and developers, have been investigated and analysed (see, for example, Herrle *et al.*, 2014), while the interests of migrants, whose insecure tenancy makes them vulnerable, are often neglected during the redevelopment of urban villages (Liu *et al.*, 2018, p. 483). Some scholars have also suggested that the urban village is not a feasible long-term solution for providing affordable rental housing to migrants (see Qian & He, 2012). Although this might be true, there has been very little research into alternatives, or into the factors that should be taken into consideration when solutions are proposed.

When they switch from a detailed focus on urban villages to urban development in China as a whole, researchers tend to take a top-down stance, echoing the common understanding, especially found among Western scholars, that China's governance mode is highly centralised. However, it should be pointed out that China's transformation from state socialism to market capitalism has engendered an increased decentralisation of administrative and fiscal powers, which has left local governments with more autonomy (Zhang *et al.*, 2003; Zhao, 2012; Zhu, 2004). Flexibility plays a vital role in urbanisation in China (Friedmann, 2005) and decentralisation has been a major factor in the rise of informal development (Zhao & Zhang, 2018). However, as Fokdal (2014, p. 1) puts it, from a macro perspective, researchers have thoroughly studied the influence of globalisation on local spaces in China "in the discourse of financial flows and 'modernity' in China", while "the social production and re-production of space on the micro level, especially in Asia and accordingly in China" has received little attention. Given this situation, migrants as a group are a worthwhile subject of research, since migration is very often the primary cause of urbanisation, and this is especially the case when it comes to the rapid urbanisation process in contemporary China. While there have been significant studies on international migration that have shed light on the implications of the urbanisation process for destination countries, there has been a lack of research on the influence of "scale, direction and demographic characteristics (such as sex

and age composition)" with regard to internal migration (Tacoli, 1998, p. 154). Research on how migrants' social production and re-production of space impact China's urbanisation from a bottom-up and micro-level perspective can potentially mitigate the research gap.

The theory of space production by Henri Lefebvre (1991, original French version published in 1974) has been widely acknowledged for its influential contribution to the in-depth analysis of the social construction and conventions of space (Shields, 1999). Lefebvre addresses space as an issue cutting across various disciplines. When Lefebvre developed his theory, he focused his discussion on the West, or, to be more specific, Eurocentric spatialisation, and the very few conclusions in his theory on space production in China are grounded in his observation of the socialist period, which ended before the 1980s.

There have been only a few studies on space production in China. Friedmann (2007) has thoroughly researched the process of place-making and place-breaking in urban China, from imperial times, covering Republican times to the creation of the People's Republic, and has proposed four potential topics for research, two of which will be tackled here in this thesis. One is "popular resistance to the erasure of places" and the other is "the actual role of an emerging civil society in the formal and informal arrangements of neighbourhood governance" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 277). More recently, in 2015, a special issue titled *Producing and consuming China's new urban space: state, market and society* was published by the *Urban Studies* Journal and featured several pioneering studies in the field (see He & Lin, 2015, for an introduction to all the articles featured). Various empirical studies, which adopted Lefebvre's spatial triad as a research framework, were conducted to study the production and consumption of China's new urban spaces. Only very few scholars (see, for example, Zhan, 2018) study the spatial and social production in urban villages and advocate for a central role of local residents in producing space. When understanding the space production in urban villages, the importance of agency of residents – not only the indigenous villagers but also migrants in the case of urban villages – in making their own living space should not be overlooked. In this case, what matters is not only the conceived space, but also the perceived space and the lived space.

1.2 Research questions

In the context of this background, the key research question of this thesis is how migrants shape urban villages in China, and specifically in Beijing, through their social production of space. In other words, the objective is to study how migrant populations produce space through their everyday life practices, which are based on their representations of the meanings of space. The underlying research assumption is that migrant populations not only passively adopt space, to live or work in particular parts of the urban village, but they also build

relationships, intentionally and unintentionally, with and within particular spaces and impart to these spaces certain identities. Therefore, space inside urban villages is transformed from abstract space with a merely functional character into concrete space that contains identities.

Another objective of this doctoral dissertation is to employ and further develop Lefebvre's theory of space production, paying particular attention to spatial dialectics in the Chinese context. While this research can be comprehended as an empirical study of Lefebvre's theory, it also intends to provide a critical reflection on the validity of the theory in this special context.

Under the umbrella of the key research question – how do migrants shape urban villages in Beijing through their social production of space? –four facets of research questions will be addressed in the thesis:

First, which stakeholder groups are involved in shaping informality embodied in the development of urban villages in China? What role do migrants play in this process, or, to put it another way, how do they do it?

Second, what are the everyday lives of migrants in urban villages like, and how do they differ from one migrant or one household to another? How do the everyday activities of migrants and the decisions they make influence the space in urban villages?

Third, how is the process of migration reflected in space in urban villages? How do migrants produce the social space, on both the micro and macro levels (i.e., city level, national level, etc.), and what are the implications?

Last but not least, is the theory of space production applicable to the analysis of space production in China, specifically in the case of informal settlements like urban villages? If the answer is yes, how and to what extent is it applicable?

This dissertation is based on empirical research carried out between 2017 and 2019 in Beijing, and the focuses on two case villages.

1.3 Overview of the thesis

This doctoral research has employed a grounded theory approach, in which the research process is non-linear. (A detailed explanation of grounded theory and how the research was conducted will be presented in Chapter 6). It has been pointed out (Dunne, 2011, p. 120) that it might be deemed problematic to present the research findings in a traditional linear format, featuring in the following order, literature review, findings, discussion and conclusion. However, as Dunne (2011) argues, failing to discuss the existing literature at the beginning, or mixing discussions of research findings and theoretical concepts would probably lead to a confusing and overly

lengthy dissertation. Therefore, while acknowledging that grounded theory study must be distinguished from other approaches in terms of the research process, this dissertation adopts a traditional structure.

The thesis is divided into four distinct parts. Part I introduces the theoretical foundations underlying the research. It presents an in-depth review of the three discourses that are crucial to the research: space production, informality, and migration. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 reflect critically on the international discussions of the respective theories and their applications in China. Part I concludes with Chapter 5, *Conceptual framework*, which lays out the definitions used in this dissertation for the three pillars of *space production*, *informality* and *migration*. Chapter 5 also presents the three aspects of space production that are specific to the research and serves as a guideline for the description of the empirical findings in Part III.

Part II introduces the methodological approaches adopted throughout the research process. It first explains why and how grounded theory is applied and elaborates on the design of the research, which employs a case-study approach. This part of the dissertation also explains how the data were collected and analysed, and includes a critical reflection on the limitations of the collected data.

Part III is dedicated to the empirical findings. Chapter 7 sheds light on the macro socio-political background of the research, narrowing its focus from China's urbanisation in general to urban villages in Beijing. Chapter 8 introduces the two case villages. It is followed by the three central chapters: Chapter 9 *The space of governance and negotiation*, Chapter 10 *The space of everyday life*, and Chapter 11 *The space of two-directional linkage*, as framed by the conceptual framework of the research.

The final chapter ties together theoretical and empirical strands in order to address the research questions posed in this thesis. Chapter 12 *Synthesis* summarises and discusses the main insights of the empirical study with regard to the trialectics of space production by migrants in urban villages in Beijing. At the conclusion of the dissertation, Chapter 13 attempts to link back to the theoretical frameworks, theorise the findings and answer the research questions. It also seeks to provide recommendations for policy and a direction for future research.

The following diagram (Figure 1) illustrates the structure of the work.

Figure 1: Overview of the thesis. Source: Own design.

PART I

2. Theory of space production

2.1 Social space and space production

2.1.1 Definition of social space

"(Social) space is a (social) product" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 26) and therefore space should be understood with an emphasis on its generative process (Huang & Yi, 2015). Every society produces its own spatial patterns in order to support the reproduction of social relations (Elden, 2004, p. 94; Lefebvre, 1991, p. 31; Qian & He, 2012, p. 2802). The reverse is also true: any set of social relations can only be enacted by occupying and producing a space (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2804). As Lefebvre (1991, p. 85) puts it, social space is both a product and a means of production. At the same time, a social space is also a field of action, offering a stage for the formation of projects and practical intentions, and a basis of action, from which energies derive and towards which energies are directed (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 190). It is both actual and potential. It is simultaneously "a precondition and a result of social superstructures" and, in order to comprehend this means of production, the components of productive forces, social division of labour and the superstructures of society should be seen as an entity (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 85).

Space in the Western lexicon has for long been conceptualised as both a physical dimension and a subject with social uses for a specific activity. It also has some abstract usages. Within the discipline of the sociology of space, it is noted that "the term space is better suited than any other term to express the spheres of juxtaposition and coexistence" (Massey, 1999, cited in Löw, 2006, p. 120). As such, spaces represent not only "the possibility of pluralities" but also "the possibility of overlapping and reciprocal relations". In addition, spaces are "always open and indefinite with respect to future formations" (Löw, 2006, p. 120). Lefebvre goes beyond conventional disciplinary debates on space, and claims that spatialisations denote not only the physical arrangements of things but also "social patterns of social action and routine as well as historical conceptions of space and the world" (Shields, 1999, p. 146). He tries to establish a lived spatialisation, through which cultural meanings are attached to the understanding of relations across territories (Shields, 1999, p. 145).

At the same time, he points out that "a social space is not a *socialized* space" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 190, emphasis in original). Social space should be understood beyond a material base for social processes and beyond the oversimplified image of a container (Löw, 2008). The so-called empty space implicates the mental and social

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void and should be seen as merely a representation of space. As such, the conceived space is targeted to be transformed into "'lived experience' by a social 'subject', and is governed by determinants which may be practical (work, play) or biosocial (young people, children, women, active people) in character" (Löw, 2008, p. 190). When talking about a space, it is more accurate to say that it plays a socialising role rather than it itself is socialised.

2.1.2 Significance of studying the production of space

When Lefebvre suggests that spaces are produced, he is not simply offering a definition. His aim is to study "the *process* of the production of space, and its configuration in any given historical period" (Shields, 1999, p. 167, emphasis in original). Shields (1999) insists that the original expression of space in French, *l'espace*, can be better conceptualised as the spatialisation of social order. The notion of spatialisation accords well with the processual nature which Lefebvre refers to as a matter of ongoing activities. In this sense, social order is not static and not some existing ideology, but rather an order constantly undergoing change because of the actions and innovations of social agents (Shields, 1999, p. 155). Spatialisation is at once a thing and a process, as well as an achievement and an ongoing practice. As suggested by Lefebvre, "production process and product themselves" are "two inseparable aspects" rather than "two separable ideas" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 37).

According to Löw (2008, p. 35), space construction is constituted of two distinguishable processes, namely spacing and synthesis, and these two processes take place concurrently. Spacing is "erection, building, or positioning", while synthesis is the process by which goods and people are linked through "perception, ideation, or recall". At the same time, space production does not exclude conflicts and contradictions (see for example the delineation of Lefebvre, 1991, on the space of work, p. 191). This has also been emphasised by Elden (2004, p. 94) who states that spaces are not always produced in correspondence with the mode of production, but may also be produced by the contradictions[2]. This mode of production through contradictions has often been overlooked by scholars applying the theory in their own research.

Furthermore, during the production process, places become interrelated with each other in a historical sequence of methods of space production (Shields, 1999, p. 144). They are also connected to political and economic processes since each space produced possesses its own identity which includes certain activities while excluding

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[2] Elden (2004, p. 94) offers the example of the medieval town which was produced by the contradictions of feudalism and eventually evolved into "the foundation for the new, capitalist, urban-based mode of production".

others. Everyday routines contribute to spatial characteristics. Research has been carried out looking closely at everyday space production. For example, Bertuzzo (2008) applied Lefebvre's theory of space production in her study of delineating dwellers' everyday life's representations and uses of space in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

From the above argument, it can be concluded that the theory of space production and its associated spatial dialectics demand a comprehensive study rather than a piecemeal analysis, of the identities, activities and images linked to any given place (Shields, 1999). With spatial dialectics, over-specialised areas of knowledge are brought together "by substituting or giving an overriding emphasis to the spatiality of action, objects, laws, semiotic codes, economic processes and cultural practices" instead of studying them with regard to "the priorities prescribed by the specialized domains of knowledge, which tend to attach themselves to different phenomena and processes" (Shields, 1999, p. 151).

2.1.3 Space production and the right to the city

Spaces serve the reproduction of production relations (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 384) and "the greatest material and intellectual division of labour is the separation of the city and the countryside" (originally by Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology*, cited in Shields, 1999, p. 147). In contemporary studies of spatial issues, the city is often the context[3]. For example, Lefebvre's *Critique of Everyday Life* deals with everyday life in the urban context. In her previously-mentioned Dhaka, Bangladesh, study, Bertuzzo states that urbanisation is "a continuous process" and the city is "essentially in a transitory state, whereby the concrete everyday life practice dominates and directs its development" (Bertuzzo, 2008, p. 26). Bertuzzo (2008, p. 26) insists that space is occupied or appropriated by the city and produced by social practice.

Castells distinguishes two dimensions of the urban, namely its scalar aspect and its functional aspect. The scalar aspect can be understood as a diverse range of 'spatial units' including "neighbourhoods, urban cores, metropolitan regions, national urban systems, metropole-colony relations and the international divisions of labour", which make up the capitalist system (Castells, 1977, cited in Brenner, 2000, p. 363). The functional aspect goes beyond "the geographical setting or territorial scope of social processes" and is related to their functional role or social content (Brenner, 2000, p. 363).

In this case, capital and the state protect their positions of power via access to spaces and the means of dividing

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[3] Some research has been carried out on the production of rural space, including on what is conceptualised as 'rurbanisation' (Kerkvliet and Seldon, 1999, cited in McGee, 2009, p. 236).

and arranging space (Löw, 2008). For example, leisure space as an extension of dominated space is "made up of 'boxes for living in', of identical 'plans' piled one on top of another or jammed next to one another in rows" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 384). Lefebvre's studies have rendered space "more material and more amenable to public debate and direct action by comparing cultural landscapes […] as well as discussing the inequality and despair of class landscapes" (Shields, 1999, p. 141). When talking about *the right to the city*, it must be recognised that it is "not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it after our heart's desire" (Harvey, 2003, p. 939). The right to the city also denotes that certain social groups will not be excluded from mainstream society or civilisation and deliberately positioned in a space which has been produced merely for the purpose of discrimination (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2802). Space production by vulnerable groups in the city is worth studying.

2.2 Spatial triad

2.2.1 An introduction to spatial trialectics

The key point set out in *The Production of Space* (Lefebvre, 1991) is that there are three specific aspects that blur into each other: representations of space, spaces of representation and spatial practices. Using this spatial triad, Lefebvre argues that "the system of space is not just spatial practice, in the sense of its social construction, but equally the representations of it and discourses about it" (Shields, 1999, p. 154).

A major criticism of the space production theory is that the individual elements of the spatial triad have not been clearly elaborated by Lefebvre (Castells, 1977; Shields, 1999). Nevertheless, the spatial triad, with its radical openness in definition, has been taken up by Lefebvre's successors. For example, in the book *Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction* (2006), Merrifield offered a summary of the definitions of the three aspects largely based on Lefebvre's original accounts (1991). *Representations of space* are conceived spaces which stand for a world of conceptualisation and abstraction and are the dominant spaces in any society (Merrifield, 2006, p. 109). *Spatial practices* are "practices that 'secret' society's space" and "have close affinities with perceived space, to people's perceptions of the world, of their world, particularly its everyday ordinariness" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 110). *Spaces of representation* or *representational spaces* refer to a lived space of everyday experience which "overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39). Such a space is so elusive that "thought and conception want to master it, need to appropriate and dominate it" (Merrifield, 2006, p. 110). These three definitions of constitution of space are also comparable to what Löw (2008, p. 36) conceptualised as "the routinized paths of action", "the structural dimension of spatiality" and "the constitution of places and

the development of atmospheres".

Another notable successor of Lefebvre is Soja (1996), who emphasises and builds on the *trialectics* of spatialization. His concept of *thirdspace* is derived from Lefebvre's space production theory and offers a new perspective for thinking about space and spatiality that is flexible, vibrant, and open to discussion. His definitions of first space, second space and third space are comparable to that of Lefebvre's spatial triad. The first space is the physical field and the mapping of a space, thus comparable to the perceived space. The second space is the conceptualisation of the first space and can be represented, for example, by a drawing. The third space is both distinct from the first two and also encompasses them.[4] Thirdspace can to some extent be understood as the combining of the first and the second spaces. Soja (1996, p. 57) conceptualises the thirdspace as the space in which "everything comes together […] subjectivity and objectivity, the abstract and the concrete, the real and the imagined, the knowable and the unimaginable, the repetitive and the differential, structure and agency, mind and body, consciousness and the unconscious, the disciplined and the transdisciplinary, everyday life and unending history."

Lefebvre's spatial triad insists that there are three elements of the space rather than two, where spatial practices mediate, in an implicit way, between representations of space and spaces of representation, and keep them at once together and apart (Merrifield, 2006, p. 111). The triple determination ensures that "each instance internalizes and takes on meaning through other instances" (Merrifield, 2006, p. 111).

2.2.2 Representations of space – the mental field as dominance of space

Although Lefebvre argues for the dialectical understanding of the spatial triad without providing definitions for the three aspects, an exploration of what they denote is necessary, if confusion is to be avoided.

Representations of space are "the logic and forms of knowledge, and the ideological content of codes, theories, and the conceptual depictions of space linked to production relations" (Shields, 1999, p. 163). This aspect refers to conceptualised or conceived space, and the ideology, power and knowledge hidden within its representation (Lefebvre, 1991; Merrifield, 2006). It signifies the world of abstraction.

Merrifield (2006) argues that representations of space are the dominant aspect of space in any society. They

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[4] This paragraph is largely taken from the website link: http://geography.ruhosting.nl/geography/index.php?title=Third_space. A good way to explain thirdspace is through the example of a person's home. The first space is the geography of the home. The second space is the feelings and emotions associated with the home. Third space is where the two come together.

have "a substantial role and a specific influence in the production of space", with their intervention in and modification of spatial textures (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 42). Such intervention takes place at the level of construction, which should not be understood "as the building of a particular structure" but rather as "a project embedded in a spatial context and texture which call for 'representations'" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 42). These 'representations' are an assemblage of social factors which provide the foundation for the professional "power structure of the capitalist state" (Shields, 1999, p. 164).

The role of the state (both local and central) cannot be overlooked, especially when discussing the physical context. State worldwide have the right to regulate everyday life in their cities' public spaces, whether in a democratic manner or otherwise (Friedmann, 2007, p. 261). "Everywhere, seen or unseen, the state's presence is felt as a constraining influence on everyday life. The physical context for the patterns and rhythms of neighbourhood life is controlled by the state" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 260).

When attempting to theorise the role of cities, everyday scalar terms (including local, urban, regional, national, global etc.) are exploited to represent distinctive socio-territorial processes (including localisation, urbanisation, regionalisation, nationalisation, globalisation etc.) (Brenner, 2000, p. 367). The social aspect of space can gradually weaken the prevailing orders and discourses, and envisage other spaces (Löw, 2008, p. 28).

Power relations ensure that spaces are connected and tied up in a static context of reference and relation. Power relations are the central component that constitutes spaces (Löw, 2008, p. 129). In this regard, certain spaces may be prioritised or overlooked. Spaces should be seen as "arrangements that are inherently dynamic but also contested" (Löw, 2008, p. 129). In this regard, Lefebvre is critical of the representation of space for ideologising knowledge and representations as means of controlling social practices (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2803). For example, the state, as a collective actor, is empowered to take the initiative to erase an existing place and replace it with another project. Visible or invisible, the state exerts a constraining influence on everyday life and regulate the patterns and rhythms of a lived space in its own way. For example, the state may regulate which activities are allowed in a public space at a certain time of day, what kinds of traffic may circulate, or for what purpose a structure may be built in some pieces of urban land. These decisions are made by the state "with or without the input of local citizens" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 261). The apparent autonomy of neighbourhood life is actually a fiction. However, state actions do not influence members of the community homogenously. Degrees of interest in and attachment to the neighbourhood vary and therefore a general attitude cannot be assumed (Friedmann, 2007, p. 272).

2.2.3 Spatial practices – the physical field as the basis of production

Lefebvre refers to spatial practices as modes of behaviour related to space (Löw, 2008) and claims that the production and reproduction of certain places and spatial elements contribute to social formation (Shields, 1999). With the help of spatial practices, social continuity is cohesively protected and the reproduction of social relations maintained[5]. The cohesion between the space and its social formations suggests "a certain level of spatial 'competence' and a distinct type of 'spatial performance' by individuals" (Shields, 1999, p. 162).

Spatial practices are often described as the perceived space featured in daily routines and urban routes, and are comprehended neutrally as the gap between objects. Lefebvre also emphasises the everyday importance of spatialisation, the composite of a comprehensive set of practices and arrangements (Shields, 1999). Shields argues that to link the oversimplified understanding of 'the perceived' as 'the visual' to a 'total space', as proposed by Lefebvre, 'perception' should be understood as practical perception and 'common sense' (Shields, 1999, p. 163). The realm of the perceived is properly explained by Shields (1999, p. 165) when he compares space to the body, and suggests that the perceived is "the practical basis for the perception of the outside world".

Referred to as action related space (Löw, 2008), spatial practices are "everyday practices reinforced by routines and routes for the production and reproduction of spaces and for the bodily experience and suffering of spaces" (Löw, 2006, p. 28). This aspect of space is produced as 'human space' through everyday practice. People generally develop a series of activities determined by habits and these activities help them organise their everyday lives (Löw, 2006, p. 36). When facing obstacles in an everyday routine, a person may deviate but will usually then return to the habitual actions.

Although the aforementioned habitual day-to-day activities are discussed at an individual level, such repetition also applies to the generalisability of spaces, which is referred to as the institutionalisation of spaces (Löw, 2006, p. 37). A certain type of structural spaces possesses an institutionalised ordering whose effect is similar across different individuals. In other words, spaces are seen as institutionalised "if their ordering remains effective beyond the action of the agent and entails normative synthesizing and spacing" (Löw, 2006, p. 37). For example, a country's railway stations usually possess the same spatial elements, and orderings between men and women are always similar (see for example Wex, 1979, cited in Löw, 2008, 37). However, it should be noted that

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[5] For a detailed explanation, an example of Lefebvre's discussion on churches and the typology of the church is given by (Shields, 1999, p. 162).

spacings that occur in the institutionalised spaces are subjected to power negotiations. Societal institutions depend on the reproduction of everyday activities, but the institutions endure even though subgroups of society do not reproduce them.

It should also be noted that such production is not generated from nothing or from a non-spatial practice. Rather, it can be traced to material 'historical heritage' (Shields, 1999, p. 162). According to Lefebvre, this can include "building typology, urban morphology and the creation of zones and regions for specific purposes" (Shields, 1999, p. 162), as well as other factors.

2.2.4 Spaces of representation – the social field with an individual origin

While the widely-read English edition of *The Production of Space* (Lefebvre, 1991), translated by Nicholson-Smith, refers to 'representational spaces', many scholars (see, for example, Bertuzzo, 2008; Merrifield, 2006; Shields, 1999) favour the literal translation 'spaces of representation', which they think better reflects Lefebvre's intention when juxtaposing this third aspect with the second, namely 'representations of space'. This thesis similarly prefers the latter translation.

Spaces of representation are 'discourses of space', in the sense that this aspect of the spatial triad "forms the social imaginary, the presuppositions that often structure problem definitions and thus influence the sort of solutions that are thought of as being possible and achievable" (Shields, 1999, p. 164). Spaces of representation are spaces lived through their associated images and symbols (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39) and "the space of everyday experience" (Merrifield, 2006, p. 109) of its inhabitants and users. In contrast to the products of spatial practice and representations of space, the products of spaces of representation are only symbolic works (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 42). As Lefebvre insists, this aspect is the space that "the imagination seeks to change and appropriate" and it "overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39).

For the users or the inhabitants of the space, the space is lived rather than represented or conceived (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 362; Löw, 2008, p. 28). While conceived space is abstract, the space of everyday activities is concrete, as a representational space with an origin. The origin is "childhood, with its hardships, its achievements, and its lacks" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 362). A person's memories are oriented to concrete places blended with objects and people, and also have an impact on his or her everyday constitution of space (Löw, 2008, p. 42). In this sense, the private realm has its impact, which usually turns out to be in a controversial way against the public one. Besides the arguments of scholars who adhere closely to Lefevre's conceptualisation, there are other discussions around the idea of socially lived space. For example, Friedmann introduces the concept of 'places', which are

small spaces shaped by being lived in. Places are "sites of resistance, contestation, and actions that are often thought to be illegal by the (local) government" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 257).

Such spaces of representation contain underground spatial practices which induce and encourage revolutionary restructurings of institutionalised space and new practices of spatialisation (Merrifield, 2006; Shields, 1999). An example provided by Shields (1999, pp. 164-165) are slum dwellers in the Global South, who shape a spatialisation practice beyond the norms of the prevailing social spatialisation. Slums are regarded by Lefebvre as localised 're-appropriation' of space, which distinguishes itself from the dominated space of the state. In this way, certain places are returned to the realm of the community from the governing spatialisation. The experience and symbolic comprehension of habitants in informal settlements in China may differ from that of slum dwellers in other developing countries, and this will be elaborated on when articulating China's organised informality.

In lived practice, it is the order of space that repeats itself (Löw, 2008, p. 28). Spaces develop a potential to influence people's feelings through the creation of atmosphere (Löw, 2008, p. 44) and people create atmosphere within a space by self-staging. In other words, any space, such as a new office or a new flat, is what Harvey calls an absolute material space (Harvey, 2006, p. 135) until its users start to change it in ways that make them feel comfortable. This can range from shifting around existing furniture or hanging a family photograph on the wall to buying some plants or new furnishings to painting the walls or simply playing music to create a mood (Löw, 2008; Marcus, 1995). This act of appropriating absolute space is called by Marcus (1995), creating a 'mirror of self'.

Another example of space appropriation is when someone moves into an established neighbourhood. The new space user may not bring about physical spatial change, but appropriates space socially by getting to know the neighbours, becoming familiar with the streets and shops, and getting involved in local activities. In this way, the newcomer will gradually be accepted by the neighbourhood and come to think of it as 'my' or 'our' community.[6] The definition of a neighbourhood is vague. It can be identified by local institutions, such as a tearoom, a pub or a temple, where people meet each other. It may also be designated with a gate or a sign. However, for those who inhabit the neighbourhood, their knowledge and memory of it is based upon "a particular pattern of social relations and specific, recurrent rituals" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 259), centred in local institutions. The rituals of everyday life contribute to people's attachment to space. There are different sorts of places of encounter – some are public, like parks and markets, and some are privately-owned public places, like

[6] This paragraph is following Friedmann (2007, p. 259).

tearooms and pubs. Some local institutions, such as temples, may typically be frequented by a certain group of the population (Friedmann, 2007, p. 272). The aforementioned spaces can all be classified as 'lived spaces' (Lefebvre, 1991). In contemporary life, social networks are likely to extend beyond the limits of the small spaces and contact with neighbours becomes more impersonal (Friedmann, 2007, p. 272).

The three aspects of space production are interwoven and should not be understood in isolation. For example, to shift from the representation of space to the space of representation, social power relations must be rewritten through spatial practice, which connects the urban reality with the perceived space (Merrifield, 2006). Löw (2008, p. 39) suggested that space is also constituted "through the selection and situating of social goods". The resources contributing to the spatial structures depend on what the social structures can make available, and, vice versa, the spatial structures organised in the routines of everyday life also reproduce social structures. On the other hand, though 'lived space' is shaped by being lived in and therefore requires a spatial context, the physical form itself does not have to be distinctive. The essence of lived space is the embedded patterns and rhythms of live, acquired after being inhabited for a significant amount of time (Friedmann, 2007, p. 260). Although patterns and rhythms of life lasts, places do not necessarily persist (Friedmann, 2007, p. 272).

2.3 Space production in China

2.3.1 Lefebvre's understanding of space production in China

When Lefebvre developed his theory of space production, he focused his discussion on the West, or, to be more specific, on Eurocentric spatialisation. While he did refer to the space production in China, the latest manuscript revised by him was in 1984, shortly before China was to undergo economic reform and enter the post-socialism[7]. Lefebvre's conclusions regarding Chinese space were essentially grounded in his observation of the socialist period.

As distinct from his accounts of the spatial triad in other contexts, Lefebvre (1991, p. 42) implies that China may not have experienced a contrast between representations of space and spaces of representation. He compares the Soviet model and the 'Chinese road to socialism' and draws the conclusion that China attempted to "draw the people and space in its entirety into the process of building a different society" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 421). Lefebvre argues that this should be conceived of as a multidimensional process, which involves "not only

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[7] The conceptualisation of post-socialism and details of the economic reform, including its impact on Chinese society, will be explained later.

the production of wealth and economic growth but also the development and enrichment of social relationships – implying the production *in space* of a variety of goods as well as the production *of space* as a whole" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 421, emphasis in the original text).

Lefebvre also uses Chinese characters in his argument to whether one can identify a contrast between representations of space and spaces of representation in China. He argues that Chinese characters integrate these two aspects in an inseparable way, that "they convey the order of the world (space-time)" while controlling "that concrete (practical and social) space-time" on which symbolisms exert an influence (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 42). While these arguments are not without significances, they were based on the Chinese context before economic reform. Lefebvre's claims, such as those regarding the inseparability of representations of space and spaces of representations, may not be valid in post-socialism. There is also lack of empirical cases from the Chinese context presented be Lefebvre. Space production in contemporary China is worth exploring further.

2.3.2 The application of the theory of space production in studies of urban China

Friedmann (2007) conducted a survey on place-making in urban China over the last 1,500 years, grounding his comprehension of place in Lefebvre's theory of everyday life and lived space. He specifically investigated small city spaces whose significance arose out of the intersection of the state with people's everyday lives. Friedmann (Xu, 2000, cited in Friedmann, 2007, p. 273) suggests that an architectural space in China has to be defined "nominally and physically" and that people's appropriation of the small spaces is a social process full of "reluctant obedience to authority, popular resistance and displacement" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 272). The state determines not only the physical context of the city but also the regulations that govern the city and therefore people's interventions can only or mostly be observed in the small spaces in the city. Friedmann also points out that the idea of the individual is perceived differently in China from how it is perceived in Western society. In Europe, the individual is a single, separate being, whereas in China the individual is a part of a society, "closely tied into the network of family and clan with its mutual responsibilities" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 266). Rapid urbanisation has displaced many people from their "familiar neighbourhoods which, together with social relations and the rhythms of their daily lives " (Friedmann, 2007, p. 268).

Similarly, McGee (2009, p. 234) argues that the large urban places in China "are less (as) organic social entities embedded in regional hinterlands and more (as) nodes in the matrix of global flows of people's commodities, capital and information which downgrades the importance of local forces of change". Urbanisation is an effect of the impact of global capital and global flows in turn impact particular urban spaces. The macro

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representations of globalisation "subsume the internal dynamics of urban development, the subtleties of local politics, the resilience of urban patterns of life, the tensions embedded in the fractured social structures, the multiple strands of cultures of modernity and resistance to the imposition of change" (Forbes, 1997, p. 462).

On the other hand, China has been undergoing the decentralisation of economic development and social welfare since the late 1970s, when local government officials started calling for more autonomy when dealing with local affairs. At the end of the 1980s, the fiscal contract system was introduced, which raised the revenue share and allowed local government more power to make local policies or to implement state policies prioritising the local interests (Wong *et al.*, 2007, p. 38). Decentralisation in China has encouraged city governments to behave in a more entrepreneurial manner and has empowered them in the production of urban space (McGee, 2009, p. 242). For example, McGee (2009) adopts Lefebvre's theory of space production as the approach to identify driving forces in the urbanisation processes in China, which is featured as a formerly socialist society, and puts an emphasis on multi-scalar governance. The project starts with the hypothesis that the urbanisation process in China is best regarded as "a project of state visioning that involves negotiation, resistance and compromise by all scales of government and quasi-government agencies and non-government institutions" (McGee, 2009, p. 231). It is activated through defining the urban and rural space, planning the urban space, regulating and implementing regulations by the state. Governmental representations play a vital role (McGee, 2009, p. 232) and the production of urban space is under the command of an institutional framework (McGee, 2009, p. 241). Meanwhile, this urbanisation project is also being encountered and experienced by individuals and households who engage in everyday life through spatial practices. However, McGee (2009, p. 232) insists that the production of urban space in China has been carefully controlled and planned by different levels of government, leaving much less flexibility to individuals.

The argument that individuals have less flexibility can be understood in a more comprehensive way by observing two different types of production of space: the 'structural' kind, which is top-down and linked to collective decision making; and the 'spontaneous' kind, which is the bottom-up, deriving from individual or household decisions (Leaf, 2000). This division is a simplification of a more complicated set of space-producing processes including negotiation, resistance, and compromise (McGee, 2009).

More recently, scholars have tried to apply Lefebvre's spatial triad as a research framework for empirical studies of the production and consumption of China's urban spaces. A special issue of the *Urban Studies* journal titled "Producing and consuming China's new urban space: state, market and society" (see He & Lin, 2015) included pioneer urban studies in the Chinese context and was loosely based on the spatial triad, covering: the production of new urban spaces and the conceived space; the consumption of new urban spaces and the perceived space;

and resulting contestations and contradictions and the lived space. He and Lin (2015) investigated urbanisation in China through a study of the production and consumption of its new urban spaces, as well as the contestations and contradictions arising from these processes. New urban spaces are defined as "the emerging physical/virtual, social, and cultural spaces that are situated at the confluence of China's recent economic and political liberalization, globalisation and market transition" (He & Lin, 2015, p. 2758). The scholars argue that the interaction between state, market and society is vital for a critical analysis of the growth and spatiality of China's new urbanism. Some of the new urban spaces are produced by the new regime of capital accumulation, while others are linked with various social processes and social identity constructions.

Investigating the various agents of capitalism, Lefebvre stressed that the modern apparatus "has become the primary regulator of the production of urban space and industrial economic growth" (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2803). With regard to the institutional context of China's urbanisation, "the technologization of discourse production and social control" can lead to "actions and decisions being evaluated less according to moral judgments of right or wrong but according to their institutional and legal validity" (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2811; Young, 1990). In its production of urban space, the Chinese state has an image of 'modern cities' integrated into the 'global metropolitanism' (McGee, 2009, p. 232). This objective results in the growth of rural-urban inequality and presents challenges in managing rural-urban transition. At the same time, space is also a means of control, of domination and of power (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 26), as elaborated in the previous sections. Huang and Yi (2015), who apply the theory of space production to their research on Chinese cities, argue that special residential space like basement housing is produced (or destroyed) to control inferior social groups, such as migrants. Zhan (2018, p. 1525) adopts ethnographic approaches to study the spatial and social production of a cluster of urban villages in the northern suburb of Beijing and looks closely into residents' "tactics in developing/participating in the informal housing market, service market and labour market". Zhan argues that the agency of local residents is of great importance in making their own living space.

The right to the city in China is considered embedded within the complexity of power relations rooted in the production process of China's urban modernity. As such, the right to urban life in China is unavoidably interwoven with "a social project of altering dominant power structures" (Qian & He, 2012). Meanwhile, the Foucauldian notion of power, with its emphasis on its dispersed and relational nature, is applied to cast the intersection of the state and society as an interactive field rooted in the complicated relations between various intentions, interests, and claims to power (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2813). Qian and He (2012, p. 2804) suggest a new spatial epistemology which considers "the power dynamics in the social domain as superimposed upon the materiality of urban space" and "the production of urban spaces as a relational field of politics".

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3. Discourse on informality, and informality in China

3.1 International debate on informality and informal settlements

3.1.1 Tracing the notion of informality

The history of the discourse on informality can be dated back to the emergence of the term 'informal sector' in the 1970s. Hart (1973) draws a distinction between the formal and the informal sectors, from an economic perspective, based on research in Ghana. However, although the concept of an informal sector had been discussed even earlier, the idea was based on the descriptions of the flow of rural-urban migrant workers in the 1950s and 1960s (AlSayyad, 2004) and Lewis's (1954) proposal of a two-sector model to understand the "new migration of people and the manner of their employment" (AlSayyad, 2004, p. 10). According to Hart (1973), the major difference between the formal and informal sectors lay in the types of employment available in each sector: employees in the formal sector earned wage, while the informally-employed poor people in urban areas, with little access to formal jobs, often had no choice but to pursue self-employment. The informal sector, has often been designated as an unprotected urban labour market (Mazumdar, 1976), or simply as the urban poor living in slums or squatter settlements (Moser, 1978, cited in AlSayyad, 2004, p. 10). The division of the economy into formal and informal sectors became a dominant theme after the International Labour Office began to employ this terminology in its studies and reports. The understanding of urbanism thus evolved from a focus on "the social life of settlements to the forms of production within them" (AlSayyad, 2004, p. 10). This dualistic framework may be useful for some policy-makers since it allows the urban poor to survive in difficult economic and physical settings through the low incomes they are able to earn in the informal sector (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011), a solution which does not threaten the interests of the rich (Bromley, 1978).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the notion of informality was expanded to encompass more than just the economic aspects. Two contrasting frames prevailed at that time. One was the crisis frame, in the context of which Hall and Pfeiffer (2000) gave a name to one category of urbanisation: 'informal hypergrowth' cities. These cities, whose emergence was attributed to migration, had been rendered ungovernable and their impact was felt in both developing and fully industrialised countries. The second frame – heroism – was put forward by De Soto (1989, 2000), who regarded informality as 'heroic entrepreneurship' and participants in the informal sector as entrepreneurs. De Soto (1989, p. 14) argued that the "informal economy is the people's spontaneous and creative response to the state's incapacity to satisfy the basic needs of the impoverished masses". Therefore, informality emerged because of excessive state regulations rather than via the dynamics of the labour market (De Soto,

1989, cited in AlSayyad, 2004, p. 13). Despite clear distinctions between the two frames, both regarded informality as essentially separate from formality and compared it to poverty. Implied was "the promise that the informal sector will eventually be integrated into a modern and manageable economy" (Roy, 2005, p. 148). Neither frames recognised "how informality might be a differentiated process embodying varying degrees of power and exclusion" (Roy, 2005, p. 148). Furthermore, regardless of crisis or heroism, Hall and Pfeiffer and De Soto agreed that the urban poor could be enabled to help themselves, thereby dismissing the role of government (Roy, 2005). Their arguments also totally overlooked the earlier observed economic interdependency of the formal and informal systems, evident in linkages between the two systems in such realms as capital, wholesale trade and transportation (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011; McGee, 2009; Santos, 1979).

The understanding of informality was further broadened when AlSayyad (2004) declared 'urban informality' to be a new way of life, thereby extending the notion into the social context and borrowing Wirth's (1938) description of 'a new mode of urban existence'. In the book *Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia* edited by Roy and AlSayyad (2004), cases from the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America were examined and the inherent logic of 'urban informality' was later consolidated by Roy (2005), who regarded informality as a mode of metropolitan urbanisation. While the term 'urban informality' was first employed in Spanish to refer to the informal economy, with an emphasis on forms of employment, it went far beyond its original meaning in Roy and AlSayyad's projects and was adopted to stand for "the social and economic processes that shape, or are manifest in, the urban built environment" (AlSayyad, 2004, p. 28). People used to regard informality as a synonym for marginality and poverty and to consider it a survival strategy of the 'urban informals', the 'urban marginals', or the urban poor. As understanding evolved, however, urban informality was shown to be "an organizing logic which emerges under a paradigm of liberalization", rather than just a set of activities carried out by the poor (AlSayyad, 2004, p. 26). Urban informality came to be seen as a new form of informality bred by liberalisation and globalisation and possessing several distinctive features. First, in the context of urban informality, an individual can be simultaneously affiliated to the formal and informal sectors, with more than one job. Second, informal processes can be seen not only among the urban poor, but also among the lower and middle classes, including those usually considered to be privileged, such as state employees and professionals. Finally, informality takes place in new forms and new geographies, including the rural-urban interface, with developments being closely connected to issues of property ownership (AlSayyad, 2004).

Although 'informality' as a notion only emerged in the 1970s, informality itself is neither a new analytical concept nor a new urban process (AlSayyad, 2004). 'Informality' has existed as an everyday life situation for

centuries. Regulatory mechanisms to limit it were imposed in ancient Asian and Medieval European cities (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011). So perhaps it can be argued that what is actually new is formality, a system only introduced as a means of organising urban society in the nineteenth century, and that the formal-informal dichotomy originated as a result of this unsettling historical process (AlSayyad, 2004, p. 25). In spite of significant attempts to formalise the urbanisation process and urban life, formality may just be one small element in a much larger social system that contains varieties of unregulated, partially regulated and deregulated subsystems (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011). Castells (1983) earlier contended that marginality is manipulated to achieve social control over the poor and their invading land and squatting represents dependency rather than revolution. In this regard, both informality and the state of exception it represents are determined based on the planning and legal apparatus of the government (Roy, 2005, 2009). However, cites are created not just by one group (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011) and informality is a way of place making where spaces in the city are shaped by resistance, contestation and actions that are often deemed illegal by the state (Friedmann, 2007, p. 257).

However, the wider the range of aspects of urban life that 'informality' is employed to deal with, the more difficult it is to operationalise the notion both in academia and in practice. Nuanced research on 'informality' has demonstrated the "structural ambiguity of the term and its ever-changing formations" (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011, p. 8) and the prevailing discourse indicates that informality may no longer be "associated with urban poverty nor with illegality, nor with control of processes" (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011, p. 7).

To dispel the myth of the informality debate, many scholars have suggested going beyond the discourse of urban informality and propose an operational framework of 'informality': for example, by seeking to understand dynamics and the ever-shifting roles of the various actors involved when analysing the negotiation processes concerning informal practice (Etzold *et al.*, 2009; Herrle & Fokdal, 2011; Ley, 2010). Herrle and Fokdal (2011, p. 11) introduced a regime matrix to define negotiation processes through three parameters, namely power, legitimacy and resources. By adopting an actor analysis, key actors and their interactions, both 'formal' and 'informal', were included to understand the dynamics of the system from a governance perspective. More recently, scholars suggested reconsidering informality as "a site of critical analysis", thereby benefiting from "a new perspective that draws on and extends political economy approaches" and gaining an insight into the "process of stratification and disadvantage" (Banks *et al.*, 2019, p. 1). To this end, despite its abundant and nuanced definitions, tools were developed to operationalise the superficial notion of 'informality'.

When informality overlaps into the traditionally perceived formal sector, the question should be asked whether the dichotomy of formal and informal really exists. In many studies, informality strategies have been seen to be employed not only by lower class groups but also by elites (Banks *et al.*, 2019; Roy & AlSayyad, 2004).

Therefore, informality can be comprehended as a zone of exception inhabited by both slum dwellers and the upper classes (Roy, 2011). The boundary between formality and informality is blurry and constantly changing, and can be further confused by the creation of a grey zone resulting from government toleration. There are also "blurry boundaries between the acceptable and non-acceptable, the legal and the 'not so legal'" (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011, p. 6). On the other hand, when most attention is drawn to disadvantaged 'informals', who do not have the option of being 'formal', little attention is paid to those advantaged 'formals' who actively choose to be partly 'informal' (Banks *et al.*, 2019). The relationship between formality and informality should be viewed as a continuum rather than a dichotomy and both elite and lower class group members can be found at various points along the continuum, either trying to gain advantage or to cope with disadvantage (Banks *et al.*, 2019, p. 2).

It can also be said that the fundamental difference does not lie between formality and informality, but in the different degrees of informality (Roy & AlSayyad, 2004). Although definitions of informality can be based on such parameters as whether land tenure is legal or whether constructions comply with land use regulations and building codes, there is a lot more to explore when one takes a close look. Informality should not be read separately, overlooking the underlying complexities, ambiguity and dynamics. Informality is "a series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to one another" (Roy, 2005, p. 148) and the question of formality and informality "can only be answered in perspective of the actors involved" (Etzold *et al.*, 2009, p. 9, cited in Herrle and Fokdal, 2011, p. 7).

3.1.2 Informal settlements and their formalisation

In the 1990s, the application of the term 'informal' in the planning field became popular. It was used to refer to "'unplanned', 'irregular' or illegal settlements that are often (but not always) inhabited by low-income communities and/or rural migrants" (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011, pp. 5-6). Informal urbanisation often takes place in the rural-urban interface, contributing to metropolitan expansion (Roy, 2005). Although the notion of 'informal settlements' was often regarded as a replacement of other terms like spontaneous settlements and unplanned settlements, it did not necessarily equate to settlements without planning or strategic thinking. For example, according to Turner's (1968) study and successive research, informal settlements in Lima were far from being unplanned, with both professional planners and the city government engaged in the development of new *barriadas* in the 1990s. The case of Lima also indicated that there can exist a grey zone where governments may tolerate informal urban development (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011).

In many contexts, the term 'informal settlement' was regarded as a replacement for 'slum'. UN-Habitat (2003, p. 12) defined a slum as: "an area that combines, to various extents, the following characteristics (restricted to the physical and legal characteristics of the settlement, and excluding the more difficult social dimensions): inadequate access to safe water; inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure; poor structural quality of housing; overcrowding; insecure residential status". As a definition, this stressed physical as opposed to socio-economic dimensions. This tendency to exclude social dimensions can be seen in many reports by the UN and Cities Alliance (see, for example, UN-Habitat, 2003; Wakely & Riley, 2011). However, social and institutional aspects do matter when discussing informality. For example, Gilbert (2007) borrows Charles Stokes' (1962) distinction between 'slums of hope' and 'slums of despair' and opposes using such language as 'slums' to refer to poor-quality housing because the heterogeneity of seemingly similar physical spaces should not be overlooked. He also argued that "what is a slum at one point in time may improve, what was an area of hope may deteriorate" (Gilbert, 2007, p. 705). This statement also reflects the dynamics of formality and informality.

Obvious conflicts can arise when it comes to upgrading. The limitations of upgrading policies usually lie within the ideological aspect rather than the spatial aspect, meaning that, while the built environment and physical amenities are upgraded, residents' livelihoods, wages and political capacities can remain unchanged or even 'downgraded' (Roy, 2005). This upgrading dilemma has been called the "aestheticization of poverty" (Roy, 2004). Informal settlements from different countries have been studied (see, for example, different chapters in Roy & AlSayyad, 2004) and it has been demonstrated that specific historical and socio-political contexts and everyday lived realities may give rise to distinct processes of urban informality (Banks *et al.*, 2019). It would be ridiculous to believe that spatial ecology produces social processes (AlSayyad, 2004).

In most developing countries in the Global South, informality is triggered by rural-urban migration and starts with land invasion. In practice, the formal status of residential settlements was often justified according to land tenure, "the mode by which land is held or owned, or the set of relationships among people concerning land or its product", or property rights, defined as "a recognised interest in land or property vested in an individual or group and can apply separately to land or development on it" (Payne, 2001, p. 416). Definitions of property rights can be generated from both an economic and a legal perspective (Barzel, 1997): economic rights take the asset as a commodity, regardless of what form this asset takes, and emphasise the individual's ability to consume the services; legal rights are defined and decided by the government. Tian (2008, p. 283) insisted that "a complete and definite specification of individual property rights diminishes uncertainty and tends to promote the efficient allocation and use of resources". De Soto (1989) advocated the formalisation of informal settlements, claiming that his titling approach produced such benefits as increased land and property values. His

arguments matched the neoliberal urban development strategies supported by agencies like the World Bank but overlooked the fact that the absence of formal titles is the price paid by the urban poor in order to access urban land which they could not otherwise afford (Gilbert, 2002; Payne, 2001; Roy, 2005). Besides, formalisation can result in the deterioration of the situation of vulnerable social groups like tenants living in unauthorised subdivisions when newly-entitled owners increase rents to achieve the maximum value of their assets. An alternative to the arbitrary approach of changing the formal tenure status, namely formalisation, might be "to increase the rights of residents" or "to extend existing customary arrangements", recognising the possibility of intermediate stages along the "continuum from complete illegality to formal tenure and full property rights" and taking incremental steps along the road to improvement (Payne, 2001, p. 427). Informality is a differentiated structure and formalisation, when rudely simplified, can deepen inequality (Roy, 2005). The right to the property can go against "the right to the city" (Lefebvre, 1991), which is essential in urban informality.

3.2 Urban villages – informal settlements in China

3.2.1 Organised informality in China

Most of the research on informality in developing countries in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries was conducted in Africa, the Middle East, and South and South-East Asia (see, for example, Etzold *et al.*, 2009; Hart, 1973; Ley, 2010; Roy, 2009; Roy & AlSayyad, 2004), while largely bypassing rapidly urbanising China. One major reason for this gap may be that, with its socialist system, China was deemed not to be fertile soil for the growth of informality. In the common interpretation of international academics, Chinese cities are rather orderly (Wu *et al.*, 2013, p. 1919), while the growth of informality requires attributes such as "loose development controls, weak enforcement of land use and building laws" and "'informal' labour arrangements" (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011, p. 4).

Nevertheless, informality in China, which is conceptualised by Schoon and Altrock (2014) as 'conceded informality', has attracted major attention in recent years, especially among scholars investigating urban issues. According to Schoon and Altrock, 'conceded informality' emerged in China due to the constant change and legal uncertainty caused by rapid urbanisation (Schoon & Altrock, 2014, p. 214) and it allows for "a flexible management of diverse informal practices depending on their relevance, usefulness and potential threat towards state authority" (Schoon & Altrock, 2014, p. 216). However, informal urbanisation in China may be similar to the same phenomenon in other developing countries, where informal urbanisation mostly happens on the periphery of metropolitan cities and is made possible by specific farmland regulations (Roy, 2005). Similarities

may be drawn with Herrle and Fokdal's (2011, p. 9) research conducted in the Pearl River Delta in China which recorded "tolerated and systematic violation of building regulations, blurred responsibilities, illegal land and labour markets, untransparent and fragmented decision-making procedures, uncontrolled transfer or land use rights etc.". However, the underlying mechanisms are different.

According to Fulong Wu, the root causes of informality are the institutions of the urban-rural dualistic. To be specific, the prime source of Chinese informality is the traditionally relaxed and vague land management and planning control in rural areas (Wu, 2016, p. 342; Wu *et al.*, 2013). In urban areas, land finance is encompassed within formal development and is part of urban expansion. In peri-urban areas, rural land is used by farmers to obtain income from informal development, through housing rentals and illegal sales. Another source of Chinese informality is the underprovision of migrant housing (Wu *et al.*, 2013).

	Formal development	**Informal development**
Spatial forms	Commodity housing estates	Urban villages
Spatial features	Overly designed and packaged	Irregular uses and spontaneous changes
The role of the state	State entrepreneurialism	Absence in social provision
Capital accumulation	Land-driven development	Rural migrants' accommodation
	Land finance	Rental income for property owners
Governance	Homeowners' associations	Villagers' committees
	Property management companies	Village collectives
		Private owners

Table 1: Comparison of formal and informal development in Chinese cities. Source: Wu, 2016, p. 344.

It has been pointed out by many scholars that informality may be a result of governance ambiguity, created deliberately by the state. Echoing Roy's opinion, informality in China cannot be simply attributed to state incompetence and weak governance. Informality may be intended by the government, encouraged by "giving much discretion to developers through exception of governance" and regarded as "being a practical solution of labour reproduction, as seen in self-building in urban villages" (Wu, 2016, p. 346). Wu *et al.* (2013) define informality in China as legal ambiguity bred and encouraged by the strength of the dual urban-rural land ownership system. Similarly, Li (1996) claims that changes in property rights in China have been ambiguous and that, by deliberately creating such ambiguity, the government has ensured both more flexibility in its revising of the rules (Cheung, 1986) and in resolving potential property conflicts in its favour (Ho, 2001; Po, 2011), as well as more local autonomy to pursue entrepreneurship (Tian, 2008, p. 284). This has contributed to economic reform success, while simultaneously leading to corruption encouraged by the uncertainty embedded in the unsystematic approach (Oi, 1996; Rawski, 2001; Tian, 2008, p. 284).

One of the major issues associated with informality is the ambiguity of property rights. Property rights can be understood both in a narrow sense and in a wider one. In many cases, property rights refer to specific ownership, while in others they are understood as "a bundle of rights including the entitlement to the benefit brought about by ownership to the more general idea of membership" (Wu & Webster, 2010, p. 4). Barzel (1997) suggested that property rights contain legal rights and economic rights. While the former can enhance the latter, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for the latter to exist (Barzel, 1997). In order to precisely define legal rights, the state and society usually have to bear high transactional costs, including those "incurred in the operation of an institutional arrangement" and those "incurred in adopting or changing an institution" (Cheung, 1986, cited in Tian, 2008, p. 296). Ambiguity in property rights existed in the institutions of urban-rural dualism before market reform and "has flourished and diversified since the introduction of market mechanisms" (Wu *et al.*, 2013, p. 1930). Ambiguous property rights facilitated economic growth in China during the transitional period and enabled the privilege derived from "informal de facto property rights", as is commonly seen in other developing countries where "the formalization of these rights lags behind due to the limited capacity of state administrations" (Tian, 2008, p. 300).

Property rights have not been comprehensively defined in China, especially in rural land administration, and collective ownership allows for ambiguity in determining land development (Zhu, 2004). When a transaction associated with rural land is undertaken, the costs may include not only those associated with negotiations between the collective and the state but also costs to cover the putting down of potential political unrest (Tian, 2008, p. 296). Fearing these elevated costs, the state tends to tolerate the poor delineation of property rights to collective land. As a result, the land market in urban villages remains informal. This means that villagers enjoy fewer rights than urban residents, but informality leaves the collective assets in their hands, resulting in wealth capture when some of the wealth spills over from the state into the public domain and the villagers use resources to capture it. De Soto (2000) insists that fuzzy property rights may be harmful for the informal sector because they make it difficult for the poor to claim the rights. In contrast, Smart (2010) argues that such fuzziness in property rights brings benefit to the informal sector in China, i.e. urban villages, since the politically powerful cannot enforce dispossession, thus allowing the less privileged villagers to negotiate unclear property rights. Nevertheless, the amount of informal housing is decreasing rapidly due to large-scale urban redevelopment (Liu *et al.*, 2018, p. 483).

While urban informality is often understood as a self-organised process, China's urban informality is mediated through several organisational layers, such as municipalities, district governments and village committees, so can be better understood as a kind of 'organized informality' (Zhang *et al.*, 2003). This organised complexity is

further structured by a set of invisible institutional boundaries (He *et al.*, 2010), which follow from the institution of the dual land system, the *hukou* institution and the institution of village governance (Wang *et al.*, 2009). Within these boundaries, the governance of informal sectors is also different from what has been observed in other countries. Whereas one of the most important characteristics of informal sectors is that they are beyond governmental regulatory control, informal sectors in China have been proved to be governed by a special regulatory system which distinguishes itself "from the generally known regulation" and also "from that of pure informal governance out of governmental regulation" (Xue & Huang, 2008, p. 1398). On the other hand, despite the conceptualisation of 'organized informality', it must also be pointed out that the boundary between 'urban' and 'rural' is often "more blurred than portrayed by administrative delimitations" (Tacoli, 1998, p. 147).

To understand such organised informality and account for the institutional complexities, Herrle and Fokdal (2011) argued that the concept of informality is inadequate and that a focus on power, legitimacy and resources from various actors is more useful. Wu *et al.* (2013) argue that informality should be studied with an awareness of the subtlety of the notion, and overgeneralised interpretation and confused debate should be avoided. Since the notion of informality, informal settlements, informal economy, etc. has been widely discussed and has broad meanings, the definition should be purpose-specific when conducting specific research.

3.2.2 Informal settlements in China – urban villages

The urban village is one of the most typical form of informal settlement in the Chinese context (Wang *et al.*, 2009; Wu, 2016). Urban villages used to be rural settlements with legal property rights to rural land but are now surrounded by urban development (Liu *et al.*, 2018, p. 484). The landscape where rural villages are surrounded by planned urban expansion echoes McGee's (2015) observation of the coexistence of urban and rural settlements in South-East Asia (Wong *et al.*, 2018). The developing mechanism of urban villages is as follows. In the process of urban development, some villages are partially converted from rural to urban, that is to say, the farmland or cultivated part of the village is transformed into urban land, while the status of residential land is left unchanged in order to reduce compensation and time costs (Tian, 2008, p. 282). The indigenous villagers left with little farmland start to extend their houses and rent out rooms to newcomers to the city. To increase their income, they try to maximize the floor area within or beyond their legal housing plots and the settlements usually become informal, legally, spatially or socially.

Earlier research has focuses differently when studying urban villages. For example, Western geographers found that residents in urban villages shared cultural or racial characteristics (Gregory *et al.*, 2011). Other scholars

(see, for example, Bao & Wu, 2002), in their studies of peasants who had lost their land focuses on villages on the city fringe, where compensation from land requisition is not sufficient for indigenous villagers to make a living. Tian (2008) investigated the land market and the associated property rights in urban villages and emphasised the collective ownership of land in his identification of an urban village. As Tian (2008, p. 282) points out, the focus and intention behind the identification of an urban village should be made clear.

'Urban village' is the most widely used translation of the Chinese *chengzhongcun*. The English term 'urban village' can be dated back to Herbert J. Gans' (1962) book *The Urban Villagers*, so originated within a Western context. However, the urban villages phenomenon in the Chinese context is totally different from its Western counterpart. Other terms that focus on different characteristics are also used to describe these settlements:

- Villages within the city, villages amid the city, villages in the city: many Chinese scholars have adopted terms directly indicating the physical position of these urban villages, such as 'villages within cities' (Lan, 2001), 'villages amid the city' (Shen et al., 2006) and 'villages-in-the-city' (Chung, 2010).

- Urbanised villages: Altrock and Schoon (2011) adopt the term 'urbanised villages' to refer to the various changes taking place during the rapid urbanisation process, in which the urbanised villages themselves stand for multifaceted characteristics.

- Urban(ising) villages: Herrle *et al.* (2014) prefers to analyse the existing variation of these former settlements and the term 'urban(ising) village' signifies being in a process leading to urbanisation. What matters is the process, rather than any stage in the process. This echoes the opinion held by many scholars that urban villages are transitional spaces that will eventually be incorporated into the formal planning apparatus (Lin *et al.*, 2014; Liu *et al.*, 2018; Schoon & Altrock, 2014)[8].

In addition to translations that differ only slightly according to the characteristics the scholars wish to emphasise, the villages can be categorised based on their spatial relationship to the city's main built-up area. According to Wang *et al.* (2009), there are three types of urban or semi-urbanised villages in Shenzhen, including[9]:

- *Chengzhongcun*: villages located inside the main built-up areas;

- *Chengbiancun*: semi-urbanised villages located in interface zones of the main built-up areas;

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[8] This sentence is derived from an earlier paper of the author (Yang & van Oostrum, 2020).
[9] The following explanations of the three types are directly quoted from the paper (Wang *et al.*, 2009, p. 960).

- *Chengwaicun*; semi-urbanised villages in suburban areas or industrialised towns.

This categorisation is based on the municipal government of Shenzhen's 1992 imposition of regulations to collectively change the *hukou* status of indigenous villagers in villages inside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) from agricultural to non-agricultural and its decision in 2003 to urbanise all the remaining rural areas outside the SEZ. This means that, regardless of their spatial relationship to the city's main built-up areas, villages in Shenzhen are all urbanised from an institutional perspective. Although the institutions may be different from those of urban villages in other cities, the criteria for categorising are worth mentioning.

Regardless of its specific location, an urban village is often a good choice of for a migrant population, since it can offer such advantages of an inner-city location as low prices, easy accessibility, a good business environment, a large potential market, etc. (Xue & Huang, 2008). As a result, urban villages accommodate two classes of resident: the landlord class (indigenous villagers) and the tenant class (mainly migrants) (Chung, 2010; He *et al.*, 2010; Liu *et al.*, 2018, p. 486). The once-prevailing criticism of urban villages by the Chinese media was summed up by Tian (2008, p. 283) as "chaotic land use, dilapidated housing construction, disintegration of public security and the environment, severe infrastructure deficiencies, intensified social disorder, large windfall gains for urban villagers and the deterioration of the cityscape". In recent years, such problems have been better understood and some of them have been addressed by either the municipality or the local village community. Though many of these problems still exist, it can be deduced that the image of urban villages has improved (see, for example, the urban villages chosen as study cases in Wang *et al.*, 2009; Wu *et al.*, 2013).

A considerable number of scholars recognise the urban villages' contributions in supplementing affordable and accessible state housing with self-built residential units (Li, 2004; Tian, 2008; Zhang *et al.*, 2003). Besides providing affordable housing for rural migrants, the urban villages in China play a similar role to informal settlements in other developing countries in that they provide an entry point to the city for newcomers of the same origin (Liu et al., 2014; Ma & Xiang, 1998; Zhang, 2001; Zhang et al., 2003), see elaborary on 'arrival city' (Saunders, 2011) in Section 4.1.2. They provide the migrant with "a low-rent enclave within which to try and build a productive urban life" (Wu *et al.*, 2013, p. 1926).

Though they are compared to informal settlements in other countries, self-help housing in urban villages in China are quite different. The biggest difference lies in the driving force behind the stakeholder group's decision to develop the housing. In other countries, self-help houses in 'arrival city' are built by the migrants themselves, whereas the houses in urban villages in China are built by the indigenous villagers for rental income and the migrants are tenants (Tian, 2008, p. 292). Rapidly growing cities and government's investment in public

infrastructures in surrounding areas have led to rising land values as those areas become prime locations and the indigenous villagers are the beneficiaries (Tian, 2008, p. 292). A survey on the residents' attitudes to renovation in an urban village in Guangzhou revealed that the indigenous villagers' powerful economic position had enhanced their political position, raising their expectations of greater compensation for land requisition (Tian, 2008, p. 298). Wang *et al.* (2009, p. 967) argue that, compared to villagers and committee leaders from villages in suburban areas, those from villages near the city centre have been exposed to the urbanisation process for a longer period of time and are therefore "more experienced in managing their affairs and in dealing with municipal authorities" and often able to "find ways to evade control policies". However, the migrants' interests are totally ignored. The state's preferred strategy for creating more governable spaces is demolition (Wu *et al.*, 2013, p. 1930).

The creation of urban villages is not the result of a state-initiated programme, but the gentrification in a larger scale has a huge impact on this particular spatial form, leading to its "constantly being made, unmade and then remade" (Zhan, 2018, p. 1538). Zhan (2018, p. 1538) points out that local residents' active involvement in the market and specifically-layered state control contribute jointly to the production of space in the form of urban villages. Zhan (2018, p. 1538) analyses the relationship between urban villages as an urban production site and Chinese and global capitalism and concludes that: on the one hand, the vibrancy of the informal economy within and influenced by the urban villages helps urban villages resist to big capital; on the other hand, as crucial sites for the reproduction of labour power, urban villages remain fundamental to Chinese and global capitalism. Urban villages are "very much a phenomenon of socio-spatial segregation rooted in deeply institutionalized urban-rural administrative dualism" (Wong *et al.*, 2018).

4. Discourse on migration and internal rural-urban migration in China

4.1 International debate on migration

4.1.1 International and internal migration

Migration is defined by the International Migration Organisation as "the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a State" (IOM, 2004, p. 137) and 'internal migration', specifically, as, "the movement of people within a State involving the establishment of a new temporary or permanent residence" (IOM, 2004, p. 108).

When seeking to understand why migration takes place, regardless of type, two traditional approaches based on 'push-pull' factors prevail. From the neo-classical perspective, the influences at play are the individuals' rational decision to migrate when faced with "hardships in source areas (the 'push' factors)" and "perceived comparative advantages in destination areas (the 'pull' factors)" (Tacoli, 1998, p. 154). From the structuralist perspective, however, individual migrants are not capable of making their own decisions, but are rather seen as victims of the "macro-social, historical and dialectical processes such as the socio-spatial restructuring of production at the national and global levels" (Tacoli, 1998, p. 154). While international migration can be attributed to various factors such as war, natural disasters and political persecution, internal migration, especially rural-urban migration, is predominantly motivated by economic factors (Gu *et al.*, 1999). Economic migrants go in search of economic opportunities (IOM, 2004), income gap between their source area and the area of destination usually being the main determinant of their migration (Tacoli, 1998, p. 154). These migrants are employed as migrant workers in the receiving countries or areas.

While globalisation makes it possible to employ the cheapest labour through the free mobility of capital (Sassen, 1990), it also aggravates the imbalance of employment relations and the lack of labour protection around the world according to the 'Global City' hypothesis originally proposed in 1991 by Saskia Sassen (2013).

Sassen (2013) argues that there is a higher risk of immigrants in global cities, compared to those in non-global cities, of being exposed to highly precarious work. Scholars have documented the phenomenon of economic migrants often having to take jobs below their skill levels and accept the most precarious labour contracts because of their vulnerability as newcomers with less familiarity with and fewer rights within the labour market. Their work is usually insecure, insufficient and poorly paid (McDowell *et al.*, 2009). For example, in a study (McDowell *et al.*, 2009) of economic migrants in Greater London and their relationship with the precarious jobs

market, economic migrants were found to be mostly employed by an agency, rather than the organisation they worked for, and to have temporary contracts. Furthermore, the government was reluctant to regulate equal work-related benefits for these agency workers in line with those enjoyed by other workers in the labour market, and UK immigration policy, together with the points system introduced by the government to manage migration flows, had the effect of further exacerbating the vulnerable position of these migrants. This kind of informal employment can be a major factor leading to precarious work (Sun & Chen, 2017), which includes "all forms of work involving job insecurity, limited statutory entitlements, both in the workplace and to social benefits, low wages and high risks of ill-health" (McDowell *et al.*, 2009, p. 7).

A comparison study (Sun & Chen, 2017) of cities in China indicates that this hypothesis may not be applicable to domestic migrants. This study found that migrant workers in the global city of Shanghai were provided with better protection within the labour market than their counterparts in other cities. The reason for this contradiction of the 'Global City' hypothesis may lie in the fact that, compared to other developed countries worldwide, the labour market in China is immature and still developing and globalisation can contribute to the promotion of institutionalisation and standardisation of labour relations and the policies related to it.

While many studies have investigated international migration and internal migration, it is not possible in either case to know the precise number of migrants. National and international censuses report on population movement, but the figures can be unreliable because of the large number of migrants who are either temporary or seasonal (Tacoli, 1998, p. 147). This thesis focuses on internal migration, which, in many cases, is synonymous with rural-urban migration.

Many countries now enact policies to control rural-urban migration, out of concern for over-urbanisation, but rural-urban migration was viewed positively until the mid-1960s (Tacoli, 1998, p. 50). Lewis (1954, cited in Tacoli, 1998, p. 149) claimed that rural-urban migration from densely-populated rural areas of the Global South would not lead to declines in agricultural productivity. Studies of permanent settlements of migrant workers and their families in urban areas were popular at the time (Tacoli, 1998). However, it was not long before the concept of an urban informal sector was introduced (see, for example, Hart, 1973, detailed discussion on this discourse can be found in Chapter 3), due to the fact that the formal industrial sector was unable to absorb the fast-growing urban populations (Tacoli, 1998, p. 150). More recently, scholars concerned about uncontrolled urbanisation are likely to "portray urban growth as due mainly to rural-urban migration" and policies have been drawn up to control rural-urban migration, whose effect is often to put increasing pressure on the poor and the middle classes (Tacoli, 1998, p. 151).

In addition to the migrants moving from rural areas or from small cities to large cities, there has also been an influx of rural migrants into secondary cities (Tacoli, 1998, p. 151). However, although most internal migration is rural to urban, migration in the other direction – urban-rural – also exists, caused mainly by unemployment and the pursuit of lower living costs (see for example Potts, 1995). This is referred to as 'return migration' (Tacoli, 1998, p. 151). According to Tacoli (1998, p. 151), this group of migrants probably have important influences on the areas they return to, both as competitors against local people for the scarce resources and as the facilitators to introduce technological and socio-cultural innovations.

4.1.2 The 'arrival city' and migrants' householding strategies

Saunders (2011) introduced the term 'arrival city' to refer to the in-between spaces accommodating migrants in the receiving countries (for international migrants) or areas and cities (for internal migrants). These spaces, on the urban outskirts, that vary from slums and shanty towns in the Global South to ethnic arrival neighbourhoods like Chinatowns in developed countries, with their transitional characteristics, provide migrants with affordable housing and employment opportunities and contribute to their successful transition to the city. After the introduction of the term 'arrival city', other scholars (Taubenböck *et al.*, 2018, p. 150) also began to use it, to avoid "terminological imprecision and related conceptual restrictions of terms such as 'slum' or 'informal settlement'".

Some arrival cities fail to fulfil the aforementioned positive functions and descend into spaces with substandard spatial quality and a high potential for violence and crime. Multiple factors can lead to their failure, including substandard spatial quality, barriers to entrepreneurship (in the informal sector), physical barriers to the city and denial of access to citizenship (Saunders, 2011). Regarding this last, Saunders (2011) gives the example of the Kreuzberg neighbourhood in Berlin, an 'arrival city' hosting primarily Turkish migrants, which fails because the government has denied the migrants access to German citizenship. The concept of citizenship goes beyond nationality and can be extended to the right to public facilities and welfare.

It should be noted that households, rather than individuals, play the major role in the decision-making process in the era of globalisation and accompanying migration (Douglass, 2006; Schmidt-Kallert, 2014). Both in their places of origin and in their migration destinations, migrant households adopt a variety of survival strategies. A major focus of studies of international immigration is transnationalism, which is defined as "the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement" (Schiller *et al.*, 1992, p. 1). Liu *et al.* (2014) reviewed literature on transnationalism and found out that the

emphasis of these studies has been shifting. Previously, they focused on the migrants' hyper-mobility – the way they moved from one place to another – and how their immigration affected the national political and cultural systems. More recently, the recent studies focused more on the mutuality of the relationship between external connection and local embeddedness.

In the case of rural-urban migration, households with family members who have migrated from rural to urban sometimes opt for householding strategies that combine agricultural and non-agricultural income sources (Tacoli, 1998). Multi-spatial households, in which some family members migrate and the rest stay behind, often maintain strong links between the rural and urban residences (Tacoli, 1998, p. 149). Moreover, for some migrants, "straddling the rural-urban divide" is "an important part for survival strategies" (Tacoli, 1998, p. 149). One study (Schmidt-Kallert, 2014, p. 63) of multilocational and split households pointed out that people tended to minimise the risks of migration by keeping a second home in their place of origin, a fact often ignored in conventional migration research. Most experts agree that "non-permanent migration has become the dominant type of migration in our century, at least in the Global South", and that most of these migrants "live in multi-locational household arrangements" (Schmidt-Kallert, 2014, p. 63). This echoes the concept of "global householding" (Douglass, 2006, cited in Schmidt-Kallert, 2014, p. 64). Other scholars appeal for an interpretation of movement across different localities within the same country with multi-scalar perspectives (Brickell & Datta, 2011; Liu *et al.*, 2014; Smith, 2011).

However, as Schmidt-Kallert (2014) argues, when conducting research into cases featuring multi-locality, transnational migration and domestic migration need not necessarily be distinguished from each other. Given that no agreement on the definition and categories of multi-locality has been reached, Schmidt-Kallert (2014) calls for more qualitative research into migrants' livelihood strategies for a comprehensive understanding of the discourse in different cultural and social contexts. An example of how to explore migrants' personal stories is offered through the following set of questions (Schmidt-Kallert, 2014, p. 64): "What problems did they encounter when they first left their village of origin? How did they find a foothold in the city? Who prompted their migration decision? What shaped their aspirations? How did the roles within the household gradually change over time?"

4.2 Internal migration in China

4.2.1 Urbanisation in China and its accompanying migration defined by *hukou*

Migration is not a recent phenomenon in China. For example, Shanghai was already a metropolitan city of three million people in the 1920s and its population soon grew to five million due to a huge influx of migrants from the impoverished countryside hoping for a better life (Friedmann, 2007, p. 266). The notion of city in China dates back more than 2,000 years, while the sense of being urban coincides with the onset of modernisation in the late nineteenth century. In imperial China, a city's walls marked it as the administrative capital of a region and a high percentage of a city's population were temporary residents or visitors (Friedmann, 2007, p. 262). Because of differences in language, food, and customs, as well as many other everyday elements, these temporary residents were constantly aware of their origins, which marked their identities as different. Complete integration into the established social order of the city was always difficult. Many of these temporary residents established or joined so-called 'homeland' or 'native-space' associations, in order to maintain their native-space emotional attachments (Friedmann, 2007, p. 263).

More recently, rural-urban migration has been widely recognised as the main contributor to China's urbanisation (Wu, 2009). Since the late 1980s, there has been a huge number of internal migrations in China (Hao *et al.*, 2011). Migrants in China are officially defined by the *hukou* system, which ties people to their place of birth. When someone moves outside their *hukou* place, they are identified as a migrant. The *hukou* system is one of the instruments of control inherited from the socialist period and has led to a more pronounced urban-rural hierarchy and a regime with no shortage of migrant labour (Fan, 2004). Before its reform, *hukou* was a kind of immutable membership (Wu, 2010), but in the post-socialist period, has become "a more open and fluid process, featuring "many contingencies and flexibilities" (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2808). For example, university graduates with a *hukou* from rural areas or other cities are able to transfer their *hukou* status to the city they work in if they are a state enterprise employee. Many indigenous villagers in urban villages have also been entitled to a city *hukou* because their collective land was requisitioned by the state.

Urban migrants are a subaltern social class in China's rising economic globalisation, made so by the particular institutional arrangements (Qian & He, 2012). The *hukou* system is a socially produced strategy for dividing the urban and the rural socio-spatially, so that uneven development across time and space can be realised. This mode of uneven development has been vital for capital accumulation and production, not only in the socialist period, but also after economic reform (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2808). When it comes to migrant workers in cities,

it is the collective exploitation of migrants' labour value that is embedded in the *hukou* system. This proves conducive to global capitalist production and, by operating in this manner, "the state has reinforced the construction of differences, defined by *hukou* status, of locality, class, and gender" (Fan, 2004, p. 301).

Some scholars have suggested that the *hukou* system could weaken China's national competitiveness, and that rural-urban migration, as well as migration from small to big cities should be encouraged in order to contribute to the country's development (Lu, 2016). Lu (2016) echoes Lewis's opinion (1954) that marginal productivity can be minimum when the population is dense. The productivity of the agricultural industry is limited by the fixed size of the farmland. Therefore, only when more of the rural population migrates to work in other industries in the city can the remaining farmers have access to more resources and better welfare. Meanwhile, with a denser population in the urban area, aggregation and scale effects can be achieved (Lu, 2016).

Based on his observations of the rural-to-urban transition of villages in Shenzhen, Wu (2009) concluded that, in the course of this process, migrant workers usually experienced a number stages: from their initial arrival as a small group of workers, through growth into the main labour force in the industrial and construction sectors, to a complex and dynamic group decreasingly employed in the secondary sector and increasingly in the service sector. Wong *et al.* (2007, p. 32) summarised the main characteristics of rural migrant workers based on the 2000 census carried out by the State Statistical Bureau, concluding that: they are mostly young people whose education level is higher than the average in their place of origin; there are more men than women; the majority are employed in the private sector, in factories and the service industries; their working hours are normally long; their household incomes are lower than those of the urban residents but higher than incomes in their place of origin; many have "dual occupations", meaning that, in addition to their employment in the city, they also do seasonal farm work. However, it must be pointed out that most research into domestic migration focuses on rural-urban migrants (see Fan & Wang, 2008; Liu, 2005; Solinger, 1999; Wong *et al.*, 2007). There is a paucity of relevant studies on urban-to-urban migrants, but these are normally perceived as a group with high educational levels and better working environments (Sun & Chen, 2017).

It is true, however, that the practice of naming and categorising social groups is closely linked to social power, and the deliberate creation of categories not only fulfils the function of providing descriptions but also contributes to shaping and reshaping power relations among differentiated social groups, as in the case of China's internal migrants, frequently referred to as a 'floating population' (Bourdieu, 1991, cited in Huang & Yi, 2015). The term 'floating population' has been widely used in academic research and in government reports on migration in China (see, for example, Lo & Jiang, 2006) to indicate their 'floating' status, both institutionally and socio-economically. Migrants are referred to as 'floaters' in Chinese, which suggests "an uncertain past, an

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unreliable present and an unknown future" (Solinger, 1999). Lo and Jiang (2006, p. 103) also argue that the huge floating population is "socially disorganized and has no attachment, commitment, or involvement in communities". Ingrained hostility from locals towards migrants is obvious and many scholars find that these 'floaters' may "be tolerated but not loved" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 275).

Migrants are often stereotyped as being associated with high crime rates and a lack of civility due to an absence of external controls and restraints (see, for example, Lo & Jiang, 2006; Qian & He, 2012). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the media often portrayed migrant workers negatively and local residents in the cities cultivated an image of migrants as stupid and ignorant (Wong *et al.*, 2007, p. 36), a view that was shared by the policy makers (Liu *et al.*, 2014). As a result, they often faced discrimination from urban residents and persecution from policy makers (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2809). According to Young's (1990) discussion of social justice, migrants in China were institutionally oppressed in four ways, three of which – exploitation, marginalisation and powerlessness – were attributable to the social division of labour, while the fourth was cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism refers to the situation in which "the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one's own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one's group and mark it out as the *other*" (Young, 1990, pp. 58-59, emphasis in original). A more recent policy implemented in Beijing has similar echoes of cultural imperialism, defining migrants or a 'floating population' with low educational attainment and low income as 'low-end' population[10]. The policies around low-end population and the associated socio-spatial phenomenon will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Similarly, Wong *et al.* (2007, p. 33) conducted research into the marginalised lives of migrant workers and conceptualised marginalisation in three ways: "the involuntary exclusion of an individual from participating in a society", "a state of relative deprivation" and "a process of excluding an individual migrant from participation in some areas of social life that are viewed as essential in a given society".

Although the construction of a shared group consciousness and a spirit of alignment among vulnerable groups is advocated and deemed to be helpful for the empowerment of the migrants (Qian & He, 2012), little evidence has been demonstrated that the bargaining power of migrants can be enhanced without entitlement to resources. Wong *et al.* (2007, p. 39) suggested helping marginalised migrant workers organise themselves into economically or socially oriented networks in order to improve their lives. The researchers insisted that central

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[10] See link: https://web.archive.org/web/20160803003348/http://env.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0801/c1010-28599290.html. According to Wikipedia, the term "low-end population" emerged in the 2000s (see link https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/北京低端人口) but gained common currency in mainstream media and government papers after it appeared in an article published by the *Renmin Daily* newspaper in August, 2016.

and local governments should guide and strengthen the development of informal mutual-aid organisations among migrants, which are mostly loosely organised, to help them settle in urban cities.

Rural migrants are often depicted as "passive and powerless sojourners driven by regional development gaps and constrained by the *hukou* system", while their "agency and subjectivity during the process of migration" are rarely attended to (Liu *et al.*, 2014, p. 3089).

4.2.2 Migrants in urban villages

There is usually extreme mobility and fluidity in the populations of peri-urban areas, which have witnessed mixed land use, with agriculture, industry and suburban development (Tacoli, 1998, p. 148). As Tacoli (1998, p. 148) reported, along with their transformation, the peri-urban areas are often witnesses to "the marginalization of both rural and urban poor".

More than 20 years ago, Wang (2000) stated clearly that the urban poor consist of both poor official urban residents and poor rural-urban migrants. The housing problems of the former group have been recognised, while that of the latter is overlooked. Migrants' options for accommodation in the city include overcrowded dormitories, makeshift arrangements on construction sites and rooms in indigenous villagers' houses on the urban periphery (Friedmann, 2007, p. 271).

Zhan (2018, p. 1528) categorises residents in urban villages into three groups, according to their market roles and relations to means of production: 1) indigenous villagers with entitlement to homes and income from the rental market; 2) migrants who invest money and labour in running a small business; and 3) migrants with little accessible land or capital who are employed in the labour market. The intention to distinguish between groups of migrants with different resources should be recognised, but the distinctions remain weak and unclear. Regardless of what resources they might have, migrants do not enjoy tenancy security in urban villages and are easily evicted when a village faces demolition (Liu *et al.*, 2018, p. 484). Many studies reveal that urban villages are usually regarded as temporary shelter by rural migrants. They know they will leave one day, either when population control policies are tightened or when they can afford better housing elsewhere (see Zhan, 2018).

Tian (2008, p. 298) investigated the renovation of urban villages in Guangzhou and argued that "any renovation program will cause the redistribution of interests among the stakeholders, and it will not succeed unless a policy that is beneficial to both village committees and villagers is adopted". This implies the reality that migrants are not taken into consideration when urban villages are redeveloped and that the migrants' short-sighted focus on

affordable housing and indifference to the urban village's future are not difficult to comprehend. The unbalanced distribution of social power and its related infrastructures of social control lead to the structural marginality of rural migrants (Qian & He, 2012). By adopting the term 'structural marginality', not only the unequal distribution of material interests is represented, but also the normalisation of a set of unbalanced social relations. Social power in this regard functions around the mode of 'manipulation', by which it carefully manages "the constitution of social relations, the production of divided urban spaces, and the control and regulation of differentiated social subjects" (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2805). Wu (2010) has acknowledged the vulnerable position of migrants and attributed their inferiority to the fact that China defines citizenship institutionally rather than territorially. Solinger (1999) was the first to employ the notion of 'citizenship' proposed by Marshall to demonstrate the vulnerability of migrant workers and Wu (2010) argued that under state socialism 'citizenship' was practised by state institutions.

For example, internal migrants in China are treated as outsiders, with no access to welfare benefits in their arrival cities. In this regard, "their situation is similar to that of 'undocumented immigrants' who are not covered by the system of citizenship" (Wu & Rosenbaum, 2008, cited in Wu, 2010, p.85). One can easily argue that the monetary value of migrant labour in the city is not determined by the local labour market but rather on a national scale. As Wu (2010, p. 85) argued, migrants' "poverty is linked to poverty in rural areas". The reason migrant workers are often in poverty is because they are victims of the privatisation of public services, which they cannot easily afford (Wu, 2010).

With the transformation towards a multi-scalar state, the Chinese government promotes a territorial form of grassroots governance based on the structure of the communities (Wu, 2010). Grassroots governance takes the form of neighbourhood residents' committees in urban areas and village committees in rural areas, and is linked to property management. China's market-oriented reforms have been described as "a process of 'clarifying property rights'" (Wu, 2010, p. 87), and claims have been made that citizenship is also becoming propertied (Roy, 2003). Where citizenship is tied to property ownership, a "lack of property rights means the denial of the right to participate" (Wu, 2010, p. 81). Webster and Zhao (2010, p. 59) compared how little rural migrants benefited from urbanisation compared to indigenous villagers in urban villages and how this was attributed to the "lack of scarcity of low-cost urban labour" and the "scarcity of peri-urban collectively owned land". According to a survey on housing conditions in urban villages in six large Chinese cities[11], the average living space per capita for indigenous villagers was 43.58 per square metres, while that for migrants was 14.56 square

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[11] Guangzhou, Kunming, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xi'an and Harbin. Beijing was not included in this survey.

metres (Liu & He, 2010, p. 196). The only mechanism for migrants to share in the benefits of urbanisation, including public goods and services, is participation in the labour market (Webster & Zhao, 2010, pp. 77-71) and they have little bargaining power in either the labour or rental markets.

Lacking secure tenure, migrants often suffer displacement in the urban villages. While 'displacement' commonly refers to physical eviction, the term has been broadened within the residential context to cover a variety of situations experienced by migrants (Liu *et al.*, 2018, p. 485). In addition to physical displacement, these include:

- *Direct economic displacement*: when a households is forced out of its home because of rent increases (Bernt & Holm, 2009; Davidson, 2008);

- *Indirect economic displacement (gentrification)*: displacement in situ, which is when residents remain in a gentrified neighbourhood despite an unreasonable increase in rent (Vigdor *et al.*, 2002);

- *Symbolic displacement (loss of place)*: the social aspect, "the perception of the place or the lived experiences of individuals" (Atkinson, 2015; Davidson, 2008; Lefebvre, 1991).

Scholars have also tried to explain the invisibility of displaced migrants as a social group and have conducted research into the impact that redevelopment of urban villages has on migrants (see, for example, Liu *et al.*, 2018, on Huangbeiling Village in Shenzhen). Liu *et al.* (2018, p. 483) argue that displaced migrants are often invisible to scholars because of the difficulty of tracking them down after they have been relocated and, through their study, tried to make this group more visible. They noticed, for example, Liu *et al.* (2018, p. 483), that migrants who have been physically displaced are likely to make short-distance moves due to "place dependence", "the presence of social ties" and "limited information about and access to other neighbourhoods". On the other hand, when an urban village is demolished, the demand for alternative affordable housing rises among evicted migrants, pushing them to other urban villages on the farther outskirts of the city (Wu *et al.*, 2013, p. 1930).

Many scholars (see, for example, Song *et al.*, 2008; Tian, 2008) have insisted that urban villages should be preserved as migrant enclaves. But Qian and He (2012) argue that, despite the affordability of informal housing in urban villages, it is not a feasible long-term solution for addressing the vulnerability of the migrant group. A distinction should be made between *negative freedom* and *positive freedom*. The former is when a group is not interfered with or otherwise disturbed by the dominant social group, whereas the latter is when that group is free to proactively claim their social, economic and political rights. In this case, the preservation of migrant enclaves could very likely lead to the perpetuation of the existing system of inequality.

4.2.3 Migrants' linkage to places of origin and the destination city

In order to understand rural-urban migration, not only the urban pole, the receiving area, but also the rural pole, the sending area, needs to be researched (Friedmann, 2006, p. 445).Various strategies are employed by rural migrants to improve their social and economic wellbeing. Among these are the splitting of households and the practice of some family members moving back and forth between their original rural homes and their adopted urban cities in pursuit of maximal economic returns and minimal risks (Fan, 2009; Fan *et al.*, 2011; Fan & Wang, 2008; Liu *et al.*, 2014; Zhu & Chen, 2009). A split-household family refers to a situation "where family members who under normal circumstances would be living in the same place are in actuality living in separate places" (Fan *et al.*, 2011, p. 2166). Migrant workers who move back and forth straddle city and countryside and the money the send back to their hometowns is a major source of income and savings for the family members left behind (Fan, 2002; Fan *et al.*, 2011; Yang, 2000). Several studies have demonstrated that migrant workers send back most of their income as remittances to invest in housing or small business (Fan & Wang, 2008; Ma, 2002). For example, one study (Wong *et al.*, 2007, p. 33) of a group of rural-urban migrants in Shenzhen showed that about half of them sent fifty percent of their incomes back home.

When it comes to the split-household strategy, the group whose role is most critical and who are most impacted by the decision are children. In China, education has for long been considered the major means of social mobility and one of the major motivations for parents to migrate is to earn sufficient funds for their children's education (Huang *et al.*, 2018). For children in migrant families, different family arrangements lead to different kinds of parental absence. In 2010, there were 97 million children in migrant families, among whom nearly two thirds were left-behind children while the remainder migrated with their parents (or parent) to their working cities (Huang *et al.*, 2018, p. 1). Family arrangements influence the children in various ways, "ranging from the macro regional and community context through the quality of the school to the household environment" (Huang *et al.*, 2018, p. 2). However, it has been proved that housing conditions have little effect on children's educational well-being (Huang *et al.*, 2018).

It should be noted that the institutional context discourages migrants from taking their children with them to the cities (Huang *et al.*, 2018, p. 16). Since the budgets for state schools are allocated through municipal governments based on the locally-registered population, admitting migrant children would be an extra burden for local governments (Wong *et al.*, 2007, p. 36). Relatively high education endorsement fees were often required for the admission of migrant children in the 1990s. Although, in 2001, the Chinese government urged local governments and local public schools to take responsibility for the education of migrants' children,

implementation varies from place to place. For example, a 'migrant children's schools' category has been introduced, targeting migrant children, most of which are "unlicensed, unregulated, poor-quality" and privately owned(Huang *et al.*, 2018, p. 4). Similarly, some local governments set very stringent criteria for parents which are costly and difficult to satisfy so that the number of migrant children admitted to state schools can be limited (Wong *et al.*, 2007). Huang *et al.* (2018, p. 17) call for the government to shift its attention from "reaping migrants' economic contributions to caring for the well-being of migrants and their children".

When studying the impact of migrants' sending areas on their life in the receiving cities, some scholars have noticed that rural migrants tend to congregate based on blood bonds or place bonds in their arrival cities (Gu & Shen, 2003; Liu *et al.*, 2014; Ma & Xiang, 1998; Zhang, 2001) and gain access to jobs with the aid of relatives or '*tongxiang*' (Liu *et al.*, 2014; Ma & Xiang, 1998; Zhang & Xie, 2013). Extreme cases are those urban villages where the majority of migrants come from the same province and where that village has been given the name of that province, such as Zhejiang Village and Xinjiang Village (Chung, 2010; Friedmann, 2005; Zhang, 2001). However, there are many urban villages that accommodate heterogeneous migrants and where there are not necessarily strong community ties among the residents (Chung, 2010). A shared finding is that migrants tend to cluster in particular locations within a city, based on their shared sense of identity (Ma & Xiang, 1998). This sense of identity is based on kinship and geographic relations to their place of origin rather than to their place of arrival. Those migrants sharing the same place bonds (*diyuan*) call each other *tongxiang* and their place of origin can be flexibly and differently defined according to contexts, which vary between village, township, city and province (Zhang, 2001). For migrant workers, *tongxiang* is the main source of labour market information (Fan, 2002). Although new-generation migrants probably rely more on 'non-territorial' networks, 'hometown-based bonds' still play a key role in their social networks (Liu *et al.*, 2012, p. 192).[12]

There has also been a debate on migrants' perceptions of urban villages and their intentions or otherwise of settling down in the city. Some scholars have argued that most migrants consider urban villages as temporary places of arrival and are eager to transit into the nearby urban area and become a permanent resident there (Saunders, 2011). In contrast, other findings indicate that migrants are unlikely to have long-term plans to settle in the city (Fan, 2002; Friedmann, 2006; Yang, 2000). For example, Friedmann (2006, p. 444) insists that these migrant workers work long hours in factories and will return to their native hometowns at some point with an accumulation of experience and a small amount of money. According to a study on the impact of migrant labour

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[12] This and the following paragraphs are extracted from an earlier paper by the researcher (Yang, 2020), which specifically studies migrants' linkage with both sending and receiving areas..

in rural China, most migrants go back to their rural origins once they have accumulated enough savings through their work in urban areas (Murphy, 2002). Another argument is that it is better to focus on migrants' 'attachment to and engagement with the origin and destination' rather than interpreting these factors according to a 'go or no-go' dichotomy (Kaufmann, 2007).

5. Conceptual framework

Based on a review of existing research and the research questions of this thesis, definitions of the main terminologies that underpin the thesis are as follows:

- *The urban village* is a village which was once rural but now has its residential core located inside the city's main built-up areas (the conceptualisation of *chengzhongcun* by Wang, 2009). The urban village still has collective land that is at the disposal of the indigenous households and village collectives. The urban village is a typical form of informal settlement in China and the term *informality / informal* is conceptualised in this thesis as anything that is against or is not regulated in laws and regulations[13]. The urban village is the socio-spatial context of this research.

- *Migrants* are the research subject and migrants in urban villages in Beijing denote not only rural migrants but refer to everyone who works and/or lives in urban villages in Beijing but does not possess a Beijing *hukou*. This definition is subject to the IOM's definition (2004, p. 108) of 'internal migration', which is "the movement of people within a State involving the establishment of a new temporary or permanent residence" (IOM, 2004, p. 108). The two-directional linkage refers to migrants' linkage with their receiving city or destination city, which denotes the city of Beijing in this thesis, and their sending area or place of origin, which is usually their *hukou* province.

- *Space production* is the theory originally developed by Henri Lefebvre in his book titled *The Production of Space,* first published in French in 1974. It is based on the argument that "(social) space is a (social) product" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 26) and space is produced by social practice. There are three specific aspects that blur into each other: representations of space, spatial practice, and spaces of representation. These three aspects are respectively adopted in this thesis as: *the space of governance and negotiation*, *the space of everyday life*, and *the space of two-directional linkage*.

  – *The space of governance and negotiation* is the mental space conceived by different layers of government as well as by the indigenous villagers. It is produced through governance and negotiation of power relations.

  – *The space of everyday life* is the physical space perceived by migrants through their daily routines and

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[13] Further explanations can refer to 'organised informality' (Zhang *et al.*, 2003) and 'conceded informality' (Schoon and Altrock, 2014.
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the connections between individuals' daily routines and urban routes.

– *The space of two-directional linkage* is the social field lived by migrant individuals, migrant households, and the community formed based on their linkage.

The conceptual framework guiding this thesis is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Conceptual framework of the thesis. Source: Author.

PART II

6. Methodological approaches

6.1 Grounded theory

There is a paucity of research into migrants' everyday lives and their space production and this thesis primarily adopts an inductive stance to address the relationship between the research and the theory (see Bryman, 2012, pp. 25-27, for a detailed explanation of induction and deduction). Grounded theory was chosen to guide the research through the explorative processes of data collection, data analysis and the generalisation of concepts and theory.

The concept of grounded theory was originally developed by Glaser and Strauss, and first published in 1967 (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory "was derived from data, systematically gathered and analysed through the research process. In this method, data collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12). The primary outcomes using grounded theory are "theories about specific phenomena in certain fields" (Flick, 2018, p. 57).

The original theory has diverged into two branches: one represented by Glaser (1992) and the other by Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 12). One of the major factors underpinning the split of Strauss and Glasser is whether a review of relevant literature in advance of primary data collection is necessary and allowed in the grounded theory approach (Dunne, 2011, p. 114). Glaser argues that the received knowledge and interpretations would hinder researchers' understanding of the new area of study and that the established theoretical ideas would discourage "their sense of self-worth and competence in the realm of theory development" (Glaser, cited in Dunne, 2011, p. 115). In contrast, Strauss advocates that it is not realistic to forbid researchers to approach literature for objectives like the identification of research gaps, contextualisation and theoretical sensitivity (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The latter position is favoured by scholars like McGhee *et al.* (2007), Dunne (2011), and Bryman (2012), especially for PhD research (Dunne, 2011). However, as Dunne (2011, p. 117) argues, the relevant literature should, however, be reviewed before entering the field: "a researcher should try to approach each new project with a mind that is sufficiently open so as to allow new, perhaps contradictory, findings to emerge from the raw data".

Grounded theory is constituted of "a spiral of cycles of data collection, coding analysis, writing design, theoretical categorisation and data collection" (Flick, 2018, p. 446). Data collection and analysis should be interlinked (Flick, 2018, p. 130) and the interpretation of the data should starts as soon as the first pieces of data

are collected (Flick, 2018, p. 127). To better understand the approach of grounded theory, it is worth devoting a paragraph here to explain theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation. A detailed account of these two theoretical terms can be found in the work of Glaser and Strauss (1967), Bryman (2012) and Flick (2018). Theoretical sampling is synonymous with step-by-step sampling, with sampling decisions being made or improved on to make them more concrete during the research process (Flick, 2018, p. 130). There are several levels at which sampling decisions are made. The criteria are not fixed from the beginning but emerge during the process and are constantly adjusted as the data collection and analysis proceed. In terms of deciding when to stop collecting data on a certain level or within a particular category, the guiding criterion is theoretical saturation. This means that research, whose two phases are data collection and data analysis (Bryman, 2012, p. 568), would reveal nothing new, were it to be continued at this level or within this category. The size of sample employed in the research is also determined by theoretical saturation.

This doctoral research applies Strauss and Corbin's (1998) approach as a guide through grounded theory study. In addition to the identification of knowledge gaps, an extensive literature review at an early stage also facilitates a familiarity with what Lefebvre (1991) terms "space production", which plays an essential role in the formulation and justification of the research questions. In the meantime, however, in order to address the core of grounded theory, the first round of field research was deliberately arranged to take place at an early stage from August to October 2017, and the establishment of a specific theoretical framework guiding the process of data collection was avoided at that stage. With the data collection and analysis progressing, ideas were derived from an initial analysis and, simultaneously, a constant comparison was made between primary findings and established knowledge, including knowledge of the context of Chinese urban villages, on the study group of migrants, and Lefebvre's well-known theory of space production and its application. New theoretical constructs emerged in the process. The circular process of constantly returning to the field and the collected data took place during two months in the field and afterwards. After identifying key concepts in the first round, literature related to the substantive research areas was reviewed. This included: 1) discussions and critiques of the application of space production theory in China; 2) the international debate on informality and the sources and developing mechanisms of informality in urban villages, which are representative of informal settlements in China; 3) in-depth studies of domestic migrants in China, including their contribution to urbanisation and their householding strategies; etc. A further round of fieldwork was conducted in 2019, when several concepts had emerged through constant comparison of the data analysed and comparison of the data with the literature. The strategy of theoretical sampling was used at different levels of the research, in order to identify the case villages and individuals to be studied. The process will be explained in detail in the following sections in this chapter.

The eventual outcome of grounded theory is the emergence of a theoretical framework in which "a set of well-developed categories […] that are systematically related through statements of relationship" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 22). However, there are two types of theory. One is substantive theory which is positioned in a specific empirical example or substantive area; the other is formal theory, which possesses a higher level of abstraction and generalisability. This doctoral research is aimed at the former.

6.2 Research design: a case-study approach

6.2.1 Methodological understanding of case study

The case-study approach aims at generating an intensive examination of a single case and a common criticism is that case-study findings cannot be generalised (Bryman, 2012, p. 71). However, it can also be argued (Yin, 2017, p. 38) that when case study is adopted as a research method, the findings can indeed be generalised to theoretical propositions that may be transferred to and examined in other cases. This is conceptualised as 'analytic generalisation' or 'theoretical generalisation', and is firmly related to the inductive research approach (Bryman, 2012, p. 71), like grounded theory. The crucial feature of a case-study approach is that the case is "an object of interest in its own right, and the researcher aims to provide an in-depth elucidation of it" and that the approach is idiographic, meaning that the unique features of the case play an essential role (Bryman, 2012, p. 69).

This thesis adopts a case-study approach to provide detailed illustrations of the everyday lives of migrants and a precise reconstruction of how migrants produce space in urban villages. While a multiple-case approach was decided when designing the research from the beginning, the number of study cases was determined during the sampling process. To serve the research purpose, two villages were ultimately selected for study. After sampling had been carried out (this process will be elaborated in the next section), the two villages were deemed to exemplify most of the various spatialities and different groups of migrants with their different demographic characteristics. This allowed for a wholistic investigation of the migrants' space production. The cases can also be called exemplifying cases (see Bryman, 2012, p. 70, and Yin, 2018, p. 50, for a detailed definition). In addition, having two cases enabled a comparison to generate findings and discussions. As Bryman puts it, by comparing two cases, the research is better positioned to tell in what circumstances an inducted theory may apply, while the comparison itself can also generate concepts that contribute to an emerging theory (Bryman, 2012, p. 74).

Nevertheless, this thesis rather advocates what Robinson (2015, p. 187) conceptualises as "a comparative approach to theory building". The quasi-scientific strict comparison between cases with control for differences can ruin the "the grounds for conceptual innovation and invention" (Robinson, 2015, p. 194) and shared features across cases should be emphasised (Robinson, 2015, p. 188). A multiple-case study, especially when there are only two cases, may be limited when researchers care less about the specific context and more about how different cases are contrasted (Dyer Jr & Wilkins, 1991, cited in Bryman, 2012, p. 75). Besides, being forced to make comparisons can ruin the open-ended and unstructured features of qualitative research. Consequently, this thesis also places more emphasis on shared features across the practices of space production by migrants in both villages, while allowing for a comparative exploration by having two cases.

6.2.2 Sampling of study cases

The multiple-case study approach has been widely used to study urban villages (see, for example, Wu *et al.*, 2013, on three urban villages, from Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou). It is critical to identify cases that will be significant for the research question (Flick, 2018, p. 107). Since the primary research question is how migrants produce space, it is necessary to target case villages where the number of migrants is large and the ratio of migrants to indigenous villagers is high. In addition, an examination of the common characteristics of space production by migrants in urban villages requires that the case villages selected should be representative of a typical urban village.

Before making the final choice, a wide range of urban villages in Beijing was considered. Due to limitations of time and resources, it was not possible to physically visit all the villages. Desktop research was conducted in advance of the first round of field research in summer 2017, in order to select 22 urban villages for a quick visit. The selection criteria and steps are as follows:

1)   Administrative divisions and geographical location

The case selection was based on the administrative divisions of Beijing and goes from district level through township level to village level. The Municipality of Beijing is divided into 16 districts, including six inner-city districts. Three districts – Xicheng, Dongcheng and Shijingshan – were excluded from consideration because

they no longer contained rural land[14]. Another parameter in deciding the choice of districts was distance from the city centre. It seems evident that, in principle, the closer the villager is to the city centre, the lager the number of migrants is likely to be. According to the literature review, at the time of the research, there were almost no urban villages remaining inside the fourth ring road, so districts with areas inside or near the fifth ring road were preferred. Four districts – Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai and Shunyi – were chosen for further investigation.

2) Population status

The second step in this process was to identify proper townships in the selected districts. Several pieces of data were collected and compared, including: a) permanent household and population; b) migrant population; c) agricultural and non-agricultural population; and d) principal industry of the town. Criteria for selecting the townships were as follows: a) a large migrant population; b) a high ratio of migrant population to permanent population; c) a substantial agricultural population[15]; and d) a variety of principal industries, to avoid industrially-imposed limitations. The location of the townships was then examined using satellite imagery, to make sure they did not lie beyond the sixth ring road.

3) Land tenure and landscape

When zooming into the selected townships, one or two villages were selected from each township. This was based on the assumption that the villages within one township were likely to be similar and to accommodate migrants from similar backgrounds. Satellite imagery and street views accessible online were also checked. Because of the lack of official and up-to-date data on land tenure in the villages, the only way to deduce whether or not a village was 'urban' was by studying the landscape. Was it close to or surrounded by urban development? Satellite imagery also revealed if a village was undergoing demolition and such cases were not selected.

By this process, 22 urban villages were chosen for field research, including 12 from Chaoyang District, five from Haidian District, four from Fengtai District and one from Shunyi District.

After visiting the 22 villages, Shigezhuang village and Dongxindian village were eventually chosen as study cases for in-depth field research. Although all 22 selected villages were in use according to the satellite imagery, many of them had been (partly) demolished by the time of the visit (see Figure 3). This was probably because

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[14] According to the 2016 statistical yearbook of the districts, there were no township administrations or village committees within these three districts. This means that the number of residents holding rural *hukou* was very small and it could be deducted that there was a limited amount of rural land.

[15] Agricultural population are people with rural *hukou* and they usually have (partial) ownership of and right to use rural land.

of the fast-transitioning nature of urban villages and because no real-time satellite imagery was available. Among the remaining villages, two types of spatiality and two types of migrant groups could be identified during the first round of field research. Regarding spatiality, buildings in these urban villages were either one- or two-storey buildings with temporary vertical or horizontal extensions, or multi-storey apartment buildings. As for migrant groups, two typical groups were identified. One group were poorly-educated labourers, most of whom came from rural areas, and the other were educated younger generations, coming from both rural areas and small cities.

There were several reasons for the final choice of the two case villages. The first and most important reason was that the two villages reflected the spatial and socio-economic features of urban villages in Beijing identified in the literature review (see Section 3.2), as well as included the aforementioned types of spatiality and migrant groups. The second reason was about feasibility and accessibility. While there were other villages that also matched the first requirements, Shigezhuang village and Dongxindian village were both located in Chaoyang District, making intensive fieldwork more feasible for the researcher. Furthermore, a majority of migrants in Shiegzhuang village came from Sichuan Province, which is also the researcher's place of origin. Speaking the same dialectic made the potential interviewees more accessible.

Figure 3: Urban villages under demolition (left: demolished factory building in Si village, Daxing District; right: demolished residential building in Heiqiao village, Chaoyang, District;). Source: Author, September 2017.

After the first fieldwork in the summer of 2017, a dramatic change happened to Shigezhuang village, when it was decided that the land would be requisitioned by the government and leased to a real estate developer for commercial development. Migrants living in Shigezhuang were to be evicted and required to relocate. Although

it was not deliberately chosen as a revelatory case, the case of Shigezhuang became revelatory when the second fieldwork was conducted, in the summer of 2019. The whole village was at that time in an intermediary stage of partial demolition. Despite the fact that many urban villages have been redeveloped and their migrant population mostly relocated, the uncertainty of the demolition timeframe and the lengthiness of the process create difficulties for scientific research. Thus, Shigezhuang village offered a valuable opportunity.

6.3 Methods of data collection

The empirical data for this thesis were collected from two strands of field work carried out in Beijing: the first from August to October 2017; the second from June to July 2019. Both case villages underwent dramatic changes over the course of these two years. A comparison study conducted in one village between two different points in time led to an addition to the categories investigated in relation to space production by migrants. This thesis can be understood as qualitative research with a mixed methodology of qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Quantitative methods like structured surveys and questionnaires were used to build background information about the demographic profiles of migrant groups in the case villages. Qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews, expert interviews, and field observation, allowed for plentiful information and an in-depth understanding of migrants' decision making, everyday activities and interactions with other stakeholder groups. In addition, visual methods, such as mapping, photo documentation and photo elicitation, were also crucial in the field research – not only for recording and studying the built environment and the physical aspects of the migrants' space production but also for providing a material stage to comprehend data collected through other methods. All the quantitative, qualitative, and visual methods affect the study as a whole. Although the research is not an ethnography, it possesses features of ethnographic research, such as an emphasis on the exploration of a social setting, working with 'unstructured' data, and investigating a small number of cases (Flick, 2018, p. 337).

6.3.1 Literature review

Besides academic articles on urban villages and migrants in China, secondary data such as government archival documents and policies were also reviewed. First, legislation governing the dual urban-rural land system and the management of urban and rural populations was screened. Legislation governing the registration system, namely *hukou*, have undergone dramatic changes in the last decades. Second, for the two case villages, archival documents pertaining to planning and development at village-level and township-level development were reviewed. Furthermore, there were a significant number of reports on Beijing's 'floating population',

synonymous with migration in this research, published by Beijing Municipal Health Commission. Although this research does not aim at accumulating an overarching narrative on the migrants in Beijing, the reports were useful in two ways. First, they provided background information derived from quantitative studies based on a large sample size and could be used to inform data analysis and the discussion of findings in this research which is mainly qualitative with a focus on individual experiences. Second, these reports included the latest policies on migration in Beijing, allowing for a better understanding of migrants' space production from the aspect of representations of space.

6.3.2 Associative walks with mapping and photo documentation

One of the key components in the interlinked aspects of space production is the physical field and the essential role played by the built environment. In order to understand the physical aspects, the researcher spent time walking through the villages to map the built environment. There were two reasons behind the mapping and photo documentation. First, it provided an opportunity to comprehend the structure of the streets. There were main streets, with shops on either side, linking the village gates and other places where people gathered. There were also lanes leading to individual housing plots, and narrow alleyways providing shortcuts which only one person at a time could pass through due to the extension of housing onto the public road. Second, the researcher also mapped some typical buildings in order to articulate how they had been transformed through the active and passive appropriation of space by migrants. The different kinds of transformation will be demonstrated in Chapter 10. Through extensive walks through the villages, it could be concluded that the transformation of buildings, especially through the construction of extensions to original houses, was similar throughout a village. Accessibility was a key feature in the choice of buildings for mapping. Photos were taken to record the physical features of the environment as well as the types of shops in the streets. Photos also provided a separate package of data for analysing the relations among the three interlinked components.

Some specific elements were also mapped. For example, cars in Shigezhuang village were mapped according to their place of origin, as revealed on their licence plates. This was inspired by an interview who mentioned that many migrants from other provinces drove to their workplaces by car every day.

6.3.3 Structured interviews

The structured interview and the self-completed questionnaire are the two most commonly employed methods in survey research and are usually connected in quantitative research or in a specifically quantitative part of

research (see Bryman, 2012, pp. 186, 201). In this research, although data were primarily collected with qualitative methodology, structured interviews and self-completed questionnaires were used to generate a quantitative understanding of the profiles of the migrants and the case villages. The quantitative information acquired through these methods did not directly contribute to the formation of concepts and theories essential to grounded theory, but provided a context for the data analysis.

Two rounds of structured interviews were conducted. The first round was completed in the summer of 2017 while visiting and investigating the two case villages for the first time. The first round of questionnaires mainly focused on gathering demographic information and details of the interviewees' living quarters. This information help construct portraits of the case villages with regard to the residents they accommodated. Second, some of the survey respondents agreed to be interviewees of a semi-structured interview, and the information acquired through the questionnaire would be used as means of appraisal of the interview partners' background and standards of life when coding the interview transcripts.

The survey was conducted in the main street of each village, with passers-by being randomly selected as respondents. To ensure randomness, the researcher always approached the first person she saw and invited them to take part in the survey. On completion of the structured interview, the respondent was then asked if they would continue with a semi-structured interview. The next potential interviewee chosen was again the first person encountered by the researcher. This ensured that such factors as gender, age and friendliness or otherwise were ignored.

There were in total 59 respondents from Shigezhuang village and 51 respondents from Dongxindian village. The precise response rate was not recorded but the estimated rate was around 70%, which is to say that around three out of ten people invited to take part in the survey either refused outright or withdrew when certain questions were raised. The response rate was high at this stage, partly because the survey was conducted on the street where people do not usually feel their privacy is being invaded. Another explanation might be that the number of questions was limited to ten and the devised answer to most questions was not a specific number but rather a range.

The second round of field research took place in the summer of 2019, after the data collected from the first fieldwork had been processed and analysed and the relevant literature had been consulted. Conducting in-depth interviews in the respondents' homes was a preferred choice. For this second phase, the multi-stage clustering approach was employed. The primary sampling unit was the housing plot and maps with numbered housing plots were obtained from the village committee. By applying a random sampling strategy, a number of housing

plots was selected. The typical situation in an urban village was that an indigenous household owned one housing plot where they usually had between 20 to 40 rooms that they rented out to migrants. After the plots had been selected, a further round of sampling was conducted by randomly selecting room numbers within each plot. Given that each housing plot had a gate and in-house interviews required the permission of the landlord, the multi-stage cluster sampling significantly reduced both the number of landlords whose permission was required and the number of sites that had to be visited.

The processes of conducting structured interviews differed slightly between the two villages. Shigezhuang village and Dongxindian village were different in terms of their built environment, the migrant groups they accommodated, and the organisational situation of the village committees. This will be covered in detail later when discussing the research findings; suffice to say here that the migrants in Shigezhuang were easier to approach than those in Dongxindian . When asked if the researcher could talk to them inside their homes, most migrants in Shigezhuang would open the door, whereas only one to two in ten in would do so Dongxindian. However, the village committee in Dongxindian agreed to help with conducting the questionnaire, while the Shigezhuang village committee refused to be involved in the research. As a result, all the structured interviews in Shigezhuang were conducted by the researcher and 11 questionnaires were completed, while 135 questionnaires were completed in Dongxindian thanks to the assistance of two committee members. In Dongxindian, the village committee had been trained to conduct such interviews with migrants in a reliable way because it was not unusual for upper-level government or academic organisations to seek their help with surveys. The questionnaire was explained carefully to the two helpers to make sure they understood each question and its potential answers. Because they were local to the village, they knew all the landlords, who were also indigenous villagers. At their request, the landlords accompanied the helpers to the selected rooms to talk to their tenants and almost all the migrants agreed to their landlord's request for the 20-minute interview.

The questionnaire that acted as a guide in the second round of the structured interviews consisted of six key sections, including: 1) employment situation; 2) housing and living conditions; 3) floating/migration situation; 4) interactions with and within the city, the village and the living space; 5) interactions with hukou place; and 6) everyday life. For the interviewees in Shigezhuang, one more section was added to ask their opinions about the redevelopment of Shigezhuang village and what they planned to do after they were displaced from their rented rooms. [16]

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[16] See Appendix C for the full version of the questionnaire.

6.3.4 Semi-structured interviews and narrative interviews

The interview is usually considered to be the most widely-used data collection method in qualitative research (Bryman, 2012, p. 469), and also for this thesis data collected from qualitative interviews provides a major contribution to the findings. Compared to the structured interviews used in quantitative research, the qualitative interview is characterised as being flexible in the use of questions to achieve a responsive interview, creating a space for the "experience and knowledge of each interviewee" (Rubin & Rubin, 2011, p. 37). The flexibility of the qualitative interview is also well suited to grounded theory methodology.

In order to encourage detailed responses from respondents and thereby add depth to the research findings, the researcher should employ follow-up questions in addition to the main questions. These may vary from one interviewee to another and depend on the interviewee's responses (Flick, 2018, p. 217; Rubin & Rubin, 2011, pp. 116-119). The creation of a relaxed atmosphere and a careful explanation to the interviewee of what the interview will entail are essential in setting the stage and facilitating the evolution of the interview (Hermanns, 2004, cited in Flick, 2018, p. 219). These elements were extremely important in this research. Urban villages are commonly regarded as informal, temporary settlements and, in all of them, rumours that they might soon to be demolished are rife. It is a sensitive topic. When migrants in the two study villages were asked at their first meeting to talk about their relationship with the village or their landlord, or about their attitude towards being evicted, they were frequently suspicious about the identity and motives of the researcher. Therefore, as a vulnerable group, they tended to keep silent or to express only positive opinions, most of which, later, after trust had been built, turned out to be false. This relationship of trust evolved only after some time spent talking about other topics with which they felt more comfortable or after the researcher had visited them numerous times. This illustrates another characteristic of qualitative research – namely that the interviewee can be interviewed several times, or on several occasions, thereby providing the researcher with rich and detailed answers (Bryman, 2012, p. 470).

The interviewee sample contained a mixture of indigenous villagers and migrants. The use of face-to-face semi-structured interviews placed limitations on the sample size, due to the necessary constraints of time and resources. There were in total 47 interviewees – 25 from Shigezhuang village, 19 from Dongxindian village, plus 3 others – and the length of the interview varied from 15 minutes to two hours. As set out in Section 6.3.2, some of the interviewees were respondents randomly selected on the street. Others were chosen based on whether they appeared to have time to talk or satisfied certain expectations for a specifically-designed interview. These respondents were interviewed on the street, in their homes or in the shops they owned. One group of

interviewees was approached through a snowball sampling technique. This technique, which is recommended when networks of individuals are the research focus, involved a number of participants being proposed by a small group of initially sampled people (Bryman, 2012, p. 424). As mentioned above, it was hard for the researcher as an outsider to build trust with interviewees, but, with the help of some key informants, snowball sampling opened up connections to many other residents. It also enabled the researcher "simultaneously to capitalize on and to reveal the connectedness of individuals in networks" (Bryman, 2012, p. 424). Different interview guidelines with specific questions were prepared for indigenous villagers and migrants.[17]

A semi-structured interview can develop into a narrative interview. Narrative interviews, sometimes referred to as the life history method (Bryman, 2012, p. 488), mainly use biographic research and usually consist of elements including a generative narrative question, a stage of narrative probing and a final phase when interviewees are asked to 'theorize' the issues or stories (Flick, 2018, pp. 279-280). While the interview starts with narration, in the final phase the interviewee is requested to try to give an explanation for the way their life has developed as it has, to explain relations between different events and to offer their opinion on some relevant issues (Flick, 2018). For example, in one study (Bertuzzo, 2008, p. 46) which employed a methodological framework similar to that of this thesis, interviewees were invited to "tell a story about the studied process, i.e. on the development and changes that they could state along with the passing of time". When conducting both semi-structured interviews and narrative interviews with the same group of interviewees, Bertuzzo (2008, p. 46) found that "not all semi-structured interviews opened to narrative ones, and vice versa not all 'narrations' started from semi-structured interviews".

It was evident while conducting narrative interviews for this research that the focus of different interviewees could vary significantly, and they related to different events they had witnessed or experienced. For example, an interviewee in Dongxindian village recalled how he and his wife had relocated more than five times in the last decades, starting from a village near the second ring road and, step by step, being pushed farther away from the city centre along with the urban development (see Interviewee D058HL19M in Appendix A). Another interviewee in Shigezhuang village had spent almost the same length of time in Beijing, but in the interview talked mainly about how his family arrangement had changed, how the development of the village had forced him to keep moving from one rental room to another and how the construction sites where he worked as a labourer were always located in a different area (see Interviewee S005SC17M in Appendix A). The story of an indigenous villager can be completely different (see for example Interviewee D054BJ17M in Appendix A).

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[17] See Appendix B.

These narrations were extremely important for illustrating the perceived and lived aspects of urbanisation processes and revealed how these processes were experienced by different groups and individuals. A total of five narrative interviews were conducted in addition to the semi-structured interviews.

The qualitative method of semi-structured interviews and narrative interviews does not aim to present a representative sample of respondents, but rather to examine individualized experiences. The sample was not big enough for a reliable quantitative research. However, appropriate saturation was achieved after interviewing the sampled interviewees in the two rounds of fieldwork; that is, no new information concerning the main aspects of space production by migrants could have been collected by undertaking more interviews[18].

6.3.5 Field observation

Although this study is not an ethnological study, ethnographic methods were employed throughout the research, one of these methods being field observation. The researcher's passion for employing field observation initially derived from reading about the ethnography conducted by Zhang (2001) on migrants in Zhejiang village, an urban village well known in Beijing in the 1990s. Zhang spent a number of years living there in order to conduct participant observation. There have been other in-depth classic sociological studies investigating the social interactions, networks, and everyday lives of certain social groups (see, for example, Whyte, 2012). This study, however, did not employ classic participant observation, but rather a mixed method of field observation, including unstructured observation and structured observation.

With regard to structured observation, the behaviour of passersby in the main streets was observed and such information, as age, gender, and number of companions, was recorded. After several walks through the villages, a series of public places in each village where residents often encountered each other were identified. These included the main street, tiny street corner squares, the park, the tap water, the market, etc. The unstructured observation of the residents' everyday lives was then conducted in these places. Unlike in traditional participant observation, the researcher did not participate in what was happening in the social setting. The unstructured observation was aimed at recording the behaviour of the residents in a detailed way so that a narrative account of their behaviour could be generated later. In some locations, unstructured participation was undertaken several times a day, in others, several times a week, depending on the activities unfolding. For example, the street corner

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[18] The same concept was adopted and explained in the same way in a book chapter published earlier (Yang, 2000). Part of the research findings have been presented.

in front of the cultural centre in Shigezhuang village was home to street vendors serving breakfast in the morning and, later, after 5 pm, became a delivery distribution centre. Another example was the open space next to the public toilets in the marketplace. During the daytime it was used by traders selling clothes to passing housewives on passed by on their way to buy food, while in the evening, it was filled with men playing chess or cards. Unstructured observation also allowed for a comparison between 2017 and 2019, and helped accumulate knowledge regarding the impact of demolition, especially long-term, incremental demolition, on the migrants' everyday lives.

6.3.6 Photo elicitation interviews

The photo elicitation interview is a method within the frame of visual ethnography (Bryman, 2012, p. 455). The use of visual materials in ethnography and of visual methods in social research has gained in popularity in recent decades (Banks & Zeitlyn, 2015). As with texts on ethnography, visual images should be read by researchers taking into account not only photographic content, but also context (Wright *et al.*, 2010). As a method of visual ethnography, the photo elicitation interview allows the researcher to use images taken by the participants as a starting point for a discussion of the meaning and significance of those images (Bryman, 2012, p. 455). Radley *et al.* (2005) employed this method when studying the everyday lives of homeless people's in London and their use of public space. Photo elicitation has proved to be extremely helpful when studying vulnerable groups.

During the field research for this dissertation, one respondent from Shigezhuang and one from Dongxindian agreed to participate in photo elicitation interviews, though five semi-structured interview respondents from each village were asked. Each participant was given a disposable camera with which he could take 37 photos. The participants were asked to take pictures over the span of a week of scenes which they found representative of their everyday life, or which attracted their attention. The pictures could be taken in the village, on the way to work, at their workplace, or anywhere they visited during the week. The film was then collected and the photos printed. A meeting was then arranged for the respondents to discuss the photos. They were asked why they took each photograph and which aspects of them they wished to highlight. In the process, the participants' day-to-day experiences unfolded. Further spontaneous questions were raised along with detailed discussions.

The methodology of photo elicitation interviews shed new light on the understanding of the migrants' space production activities. On the one hand, it provided in-depth perspectives on the migrants' lives, which the researcher could otherwise have little knowledge of. On the other hand, since it was the migrants who decided what to photograph, the photographs offered an insight into their attitudes and values in a way that would not

be easily accomplished in an interview. Photo elicitation also enabled the researcher to have a better idea about the built environment and its spatiality.

6.3.7 Expert interviews

The expert interview can be regarded as a specific form of semi-structured interview. The method targets "experts in institutions, who have specific insights and knowledge because of their professional position and expertise" (Flick, 2018, p. 236). In contrast to the semi-structured and narrative interviews carriedout with other groups, this type of interview was less concerned with the interviewee's experience as a person and more about his or her capacities and expertise in a particular field (Flick, 2018, p. 236).

Two groups of experts were interviewed, including well-established academic scholars who had conducted similar research in the relevant field, and township governments officials responsible for the management of migrants. In total, five expert interviews were conducted: two with academics and three with government officials. In the early phase of the research, expert interviews were employed as a means of orientation in the field (for example, with Prof. Yumin Ye, see Interviewee O01EXP2017F in Appendix A). In addition, expert interviews were used to complement for other methods and were conducted while other information was being collected and analysed.

For example, many regulations regarding the management of migrants and were mentioned in government documents and during semi-structured interviews with residents. However, neither of these sources explained with any clarity how a specific policy was implemented in reality. When the information regarding policies and regulations was unclear, questions were added to the interview guidelines for expert interviews. The expert interviews were also aimed at testing the information acquired from semi-structured interviews. For example, cadres of Cuigezhuang township, to which Dongxindian village belonged, were interviewed to gain an understanding of the administrative institutions governing migrants. In addition, it is not easy to articulate the urbanisation process, the emergence and development of urban villages, the inflow and outflow of migrants, as well as the correlations between these three, by consulting the literature alone. Given the complexity, it is useful to have a clear story told by an expert with extensive knowledge of the processes and the ability to selects important and relevant events and details. A government official from Cuigezhuang township, responsible for the management of migrant population, was invited to talk about the development of the urban villages and the influx and evictions of migrants. The interview was conducted partly as a narrative interview. His account was then supplemented and enriched with information acquired from other interviews and reviews of relevant

literature and news reports. The interviewee's accounts of certain events and policies also served as an individual instance of representations of space.

6.4 Methods of data analysis

Data were evaluated based on a circular, rather than a linear, process of interpretation. This both required and enabled the researcher to constantly return to the field and to the collected data.

6.4.1 Analysing surveys and questionnaires

The surveys and questionnaires were designed to create profiles of the case villages, in terms of what groups of migrants the two villages accommodated, the type of rental rooms provided and the migrants' activities. The quantitative data collected through the surveys and questionnaires were analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software, which is commonly used by social scientists for analysing quantitative data (Bryman, 2012, p. 354). The results of these analyses are presented in Chapter 8.

6.4.2 Coding qualitative interviews

Coding refers to the process of analysis where data acquired from interviews are broken down into component parts and codes are given to each piece of information based on the researcher's interpretation (Bryman, 2012, p. 568), and more selective and abstract ways of conceptualising the phenomenon of interest (Bryman, 2012, p. 570). Strauss and Corbin (1998) distinguish three levels of coding: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. Charmaz (2006) suggests two main forms of coding: initial coding and focused coding. Despite slight differences in defining the process, the basics embedded in these scholars' interpretations are that grounded theory is a process from initial data to abstract conceptualisation via coding from different levels of abstraction.

Coding methods employed in this doctoral research are best explained with reference to Charmaz's (2006) interpretation. The initial coding of the interview transcripts was carried out in detail with an open mind, thus a generating as many new codes as possible. In the next step, focused coding, the initially coded data were brought together to identify the most common or most revealing codes. Codes were selected and categorised, and new codes were generalised at the same time. Some of the data were explored and reevaluated. The coding procedure was followed by and interlinked with constant comparison. Constant comparison means that researchers constantly "compare phenomenon being coded under a certain category so that a theoretical elaboration of that category can begin to emerge" (Bryman, 2012, p. 568). Concepts and categories are the outcomes of coding and

constant comparison.

Coding was applied in the analysis of data acquired from semi-structured interviews, narrative interviews, photo elicitation interviews and expert interviews. While the coding outcomes of the last type of information were more direct and focused, those of the former three types were more typical of grounded theory research, with fragmented findings contributing to various perspectives. Meanwhile, the interviews were also analysed in connection to the spatial elements presented in mappings and drawings.

NVivo computer software was used to replace the traditional coding by hand. This enabled researchers to code qualitative data, specifically interview transcripts, with the help of a computer. The logic behind NVivo is the same as that of coding by hand, in that it involves breaking down data into pieces, writing marginal notes to pieces of data, refining notes into codes, and mapping the codes by exploring their shared properties and interconnections, thereby initiating the development of concepts.

6.4.3 Analysing visual data

Visual material like drawings and photographs made up a large percentage of the collected data. The primary function of the photographs taken during the fieldwork was to record the field of space production. They also served the function of providing a context within which the coding of other qualitative data could be better carried out. The photos were also analysed in a way similar to coding. Fragments were taken and coded based on the researcher's interpretation.

Drawings, such as the axonometric drawing of a typical residential building for migrants and the floor plan of a typical rental room, were also considered as findings. Not only did they provide information in themselves, they could be compared to other drawings and visual material and link up with material derived from the coding of interviews.

6.5 Limitations of the data collection and data analysis

The research focus of urban villages and migrants can be sensitive in China. Migrants are usually the most vulnerable of groups and tend to resist being too truthful for fear of reprisals from other stakeholder groups. In addition, the urban village is an open neighbourhood, whereas the buildings or compounds in which the migrants lived are more like gated communities. This, together with the sensitive nature of the topic, leads to rather low accessibility to the field. These limitations, however, were largely resolved by approaching to interviewees on

several occasions and building up trust. On a second or third meeting, interviewees were more likely to express their true feelings. It was also the case that, by establishing a connection with the key respondents, more interviewees within their network were able to be reached by snowball sampling and were less likely to refuse to participate.

As has been discussed in previous sections, circumstances in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian were very different. The migrants in Shigezhuang village were more approachable due to the more open built environment and the less busy routines of the residents. However, less support was forthcoming from the Shigezhuang village committee when it came to collecting questionnaires and accessing quantitative data, due to the fact that the village was under redevelopment and the interests of different stakeholder groups were at play. Dongxindian village had a less accessible built environment because most apartment buildings were secured behind a locked gate, with only a few rooms directly opening on to the street. Indigenous villagers – namely the landlords – would sometimes be suspicious of the intentions of a stranger seeking to gain entry to the building. At the same time, however, the governing system and socioeconomics of the village were more organised and questionnaires proved effective in building a profile of the village, although there were undoubted drawbacks in using village committee members as helpers during the structured survey. Originally, questions about the migrants' attitudes towards the indigenous villagers or whether they would prefer to live in the village or in the city of Beijing were included in the questionnaires. Predictably, however, the migrants were unwilling to express dissatisfaction with their host villagers. Also, given the city-wide policy of evicting migrants, they were aware that the village committee would not welcome their tenants expressing a desire to stay in the city and thereby making the village a target for redevelopment by the municipal government. On recognising these limitations, only objective facts collected through questionnaires were analysed and included in the thesis, basically serving as demographic profiles of migrants.

Another crucial problem affecting both the collection and analysis of data is that the researcher as an individual may affect the process and the result. The researcher's appearance and status as a stranger can influence the interviewees' response. However, the use of grounded theory requires reflexivity as a vital part of the research process, where "the researcher as an individual with a particular social identity and background has an impact on the research process" (Robson, 2002, p. 22, cited in McGhee et al., 2007, p. 335). There is a cautious balance between the researcher's unintentional interference in the research and the objectivity of the research. At the same time, in the grounded theory approach, data collection and data analysis are interlinked. This research confirms Flick's assertation (2018, p. 130) that it is helpful to analyse early interviews in order to figure out which topics were missed when designing the interview guide, what directions would be promising for the

research, and how the interviews could be improved, etc. It should be pointed out that, while the research data were collected in a mixed-method approach – both qualitative and quantitative data were collected during the field research – the predominant research strategy was qualitative. The holistic research took an inducive approach to building the relationship between theory and research.

PART III

7. Research background

7.1 Urbanisation in China with Chinese characteristics

China could be described as a completely rural society until very recent times. In 1949, China's urban population accounted for less than 10% of the total (Friedmann, 2007, p. 261). Between 1949 and 1960, the urbanisation rate doubled to almost 20%. In the following decade, this figure was stabilised at approximately 17%, the effect of *shangshan xiaxiang*, when millions of young city residents were sent 'down to the countryside' (Friedmann, 2007, p. 267). Before post-socialist reform in 1979, China was a centrally-planned economy, which restricted private ownership and investment, and enforced controls on population movement between rural and urban areas. The urban space, at that time, was produced with limited investment in infrastructure and featured state-owned enterprises with work units and their residential housing close together, and 'socialist public spaces' (McGee, 2009, p. 235).

With the introduction of a market economy in 1979, components of the planned economy were dismantled and China's integration into the global system started. The deliberately reinforced rural-urban social and economic equality began to collapse, with the emphasis now on city development, and rural-urban migration was not freed until the early 1990s. The most recent phase dates from the 1990s and is characterised by an increasing integration into the global economy while retaining primary driving impulses locally (McGee, 2009, p. 243). Some scholars (McGee, 2009, p. 236) argue that the ban on domestic migration, contributed to the country's rapid development during the early phase of urbanisation. Compared to other countries that witnessed an inflow of rural-urban migration from the beginning of their transition to a market economy (see for example Vietnam, McGee, 2009), China was able to focus on investing in and upgrading the infrastructure in the cities without having to invest time in taking care of the potential problems brought by migration, such as out-of-control squatters and the under-employed living in the informal sector. This is a tricky statement but reveals certain characteristics of China's urbanisation.

There have been two major transformations in the post-reform period (Wu, 2010, pp. 79-80). The first is the scalar transformation: the state used to be centrally dominated and has been turned into a multi-scalar state. The second is the "partial 'neoliberalization'" (Wu, 2010, p. 80, quotation marks in original) adopted by the government to maintain its authority and give priority to the market. The old work-unit system that previously connected the citizenship has been dismantled and "transformed towards a more territorial form – the city".

These shifts can, on the one hand, be regarded as a process of empowerment since the state control has been weakened, but, on the other hand, the replacement of citizenship with property rights has led to the marginalisation of the groups who are unable to sell their labour for a price that would allow to them to lead a decent life in the market-oriented society. These groups include the poorly-educated former workers in the work-unit system, who lost their positions in their forties and fifties, and migrant workers adversely affected by the rising cost of living.

Decentralisation leads to difficulties for the central government in enforcing policies. When the central government stipulates certain laws and notices, local governments may understand and respond to them differently, intentionally or otherwise, out of concern for local interests. In such cases, since most state policies are formulated only in principle and local situations and resources vary, no punishment will be imposed by the state on the local government for not strictly implementing policies (Wong *et al.*, 2007, p. 38). For example, when explaining why local governments are not motivated to implement the call to take responsibility for migrant children's education, Wong *et al.* (2007, p. 38) point out that "there are little incentives or disincentives for local governments to either carry out or not carry out the policies". With a multi-scalar governance in post-socialist China, the local city often exercises its power to make the city more entrepreneurial, such as by investing in infrastructure, and this will usually result in an increase in the cost of living (Wu, 2010).

In post-socialist China, the point of departure in market transition is not ideology but governance technique (Wu, 2016). China has experienced a political liberalisation, in which the focus of Chinese political authority has shifted from the promotion of ideology to the management of economic development and the reiteration of political legitimacy (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2813). Chinese urbanisation reveals itself as a unique process of development, described by scholars as neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics (Harvey, 2005) and as a localised process of neoliberalisation (Wu, 2016). Despite the widely accepted definition of China's current political-economic system as a post-socialist system with a market economy, persistent elements from the previous socialist period have led to a hybrid rather than a linear transition to a market system (McGee, 2009, p. 231). In other words, rather than being dominated by a free market ideology, a hybrid combination of developmental state and market economy can be detected throughout the post-socialist period. A series of entrepreneurial-like government behaviours is typical in this Chinese case of neoliberalism, such as the promotion of local cadres on the basis of economic performance, deliberate ambiguity in property rights and land-based finance. "The institution of land, fiscal policy, and cadre promotion laid down the foundation on which the local state has been incentivized and transformed" (Wu, 2016, p. 345). Despite totally different mechanisms, Chinese cities share remarkable similarities with local competition state, but also with "varying

degrees of state persistence" (Wu, 2016, p. 345).

With the devolution of economic decision making, the local state retains the revenues from land development. Meanwhile, citiy governors are assigned by the state, directly or indirectly, thus consolidating the power of the state (Wu, 2016, p. 339). This creates a specific mechanism, namely "state entrepreneurism" (Wu, 2016, p. 339), where locally managed land sales as market-oriented behaviour lead to the promotion of local officials on the basis of economic performance, one of the most important indicators of which is gross domestic product [GDP] growth rate (Wu, 2016, p. 340).

China's urbanisation is also characterised by its speed, and migrants, referred to in government reports as 'floating population', play a critical role. There was an urban population of 901.99 million in 2020, accounting for 63.89% of the total population[19]. The urban population in 2010 was 665.57 million, 49.67% of the total population. Master plans were made mandatory in 1984[20] in order to regulate the physical form of urbanisation, but these mostly turned out to be meaningless, because "urban spaces are transformed at a far faster pace than it takes to draw them up" (Friedmann, 2007, p. 271). In 2020, the 'floating population'[21] numbered 492.76 million, accounting for more than one third of the total population – this percentage was less than 10% in 2000 (Liang *et al.*, 2014, p. 698).

Alongside national-wide urbanisation and rapid economic growth, China has simultaneously witnessed the emergence of the urban poor. Earlier data indicated that there were between 15 and 47 million urban residents living in absolute poverty, but migrants were not included in this figure (Solinger, 2006). This indicates a new underclass, unprecedented in China (Solinger, 2006). It should also be pointed out that urbanisation in China is characterised by city-based development and that the public investment is arranged institutionally with a focus on urban development (Liu *et al.*, 2010). The city has been positioned at the centre of capital accumulation and urbanisation is employed as an instrument to promote city-based development. Therefore, the city is in a dominant position over the rural area and this dominance is being strengthened with further urbanisation (Wu, 2010). Wu (2010, p. 87) argued that "the process of marginalization in contemporary China is due to a whole range of market reforms that constrain marginal people from making a citizen-type claim".

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[19] Figures are taken from the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, see link: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202105/t20210510_1817185.html.

[20] The State Council announced China's first City Planning Ordinance in 1984, which officially made the drafting of master plans mandatory.

[21] 'Floating population' is officially defined by the government report as people "who live in places other than their registration areas". Household registration is the synonymous of *hukou.* Both the definition and the figures are taken from the official website of National Bureau of Statistics of China: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202105/t20210510_1817185.html.

Urbanisation in China takes place against a totally different political and economic background from the Western world (Sun & Chen, 2017, p. 4). Domestic migration, along with market reforms and globalisation, has a huge impact on Chinese urbanisation (Logan, 2011; Sun & Chen, 2017, p. 4). Although the physical form is shaped under Western influence, Chinese cities are developing in their own ways and will "end up as cities embodying a Chinese form of modernity" (Friedmann, 2006, p. 441). The similarities between urbanisation in China and that in other countries are largely superficial and what is happening in China cannot be simply understood as a replication of what has happened in other countries, regardless of location, ideology or developing time (Friedmann, 2006, p. 441). Existing urban theories which are mainly derived from Western experiences cannot properly explain the novelties in the urbanisation process of Chinese cities either (Wu, 2016, p. 338). McGee (2009, p. 234) distinguishes between 'internationalisation' and 'Westernisation', which are often taken as synonyms for 'globalisation'. 'Internationalisation' denotes a willingness to accept from outside, such as learning about outside technology and linking to global economy, while 'Westernisation' represents the process of changing internal 'Chinese culture' to 'being Western'. It is suggested that the globalisation process in China is closer to 'internationalisation' whereby the indigenous culture in everyday practices has been retained.

Eearly research of Friedmann (2006) provides a valuable theoretical framework for understanding China's urbanisation. The socio-spatial urbanisation processes can be studied from seven dimensions: demographic, social, cultural, economic, ecological, physical and governance (Friedmann, 2006, p. 446). As Friedmann (2006, p. 447) argues, "Chinese cities are nothing more than an artefact of administrative decisions to establish boundaries", which is different from what Weber called 'complete communities' (Weber, 1958, *The City*, cited in Friedmann, 2006). Ever since the days of imperial China, the country's complex city system has been set up mainly according to administrative designations rather than urban economic functions (Chung & Lam, 2004). At present, there are five levels of administrative divisions in China: the provincial level, the prefectural level, the county level, the township level, and the basic level autonomy. At each level, different types are included, and Table 2 presents the types and examples that are mentioned in the thesis[22]. According to the definition of administrative divisions, districts formerly only contained urban areas but currently may also consist of counties with towns, villages, and farmland. As for the fourth level, both towns and townships are rural areas, while subdistricts are mostly urban areas. The structural hierarchy of counties, which consists of both urban and rural

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[22] The explanation of administrative divisions is cited from Wikipedia. For the detailed types at each level and the explanations, please refer to the link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_divisions_of_China. In the texts and the table, only the types relevant to the thesis are presented.

areas, also plays a vital role. Counties in China can also be understood as what Tacoli (1998, p. 1522) describes as "small and intermediate urban centres" which ae crucial for rural-urban interactions.

Name (Level)	Provincial level (1st)	Prefectural level (2nd)	County level (3rd)	Township level (4th)	Basic level autonomy (5th)
Types (Mentioned in the thesis)	Province (*sheng*)	Prefectural-level city (*dijishi*)	County (*xian*) / County-level city (*xianjishi*)	Town (*zhen*) / Township (*xian*) / Subdistrict (*jiedao*)	Community (*shequ*) / Village (*cun*)
	Municipality (*zhixiashi*)	District (*shixiaqu*)			
Examples (Mentioned in the thesis)	Sichuan Province	Dazhou City	Da County	-	-
	Beijing Municipality	Chaoyang District		Cuigezhuang Township	Dongxindian Village

Table 2: Structural hierarchy of the administrative divisions and examples mentioned in the thesis. Source: Wikipedia and own design.

7.2 Urban-rural dualism in China

7.2.1 Dual land system

China's urbanisation is a trial-and-error process and gradualism allowing for the coexistence of new and old systems can be seen in major economic and institutional changes (Tian, 2008, p. 284), of which urban-rural dualism is one of the most typical reflections. China before 1949 was largely rural and since the foundation of the People's Republic of China, it has experienced major agrarian reforms (Tian, 2008, pp. 294-295). In the early 1950s, right after the founding of the People's Republic, land was expropriated from former landlords and distributed to peasants, thus creating agroup of private smallholders. These individual farmers were gradually collectivised and the Household Responsibility System developed in the early 1980s, was a benchmark which brought into being the current situation. It stipulates that rural households have the right to use the land allocated to them, while the village collective retains the authority to deal with collective land. At the same time, urban land is owned by the state, while rural land is owned by the rural collectives and is prohibited from entering urban land markets. Article 43 in the Land Administration Law stipulates that "Any individual or work unit

requiring the use of state land has to apply for planning permission to the relevant government departments; the construction of village-enterprises, farmers' housing, and village public facilities on collective land, however, can be exempted from this application" (Tian, 2008, p. 284). According to this law, the collective land must be converted to state land before it can be leased for urban development and rural collectives and households are entitled to compensation for land requisition, in the form of land compensation, relocation compensation and property compensation (Tian, 2008, p. 285).

While construction on urban land is regulated under city planning development, owner-built housing extensions in urban villages are subject only to the approval of a village committee (Tian, 2008, p. 290). The planning of urban villages is not integrated into the urban planning framework (Liu & He, 2010). Meanwhile, the power of the state is less developed in rural China compared to urban areas (Wu, 2016, p. 339).

The urban-rural division has led to fragmented structures. Under state socialism, urban residents' welfare was affiliated with their workplace, while rural residents were left outside of the state domain. With the transition to market-oriented economy, rural migrants can only rely on the market provision of social services, since they fall outsider the state social welfare system. Such marginalisation cannot be easily comprehended from the perspective of economic restructuring, only from an institutional perspective (Wu, 2016, p. 342).

According to Wu (2016, p. 341), the rural to urban income ratio of households decreased substantially from 45 percent in 1984 to 27 percent in 2007, then increased slightly, reaching 32 percent in 2013. This income gap between rural and urban is an indicator of the increase in social inequalities. These inequalities are gradually translated from inequalities between rural and urban areas into inequalities between different social groups inside the cities, with migrants being the actual urban working poor. Local institutions, and the urban-rural division in land and citizenship, have taken on a new meaning in the urban transformation brought about by globalisation, creating new space such as urban villages and turning rural villagers with local *hukou* into tenants in informal housing.

Employing a spatial perspective, Wong *et al.* (2018) studied the government's top-down restructuring strategy of urban villages and the villages' response at neighbourhood level. Wang *et al.* (2009, pp. 960-964) traced the development of evolving regulations governing the size of housing plots and floor space in housing construction and the reactions of village households, between 1982 and 2005. The contrast between the outcomes predicted by the municipality before implementing certain policies and the actual reactions of the villagers took the planning experts by surprise. For example, one regulation announced in 1986 aimed at slowing down village house extensions and imposing a stronger sense of government control. However, the imminent tightening of

controls simply spurred villagers to seize their last chance to appropriate land and extend their houses. Another example is the 2001 regulation imposing penalty fees for unauthorised housing. Since the sums of money imposed as penalties were much smaller than the potential gains and since the villagers were able to claim property ownership certificates after paying the penalties, the regulation was seen as an opportunity to legalise informal housing and build even more.

7.2.2 *Hukou* system and migrants

Hukou is a national system of household registration in China and was enacted in 1955. The literal meaning of the Chinese character *hu* is household, and *kou* is the population or members of a family. *Hukou* is assigned according to one's native space, which fits well with Chinese traditional culture. Friedmann (2007, p. 267) argues that this affiliation with the native space might account for the fact that there was little resistance to the introduction of *hukou*. When enacted in 1955, the *hukou* system created a two-tier society composed of the majority (83% of the population) agricultural (rural) population who lived in the countryside and the minority (17%) non-agricultural (urban) population who lived in urban areas (Friedmann, 2007, p. 267). Rural-urban dualism also distinguishes individuals holding different types of *hukou* in terms of their entitlement to public and social services. An urban *hukou* holder is entitled to such privileges as employment, health care, housing, education, pension and food subsidies, while a rural *hukou* holder has access to none of these privileges (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2808; Wong *et al.*, 2007, p. 37). The dualism denotes an explicit division between urban and rural, which forces the s the rural population to be self-sufficient and minimises cities' responsibility for providing for the rural area (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2808).

Rural *hukou* assigned peasants to communes and their *hukou* cards were held collectively by the village, while non-agricultural *hukou* was issued to individuals living in cities. A *hukou* card is an important form of identification when accessing to social amenities. When *hukou* was introduced, movement from rural to urban areas was not allowed without the approval of the relevant authority (Wang *et al.*, 2009). As a result, for the first two decades after its introduction, the *hukou* system constrained peasants from leaving their communes to search for jobs in the city. Urban workers were the historically privileged class. Friedmann (2007, p. 267) claimed that the purpose of *hukou* was to hold back urbanisation.

After 1978, the government gradually relaxed the restrictions that the system imposed on the spatial mobility of workers (Friedmann, 2007, p. 268), especially in the coastal regions where foreign trade centres were located (Chen & Parish, 1996). In 1985, rural migrants were for the first time permitted to register as temporary residents

in urban areas (Shen, 2006). An inflow of tens of millions of rural workers to cities and peri-urban villages was reported. These non-local residents often outnumbered the locals (Friedmann, 2007, p. 268).

Although residents without local *hukou* are now allowed to work and live in the city, they are governed by an array of institutional arrangements aimed at ensuring their minimal consumption of public resources and controlling society's overall reproduction cost (Qian & He, 2012). State monopoly of resources and the constraints on citizenship make it difficult for migrants to benefit directly from social welfare. Social welfare is therefore transferred to the market and delivered as paid services. For example, migrants send their children to migrant schools in their arrival cities, which are licensed by the local government but actually run by the private sector. In spite of the relaxation of the *hukou* system, discrimination derived from rural-urban and local-non-local divisions remains (Chung, 2010). It has been argued that *hukou* is an arm of state control (Qian & He, 2012; Wu, 2016) and that the *hukou* system represents the state's power to regulate migrants' everyday lives (Qian & He, 2012, p. 2808). For example, the strict entry criteria imposed by big cities are intentionally stipulated by the Chinese government to push migrants away from megacities to smaller cities in the countrywide urbanisation process (Fang & Zhang, 2016; Wu & Zhang, 2018).

Wu and Zhang (2018) evaluate migrants' housing tenure choices by focusing on the push and pull factors of both their rural origins and urban destinations. This empirical study indicates that institutional constraints have more impact on migrants' decisions regarding the purchase of housing than the socio-economic status of individual households. The push force of the urban destinations, namely the difficulty of obtaining *hukou*, and the pull force of the rural origins, which is the land tenure and land transfer rights of housing plots, contribute to the lower likelihood that rural migrants to purchase housing in cities. This finding can seem glaringly obvious in the context of megacities. For example, the municipality of Beijing allows migrants to buy housing only if they either obtain Beijing *hukou* or continuously pay local income tax and social insurance in Beijing for at least five continuous years. For the latter way, housing purchase alone without *hukou* does not allow them access to other urban resources, such as education of children in public schools.

A study of the place attachments of migrants was carried out by Du *et al.* (2017) in the city of Guangzhou and discusses the relationship between migrants and their urban milieu, especially urban villages, where a majority of migrants live, from three perspectives, namely familiarity, attachment and identity. These relationships prove to be precarious. The research indicates that the dominant role of the indigenous villagers proves a real obstacle to migrants establishing attachments to the urban villages. In addition, the *hukou* system, as a state-legitimised institution to evaluate place identity, actually prevents migrants from creating their own narratives of identity. Many scholars have pointed out the migrants' lack of a sense of a belonging to a community in the receiving

cities and have drawn attention to the emotional needs of migrants (Du *et al.*, 2017, p. 3198).

7.3 An introduction to some well-researched urban villages

The topic of the urban village is nothing new in academic debates and in this section, some well-researched urban villages will be introduced, including cases from both Beijing and the Pearl River Delta.

Beijing is one of the two cities (i.e. Beijing and Shanghai) ranked as global cities in mainland China. Historically, there have been hundreds of village communities dispersed on the periphery of Beijing city (Jeong, 2011). However, there are currently few urban villages left within the city's fourth ring road due to the large-scale urban redevelopment of recent years[23]. The number of urban villages in Beijing was 332 in 2005 and had decreased to a little over 100 by 2014. At the end of 2010, the municipality of Beijing announced that there were no more urban villages inside the third ring road (Zhan, 2018, p. 1537). According to a study conducted on urban villages in Beijing, "there are more than 100 urban villages in and around the city, hosting a total of roughly four million rural migrants" (Zhan, 2018, p. 1527).

Zhejiang village is one of the best studied examples of Beijing's urban villages (Friedmann, 2005; Leaf & Anderson, 2007; Zhang, 2001). It has a folk-based and handicraft economy (Chan *et al.*, 2003) and the place bonds they feel towards it play a vital role among its resident migrants (Ma & Xiang, 1998). In 2007, Zhejiang village inhabited more than 100,000 Zhejiangers, outnumbering indigenous Beijing villagers five to one (Friedmann, 2007, p. 269). A sort of native association, self-generated and self-governed by migrants, though very popular with Zhejiangers, was officially discouraged, since it was not a state-backed initiative (Friedmann, 2007, p. 271). Zhejiang village was the pioneer in developing *dayuan,* a type of compound, the largest *dayuan* in Zhejiang village housed nearly 6,000 people (Leaf & Anderson, 2007, p. 130).

In a study related to the development and redevelopment of urban villages, Tangjialing village was identified as a case village. Mainly inhabited by low-income IT workers from Zhongguancun Science Park (Wu *et al.*, 2013, pp. 1926-1928), it is located outside the fifth ring road of north-west Beijing. In Tangjialing, it is common for villagers to lease land to private 'informal' developers to build large standard housing blocks. These blocks were dubbed as 'student apartments[24]' and 'white-collar apartments'. This type of apartment buildings shared many similarities with the *dayuan* built by the migrants in Zhejiang village (Zhang, 2001). Although a formal land

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[23] This statement is based on an early round of overall field research in summer 2017 on sampled areas in Beijing, conducted prior to in-depth fieldwork in two case villages. In addition, the research of (Fan *et al.*, 2011) and the online source (link: https://www.douban.com/note/708062549/ , accessed in August 2020) are also important references.

[24] Although it was named as 'apartment', it is rental rooms inside these housing blocks.

lease contract was signed between the developers and the village committee and these rental rooms were of a higher quality than those in individual self-built blocks, the housing they provided was still informal, from two different perspectives. First, the use of agricultural land as urban went against the state's regulations on collective land; second, the rental activity was not recognised as formal economy and no urban taxes were paid. Some scholars argue that Tangjialin village featured the characteristic of 'graduatification' – a word created from studentification (see the detailed definition of studentification of urban villages in He, 2014). The redevelopment of Tangjialing took place in 2010 and the strategy of 'vacating' (in Chinese: *tengtui*) was adopted, where villagers temporarily vacated the old village, then moved back again when the project was finished (Wu *et al.*, 2013, p. 1927). Property rights were in this way redistributed among the stakeholder groups, namely the municipal government, the developers and the village collective.

Wong *et al.* (2018, p. 606) chose three villages in their research into the reconstruction strategies of urban villages in Beijing. Each village possessed some dominant feature that matched the spatial and functional patterns of most urban villages mentioned in the literature. The chosen villages were: Hanjiachuan, "an 'arrival' settlement for new and relocating rural migrants"; Langezhuang, "a rural enclave besieged by a planned urban expansion"; and Dinggezhuang, "a site of mixed rural economy with a small manufacturing sector". Through this study, scholars could identify the features the three villages had in common. Spatially, the built environment was characterised by low-rise and derelict buildings, poorly maintained streetscapes and chaotic parking. Nevertheless, all three villages were well connected by various means of transport to other parts of Beijing and life in the villages was well supported by local micro businesses and services.

Some scholars argue that urban villages in Beijing are different from those in Guangzhou or the Pearl River Delta, where urban villages are "heterogenous migrant settlements characterized by diversity of occupation and birthplace" (Tian, 2008, p. 287). This argument has been proved not to be true according to the researcher's fieldwork, as will be discussed in following chapters.

A study of Xiadu village in Guangzhou (Xue & Huang, 2008, p. 2008) mentions that there are groups of stakeholders influenced by the informal sector of the urban village, namely the municipal government, the village committee, a local ruffian group, the indigenous villagers and the residents of the surrounding areas. While it has been commonly agreed that urban villages in Guangzhou have influenced their surrounding neighbourhoods significantly, partly in a beneficial way by providing neighbourhood services and partly in a detrimental way with bad sanitation, noise and pollution (Xue & Huang, 2008).

Liu *et al.* (2014) conducted research in Dongfeng village (Little Hubei, abbreviation LHB) in Guangzhou to

examine how urban villages as migrant enclaves are influenced and shaped by rural migrants' translocal practices. In 2010, there were 5,000 local residents in LHB, while the number of migrants was around 120,000. The name LHB derives from the fact that the village is home to about 50,000 Hubeinese migrants, 95% of whom are from three county-level cities in central Hubei. These migrants have set up a large number of garment factories, which operate flexible management and payment practices, thereby promoting labour productivity. They are also flexible when it comes to schedules and products, which allows them to respond quickly to market demand. Many Hubeinese in LHB reported a sense of community cohesion and employers and employees enjoyed a sense of mutual reciprocity and interdependence. Scholars also observed that LHB provided its migrant dwellers with a familiar environment in the unfamiliar arrival city and a viable path for climbing the social ladder. Liu *et al.* (2014, p. 3100) argued that "the case of LHB has also illustrated that such native-place-based and employment-specialized enclaves are neither hopeless 'slums' nor temporary 'footholds' for rural migrants moving to large Chinese cities". Contrary to what happened in Zhejiang village when migrant leaders built housing compounds on their social spaces (Zhang, 2001), entrepreneurs in LHB shared the power with indigenous villagers (Liu *et al.*, 2014). Liu *et al.* (2014) suggested that this difference might account for the very different fates of the two villages – the former was regarded as an obstacle to state governance because of the privatisation of space and power and was eventually demolished, while the latter was tolerated and accepted by the government and continues to survive and thrive.

The eradication of urban villages was carried out in Shenzhen in 2005 in line with a strategic economic shift towards "higher value-added manufacturing and services" (Wu *et al.*, 2013, p. 1932). By demolishing the affordable homes of migrant workers, the municipality drove them away. This practice was imitated by the municipality of Beijing with the adoption of the notion of 'low-end population' in reference to migrant workers and the introduction of a policy to drive them out of Beijing.

8. The two case villages: Shigezhuang village and Dongxindian village

8.1 Historical development and basic information of the two case village

8.1.1 Shigezhuang village

Shigezhuang village is located in the Pingfang township in Chaoyang District, directly outside the fifth ring road. It lies about 15 km from Beijing city centre (the Forbidden City) and to the east of the Central Business District (CBD) (Figure 4). The research supporting this thesis focuses on the village's residential core in 2017, which is defined by Yaojiayuan Road, a side road on the second Airport Expressway, to the north, Yaojiadian Road to the south, Dingfuzhaung Road to the east and the Jingcheng Liyuan leisure park to the west (see Appendix D). Beyond these roads, Shigezhuang village is surrounded by formally developed residential communities consisting of highrise and midrise apartment buildings. For example, across Yaojiayuan Road lies the Dongba area, an important residential area in Beijing with several gated communities and shopping malls.

The village has three gates: the main, north, gate and two side gates. the south and east gates. Although Shigezhuang is not located in the city centre, it is convenient in terms of public transport for reaching other parts of Beijing city. There are two bus stops outside the north gate that serve three bus lines linking central areas in Beijing, including Beijing Railway Station inside the second ring road and the Sihui Transportation Hub on the outskirts, offering passengers a choice. About 400 metres from the south gate is the Dalianpo subway station of the Beijing Subway Line 6, a major east-west line covering a total of over 50 km and serving several residential areas, as well as commercial and business areas such as Financial Street, CBD and the sub-administrative centre of Tongzhou District.

The village has witnessed a rapid increase in both built-up area and housing density since the 1990s, due to the influx of migrant population. According to interviews with some of the older indigenous villagers (see, for example, interviewee S060BJ17M), the southern half of the village used to be covered by farmland, with no houses, and the river to the north provided a pleasant natural environment.

Inside the village, a north-south main street connects the north and south gates. The main street is packed with shops, grocery stores, restaurants and various other services. During the first round of fieldwork in summer 2017, there were several public facilities, including a community centre, a market, a police station that housed the administrative station for migrant population, and a community park. Due to the demolition of the village that was begun in 2018, most of the facilities had been demolished by the time of the second round of fieldwork

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in July 2019. Restaurants and shop buildings on the southern part of the main street that incorporated housing had also been torn down by 2019.[25]

Figure 4: Location of Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages on the city map of Beijing. Source: Author.

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[25] Unfortunately, Shigezhuang village committee refused to provide official data on the registered and migrant populations in the village.

8.1.2 Dongxindian village

Dongxindian village is located in Cuigezhuang township in Chaoyang District in northeast Beijing and is just one block away from Wangjing Subdistrict, one of the most important commercial areas in Beijing. Dongxindian is midpoint along the line that runs between the city centre and the airport, being 15 kilometres from both (Figure 4). The village is at the intersection of the fifth ring road and the Airport Expressway. To the north, it was once close to another village in Cuigezhuang township, which had been entirely demolished by 2019 and turned into a green area. Outside the east gate, is a bus stop serving close to ten bus lines. Within a one-kilometre radius of the village are two subway stations, Wangjing East station and Cuigezhuang station, both on Beijing Subway Line 15. A main street packed with shops, grocery stores, restaurants and various other services connects the eastern, central and western parts of the village. Public facilities inside the village include the village committee offices, a police station, an administrative station for migrant population, a bank, a kindergarten, a market hall, and a historic temple.

The nearby Wangjing commercial area has a considerable impact on Dongxindian village. Wangjing district used to be a village before its demolition. Since the beginning of this century, a significant number of residential buildings, office buildings and commercial facilities have been gradually built there. Many international corporations have set up local headquarters in Wangjing, such as Daimler, Siemens and Microsoft. Wangjing district, with an area of around 17.8 square kilometres, accommodates around 300,000 residents[26], ranging from entrepreneurs, corporate staff, IT engineers, doctors, actors and actresses. In addition, there are several commercial housing communities nearby, including, to the north, Guantang Community, one of the oldest villa communities in Beijing. The famous 798 Art Zone is also only two kilometres away.

As one of the most centrally located urban villages among those remaining in Beijing, Dongxindian village is also under constant threat of demolition. The rumour that the village would soon be demolished was in existence before the first round of fieldwork in 2017 and still persists at the time of writing this thesis. A major change witnessed in the village between 2017 and 2019 was the demolition of most of the compounds (*dayuan* in Chinese) in the wake of a major fire in November 2017. A *dayuan* is a typical form of rental housing found in many urban villages and is comprised of a large gated yard with several residential buildings. A detailed

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[26] According to the Sixth National Population Census in 2010. The statistic was taken from the website http://www.bjchy.gov.cn/dynamic/dynamicwork/8a24fe832e9fcd5301300c28cbac130e.html (accessed on August 7, 2020).

description of this type of rental housing will be given in the following chapters.

With urbanisation and the influx of migrant workers since the 1990s, the indigenous villagers' means of livelihood has gradually shifted from farming to employment in factories and companies while renting out housing to migrants. When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, Dongxindian village had a population of just over 600 and the village covered an area of around 400 hectares. From the early 1990s, a large area of farmland was gradually requisitioned by the government for infrastructural and industrial construction, including the construction of the fifth ring road. With the requisition of farmland, the status of the village was partly transferred from rural to urban and the *hukou* status of some indigenous villagers also became urban. In 2010, the total indigenous population was 1011 (578 households), made up of a rural population of 431 (247 households) and an urban population of 580 (321 households).[27]

Meanwhile, from the 2000s, the village witnessed a rapid increase in the migrant population due to the less strict regulations governing migrants as well as a similar easing of regulations governing small rural enterprises. At the beginning of 2010, there were about 23,000 migrants, a number that rose to 38,800 by July 2014. According to the official data acquired from the Cuigezhuang township[28], the migrant population in Dongxindian has been steadily decreasing since 2014. It was 18,911 in July 2017 and was 9,261 in July 2019. The most dramatic drop in the past ten years took place between July 2017 and July 2018, with numbers falling from 18,911 to 10,353, a rate of 45.25%. This drop may be largely attributed to the implementation of a city-wide policy directed at the eviction of migrants, which was triggered by a major fire in November 2017.

8.2 Demographic profiles of migrants and housing profiles of their rental rooms

In this section, the demographic profiles of the migrants living in the two case villages and the housing profiles of their respective rental rooms will be briefly presented in the form of a comparison. An attempt at explaining the differences between the migrant groups in the two villages will also be presented, partially based on qualitative findings. A detailed analysis of the quantitative data can be found in Appendix F.

Age

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[27] The figures in this paragraph are retrieved from a document published by village committee of Dongxindian in 2010. The document is titled *Dongxindian cunzhi* [东辛店村志] and the editor is Liang Li.

[28] The figures for migrant population were acquired from an internal document provided by the township government of Cuigezhuang, see Appendix E. However, it must be pointed out that the regulation for registration of temporary migrant population is not strictly enforced, so the actual number of migrants is larger than the document states. However, the official data show the trend in migrant numbers.

Of the 76 interviewees[29] in Shigezhuang village, one third were aged between 41 and 50 years old, making up the largest share of all age groups. The two age groups, 31-40 years old and 51-60 years old, were similar in size, making up, respectively, 24% and 21%. There were only ten interviewees aged between 21 and 30 years old. Of the five interviewees aged over 60 years old, three were retired indigenous villagers, one was a retired migrant from Sichuan Province and one was another Sichuan migrant, still working as an hourly labourer at the age of 65.

Interviewees in Dongxindian village were overall younger than those in Shigezhuang village. The largest group, making up 45%, were between 21 and 30 years old, and the second largest group were 31-40 years old, with a share of 26%. The older the age group, the smaller the group was. Of the 198 interviewees in Dongxindian village, only 32 (16%) were in their 40s and 14 (7%) in their 50s. In total, six interviewees were over 60 years old, including four retired indigenous villagers and two migrants from Henan Province who worked as cleaners.

Gender

The distribution of gender of the interviewees differed significantly in the two villages. In Shigezhuang village, the number of interviewees was evenly distributed between male and female, with the female group slightly larger. Of the 81[30] interviewees, 47% were male and 53% were female. However, in Dongxindian village, the male group was much larger, making up 65%, while females accounted for 35%.

There may be two explanations to account for these differences. On the one hand, they may be linked to the different age distributions in the two case villages. As presented above, interviewees in Dongxindian village were much younger, with nearly half of them aged between 20 and 30. It can be inferred that many of the interviewees in their 20s were not married and the qualitative findings show that single women were less likely to migrate alone and live in urban villages than single men. In addition, even after marriage, women were more likely to stay in their hometown to take care of school-aged children and only migrate with their husbands to Beijing after the children were "old enough" (see, for example, interviewee S005SC17M) to take care of themselves or be looked after by grandparents. On the other hand, the data collected may only reflect the time frame when the fieldwork was conducted and may have been influenced by the differences in spatiality of the two villages (as discussed in Chapter 6). Most of the interviews were conducted during the daytime, in summer,

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[29] Unless otherwise specified, the 'interviewees' referred to in this section include all respondents of structured interviews, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, who have answered the specific question. An overview of the interviewees and the information about which part of the fieldwork they have participated in can be found in Appendix A.

[30] Because some migrants may have refused to answer certain questions or the questions designed in different methodologies were different, the valid total number of interviewees in each analysis may vary.

and it was common practice in Shigezhuang village for mothers to take their children for visits to Beijing city during the summer vacations and the men were out at work during the day. In addition, the spatiality of Shigezhuang made interviewees more accessible than those in Dongxindian, and female migrants were more likely to refuse to be interviewed, out of safety concerns.

Hukou *province*

Of the 81 interviewees in Shigezhuang village, more than half (51%) came from Sichuan Province. The second largest group were Henaners, making up 17% of all interviewees. Both Sichuan and Henan provinces have a reputation for huge outflows of migrant workers. Beijingers made up 9% and the rest were from Shandong (7%), Hebei (5%), Hubei (5%), Gansu (3%), Shanxi (2%), and Jiangsu (1%) provinces. A total of nine provinces of origin for all interviewees.

By comparison, the origins of interviewees in Dongxindian village were distributed among 25 provinces (see Appendix E for list). While migrants from Hebei made up the largest group (17%), migrants from Sichuan and Henan provinces were also well represented, at 13% and 12% respectively. The next most numerous group were Beijingers, of whom there were 22 (11%), and this group was made up of both indigenous villagers and residents of other districts in Beijing. (Interviewee D063BJ19M, for example, came from Pinggu District in Beijing and ran a hairdresser's shop in Dongxindian.) The remainder of the interviewees' provinces of origin were more or less evenly distributed among the other 25 provinces.

The number of provinces of origin of interviewees in Dongxindian were almost three times as many as were found in Shigezhuang village and, to some extent, that reflected the diversity of migrants in Dongxindian. While the groups of migrants from Sichuan and Henan provinces were both large, their position was not so dominant as was observed in Shigezhuang, where they accounted for more than 50% of migrants. This comparative diversity will be elaborated in the following paragraphs and when discussing qualitative findings.

Education

Migrants in Shigezhuang village tended to have a much lower level of education than migrants in Dongxindian village. Of the 11 interviewees in Shigezhuang whose educational level was recorded, only one had attended university. However, this single migrant worker, who held a bachelor degree, was not a long-term resident in Shigezhuang but the son of migrants visiting his parents during the summer vacation. Of the remaining ten, one had attended high school while the others had only gone as far as middle school or lower.

The situation in Dongxindian village was different. Of the 126 migrants interviewed there, only 20% had an

educational level of middle school or lower. Almost half (49%) had attended high school. In addition, 22% of these migrants held a certificate from a three-year college, a post-high school institution where students are taught certain skills. Of the 126 migrants, 9% had attended university.

The different levels of education were reflected in the occupational categories of the two villages.

Occupations

The differences observed between the two villages with regard to diversity of *hukou* province were mirrored when it came to an analysis of occupations, with Dongxindian village interviewees having a wider diversity than Shigezhuang. Of the 79 interviewees in Shigezhuang, 24% were self-employed. This confirmed the observation made during fieldwork that many migrants ran small informal businesses, either inside the village or, via tricycle, selling things informally on the street. Nearly half of the Shigezhuang interviewees had low-skilled jobs, working as construction workers (18%), cleaners (13%) and hourly labourers[31] (8%). There were also five students (6%), four sales and services workers (5%), three company staff members (4%), two drivers (2%) and one cook (1%). The rest of the interviewees were either unemployed (6%) or retired (13%). The semi-structured interviews suggested that, apart from a very few who had been unable to find a job, most of the unemployed and retired migrants (see interviews with interviewee S045SC17F, S076SC19F, S032SC17F) were taking care of their children or grandchildren.

Of the 187 interviewees in Dongxindian village, sales and services workers, such as customer services workers, shop salespersons, waiters and waitresses, etc., made up the largest group (28%). Most of them were in their 20s or 30s. Food deliverymen (13%) and other deliverymen (for parcels) (6%) were also common occupations in Dongxindian, that had not been found in Shigezhuang. The self-employed were also a major group, taking a share of 12%. Although there were also construction workers, cleaners and hourly labourers, these groups made up 12% in total. A number of highly-skilled and professional workers were also found in Dongxindian village, including 13 white-collar workers whose number included accountants, five IT workers, one nurse, one designer and one engineer.

Dwelling profiles

Because Shigezhuang village was being redeveloped during the second round of fieldwork in 2019 and housing

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[31] The work of hourly labourers is similar to that of construction workers. Hourly labourers may do interior decoration, transport construction materials, etc.

conditions and rents were constantly changing, in order to make a valid comparison between the two villages, it made sense to use the data on dwelling profiles that had been collected through structured interviews in the two villages during the first round of fieldwork.

In Shigezhuang village, 54 interviewees provided valid data on dwelling profiles. Average living space per person among the five indigenous villagers was 26.2 square metres, while for migrants it was 5.2 square metres. One family of three migrants had travelled to Beijing simply to enjoy their retirement and had rented an atypically comfortable apartment. If they were excluded from the calculations, the average living space per migrant dropped to 3.9 square metres. Of the 46 migrant workers, only five lived in rooms with indoor toilets, making up 11% of the whole group. The monthly rent in 2017 for a room without a toilet was around 80 yuan per square metre, and one with a toilet cost between 20 and 30 yuan more.

In Dongxindian village, a total of 47 people took part in structured interviews. Five of them were indigenous villagers and their average living space per person was 36.3 square metres. Of the remaining 42 interviewees, who included both migrants from other provinces and Beijingers who had moved from other districts in Beijing to find work, the average living space per person was 6.8 square metres. Eleven of the aforementioned 42 interviewees lived in rooms with indoor toilets, making up 26%. The monthly rent in 2017 for rooms without toilets was between 70 and 80 yuan per square metre in Dongxindian, comparable to Shigezhuang, and between 120 and 130 yuan per square metre for rooms with toilets.

9. The space of governance and negotiation

9.1 The socio-political transformation of policies on migrants in Beijing

9.1.1 Space as a tactic of governance

Conceived space, or the representations of space, is the dominant space in any society. This is also the case in China. This aspect of the space plays a critical role in China, and especially in the capital city of Beijing.

The massive construction that has taken place in urban villages did not start until 2009[32]. Although it had been common since the 1990s for indigenous villagers to rent out rooms to migrants, the extensions they built on their housing plots were added incrementally, in small volumes and, for the most part, as a temporary measure. At the same time, the villages also had collective land that was not made full use of and was therefore rented out to migrant investors. Before 2000, most rural collective land was used to build factories and storage facilities. After 2000, these investors found that they could earn more if the land was used for residential purposes and started to turn factories into apartment buildings. The village collectives received land rent from these investors and distributed it to the villagers by way of dividends.

The trigger for the massive growth in informal construction was the rapid urban construction that took place before and after the Beijing Olympics in 2008. Due to rapid urbanisation, many centrally located villages were requisitioned by the government and indigenous villagers were awarded a cash compensation and relocated. The amount of cash compensation varied from one village to another, but a number of news reports featured stories of rural households that had become rich overnight thanks to requisition and relocation. At the same time, thanks to urban sprawl, urban villages like Shigezhuang and Dongxindian, that had once been on the outskirts of Beijing, now enjoyed a more valuable location. In pursuit of higher rental incomes, as well as potentially higher compensation fees from the government, indigenous villagers in almost all urban villages started to undertake massive construction work. The increased supply of rental rooms on the market caused a relative decrease in rents, so attracting many migrants.

The increased working opportunities brought about by urbanisation and the supply of affordable rental housing

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[32] This section is mainly based on an expert interview, as well as narrative interview, with interviewee O03EXP2019M. It is supplemented by information acquired from other sources, including literature review and an expert interview with the interviewee O02EXP2019M.

meant that Beijing witnessed a steep growth in migrant numbers between 2008 and 2013. In 2013 the city government realised that the growth in migrant numbers was out of control and started to take measures to stop or reverse the growth. The first measure was the enforced closure of the wholesale zoo market in Xicheng District, which covered a total of 300,000 square metres[33], and the dismissal of its entire staff. The aim was to remove low-end industries like the wholesale clothes business from the city centre and relocate the migrants who worked in these industries to suburban districts. From 2013 to 2016, this mission to relocate the migrant population was officially stated in the city government report distributed to various levels of government, including district and township. The overall objective was to reduce migrant populations by 20 percent each year. In January 2016, Beijing City Government (2016) published its economic and social development plan for next five years, namely from 2016 to 2020. One of its critical goals was to limit the city's total population to 23 million by 2020 and, more specifically, to reduce the population in the six inner-city districts by 15 percent compared to 2014. "This is the first time that the capital has drawn a red line on its population", proclaimed a news report in *China Daily* (Kai, 2016). The population of the six inner-city districts was around 12.76 million in 2014, meaning that in order to fulfil the government's goal, there would need to be a reduction of around 1.91 million (Kai, 2016).

From early 2017, the Beijing government embarked on a special operation aimed at upgrading through function transfer and remediation[34]. This meant removing non-capital city functions to outside Beijing, a long-term initiative aimed at improving the economic structure of the capital city through a shift to essential capital city functions and industries with high added value. Although this initiative does overtly target migrants, the industries affected are predominantly staffed by migrant workers.

On 18 November, 2017, a fire broke out in a housing block accommodating thousands of migrants in an urban village[35] in Daxing District in southern Beijing. The compounds containing the housing blocks (*dayuan*) had been converted from a former factory warehouse, and spatial fire regulations had not been followed, making it difficult for the firefighters to put out the fire and leading to the death of 19 tenants, including eight children. The special operation initiated in early 2017 had already seen measures introduced to tear down such housing blocks, but the fire triggered a massive citywide eviction of migrants and the demolition of 'illegal structures' in urban villages. Before the fire, according to interviewee O03EXP2019M, the reasons given for the launching

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[33] This figure was taken from Baidu Baike under the item "北京动物园服装批发市场".

[34] The Chinese term for this special operation is shujie zhengzhi cutisheng. The English translation is referred to in a press conference, see link: https://new.qq.com/omn/20180125/20180125A02LBQ.html

[35] See the news report: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42043640

of anti- housing block policies mostly cited low efficiency of land use and only to a lesser extent mentioned the housing blocks' violation of safety codes and the measures taken had been gradual, especially from the perspective of actual execution. After the fire, overnight, the measures imposed were harsh. Many tenants were forced out of their homes with as little as three days' notice, with such measures as cutting off electricity and heating being employed by some local governments.

In Daxing District, where the fire occurred, measures to exert control over informal residential buildings, including housing blocks, had already been in place but, after the fire, these were enforced with greater vigour. In citywide operations, an estimated tens of thousands of migrants were evicted from their rental rooms[36]. In this round of demolition and eviction, a group of rich migrants from Fujian province who rented land from the village collective to build residential yards were required to return the land to the village committee even if the lease had not yet expired.

Interviewee O02EXP2019M, who was responsible for the comprehensive management of Cuigezhuang township[37], suggested that the development of urban villages should be seen as a land-associated issue. This opinion was representive one of the mainstream opinions held by planners from academia and in practice:

"To understand issues related to land, one should take a stance of multiple stages. The existence of every stage is reasonable." (Interviewee O02EXP2019M, July 2019)

Constructions on collective land and its transformation over the last 20 years can be taken as an example. Twenty years ago, urban village land was left unused, and could be rented out at a low price. Factory owners rented the land to build plants. With the sprawl of urbanisation, land value increased. To make better use of the land, the industrial function was switched to residential and plants were converted into compounds with housing blocks. Over time, land values continued to rise as the villages effectively grew closer to the city. At the same time, from a governmental perspective, the value generated by rents from the compounds, which targeted low-income groups looking for cheap accommodation, did not reflect the actual value of the land. There are two common practices for achieving value, depending on whether it is commercial value or value of the common good. To achieve the first, the government requisitions the land, then leases it to developers for formal commercial development. To achieve the second, the government requires the village collectives to take back the land and

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[36] There were no official data on the number of migrants affected by the mass eviction. This figure was extracted from a news report in *The New York Times*: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/asia/china-beijing-migrants.html

[37] In Chinese: zonghe zhili bangongshi (综合治理办公室)

turn it to public green spaces. Echoing the interviewee O02EXP2019M's opinion, Prof. Yulin Chen also argued:

"Although the development of different villages varies and different explanations are given for urban villages' redevelopment, one rule applied to all is that: when the land value of an urban village is high enough, the village will definitely be demolished and redeveloped (for formal use)."

The arguments around land values also implicate the temporary status of urban villages as migrant settlements. For migrants, the location of the urban village they live in can be a paradoxical dialectical. On the one hand, the prime location is one of the most important factors in the migrants' decision to live there. On the other hand, the more favourable the location of an urban village has the less likely it is to be able to maintain its status as an urban village, placing residents at the risk of being evicted. In other words, migrants cannot benefit from increased land value.

9.1.2 Impact of city events on migrants' work and lives and migrants' resistance

Besides policies directly aimed at them or indirectly affecting them, other city- and nationwide events have a significant impact on migrants. Given the special status of Beijing as an international metropolitan city as well as the capital of China, both the city and its residents have different experiences from those of an ordinary large city. The previous section introduced events and regulations targeted at migrants and urban villages whose impact lay for the most part in the domain of the migrants' living space. This section deals with measures which were not directed at migrants but nonetheless had a major impact on their ability to earn a living in the city.

Some national and city events from the years 2017 to 2019 will be introduced, together with their impacts on migrants. These events were not selected according to the subjective viewpoints of experts, government officials or desktop research, but were brought up in interviews with migrants in Dongxindian and Shigezhuang villages.

19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 18-24 October, 2017

The 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Beijing from 18-24 October, 2017. This national congress takes place every five years and is one of the most important regular national events in China. As is usual, intensive preparations for the congress began months in advance and their impact was citywide. For example, starting from a few weeks before the congress, security checks on both transportation and deliveries were stepped up to make sure that no dangerous people or goods could enter Beijing. In Dongxindian and Shigezhuang, most recreational establishments were forced to close more than two months before the congress (see Figure 5). According to interviewee S059SD17F, there were two reasons for the forced

shutdown. First, the village committees argued that many of them encroached on street space, with billiards and mahjong shops putting out tables in the street to serve more customers, and that this would harm the image of the city. The second reason was that these shops usually contained a significant number of people at any one time, thus posing a high fire and security risk. Unwilling to take this risk, the village committees preferred to halt their operations. As a result, most of the shops were closed and their income suspended.

Figure 5: Billiards shop in Shigezhuang forced to close in advance of the National Congress. Source: Author, September 2017.

However, in resistance to these informal regulations, some interesting solutions were devised by the migrants. The owner of a mahjong shop in Shigezhuang put up a curtain inside the shop and left the door half-open. Seen from outside, with the shop light turned off, it appeared that no activities were taking place inside. The researcher only discovered the truth when invited inside the shop by an interviewee and witnessed ten mahjong tables, each with four players, operating as usual.

The fieldwork took place before the National Congress and several shop owners were asked whether they had been informed when their shops would be allowed to reopen. None of them knew the exact date and merely assumed that it would be sometime after the congress.

Programme to reduce air pollution in Jingjinji Metropolitan Region and surrounding area in the autumn and

winter of 2017 to 2018[38]

The programme was carried out to control PM2.5 and thereby improve air quality and protecting blue skies, particularly in the Jingjinji region. The Jingjinji region, which includes Beijing Municipality, Tianjin Province and Hebei Province, is the National Capital Region and the largest urban metropolis region in North China. In the previous years, air pollution in the region had been especially severe in winter because of the inability of air to spread in cold temperatures. In order to address this problem, the programme was targeted at the autumn and winter seasons, the primary goals being to decrease the average PM 2.5 level and reduce the number of days of heavy pollution by 15%. Although the programme was a citywide event that affected every industry, one of the most affected was the construction industry. The programme, announced on 15 September, 2017, decreed that all construction sites in the six inner-city districts and other suburban districts in Beijing must be suspended from 15 November, 2017 to 15 March, 2018. As explained in Chapter 8, a high percentage of migrants with little education – especially among those from Sichuan Province – make their living in Beijing as construction workers. This regulation, with its ambitious goal for the welfare of the city residents, to a great extent negatively affected these construction workers by depriving them of the opportunity to work.

In late September 2017, several migrants talked during the interviews about this 'historically strongest regulation on prohibiting constructions'. They had been informed about it by the construction leaders that they worked with. On the one hand, some of the scheduled construction work was as a result carried out intensively in order to complete it ahead of schedule, giving the workers an opportunity to take on more work. On the other hand, there would now be no more work for them during the coming four months and they were supposed to make their own arrangements during this time. Interviewee S058SC17M said he would look for other hourly paid manual labour work, such as cleaning or house decorating, to make up for the lost income. Another two interviewees (interviewee S001SC17M and interviewee S005SC17M) planned to go back to their hometowns in late November to spend the winter in the countryside to avoid the high cost of living in Beijing, then return to the city in March.

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[38] The original Chinese name of the programme: 京津冀及周边地区 2017-2018 年秋冬季大气污染综合治理攻坚行动方案. See the following link for the full version of the document: https://www.sohu.com/a/168796695_174505 [accessed on 15th October 2020] http://news.hexun.com/2017-09-16/190890277.html [accessed on 17th October 2020]

Figure 6: Ongoing 'coal to gas' project in Xishan village and Yuanmingyuan East Street in Haidian District. Source: Author, September 2017.

The measures to improve air quality also affected the urban villages by limiting the amount of fuel that could be used every day. Coal burning used to be a major source of PM 2.5 pollution. Besides industrial use, like power plants and district boilers, small-scale burning of coal in households in rural areas also had an effect. In order to address the air pollution problem, the city government executed a city-wide project named 'coal to gas'[39]. The project was aimed at making a wholesale switch from coal to natural gas in both urban and rural areas. Given the chaotic and crowded spatiality in most urban villages, it was often necessary to tear down parts of buildings that impeded the instalment of natural gas pipes. During the fieldwork in 2017, many urban villages that had completed or were in the process of the transition from 'coal to gas' were visited (Figure 6). This air pollution project led to a considerable decrease in the number of rental rooms.

The grand military parade for the 70th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, 1 October, 2019

To celebrate the 70th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, a series of ceremonial events were held in Beijing and across the country, among which the grand military parade on National Day was the highlight. It was recorded as being the largest military parade in Chinese history[40]. It was held in an open space along Chang'an Avenue and participants and audience came from various origins and backgrounds. In advance of the

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[39] In Chinese: mei gai qi (煤改气).
[40] According to the news: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3030206/china-says-national-day-military-parade-wont-disappoint-scale [accessed on 17th October 2020]

official parade, a rehearsal was scheduled for early September and preparations for the event itself were started several months earlier. Safety measures played a critical role. These included the banning of flying objects in the sky over the city, the banning of alcohol and devices using radio waves, the banning of self-service refuelling of cars, the temporary closure of some shops, restaurants and underground stations near the parade venue, and instructions to residents living nearby to draw their curtains and stay away from the window.

As for the Dongxindian and Shigezhuang migrants, the group who most frequently mentioned the impact of National Day on their lives were the street vendors. Interviewees S064HN19F and S065HN19M earned a living selling food on the street from their food trucks, providing breakfasts and cooked snacks. Officially, street vendors, like other workers in the informal economy, were not allowed to ply their trade in many public spaces in Beijing, but this regulation tended to be rather loosely applied. Now, however, a strict ban was placed on the street vendors, from as early as July, when the second round of fieldwork was conducted.

At first, they were still allowed to sell food in public spaces inside the village, but very quickly were prohibited from taking their food trucks out of the yard where their rental rooms were located. By the time of their interviews, S065HN19M and S066HN19M were confined to their homes. One of them said:

"What can we do? This is not the first time. What we can do is just waiting and we really cannot predict when we would be allowed to run the business in the street again. We hardly had any income in the past month and this situation will definitely last at least until the grand military parade of National Day." (Interviewee S065HN19M, July 2019)

Other city events impacted migrants' livelihood dramatically, also from a supply and demand price perspective. For example, the average rent for a room in Shigezhuang village increased by 150 yuan from 500 yuan at the time of the first round of fieldwork in 2017, an increase of more than 30 percent. Later in 2017, rents were raised again after the massive eviction that following the big fire in Daxing District. The significant drop in the number of available rooms meant that these increases were applied to all the remaining rental rooms.

In summer 2018, when it was decided that Shigezhuang village was to be redeveloped by a developer, some buildings were demolished, causing no little inconvenience to residents. In addition, fearing unexpected eviction, many migrants started relocating to other villages, leading to less demand in the Shigezhuang rental market. As a result, rents briefly dropped, only to recover a few months later when those who had moved out returned to Shigezhuang. Despite the inconvenience caused by ongoing construction work, Shigezhuang continued to enjoy the advantages of favourable location and proximity to work opportunities compared to other villages on the city outskirts. In response to the recovery in demand, landlords initially raised rents back to previous levels,

then added around 5 to 10 percent, taking advantage of the overall drop in the supply of rental rooms.

Dongxindian village has witnessed similar rent increases due to external events, including the Daxing fire in November 2017. In addition, when nearby Feijiazhuang village was entirely demolished for urban development, the displaced residents moved to Dongxindian, creating more demand and consequently higher rents.

9.2 The impact of migrants on the institutions within the governance of villages and townships

9.2.1 Change in governance institutions

In response to the inflow of migrants that has resulted in migrants outnumbering local residents, institutions for the governance of residents have been reshaped. Governance institutions in urban villages have changed significantly and institutions specifically targeting the governance of migrants have been introduced. In the following paragraphs, the traditional governing structure in villages – the village committee – and the administrative station of migrants (in Chinese: *liudong renkou guanlizhan*), an organisation introduced in Beijing in 2016 specifically to govern migrants, will be briefly reviewed.

Village committee

When studying the governance of urban villages, the village committee, as a form of community-level governance, is always a key stakeholder. The earliest village committees emerged in 1980 (O'brien & Li, 2000). In the early stages, they were formed without reference to the local authorities and committee members were appointed informally by the villagers to take care of neighbourhood affairs. The village committee was later accepted by the state government as a "perfect vehicle for practising grassroots democracy" and "was written into the Constitution as elected, mass organization of self-government" (*cunmin zizhi*) in 1982 (O'brien & Li, 2000, p. 467). The village committee is now considered to be the lowest level of the government and its members continue to be selected by the villagers rather appointed by upper-level government. Friedmann (2006) found that village committees are self-financed and do not receive funds from upper-level government despite being a formal arm of the government. However, field research has revealed that the committees of villages like Dongxindian and Shigezhuang do receive a certain amount of governmental funding as well as independently generating financial incomes. Village committees are responsible for mediating in disputes, maintaining public order and social stability, developing public services and passing on opinions and suggestions to the people's government (Benewick *et al.*, 2004). Po (2011, p. 510) highlights the conflicting role of village governments in

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that they are simultaneously "an agent of the state (to collect taxes and implement state policies), an agent of local autonomy (to represent local interests) and an agent of collective ownership (to control and manage collective assets)".

The first village committees were formed in the 1980s as a community-governance instruments to manage the affairs of the indigenous villagers. Therefore, when migrants gradually started to make up a major percentage of the population in a village, the village committee adjusted its duties in response. For example, an earlier study by the researcher of another urban village in Beijing (Yang & van Oostrum, 2020) revealed that in 2007 the village committee of Maquanying village, in response to the large number of migrants in the village, drew up a new set of rules that, for the first time, took migrants into account. From 2007, self-governance regulations set rules for migrants' temporary registration and imposed a monthly fee of ten yuan per month for tap water and garbage disposal (Yang & van Oostrum, 2020). Villages like Shigezhuang and Dongxindian also implemented similar regulations to manage migrants until the introduction of the specialised institution – the administrative station of migrants.

Administrative station of migrants

The administrative station of migrants (in Chinese: *liudong renkou guanlizhan*) is the abbreviated name of the service station for people coming to Beijing and leasing houses (in Chinese: *laijing renyuan he chuzu fangwu fuwuzhan*)[41]. The administrative station of migrants was introduced on 1st October 2016[42], with a total of 346 stations opened citywide that same month[43]. The administrative station of migrants emerged out of the steady growth of the migrant population and the increasing need to both manage and provide for this group. Whereas the institutions and policies governing migrants used to be informally incorporated within the organisational structure of the village committee, the newly-formed administrative station is organisationally controlled by the municipal and district departments of public security. The administrative station is usually set up as either a branch within the department of public security or an individual agency in the township or village. This means that, in most cases including Dongxindian and Shigezhuang, the administrative station and the village committee are two parallel agencies, in charge of different administrative issues and reporting to different upper-level governance institutions. Unlike in the village committees, where members are elected from and by the indigenous villagers, the administrative station of migrants staff are mostly recruited publicly, with the head

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[41] In Chinese, the name of this institution is often shortened to *liuguanzhan* (流管站).
[42] See the official document (in Chinese): http://gaj.beijing.gov.cn/wsgs/xzgfxwj/201912/t20191227_1523566.html
[43] The figure is cited from: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-09/30/content_5113830.htm

appointed by the local department of public security. However, it was observed during fieldwork that almost all staff in the administrative station of migrants in Dongxindian village were indigenous villagers.

The administrative station of migrants can be understood as an external governance addition to the village's original system. Its administration, personnel and finances are all independent of the village committee. The administrative station within the village is responsible for collecting information on migrants, issuing residence registration cards, and the administration of public security and fire prevention related to the leasing of houses, as well as other administrative services related to migrants (interviewee O03EXP2019M, July 2019). At the same time, when the village committee is faced with issues concerning migrants, they can turn to the administrative station for assistance.

The administrative station of migrants is a structural product that grew out of the balance of supply and demand. When the increasing number of migrants led to the need for a properly functioning agency responsible for them, especially from the perspective of municipal and district government, the emergence of such an agency was a natural development. It was also not new. For example, in Shenzhen, another large city in China where a large inflow of migrants took place earlier than in Beijing due to rapid 'opening up', regulations governing the leasing of houses were drawn up in 1997 and the term 'floating population' (referring to migrants) came into use for the first time in the revised version of the regulations in 2007[44]. These sorts of changes have a significant impact on the original structure of village governance. Urban-rural dualism in China means that villages are often taken to be self-governed in terms of their inhabitants, land, houses, administrations and finances, and the introduction of upper-level government in the form of administrative stations weakens the village committee's power over the village's affairs, although it also offers assistance in the provision of better governance.

9.2.2 Registration of migrants

Since 2016, there have been two types of residence registration for migrants. The first type is the Residence Registration Card ('the card' in the following paragraphs), which is a temporary registration permit valid for six months. Residents not in possession of a Beijing *hukou* are required to apply for the card within three days of their arrival at Beijing. They can do this either at the administrative station in the village or at the administrative station in the local department of public security. The application process is clear and simple. The documents required include an identification card, a residence certificate such as a rental contract signed by the landlord,

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[44] See: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=10443&CGid=

and a photograph. The applicant fills in a registration form and the card can be issued on the spot.

The second type of residence registration for migrants is the Residence Registration Permit ('the permit' in the following paragraphs), which is for migrants who have been resident in Beijing for more than six months. This can be seen as an upgrading of the card and has correspondingly higher requirements. In addition to a rental contract, the landlord's registration card and other personal documents are required. In place of a residence certificate, the applicants can provide a labour contract or formal business licence to prove they have legal and stable employment in Beijing. Students can provide student certificates as an alternative. Unlike the card, the permit can only be applied for and processed at the administrative station in the local department of public security. Both the card and the permit are free of charge.[45]

Although regulations make it compulsory for migrants to register, not all of them do. According to a government official (interviewee O03EXP2019M), migrant registration can be categorised, from a governance perspective, as either active or passive. Active registration means that, in many villages, administrative station staff make regular visits to indigenous households to register migrants. Passive registration means that most migrants only apply fora card or the permit when they have to. For example, before a child can attend kindergarten or primary school in Beijing, his or her parents must submit a copy of their residence permits. In other words, unless there is some benefit to having a card or the permit, migrants are unwilling to take the trouble to register, since no punishment or penalty will result.

While a significant number of migrants said that they did not have a rental or a labour contract, supposedly mandatory when making an application, many of them did possess a residence card or permit. These migrants had mostly been registered through 'active registration', with registration being carried out at the housing plot where they lived and the landlords providing a single copy of the necessary documents to enable the registration of all his tenants at the same time. In these circumstances, most migrants are quite willing to register. When asked in the interview whether he had a residence permit, Uncle Tan said:

"Yes, both your aunt (uncle Tan's wife) and I have applied for one. This totally depends on your personal willingness. If you want, you can apply for one. If you do not have the permit, nobody will check on you. We just thought it would do no good but also no harm to us, so we registered – the residence permit is free of charge anyway." (Interviewee S005SC17M, July 2019)

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[45] The information was acquired from an expert interview with an employer (interviewee O08EXP2019M) at the department of public security in Pingfang township, and from the official document: https://www.cnu.edu.cn/sqjwh/bszn/jmdjq/110683.htm

However, some migrants remain unwilling to register. Some insisted the registration system is a hostile government tactic. One interviewee in Dongxindian (interviewee D067JX19M) claimed that registration makes it possible for the village committee to charge them extra fees:

"I was charged 120 yuan as the administration fee when applying for the residence card at the administrative station in the village. They only offered me an informal receipt for the fee. They said that the village committee 'commissioned' the station to collect the fee. A friend of mine applied for the card at the local department of public security (in Chinese: paichusuo*) and he was not asked for the fee."* (Interviewee D067JX19M, July 2019)

This was later verified in an interview with an indigenous villager (interviewee D060BJ19F). The village committee charges migrants this fee for electricity and water consumption and processing of garbage. The township officer (interviewee O03EXP2019M) also pointed out that additional security staff have had to be employed due to the large number of migrants and that these costs are allocated to the individual migrants at 120 yuan per person. However, given the high turnover rate of tenants and the fact that most migrants go to work early in the morning and come back late at night, it is hard for the village committee to collect the fee directly from tenants, so the village committee normally commissions landlords to collect it or, as in this case, commissions the station of migrants.

Similar to the informality of the rental housing market, the collection of the fee is informal in three ways. First, the fee collected for a public service within the village is not formally regulated in law. Both the item and the precise fee are determined by the village committee. Second, no official receipt is provided. The fees collected are recorded in the village committee's standing book (in Chinese: *taizhang*, an informal accounting book) and are used for the village's everyday expenses. It is a form of collective saving for community building and the committee usually does not report the inflow and outflow of this money to upper government or any other supervisory institution. Third and trickiest, collection of the fee depends to a large extent on the will of individual migrants. As mentioned above, if the migrants do not want to pay this fee, they can register at the department of public security instead of at the administrative station in the village. As for the collecting process led by landlords, some migrants may refuse to pay the fee since the landlords do not have any power of enforcement over the migrants, and neither does the committee. However, landlords do have the right to refuse to continue renting to the migrants, though they are unlikely to do so since they derive no direct benefits from payment of the fee. Something of the intermediary role played by landlords between the village committee and the migrants and their invisible power can be glimpsed here. This theme will be expanded in Section 9.3.

9.2.3 Informal economy in urban villages

Most shops and restaurants on the main streets of Dongxindian and Shigezhuang are opened and run by migrants. Restaurants vary in size from very small, with an area of less than ten square metres, serving fast food, to large establishments with a dining area of over 100 square metres and tables that can accommodate large groups of family and friends. Shops range from basic grocery stores and supermarkets providing for residents' everyday needs, to hairdressers, clothing stores, stores selling and servicing smartphones, and motor repair shops, etc.

Regardless of the kind of businesses, the feature they share is that they all operate within the informal economy. Asked in 2017 about the businesses on the main street of Dongxindian, an 85-year-old indigenous villager (interviewee D054BJ17M) said:

"Business licence? I have never seen such thing in the village. I can promise you that more than 99 percent of the shops in the village do not have a licence." (Interviewee D054BJ17M, October 2017)

The implementation of official regulations governing businesses in urban villages has been described as "*following the law and following the regulations*" (in Chinese: *yifa yigui*) (interviewee O03EXP2019M, July 2019). The definition of regulation is fuzzy. On the one hand, it refers to regulations at community level inside the village. On the other hand, according to Chinese custom, a regulation can be seen as an informal agreement reached among a certain group of people. The agreement is not verbal or explicit, but rather a way of doing things that has come to be accepted as reasonable and legitimate without being strictly legal. According to Shan (interviewee O02EXP2019M), who takes care of the comprehensive management of Cuigezhuang Township, the management of businesses can be described thus:

"We have a low threshold for businesses in villages. The laws are a reference of the management. However, it is difficult and impossible to directly enforce the law in the village context. The businesses are managed in a more 'humanised' way. Most businesses (in villages in Cuigezhuang Township) do not have business licences." (Interviewee O02EXP2019M, July 2019)

Unlike businesses in the formal economy, which require a licence to operate, informal businesses have usually been operating for some time before they are gradually, partly or fully, formalised. For example, in Dongxindian and Shigezhuang, shop and restaurant owners used to need only to rent a shop front in order to start up a business. Most street-facing buildings have a mix of residential and commercial use, with ground floor space divided into several shopfronts and upper floor space into rental rooms. The only difference is that the price per square metre

is higher for commercial use.

However, when some important event is taking place in Beijing, an inspection will be carried out by upper-level government (see Section 9.1.2) and these informal economic activities will be partly suspended. For example, in advance of the 19th National Congress, a shop selling everyday necessities was required to rearrange its shelves so they did not encroach on street space and to remove the sign that identified it as a business (see Figure 7). After the inspection, the informal economy was able to prosper again with 'conceded' permission from the village committee.

Figure 7: A corner shop in Shigezhuang village, during inspection for the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (left) and after inspection (right). Source: Author, September 2017 (left) and October 2017 (right).

As the socio-economic and governance environment in urban villages became more urbanised, different governing instruments were introduced. Grocery store owners in Dongxindian showed the researcher a written agreement on responsibility (in Chinese: *zerenshu*), signed by Cuigezhuang township, setting out the shop owner's responsibility for the area extending from the store front of its store to the street. It echoes the citywide Administration of 'Three Doorstep Assignments' Responsibility System[46] measures imposed on businesses in urban areas in Beijing from April 1999. The Dongxindian village version is called the Administration of 'Six Doorstep Assignments' Responsibility System for Cuigezhuang District. It includes double the number of

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[46] See the link for the full text: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=14028&CGid=

assignments contained in the citywide system and makes shop owners responsible for the following six items on their doorstep: tidiness, green area, public facilities, order, safety and drains (see Figure 8). This also applies to restaurants in Dongxindian. By contrast, the owner of a business in the formal economy is required to have a business licence, a pollutant discharge permit and a hygiene certificate. In addition, they are required to register with the taxation authorities and pay tax.

Figure 8: The signed 'Six Doorstep Assignments' hanging on the wall of the grocery store run by two of the interviewees (D058HL19M and D059HL19F). The street number of the shop and the name and phone number of the shop owner have been deliberately blurred to anonymise the interviewees. Source: Author, July 2019.

From summer 2019, the village committee of Dongxindian decided to issue business licences for existing businesses. Shop owners could apply for a business licence and the village committee would pay a visit to their

shop to check that it met hygiene requirements. For most applicants, the licence was free of charge. At the time of the researcher's second round of fieldwork, the issuing of business licences for shops was still not common in urban villages. Even in Dongxindian village, one of the first to offer them, shop owners remained unclear as to what the village committee or the township government would expect of shop owners with a business licence, and, as a result, few took up the offer. Nevertheless, the trend is obvious. The informal economy is gradually being formalised with an incrementally strengthened regulation system and increasing interference by the village committees. Currently, businesses in Dongxindian are being registered in the system and a direct link with the village committee set up.

According to a township government official (interviewee O02EXP2019M), better management and social order, and greater governance costs are the two sides of the coin when discussing business licences. Given limited government resources, the choice of whether to get involved with the informal economy depends on both a willingness to do so and any sense or otherwise of urgency. Government bodies, such as village committees and township authorities, play a dominant role in determining the regulatory system and management of the informal economy in urban villages, while indigenous villagers and migrants also play their part. The word 'reasonable' was frequently mentioned in interviews with members of the township government and the village committee, suggesting that what is needed is a measured approach that can be accepted by the various parties of stakeholders when seeking to implement reform of the informal nature of spatiality, socioeconomics and governance in urban villages. As Prof. Yumin Ye put it:

"There were no laws (about this issue). But everyone (or more specifically, every local government) does it in this way." (Interviewee O01EXP2017F, August 2017).

The 'unregulated' status of the informal economy can also be used as an instrument of governance in urban villages, which can decide to implement previously unimplemented regulations when it is useful for them to do so. For example, when it was decided that Shigezhuang village should be fully redeveloped, the village committee instructed all restaurants to be closed down because none of them had a hygiene certificate and did not meet hygiene standards. This made it easier for the committee to demolish the buildings that were rented by the restaurant owners. Prior to the redevelopment scheme, the lack of a hygiene certificate had never been an issue.

9.2.4 Public services including the education of second generation migrants

One of the public services that migrant families care most about is education, in particular the education of the second generation. Migrant children are able to attend kindergarten in the village where they live. The national education committee has regulated that there should be at least one kindergarten for each village, thereby ensuring that there are enough kindergarten places both local and migrant children. These kindergartens are mostly set up and operated by social organisations and individuals, and certified by the government. The involvement of social organisations also ensures that a large number of pupils will be enrolled and that tuition fees will be comparable to those of other types of kindergartens.

When it comes to education after kindergarten, the Chinese government has mandated nine years of compulsory education, including six years of primary school and three years of middle school. Attendance at a public school is free of charge, paid for by local government, such as the district government. However, this free compulsory education is, in practice, difficult for non-locals – whether living in urban villages or not – to access, thanks to the documentation required to attend a public school. This and related issues have been widely discussed by a variety of scholars (see discussions in Section 4.2.2) and media[47].

Admission to a public primary school requires the production of five documents. These are: the parents' household registration (*hukou*) booklet, a Beijing residence permit, an identification card, a work certificate and a certificate of living space, along with supporting documents from the parents' landlord and the village committee. In addition, in the case of a child who does not live with both of his or her parents in Beijing, some districts also require applicants to submit a document issued by their *hukou* place to prove that there is no one to take care of the child in their hometown.[48]

Of the five documents required, the one that most migrants living in urban villages are least likely to have is a work certificate. As an example, the district government of Chaoyang regulated that both parents were required to have paid at least six months' social insurance before they could apply to enrol their child in a public school. As described in previous chapters, most migrants are employed in the informal sector, which means they do not

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[47] See, for example, a story in the following link: https://www.douban.com/note/634448736/ [accessed on 25th October 2020]

[48] The information in this paragraph and the paragraph below was obtained from two major sources: interviews with Cuigezhuang township government officials (interviewees O02EXP2019M and O03EXP2019M) and a migrant mother (interviewee S057SC17F) whose son was attending the eighth grade at a private middle school in Beijing. Other sources were news and reports online. For more details, check the following two links: http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/news-19613.html and https://www.douban.com/note/634448736/.

have a labour contract and their employers do not pay their social insurance. To make things even more difficult, a work certificate is required of both parents. This leaves migrant children unable to benefit from free compulsory education and their parents with no alternative but to send them to private schools, which require fewer documents. However, private schools fees are beyond the reach of most migrant households.

The requirements for attending middle school are similar, but the percentage of migrant children in Beijing proceeding to a middle school from primary school is considerably lower than the percentage who proceed to primary school from kindergarten. This is attributed to the regulation that bars non-local students who have graduated from middle school from applying to high schools that offer participation in college entrance examinations. Instead, the only option they are offered is a place at a high school where specialised manual skills are taught. If this is not a road they wish to go down, their only choice is to return to their *hukou* province before middle school graduation and continue their education there.

Given all the above obstacles, only a few migrants living in urban villages choose to keep their children in Beijing after kindergarten. Of all the migrants interviewed, only one female interviewee in Shigezhuang had opted to send her son to primary and middle school in Beijing. Her reason was that she and her partner, her son's father, were not married:

*"I cannot send him to my hometown. My parents do not like it (*it is not widely accepted in China for an unmarried woman to have a child*). He will experience prejudice in my hometown. He is attending a private school near the Olympic village. Of course, I do cleaning and do not have a labour contract. Even if I can provide a work certificate, there is no way for my son to attend a public school because I am unmarried (*and cannot provide the legal registration document for him*)."* (Interviewee S057SC17F, September 2017)

Thanks to the impossibility of attending a public school, the high tuition fees of private schools and the limited choice of high school, most migrants in Dongxindian and Shigezhuang only keep their children in Beijing until primary school. This explains the preponderance of children below the age of six in these two villages and the seasonal increase in the number of children of school age during the summer vacation.

In addition to compulsory education, other public services and facilities are also provided in Shigezhuang, such as the community centre, where people can read books in the library and do indoor sports in the hall. Asked about the use of public services, a Cuigezhuang township official (interviewee O02EXP2019M) said:

"Public services primarily target the local residents. If migrants meet the requirements, they are also allowed to have access to service." (Interviewee O02EXP2019M, July 2019)

When asked to clarify what the requirements were, the official did not respond to the question directly, but instead talked about the costs incurred by migrants:

*"In Heiqiao Village (*another village in Cuigehuang township*), there are only thousands of indigenous villagers but more than 45,000 migrants. The extra costs for water, electricity and garbage processing are over 10 million yuan annually. Security costs are 20 million yuan."* (Interviewee O02EXP2019M, July 2019)

The figures show that not only do migrants not generate much income in a village or township but they also incur public costs. Resources including public services are provided at a cost and cannot easily be offered to migrants who have no local affiliation and make no contribution. When the supply of public services, including compulsory education, are decentralised and funded by local authorities, migrants working in the informal sector can have little access to the city's welfare provision.

9.3 Indigenous villagers and migrants

9.3.1 Land tenure versus informality in the rental market

The story of Aunt Xiang (interviewee D060BJ19F) and her family is typical of the point of view of indigenous landlords in Dongxindian. Aunt Xiang, a woman in her 60s, was interviewed with her husband in their apartment on the fourth floor of the building they owned (see the axonometric drawing of Site 4 in Section 10.1.1). After their farmland was requisitioned along with other farmland in Dongxindian, the family was left with only a housing plot of roughly 270 square metres. At first, in order to have more rooms to rent out, they added incremental extensions, both vertical and horizontal, to the existing building. However, the oldest part of the building dated back to the 1990s, when the original single-storey brick house was built, and the foundations, which were not intended to support a building of two storeys, were unable to support the extensions and became fragmented and fragile. At this point, they had 15 rooms which they rented out. Taking issues of safety into consideration and wishing to accommodate more tenants, the couple decided to build a new building to replace the old one. The new building was constructed in 2016 and has four floors, with a total floor area of around 1,000 square metres. Construction cost a little over one million yuan. At the time of the interview, the family lived on the fourth floor and rented out the other three floors to migrants. There were in total 33 rental rooms, the rent of which varied from 1,200 to 1,700 yuan per month, and a large store front accommodating a restaurant, the monthly rent of which was over 10,000 yuan. Taking the average rent per room as 1,500 yuan, the rental income for the household was over 59,500 yuan per month and 714,000 yuan per annum.

According to Aunt Xiang's account, the construction was not allowed by the government when strictly following regulations:

"In the beginning, the village committee did not permit the construction. Actually, in 2016, the village committee finally permitted while the upper government still would not agree. Someone reported the construction (to the upper government). We were stopped for some time several times. They sometimes disapproved this part and sometimes disapproved another. We have put so much effort into it and finally got it done." (Interviewee D060BJ19F, July 2019)

As mentioned in Section 9.2.1, the village committee performs a number of complex and conflicting roles as a self-governance institution. Its role in the construction process of Aunt Xiang's housing block echoes an earlier study of the researcher's on self-development in a nearby urban village (Yang & van Oostrum, 2020). Because village committee members are selected by and from the pool of local villagers, it is to be expected that the committee would take the part of local households, including helping them override policies against their interests while simultaneously exercising responsible government. A further comment made by Aunt Xiang is worth highlighting:

*"We only have such a tiny land to use. Somebody would not be willing to tell you the whole story (*about how they built the housing block in violation of the regulations*). But the fact is there, and you can see with your eyes. You can also talk to village committee cadres. Their families were faced with the same situation."* (Interviewee D060BJ19F, July 2019)

The informal construction of a four-floor building is not an exception in Dongxindian village, despite its violation of the regulations, which stipulate a maximum of three floors. While acknowledging the informal construction of the building, Aunt Xiang offered three reasons why her family believe the building to be acceptable. First, when their neighbour in the adjacent housing plot rebuilt his house, the foundations and one of the walls of Aunt Xiang's original house were rendered unsafe. Second, the money used for rebuilding was out of their own savings and they should have the right to spend it as they wish on their own land. Third, the piece of land was virtually the only source of income for the family of six people, and they needed to make the most of it. As what Aunt Xiang said:

"To occupy the land or occupy the sky. Because we do not have enough land for so many people, we can only exploit the sky." (Interviewee D060BJ19F, July 2019)

Aunt Xiang and her husband were both retired and in receipt of a tiny retirement pension from the village

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collective. The other four family members who lived with them in their apartment were their daughter and son-in-law, and their 14-year-old granddaughter and four-year-old grandson. Their daughter was 38 years old and a housewife. Their son-in-law was employed by the administrative station of migrants in the village. The couple's retirement pension plus their son-in-law's salary would not exceed 10,000 yuan per month. When this is set against the family's monthly rental income of nearly 60,000 yuan, it is clear that the family make a living principally from the rental market. This was also the case for many other villager households.

The concept of *own* land (in Chinese: *zhaijidi*) is firmly established in the heads of most rural householders. It is notable that indigenous villagers are likely to emphasise the legitimacy of their behaviour and to their tenure of housing plots. For example, when Aunt Xiang was asked how the demolition of rental rooms in a nearby village affected rents in Dongxindian, she did not respond to the question directly but proactively started talking about the reason for the demolition:

*"Do you know why they were forced to demolish the houses? Most of the houses were not built on the housing plots. The land (*on which the houses stood*) was not their own land and they were 'black houses'. Ours are different. Our land is housing plots."* (Interviewee D060BJ19F, July 2019)

Contrary to the common belief that a household owning a housing plot must have at least one member with a rural *hukou* affiliated to the village, the *hukou* status of all of Aunt Xiang's family members, as well as of most of the villagers in Dongxindian, had been transferred from rural to urban. This was done in 1988 and Aunt Xiang and her husband inherited the housing plot when his mother passed away in 2014.

"My mother-in-law was a farmer. The land was hers. It was the 'old housing plot' and there is a property ownership certificate. The certificate is always there and has not changed with hukou*. But you see, my daughter has also grown up and has her family. No new housing plots have been distributed and she is with us."* (Interviewee D060BJ19F, July 2019)

The property ownership certificate stated a legal area of 200 square metre and the family lived in a 270-square-metre apartment with a terrace (Figure 9). The average living area per person was 45 square meters. A lift for the family's exclusive use opened directly into the apartment living room. The apartment's interior and terrace were well decorated, with sophisticated ceiling and wall decorations and carved furniture. Another landlord, interviewed in Shigezhuang village (interviewee S054BJ17M), had built a small courtyard house on his housing plot and filled the remaining area with bare, brick-walled rental rooms (Figure 10). The courtyard house had a traditional wooden structure and was painted in bright colours, which, according to the interviewee S054BJ17M, was a sign of 'social status'.

Figure 9: The apartment of Aunt Xiang, interviewee D060BJ19F. Left: living room with direct access to the lift; right: rooftop terrace with green plants and children's toys. Source: Author, July 2019.

Figure 10: Porch of the courtyard house home of the family of interviewee S054BJ17M (left), and the bare, brick-walled rooms rented out to migrants (right), both on the same housing plot. Source: Author, September 2017

Aunt Xiang's two grandchildren – one in middle school and the other in kindergarten – both attended multiple extracurricular courses, which are generally costly in Beijing. The daily duty of Aunt Xiang's daughter was to take care of the two children. Aunt Xiang and her husband were responsible for the management of the rental rooms, including collecting rents every month and cleaning the public spaces in the building. Apart from these duties, they led a relaxed life, regularly frequenting the activity centre for the elderly in the village.

Ownership of housing plots has empowered indigenous villagers, most of whom were formerly farmers or factory workers in rural industries, allowing them to lead an urban life supported by a considerable and continuous rental income, and in the interviews landlords rarely expressed any desire to accept the relocation compensation money offered by the government and real estate developers. They explained this by recounting how their farmland had been requisitioned, the importance of their housing plots for making a living, how their rental income was actually quite limited, and how difficult it would be for them to make a living if they were relocated to formal residential buildings. Behind these words lies an awareness of ever-increasing land values and the negotiating power that legal tenure provides.

Dongxindian and Shigezhuang villages are spatially very different. They share similarities with regard to distance from the city centre and in such physical aspects as geology, topography, and the spatial codes of the houses before the massive expansion and rebuilding took place. But they are distinguished by their current space, both physically and socially. On tracing the socio-spatial transformation process from start to finish, two major reasons emerged to explain the differences.

First, the surrounding urban areas were developed at different speeds, so that the groups of migrants who chose to settle in the two villages were different. Most migrants living in Shigezhuang worked in low-skill industries like construction and cleaning while those in Dongxindian had a wider variety of occupations, including more skilled. This meant that, historically, migrants in Dongxindian were often able to pay higher rents, allowing indigenous households to start accumulating capital earlier. They could then invest this money by initially building extensions to their houses, then, later, make more radical improvements by entirely rebuilding them. Meanwhile, in Shigezhuang, houses were extended more gradually. However, over the past ten years, high demand in the Shigezhuang village rental market meant that rebuilding houses with more floors became an attractive proposition, with the promise that villagers could achieve returns on their investment within a couple of years. But the reality was that there were hardly any buildings exceeding three floors in Shigezhuang. The second reason that led to the differences in the two villages' spatiality was linked to timing. Their differing speeds of development meant that they had very different experiences in their encounters with the policies and regulations governing spatial codes on rural land. The researcher asked an indigenous villager in his eighties

why housing blocks in Dongxindian are of different heights in spite of the fact every villager wants to have as many rooms as possible to generate maximum rental income. His answer helped explain the different spatiality of the two villages:

"Historically, the government never cared about building height in villages. Villagers could build as many floors as they wanted, as long as they had enough money. Later, in the 2000s, it was informally regulated that four floors was the maximum height allowed and many villagers built houses at that time with four floors and an extra half floor on top. In recent years, only three floors are allowed. The regulation has become more and more strict. If you were too late to take advantage of the more relaxed regulations, you could only follow the latest ones. Of course, some people also violated regulations. These regulations are not like laws, and you would not be sent to jail. If you managed to finish the extra floor secretly, you might be fined a small amount of money, but nobody would force you to tear down that floor." (Interviewee D054BJ17M, September 2017)

Under this ever-changing, uncertain, and informal regulatory system, there are advantages to moving quickly. Factors such as the overall economy of the township, the leadership of the village committee and the timepoint when the village was first approached by developers with regard to demolition and relocation were all undeniably significant in how the village grew. However, taking a historical view, it would appear that the main reason landlords failed to extend their properties earlier was the belief that the growth of the migrant rental market would be short-lived, since the low-skilled migrants living in Shigezhuang expressed a strong desire to return to their hometowns. This proved not to be the case and the rental market grew, causing landlords to regret not having extended their properties earlier.

The purpose of the above is not to explain how landlords could have earned more money if they had made the right decisions at the right time, but rather an exploration of why certain decisions were made and the role of the migrants in those decisions that ultimately determined representations of space and the production of space in the village.

9.3.2 Representation of rental rooms and interactions between migrants and indigenous villagers

Not all indigenous villagers were in favour of housing extensions and the large income they provided. A case in point was a villager in Shigezhuang, whose house had remained as a traditional rural courtyard house, with a luxuriant two-storey-tall tree in the garden. Of all the indigenous villagers interviewed, he was the only one who did not rent out rooms to migrants. In a semi-structured interview in September 2017, he expressed

concerns about the explosion of housing extensions in the neighbourhood and the overpopulation of migrants in the village:

*"You see how the village looks like now. But 20 years ago, the river at the northern end of the village was so beautiful. The environment used to be good and you could see a lot of trees. However, houses are currently encroaching into the street. The green space was occupied for accommodating more migrants. The village committee cadres are not exercising their duty and the village is in chaos. You can see migrants everywhere. They (*local villagers*) are losing their dignity to earn money."* (Interviewee S060BJ17M, September 2017)

Rather than blaming the chaos of the built environment and the loss of greenery on migrants, he argued that it was a result of the villagers' greed. He regretted that Shigezhuang no longer had the appearance of a traditional village and, when asked about how he got along with the migrants in the village, said:

"I do not talk to them. They are louts[49]. We do not have any common topics." (Interviewee S060BJ17M, September 2017)

It can be deduced from his answers that he felt uncomfortable having migrants around him. Unlike most indigenous villagers, he had no economic contact with migrants and his feelings towards them were likely instinctual. It is also likely that, although he did not say so, he did in fact blame inflow of migrants for the erosion of open green spaces, the chaotic and unclean spatiality, and the potential for social disorder.

Indigenous landlords renting out rooms to migrants appeared to interact with them differently in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages. The most frequent comments made by the migrants interviewed were neutral, for example "I seldom see my landlord" or "I do not know him (or her) very well". But some were willing to express an opinions, even a strong one. Migrants in Shigezhuang tended to express their dislike of their landlords by using certain negative adjectives or telling stories, while more migrants in Dongxindian described how they got along well with indigenous villagers.

Interviewee S058SC17M, who lived in a rental room in Shigezhuang village next door to his landlord's courtyard house, when asked if he might introduce his landlord to the researcher after the interview, replied[50]:

"You want to interview my landlord? I know his family lives in that courtyard house, but I have never been

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[49] The original Chinese was: suzhi di（素质低）. This expression is widely used in everyday Chinese to describe a person of low education who doesn't know how to behave.
[50] The following interview transcripts of interviewees S058SC17M and S001SC17M have been used in an earlier paper of the researcher's, see Yang (2020).

inside. They keep a fierce guard dog and it will bite us. You could go and try. Maybe the landlord will be more friendly to a university student." (Interviewee S058SC17M, October 2017)

The landlord in question (interviewee S054BJ17M) later agreed to be interviewed and invited the researcher into his house. When asked about his interactions with his tenants, he said he had little communication with them and did not know them very well. He then described how he had designed the housing extensions and spoke about his pride in his daughter, who worked for the municipal government.

Another interviewee in Shigezhuang, when asked how he got along with his landlord, replied:

"They (indigenous villagers) are all very bad. They keep raising our rent unreasonably, especially after the government's demolition of the nearby villages. If we do not agree to the high rent, they will force us to move out. There are plenty of people waiting to rent their house." (Interviewee S001SC17M, September 2017)

When it came to questions and discussions about their interactions with indigenous villagers, the attitude of migrants in Dongxindian village was more likely to be positive compared to migrants in Shigezhuang. However. most interviewees, especially the younger generation (for example, the 22-year-old interviewee D064GS19M and the 25-year-old interviewee D065SX19F), preferred not to answer such questions since they seldom met their landlords or other indigenous villagers. Other interviewees told their stories and expressed positive opinion, including interviewees D059HL19F and D058HL19M:

"I have very good impression of local Beijing people. We have been in Beijing so many years and have never seen a single Beijing person who looks not so kind. They do not despise us non-locals. Our former landlord once saw that I could barely walk with a pain in my back. She then brought a plaster to me. They are really warm-hearted." (Interviewee D059HL19F, July 2019)

"Local villagers in this village are generally nice, especially those older villagers. They understand that they would be living a poorer life without these tenants. When the old chat with us, they say that if migrants no longer stayed in Beijing, their houses would be empty. Young people do not know (the cause and effect) and sometimes complain about migrants. Once a Beijing man told me that his son looked down on migrants. He criticised his son and told him that he should feel thankful for migrants. He said that migrants are hardworking and provide for the locals." (Interviewee D059HL19F, July 2019)

"The relationship between people is established by getting along with each other. If you are good to others, they will also be good to you." (Interviewee D058HL19M, July 2019)

Such attitudes were echoed by this response from an indigenous householder:

*"I try to be as quiet as possible when cleaning the stairs and corridors. The lives of these kids (*tenants living in the building*) are not easy. They always come back from work late at night. I do not want to disturb their sleep."* (Interviewee D060BJ19F)

9.4 Development, transformation, and demolition of a '*dayuan*' built by migrants

Besides indigenous landlords, there is another group of landlords known as 'second landlords'. Second landlords are themselves migrants rather than indigenous Beijingers who rent land or buildings from indigenous villagers, carry out construction or renovation work then rent out rooms to migrant workers. Their income is the difference between the rent migrants pay them and the rent they pay to the indigenous villagers. While most o villagers between the ages of 50 and 70 prefer to manage their properties by themselves, there are two groups who habitually lease their properties to second landlords. The first group are younger, mostly under the age of 50. They live and work in the urban area outside of the village and lead a typical urban lifestyle, employed in a formal sector job while also enjoying the regular income from their rentals in the villages, which help finance their city lifestyles and mortgages. The second group are older, usually in their 70s or 80s. They are not physically capable of taking care of their rental rooms or performing such tasks as collecting rents and cleaning their buildings' public spaces, so they lease out the buildings or housing plots below market price. Unlike the first group, they continue to live on their housing plot in the village, either in a rental room like those of the migrant tenants or on the top floor of the building.

As stated above, second landlords are migrants, though hardly typical. Setting up as a second landlord requires a large upfront investment, so these are people with resources who have acquired a higher socioeconomic status. Take the example of interviewee D052FJ17M and his friends, all from Fujian Province, who together rented a piece of collective land from the village committee and built a compound with several housing blocks to rent out to migrants. Another example are a group of second landlords who reached a deal with several villagers, whose housing plots were adjacent to each other, then reconstructed a housing block to occupying the combined area. Another second landlord, interviewee D068FJ17M, also from Fujian Province, similarly rented three adjacent housing plots and built an apartment building with five floors and 200 standard rental rooms. The building was designed with a setback on the fifth floor, so from the street appears to be only four storeys high. It was built informally in 2016, violating the spatial code that buildings should not exceed three storeys, and became the tallest building in Dongxindian, where the previous tallest buildings were three storeys with a set-back on the fourth floor. In the summer of 2017, the rent for each room was 1,200 yuan per month, generating

a total monthly rental income of 240,000 yuan.

In Dongxindian village, there is a housing administration office on the ground floor of many buildings. This is the second landlords' daily workspace. Although it is not common for buildings in Shigezhuang village to be equipped with such an office, several migrants interviewed in Shigezhuang reported that their only dealings were with their second landlords and had never seen their landlords.

It was impossible to obtain an accurate number of the second landlords in each village but it can be deduced from the interviews that there are much fewer second landlords than indigenous landlords. This was especially true in 2019 when compounds built on collective land were demolished. However, although second landlords are few in number, they appear to play a critical role in establishing rent levels, as attested by Aunt Long:

"The rent of the room was usually decided by the second landlords, and then local landlords benchmarked their price." (Interviewee D059HL19F, July 2019)

Unlike local landlords, second landlords regarded renting and sub-renting land and rooms as a business, similar to that of a real estate agency, part of whose job is to determine prices. In addition, social networking among second landlords allows them to acquire up-to-date citywide information in real time, allowing them to respond quickly to changes in supply and demand in the rental markets in both the villages and the city. They are usually the first movers when it comes to raising or lowering the rents.

One of the risks that second landlords are faced with is that they might not make a profit on their investment. Regardless of the occupancy rate of their rental rooms, they must pay rent for the land or building, as well as construction or renovation fees. In some urban villages in the Pearl River Delta, second landlords run their rental businesses at a loss because of a lack of tenants but, according to fieldwork carried out in 2017 and 2019, this does not seem to be the case in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian. However, some second landlords suffered losses when the village land was requisitioned by the government for commercial development in Shigezhuang village and when a policy forbidding the renting out of collective land to individuals for residential construction was strictly implemented in Dongxindian village. Regardless of the resources and powers of negotiation possessed by second landlords, they have no legal tenure for the properties they employ as production materials.

Another point worth briefly mentioning is how second landlords interact with the village committee. In the course of ethnographic research in Zhejiang village in Beijing, Zhang (2001) discussed the negotiation processes and power relations between the owners of *dayuan*, who also belonged to the group of second landlords identified in this thesis, and local government officials including the village committee members in Zhejiang

village in Beijing. Insufficient information was obtained from the fieldwork to allow for further elaboration, but it was hard not to draw the tentative conclusion that the village committee must have provided a degree of protection – formally or informally – to this group, otherwise interviewee D068FJ17M's informal building of a five-storey housing block could not have been accomplished. Also, in the case of the interviewee D052FJ17M, renting out collective land generated extra income for the village committee.

9.5 Demolition of urban villages and citywide eviction of 'low-end' labourers

While conducting fieldwork in one of the urban villages in Haidian District in 2017, the researcher spoke to an indigenous villager who complained about the forced demolition of some informal housing which he had rented out. With fewer rooms available to rent, the household's rental income had dropped significantly. He went on to explain the reason behind the timing of the forced demolition of informal extensions like his, that had been around for a very long time, and revealed an interesting fact:

"The upper government has distributed the goal to Haidian District (government). They must evict at least 550,000 migrants this year." (Interviewee O09SEM2017M, August 2017)

This echoes the city-wide policy mentioned by interviewee O03EXP2019M (see Section 9.1.1). When Uncle Tan, a key fieldwork respondent, was asked during an interview in 2017, before the notion of 'low-end' labourer was stated explicitly in news, if he was aware of any policy against migrants living or working in Beijing, he replied:

"It is impossible for a government to develop policies specifically targeting rural migrant workers. For example, the city government cannot announce that all rural migrant workers must get out of Beijing. However, if there is no more work for these rural workers, they will go back home. (There is) No need of eviction. All they need to do is to cut off their working opportunities." (Interviewee S005SC17M, September 2017)

However, the migrants interviewed mentioned loss of home more often than loss of working opportunities. Loss of home happened due to the city-wide demolition of urban villages. The relocation history of interviewees S064HN19F and S065HN19M, a couple from Henan province who had run a small business in Beijing for nearly 20 years, largely reflected the trajectory of Beijing's urbanisation:

"We moved from the second ring road to the third ring road, then from the third ring road to the fourth ring road and now from the fourth ring road to the current place outside the fifth ring road. With the continuing demolition of urban villages in the inner city, we have been constantly turned out and forced to move to the outskirts. We have lived near Deshengmen Bridge, Madian Bridge, Jianyan Bridge, Laiguangying and Guangshengqiao in

sequence. When Guangshunqiao was to be demolished, our tongxiang[51] *in Shigezhuang said there were rental rooms in this village and we then moved here.*" (Interviewee S065HN19M, July 2019)

Shigezhuang village's redevelopment for urbanisation was begun in the spring of 2018. The researcher's two rounds of fieldwork – in summer 2017, and summer 2019 – offered a chance to observe the impact of ongoing village redevelopment on migrants and to study the intermediate situation. Most of the demolition started with buildings on collective land and the market and the cultural centre were the first buildings to be torn down. It was more difficult to demolish houses built on villagers' housing plots and relocate these households because negotiations had to be conducted separately with each household. As one of the interviewed migrants said:

"They (the developer) have not reached agreement with all the local villagers. The time of the demolition of Shigezhuang village depends on when these old men and women would agree to sign. If they sign today, the village can be demolished today." (Interviewee S068HB19F, July 2019)

When relocation agreements are reached between the authorities and the indigenous villagers, with the migrants having no say, the migrants are the group that tends to be seriously adversely affected. The migrants, as a rule, have only a verbal agreement with their landlords, and are usually given short notice if their rent is to be raised or if their rental room is to be demolished. The uncertainty brought about by the redevelopment process made them even more vulnerable.

As described in section 9.1.2, when it was announced that Shigezhuang village was to be redeveloped, many migrants relocated to other urban villages out of fear that their rental rooms would soon be demolished. This drop in demand for rental rooms, and the deterioration of the environment that followed, led to rents being lowered. However, when the redevelopment process took longer than expected and many migrants moved back to reestablish their social and work networks, the partially-demolished village did not have enough rooms to meet the demand. At this point, landlords raised the rents to a higher level than they were before. This was the situation during the second fieldwork in summer 2019. Half of the village had been demolished and there was building debris everywhere. Virtually the only intact buildings were the government-built public toilets (Figure 11).

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[51] The term '*tongxiang*' refers someone who come from the same hometown. More details about space production by *tongxiang* will be discussed in Section 11.3.

Figure 11: The grey building in the middle is the government-funded public toilet, which remained clean both outside and in, while the surrounding houses were emptied and partially demolished and the site was turned into a parking lot. Source: Author, July 2019.

Despite the substandard living conditions, rents were even higher than previously. This was also true of storefront rents. For example, the rent for a hairdresser's shop, with an area of 20 square metres, was 4,800 yuan per month before redevelopment. It dropped to 3,000 yuan in 2018 but was raised to 4,000 yuan in 2019 (figures taken from interview with interviewee S062HN19M). The owner of one hairdresser's shop said:

"The landlords did not need to explain why the rent was increasing. They just said the rent is increased next month. Then you can decide whether you will continue the lease or not. If you do not rent the front, there will be other tenants." (Interviewee S062HN19M, July 2019)

Redevelopment also had a major impact on the working lives of migrants. The majority of them were construction workers, cleaners, or hourly labourers, and, when they lost their homes in Shigezhuang, most of them chose to relocate to another urban village, further from the centre, in search of work. Very few were prepared to consider returning to their hometown.

An interesting finding was that the migrants' social networks were to some extent maintained by relocating to the same villages. Villages such as Jinzhan village and Pi village were popular with these migrants. Two reasons can be attributed to this phenomenon. First, these villages are just a few kilometres from Shigezhuang. Second, the migrants' relocation followed a pattern similar to when they arrived in Beijing. A number of migrants settled in the new village and put the word via their *tongxiang* about the rental rooms available. And so the old community was gradually reformed.

Figure 12: Permanently closed corner shop, see Figure 7 for a comparison. Source: Author, July 2019.

The situation of self-employed migrants was different. More than half of the self-employed migrants reported that they would definitely return to their hometowns if Shigezhuang village was totally demolished. The case of the owner of a hairdresser's shop (interviewee S062HN19M) is typical. He came to Beijing at the age of 14 and learned hairdressing through an apprenticeship. At the age of 18, he opened his first hairdresser's shop in an urban village in Shijingshan District. After the redevelopment of that urban village, he relocated to Shigezhuang village and rented a storefront outside the market where there were a lot of people passing by. When the demolition of Shigezhuang began and the buildings near the market were demolished, he moved again, to the current storefront, which belonged to a local householder whose housing plot has a side facing the main street. When asked what his plan after the demolition of Shigezhuang was, he said:

"I will return to my hometown. I guess most of the self-employed people will go back to their hometowns. Residents in the suburban area have low living expense. It would be hard to run a business in a village there. Besides, if someone is going to start a business by renting a new storefront, he needs to pay the transferrial fee as well as the decoration fee. These fees could add up to 100,000 yuan. However, with this upfront investment of over 100,000 yuan, you still do not know until when you can run the business. It can happen that the new storefront is to be demolished in one or two years. Can you ensure the return on investment within such a short time?" (Interviewee S062HN19M, July 2019)

Given these reasons, he showed no interest in finding a new place in another village to restart his business. He suggested that finding a new place in a formal housing neighbourhood might be an alternative, but the

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investment requirements were higher. He was also asked a hypothetical question: If Shigezhuang was not demolished, would you stay longer in Beijing? His answer was:

"Of course. This is a stable source of income, and I definitely would not abandon it. I might search for additional sources to increase my income. For example, I could start another business with friends. But I would keep this hairdresser's shop as long as I could." (Interviewee S062HN19M, July 2019)

The impact of the demolition process was also felt in the everyday lives of those who remained in the village Public facilities located on the collective land, including the market, were the first to be demolished. In response, some migrants spontaneously set up a temporary market on the vacant land where the former cultural centre had stood. It looked more like a square with abandoned brick walls and temporary plastic tents than a proper market (compare the two photos in Figure 13), but was continuing to function well as this thesis was being completed.

Figure 13: Indoor market managed by the village committee (left) and the temporary outdoor market set up after its demolition (right). Source: Author, September 2017 (left) and July 2019 (right).

10. The space of everyday life

10.1 Housing construction and extensions

Before the rapid urbanisation of rural villages and the inflow of migrants, the courtyard house was a typical form of housing in traditional China – especially in northern China. With the increasing demand for rental rooms, indigenous villagers started to increase the household's available floor area in two ways: 1) by adding extensions, both horizontally and vertically, to existing houses; and 2) by building or rebuilding new housing blocks.

10.1.1 Housing extensions added to courtyard houses in Shigezhuang village

Most recent housing construction in Shigezhuang village belonged to the first type – namely extensions to existing houses. The early wave of housing extensions for accommodating migrants can be dated back to the late 1990s or early 2000s (interviewee S060BJ17M). Extensions to a household's housing plot were not usually all built at the same time, but added incrementally.

According to interviewee S054BJ17M, incremental extensions made to the traditional courtyard house followed a typical path. When a household first started renting rooms to migrants, they would install dividing walls in the west, east and south wings of the house to create multiple rooms to let out. The household would carry on living in the main, north, wing and continue to use the yard. As demand for rental rooms increased, a single-storey extension would be built into the courtyard, leaving only a narrow public corridor to provide access to the individual rooms (see Figure 10 in Section 9.3.1). In this way, the courtyard house was transformed into a compound. Later, following the same pattern, rooms would be added outside of the yard. These were always attached to the original external walls of the courtyard and encroached onto the village's public laneways. The doors of the rooms opened directly on to the streets. When the single-storey extension was no longer sufficient, a second floor would be built. To support these second floors, structures would be built from the ground up. These mostly 'floated' above or were detached from the original buildings' roofs, and external staircases would be added to provide access to the second floor (Figure 14). In cases where the householders still lived on the housing plot, they usually chose to live on the second floor or in the first floor rooms that were located farthest from the courtyard entrance, in order to distance themselves from the migrants and protect their privacy. Some landlord householders created a 'tiny courtyard house' for their exclusive use within the compound (see, for example, the house of interviewee S054BJ17M's, Figure 10 in Section 9.3.1).

At the same time, Shigezhuang village also witnessed new construction on farmland, on which housing

constructions was not legal. These buildings were intended specifically for renting out to migrants and were mostly one storey and built of bare bricks. A multi-storey building providing more rental rooms was not feasible since brick buildings exceeding one floor required a foundation to be laid. This would cost more both in terms of financial investments and construction time (see interviewee S005SC17M). In the cases, where this was undertaken, migrant tenants and indigenous landlords lived on separate plots.

Figure 14: Vertical extensions on top of the original buildings with external staircases in Shigezhuang. Source: Author, September 2017.

Regardless of how they were built, housing extensions and newly-constructed buildings for migrants had several characteristics in common. First, low-cost building materials were used, such as old wood panels and plastic boarding. Second, decisions favouring short-term incentives rather than long-term benefits were made. The evidence was all too visible of the piecemeal, ad hoc manner in which the landlords had responded to the growing demand for rental rooms. A long-term vison, baked by a one-time investments was rare. Besides, there was also very little difference between buildings built ten years ago and those built more recently, with virtually

no discernible evolution of spatiality over the more than twenty-years span of development of Shigezhuang village.

10.1.2 Construction of housing blocks in Dongxindian village

Most villagers' houses in Dongxindian used to be courtyard houses, but today there are few examples of this 'heritage' still standing. This could be attributed to the fact that most villagers tear down their old houses, partially or completely, before constructing a new one. The partial 'heritage' of courtyard houses could be seen in some housing construction that took place between 2005 to 2010 (see, for example, the axonometric drawings of Sites 2 and 10 at the end of this section).

A majority of the buildings in Dongxindian village were completely new, and did not feature a spatiality inherited from courtyard houses. Their spatial form was similar to the compounds (*dayuan*) built on collective land by migrants with resources.

Housing construction site	S.1	S.2	S.3	S.4	S.5+6[52]	S.7	S.8	S.9	S.10
Plot size (m²)[53]	312	288	216	288	480	216	162	324	262
Construction year	2015s	2005s	2015s	2015s	2010s	2010s	2010s	2010s	2005s
Total floors	4	3	4	4	3	4	4	4	3
Floor landlord(s) lives on	4F	2F	4F	4F	/	4F	/	4F	1F
Lift (Yes/No)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
No. of rental rooms[54]	39	31	27	39	72	38	35	51	23
Average room size (m²)	15	9	13.5	13	9.5	11.5	11.5	10.5	6
Indoor toilet (Yes/No)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Table 3: Profiles of sites and housing construction in Dongxindian village. Source: Own design.

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[52] The householders of Sites 5 and 6 are brothers and built the housing blocks together.

[53] The plot size was roughly measured using Google Earth Pro software and was assumed to be slightly larger than the real area of the size. For example, the size of Site 4 was measured as 288 square metres, slightly larger than 270 square metres according to its owner Aunt Xiang. This figure was not related to the figure stated on the landlord's property ownership certificate.

[54] For valid comparison, when the site offered shopfronts on the ground floor of the street side, the number of rental rooms was calculated based on the layout of a standard floor (usually 2F or 3F).

Given the co-existence of buildings constructed at different times, it was possible to investigate how the physical environment of Dongxindian village had evolved over the years (see Table 3 and axonometric drawings of sites 1-10 at the end of this section). The spatiality of newly constructed houses was determined by multiple factors:

1) *Unpredictable and constantly changing building codes*

The first factor was the unpredictable and constantly changing building codes regulating the spatiality of housing construction in urban villages. For example, before 2007, there were no explicit national planning regulations governing construction on collective land. An indigenous villager in Dongxindian (interviewee D054BJ17M), explained that, before the 2010s, there was an informal agreement between the villagers and the village committee that four-storey buildings were allowed, but that, from 2015, regulations became stricter, with new buildings exceeding three floors forbidden.

Figure 15: Housing blocks in Dongxindian, Sites 1, 2, 3, and 4 from left to right. Source: Author, September 2017.

For buildings constructed before 2015, only the part that exceeded three floors, violating the new height regulations, was considered illegal and the construction of any building exceeding three floors would be stopped as soon as it came to official notice. One of the spatial forms that emerged from these restrictions was the setback on the top floor of the street side that commonly featured in houses built after 2015, unlike pre-2015 houses, which occupied the entire area of the fourth floor (for example, compare Sites 4 and Site 8). This spatial form ensured that violation of building codes was not visible from the street level (see, for example Sites 1, 2, and 4 in Figure 15).

2) Shift in socioeconomic status of indigenous villagers

Before Dongxindian became an urban village, the villagers' lives were no different from those of the farmers in other rural areas. Only in the past ten to twenty years, with the emergence of rental markets, have they joined the rentier class, though a lack of financial resources initially prohibited them from making large investments a in the construction of housing blocks. However, as they began to benefit significantly from the informal rental market and saw some pioneers (including second landlords from other provinces) design buildings with more modern and denser layouts, an increasing number of indigenous villagers were encouraged to introduce architectural features such as inside toilets, rooftop platforms and lifts (such as Sites 1 and 4), into their new buildings. Their improved socioeconomic standing also made them more likely to maximise the floor area of the building to accommodate a greater number of rental rooms and thereby increase their rental income, which they also did by raising rents. They could enjoy a better quality of life by building more modern housing blocks and moving into the top floor (see the top floors of Sites 1, 3, 4, 7 and 9).

3) Narrowing of gap between migrants' spatial practice and villagers' conceptions

The last but determining factor is the migrants' spatial practice, which can be understood as their indirect impact on the built environment. The needs of the migrants were constantly growing and changing, and the gap between those needs and the villagers' understanding of them was gradually being filled. When the villagers started to rebuild their houses as housing blocks, it was natural for them to opt for layouts with good daylight and ventilation (see, for example, Sites 2 and 10), in which a hint of the old courtyard houses could be recognised.

Figure 16: Glass floor in housing blocks in Dongxindian. The right image is taken on Site 4. Source: Author, September 2017 (left) and July 2019 (right).

Figure 17: A typical rental room in housing blocks built after 2015 in Dongxindian. Source: Author, September 2017.

As the village developed, the villagers began to realise that a housing block with more public space earned less than the same-size housing block with a denser floor plans but with indoor toilets. This might largely explain why the more recently a building had been built, the less public space and the worse ventilation and daylight it had. In the newly-built housing blocks, more space was incorporated into the individual rental rooms to accommodate indoor toilets. The old housing blocks had atriums and skylights to let in fresh air and daylight, but in more recently built blocks where atriums still existed they tended to be smaller (compare Sites 1 and 2) and some blocks had only corridors with glass floors to let in light (for example, Site 4, in Figure 16). This may be related to the fewer restrictions imposed on spatiality in new-build houses as compared to courtyard house extensions.

The layout of Site 4 can be taken as typical of housing blocks built after 2015. A standard floor had a narrow corridor to access rental rooms measuring 12 to 15 square metres. Each room had an indoor toilet and an 'open kitchen' (Figure 17). The rooms located at either end of the corridor had windows that looked outside, while the others only had barred windows that looked out into the corridor. The rooms on the ground floor facing the main street had been turned into shops and restaurants with higher rents. The indigenous landlord and his family live in a specifically designed top floor apartment, set back from the street side and featuring a roof garden. They also had exclusive use of a lift, while the migrant tenants were required to use the staircase, ensuring little daily contact between the two groups.

From the next page on, axonometric drawings of housing blocks on the ten selected sites are presented (Figure 18).

142

4F

3F

2F

lift

rental room

shopfront

landlord's apartment

1F

SITE 1

143

3F

2F

lift

rental room

shopfront

landlord's apartment

1F

SITE 2

4F

3F

2F

lift

rental room

shopfront

landlord's apartment

1F

SITE 3

4F

3F

2F

lift

rental room

shopfront

landlord's apartment

1F

SITE 4

3F

2F

lift

rental room

shopfront

landlord's apartment

1F

SITE 5&6

147

4F

3F

2F

lift
rental room
shopfront
landlord's apartment

1F

SITE 7

4F

3F

2F

lift

rental room

shopfront

landlord's apartment

1F

SITE 8

149

4F

3F

2F

lift

rental room

shopfront

landlord's apartment/
landlord's office

1F

150

SITE 9

3F

2F

lift

rental room

shopfront

landlord's apartment

1F

SITE 10

Figure 18: Axonometric drawings of ten housing blocks in Dongxindian village. Source: Author.

10.2 The couple who ran a grocery shop ('low-end' urban services) in Dongxindian

Section 10.1 presented the physical space accommodating the individual resident's everyday routine and in the following sections a detailed account of how the migrants' everyday routines unfolded in this physical space and how they produced space through their spatial practice will be given.

Uncle Long (interviewee D058HL19M) and Aunt Long (interviewee D059HL19F) were a couple who ran a small grocery shop in one of the main streets in Dongxindian village.

Before coming to Beijing, the couple lived in a village in Wuchang City in Heilongjiang Province. During the summer, they grew crops and, during the winter, Uncle Long drove a taxi and Aunt Long stayed at home. They had a house with a big garden in the countryside and their income allowed them to lead a decent rural life. In 2010, after graduating from university, their daughter started work with an IT company in Beijing and the couple moved to Beijing in 2011. There were two reasons for their decision. The main one was that their daughter considered farm work to be too hard and thought it would be easier for the couple to run a small business in Beijing, which would also allow them to live closer to her. The second reason, and the effective trigger, was the heavy snowfall in autumn 2010 that blighted the rice crop, resulting in a very poor harvest. Like most farmers, the Longs ran their farm on credit and, unable to pay off what they owed for the previous year, were unable to access credit for 2011.

They moved first to Shigezhuang village[55] in Changping District, which is located in north Beijing between the fifth and sixth ring roads, near the Huilongguan residential area. They then moved to Shilihe village on the southeast third ring road, then to Fenzhongsi and Chengshousi villages near the south third ring road, then to yet another village near the west third ring road before settling in Dongxindian village at the end of 2015. These frequent moves were due to the demolition of the villages where they were staying and the consequent eviction of tenants. In each village where they stayed, they rented a shopfront to and ran a grocery store. In Fenzhongsi village, they were forced to move multiple times within the space of a year when the series of rental rooms that provided their accommodation were demolished, though at least the building where their grocery store was located was spared. As Uncle Long said:

"In Beijing, outsiders ('waidiren' *in Chinese) will never settle down. Life is really hard for outsiders. It seems that every building we moved into was to be torn down. (We stayed in) Some (for) several months, while some*

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[55] Although the 'Pinyin' spelling of the village name is the same as one of the case villages in this thesis, the Chinese character is different and refers to another village, located in Changping District.

only (for) one month. It was annoying.” (Interviewee D058HL19M, July 2019)

Meanwhile, their daughter also lived in rental rooms. She rented a room in a formal residential community, comprised of a number of tall buildings, and had only relocated twice during the previous nine years. Her reason for moving was that she had changed job and wished to live closer to her workplace.

The Longs' grocery shop was around 20 square metres and the rent was 5,000 yuan per month. Rents for shops on the same street were between 4,500 and 5,000 yuan, depending on size. The premises were rented to them empty and they had arranged them into a grocery shop and a space to accommodate their daily lives, apart from sleeping. The place where they slept was also in Dongxindian, close to the grocery shop, a rental room with a bedroom space, a kitchen and a bathroom. The rent was 1,500 yuan. In 2010, when they lived in Shigezhuang, the village they first settled in in Beijing, the rent for a two-room apartment was just 600 yuan. Their income varied from month to month. In a good season, their monthly net income (excluding rents and daily expenses) could reach 6,000 yuan, while in a bad season, it might only be around 1,000 to 2,000 yuan. They also experienced the occasional month when net income was negative.

Figure 19: Selection of photos taken by Uncle Long over the course of a week. Top row, from left to right: stuck in a traffic on the way to the wholesale market; wholesale market entrance; ongoing construction of commercial housing in the surrounding area of Dongxindian. Bottom row, from left to right: carpark near the entrance to the village; power outage after a heavy rain; diners in a restaurant in Dongxindian. Source: Uncle Long, July 2019.

The Longs' grocery shop was open for business 18 hours a day, from 6 am until 12 midnight, every day of the year. Over the previous four years in Dongxindian, the shop had been closed for ten days at the most. The daily routines of Uncle and Aunt Long differed slightly. Uncle Long usually got up around 5 am and rode his electric tricycle to a large wholesale market to buy groceries for the store, though the exact time could vary between 3 and 7 am, depending on the amount of groceries needed. These trips were the longest time Uncle Long spent outside Dongxindian. When asked to take photographs reflecting his everyday life during the photo elicitation, more than half were taken during in the course of his between Dongxindian and the wholesale market or at the wholesale market (Figure 19).

Meanwhile, Aunt Long opened the store at 6 am. The reason for this early opening was that peak business hours for the store were 6 am to 9 am, before their customers went to work, then from 8 pm to 12 pm, when they headed back home after work. Although there was a central market in the village offering a wider selection of fruit and vegetables and meat and snacks, most migrants preferred to use the Longs' store. There were three reasons for this. The first and most important reason was that the market was open only from 8 am to 8 pm, which was inconvenient for most working people. The second reason was that the Longs' store was located in the heart of the residential area, on the ground floor of an apartment building, whereas the market was close to the edge of the village. A third reason was that the store's prices were comparable to, or only very slightly higher than, those of the market. Taking into account the time cost of walking to the market, most young migrants tended to ignore such differences, but the indigenous villagers rarely used the store. As Aunt Long said:

"They (indigenous villagers) always go to the market. They have plenty of time." (Interviewee D058HL19F, July 2019)

The couple's routine was only slightly disturbed during the two- to three-week period around Spring Festival, which in China is considered to be the most important holiday of the year, when even the poorest and hardest working take a break and go to visit family in their hometowns. During this period, both the wholesale market and the village market in Dongxindian were closed for between 14 and 20 days. When the couple were asked why they did not close the store, but rather took pains to keep their shelves filled during the festival, even though there were few people about, Aunt Long replied:

"Yes, (there were) very few people. Others all went back home. However, although there were not so many people, we should not close the store. Just keep it open. They were having holidays, but we were not." (Interviewee D058HL19F, July 2019)

When the researcher met them in summer 2019, they were planning their first visit back home in five years.

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One explanation for their lack of a strong desire to visit family back home was that their daughter also lived and worked in Beijing and so was able to spend these important festivals with them. It is also likely that middle-aged Chinese couples care more about their children than they do about their parents, especially before their children are married. When asked to recall a recent memory from their less than ten days of free time in Beijing, Aunt Long produced a video she had taken with her daughter in Tiananmen Square on the first day of Chinese New Year 2019.

Figure 20: Space arrangement of the grocery shop (left) and Aunt Long seated in their living area. Source: Author (left) and Uncle Long (right), July 2019.

During the non-peak hours of their working day, from 9 am till 8 pm, with no urgent duties to perform, the couple were able to take things relatively easy. The original empty room of the shop had been arranged into two kinds of spaces. The larger space, on the street side, was the public, grocery, space, filled with shelves and tables where fruit and vegetables and various kinds of snacks were set out. Two narrow aisles, 50-centimetre wide, allowed customers to access and inspect the goods. The inner space – a third of the total space – had a semi-public feel to it and could be regarded as the couple's living space. A raised platform had been constructed for storage and decorated with wallpaper in a pattern of traditional Chinese lanterns. The space directly below it, with around 1.5 metres of headroom, was furnished with a table, several chairs and a refrigerator. The area next to it, away from the raised platform, contained a washbasin, a cooking stove and a tiny work surface for preparing meals. Apart from the 6 hours they spent sleeping in their rental flat, most of the Longs' day, all year round, was spent in the shop (Figure 20).

During the four interviews conducted with them in their shop, the Longs would recount stories, after their

departure, about the customers who came to visit. Their backgrounds varied tremendously. There was a local villager in his thirties who worked in Wangjing and a man in his sixties, from Hebei, who had come to live and work in Dongxindian as a cleaning man because his daughter had married a Beijing man and he wanted to live close to her. There was also a young Danish woman who worked in the 798 Art District as an English teacher. She had lived in China for five years and spoke perfect Chinese. Uncle and Aunt Long would have a little chat with every customer, sometimes for five to ten minutes if the customer was not in a hurry. Some customers were also curious about the researcher and asked the couple if she was a visiting relative. The visitors to the shop were not only customers, but also neighbours and acquaintances[56]. These might include a cleaning man looking for a place with air conditioning to take a short rest or a cook from a nearby restaurant who was free for the afternoon and felt like killing time with a chat.

While chatting with customers was one of their main entertainments, the couple also pursued other activities together. Both enjoyed music and Uncle Long played saxophone while Aunt Long sang along. They also played *erren zhuan* together, which involves telling stories through playing different roles and is a traditional and popular art form in their hometown in north-eastern China. *Douyin*, the Chinese version of TikTok, was becoming popular at the time and their daughter had taught them how to use the app, allowing them not only to watch videos but also to post their own online.

Aunt Long recalled the early days when they first arrived in Beijing and went to stay in Shigezhuang village, how she fell into a depression and longed to go back home. She had been used to living in a village where she knew everyone and could always find someone to stop and chat with whenever she stepped outside and now she was a stranger in Beijing who knew no one. In addition, they had been used to living in a large rural house with a spacious courtyard and were now confined to a tiny rental room. The business of keeping a grocery store, plus her own outgoing personality, solved the first problem. And, though she was still physically limited to a tiny room, the emergence of social applications like TikTok, which do not only target highly-educated people, allowed Aunt Long and her husband to access a wider virtual space via the internet.

10.3 A construction worker and his family in Shigezhuang

Uncle Tan (interviewee S005SC17M) had been living in Shigezhuang village since 2002. He learned about Shigezhuang through other *tongxiang* who had come to Beijing earlier and settled in the village. Shigezhuang

[56] Xiaotong Fei's book *From the Soil* has described Chinese society as a society of acquaintance. This was reflected among people living in urban villages, especially among migrants. This is further elaborated on in Chapter 11 when discussing spaces of representations.

was the first place Uncle Tan had settled after his arrival in Beijing and the only village he had lived in when, in 2018, it was announced that the village was to be demolished. He was one of the migrants who had witnessed the village's socio-spatial transformation. In 2002, when he first arrived, he lived in a room in a traditional courtyard house, where the indigenous villager household also lived. With the influx of migrants, like many other householders, his landlord decided to add rental rooms to his property, first extending into the open space in the yard, then gradually adding more rooms outside of the house, as well as an additional storey. Uncle Tan ended up having to move several times within the village until he ended up in the room where the researcher met him in 2017. It was one of eight rental rooms in a single-storey building on the edge of the village, built on what used to be farmland. After renting out all the rooms on his housing plot, the owner of this piece of farmland had built extra rooms out of brick, giving the structures a temporary look, since construction on farmland was forbidden (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Housing block where interviewee S005SC17M lived. Source: Author, July 2019.

In 2018, the village committee reached an agreement with the upper government that Shigezhuang village would be requisitioned for commercial redevelopment, with compensation to be negotiated with each individual household. Migrants were therefore informed that the buildings they lived in would soon be torn down. From summer 2018 till the beginning of 2019, Uncle Tan went to live in another village, but returned when it became clear that Shigezhuang's redevelopment would take some time. His old room having been rented out, he moved into a different room in the same building.

Uncle Tan had two sons, the elder born in 1998 and the younger in 2000. He had he moved to Beijing to find

work in 2002, but his wife only came to join him and also look for work in 2010, when their sons had both finished primary and middle school and were *"old enough"* (interview with Uncle Tan) to be left in the care of their grandparents. After finishing middle school, the elder son joined the military in 2013. The younger son continued on to high school after middle school and was admitted to university in 2019. Uncle Tan and his wife undertook a regular seasonal commute between Beijing and their hometown in Sichuan. Before her move to Beijing, Uncle Tan's wife took care of the boys and worked on a farm and, every year, Uncle Tan would travel back home for a month to spend the Spring Festival with them. In summer, his wife would bring their two sons to Beijing to visit their father and stay for the entire two months of the summer vacation. After 2010, Uncle Tan and his wife worked together in Beijing, but the family's commutes continued to follow the same pattern, with the parents travelling back home together in winter and their grown-up sons coming to visit them in Beijing in the summer. After the elder son joined the military, he had fewer holidays and was unable to visit Beijing every year.

Uncle Tan worked as a construction worker, specialising in steel construction. Unlike most construction workers, he had a steel construction working certificate, that recognised his high level of skill and allowed him to earn a higher wage. In 2017, he was earning 500 yuan per day, compared to the 200 to 300 yuan per day earned by other workers without certificates. Like other construction workers, his employment was casual rather than fixed, depending on what work was available. Sometimes he would work for 20 consecutive days, moving from one construction team to another, and at other times would be stuck at home for several days with no offers of work. Considering an average of 22 working days a month, Uncle Tan earned 11,000 yuan per month. His wife worked as a cleaner, earning around 4,000 yuan per month. During the second fieldwork in summer 2019, their younger son was in Shigezhuang, spending his long summer vacation between high school and university in the village, informally employed as an assistant in a bubble tea shop. He worked every day without a break and was paid weekly, earning between 3,000 and 4,000 yuan per month. Both Uncle Tan's wife and his son took two days off a month.

Uncle Tan and his wife – and their son while he was visiting – lived in an 8.5-square-metre room, for which they paid a monthly rent of 750 yuan in 2017. If their second son were to visit at the same time, the living space available to each person would be 2.25 square metres, compared to the 4.5 square metres available when the couple were on their own. However, when analysing the dwelling space of the family, it is not enough to look only at this 9-square-metre room. A three-layer spatial understanding would be helpful, including within the room, outside the room but within the building, and outside the building. The room itself contained necessary pieces of furniture and electrical devices. A set of bunk beds occupied a major space against one wall. It had a

90-centimetre-wide bed on top and a 120-centimetre-wide bed below. Uncle Tan and his wife slept in the lower bed, which also served as a sofa when they were watching TV or when friends came to visit. For most of the time, the upper bed was used as storage space for clothes but, when either or both sons came to visit, this was where they slept. In addition to the bunk beds, there was a table in the middle of the room and two simple chairs. Against another wall, was a refrigerator and a kitchen cupboard with a television on top. An air conditioning unit also hung on this wall. Against a third wall was a wardrobe.

Outside the room was a corridor, where many interactions with neighbours took place. It is interesting to note that, during the researcher's more than five visits, the door of the room was never closed. The corridor served as a communal kitchen and living room. The ovens and cooking utensils and ingredients belonging to each household were arranged against the outer wall of each room and people would gather there, to cook and chat. The corridor was lit by windows at the entrance and in the roof. All eight rooms had windows that opened into the corridor (see the left image of Figure 22).

Figure 22: Left: Migrants cooking, eating and chatting in the corridor. Source: Author, September 2017. Right: Space outside the building. Source: Uncle Tan's son, July 2019.

The third layer of the family's dwelling space was the street space outside the housing block. The building was on the edge of Shigezhuang and there was little through traffic. On the other side of the 2.5-metre-wide street was a tap, a focal point where the inhabitants of the block washed themselves in the morning, washed clothes in the afternoon and washed dishes in the evening. The space outside the building also served as a communal living space where different families could gather together, taking out tables and chairs and chatting and eating

on warm summer evenings. Against one of the outside walls of the housing block, a plastic tent was set up in the evenings and residents took turns to take showers inside it. Like most people in Shigezhuang, the migrants living in the building had no indoor toilets and had to take a two-minute walk to use the public toilet.

Unlike other interviewees, Uncle Tan owned an important asset: a car. This allowed him to drive to his hometown, Sichuan, a distance of around 1,500 km, which took him around 17 hours without break. Uncle Tan and his wife usually made the journey with another couple, the two men taking turns at the wheel to avoid an overnight stop. Because it was licensed in Sichuan, the car could not enter the city beyond the fifth ring road[57], but this was not a problem for Uncle Tan. He said:

"I brought my car from Sichuan to provide more convenient transportation to my workplace. I know that cars without a Beijing licence plate are not allowed inside the fifth ring road, but most of the construction sites are on the outskirts. Sometimes, I need to drive more than an hour to a peri-urban area, such as Huairou or Liangxiang. I don't need to drive my car to the city centre." (Interviewee S005SC17M, September 2017)

Given the absence of a regular weekend break, the family's daily routine tended only to differ according to whether Uncle Tan was working or not on a particular day. When he was working, they would go to bed between 9 and 10 pm and Uncle Tan would get up between 4 and 6 am, depending on the location of the construction site. Although construction workers' working hours were fixed at eight hours a day, they usually tried to arrive at the site as early as possible, especially in summer, to avoid working in the midday heat. Uncle Tan would usually work four hours in the morning, followed by another four after lunch and a siesta, and get home in the evening between 6 and 8 pm. His wife, who worked as a cleaner, had a more fixed schedule. She worked from 8 am to 5 pm with a lunch break of an hour. She took the bus or cycled to her workplace and returned to Shigezhuang around 5:30 pm, then made a trip to the market and prepared dinner for the family. When Uncle Tan was not working the next day, they would go to bed later, around 10 pm and Uncle Tan would have a lie-in next morning. He would then do some housework, such as cleaning the floor or washing clothes and, in the afternoon, go to the village market to buy groceries for the evening meal. However, he tended to spend most of the day in bed watching soap operas on his laptop or playing games on his phone.

Other than trips into work, the family seldom left Shigezhuang. In the evening, during and after dinner, they

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[57] This rule changed on 1 November, 2019, when a new regulation on cars with non-Beijing license plates came into force. According to the new regulation, these cars were no longer allowed inside the sixth ring road, though owners could apply for special permission a maximum of 12 times a year. Detailed information (in Chinese) on this regulation can be found via link: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-11/01/content_5447388.htm.

often exchanged visits with neighbours. Between 7 and 8 pm, many people could be seen hanging out in the street outside the building, dressed casually, some with bowls of rice in their hand, others carrying small, crying babies. Uncle Tan and his wife liked to go to the park in the village for a dance and a walk after dinner, and also often played mahjong, which is especially popular in Sichuan province. Because of the significant number of Sichuan migrants in Shigezhuang, some of them ran mahjong shops. Some evenings, Uncle Tan and his friends would go to one of these teahouses to play mahjong for several hours. Social networks based on a shared place of origin meant that many of the social activities were those that are common in rural areas or small towns. For example, birthdays or the birth of a grandchild were usually celebrated by treating friends to a good meal in a restaurant, with the guests reciprocating by presenting the host with a red envelope containing money as a token of their blessings. Friends also took turns to treat each other to a meal on traditional Chinese festivals and, before the demolition of the village started, there was a row of restaurants at the southern end of the main street that specifically catered for these special occasions. Uncle Tan's family were invited to such events several times a year and, in turn, hosted these kinds of gatherings of friends once or twice a year.

Interviews and observations confirmed that most of the family's needs could be satisfied within the village. This included the purchase of clothes. If they needed to buy something that was not available in Shigezhuang, they would turn to online shopping rather than go to shopping malls in other areas of Beijing.

10.4 The owner and caretaker of a '*dayuan*' in Dongxindian

A group of housing blocks in urban villages typically takes the form of a compound, or *'dayuan'* in Chinese. Dongheyuan was a *dayuan* in Dongxindian that stood next to the village committee office building, which had been demolished by the second round of fieldwork in 2019. Uncle Feng (interviewee D052FJ17M) was one of the owners as well as one of the caretakers of Dongheyuan.

Uncle Feng was from Fujian Province and had come to Beijing in 2007. He had lived in Dongxindian since his arrival. During his first two years in Dongxindian, he ran a small business with his wife. Later, he and several friends from Fujian decided to build compounds to rent out rooms to other migrants. They negotiated with the village committee, which was responsible for leasing out the collectively-owned land, on which a now-disused factory had been built. They also negotiated with some households whose housing plots were adjacent to each other and rented the plots together. These pieces of land were then converted to separate *dayuan*.

The decision was made when constructing Dongheyuan to keep the original layout of the factory, which contained several buildings, and a carpark was created next to the factory's entrance gate. Most of the original buildings were also kept and converted into rental rooms with the addition of dividing walls and interior

decoration. In the case of one single-storey building, the roof was preserved and new concrete residential units were arranged underneath (Figure 23). Other buildings were torn down and replaced with housing blocks. The spatial code enforced by the village was that the height and volume of the new buildings should not exceed that of the original ones. The original foundations were reused for the new buildings, which helped reduce construction costs.

Figure 23: Gated Dongheyuan with central carpark surrounded by housing blocks surrounded (left); rental rooms converted from a former factory, with original roof (right). Source: Author, September 2017.

There were two major costs associated with setting up the compound. First, the land rent for the entire leasing period had to be paid upfront, though there were no other administrative fees or taxes involved. The second major costs were the construction costs, which were evenly distributed amongst Uncle Feng and his friends, who, besides being shareholders, were also self-employed as caretakers for the multiple compounds. Uncle Feng and one other friend were jointly responsible for Dongheyuan, where the families of both men lived. Uncle Feng also participated in the construction process as a leader of the construction workers.

Dongheyuan provided better living condition than most housing blocks built by indigenous villagers on their housing plots. Each rental room had a bathroom with a toilet and a shower, and a cooking area with stove, kitchen ventilator and sink. The living space was equipped with a double bed, a wardrobe, a table and two chairs. In addition, all rooms had air conditioners and most had at least one window to let in light and fresh air. Signs had been put up inside and outside the gate, advertising Dongheyuan as offering rooms with luxury décor that tenants could move into immediately without the need to buy furniture. The rent for each room was 1,400 yuan

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per month when signing a contract for at least 6 months, and 1,500 yuan per month for a shorter stay. Dongheyuan had around 110 rooms in total that could generate an income of around 160,000 yuan per month. The carpark was divided into more than ten parking spaces, all of which were rented out to tenants.

Uncle Feng was himself a migrant but, for the migrants living in Dongheyuan, he was also their landlord. He and his wife lived in one of the rental rooms, on the ground floor, close to the gate. This allowed him to keep an eye on who was coming in and out of the yard and to be on hand to open the gate when a car needed to pass through. While Uncle Feng's room was exactly the same as the tenants', it was not the only living space he and his family occupied. He had appropriated most of the large entrance hall to one of the buildings and turned it into an open-plan living room and kitchen, with a four-seater dining table, a pair of sofas and a side table. The kitchen area was equipped with multiple household appliances, including a rice cooker, a refrigerator, a microwave and a TV. The TV served as a monitor with live videos recorded by 16 cameras covering every corner of Dongheyuan (Figure 24). However, this living space also continued to function as a corridor, with tenants constantly passing through. Uncle Feng had also appropriated a corner of the carpark to use as a space for drying clothes.

Figure 4: Uncle Feng seated in his living room in the entrance hall of a housing block in Dongheyuan. Source: Author, September 2017.

Uncle Feng's wife worked as a temporary employee at some shops outside of Dongxindian, while he managed Dongheyuan on a shift basis with his friend. When it was his shift, Uncle Feng spent most of his day, from 9 am to 9 pm, in his public entrance hall living room. Tenants could easily reach him at any time during this 12-

hour shift, either in person or by phone. The matters he took care of ranged from the collection of monthly rents to the collection of the six yuan required for the use of the washing machine, from showing round potential tenants to ensuring that no residents brought in outsiders to stay overnight, and from fixing internet connections to checking that no personal belongings were kept outside tenants' room, potentially blocking emergency exits. His responsibilities were many, but the demands they made on his time were variable and flexible and he had no fixed daily duties. He had adopted a house-husband style of routine: waking at 8 am, then taking his time about washing and having breakfast, enjoying a walk in the yard, sitting on the sofa in his living room with an eye on the monitor screen, washing clothes, buying groceries at the village market, cooking lunch, which he ate alone, then cooking dinner, which he ate with his wife. At the same time, his life was tightly bound to Dongheyuan and his leisurely routine could be interrupted at any time by the needs of one of his tenants, though, once these needs were satisfied, he was free to return to normal.

In this regard, Uncle Feng was a second landlord and his life was similar to that of indigenous villager landlords. As co-owner of Dongheyuan, he lived on rental income rather than by earning a living from employment. Dongheyuan was a gated community within Dongxindian village, on which Uncle Feng and his co-investors had paid land rent at the start of the lease but were liable for no other fees. His interactions with the village community were minimal and he had the power to manage Dongheyuan as he wished, setting rents and laying down regulations which tenants were required to follow.

However, on closer examination, Uncle Feng's situation was very different from that of the local landlords. The family lives of indigenous villagers who extended their houses to rent out rooms did not change significantly. The family continued to live together and pursue their regular means of employment, with a retired family member usually taking care of the rental business, whereas migrant landlords faced the same issues as other migrant households. With little possibility of sending their children to a state school in Beijing, they usually left their children behind in their hometowns, thus breaking up the family. In the sense that Beijing was only a place of work rather than a place where they could fully live, they were still 'floating'. This could explain why local villagers usually built an extra floor for the exclusive use of their family in their housing blocks, but *dayuan* owners seldom planned for their own living space when designing the layout of a *dayuan*.

A second way in which indigenous and migrant landlords' situations differed was related to land status. The migrant landlords had acquired the land they built on through financial investment, whereas the villagers' housing plots were theirs through inherited *hukou*, with extensions being financed with capital accumulated via previous rental practice.

A third difference, rooted in the second one, was the negotiating power that came with land tenure. Indigenous villagers' tenure of housing plots was legally regulated, while no explicit policies existed for or against the construction of residential communities like Uncle Feng's and, when asked the duration of the land lease as stated in his contract with the village committee, he said:

"Some contracts are for five years, while others may be for ten years. However, nobody knows when officials from the upper government will look into these businesses." (Interviewee D052FJ17M, September 2017)

The contracts agreed with the village committee may to some extent have been legal and legitimate, but it was generally acknowledged that they could easily be overridden by future policies against such land leasing and Uncle Feng's prediction regarding Dongheyuan was borne out by events. The contract leasing the collective land for the construction of Dongheyuan was signed in 2015, with a leasing period of five years. The first round of fieldwork took place from August to October 2017, when the interviews with Uncle Feng were conducted. By the time of the second round of fieldwork, in July 2019, all of the buildings in Dongheyuan had been torn down and the researcher was unable to make contact with Uncle Feng. According to interviews with members of the village committee, a policy was implemented in 2018 which explicitly regulated that village collective land was prohibited from being rented out to individuals for residential construction. Uncle Feng's contract with the village committee was no longer worth the paper it was written on. By the time of the second round of fieldwork, there were no more *dayuan* either in Dongxindian or Shigezhuang villages.

10.5 Young people living in apartment buildings in Dongxindian

10.5.1 A food deliveryman living with his friend

Gang (interviewee D064GS19M) had just celebrated his 23rd birthday when he was interviewed in his rental room in Dongxindian village in July 2019. A further four young men of the same age took part in the interview, one of whom was Gang's roommate, while the other three were friends who also lived in Dongxindian village. Gang and his roommate had known each other for many years before moving together from their rural hometown in Gansu Province to Beijing at the age of 19. Since then, both had been working as food deliverymen.

The first place they settled in Beijing was Dongxindian village. Both the village and the work they took up had been introduced to them by a *tongxiang*. By the time of the interview in July 2019, they had moved twice within the village in order to improve their living conditions. Their current rental room was around 10 square metres with a cooking space and a bathroom, and their rent was 1,500 yuan per month. Their income as deliverymen

was between 5,000 and 6,000 yuan per month, but neither had a long-term contract. They had been living in the room for a year and a half, but it lacked any personal touches other than the bed covers.

Gang had a very regular daily routine. He rose at 8 am, worked all day and returned to Dongxindian around 6 or 7 pm. He then had dinner in a restaurant in Dongxindian with friends, before going on to plays games with them till around two o'clock in the morning, at which time he normally went to bed. Most of his friends were other food deliverymen and they all lived in Dongxindian. They had become friends through their work and enjoyed socialising together. They were all single and of a similar age and a similar educational level. When Gang was being interviewed in his room, the friends who were also present played games on their phones and chatted amongst themselves. Gang told the interviewer that they went in search of entertainment outside the village every week or so. They had no fixed destination, but chose "*places that have not been visited yet for a tour*" (interviewee D064GS19M, July 2019).

When asked what he thought about Dongxindian village and whether he intended staying in Beijing in the future, Gang's answer reflected both his own feelings and those of his group:

"*I do not intend to stay in Beijing for a long time, because of love. My girlfriend is waiting for me and it is not a long-term solution to float outside. I will go back home in half a year. The thing I like most about Dongxindian is the convenience it allows for my work. If you ask the thing that I dislike most about Dongxindian, I would tell you the truth. As long as you are a human, you will not like it. I do not have local friends. But I think, if you are nice, others will be nice to you.*" (Interviewee D064GS19M, July 2019)

10.5.2 A hairdresser living with colleagues in a dormitory

Xiao Bin (interviewee D056HL17M) lived in Dongxindian village and worked as a hairdresser in the Wangjing district. He had come Beijing in 2013 and taken up an apprenticeship with the owner of the hairdresser's shop who had rented a room in Dongxindian and turned it into a four-people dormitory to accommodate single hairdressers like Xiao Bin. To understand the reasons behind this kind of staff dormitory it is necessary to look at the two ways in which service workers are typically paid. Most shops or companies simply pay a wage, while others provide their employees with dormitories and two or three meals a day, with the cost deducted from the employee's wages. In expensive cities like Beijing, this kind of package, that includes accommodation and meals, is often preferred by employees. However, in this situation, employers have an incentive to keep costs down and save money, leading to dormitories crammed with up to eight people.

Xiao Bin's shared room was at the end of a corridor in an apartment building and was larger than most rental rooms, being around 20 square metres. It had a bathroom and a kitchen area. In the large living space, there were two sets of bunk beds, two tables, and four standard wardrobes, all provided either by the apartment building landlord or the owner of the hairdresser's shop. Xiao Bin and his three roommates had not bought any furniture or electric appliances.

Xiao Bin had been living in the room for one and a half years, since he started work at the hairdressers' shop. Since the room was close to the shop, he was able get up at 9 am or even later in order to start work at 10 am. He finished work at 10 pm and went to bed around 1 am. After work, he enjoyed hanging out in Wangjing district, where he frequented the clubs and bars. When asked what his favourite places in Dongxindian were, he said:

"I do not go to any place in Dongxindian other than my room. Dongxindian is only a place for sleep. It is so dirty and untidy in this village. I will move out when I just have a little more money ... you know there is another village named Maquanying[58] in the nearby? It is much better than Dongxindian. It has been planned in a unified way." (Interviewee D056HL17M, September 2017)

He also further unintentionally emphasised his attitude towards Dongxindian village when asked whether he knew the occupations of the other tenants in the same housing block:

"There are many deliverymen, because they cannot charge the battery of their scooters when living in a normal residential building. There are very few white-collar staff. They definitely want to save face anyway and would prefer to live in the city." (Interviewee D056HL17M, September 2017)

Xiao Bin was a young man with a fashionable haircut and fashionable clothes. He said that he had come to Beijing, and Wangjing district in particular, because he wanted to learn hairdressing. All his friends in Beijing were either people he had met at work or in the places he went for entertainment after work. "*I do not know anyone in Dongxindian*", he said, a clear enough indication that he did not mix with the local villagers.

10.5.3 A white-collar office worker living alone

Hua (interviewee D065SX19F) was the only university graduate to take part in a semi-structured interview. She

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[58] Maquanying village is another urban village in Cuigezhuang Township, Chaoyang District. An earlier paper has been published by the author on this village (Yang and van Oostrum, 2020).

was reluctant to be interviewed the first time the researcher knocked on her door, but finally agreed the next day when the researcher visited again. As a single woman living in Dongxindian who knew nobody in the neighbourhood, she was more cautious towards strangers than those who lived with family or friends.

Hua was born in 1994 in Shanxi Province and came to Beijing for the first time in 2015, when she graduated from a university in Shandong Province. Her first job in Beijing was in another district and it was only later that she got her current job in Wangjing district. Like most university graduates, she did most of her job searching online. She found her current rental room shortly after starting work in Wangjing and chose Dongxindian village because of its proximity to her work and the low rents.

She lived in a room in a typical housing block built by an indigenous household. Her room was about 12 square metres with a kitchen and a bathroom, divided by a thin glass partition. It was located on the second floor and had a window facing into the inner corridor. The rent was 1,700 yuan per month. The room was rented with standard furniture, including a table, a bed and a wardrobe, but Hua had bought some additional furniture, such as a plastic wardrobe, as well as some decorative pieces. She had also purchased essential appliances like a rice cooker and a refrigerator. Out in the corridor, against the wall next to her door, she had arranged a shoe rack and a clothes dryer. Her room was cosy and, compared to a standard room, featured many personal touches, including pink-patterned curtains at the window.

Hua worked in an office in Wangjing and earned a salary of around 8,000 yuan per month after paying tax insurances. She got up at 7 am and started work at 8 to 8:30 am, and came home at 9 pm. For the most part, she had regular weekends off, but, when required to work over the weekend, was given time off during the week. Her after-work entertainment was watching soap operas in her room. She bought most of her daily groceries, as well as toiletries and clothes, from online e-commerce platforms, but, for fresh fruit and vegetables, she went to the market in the village. Hua had only a verbal agreement with her landlord, who lived on the fourth floor of the building and whom she met every month to pay the rent. He was the only person she knew in the village, and she was extremely reluctant to talk about her life in Dongxindian:

"You do not need to ask about people I know in Dongxindian. I do not know anyone in Dongxindian. Please do not ask about my favourite place in Dongxindian. I do not know … I am not sure if I like Dongxindian or not. Can I refuse to answer this question?" (Interviewee D065SX19F, July 2019)

Her attitude changed and she became more willing to talk when the topic shifted to friends or people she knew in Beijing outside Dongxindian village. She numbered the people with whom she was familiar as being in excess of 20. These were people she had got to know in various ways: some were colleagues or *tongxiang*, some had

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been introduced by friends, and others were people she had met through such activities as her dance class. Hua met these friends on a monthly basis and often in public spaces such as shopping malls in preference to each other's homes.

According to data acquired from questionnaires, more than ten percentage of migrants living in Dongxindian had attended university. However, when it came to in-depth, face-to-face interviews, the number of respondents in this group who were prepared to take part was quite low. The interview with Hua suggested two major reasons for the low accessibility of this group. First, they worked long hours during the week and tended to spend the weekend outside the village. Second, they knew few people inside the village and had little interaction with their neighbours, tending to stay shut up in their rental rooms.

11. The space of two-directional linkage

11.1 Migrants as individuals – perception of the city as a place of work

As discussed in Section 8.2, structured interviews on migrants' demographic and dwelling profiles were undertaken. In Shigezhuang village, the average living space per person for migrants was 3.9 square metres and, in Dongxindian village, it was 6.8 square metres. The average living space for indigenous villagers was over 26 square metres for both villages. Only 11 percent of respondent migrants in Shigezhuang had an indoor toilet, and 26 percent in Dongxindian. The rent for rooms without toilets in Shigezhuang was 80 to 85 yuan per square metre in 2017 and this was raised to around 95 yuan in 2019. Interviewee S005SC17M reported that the 8.5-square-metre room their family lived in cost 750 yuan in 2017 and 900 yuan in 2019. Rooms with toilets were mostly larger and the average rent was slightly higher. In 2017, a room with a toilet usually cost more than 1,100 yuan.

During the field research, some interviewees were asked a hypothetical question[59]:

"I know there is a room, in the nearby urban village, that is the same size as the one you live in now but that has a toilet, and the rent is 200 yuan higher. Would you be willing to move to that room?" (Author, September 2017)

Interviewee S005SC17M's answer was representative of most respondents':

"There is already enough space within our room for my family to live. Why would we pay extra money for the rent? We don't need an indoor toilet." (Interviewee S005SC17M, September 2017)

The answer was contrary to expectations since these migrants earned a relatively high salary in comparison to their rent. In the case of interviewee S005SC17M, he and his wife earned 15,000 yuan in total per month in 2017 (see detailed description in Section 10.3) and their yearly income was 165,000 yuan – taking an average working year to be 11 months. This was higher than the 2017 annual income per capita of residents in Beijing, which was 57,230 yuan[60]. The couple's rent took only 5% at the most of their combined income.

Does migrants' unwillingness to spend more money on rent mean that they are satisfied with their current living

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[59] The following paragraphs are cited from an earlier paper by the author (Yang, 2020).
[60] The figure was taken from the government report titled *The per capita disposable income of residents [*居民人均可支配收入情况*]* by Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (2018), via the link: http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/tjsj/yjdsj/jmsz/2017/ [accessed on 16 February 2019].

conditions? Field observation and interviews suggest that the answer is no. Interviewee S059SD17F explained why they chose to house their five family members in a cramped space:

"We leave home simply to do some work and earn money, so we have to live in an improvised way."[61] (Interviewee S059SD17F, September 2017)

For most migrants, the city of Beijing was only a place of work. This was also evidenced by other interviews, such as:

"The shopping mall is within ten minutes' walk, but I have never been there. That is not for us. Why would we go there?" (Interviewee S005SC17M, September 2017)

"I will go back home when I can't work anymore. We peasants don't have retirement benefits. The living cost here in the city is much higher than in our countryside. I don't think we can afford this when we are old." (Interviewee S058SC17M, September 2017)

On the other hand, because the city is a place of work, the expectation of both the migrant workers and their families back home is that they will return home with money. Uncle and Aunt Long had a difficult time during their early days in Beijing and Aunt Long was depressed because she didn't fit into city life. However, Uncle Long said it was impossible for them to return to their home village:

"Everyone in the village knows that you go to Beijing to run a business. How can you go back directly without earning money? You will be teased!" (Interviewee D058HL19M, July 2019)

The length of time spent in the city does not necessarily impact migrants' decision whether to go back to their hometown or not. Interviewees S005SC17M and S058SC17M, both in their 50s, were certain about their intention to return to their rural hometowns when they could not work anymore. The fact that they had been working in the city for more than ten years had not influenced their plans.

During the first round of field research in the summer of 2017, the researcher visited several other urban villages in addition to the two case villages and witnessed the demolition and evictions happening in these villages.

"You can go back to your hometowns, but there are no working opportunities." (Interviewee O06SEM2017F, a migrant living in Nanyuan village in Daxing District, September 2017)

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[61] In Chinese: *couhe zhe guo (*凑合着过*)*.

According to the questionnaires, most of the migrants in Shigezhuang village hardly ever went outside the village other than for work and more migrants tend to spend time outside of Dongxindian on weekends. Migrants' attitudes towards the place where they had come to live and their accounts of life in Beijing indicated that most of them only came to Beijing to find better opportunities for well-paid work and were not interested in city life. This results in them settling for substandard living conditions and further demotivates indigenous landlords' from upgrading housing conditions in the village. When most migrants were unlikely to invest much in rental housing, indigenous villagers tended to develop rental rooms that satisfied only the basic need for shelter. In the special rental market in urban villages like Shigezhuang, rooms with more decent conditions, such as the provision of a toilet, were not more sought after by migrants.

Figure 24: Left: Space filled with vegetable plants outside of the rental room of interviewee S058SC17M. Source: Author, September 2017. Right: A tiny bathroom built by Interviewee S058SC17M. Source: Author, July 2019.

Nevertheless, some spatial modifications had been made by migrants in Shigezhuang village, which can be seen as projections of their rural origins onto the arrival city. For example, interviewee S075HN19M had built an

extra room himself attached to one of the external walls of the yard he lived in, where he had a rental room of six square metres. Interviewee S058SC17M had put up frames outside his rental rooms and grew vegetables that provided for the needs of his whole family (Figure 24).

The reluctance to pay a higher rent for better housing and the tendency to perceive the city only as a place for work were less prevalent among the migrants in Dongxindian village. Figures on rents and the provision of indoor toilets, as well as field observation, revealed that overall living conditions in Dongxindian village were better than those in Shigezhuang. Furthermore, when asked their opinions about rental housing, interviewees in Shigezhuang tended to complain about the frequent rent increase, while those in Dongxindian (for example, interviewees D056HL17M and D065SX19F) talked more about their plans to move out of village once they were earning more money. While income did affect migrants' housing choices, it was not the determining factor.

This anomaly can probably be attributed to two factors. First, young migrants, especially unmarried ones with fewer concerns about the future of a household, were more likely to pursue a better standard of living and explore city life. Second, migrants working in a more formal job market or in a work environment with more connection to people outside the urban villages were more attracted to city life. For example, working on construction sites only allows contact with other construction workers and working in a self-employed capacity in a village only allows contact with residents inside the village, whereas working as hairdresser in Wangjing (like interviewee D056HL17M) allows contact with customers from a middle-class neighbourhood and joining the staff of a company allows contact with colleagues who live in different communities and come from different backgrounds. As a result, compared to interviewees in Shigezhuang village, more interviewees in Dongxindian village talked about how they spent their leisure time in shopping malls in the city and expressed their desire to rent a room in a formal community in the urban area.

The activities pursued by Dongxindian migrants (such as interviewee S005SC17M and his wife, and interviewee couple D058HL19M and D059HL19F) were quite different to those pursued by migrants living in rental rooms elsewhere or in formal commercial residential communities. For example, when they had the time to leave their village and visit other parts of Beijing, they usually choose a tourist destination such as Tiananmen Square or the Forbidden City and tended to describe these excursions as 'travel' or a 'tour'. (for example, interviewees S005SC17M and D059HL19F). They did not by any means consider themselves to be long-term Beijing residents.

11.2 Migrants as households – circulation of resources between sending and receiving areas

11.2.1 Family arrangements linking the city and hometowns

Migrants' own stories and life histories, including their "individual accounts of the power play within their household" (Schmidt-Kallert, 2014, p. 64) have been emphasised. Previous research has categorised types of migration as sole migration, couple migration and family migration (Fan *et al.*, 2011, p. 2011). According to the field research, more than 80 percent of migrants in Shigezhuang and one third in Dongxindian came to Beijing with other family members or close friends with whom they shared one or two rooms in the same urban village. It was identified that different family arrangements were made by different households. When the family had children, an initial distinction should be made between 'left-behind children' and 'migrant children'. Some interviewees reported that their children migrated with them to Beijing, but these children were mostly under six years old. For example, interviewee S076SC19F's husband was a construction worker in Beijing and she took care of their four-year-old daughter and eight-month-old son as a housewife. Interviewee D062HN19F and her husband had opened a shop in Dongxindian and their five-year-old son was attending kindergarten in the village.

As discussed in Section 9.2.4, due to the regulations that effectively deny migrants access to public services, children who have reached school age seldom migrate with their parents. There is little chance for migrants to send their children to primary school and middle school in Beijing and no chance for high school. Therefore, for families with children over six or seven years old, the split household is the common solution and takes two forms: either the mother stays in the hometown with the children or grandparent(s) take care of the children and both parents go to work in the city. Although much has been written and discussed in China regarding the latter solution, emphasising concerns over the potential harm done to left-behind children's intellectual growth and mental health, fieldwork suggests that as many households opt for this solution as for the other. Both solutions have already been widely studied and this thesis will therefore not spend many words on them. Two typical examples will be used to briefly illustrate the family arrangements involved in each.

39-year-old interviewee D067JX19M had been living in Dongxindian village as a self-employed migrant for over seven years in 2019. His wife and their children – one 17 years old, the other 14 years old – lived in their hometown in Nanchang City, Jiangxi Province. His wife took care of the children while earning 4,000 yuan per month as a salesperson. She and the children lived in the commercial apartment the couple had bought in the

county and kept a rural housing plot in the countryside. The interviewee earned more than 8,000 yuan per month and usually remitted half of his earnings back home. This remittance was used to provide for elderly relatives and the children. Since all his family members were in his hometown, he went home at least three times a year and stayed for one to two weeks each time. His children had never visited their father in Beijing, because of study commitments and a lack of space in his rental room, but his wife came to Beijing once a year. This case was similar to the cases of interviewees S075HN19 and S081SC19M.

38-year-old interviewee S073SD19M and his wife had opened a breakfast restaurant in Tongzhou District and lived in Shigezhuang village. They had two sons – the elder was 16 years old and the younger was 14 years old. The boys lived with grandparents in the countryside in Shandong province and attended school there. The couple earned 10,000 yuan per month between them and sent back 2,000 yuan to the grandparents for the maintenance of their sons. The couple returned to their hometown at least twice a year and their sons always spent their entire summer vacation in Beijing – what could be described as an annual bi-directional circuit. The two sons stayed with their parents in their 10-square-metre room when they visited. This is similar to the cases of interviewees D061HN19F and D066HN19M. Children living with grandparents in their hometown usually spent more time in Beijing than those living in their hometown with their mother. This can be explained by the fact that it is generally agreed that a mother can exercise parental responsibility in lieu of a father, whereas grandparents cannot and having children come to Beijing during vacations may to some extent make up for parental absence. Besides, when the mother also works in Beijing, the children's visit needs not disrupt her daily routine. She can go to work as usual and the family can spend time together in the evening or at weekends.

In traditional Chinese society, the arrangement of family members usually takes place across three generations and this is especially common for rural families. In the examples above, the grandparents played the role of the 'stay behind' in the hometown and supported the family by looking after their grandchildren when needed. However, the field research identified a type of three-generation migration that had rarely been studied before. In the examples that came to light (see interviewees S010HN17M, S045SC17F, S059SD17F, S063SC19F S074HN19F), each family had five or six members living in the urban village, usually an older couple with their son or daughter and his or her spouse and one or two small children (Yang, 2020, p. 156).

For example, interviewee S059SD17F had opened a grocery store near the east gate of Shigezhuang village and lived with her husband and their daughter and son-in-law. The shopfront of the grocery store had an area of 15 square metres and featured a tiny sleeping area divided from the main business area by a temporary, thin plastic wall. In the sleeping area, there were two beds with a curtain between them and a sofa and television to one side. The interviewee was 49 years old. Her husband, an hourly labourer, habitually worked the night shift and

slept during the day. Her daughter and son-in-law worked in the city during the day and returned to Shigezhuang in the evening. The interviewee had a grandson aged six whom she had previously taken care of and who had attended kindergarten in Shigezhuang village until reaching school age, when he was sent back to the family's hometown in Shandong to live with his paternal grandparents and attend primary school there. A similar solution involving three generations, and both sets of grandparents was described by interviewee S074HN19F.

Another case was interviewee S063SC19F, who lived in Shigezhuang village with her husband, son and daughter-in-law and newborn grandson. She and her daughter-in-law worked as cleaners and her husband and son were construction workers. Since the birth of her grandson, she had temporarily stopped work to take care of him full time. She and her husband lived in an 8-square-metre room and the younger couple and their infant lived in a larger room of 15 square metres. The two rooms were less than 50 meters apart and all five family members' activities, including cooking, eating and watching TV, tended to take place in the larger room.

"When I worked, my husband and I could earn in total around 10,000 yuan a month. His (the child's) father (namely the interviewee's son) is even better. He himself alone can earn more than 10,000 yuan. He also has his own car and can take people to work and back." (Interviewee S063SC19F, July 2019)

When asked how she felt about spending every day with her grandson, she said she was happy about it and seemed content with her current life. The father and son always worked in the same construction team and took care of each other. The four adults – and now also the newborn – always drove back to Sichuan together for the Spring Festival.

In this type of three-generation migration, parents can stay close to their small children and at the same time look after their elderly parents if need be. It was observed that this was the migration model preferred by most families with children younger than six years old, when economic conditions allowed, and when the older couple were not too old to work.

However, no significant differences regarding financial decisions were found amongst these different types of family arrangements. The number of family members in the destination city did not necessarily affect the migrants' willingness to invest more money in better living conditions. For this type of three-generation migration, the average living space per person was less than 2.5 square metres. In summary, choice of family arrangements is a complex decision requiring a compromise between maximising the financial rewards of working in the city and enjoying the best of family life.

Another consideration, deeply rooted in Chinese culture, is the need to save money for emergencies and to

provide a better future for one's children.

"My son is a young soldier in the army now. I don't need to give him money every month like in his university times, but we need to save money from now on to help him buy an apartment when he gets married in the future."
(Interviewee S005SC17M, September 2017))

Many migrants (see, for example, interviewees S001SC17M, S058SC17M, D053SC17F and D066HN19M) also reported that they had purchased a formal apartment in an intermediate urban centre, such as a township close to their village of origin. After they left home to work in Beijing, they decided to stop tending their farmland in the countryside and sublet it to neighbours who had remained. Although they kept their rural hometown houses, they could use the apartment on their seasonal visits home and it could also be used by grandparents taking care of grandchildren who attended school in the township. However, the reason most frequently cited for purchasing such an apartment was 'investment'. For these migrant workers, purchasing a property in these intermediate city centres was a low-risks investment made affordable by the wages they earned in Beijing. In addition, the purchase involved no *hukou* requirements since these township authorities frequently welcomed such investments. These apartments were also where these migrants intended to settle after retirement.

11.2.2 Family arrangements linking the urban village and other parts of Beijing

A new type of family arrangement, when older migrants live in urban villages and support their sons or daughters who have formal jobs in the city, has emerged in the last few years. While scholars studying the family arrangements of migrants in urban villages in Beijing or Pearl River Delta used to focus on the link between the arrival city and the migrants' hometowns, nowadays more dynamic urbanisation modes enable family arrangements to link the urban village and other parts of Beijing.

Interviewees D058HL19M and D059HL19F in Dongxindian village chose to move to Beijing because their daughter worked on the staff of a company in the city after graduation. This was also the case for interviewee S068HB19F and her husband in Shigezhuang village. The two couples were both living and running small businesses in the villages. Interviewee S020SC17M was a 20-year-old university student in Beijing, whose parents, both in their 50s and retired, lived in Shigezhuang village. The father had served in the army and had an adequate pension to provide for the family. The parents rented a 70-square-metre apartment and enjoyed their retirement in the village. Interviewee D070HN19M was a 62-year-old man whose daughter was married to a local Beijing resident and lived in Wangjing, while he lived in Dongxindian village and worked as a cleaner. In these three examples, the son or daughter lived an urban life in the city, in a formal commercial apartment or

dormitory, and visited their parents every week.

This type of migrant, who follows their offspring to the city, has rarely been mentioned in the early literature on urban villages. The emergence of such examples could be attributed to today's higher urbanisation rate, looser regulations on migration and more dynamic working opportunities in the city. But another influence at work could be the 'one-child policy', which was in force from the 1980s until 2015, and allowed urban families to have only one child and rural families a maximum of two. This led to the strengthening of bonds between grown-up children and their parents. When discussing and researching working migrants and their left-behind, underage children, cases such as these young working migrants and their parents also need to be highlighted. In the examples cited, the choice to go and live in an urban village in the city where their children worked may have represented a happy middle option between staying in the hometown or living with the grown-up children's family in the urban area.

Figure 25: Children playing in the street in Shigezhuang. Source: Author, September 2017.

There is little evidence that these migrants' space production differs significantly from other migrants. Most of

them chose rental rooms in similar areas and of similar prices. Their work practices were also comparable to other migrant workers. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the opportunity to earn a living in the city was not their only reason for going to stay in the urban villages. On the one hand, these parents wished to live close to their children in the city without disturbing the young people's life; on the other hand, coming from rural area or small cities, they were also looking for lower living expenses than they would incur in formal residential arrangements. As for their attitude towards working and saving money, this differed slightly from other migrant workers with financial considerations as their primary motivation. This was illustrated by interviewee D070HN19M:

"For killing time, it is better to do something than to do nothing. Besides, it is better to earn a penny than to earn nothing." (Interviewee D070HN19M, July 2019)

In these cases, urban villages acted as a backup family arrangement. The intention of this section is to make visible a kind of family arrangement that links the formal urban area and the informal urban villages, both socially and economically.

11.3 Migrants as a *tongxiang* community

11.3.1 Housing

More than half of the interviewees and questionnaire respondents living in Shigezhuang explicitly reported that they learned about housing in Shigezhuang village via a *tongxiang*. The number was around 11 percent for migrants living in Dongxindian village. Furthermore, regardless of whether they knew each other before coming to Beijing, people from the same province or hometown tended to form a strong community once they settled because of their similar dialects and lifestyles.

The rent that couple S064HN19F and S065HN19M paid for their 12-square-metre room was lower than the average price in Shigezhuang. When asked why, interviewee S065HN19M explained:

"Several of us tongxiang *contracted the whole courtyard. Shouldn't the rent be cheaper than the normal price? ... All the tenants in this yard come from the same village. We lived together at Deshengmen Bridge near the second ring road 20 years ago and moved together all the way here. It is good that people knowing each other well could take care of each other."* (Interviewee S065HN19M, July 2019)

In addition to a lower rent, another advantage of contracting the yard as a group was that they were free to use

the space in the yard as they wished. Migrants living in rooms without indoor kitchens cook either in the corridor or in the open space outdoors, while interviewee S065HN19M and his fellow tenants had designated one of the four rooms in the yard to be a communal kitchen and bathroom serving the three households. Some cheap furniture had been arranged in the courtyard and a small piece of land directly in front of the entrance to the yard had been enclosed by bricks and used to grow vegetables. The compound had been effectively transformed into a single-family rural courtyard house accommodating three households (Figure 26).

Figure 26: Neighbours of interviewee S065HN19M seated in front of the yard (left) and their communal kitchen and bathroom (right). Source: Author, July 2019.

The *tongxiangs'* attachment to one another and their information-sharing habits in relation to housing issues were also evidenced in their attitudes to relocation in the case of eviction. When asked where he would go if Shigezhuang village was completely demolished, interviewee S075HN19M, an hourly labourer, said:

"I would follow the majority. I would go to the place where everyone goes." (Interviewee S075HN19M, July 2019)

This might be interpreted as him being only a follower who left others to make the decisions but, in fact, his statement simply reflected his membership of a close-knit group with common interests who were able to reach an agreement without discussion. The term "majority" is an ambiguous and abstract concept. In this case, it did not refer to a particular group of people but to the abstract conceptualisation of the *tongxiang* community, which included the interviewee himself. For example, during the interim demolition of Shigezhuang village in 2018,

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many Sichuan migrants moved to another urban village named Caofang village, around five kilometres east of Shigezhuang. The village was chosen because of its proximity to Shigezhuang and the possibility that offered to preserve community attachments. Word of Caofang village spread via *tongxiang* and more and more Sichuan migrants living in Shigezhuang moved there. One construction worker who lived in Shigezhuang and owned a car had the habit of picking up some of his co-workers who lived in Caofang every morning and giving them a lift to the construction site. This also helped spread the word and when other *tongxiang* in Shigezhuang were about to be evicted due to the demolition of their rental rooms, they immediately thought of Caofang village and went to find a room there. Gradually, Caofang village became a new community of Sichuan *tongxiang*.

11.3.2 Working opportunities

Besides sharing information on rental rooms, *tongxiang* also share work information and refer others to employers. Many migrants are informally employed without a steady contract and are paid by the day. They have to keep searching for new work opportunities. For low-skilled occupations like construction work and house cleaning, little information can be obtained online or via formal platforms. The social network is the primary source of information and migrants often rely on the *tongxiang* community[62]:

"When a familiar construction team leader calls me and tells me that they need four or five construction workers on their sites for a week, I will say I can help him to find all these people. Then I often call my relatives or go to knock on the doors of my neighbours and ask if they have time for that one-week work. We will also drive a car together to the construction site. This is very common and other people will also do so. The man with much job information is highly respected." (Interviewee S005SC17M, September 2017)

"Sometimes I am busy when the household that I often work for asks me to do the cleaning. I will recommend my friends from the villages and guarantee the household that they can do the cleaning as well as I do it." (Interviewee S012SC17F, September 2017)

Although they were variously referred to as "relatives", "neighbours" and "friends", the people being talked about were all *tongxiang*. This offers a possible explanation for the phenomenon of migrants from the same province tending to have the same occupations. For example, the previously mentioned interviewees S005SC17M and S012SC17F both came from Sichuan province. According to the surveys and questionnaires

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[62] This paragraph and the following interview transcripts were partly used in a published book chapter written by the author (Yang, 2000).

conducted in Shigezhuang, Sichuan *tongxiang* were mostly migrants with low educational levels who had not been trained for any particular occupation before moving to Beijing. However, an obvious trend could be observed according to the fieldwork: among these Sichuan *tongxiang*: 68 percent of the men were construction workers or hour labourers and 41 percent of the women were cleaners. It can be deduced that their occupations were not determined by their skills but by their access to information on work opportunities.

The support provided within *tongxiang* communities not only applied to informal employment like construction work and cleaning but also to some areas of self-employment in the informal economy. Those running small businesses looked out for each other and taught each other skills. As in the previous examples, none of the self-employed workers possessed any particular expertise or had even planned to run a business before moving to Beijing. It was also the case that people sometimes switched from one business to another, for the most part businesses requiring a low level of skills, such as selling breakfast snacks or vegetables. As interviewee S066HN19M put it:

*"We (*tongxiang*) run different types of businesses next to each other. Besides keeping an eye on other's businesses, we also learn from each other. When your business is bad and his business is good, you can learn to do it, too. It is like classmates attending school – about communication and mutual help."* (Interviewee S066HN19M, July 2019)

There were also cases where migrants impacted the physical and social space in the urban villages as *tongxiang* communities. There were examples of groups of migrants using collective financial resources to rent land to build residential blocks or start up a business that required a major initial investment. Interviewee D052FJ17M in Dongxindian village rented collective land with his *tongxiang* from Fujian province to build a residential yard with rental rooms. Interviewee S062HN19M in Shigezhuang village rented and furnished a shopfront with his *tongxiang* from Henan province and started a hairdressing business. Urban villages attract migrants with their prime locations and low living costs, but their insufficient facilities mean that they are unable to meet the increasing demands of inflowing migrants. However, some of these migrants saw opportunities in their village's informal economy and leveraged their own resources in their hometowns to earn money in the arrival city. This in turn improved the quality of life in the urban village.

The space production in urban villages of migrants from different provinces is a representation of features of different areas in China – a miniature of the state in a confined informal space. While the contrast between indigenous villagers and rural migrants is already strong, there are also many differences between migrants with different origins. For example, Sichuan migrants are more likely to take employment as construction workers

and cleaners, Henan migrants are usually self-employed, and most second landlords come from Fujian province. With the mixture of different groups of migrants flowing into urban villages, the space in these villages is given a new character.

11.3.3 Interactions with other stakeholder groups as the *tongxiang* community

As members of a *tongxiang* community, migrants usually support each other in various areas of life and form strong neighborhood attachments, sharing information and everyday activities like cooking, playing cards and looking after children (Figure 27). However, it should be pointed out that their established network failed to strengthen their position in negotiations with indigenous villagers. Despite their dominance in numbers, the informality of the rental market and their lack of the necessary resources for conducting negotiations meant they were ill-equipped to enter into a discourse.

Figure 27: Public spaces appropriated by *tongxiang* community in Shigezhuang, persisting during demolition (right image). Source: Author, October 2017 (left) and July 2019 (right).

Some scholars, such as (Zhang, 2001), have suggested that in some urban villages there are leaders among the migrants who fight for the community's rights in the negotiation process. These leaders possess the right to enter into a discourse because of their superior wealth and so are able to represent other *tongxiang*. However, this was not evident in the case villages, especially not in Shigezhuang. Several Sichuan *tongxiang* who were neighbours in Shigezhuang mentioned in interviews that they were suffering unreasonable rent hikes by

landlords:

"Last month the villagers decided collectively to raise our rent by an average of 200 yuan. We are so angry because they just raised the rent once at the beginning of this year. We had a big fight with them. However, the village committee leaders who were supposed to administer justice always stood by the villagers' side. The rent still rose despite the fight." (Interviewee S058SC17M, September 2017)

"Of course, there is no leader for our tongxiang *community. Nobody dares to be the leader. Leaders are always the first to suffer. Those villagers can at any time kick us out of their rooms."* (Interviewee S005SC17M, September 2017)

A migrant group made up of people with low social status and little education lack the resources to fight for their rights or make demands. Although *tongxiang* in the established community support each other in everyday life, few are willing to represent the group's common interests. One of the most important reasons was that the migrants all knew that the primary objective of their time in the city was to earn money and they did not want to jeopardise that by leading or representing a "temporary" community.

The bonds within *tongxiang* communities were referred to less frequently by interviewees living in Dongxindian than by those in Shigezhuang. One possible explanation is that the higher the level of education of the migrants, the less dependent they are on social networks based on place bonds for finding work opportunities. From this perspective, the *tongxiang* community also strengthened the homogeneity of the migrants in any urban village.

It was also reported by several interviewees during the field research in 2017 that the migrants' reliance on social networking for work opportunities meant that they tended to remain in Shigezhuang and so be faced with steadily increasing rents. They were held back by the possible loss of work should they opt for resettlement. This has been referred to as "economic displacement" (see Section 4.2.4), which in this case was indirectly caused by the migrants' dependence on a social network based on their bonds of place.

PART IV

12. Synthesis

In this chapter, the key findings of this thesis will be summarised. Before delving into a detailed elaboration of the empirical findings presented in Chapters 9, 10, and 11, the research questions and objectives will first be recapped.

The key research question of this thesis is how migrants shape urban villages in Beijing through their social production of space, and the primary objective is to study how they produce space through their everyday life practices, which are based on their representations of the meanings of space. At the same time, this thesis is also aimed at employing and further developing Lefebvre's theory of space production, paying particular attention to spatial dialectics in the Chinese context.

The key research question is comprised of four facets:

- Which stakeholder groups are involved in shaping informality as embodied in the development of urban villages in China? What role do migrants play in this process?

- What are the everyday lives of migrants in urban villages like, and how do they differ from one migrant or one household to another? How do the everyday activities of migrants and the decisions they make influence the space in urban villages?

- How is the process of migration reflected in space in urban villages? How do migrants produce the social space, on both the micro and macro levels (i.e., city level, national level, etc.), and what are the implications?

- Is the theory of space production applicable to the analysis of space production in China, specifically in the case of informal settlements like urban villages? If the answer is yes, how and to what extent is it applicable?

12.1 The space of governance and negotiation

The representations of spaces are the dominant aspect of space and signify the world of abstraction (Lefebvre, 1991; Merrifield, 2006). In the case of space production in urban villages in Beijing, the space corresponding to this conceived space, namely the space of governance and negotiation, also plays a central role, where various stakeholders intervene and demonstrate their power, ideology and knowledge.

Urban villages as fertile ground for organised informality

The urban-rural dualistic system of land and population provides fertile ground for informality. Within a set of visible institutional boundaries, urban villages allow for "a flexible management of diverse informal practices depending on their relevance, usefulness and potential threat towards state authority" (Schoon & Altrock, 2014, p. 216), which has also been conceptualised as 'conceded informality'. This can best be seen in the frequently quoted phrase "*following the law and following the regulations*" (in Chinese: *yifa yigui*), behind which two sources of organised informality can be detected.

First, different layers of governance institutions can interpret and implement the same law or regulation differently according to local interests. In the case of Beijing, these institutions include municipal, district and township government, and the village committee. In Chapter 9, the phrase "the regulation or law starts to be strictly enacted" appeared several times. One example of this was after the Daxing fire when the ban on leasing out collective land for the building housing blocks was suddenly strictly enforced and long-standing *dayuan* forcibly demolished.

The second source is the fuzziness of regulations and the deliberate lack of regulations in some areas. The government deliberately leaves some areas unregulated so that the local government, such as the township authorities and the village committee, have more flexibility to exert their own entrepreneurial will. This also ensures flexibility when revising the rules or resolving property conflicts. All these factors contribute to informality. This informality can be alleviated or eliminated by introducing laws or regulations when needed. For example, in Dongxindian, certain procedures and certificates were introduced in an attempt to regulate the informal economy and incorporate it into the formal sector.

The village committee has significant power over issues within the village boundary and organised informality places the space of governance in a dominant position. Because of the vagueness in governance, migrants' space production is subjected to ever-shifting power relations. Such informality is conceived by the state, and perceived and lived by migrants

Informal space as government's controlling tactics over migrants and informality enhanced through migrants' participation

Organised, conceded informality makes it possible for the government to use the space of urban villages as a means of exerting control over migrants. In this regard, certain spaces are prioritised or overlooked, and representations are often used as a means of controlling social practices (see Section 2.2.2). The

conceptualisation of urban villages as migrant enclaves may be created with the objective of deprioritising urban villages and, more importantly, the migrant population, and excluding them from the mainstream of society.

On a macro level, in the early stages of urbanisation, migrant workers were needed in the city and the emergence and growth of urban villages as migrant enclaves was tolerated by the government, thus allowing them to focus on investing in and upgrading urban infrastructure and avoid having to attend to other issues (like the need for affordable housing) brought about by the sudden increase in urban population due to the inflow of migrant workers. Yet, in the wake of a plan for the wholesale upgrading of city functions, the focus suddenly shifted to 'illegal structures' in urban villages and the need to demolish them. Unsurprisingly, these demolitions have been accompanied by the relocation or departure of cheap labourers, the group which services low-end industries and non-essential capital city functions. Laws and regulations have been published and actions taken regarding the physical space, but the intentions are the representations of space and little attention has been paid to the negative toll in human terms.

As elaborated in Section 9.1.1, migrant numbers in Beijing are linked to the number of rental rooms available in the urban villages, which in turn is determined by the construction and deconstruction of urban villages. Decisions regarding construction and deconstruction are affected by the market, by the wishes of the indigenous villagers and by overall policy. While the issue appears to be a spatial one when merely looking at housing blocks and rental rooms, the evolution of these spaces, either weakly or strongly, directly or indirectly, reflects the underlying interventions of the government and planning authorities. The spatiality of urban villages can be considered an agency of government control over migrants. For example, as discussed in Section 9.1.1, the demolition of 'illegal' buildings in urban villages across Beijing after the fire in November 2017 and the consequent eviction of migrants, led to the production of new representations of spaces. This echoes Lefebvre's contention that representations of space intervene and modify spatial textures, in a manner of construction that should be conceived of as "a project embedded in a spatial context and texture which call for 'representations'" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 42, see also Section 2.2.2).

Further, there is an obvious mismatch between major interventions taking place in the mega capital city and the generally overlooked groups of migrants (see Section 9.1.2). Although on the surface it might appear that the state is not directly interfering in the everyday lives of migrants, in reality it exerts a considerable constraining influence on the patterns and rhythms of the migrants' lived space. The migrants' quality of life and the opportunities afforded them to live and work in the city may be impacted or denied by the state, intentionally or unintentionally. This again proves the dominant status of representations of spaces over the other two aspects of the spatial triad.

Indigenous villagers' dominant role in space production, as rentier class empowered by property rights

As well as the state and local government, the indigenous villagers are also producers of the space of governance and negotiation. None of the migrants interviewed mentioned tenure or their right to the rental rooms they lived in or ran their businesses from, whereas the indigenous landlords referred constantly to the property rights they enjoy with regard to land and houses. Some conflict between the two groups was reported in Shigezhuang village, but most interviewees in Dongxindian talked about equal rights and mutual respect. One explanation for this may be that the more resources migrants have, the less dependent they are on the space in the urban village and the better their chance of playing a role in the production of representations of space. However, a large portion of migrants were still suffering from displacement, both physical and economic, and, as discussed in Section 9.3, from the creation of an ideology with regard to production relations that was characterised by discrimination and vulnerability.

Unlike the migrant groups they dealt with, the indigenous villagers, by virtue of their tenure rights, had the power to defend themselves in the face of land requisition and eviction, in the sense that they were in a position to negotiate compensation. They also put the power embedded in their property rights to good use in their response to the influx of migrants, resulting in the rise of a petty rentier class of indigenous villagers as the migrants created a new and lucrative rental market. As discussed in Section 9.4, the indigenous villagers were then in a position to enhance their spaces of representation, for example by decorating their courtyards in a manner than would reflect their elevated social status.

Production of conceived institutional space in response to migration

While migrants may not be the initial producers of the logic and forms of knowledge, the social space evolves with the products co-produced by this group, such as the administrative station of migrants agency and the introduction of residence registration (see Section 9.2.1). In the rural villages, the village committee used to be a highly autonomous self-governance institution. The introduction of upper-level government in the form of administrative stations weakened the village committee's power over the village's affairs. However, these stations are of benefit to migrants. In the days before the migrants outnumbered the indigenous population, the only intermediaries available to them were the landlords, for example in their dealings with the village committee. The administrative station of migrants has altered that dynamic by interacting with them directly. Other institutional spaces have been similarly conceived. These include a village kindergarten certified by the government and run by a private organisation, and the Administration of 'Six Doorstep Assignments' Responsibility System which was set up to regulate informality in Dongxindian village.

These representations of space have emerged in response to the influx of migrants. They were produced by the government with input from migrants and influence formerly existing spaces of governance and negotiation.

Space produced through migrants' resistance to space of governance

While the space of governance is dominant, migrants also produce space by resistance to space of governance. Resistance by individuals can take the form of the mahjong shop that continued to operate secretly when all recreational establishments were ordered to close during the National Congress. Another example is the collective relocation to the same village of a group evicted when Shigezhuang was demolished. Thanks to resistance put up by *tongxiang* communities, a new Shigezhuang-type urban village emerged with greater speed than is usually employed in the formation of a space of governance. Resistance to space of governance can also take the form of persistence in a routine. After the demolition of the central market in Shigezhuang, migrants self-organised a temporary market on the debris of another building, thereby continuing to service the migrants' need for groceries regardless of the changes to spaces of representations.

As a result, spatial practices and spaces of representations, rather than representations of space, dominate in space production.

12.2 The space of everyday life

The basis of space production is the physical aspect or spatial practice. In the two case villages, and in most urban villages in Beijing, it is not hard to conclude that these spaces are often directly produced by indigenous villagers. The only exceptions are the *dayuan* and the apartment buildings let out by second landlords, who are themselves migrants. However, even migrants with few resources have a critical impact on the spatial elements and their arrangement. In most cases, their influence takes place indirectly, exerted through the decisions they make with regard to the indigenous villagers' spatial practice.

Spatial practice correlated with migrant profiles

A comparison of spatial practices in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages suggests that migrant profiles have an impact on spatial practice in urban villages. As elaborated in Section 8.2, housing profiles differed significantly between migrants in Dongxindian and Shigezhuang. The average living area per migrant in Dongxindian was almost double that of migrants in Shigezhuang, and the presence of an indoor toilet was three times more likely. These figures echo information gleaned from the interviews conducted in the two villages. While most respondents in Shigezhuang village reported that they would not be willing to pay an extra 200 yuan per month for a rental room with a toilet, their counterparts in Dongxindian generally regarded an indoor

toilet as critical. These differences were correlated with differences in the migrants' profiles. Migrants living in Dongxindian were on average younger than those in Shigezhuang and had a higher level of education. Both the occupations and *hukou* provinces of interviewees were more diverse in Dongxindian, with a larger proportion employed in highly-skilled fields.

In terms of distance from the centre of Beijing, Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages had similar locations and the indigenous villagers of both used to be rural peasants. However, in response to different tenant profiles, the addition of housing extensions and the construction of new buildings had been approached very differently in the two villages, gradually resulting in a variety of spatial practices. Synergies were then created between migrant group profiles and the profiles of the rental rooms. Different groups of migrants gave the urban villages different new characters, which in turn attracted more of the same type of migrant tenants. Other related findings in this regard will be presented in the following paragraphs.

'Floating' migrants leading to 'temporary' buildings

It should be pointed out that, according to data collected in fieldwork, an expressed desire to remain long-term in Beijing was not determined, in either village, on the basis of income, but rather according to attachment to the city. All of the migrants interviewed in Shigezhuang village regarded Beijing only as place of work and did not intend to stay long-term, whereas many migrants in Dongxindian, who had a job in the formal sector and more contacts in and connections with the city, talked about their desire to move to the urban area of Beijing. For the former group, migrants' *hukou* status already limited their access to social benefits in Beijing, while working in the informal sector further exacerbated their 'floating' status. Such 'floating' character led to the 'temporary' character of buildings in Shigezhuang.

As described in Section 10.1.1, most of the building extensions and new constructions in Shigezhuang had a 'temporary' feel, constructed of poor-quality materials and put together in an ad hoc, piecemeal fashion, with no discernible improvements in construction practice over time. Because migrants working in the informal sector were not entitled to public welfare in the city, they had no sense of attachment to the city and were unwilling to pay extra money for a better rental room (see detailed explanation in Chapter 11), since they regarded the city only as a place of work. This attitude in turn discouraged villagers from improving the condition of the rental housing. In addition, the 'floating' status of the migrants and their expressed desire to return to their hometown one day left the indigenous villagers with the impression that their rental businesses were 'temporary'. This discouraged them from investing in the reconstruction of old rural houses, which would require a large investment upfront, with returns coming in over the long term. In addition, with regard to space

of governance and negotiation, with its lack of a 'modern image' resulting from the above factors, Shigezhuang was at greater risk of being demolished compared to other urban villages such as Dongxindian. This created a sense of uncertainty in the villagers about how long the village would continue to exist, further demotivating them from making long-term investments.

Emergence of mixed-use typology of housing blocks

From a temporal perspective, the layout and function of the villagers' houses had evolved over time, from the once-dominant rural house typology of a single-family courtyard house before the inflow of migrants, to a multi-family house with a yard and facilities shared among landlords and tenants, to mixed-use housing blocks.

The rural landscape of the village, once dotted with houses and homogenous in all directions, had gradually become semi-urban and semi-rural, with a street layout comprised of one or two main streets and several side streets growing out from the main ones. At the same time, the houses had grown vertically. A typical spatial practice in Dongxindian was for the villagers to move their living space to the top floor of the building. As a result, a new building typology had been produced. Each building was a mixed-use, multi-family apartment building on three levels. The bottom level was public, for commercial use, occupied by informal economy restaurants and shops. The middle level was semi-public and semi-private, with individual rental rooms and staircases and corridors accessible to all residents in the building. The top floor was private, occupied by the indigenous landlords, and was usually linked to street level by a lift for their exclusive use, another new spatial element that was only introduced in response to the huge influx of migrants. The top floor was usually arranged with the family's apartment and a rooftop platform.

A bird's-eye view of Dongxindian village and a drawing of the top-floor plan would look very similar to the village's original masterplan before urbanisation, in which houses did not extend fully to the edge of housing plots and open yard played a vital role for the family. Although the term 'urban village' has its origins in the fact that the rural village is surrounded by an urbanised area, the urbanisation process of the village itself is only made possible with the contribution of migrants. The cityscape of urban villages can be understood as a space typology between the village and the city and has elements in common with township space in China, where residential space is not dominated by gated communities.

Migrants' search for affordability increases densities and reduces public spaces

Over the nearly 20 years of development of housing blocks in Dongxindian village, an evolution of building layouts can be observed. When indigenous villagers started to redevelop housing in the early years of this

century, the principles of spatial practice still mainly followed their conventional understanding of living conditions. A fairly large public space and windows that faced outside were considered necessary, both for the villager household and the potential migrant tenants they envisioned. Villagers were used to living on the ground floor, which allowed them to access the inner yard and the street space outside, and to keep an eye out for any incomers.

This conceptualisation of spatial practice changed when the indigenous tenants began to understand what was important to the migrants and what was not. For example, the provision of public space areas did not affect the migrants' willingness to rent a room. In Shigezhuang village, migrant tenants used the street as a public domain and carried out their social activities there, and in Dongxindian village many young migrants considered the village only as a place for sleeping and never interacted with other tenants. Tenants in urban villages looked for affordability and were not willing to pay for public space. In addition, although a rental room with better ventilation was naturally preferred, it did not necessarily follow that the tenant would be prepared to pay a higher rent in order to have it. Many tenants in Dongxindian were prepared to rent a small, cramped room if it had an indoor toilet.

As a result, the more recently a house had been built, the less public space it had, and the more densely rental rooms with indoor toilets were packed inside the building. These spatial practice outcomes were driven by the migrants' demands.

Spatial practices through connecting daily routines and urban routes

In addition to the profiles of migrants as groups which affect the production of the perceived space, the modes of behaviour of individuals also matter. As Löw (2008) conceptualised (see Section 2.2.1), spatial practice is action related to space and is produced as 'human space' through everyday practice. In Sections 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, and 10.5, descriptions were given of individual migrants. While they inhabit rental space that is physically similar, especially those living in the same village, they develop individually a series of activities determined by habits and these activities help them organise their everyday lives. The ways they connect daily routines and urban routes differ from each other. Social continuity is thereby reinforced by individuals' everyday lives and the space is produced through spatial practices.

Both the individuals and the collective featuring a particular group of individuals with similar features produce space through their repeated day-to-day activities. The latter has been less discussed by Lefebvre. While he also discussed the generalisability of spaces, his focus was a certain type of structural space whose institutionalised ordering was similar across different individuals. This could also be linked to the discussions on the space of

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two-directional linkage in the next section.

12.3 The space of two-directional linkage

The space of two-directional linkage denotes the space of representations where "the imagination seeks to change and appropriate" and which "overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects" (see Section 2.2.3, Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39). The space of the urban village is lived through the individual's imagining of the urban and their memory of their place of origin – be it a rural area, or a small town or city.

Straddle the rural and urban to maximise living qualities and minimise risks

Most migrants in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages maintained strong links with their places of origins. These links were embodied in the arrangements they made concerning where to stay over the course of the year (for example, seasonal migration during the busy farming seasons), their arrangements concerning family members (for example, split households and three-generation migrant households), and arrangements regarding money, etc. Their perception of the city as being only a place of work, as well as their lack of access to 'citizenship' in the city, also encouraged the migrants' investment in their sending areas. In addition to providing for their children and elderly relatives, an important use of their remittances back home was investment in real estates in intermediate city centres near their hometowns, i.e., in townships or small cities.

The two-directional link maintained by migrants also enables return migration, which can occur in a variety of circumstances and can be both voluntary and forced. Groups of return migrants vary from young temporary workers in their twenties who have experienced life in the city and have decided to return home to settle down, to the middle-aged self-employed who have been evicted from urban villages and deprived of business opportunities, to those of an older generation who are approaching retirement and wish to return to the apartments they have invested in in the intermediate urban centres near their home villages. However, interviewees also reported the difficulties they would face in finding proper employment in their hometowns, a major disincentive for anyone considering going back.

By straddling the rural and urban, migrants develop suitable strategies to maximise their quality of living while minimising risks, both as individuals and households. According to the field research, the links maintained with their rural origins were particularly strong in the case of poorly-educated migrants, such as construction workers and deliverymen. This can probably be attributed to the lack of pathways open to them to achieve social mobility in a global metropolitan city like Beijing.

Migration following and supporting the younger generation

While economic reasons account for most cases of migration, migrants also migrate in order to reunite their family, or simply keep it together. In addition to the well-researched type of migration in which the spouse and children of a male migrant also migrate, this thesis reveals two other types. The first is when grandparents migrate with a son and daughter-in-law, or a daughter and son-in-law, in order to take care of the grandchildren while both parents work. This type of migration, for the purpose of keeping the family together, functions as a result of family arrangements across three generations. In such cases, all family members usually live in two separate but closely-located rental rooms in the same urban village. The other type of migrant who migrates to keep the family together are parents who follow a son or daughter who has found employment and a (rental) room in the formal sector in Beijing (see, for example, the case of Uncle and Aunt Long.) Few differences regarding space appropriation were found between this type of migrant and other migrants in the urban villages.

Both of these types of migration involve following and supporting the younger generation, a motivation that has been overlooked in previous research. The emergence of the two types, especially the second one, may be attributable to the 'one-child policy' that was in force in China from 1980 until 2015 and which led to stronger attachments between parents and their single child than would be the case within a family with several children. The latter would also be less likely to migrate anyway in the footsteps of any one child when they had other children who had not migrated and were living close to them in their hometown. Although no distinct characteristics appeared to feature in the spatial practices and spaces of representations in this second type in this thesis, this may be attributable to the fact that it is a fairly recent phenomenon whose impact has not had sufficient time to be reflected in space production. However, migrants belonging to this type do share two characteristics: the prioritisation of living close to their children over such factors as affordability and proximity to employment, and having family members employed in highly-skilled occupational field with a high potential to become permanent migrants in the city. Their preferences and decision making regarding choices of rental rooms will be gradually reflected in space production in the future.

Self-staging through spaces of representation

With this lived aspect, space develops the potential to influence people's feelings and people produce space in response to its atmosphere by self-staging (see Section 2.2.3, Löw, 2008, p. 44). Users create a "mirror of self" from the absolute material space (Marcus, 1995). This may account for the depression some migrants fall into when they first arrive in Beijing (see, for example, Aunt Long). When the space is at odds with the migrant's memories of home, the individual can feel alienated and further discouraged if they are unable to immediately self-stage the space. Self-staging activities can vary from Uncle and Aunt Longs' hanging of a decorative picture on the wall, to Hua's putting up pink-patterned curtains, to Uncle Feng's converting a corridor space into a

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living room filled with furniture. These activities can also include more extreme spatial modifications, like building an extra room or putting up frames for growing vegetables. With regard to a larger space, these activities can involve getting used to visiting a certain corner of the village or always hanging out along the same path around a building block. These self-staging activities are fed by the migrant's imaginings of what the space should be rather than what the space is. It is the symbolic effect of their space of origin on the arrival city.

Tongxiang *community's collective appropriation of space*

On the subject of the space of two-directional linkage between origins and destination, a literal reflection of origin is the conceptualisation of *tongxiang* and the social space organised around *tongxiang* communities. With its collective and naturally coherent memory, the *tongxiang* community re-appropriates the space in urban villages, in a way that distinguishes it from the prevailing social spatialisation. The products of the lived space include the sharing of information about housing and work opportunities, a courtyard inhabited by a *tongxiang* community, the provision of teahouses for playing mahjong, car sharing from settlement place to construction site, planning the future together, etc. (see Section 10.4).

Their attachment to the *tongxiang* community can also exacerbate the migrants' vulnerable status, for example, by leading them into indirect economic displacement. Their limited access to information on jobs in the city encourages them to rely on these social networks for informal employment information, keeping them stuck in the urban villages, at the mercy of rising prices and inequality in the rental market.[63]

'Ruralisation' of spaces in urban villages

The lived space produced by migrants is a tense midpoint along the thread that connects the arrival city and their rural origins, pulling them in both directions. Although the inflow of migrants contributes to the physical urbanisation of the village space, the migrants' imaginings of the urban works in the opposite direction, an effect which can be conceptualised as the 'ruralisation' of the urban village.

For many migrants, the urban village where they live and the alleyways close to their homes are what constitute the 'city' for them, and the famous landmarks and modern amenities that Beijing has to offer have no place in their lives. Their habits are shaped by the memories they carry with them from their hometowns and the lived space they produce sets the urban villages apart from other parts of the city, pulling them back from urbanisation. In Shigezhuang village, the migrants' reliance on their *tongxiang* community and a system of incentives that

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[63] This paragraph is taken from an earlier paper of the researcher (Yang, 2020).

favour short-term financial reward reflects the influence of their origins. In Dongxindian village, the migrants' reluctance to participate in the life of the village, regarding it purely as somewhere to sleep, has been shaped by their imaginings of the urban.

The "ruralisation" of space in urban villages can be understood as resistance to and contestation of the space of governance and negotiation and some of these practices are illegal. However, unlike the practices of spatialisation of slum dwellers in other countries, discussed in Section 2.2.3, the creation of spaces of representation by migrants in China should be understood as incremental rather than revolutionary and contains underground spatial practices within the frame of organised informality.

12.4 The spatial triad (the interaction of three aspects of space production)

As conceptualised in Section 2.1.2, the notion of spatialisation denotes the process where the social order is under constant change attributed to the actions and innovations of social agents (Lefebvre, 1991; Shields, 1999). With regard to the space production in urban villages, the migrant group is the social agent that contributes to the space of individuals' everyday lives, the space of governance and negotiation, and the space of two-directional linkage.

Space production is simultaneously an achievement and an ongoing practice. The processual nature has been little emphasised in previous studies and researchers on urban villages have mostly focused on the spatial or socio-economic characteristics or activities of residents at a certain point in time, overlooking the high variability and mobility of both the context and the social agents. Each urban village is the product of rapid urbanisation and the village itself is undergoing rapid change. Migrants are also a group of high mobility and they produce the space in urban villages at a city scale through silent confrontation and resistance.

On the one hand, it is undeniable that the space of governance and negotiation is the dominant space. The state and the city government try to force migrants with low levels of education to leave the city by depriving them of work opportunities and evicting them from their living places. Unlike indigenous villagers, migrants do not possess legal tenure of space in the city and neither do they possess the right to directly confront the government. On the other hand, the space of governance and negotiation is not capable of overwriting the space of individuals' everyday lives. The perceived space exists in the way that migrants keep changing their means of livelihood and relocating in the city. As discussed above, the space of two-directional linkage in Shigezhuang persists when *tongxiang* communities move together to another village. Compounds of *tongxiang*, along with various spatial layers and the informal economy, are growing in number and, thanks to the continuing interplay of these three

facets of the space, another Shigezhuang-type urban village, just like the old one, will eventually be produced.

The observation on space production in urban villages echoes what Friedmann (2007) suggests regarding the relationship of the lived space and the physical form of the space (see Section 2.2.3). Although lived space is shaped by being lived in and therefore requires a spatial context, the physical form itself does not have to be distinctive. The patterns and rhythms of the lived space produced by migrants persist regardless of changes to the physical aspect of space in urban villages and the dominant space of governance.

13. Conclusions and outlook

13.1 Research gaps addressed in the thesis

This thesis has researched Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages in Beijing to understand how migrants shape urban villages in China through their social production of space. Whereas urban villages have attracted significant attention from both practice and academia, and rural-urban migration in China is not a new research topic, many research gaps have been found when reviewing the related literature. Migrants have been seen as only passively reacting to the space produced by the institutions and indigenous villagers and as neither contributors nor stakeholders in discussions about the development and redevelopment of urban villages. Far too little attention has been paid to the impact of migrants' activities on space in urban villages and vice versa. Besides, migrants inhabiting urban villages have been stereotyped as a marginalised group of rural-urban migrants characterised by substandard educational backgrounds, limited financial resources, and usually also bad behaviour. There is little research on the potential heterogeneity embedded in this group, not to mention the limited amount of studies on their decision-making and everyday lives, both from a collective and an individual perspective. Such research gaps are also echoed by Lefebvre's emphasis on China's space of representation and the implication that China may not have experienced a contrast between representations of space and spaces of representation. His argument was based on the Chinese context before economic reform and only a few scholars applying his theory to empirical studies attend to the recent Chinese context, where migration has contributed significantly to urbanisation.

To fill in the aforementioned research gaps, this thesis has adopted grounded theory method with a design of case study approach to conduct an in-depth study of space production by migrants in urban villages in China. Two urban villages were chosen as study cases and a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods were employed to collect and analyse data. Key research findings have been discussed in the previous *Synthesis*, which will not be repeated. The next section will briefly draw conclusions and shed light on the implications of these conclusions for theory and practice.

13.2 Conclusions and implications for theory and practice

Applicability of space production theory in urban villages in China

In contrast to Lefebvre's (1991, p. 42) inference that China may not have experienced a contrast between representations of space and spaces of representation, the thesis has proved that all three aspects of Lefebvre's spatial triad can be explicitly observed in space production in China – specifically in the context of urban

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villages. Representations of space, which are the mental field of the trialectics, take the form of space of governance and negotiation. The space is conceived by different layers of government and the rentier class of indigenous villagers. The space, with its character of 'organised informality', exerts controls over migrants but is also contested and resisted by migrants. Spatial practices, which are the physical basis of space production, are in this context the space of everyday life of migrants. Individuals produce space through their daily routines and their connections to the urban routes. Space of representations, which are the social field featured by the process of migration and its two-directional linkage to both origins and destinations, is lived by migrants as individuals, migrant households, and members of a *tongxiang* community.

It has been proved that Lefebvre's theory of space production can be applied to explain empirical studies in the context of China in its post-economic-reform era, where and when a high level of decentralisation and flexibility in governance can be observed. Although representations of space still have the dominant position, as in most societies worldwide, distinctions between the three aspects of spatial triad can be seen in China's space production. The trialectics are both embodied in and further contribute to the production and reproduction of Chinese society, which is featured as largely organised with 'conceded informality'. At the same time, it must be pointed out that space production in China takes place in a gradual and incremental, rather than a revolutionary, manner. Space production in China should not be over-simplified, and processes, including negotiation, resistance and compromise, deserve better investigation. To better understand China's urbanisation, the habit of seeing China as a highly centralised country where all social spaces are produced by the state needs to be replaced with fresh, bottom-up perspectives, in both theory and practice.

Housing, but not only housing

When discussing migrants in urban villages, much attention has been paid to their housing conditions, in particular to its affordable but substandard character. While this is definitely true, in order to address and solve migrants' vulnerability, two other issues need to be attended to. The first is their employment conditions. This thesis has researched migrants' employment in informal sectors, where many of them are well paid in terms of daily wage. However, because of the high level of precariousness associated with the informal sector and the migrants' lack of information about and access to employment opportunities, they come to depend on social networks based on blood and place bonds, which usually leads to a lower likelihood of them integrating with other groups, as well as other negative effects, such as indirect economic displacement.

The other issue that badly needs attention is their 'citizenship', as framed by Wu (2010). While migrant workers in the city have long been seen as 'the urban poor' (see, for example, Wang, 2000), this thesis states explicitly

that migrants are not necessarily poor in financial terms but rather are considered 'poor' with regard to their citizenship and right to the city. Their impoverished citizenship lies in the fact that, although they live and work in cities in their own country, they have limited access to the city's public services and welfare provision, much in the manner of 'undocumented immigrants'. This situation can be attributed to the *hukou* system, within which 'citizenship' is defined institutionally.

On the one hand, these two issues lead to migrants' vulnerability in their destination cities, where, even if they have proper housing, the best they can hope for is 'negative freedom', as opposed to 'positive freedom' (see Qian and He, 2012, for conceptualisation of 'negative freedom' and 'positive freedom'). On the other hand, lack of work security and exclusion from welfare provision in the city reduces the migrants' willingness to invest in life in the city, which further exacerbates the deterioration of housing and spatial quality in urban villages (see synthesis for detailed elaboration). From a governance perspective, helping migrants, which is the basic and right thing for a government to do, would also help achieve the 'modern image' it sets out to create through the demolition and redevelopment of urban villages.

Therefore, more measures should be taken to address the migrants' work situation and citizenship. Public and social sectors can work on solutions that would offer migrant workers, especially the low-skilled and poorly-educated, more alternatives for access to information on work opportunities, such as platforms that connect them to employers in their occupational field. In terms of citizenship, whether or not the *hukou* system is abandoned, public services, such as medical and educational services, should be gradually shifted to a system that is not defined institutionally, but territorially, meaning that a person can access public services wherever they work and live, regardless of place of origin. This would definitely throw up a number of obstacles and one of the first steps might be to take action to homogenise the public services provided by the different areas and cities across the country in current multi-scalar China.

Language matters – acknowledging heterogeneity of urban villages and migrants

While earlier research usually stereotyped migrants as a group with substandard educational backgrounds, limited financial resources, and usually also bad behaviour, this thesis has proved the heterogeneity within the group. Migrants do not necessarily have to be poor or badly educated; they can have financial resources and a good level of education. An examination of individuals' everyday lives and their production of micro space in the city reveals different types of migrants and different types of urban villages produced by them. For example, Shigezhuang village can be seen as the more traditional type. where migrant workers mostly come together based on place bonds, while Dongxindian village is a more 'modern' type, where the inhabitants are better

educated and have more skilled jobs and more attachment to the city. As Gilbert (2007) argued, language matters and one should be cautious about using the term 'slum'. This also applies in the case of urban villages in China, where the term is associated with an image of chaotic spatiality, substandard housing and a potential risk of crime, with the villages seen as candidates for redevelopment. The fact that migrants are conceptualised as a vulnerable group and urban villages as 'migrant enclaves' may be a tactic of governance, through which certain spaces are privileged or overlooked.

Therefore, both scholars and practitioners should recognise such diversity when tailoring their studies, designs and policies. When naming a space 'urban village' or a group 'migrants', a more explicit definition and the specific purpose behind such naming should be given.

'Architecture without architects' and affordable character made visible

The spatial practice reflected in housing blocks in urban villages, especially the newly-built ones in Dongxindian village, is a source of inspiration for planners and architects in practice. The building form of great density, with minimal public space and maximum indoor function, is produced directly by indigenous villagers and indirectly by migrants. It is a long-term result, well tested over time, that successfully avoids the problem often seen in professional designs of affordable housing, that is, the gap between the spatial needs perceived by professionals and the real needs of the dwellers. As long as spatial codes to avoid fire hazards are followed and the safety of residents is guaranteed, such rental units provide an alternative for people in search of affordable housing they are unable to find in the formal rental market. The spatiality emerging in urban villages should be visible to mainstream planning and architecture practices.

Policy implications for the sending areas

The research has argued that migrants' social practices should be analysed with regard to both their sending area and receiving area. The continuum between the two ends is produced by the migrants and the space of two-directional linkage is an important aspect of space production. Current policies on migrants primarily focus on the receiving areas but overlook the sending areas.

While the thesis cannot conclude whether national policies should encourage intense provision of resources in certain urban areas (see, for example, Lu, 2016) or pursue balanced development across the country, it is beyond doubt that the rights and welfare of every citizen matter. If the state intends to control urban populations, especially in big cities, by controlling migration, the emphasis probably needs to shift from preventing migrants from moving, which has little impact but lowers welfare, to incentivising them to stay in the rural areas or

intermediate urban areas (such as towns or secondary cities) near their hometowns. These kinds of policies can be developed both at state and local level. The state would exert less pressure on the local governments of metropolitan cities to control population and encourage a nation-wide reformation towards uniform education, healthcare, and pension system, regardless of *hukou* provinces. For local governments in less developed provinces and cities, incentives to attract investment and create job opportunities should be created. Migrants' willingness to invest in their hometowns and the skills and innovative ideas that return migrants take home with them have often been overlooked. The resources of migrants and return migration should be employed efficiently, not only to increase the competitiveness of the real estate market but also to contribute to the production and reproduction of the areas. Besides the traditional entrepreneurial approaches of local governance, the financial and intelligence resources brought by return migrants, as well as by migrants who migrate only temporarily to the big cities, can also be helpful.

13.3 Directions for future research

These findings and conclusions provide the following insights in terms of directions for future research.

First, a further study could be conducted on space production in other spaces, with a higher degree of formality, in China. This thesis's research subject, i.e., migrants, and the research context, i.e. urban villages, are more confined to the informal sector. To understand the applicability of the theory of space production in the Chinese context, a broader selection of investigated spaces would be helpful.

Second, more in-depth research could be conducted into the sending areas of migrants, as well as the mechanisms of return migration and the impact of returnees in domestic China. This research has conceptualised the two-directional linkage made by migrants but focuses on their space production in the receiving area and how it is influenced by the sending area. Research conducted in the other direction would also be interesting and helpful for policy implications on both national level and local level.

Third, this research has also shed light on the existence of a newly-emergent migrant group, that is, parent migrants who follow their offspring to the big city. It can be projected that this group will grow in the near future as an outcome of China's 'one-child' policy and will be a focus of attention in terms of the problem of population aging. The urban villages may be the ideal places for this group to settle. Research on this groups' decision making, everyday lives, and connectivity with other parts of the city will be inspiring.

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Appendix A: Overview of the interviewees

Table 4: List of interviewees in Shigezhuang village. Source: Author.

	Demographic profiles of the interviewee				Profiles of the (rental) room			Information of interviewee's participating in fieldwork			
Interviewee Code[64] (Pseudonym[65])	Gender	Age [66][67]	*Hukou* Province	Occupation[68]	Room Size (m²)	No. of Dwellers	Indoor Toilet	Structured Interview (2017)	Questionnaire (2019)	Semi-structured Interviews [69]	Photo Elicitation
S001SC17M	Male	33	Sichuan	Construction workers	9	3		Yes		2017	
	Male	40	Shanxi	Self-employment	12	3		Yes			
	Female	43	Sichuan	Construction workers	8.5	2		Yes			
	Female	21	Sichuan	Unemployed	8	1		Yes			
S005SC17M (Uncle Tan)	Male	45	Sichuan	Construction workers	8.5	2		Yes		2017, 2019	Yes
	Female	43	Sichuan	Construction workers	6	2		Yes			
	Female	23	Hubei	Salespersons	8.5	4		Yes			
	Male	55	Henan	Self-employment	7.5	2		Yes			
	Female	55	Henan	Self-employment	7.5	2		Yes			
S010HN17M	Male	55	Henan	Self-employment	7.5	2		Yes		2017	
	Female	49	Sichuan	Cleaners	9	2		Yes			

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[64] The code was made by the researcher. The code of the first interviewee 'S001SC17M' is taken here as an example to explain the rule of the labelling: 'S' is the abbreviation of the place, i.e. Shigezhuang (S), Dongxindian (D) or other places (O), where the interview was conducted; '001' is the number of the interviewee; 'SC' is the abbreviation of the interviewee's *hukou* province, for example, 'SC' stands for 'Sichuan'; '17' is the year, i.e. 2017 (17) or 2019 (19), when the interviewee was first interviewed; and 'M' stands for the gender of the interviewee, i.e. male (M) or female (F).

[65] The pseudonym was given to some key interviewees for naming them in the thesis while preserving their anonymity.

[66] The symbol '/' in the table means the certain question was not answered by the interviewee.

[67] The age was recorded when the first interview with the respect interviewee was conducted.

[68] The occupation of the interviewees was categorised according to the *International Standard Classification of Occupations*, see link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Classification_of_Occupations.

[69] The year when the interview(s) was conducted was given in the table. Most of the interviewees were interviewed either in 2017 or in 2019. Only interviewee S005SC17M was interviewed both in 2017 and in 2019 (see, in the table, 2017, 2019).

ID	Gender	Age	Province	Occupation					Year
S012SC17F	Female	43	Sichuan	Cleaners	7	2		Yes	2017
	Male	45	Sichuan	Services workers	7	2		Yes	
	Male	16	Shandong	Students	8.5	3		Yes	
	Male	40	Shandong	Self-employment	8.5	3		Yes	
	Female	40	Shandong	Self-employment	8.5	3		Yes	
	Female	45	Henan	Self-employment	9	2		Yes	
	Female	60	Sichuan	Retired	70	3	Yes	Yes	
	Male	60	Sichuan	Retired	70	3	Yes	Yes	
S020SC17M	Male	20	Sichuan	Students	70	3	Yes	Yes	2017
	Female	55	Sichuan	Cleaners	8.5	2		Yes	
	Female	35	Hubei	Hour labourers	8.5	2		Yes	
	Male	26	Gansu	Drivers	30	8	Yes	Yes	
	Female	45	Sichuan	Hour labourers	14	3	Yes	Yes	
	Male	65	Sichuan	Hour labourers	7.5	1		Yes	
	Male	22	Sichuan	Students	14	2	Yes	Yes	
	Male	45	Sichuan	Construction workers	14	2	Yes	Yes	
	Female	45	Sichuan	Construction workers	14	2	Yes	Yes	
	Male	65	Sichuan	Retired	4	1		Yes	
	Male	40	Sichuan	Construction workers	4	2		Yes	
	Female	43	Sichuan	Cleaners	4	2		Yes	
S032SC17F	Female	60	Sichuan	Retired	5	3		Yes	2017
S033SC17F	Female	24	Sichuan	Company staff	30	4	Yes	Yes	2017
	Female	45	Sichuan	Cleaners	5	2		Yes	
	Female	35	Hebei	Company staff	/	/	/	Yes	
	Female	45	Jiangsu	/	/	/	/	Yes	
	Male	37	Sichuan	Hour labourers	5.5	3		Yes	
	Female	63	Beijing	Retired	75	4	Yes	Yes	
	Male	60	Sichuan	Hour labourers	7.5	3		Yes	

ID	Gender	Age	Province	Occupation					Year
	Female	32	Shanxi	Self-employment	10	2		Yes	
	Male	35	Henan	Cooks	7.5	2		Yes	
	Female	30	Sichuan	Self-employment	/	/	/	Yes	
	Female	30	Hebei	Unemployed	10	2		Yes	
	Male	32	Hebei	Construction workers	10	2		Yes	
S045SC17F	Female	32	Sichuan	Unemployed	8.5	4		Yes	2017
	Male	34	Sichuan	Construction workers	8.5	4		Yes	
	Female	78	Beijing	Retired	90	5	Yes	Yes	
	Male	38	Shandong	Self-employment	7.5	2		Yes	
	Male	55	Sichuan	Construction workers	3.5	1		Yes	
	Female	45	Henan	Unemployed	/	/	/	Yes	
	Male	37	Henan	Company staff	9.5	3		Yes	
	Female	60	Beijing	Retired	120	4	Yes	Yes	
	Male	43	Henan	Drivers	5.5	1		Yes	
S054BJ17M	Male	60	Beijing	Retired	85	2	Yes	Yes	2017
	Female	60	Hubei	Cleaners	7.5	3		Yes	
	Female	65	Beijing	Retired	175	8	Yes	Yes	
S057SC17F	Female	43	Sichuan	Cleaners	8	3		Yes	2017
S058SC17M	Male	57	Sichuan	Construction workers	9	2		Yes	2017
S059SD17F	Female	49	Shandong	Self-employment	15	5			2017
S060BJ17M	Male	60	Beijing	Retired	/	/			2017
S061HB17F	Female	35	Hebei	Self-employment	/	/			2017
S062HN19M	Male	/	Henan	Self-employment	/	/			2019
S063SC19F	Female	/	Sichuan	Cleaners	8	2			2019
S064HN19F	Female	50	Henan	Self-employment	/	/			2019
S065HN19M	Male	52	Henan	Self-employment	12	2			2019
S066HN19M	Male	45	Henan	Self-employment	/	/			2019
S067SC19M	Male	/	Sichuan	Construction workers	/	/			2019

S068HB19F	Female	48	Hubei	Self-employment	8	2			2019
S069BJ19M	Male	/	Beijing	/	/	/			2019
S005SC17M	Female	49	Sichuan	Cleaners	6	2		Yes	
	Male	49	Sichuan	Construction workers	10	1		Yes	
	Female	49	Sichuan	Cleaners	7	2		Yes	
S073SD19M	Male	38	Shandong	Self-employment	10	2		Yes	2019
S074HN19F	Female	27	Henan	Salespersons (not specified)	7	2		Yes	
S075HN19M	Male	31	Henan	Hour labour	6	1		Yes	2019
S076SC19F	Female	26	Sichuan	Unemployed	10	4		Yes	
	Female	44	Gansu	Salespersons (not specified)	15	2		Yes	
	Female	56	Sichuan	Self-employment	5	2		Yes	
	Female	22	Sichuan	Students	7	3		Yes	
	Male	/	Sichuan	Students	8.5	2		Yes	
S081SC19M	Male	46	Sichuan	Construction workers	7	1		Yes	2019

Table 5: List of interviewees in Dongxindian village. Source: Author.[70]

| Interviewee Code (Pseudonym) | Demographic profiles of the interviewee | | | | Profiles of the (rental) room | | | Information of interviewee's participating in fieldwork | | | |
	Gender	Age	*Hukou* Province[71]	Occupation	Room Size (m²)[72]	No. of Dwellers	Indoor Toilet	Structured Interview (2017)	Questionnaire (2019)	Semi-structured Interviews	Photo Elicitation
	Male	17	Beijing	Students	35	3	Yes	Yes			
	Female	53	Jiangsu	Cleaners	10	2		Yes			
	Female	20	Sichuan	Shop salespersons	9	3		Yes			
	Female	28	Hebei	Salespersons	10	2		Yes			
	Female	24	Hunan	IT workers	20	1		Yes			
	Male	24	Henan	Self-employment	13	1	Yes	Yes			
	Female	52	Henan	Cleaners	/	2	/	Yes			
	Female	58	Beijing	Retired	60	2	Yes	Yes			
	Female	35	Hebei	Cleaners	8	1		Yes			
	Male	60	Henan	Cleaners	6.5	2		Yes			
	Male	55	Sichuan	Construction workers	7.5	2		Yes			
	Female	27	Gansu	Unemployed	13	3		Yes			
	Male	44	Sichuan	Construction workers	6.5	2		Yes			
	Female	40	Beijing	Shop salespersons	25	3	Yes	Yes			
	Male	55	Sichuan	Construction workers	8	1		Yes			
	Male	55	Beijing	Village committee	60	1	Yes	Yes			
	Male	50	Shaanxi	Construction workers	/	/	/	Yes			

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[70] The instruction of how the table has been filled out can be referred to in the previous table on Shigezhuang village.

[71] All the provinces are given in full spelling, except HLJ (Heilongjiang), NMG (Neimenggu) and GD (Guangdong)

[72] For interviewees who only participated in questionnaires in 2019, they were only provided with five choices of ranges of living area (for example, between eight and 12 square metres) to choose from. For simplification, the middle number was recorded in this table. For example, in the case of the choice "between eight and 12 square metres", "10" is recorded.

Male	25	HLJ	Company staff	15	1	Yes	Yes
Male	25	Shandong	Self-employment	10	2		Yes
Female	59	Henan	Cleaners	5.5	2		Yes
Male	70	Beijing	Retired	120	2	Yes	Yes
Male	26	Hebei	Self-employment	10	3	Yes	Yes
Male	60	Shaanxi[73]	Cleaners	15	2		Yes
Male	60	NMG	Cleaners	7.5	2		Yes
Female	45	Shaanxi	Self-employment	15	3		Yes
Female	30	Sichuan	Waitresses	6.5	2		Yes
Male	38	Hebei	/	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	65	Beijing	Retired	100	/	Yes	Yes
Female	47	Anhui	Cleaners	7.5	2		Yes
Female	28	HLJ	Self-employment	20	2	Yes	Yes
Male	50	Sichuan	Construction workers	5	1		Yes
Female	28	Anhui	Unemployed	12	3	Yes	Yes
Male	43	Sichuan	Construction workers	5.5	2		Yes
Male	33	Hubei	IT workers	30	2	Yes	Yes
Female	30	Hebei	Self-employment	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	47	HLJ	Unemployed	12	1		Yes
Female	40	Beijing	Drivers	7.5	2		Yes
Male	50	Shanxi	Self-employment	7.5	1		Yes
Female	50	HLJ	Cleaners	10	5		Yes
Female	45	Sichuan	Cleaners	7.5	/		Yes
Male	63	Hebei	Cleaners	7	1		Yes
Male	26	Guizhou	IT workers	18	1	Yes	Yes

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[73] Shaanxi Province stands for 陕西省 in Chines, to avoid confusion with Shanxi Province (山西省) due to the same spelling in *Pinyin.*

ID	Gender	Age	Province	Occupation					Year
	Male	30	HLJ	Drivers	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Female	30	Sichuan	Cleaners	7	2		Yes	
	Male	55	Beijing	Drivers	13	2		Yes	
	Male	47	Tianjin	Others	20	3		Yes	
	Female	51	Beijing	Retired	80	4	Yes	Yes	
	Female	50	Sichuan	Cleaners	10	2		Yes	
	Female	28	Sichuan	Unemployed	10	3		Yes	
	Male	45	Shanxi	Unemployed	8	1		Yes	
	Female	48	Chongqing	Unemployed	13	2		Yes	
D052FJ17M	Male	/	Fujian	Self-employment	12	2	Yes		2017
D053SC17F	Female	25	Sichuan	Unemployed	7	3			2017
D054BJ17M	Male	85	Beijing	Retired	45	2	Yes		2017
D055BJ17M	Male	85	Beijing	Retired	20	1	Yes		2017
D056HL17M (Xiao Bin)	Male	25	HLJ	Hairdressers	20	4	Yes		2017
D057XX17M	Male	/	/	Drivers	/	/			2017
D058HL19M (Uncle Long)	Male	/	HLJ	Self-employment	12	2	Yes		2019
D059HL19F (Aunt Long)	Female	/	HLJ	Self-employment	12	2	Yes		2019
D060BJ19F (Aunt Xiang)	Female		Beijing	Retired	270	6	Yes		2019
D061HN19F	Female	42	Hunan	Self-employment	12	2			2019
D062HN19F	Female		Henan	Self-employment	18	3	Yes		2019
D063BJ19M	Male	38	Beijing	Self-employment					2019
D064GS19M (Gang)	Male	22	Gansu	Food deliverymen	10	2	Yes		2019
D065SX19F (Hua)	Female	25	Shanxi	Company staff	10	1	Yes		2019
D066HN19M	Male	32	Henan	Hour labourers	10	2	Yes		2019
D067JX19M	Male	39	Jiangxi	Self-employment	15	1	Yes		2019

D068FJ17M	Male	/	Fujian	Self-employment	12	1	Yes		2017
D069HB19M	Male	49	Hebei	Cleaners	6	1	No		2019
D070HN19M	Male	62	Henan	Cleaners	7	1	No		2019
	Male	34	Hunan	Services workers	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Female	39	Henan	Salespersons	10	1		Yes	
	Male	30	Hebei	Services workers	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	29	Shanxi	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	30	Shanxi	Shop salespersons	6.5	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	45	Hebei	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	29	Shandong	Real estate sales	13.5	1	/	Yes	
	Female	27	Jilin	Food deliverywomen	13.5	1	/	Yes	
	Male	26	Shandong	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	42	Henan	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	32	Henan	Real estate sales	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Female	24	Hebei	Nurses	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Female	22	Sichuan	Hairdressers	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	24	Hebei	Hotel managers	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Female	46	HLJ	Cleaners	6.5	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	30	Gansu	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Female	38	Gansu	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Female	28	Henan	Salespersons	10	1		Yes	
	Male	29	Gansu	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	41	Shanxi	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes	
	Male	22	Hebei	Food deliverymen	6.5	1		Yes	
	Male	22	Shanxi	Salespersons	6.5	1		Yes	
	Male	22	Henan	Real estate sales	6.5	1		Yes	
	Male	22	Shanxi	Deliverymen	6.5	1		Yes	
	Female	24	HLJ	Waitresses	6.5	1		Yes	

Gender	Age	Province	Occupation				
Female	21	Shandong	Waitresses	6.5	1		Yes
Male	40	Hebei	Cashiers	10	2		Yes
Female	23	Sichuan	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	23	Hebei	Nurses	10	1	/	Yes
Male	31	Hebei	Deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	24	Liaoning	Custom service clerks	25	2	Yes	Yes
Female	21	Henan	/	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	27	Shanxi	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	22	Anhui	Hour labourers	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	28	Hebei	Deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	31	Sichuan	Hour labourers	10	2		Yes
Male	33	Beijing	Food deliverymen	10	2	Yes	Yes
Female	34	Henan	Cleaners	13.5	3	Yes	Yes
Male	47	Hebei	Company staff	10	3	Yes	Yes
Male	48	Shanxi	Hour labourers	10	2		Yes
Female	32	Jilin	Cashiers	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	34	Chongqing	Construction workers	10	2	Yes	Yes
Female	30	Sichuan	Custom service clerks	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	40	Anhui	Construction workers	10	2		Yes
Female	26	Henan	Company staff	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	36	Sichuan	Hour labourers	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	38	Henan	Service workers	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	19	Beijing	Company staff	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	36	Sichuan	Hour labourers	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	39	Sichuan	Self-employment	25	3	Yes	Yes
Male	40	Hebei	Food deliverymen	10	2		Yes
Male	24	Jiangxi	Deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	19	Henan	Shop salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes

Female	49	Beijing	Salespersons	13.5	2	Yes	Yes
Female	24	Hebei	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	26	Shandong	Company staff	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Female	25	Hebei	Waitresses	10	1		Yes
Female	24	Liaoning	Company staff	10	1		Yes
Female	23	Shandong	Company staff	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	29	HLJ	Company staff	13.5	2	Yes	Yes
Male	25	Hunan	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	36	Hebei	Deliverymen	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	26	Zhejiang	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	37	/	Deliverymen	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	55	Sichuan	Construction workers	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	39	Sichuan	Food deliverymen	10	2		Yes
Female	26	NMG	Company staff	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	22	Henan	Deliverymen	10	1		Yes
Male	25	Hebei	Self-employment	6.5	1	/	Yes
Female	24	Beijing	Salespersons	10	1		Yes
Male	24	Anhui	Service workers	10	1		Yes
Female	31	Shanxi	Salespersons	13.5	2	Yes	Yes
Male	39	HLJ	Drivers	10	2	Yes	Yes
Female	31	Henan	Services workers	10	2		Yes
Male	43	Shanxi	Self-employment	10	2		Yes
Male	34	Beijing	IT workers	25	2		Yes
Female	38	Shandong	Salespersons	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	42	Anhui	Construction workers	10	2		Yes
Male	34	Shandong	Services workers	10	2	Yes	Yes
Female	44	Hebei	Salespersons	13.5	2		Yes
Male	30	Henan	Designers	10	2		Yes

Male	27	Shanghai	Accountants	6.5	1	/	Yes
Male	25	Henan	Engineers	10	1		Yes
Male	25	Shandong	Self-employment	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	28	Jiangsu	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	26	Hunan	Deliverymen	6.5	1		Yes
Male	35	Guangxi	Salespersons	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	29	Jiangsu	Salespersons	10	2	/	Yes
Male	23	Shanxi	Food deliverymen	6.5	1		Yes
Female	43	Anhui	Salespersons	13.5	2	Yes	Yes
Male	37	Sichuan	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	26	Beijing	Drivers	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	22	Henan	Food deliverymen	6.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	39	HLJ	Deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	34	Sichuan	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	23	Shanxi	Cashiers	6.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	34	Hebei	Salespersons	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	37	Anhui	Deliverymen	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	30	Shandong	Salespersons	10	2	/	Yes
Female	35	Hebei	Salespersons	6.5	1		Yes
Male	39	HLJ	IT workers	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	21	Sichuan	Cashiers	6.5	1	/	Yes
Male	31	Hebei	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	46	Sichuan	Deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	21	Shandong	Company staff	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	32	Gansu	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	24	Hubei	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	54	Sichuan	Cleaners	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	31	Beijing	Drivers	10	1		Yes

Male	23	Tianjin	Hairdressers	6.5	1		Yes
Male	46	Hebei	Food deliverymen	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	25	Hebei	Waiters	10	1		Yes
Male	47	Hebei	Self-employment	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	38	Beijing	Drivers	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	25	Chongqing	Real estate sales	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	20	Shandong	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	22	Hebei	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	32	Shandong	Customer service clerk	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	41	HLJ	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	24	Hebei	Others	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	40	Hubei	Self-employment	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	28	Henan	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	33	Hebei	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	29	Henan	Shop salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	26	Hebei	Salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	27	Beijing	Drivers	10	1		Yes
Male	24	GD	Self-employment	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	27	Shanxi	Salespersons	6.5	1		Yes
Female	22	Gansu	Shop salespersons	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	20	Jiangxi	Food deliverymen	10	1	Yes	Yes
Female	25	Shanxi	Services workers	10	1	Yes	Yes
Male	39	Jiangxi	Self-employment	13.5	1	Yes	Yes
Male	32	Henan	Hour labourers	10	2	Yes	Yes
Male	49	Hebei	Cleaners	6.5	1		Yes
Male	22	Gansu	Food deliverymen	10	2	Yes	Yes

Table 6: List of interviewees outside Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages. Source: Author.

		Personal information of the interviewee[74]		Interviewee's participating in fieldwork	
Interviewee Code[75] (Pseudonym)	Gender	Notes about the interviewee (for example, name[76], occupation, affiliation, etc.)		Semi-structured Interviews	Expert Interviews
O01EXP2017F[77]	Female	Prof. Yumin Ye, professor at Renmin University in Beijing, China			2017
O02EXP2019M	Male	Government official responsible for comprehensive management at Cuigezhuang township			2019
O03EXP2019M	Male	Government official responsible for administration of migrants at Cuigehuang township			2019
O04SEM2017F	Female	Head of a construction company, which hired migrant workers		2017	
O06SEM2017F	Female	Migrant in Nanyuan village, Daxing District		2017	
O07EXP2019F	Female	Prof. Yulin Chen, professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China			2019
O08EXP2019M	Male	Government official at the department of public security at Pingfang township			2019
O09SEM2017M	Male	Indigenous villager in the neighbourhood of Yuanmingyuan East Street, Haidian District		2017	

[74] Other personal information, such as age, *hukou* province and dwelling profiles, does not affect the analysis of the following interviews, thus not being asked or included in the table. Gender was recorded only for the purpose of labelling the interviewees.

[75] The code was made by the researcher. The code of the first interviewee 'O01EXP2017F' is taken here as an example to explain the rule of the labelling: 'O' is the abbreviation of other places (O), indicating that the interview was not conducted in Shigezhuang or Dongxindian villages; '01' is the number of the interviewee; 'EXP' is the abbreviation of the methodology used for the interview – 'EXP' stands for expert interview and 'SEM' stands for semi-structured interview; '17' is the year, i.e. 2017 (17) or 2019 (19), when the interview was conducted; and 'M' stands for the gender of the interviewee, i.e. male (M) or female (F)

[76] Two of the interviewees of expert interviews are not anonymised with permission from them.

[77] The researcher was not able to attend the interview with Prof. Yumin Ye personally, and her collaborator of an earlier paper (Yang & van Oostrum, 2020) conducted the interview on behalf of both. The interview guideline was co-designed by the researcher and van Oostrum and the interview was transcribed and translated by the researcher.

Appendix B: Guidelines for semi-structured interviews

Guideline for semi-structured interviews with migrants (in addition to the information asked in structured interviews or questionnaires)

- What or who prompts your decision for migration?

- Why and how did you decide to settle in Shigezhuang (or Dongxindian) village?

- What is your job? How did you find the job? Can you tell me more about the detailed work in your job?

- Can you describe how you spend your day, i.e., getting up, going to work, coming back from work, cooking, having meals, entertaining, going to bed, etc.? If there is a difference between weekdays and weekends, can you describe your routines for both?

- How do you interact with your landlord / other indigenous villagers in the village / your neighbours / *tongxiang* in the village / other migrants in the village?

- What is your favourite place in Shigezhuang (or Dongxindian) village? Can you describe to me what do you usually do there?

- What is your favourite place outside Shigezhuang (or Dongxindian) village? Can you describe to me what do you usually do there?

- How often and how do you contact family members in hukou place? How often and how do you visit them?

- Have your family visit you in Beijing? Can you tell me more about what happened during their visit?

Guideline for semi-structured interviews with indigenous villagers

- How did you (and your family) make the decision to extend or rebuild your house?

- Can you tell me some stories you remember related to key time points when Shigezhuang (or Dongxindian) witnessed major changes (for example, land requisition, change of *hukou* status of villagers, an inflow of migrants, an increase in housing extensions, a change in spatial code regulated, etc.)?

- Can you describe how you spend your day, i.e., getting up, going to work, coming back from work, cooking, having meals, entertaining, going to bed, etc.? If there is a difference between weekdays and weekends, can you describe your routines for both?

- How do you interact with your tenants / other migrants in the village?

Appendix C: Questionnaires for structured interviews

(Translated English version)

Questionnaire about Migrants' Everyday Life
in Dongxindian Village, Cuigezhuang Township, Beijing[78]

Please fill out the following table about basic information of you, your spouse and children (including who live in Beijing, in Hukou province and also other cities), and other people, if any, who share the rental room with you in Dongxindian.

ID	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	I
Number of members	Relationship with the interviewee	Gender	Age	Education level	Marital status	h u k o u	Current living place	Purpose of living in Beijing
	1. The interviewee 2. Spouse 3. Son/daughter 4. Son/daughter-in-law 5. Father/mother (-in-law) 6. Grandson/-daughter 7. Grandparent 8. Friend	1. M 2. F		1. (Under) middle school 2. High school 3. Junior college 4. Bachelor 5. Master	1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widowed		1. Same room 2. Another room in Dongxindian 3. Hukou place 4. Another neighbourhood in Beijing 5. Other cities	1. Work 2. Family reunion 3. Marriage 4. Visiting relatives or friends 5. Study 6. Relocate 7. Birth 8. Other 9. Not in Beijing
01	1							
02								
03								
04								

---

[78] For migrants interviewed in Shigezhuang village, the questionnaire titled *Questionnaire about Migrants' Everyday Life in Shigezhuang Village, Pingfang Township, Beijing* was used. An extra section about the impact of redevelopment (see Section VII at the end of the questionnaire) was included in addition to the six sections applied to interviewees in Dongxindian village.

I. Employment situation (Only for the interviewees who have a job according to Q0)

1. **What is your primary occupation?**

2. **What kind of working contract do you have?**

   A. Permanent or long-term contract

   B. mid-term or short-term contract

   C. non-contract or temporary job

   D. self-employment

   E. other

3. **Does your employer pay for your social insurance (including retirement pension and medical insurance)?**

   A. yes

   B. no

   C. the employer offered to pay, but I decided not to have it

4. **What is your average monthly income?**

   _____Yuan (RMB) (It is after tax and can be a range.)

5. **What is the average total monthly income of other family members (including your spouse and son or daughter who are not married)?**

   _____Yuan (RMB) (The question is only for the married interviewees)

6. **What is your annual income in the year of 2018?**

   _____Yuan (RMB) (It can be monthly income times the number of valid working months.)

7. **What is the annual income of your family in the year of 2018?**

   _____Yuan (RMB) (It can be monthly income times the number of valid working months.)

8. **How did you learn about the information and start your current job? (the source of the job information)**

   A. On-campus recruitment

   B. Internet

   C. Job agency

   D. Introduced by *tongxiang*

   E. Introduced by friends

II. Housing and living conditions

1. **How many square metres is your rental room?**

    A. < 5 m²

    B. 5~8 m²

    C. 8~12 m²

    D. 12~15 m²

    E. > 25 m²

2. **Do you have following facilities in your rental room?** (Multiple choice)

    A. in-room toilet

    B. in-room kitchen

    C. in-room cooking space (but not an individual kitchen)

    D. a living room and a bedroom

3. **How much is the monthly rent?**

    _____Yuan (RMB)

4. **How much is the monthly household expenditure except rent?**

    _____Yuan (RMB) (This can be a range.)

5. **How many persons live in the rental room?**

    __Persons (the number can be double checked with the answers in the first table)

    How many persons has the rental room maximally accommodated?

    __Persons

    If the number fluctuates, the reason is:

    A. Daughter(s) or son(s) visit(s).

    B. The spouse visits.

    C. Parent(s) visit(s).

    D. Friend(s) visit(s).

    E. Other

6. **Do you have rental contract?**

    A. Yes, a written one.

    B. I have verbal agreement with my landlord.

    C. No, I do not have one.

7. **How long have you been living in the current room?**

    A. Less than 3 months

B. 3 to 12 months

C. 1 to 3 years

D. 3 to 5 years

E. 5 to 10 years

F. More than 10 years

(Whether to ask Q8-10 or not is decided by the answer of Q7.)

8. **Has your rent changed within the last 3 months?**

A. No

B. Yes, it is ___Yuan/Month higher than the rent three months ago.

9. **Has your rent changed within the last 3 months?**

A. No

B. Yes, it is ___Yuan/Month higher than the rent one year ago.

10. **What reason do you think can best explain the rent increase?** (Multiple choice)

A. Inflation or price increase

B. Improvement in housing conditions

C. Improvement in Dongxindian environment

D. Increasing working opportunities nearby

E. Demolition of nearby urban villages (such as Feijiacun)

F. Other

III.   Floating/Migration situation

1. **Have you temporarily lived in other province(s) other than your Hukou province before coming to Beijing?**

A. No

B. Yes, __ Province. I lived there because __.

2. **In which year did you first come to Beijing?**

In the year of ___. (It is not considered if the stay is less than 1 month.)

3. **From which year did you start living in Dongxindian?**

From the year of ___.

4. **Have you lived in other neighbourhoods or urban villages in Beijing before moving to Dongxindian?**

A. No

B. Yes, ____ (name of the neighbourhood or village).

Why did you decide to move out from that place?

a. The neighbourhood or the urban village was demolished.

b. The rent increased.

c. I changed the job, or I graduated.

d. Other

5. **Why did you choose to live in Dongxindian? (How did you acquire information about rental housing in Dongxindian?)**

A. It is close to the place where I work.

B. Through *tongxiang*.

C. Through friends.

D. Through advertisement of housing agency.

E. My employer rents rooms here as dormitory for employees.

F. Through colleagues.

G. Through online information.

H. Other

6. **Have you moved inside of Dongxindian?**

A. No

B. Yes, __ times.

Why did you move?

a. I want better housing conditions.

b. The rent of the room I rented increased.

c. The room I rented was demolished.

d. I could not get along well with my former landlord.

e. I could not get along well with other tenants in the former living place.

f. I moved in order to be close to friends.

g. Other

7. **Do you plan for a long-term stay in Dongxindian (more than 3 years)?**

A. Yes.

B. No, because _____.

C. I am not sure.

8. **Do you plan for a long-term stay in Beijing (more than 5 years)?**

A. Yes.

B. No, because _____.

C. I am not sure.

IV. Interaction with and within the city/the village/the living space

1. **To which extent have you changed your rental room?** (Multiple choice)

   A. It remains the same as what it looked like when I moved in.

   B. I have posted up or hung some decorations.

   C. I have purchased some electrical appliances.

   D. I have purchased some furniture.

   E. I have painted the walls.

   F. I have reorganized the layout or the structure of the room.

   G. Other

2. **To which extent have you changed the space of the corridor or the street?** (Multiple choice)

   A. I have not made any change.

   B. I have posted up or hung some decorations.

   C. I put some furniture of necessities there (such as a cooker, shoe case, clothes hanger, etc.).

   D. I put some furniture of leisure there (such as table and chair, sofa, etc.).

   E. I add some semi-permanent construction (such as growing vegetables, wooden frame, shed, etc.)

   F. I add some permanent construction (such as brick walls).

   G. Other

3. **How many acquaintances do you have in Dongxindian?**

   A. Almost none

   B. <5

   C. 5~10

   D. 10~20

   E. >20

   (If the answer is A, the following sub-questions can be skipped.)

   How did you develop an acquaintance?

   A. We are *tongxiang*.

   B. We are neighbours.

   C. We are colleagues.

D. We share similar leisure activities.

E. Our children are classmates.

F. Other

What percentage of these acquaintances are indigenous villagers in Dongxindian?

A. Almost none

B. A small percentage

C. About half

D. A large percentage

What percentage of these acquaintances have you known before moving to Dongxindian?

A. Almost none

B. A small percentage

C. About half

D. A large percentage

Where do you often interact with these acquaintances? (Multiple choice)

A. In the rental room

B. In the corridor

C. In the street

D. In restaurants

E. In public/open space in the village

F. Other

What kind of activities are involved in the interactions? (Multiple choice)

A. chatting

B. playing cards

C. eating

D. doing sports

E. other

How often do you interact with most of the acquaintances?

A. It happens casually when we meet by chance.

B. Every day

C. Every week

D. Every month

E. Other

4. **How many acquaintances do you have outside Dongxindian in Beijing?**

   A. Almost none

   B. <5

   C. 5~10

   D. 10~20

   E. >20

   How did you develop an acquaintance? (Multiple choice)

   A. We are *tongxiang*.

   B. We are neighbours.

   C. We are colleagues.

   D. We share similar leisure activities.

   E. Our children are classmates.

   F. Other

   Where do you often interact with these acquaintances? (Multiple choice)

   A. In Dongxindian

   B. In his or her living neighbourhood

   C. In the working place

   D. Restaurants, shopping malls, etc.

   E. Tourist destinations in or near Beijing

   F. Other

   What kind of activities are involved in the interactions? (Multiple choice)

   A. Chatting

   B. Playing cards

   C. Eating

   D. Travelling

   E. Other

   How often do you interact with most of the acquaintances?

   A. Every day

   B. Every week

   C. Every month

   D. Other

5. **Where do your landlord live?**

240

A. On the same floor

B. On another floor in the building

C. Another building in Dongxindian

D. Outside Dongxindian

E. I do not know.

How often do you interact with your landlord?

A. I have never met my landlord.

B. Only when I pay the rent to him/her.

C. Every week.

D. Every day.

E. Other

V.   Interaction with *hukou* place

1. **How much remittance do you send back to your *hukou* place every month?**

   _____ Yuan (RMB) (This can be a range.)

   What are the main purposes are these remittances used for? (Multiple choice)

   A. To provide for parent(s)/the elderly

   B. To support children

   C. To support the spouse

   D. To pay for the real-estate loan

   E. For savings

   F. Other

2. **Do you keep your homestead in your *hukou* place?**

   A. Yes.

   B. No.

   C. I have never had a homestead.

3. **Have you purchased a property in your *hukou* place?**

   A. No.

   B. Yes. a) in the town; b) in the county; c) in the city.

4. **How often do you contact with your family members in your hometown?**

   A. Every day.

   B. Every other day.

C. Every week.

D. Every month.

E. Seldom.

5. **How many times do you go back to your hometown every year?**

    A. Once

    B. Twice

    C. More than twice

    How long do you usually stay every time you go back home?

    A. Less than a week

    B. From a week to half a month

    C. From half a month to one month

    D. More than one month

6. (Only ask interviewees with stay-behind children)

    Do your children come to Beijing for a visit?

    A. No

    B. Yes

    If yes, how often do they come and how long do they stay every time?

VI.   Everyday life (open questions)

1. **Where do you buy groceries/food?**

    Where do you buy daily products?

    Where do you buy clothes?

2. **Where is your favourite place in Dongxindian, other than your room?**

    What do you usually do there?

    Is the any public space in Dongxindian you notice where men/women prefer to gather?

3. **Can you briefly describe some key time points of your daily routine?**

    Get up:

    Start work:

    Get back home from work:

    Dinner:

    Go to bed:

    Does your daily routine change in the weekend?

4. **How often do you go outside of Dongxindian except for work?**

    Which area/place you mostly go when you go out? For what?

5. **Do you like living in Dongxindian?**

    A. Yes

    B. No

    C. I am not sure.

VII.   Impact of Redevelopment (Demolition and Relocation)[79]

1. **Do you think the redevelopment of Shigezhuang have a major impact on your daily lives?**

    A. Yes, an enormous impact.

    B. Yes, a big impact.

    C. A small impact.

    D. A negligible impact.

    E. I have never thought about it.

2. **In which of the following aspects do you think the redevelopment has major impact on your daily lives?** (Multiple choice)

    A. I have lost my job.

    B. My income has decreased.

    C. I have lost the places where I can buy groceries/food and daily product.

    D. I have lost the leisure spaces.

    E. The living environment has been polluted by the demolition of buildings.

    F. My friends in Shigezhuang have moved out.

    G. The rent has increased.

    H. I am suffering from worries and anxieties.

    I. Other

3. **Did you move out during the redevelopment period last year?**

    A. No

    B. Yes

    When and where did you move?

    In _____(month, year), to _____.

---

[79] This section was only included in the questionnaires for migrants in Shigezhuang village.

4. **Do you have an idea where will you move if the building you live in now is demolished? Do you have a specific neighborhood as your choice in mind?**

   A. Other buildings in Shigezhuang

   B. Some nearby neighborhoods

   C. Some villages on the periphery of the city.

   D. Back to hometown.

   E. I do not have a plan. I will decide only when I have to.

   What is the reason for your decision?

"统计调查中获得的能够识别或者推断单个统计调查对象身份的资料，任何单位和个人不得对外提供、泄露，不得用于统计以外的目的。"《统计法》第三章第二十五条

北京崔各庄乡东辛店村流动人口日常生活监测调研
流动人口问卷

尊敬的先生/女士：

您好！我们是城市规划专业的博士生。为更详细、客观地了解北京流动人口的日常工作、生活状况，我们进行此调查。您的回答将对我们目前正在做的课题研究提供重要依据。本次调查将会耽误您一些时间，希望得到您的理解和支持。每个问题没有标准答案，您不用担心您的回答是否正确，只要把真实情况和想法告诉我们即可。调查结果仅限于研究，我们绝不会泄露您的任何个人信息。感谢您的支持与配合！

2019 年 7 月

请谈谈您**本人、配偶和子女**（包括在本地、老家和其它地方的）以及与您在本户**同住**的其它成员的情况（如大于 6 人在表格下方空白处填写）

ID	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	I
成员序号	与被访者关系 9. 本人 10. 配偶 11. 子女 12. 媳婿 13. 父母/公婆/岳父母 14. 孙辈 15. （外）祖父母 16. 朋友	性别 3. 男 4. 女	出生年份	受教育程度 6. 初中以下 7. 高中中专 8. 大学专科 9. 大学本科 10. 研究生	婚姻状况 5. 未婚 6. 已婚 7. 离婚 8. 丧偶	户口省份	现居住地 6. 同村同住 7. 同村不同住 8. 户口地 9. 北京其它地方 10. 其它	在北京的目的（在老家居住的不用填写） 10. 务工经商 11. 家属随迁 12. 婚姻嫁娶 13. 投亲靠友 14. 学习培训 15. 拆迁搬家 16. 出生 17. 其它
01	1. 本人							
02								
03								
04								
05								
06								

一. **就业情况**（仅询问目前正在工作的人员）

9. 您现在的主要职业是什么？

10. 您是否有工作合同（工作合同的类型）？

　　　【A】固定或长期合同　　　【B】中期或短期合同　　　【C】临时工，无合同

　　　【D】个体户　　　　【E】其它

11. 您的雇主是否为您购买社保？【A】是　【B】否　【C】雇主可以购买，但自己决定不买

12. 您个人月收入多少？＿＿＿＿元（税后。如被访者不回答，请询问范围填写大概数据）

13. 您配偶以及未分家子女总共月收入多少？＿＿＿＿元（仅请已婚被访者回答）

14. 您个人 2018 年收入多少？＿＿＿＿元（可询问相当于月收入乘以多少个月）

15. 您家庭 2018 年收入多少？＿＿＿＿元（可询问相当于月收入乘以多少个月）

16. 您是怎么了解并开始从事目前这份工作的（工作信息来源）？

　　　【A】校园招聘　【B】网络　【C】人才市场　【D】老乡介绍　【E】朋友介绍

二. **住房情况**

11. 您租住的房间面积是多少？

　　　【A】< 5 ㎡　【B】5~8 ㎡　【C】8~12 ㎡　【D】12~15 ㎡　【E】> 25 ㎡

12. 您租住的房间是否有以下设施？（可多选）

　　　【A】房间内卫生间　【B】房间内独立厨房　【C】房间内做饭空间　【D】一室一厅

13. 您家目前每个月支付的房租是多少？＿＿＿＿元

14. 您家在北京除房租外每月平均支出是多少？＿＿＿＿元（如无具体金额，请询问填写大概数据）

15. 您租住房间的长期居住人口是__人（可对照首页表格基本情况），**最多居住人口达到过__人，如果人口有浮**

　　动，浮动原因是：

　　　【A】儿女探亲　【B】配偶探亲　【C】父母探亲　【D】朋友拜访　【E】其它

16. 您是否有租房合同？【A】有书面合同　　【B】与房东有口头约定　　【C】没有合同

17. 您在目前的房间里已居住多长时间？

　　　【A】<3 个月　【B】3 个月~1 年　【C】1~3 年　【D】3~5 年　【E】5~10 年　【F】>10 年

（根据第 7 题答案决定是否询问 8~10 题）

18. 您的房租在近 3 月内是否有变化？【A】否　【B】是，相对 3 月前涨__元/月

19. 您的房租在近 1 年内是否有变化？【A】否　【B】是，相对 1 年前涨__元/月

20. 如果您的房租在近 3 月或 1 年内有上涨，您认为最主要原因是？（可多选）

　　　【A】随物价自然上涨　【B】住房条件改善　【C】村内环境改善　【D】附近工作增加

　　　【D】附件村落（如费家村）拆迁　【E】其它

三. **流动情况**

9. 您在来到北京前是否在非户籍所在省份暂住过？【A】否　【B】是，__省，主要目的是

10. 您第一次到北京是哪一年？___年（逗留短于1个月的不计算）

11. 您从哪一年开始在东辛店村居住？___年

12. 您在到东辛店村前是否在北京其它社区/村子居住过？【A】否　【B】是，____（名字）。**您搬离北京原居住地原因**：

　　【A】原居住地拆迁　【B】原居住地房租上涨　【C】工作变动、毕业　【D】其它

13. 您为什么选择在东辛店村居住？（您如何了解到东辛店村的住房信息的？）

　　【A】靠近工作地点　【B】老乡介绍　【C】朋友介绍　【D】租房中介或租房广告

　　【E】单位集体租住　【F】同事介绍　【G】网络信息　【H】其它

14. 您在东辛店村内部是否搬过家？【A】否　【B】是，共__次。**搬家的主要原因是？**（可多选）

　　【A】需要更好的住房条件　【B】原来居住的房间房租上涨　【C】原来居住的房间拆除

　　【D】与原房东相处不好　【E】与原房客相处不好　【F】搬家后更靠近朋友　【G】其它

15. 您今后是否打算在东辛店村长期居住（3年以上）？

　　【A】打算　　【B】不打算，因为_____　　【C】没想好

16. 您今后是否打算在北京长期居住（5年以上）？

　　【A】打算　　【B】不打算，因为_____　　【C】没想好

四.　　与所在城市/村/居住空间互动

6. 您对所在房间的有哪些改变？（可多选）

　　【A】与入住时完全一样　【B】张贴、悬挂饰品　【C】购置电器　【D】购置家具

　　【E】粉刷墙面　【F】改变房间原有布局、结构　【G】其它

7. 您对楼道/街道空间有什么影响与改变？（可多选，访谈时可大致更详细询问具体干预形式）

　　【A】无干预　【B】临时装饰（张贴）　【C】放生活必需品（如：炊具、鞋柜、晾衣架等）

　　【D】放休闲时用品（如：桌椅、沙发等）　【E】增加半永久构筑（如：种菜、藤架、棚子等）

　　【F】增加永久构筑（如：砌墙）　【G】其它

8. 您在村子里的熟人有多少人？【A】几乎没有　【B】<5　【C】5~10　【D】10~2　【E】>20

　　（如答案是"A 几乎没有"则无需继续询问下面的问题）

　　您与他们相熟的主要原因是？

　　【A】老乡　【B】邻居　【C】同事　【D】休闲娱乐　【E】孩子是同学　【F】其它

　　其中东辛店村村民占多大比例？【A】几乎没有　【B】一小部分　【C】一半左右　【D】一大半

　　其中来东辛店前认识的占多大比例？

　　【A】几乎没有　【B】一小部分　【C】一半左右　【D】一大半

　　您与这些熟人互动的地方主要地点？

【A】房间　　【B】楼道　　【C】街道　　【D】餐馆　　【F】村内公共空间　　【G】其它

　　　互动的内容是？（可多选）【A】聊天　　【B】打牌　　【C】吃饭　　【D】运动　　【E】其它

　　　与大多数人互动的频率是？【A】碰到的时候　　【B】每天　　【C】每周　　【D】每月　　【E】其它

9. **您在东辛店村外的熟人有多少？**【A】几乎没有　　【B】<5　　【C】5~10　　【D】10~2　　【E】>20

　　　您与他们相熟的主要原因是？（可多选）

　　　　【A】老乡　　【B】邻居　　【C】同事　　【D】休闲娱乐　　【E】孩子是同学　　【F】其它

　　　您与这些熟人互动的地方主要地点？（可多选）【A】东辛店　　【B】对方住处　　【C】工作地点

　　　　【D】北京餐厅商场等商业空间　　【F】北京及周边旅游地点　　【G】其它

　　　互动的内容是？（可多选）【A】聊天　　【B】打牌　　【C】吃饭　　【D】旅游　　【E】其它

　　　与大多数人互动的频率是？【A】每天　　【B】每周　　【C】每月　　【D】其它

10. **您的房东住在哪儿？**【A】同楼　　【B】_楼　　【C】村内别处　　【D】村外　　【E】不知道

　　　与他互动频率？【A】从未见过房东　　【B】仅在交房租时　　【C】每周　　【D】每天　　【E】其它

五. *与户籍所在地的互动*

7. **您家每月转账汇款到户籍所在的金额是多少？**＿＿＿元（如无具体金额，请询问填写大概数据）**主要用途是？**（可多选）

　　　　【A】赡养老人　　【B】抚养子女　　【C】配偶开销　　【D】偿还房贷　　【E】存储　　【F】其它

8. **您是否在户籍所在地保留宅基地？**【A】是　　【B】否　　【C】从未有过宅基地

9. **您是否在户籍所在地购置房产？**【A】否　　【B】是，在哪儿？a)乡里　b)县里　c)市里

10. **您与家人联系的频率是？**【A】每天　　【B】隔天　　【C】每周　　【D】每月　　【E】几乎不联系

11. **您每年回老家几次？**【A】一次　　【B】两次　　【C】多于两次

　　　您平均每次在老家停留时间？【A】<一周　　【B】一周到半月　　【C】半月到一月　　【D】>一月

12. （仅对有孩子且孩子留在老家的被访者提问）**孩子是否会到北京来探望？**【A】否　　【B】是

　　　探望频率与逗留时间是＿＿＿＿＿（根据回答填写具体时间）

六. *日常生活*（多数问题无固定选项，根据被访者回答记录答案）

1. **您最常在哪儿买菜？**＿＿＿＿＿**买日常用品？**＿＿＿＿＿**买衣服等？**

2. **在东辛店村内除了家里以外您最喜欢呆的地方是？**＿＿＿＿＿**在这里的主要活动是？**

　　　您是否有观察到东辛店村内有明显男性/女性（根据被访者性别）**聚集的公共空间？**

3. **请描述您一天生活的几个关键时间点分别是几点：**

　　　起床__点　工作__点　下班__点　晚饭__点　睡觉__点

　　　这些时间、活动在周末是否有变化？

4. **您除工作需求外出村的频率是？**＿＿＿＿＿**最常去的区域/具体地方是**＿＿＿＿＿**目的是**

5. **您是否喜欢住在东辛店村？**【A】是　　【B】否　　【C】不确定

七. *拆迁对您生活的影响*

1. **您觉得拆迁对您的生活影响大吗？**

   【A】影响非常大 【B】影响较大 【C】影响较小 【D】几乎没影响 【E】没想过

2. **您觉得拆迁对您的影响主要体现在以下哪些方面？** (可多选)

   【A】失去工作 【B】工作收入减少 【C】失去原有买菜、买生活用品的必须场所

   【D】失去原有活动场所 【E】生活环境由于拆迁污染变差 【F】村内朋友减少

   【G】房租上涨 【H】担心、焦虑增加 【I】其它

3. **您是否已经在去年的拆迁中搬出去过？** 【A】是 【B】否

   (第3题回答"是"的被访者请回答第4题)

4. **您搬出去的具体时间是?** _____ 年 ____ 月。搬去的地点是?

5. **您是否考虑过如果目前所住的房子拆迁后您将搬去哪儿？是否已经有具体的选择？**

   【A】石各庄内其它未拆迁的房子 【B】附近的其它小区 【C】北京更外围的村子

   【D】回老家 【E】没想过，走一步算一步

   您决定的主要原因是？

Appendix D: Maps of Dongxindian and Shigezhuang villages

Figure 28: Map of Dongxindian village. Source: Dongxindian village committee.

Figure 29: Map of the residential core of Dongxindian village, with plots of each household numbered. Source: Dongxindian village committee.

Figure 30: Map of Shigezhuang village. Source: Shigezhuang village committee.

Appendix E: Official data on migrant population in Dongxindian village

<div align="center">东辛店村流动人口数据</div>

序号	日期		2019.7.1	2018.7.1	2017.7.1	2016.7.1	2015.7.1	2014.7.1
1	平台流动人口数据		9261	10353	18911	22615	25241	38722
2	同比去年：下降/上升		下降10.55%	下降45.25%	下降16.38%	下降10.40%	下降34.81%	
3	年龄分类占比	18岁以下	19（0.21%）	30（0.29%）	52（0.28%）	88（0.39%）	233（0.92%）	570（1.47%）
		18岁（含）-35岁	5427（58.6%）	6237（60.24％）	10925（57.77％）	13749（60.79%）	15404（61.03％）	22196（57.33％）
		35岁（含）-50岁	2766（29.87%）	3029（29.26%）	5911（31.26％）	6734（29.78%）	7658（30.34%）	12795（33.04%）
		50岁（含）-60岁	841（9.08%）	835（8.07％）	1653（8.74％）	1664（7.36％）	1597（6.33％）	2530（6.53％）
		60岁（含）以上	208（2.24%）	222（2.14%）	370（1.95%）	380（1.68%）	349（1.38%）	631（1.63％）
4	性别分类占比	男	5610（60.58%）	6287（60.73%）	11094（58.66%）	13299（58.81%）	14825（58.73%）	22631（58.44%）
		女	3651（39.42%）	4066（39.27%）	7817（41.34%）	9316（41.19%）	10416（41.27%）	16091（41.56%）
5	籍贯分类占比	河北	2081（22.47%）	2350（22.70%）	4246（22.45%）	5195（22.97%）	5763（22.83%）	9097（23.49%）
		河南	1359（14.67%）	1556（15.03%）	2799（14.80%）	3319（14.68%）	3675（14.56%）	5593（14.44%）
		四川	943（10.18%）	984（9.50%）	2415（12.77%）	2913（12.88%）	3322（13.16%）	5204（13.44%）
		山东	728（7.86%）	859（8.30%）	1505（7.96%）	1743（7.71%）	1889（7.48%）	2704（6.98%）
		安徽	662（7.15%）	738（7.13%）	1724（9.12%）	2006（8.87%）	2306（9.14%）	3593（9.28%）
		其他	3481（37.67%）	3866（37.34%）	6222（32.9%）	7439（32.89%）	8286（32.83%）	12531（32.37%）
6	受教育程度分类占比	初中	4671（50.44%）	5351（51.69%）	12631（66.79%）	15582（68.9%）	17978（71.23%）	30701（79.29%）
		高中	2746（29.65%）	3116（30.1%）	4795（25.36%）	5612（24.82%）	5667（22.45%）	5956（15.38%）
		大学专科	978（10.56%）	1024（9.89%）	670（3.54%）	632（2.79%）	699（2.77%）	744（1.92%）
		大学本科	576（6.22%）	594（5.74%）	321（1.7%）	275（1.22%）	300（1.19%）	338（0.87%）
		小学	230（2.48%）	226（2.18%）	452（2.39%）	476（2.1%）	556（2.2%）	841（2.17%）
		研究生	36（0.39%）	32（0.31%）	18（0.1%）	13（0.06%）	14（0.06%）	20（0.05%）
		不识字	24（0.26%）	10（0.1%）	24（0.13%）	25（0.11%）	27（0.11%）	122（0.32%）
7	职业分类占比	办事人员	764（8.25%）	685（6.62%）	385（2.03%）	192（0.45%）	260（0.76%）	629（1.62%）
		商业、服务业人员	748（8.08%）	604（5.83%）	542（2.87%）	567（2.51%）	704（2.8%）	2516（6.5%）
		专业、技术人员	551（5.95%）	545（5.26%）	309（1.63%）	159（0.7%）	279（1.11%）	719（1.86%）
		单位负责人	108（1.16%）	119（1.15%）	71（0.38%）	28（0.12%）	48（0.19%）	95（0.25%）
		生产运输工人	47（0.51%）	65（0.63%）	265（8.25%）	325（1.44%）	1094（4.33%）	4640（11.98%）
		农林牧渔水利生产人员	4（0.04%）	11（0.11%）	48（1.4%）	63（0.28%）	131（0.52%）	1635（4.22%）
		未录入相关信息	7039（76.01%）	8324（80.4%）	17291（83.44%）	21281（94.5%）	22725（90.29%）	28488（73.57%）

Table 7: Official data on migrant population in Dongxindian village, original version in Chinese. Source: Dongxindian village committee, July 2019.

Appendix F: Results of data analyses

Shigezhuang village

Male, 38, 47%

Female, 43, 53%

■ Female   ■ Male

Dongxindian village



Female; 71; 35%

Male; 134; 65%

■ Female   ■ Male

Figure 31: Gender distribution of interviewees in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages. Source: Author.

Shigezhuang village

>70; 1; 1%
61~70; 4; 5%
0~10; 0; 0%
11~20; 2; 3%
21~30; 10; 13%
31~40; 18; 24%
51~60; 16; 21%
41~50; 25; 33%

■ 0~10 ■ 11~20 ■ 21~30 ■ 31~40 ■ 41~50 ■ 51~60 ■ 61~70 ■ >70

Dongxindian village

11~20; 6; 3%
61~70; 4; 2%
>70; 2; 1%
0~10; 0; 0%
51~60; 14; 7%
41~50; 32; 16%
21~30; 89; 45%
31~40; 51; 26%

■ 0~10 ■ 11~20 ■ 21~30 ■ 31~40 ■ 41~50 ■ 51~60 ■ 61~70 ■ >70

Figure 32: Age distribution of interviewees in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages. Source: Author.

Shigezhuang village

Beijing ; 7; 9%
Gansu; 2; 3%
Hebei; 4; 5%
Henan; 14; 17%
Hubei; 4; 5%
Jiangsu; 1; 1%
Shandong; 6; 7%
Shanxi; 2; 2%
Sichuan; 41; 51%

■ Beijing ■ Gansu ■ Hebei ■ Henan ■ Hubei ■ Jiangsu ■ Shandong ■ Shanxi ■ Sichuan

Dongxindian village

Tianjin; 2; 1%
Zhejiang; 1; 0%
Anhui; 8; 4%
Chongqing; 3; 1%
Fujian; 2; 1%
Gansu; 8; 4%
Guangdong; 1; 0%
Guangxi; 1; 0%
Guizhou; 1; 0%
Beijing ; 22; 11%
Hebei; 34; 17%
Heilongjiang; 15; 7%
Henan; 25; 12%
Hubei; 3; 1%
Hunan; 5; 2%
Jiangsu; 3; 1%
Jiangxi; 4; 2%
Jilin; 2; 1%
Liaoning; 2; 1%
Neimemggu; 2; 1%
Shaanxi; 3; 1%
Shandong; 13; 6%
Shanghai; 1; 0%
Shanxi; 16; 8%
Sichuan; 26; 13%

■ Anhui   ■ Beijing   ■ Chongqing   ■ Fujian   ■ Gansu
■ Guangdong   ■ Guangxi   ■ Guizhou   ■ Hebei   ■ Heilongjiang
■ Henan   ■ Hubei   ■ Hunan   ■ Jiangsu   ■ Jiangxi
■ Jilin   ■ Liaoning   ■ Neimemggu   ■ Shaanxi   ■ Shandong
■ Shanghai   ■ Shanxi   ■ Sichuan   ■ Tianjin   ■ Zhejiang

Figure 33: Distribution of *hukou* province of interviewees in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages. Source: Author.

Shigezhuang village

- (Under) middle school
- High school
- Bachelor

Dongxindian village

- (Under) middle school
- High school
- Three-year college
- Bachelor

Figure 34: Educational level of interviewees (migrants only) in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages. Source: Author.

Shigezhuang village

Unemployed; 5; 6%

Students; 5; 6%

Cleaners; 10; 13%

Company staff; 3; 4%

Self-employment; 19; 24%

Construction workers; 14; 18%

Cooks; 1; 1%

Drivers; 2; 2%

Hour labourers; 6; 8%

Sales and services workers; 4; 5%

Retired; 10; 13%

- Cleaners
- Company staff
- Construction workers
- Cooks
- Drivers
- Hour labourers
- Retired
- Sales and services workers
- Self-employment
- Students
- Unemployed

Figure 35: Occupation distribution of interviewees in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages. Source: Author

Shigezhuang village

GENDER | AGE | HUKOU PROVINCE | OCCUPATION | FAMILY MEMBER IN THE VILLAGE | LIVING SPACE PER PERSON (M²) | TOILET IN ROOM

Dongxindian village

Figure 36: Diagram on demographic and dwelling profiles of interviewees in Shigezhuang and Dongxindian villages (data collected with structured interviews in 2017 only). Source: Author.