

## **Thinking the Unthinkable: Two Sovereign Palestinian States**

An Unconventional Reading of Trump's Peace Plan through the Lens of Wendt's Constructivism.

Marie Gabenisch

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## Abstract

Trump's 2020 Peace Plan, a "Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People" may indirectly or implicitly be the catalyst for a new way of looking at the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. A constructivist analysis, with regard to the territorial, political, security, social and economic aspects of the Plan, reveals a new constellation of interests and identities of key actors in the region. The identities and interests of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israel have developed separately, and are unevenly reflected in the Plan. Let us "think the unthinkable" (Khalidi 1978): why not Two Sovereign Palestinian States and a *three-state solution*?

**Keywords:** constructivism; identity; interests; security; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; two or three-state solution.

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## 1. It is time to give attention to the unnoticed Trump Peace Plan

### - Introduction

Trump's Political Peace Plan for the Middle East, released on January 28, 2020, has triggered quiet and cautious reactions on the world stage, maybe because President Trump is not taken seriously, or maybe because nobody dares to confront the American *hegemon* and to get involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In December 2017, as Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, Arabist Dina Powell left the Plan's drafting team (Tibon 2017), and the Palestinians cut off contact with the Trump administration. Trump continued to isolate the Palestinians by ending bilateral aid and U.S. contributions for UNRWA. Inauspicious start, even before the final publication of the Plan, concerns were expressed that the Plan was an immediate annexation of Palestine. The "deal of the century" was renamed "slap of the century" by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Sawafta and al-Mughrabi 2020), "steal of the century" by the Economist (2020), "fraud of the century" by the PLO secretary general (Abdalla 2020) and "joke of the century" by an Israeli journalist from Haaretz (Verter 2020). Despite the common harsh criticism of the Plan, it is striking how key stakeholders, including European countries, which were remarkably involved in the peace negotiations during the 1990s, have refused to act firmly against the Plan. The same is true for Arab countries, and more surprisingly for the main party involved: Palestine. Be it Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, or Fatah, which controls the West Bank, the Palestinian political parties have remained relatively silent while the United States and Israel have made plans for their future. These quiet reactions are all the more surprising given that there have been numerous armed struggles between Palestine and Israel since the latter's creation in 1948, and more recently in 2014 (Gaza War), 2018 (Gaza border protests or "Great March of Return"), May 2021 and August 2022. Although the so-called "Vision" has not triggered a constructive response so far, Donald Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner could eventually trigger change in this region. This paper explains why.

Addressing the efficiency and the influence of peace negotiations on a conflict is crucial. It appears that no initiative has had meaningful effects since the last Camp David Summit in 2000, falling short of bringing a credible solution but followed by the outbreak of the Second Intifada. While the efforts toward peace between Israel and Palestine triggered a constructive debate in the 1990's, the public opinion as well as governments on the world stage show disinterest and have given up on this conflict. The fact that the United States has proposed a peace plan is an occasion to put the issue back in the spotlight. A constructivist analysis of Trump's Peace Plan enables scholars to excavate and reflect on a new constellation of interests and identities in the region. The Plan may indirectly or implicitly be the catalyst for a new way of looking at the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and, perhaps, bring a credible solution to this conflict. Indeed, while Trump's two-state solution will be proven as unachievable in this paper, the alternative could be a *three-state solution*. This leads to the

central question: *to what extent does Trump's Plan bring new perspectives to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?*

The Constructivist theoretical approach combines an analysis of both material and social components to better explain the social construction of a conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the perfect case study to underline constructivism's assets compared to rationalist approaches, which traditionally deal with territorial and security matters in a purely materialistic way and in terms of power politics. The latter are not sufficient to understand what hides behind Trump's Plan and the Palestinian rejection of Trump's proposals. Indeed, the conflict appears as an inextricable problem that involves religion, territory, and power; but also values, culture, ideas, and norms, which are constructivism's topics of focus. The situation is sometimes labeled intractable (to which no peaceful end can be found), on the verge of being existential (which threatens the mere existence of the belligerents). Thus, this paper does not aim at putting forward a revolutionary idea to bring peace to the region, but to modestly contribute to the debate around the two-state solution proposed in Trump's Plan. The existing literature helps to understand that scholars (and politicians) are trapped in a "cognitive cage" that prevents them from considering alternatives to the one- or two-state solutions (2. *The Deadlock of a Two-State Solution - Literature Review*). The use of the Constructivist perspective on identities and interest is justified by the credible account it gives of the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as socially constructed (3. *The Constructivist perspective of topical interest - Theoretical bases*). A qualitative analysis of the Plan (4. *Organizing a Qualitative Analysis of Trump's Peace Plan - Research Design*) aims to demonstrate that its proposals to build a State of Palestine cannot be realistically implemented, since it violates some of the belligerents' identities and interests. It also excavates competing interests and identities between Israel and Palestine, and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (5. *Getting into the substance - Qualitative Analysis of Trump's Peace Plan*). From Israeli, as well as from Palestinian view, a two-state solution appears to be less and less attractive, since the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are disconnected in several respects. A three-state solution could represent an alternative to the unproductive and out-of-date idea of a two-state solution. The conclusion will reiterate the necessity to keep on imagining a new future for this tormented region, potentially thanks to a three-state solution. It will also tackle the limits and perspectives brought forth by this paper. Let us continue the debate around the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and realize an assessment of the current relationship between Israel, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. To follow Khalidi's imperative as he imagined a "Sovereign Palestinian State" in 1978, it is time to "think the unthinkable": why not two sovereign Palestinian states?

## **2. The deadlock of the two-state solution - Literature Review**

The following literature review emphasizes how much scholars are divided around the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while they do not see beyond the one-state and two-state

solutions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a highly discussed topic, by passionate people. From news articles to books, writings are highly politicized. For example, Israeli scholars such as Benny Morris (2010) and Ilan Pappé (2004) claim to be "new historians" and give a new interpretation to some historical facts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Caplan (2011) calls some of these writers "nationalist historians". Although such writings are useful in order to better understand Israeli or Palestinian identities, the orientation of scientific publications is to be carefully kept in mind when using them.

The debate over possible solutions to this conflict is very rich. Halwani and Kapitan (2008) provide an overview of the different solutions thought to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "Two-state solution" is specifically used to describe the organization of both an independent and sovereign State of Palestine and a State of Israel. Far from being a reality, the two-state solution has remained at the basis of numerous peace talks, notably the Oslo Accords in 1993. Therefore, the two-state solution has been much discussed in academia. Some scholars defend it, like Miller (2016), who claims it is "desirable, necessary and feasible", or Kelman (2018), who writes about its "necessity and possibility". On the other hand, scholars put forward its limits, like Hilal (2007), who highlights the "demise" of this solution. The one-state solution is worth mentioning in the literature review, since it receives significant attention from scholars, like Halwani and Kapitan (2008, 198), who argue that it is "the morally optimal solution". It refers to the organization of a unified state composed of two ethnicities with, apparently, the same rights and duties. The main issue with this option is that Israel strives to become a nation-state (Bekerman 2002), which it would not be according to this solution since Arab citizens would compose a significant part of society. In addition, Palestinians would have to give up on the creation of their own state. Therefore, this option is left aside in this paper. Nowadays, Israel and Palestine are stuck mid-way between both options: the current unclear situation, being a source of tensions, has been until now unsuccessfully addressed by several third parties and mostly by the USA (Hammond 2016). Adding to the complexity of the situation, the disconnection between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has increased. Political rivalries between Fatah and Hamas have deepened, and additionally there are two very different economic and social situations (Schanzer 2008). Thus, the two-state solution that Israel was so reluctant to implement is not evident for the Palestinians themselves anymore. That is why this paper proposes the new perspective of a three-state solution (Gaza, the West Bank and Israel), that would fill both the research deficit and perhaps a political deficit concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This would go along with the will of some scholars to conduct "'out of the box' thinking" (Mossberg 2010). This is necessary, since numerous writings, as well as this one, highlight that the two-state solution represents a deadlock preventing to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Associating the decreasing viability of a potential State of Palestine because of internal tensions with the failure of the two-state solution is the main contribution to research of this paper.



This paper does not only deal with the ideas of three-state and two-state solutions, but more specifically with the variety of latter proposed by Trump. A series of articles from the American magazine of international relations *Foreign Affairs*, entitled "Trump's Middle East" (October 2019) confirmed the significant influence the United States continue to exert in this region. Yet, scientific analysis of Trump's version of a two-state solution remains rare due to the recent release of the Plan and the lack of perspective on it. Did Trump proposed a viable two-state solution, beyond his alleged bias in favor of Israel? The Plan is either considered by scholars to be a one-state solution hiding behind a two-state solution or as a provocation not worth of an in-depth analysis. Literature about Trump's Plan often delivers a critique of its general orientation. For example, Lustick (2020) calls the Plan "a morbid symptom" of a "One-State-Reality". Some contradictions regarding the conditions of implementation of Trump's two-state solution seem to make it difficult to appease tensions. Once again, the two-state solution puts Israelis and Palestinians in a deadlock. Gordon and Cohen (2012) explain it by denouncing the "damages of Israeli unilateralism and Western interests" on peace processes and on the implementation of the two-state solution. Marrar (2008) associates the idea of a two-state solution with the will of the USA to implement it. Such critical writings are nowadays still topical to describe the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Trump's Plan. Because the limited existing literature on the Peace Plan is very critical of it, it lacks a dynamic view of the conflict, that is, the proposition of new alternatives. To solve this, this paper aims at analyzing all main proposals of Trump's Plan by conducting a qualitative analysis. One could fear that this analysis of Trump's two-state solution will not manage to get out of the cognitive cage, imprisoning scholars in already existing concepts. This paper's analysis becomes the starting point of a new reflection around the idea of a three-state solution.

### **3. The Constructivist Perspective of topical interest - Theoretical bases**

Alexander Wendt is well-known for being one of the most influential constructivist scholars. Mershon Professor of International Security and Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, he was born in Germany in 1958 and studied Political Science and Philosophy at the University of Minnesota, where he received his PhD in Political Science in 1989 (Wendt n.d.). His work is strictly theoretical (Schouten 2008) and the abstraction of his thought is sometimes difficult to catch. His argumentation is however very precisely structured and he sometimes illustrates his theories with examples. Given the scope of Wendt's work, five works were chosen on the basis of their importance for the field of International Relations (Wendt 1992, 1999, 2003) or their explanatory value of core concepts (Wendt 1994, 1995). Criticisms of his theories, such as the ones of M. Zehfuss in *Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison* (2001) or J. Mercer in *Anarchy and Identity* (1995), clearly show that Wendt's thorough analysis of the notions of identities and interests has reached enough resonance to be discussed among other scholars.

The Constructivist approach to International Relations thrived in the 1990's, after the end of the Cold War. At that time, constructivists proposed a revolutionary conception of social science, leading to the Fourth Great Debate in International Relations opposing them to rationalists, realists and liberals. With a post-positivist ontology (reality is intersubjective) and a positivist epistemology (International Relations should be studied scientifically), they introduced a new way to apprehend the world. Thin constructivists, like Wendt, have found a *via media* between positivist and post-positivist assumptions (Zehfuss 2001, 340). Despite some disagreements, constructivists agree on emphasizing the fact that reality is socially constructed, influenced by the context in which it is embedded, and not given *per se*. They claim that it is intersubjective, meaning neither objective, nor completely subjective (Battistella 2015, 315ff.). Constructivists also agree on saying that ideational structures matter to understand the world. Wendt is in that sense an "idealist", since he argues that social structures are dependent on ideas (Wendt 1995, 73). Contrary to realists, who prioritize the explanatory value of material structures, constructivists argue that ideas make the material and the social meaningful. The Constructivist perspective on interests is original, because it emancipates itself from the classical realist conception of pure material interests defined at a national scale. Wendt (1995) does not exclude sharing some assumptions with neorealists, such as J. Mearsheimer. For example, he claims that shared knowledge, practices, but also the material, which also constitutes the social, are important (Wendt 1995, 76). Yet, this conflict cannot be explained only in terms of material components, since it has emerged and evolved toward an increasing involvement of values, norms, ideas, culture, practices, and a social reality, that form the identity and the interests of the belligerents. An actor's identity is the set of ideas it has upon itself, the way it perceives itself (place, role, rank): "Identities refer to who or what actors *are*" (emphasis in original, Wendt 1999, 231). "Interests refer to what actors *want*" (emphasis in original, Wendt 1999, 231) and they result in motivation and in a particular behavior. Since actors cannot know what they want if they do not know who they are, identities are at the basis of interests. Identities and interests are largely intertwined and influenced by ideas. They are mutually constitutive. Identities and interests engender motivation, an interaction and thus a process that can induce structural change. Constructivists argue that an actor forms his identity based on how the Other sees him, and how the Self thinks that the Other perceives him (Hopf 1998, 175). More concretely, a Palestinian identity is composed with how Palestinians see themselves, how other states, like Arab states, perceive them, and how Palestinians think that others perceive them.

Wendt's conceptions of anarchy(ies) and of its effects on the international structure completely differ from the realist or liberal ones. Neorealists take anarchy for a "fixed", "immutable" component of the international system, that engenders self-help behavior and power politics among states. For them, identities and interests are exogenously given. This view leaves aside the understanding of identities' and interests' formation. In his famous 1992 text, Wendt argues that identities and interests are formed and transformed by interactions in an anarchical environment and by international institutions. Constructivists

thus observe these processes, interactions, and practices and not only structure. In a way, Wendt seems to be more optimistic than pessimistic (Mercer 1995, 231): since self-help behaviors and egoism are not only caused by anarchy but by the formation of identities and interests, they are not a fatality. Identities and interests can engender a different behavior, favorable to cooperation. Thus, neorealists and constructivists have competing views regarding the cause of a conflict. Wendt (1994) confirms that the choice over self or collective interests, over a security dilemma or cooperation, depend highly on identities and "effects of practice" (Wendt 1995, 77). In anarchy, states can be "friends" or "foes" and the realist perspective omits to consider this "content" or "dynamic" of anarchy (Wendt 1992, 396). Of course, Wendt is being influenced by the Cold War, whose end has been favored by Gorbachev's "New Thinking", which he considers to be a good illustration of identities' and interests' formation toward a cooperative security system (Wendt 1992, 419f.). His conception of anarchy leads him to give importance to identities' and interests' formation and to categorize these two concepts. Wendt (1994) distinguishes two types of identities: corporate identities ("the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality" (Wendt 1994, 385)) and social identities ("sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object" (ibid.)). In 1999, Wendt refined his typology of interests and identities (Wendt 1999, 224ff.) and he drew four categories: corporate/personal, type/social, role and collective identities. Role identities imply that an actor adopts an identity only in regard to the Other (for example, state sovereignty has become one, "with substantial rights and behavioral norms" (Wendt 1999, 228)). Wendt quotes the Arab-Israeli conflict as a relationship in which role identities can be hardly changed since they rely on "the representations of significant Others" (Wendt 1999, 228). These texts are useful, insofar as they allow a better understanding of the importance of identities and interests formation. That said, the notion of collective identities is not useful for this paper, since it implies identification, that is to say the blurring of the border between Self and Other to form one common identity (Wendt 1999, 229).

Constructivism is not the first approach one thinks about when talking of a conflict or a war, contrary to rationalist approaches. However, constructivism provides new insights into conflict resolution, conflict and war (Jackson 2008). It challenges the dominant rationalist perspective and, as a "social theory", adds content regarding the social construction of conflicts and the influence of ideas on them. Moreover, it is wrong to say that constructivists are utopians who only believe in peace (Wendt 1995, 81). Indeed, they observe the current international stage, that counts less and less inter-state conflicts, but conflicts being a part of the international structure, constructivists do not exclude them from their research. However, Wendt's observation that the international system grows towards an anarchy of friendship rather than an anarchy of enmity is not being corroborated in this paper. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an illustration of enmity between two entities, that do not recognize each other's right to exist and are perpetually eager to go to war with each other. In this paper, constructivist theories on interests and identities are used as a tool and a basis to

understand why this enduring conflict cannot find an end despite numerous peace talks and the proposition of a two-state solution.

Relating identities and interests to the way actors behave and trigger conflicts may make us expect specific reactions from them. For example, one could expect that Gaza reacts violently to Trump's Plan since Hamas claims violence - which was not the case. However, it is important to note that identities and interests change, though they are considered to be relatively stable. As a result, Trump's Plan is an illustration of changing interests: Israeli interests appear to converge with American interests. Meanwhile, Arab countries' interests have changed, since they have only quietly supported Palestinians after the unveiling of Trump's Plan, and some now develop peaceful relations with Israel. The changes in identities and interests, that challenge the idea of a State of Palestine, lead this paper to propose the three-state solution as alternative. This paper argues that Trump's Plan illustrates a change in actors' identities and interests and therefore, has not triggered any "third intifada" or violent criticisms. Actors are still in the process of institutionalizing their identities to act according to them and react to the Plan. All in all, constructivism enables to explain why the two-state solution proposed by the American President can never be implemented as it is, since it violates the identities of the majority of the parties involved. One of this paper's biggest challenges will be to define the actors' identities and interests, and Wendt gives little clue about how to do that.

## **4. Organizing a Qualitative Analysis of Trump's Peace Plan**

### **- Research Design**

#### **4.1. Analytical Purposes**

What does Trump's Peace Plan propose exactly and how are different actors susceptible to respond to it? Do the proposals satisfy the stakeholders' interests and correspond to their identities or can they be threatened by some aspects of the Plan? All main proposals will be examined, thanks to their organization in categories through content structuring (4.2). Once these categories are composed, theoretical assumptions will be included in the analysis (4.3): are identities and interests contradicted or corroborated in each category of proposals? And to what extent? Each main category of proposals will be assessed in terms of the identities and interests of Israelis, Palestinians from the West Bank and Palestinians from Gaza. How do Israel, Gaza and the West Bank define their identities and interests? Who are they and what do they want? This paper aims to grasp the essence of current Israeli and Palestinian changing identities, thanks to a broad definition made of "landscapes" and "lifestyles" (Roca and Oliveira-Roca 2006). According to Wendt, "social structures have three elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices" (Wendt 1995, 73). Thus, identities can find their expression in official and legal documents (*shared knowledge*).

Resources are also important: poverty, access to water, food, or security providers, are also determinants of identities (*material*). Identities are also being expressed by populations (opinion polls, cultural heritage) and by their living conditions (*practices*). These social structures shape and construct states identities and interests, forming interactions, including policy decisions. They are a mix of immutable, historical components and of social realities that evolve over time. The results of the qualitative analysis will be gathered in a table (see annex) and a graph in the interpretation of the findings (6.1), in order to find out whether key stakeholders consider Trump's proposals positively, negatively or neutrally.

#### 4.2. A possible reading of the Plan - Thematic categorization

It is first important to create categories to understand and handle the content of the Plan and to enable a more precise analysis. The Plan is composed of two parts, a "Political Framework" (39 pages + appendixes) and an "Economic Framework" (39 pages + appendixes). Only the proposals from the Political Framework will be analyzed. The Constructivist framework used in this paper is more interesting related to ideas, norms, values, rather than with material aspects and thus does not enable to assess properly the Economic Framework. Moreover, the most discussed and interesting proposals are contained in the Political Framework, which also integrates economic aspects (cf. Section 6 of the Plan for example). The Political Framework regroups 22 sections, themselves containing several proposals. Sections and proposals can be better assessed when gathered in thematic categories. In this part, each section will be included in a thematic category according to its main topic and to its influence and importance for the theme. To do so, the table, to be found in the annex, gives the title of each section, summarizes it, picks out key words or the main topic of the section to order it in a category. These summaries reveal the theme of each section. Some sections could be ordered in several categories: however, each categorization will be justified. The main themes are: Territory, Politics, Security, Population, Economy.

- The category "Territory" encompasses all proposals that include a territorial matter, that is to say: Borders, Jerusalem, Crossings and Appendix 1, which summarizes, in two maps, the future organization of the territory.
- The category "Politics" gathers every proposal related to the general framework of the Plan, peace making and peaceful relationships, mutual recognition and the conditions for Palestine to become a State. Thus, this part is about the political process accompanying peace negotiations (politics), political goals to achieve peace (policies) and the creation of a political system for Palestine on a national and international scale (polities).
- The category "Security" includes all sections related with security and defense. This part is straightforward to organize, apart from the section entitled "Gaza Criteria". Its

categorization in "Security" is due to the fact that Israel considers Gaza to be a major threat for its security and its proposals mostly deal with demilitarization.

- The category "Population" regroups two types of topics. On the one hand, the Plan proposes to improve the life of populations (cf. Dead Sea Resort Area). On the other hand, it gives guidelines to handle the flow of people in the region (cf. Prisoners, Refugees).
- "Economy" regroups the conditions of implementation of the economic plan, of trade deals, the use of port facilities, Water and Wastewater Treatment.

Wendt (1999, 201ff.) also uses five categories to define the state, which tend to match those used in this paper: territory, institutional-legal order, monopoly on the use of legitimate violence, society, sovereignty. This "content structuring" is different from the one proposed by P. Mayring (2007, 81), insofar as it is not theory-laden but thematically organized. Theory intervenes in the following subsection.

#### 4.3. Identities and interests in the foreground - Assessment criteria

Just like Wendt explains, identities are at the basis of interests, which shape how actors act on the world stage and interact with other actors. Therefore, identities and interests have to be satisfied if one wants to change the status quo or the current situation of a conflict. Otherwise, peace negotiations can be counterproductive. Many factors, observed by Mac Ginty (2010), prevent peace negotiations to "deliver peace". Interests and identities give constructivists guidelines to understand why an actor reacts the way he does. Indeed, realists focus on expected behaviors, which makes them unable to understand their cause and the possibility of change. If proposals are considered negatively by a party, this could mean that a unilateral decision to implement them could lead to dissatisfaction, to the abandonment of the proposed two-state solution or to a revival of tensions. If the West Bank and Gaza have competing or different identities and interests, this could mean that even the Palestinian side does not predominantly aim at founding a state and at reuniting both parts of Palestine anymore. To find out about this, Wendt's theory has to be codified, in order to establish the systematic rules used to analyze the Plan. Simply put, interests and identities can be satisfied positively if the actor is satisfied by the proposal (+), negatively if it is not satisfied (-), or neutral if the proposal does not change its initial situation at all (/). Moreover, one actor might not be directly concerned by a proposal, might only have an opinion regarding its effects or it might not change the current situation radically. This leads to the following codification, which will be useful for drawing conclusions:



Table 1: Assessment criteria for Trump's Plan's categories of proposals

++	The actor is <b>directly</b> concerned by the proposal and the latter satisfies <b>positively</b> its interests and identities.
+	The actor is <b>indirectly</b> concerned by the proposal and the latter satisfies <b>positively</b> its interests and identities.
/	The actor is <b>not concerned</b> by the proposal and the latter has <b>no effect</b> on its interests and identities.
-	The actor is <b>indirectly</b> concerned by the proposal and the latter <b>does not satisfy</b> its interests and identities.
--	The actor is <b>directly</b> concerned by the proposal and the latter <b>does not satisfy</b> its interests and identities.

Own illustration

## 5. Getting into the substance

### - Qualitative Analysis of Trump's Peace Plan

Now that all variables have been operationalized, it is time to cross them, meaning to confront Trump's Plan to the identities and interests of the actors; categories (Territory, Politics, Security, Population, Economy) to the codification (++, +, /, -, --).

#### 5.1. Territory and land

**Blurred Borders.** Territory is one of the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, since it has religious, economic, and symbolic meaning. There have been many land swaps since the creation of the State of Israel. Even now, the borders are not clearly defined, having significant consequences on identities and interests. On the one hand, Israel cultivates this uncertainty by having no written constitution (Falah 2003, 183), but only Basic Laws. Israel may take advantage of an unclear territorial situation to pursue its strategy of territorial "expansion", "maximization", "hegemony", embedded in a "territorial ideology" (Falah 2005, 1344). Wendt recognizes it: "even though territory must have boundaries of some kind [...], the breadth and depth of this boundary may vary" (Wendt 1999, 211). On the other hand, the uncertainty generates senses of fear and vulnerability on the side of Israelis, as well as Palestinians. To satisfy the need for stability, Trump's Plan puts forward the creation of clear borders under Israel's control, as shown in the following Map 1 (The White House 2020, 42). Yet, the Palestinians are not satisfied with Trump's proposal regarding the distribution of land and strongly feel that they have been dispossessed of their lands. The consequences of the occupation, as well as the Israeli strategy of "enclavisation" or "spatial dismemberment" of Palestinian Territories (Falah 2005, 1345) led them to be increasingly attached to their land.

Map 1: Vision for Peace, Conceptual Map



Source: The White House (2020, 42)



**Attachment to land.** The West Bank and the Gaza Strip have experienced this attachment in a different way. From 2005 on, Israel has unilaterally disengaged from Gaza, putting an end to the occupation. This was however followed in 2007 by the Israeli blockade of Gaza in order to isolate the territory, reinforcing the feeling of oppression. Now, Trump's Plan proposes to increase the size of Gaza by providing additional agricultural and industrial zones. This may be seen as an opportunity to finally improve a disastrous humanitarian situation in a poor and overcrowded territory. Gaza's identity, marked by years of isolation and extreme living conditions, leads to the following interests: gaining land and taking land back. Hamas, currently controlling the Gaza Strip, puts the defense of its land in the spotlight in its charter: "the Palestinian cause in its essence is a cause of an occupied land" (Hamas 2017, 4) and "Hamas believes that no part of the land of Palestine shall be compromised or conceded" (Hamas 2017, 6). For these reasons, Gaza's interests and identities are being satisfied positively by the Plan (++) . Israel's potential concession of some lands around Gaza highlights its strategy: consolidating already existing settlements in the West Bank, rather than "conquering" new territories, like Gaza (Yiftachel 2006, 9). In addition, thanks to the Gaza borders defined by Trump's plan, Israel would isolate itself from Egypt and reduce potential contacts with its Arab neighbor, its former enemy (until the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty). Meanwhile, the West Bank is still under occupation through Israeli settlements. Trump's Plan proposes that Israel annexes the already occupied 30% of the West Bank, endorsing the loss of Palestinian land in order to partly satisfy Israel's "historical right" to Judea and Samaria. In its political platform, the Likud party, currently governing in Israel, reiterates that "Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza are the realization of Zionist values" and "a clear expression of [an] unassailable right" (The State of Israel 1999, 1). Therefore, the West Bank is faced with Israel's intransigence and its dependency on this country. Contrary to Hamas, Fatah, currently governing in the West Bank, shows lesser attachment to land in its charter. Although "liberation" and "revolution" are key words (Fatah 2009), the charter mostly deals with the party's organization rather than with ideological goals. Fatah gives less symbolic importance to the land in official programs. Some Israeli Palestinians accept Jewish settlements better when they "perceive themselves to be integrated together with the Jewish state" and retain "a limited degree of territorial autonomy" (Schnell 1993, 455). As a result, Palestinians living in the West Bank, in contact with Israelis or next to settlements, and those living in territories isolated from any Israeli population like in Gaza, have different stances regarding cohabitation. The degree of acceptance of land loss is one of the major divergences between identities and interests of Palestinians from the West Bank and from Gaza.

**Territorial discontinuity.** Although the Plan aims to bring clarity to Palestinian and Israeli territorial possessions, a problem remains: territorial discontinuity. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank are separated by about sixty kilometers. The Plan proposes to give sovereignty to Israeli settlements located in the West Bank, leading to the fragmentation of the future

Palestinian State. This makes impossible the organization of politics "smoothly" (Robinson 1953, 540 in Falah 2005, 1346). This could be an opportunity for Israel to apply a strategy of "divide and rule", where Palestinians would have "a kind of 'mock' sovereignty over an archipelago of truncated spaces-behind borders" (Falah 2005, 1351). Speaking of sovereignty, Trump's Plan argues that "[t]he notion that sovereignty is a static and consistently defined term has been an unnecessary stumbling block in past negotiations" (The White House 2020, 9). This means that this concept is adaptable, since it is "amorphous" (ibid.). However, the socially constructed notion of sovereignty is required for a state to have authority and autonomy (Wendt 1999, 206ff.), it is "a right and a power" (Wendt n.d.), but Palestinian Territories remain, for now, dependent and stateless. As a result, the West Bank's interests and identities are not being satisfied by the Plan (- -). Territorial discontinuity also reinforces political divisions between Fatah and Hamas in their fight for power. The West Bank and Gaza face a dilemma: if "states are effects of boundary construction as much as they are its causes" (Abbott 1995 in Wendt 1999, 213), a Palestinian State shall be built only thanks to a strong common political will. Territorial organization alone will not allow it.

**Meaning of land.** Israelis and Palestinians share an "ontology of emergency" (Falah 2004, 973) regarding the question of their land. This "ontology of emergency" is present in the Israeli Proclamation of Independence and is linked with the Holocaust: "The catastrophe [...] was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness" (Provisional Government of Israel 1948). Attachment to land is translated into a "buffer zone mentality" (Falah 2004, 957) and a desire to erect walls to protect identities and interests from the Palestinians, physically and psychologically (Lupovici 2012, 827). Israel's doctrine of defensible borders has a "'Hobbesian' meaning" and borders are "walls of exclusion to be policed and defended at all costs" (Wendt 1999, 212). The Israeli territorial ideology also stems from security imperatives due to historically traumatic events for the Jewish people, including the Holocaust. As Wendt emphasizes, "states will come to define their (and our) security in terms of preserving their 'property rights' over particular territories" (Wendt 1992, 414). However, he argues that preserving a state's territory does not equate enabling its survival, since this idea is socially constructed. He justifies it by taking the example of Israel, not willing to separate itself from the West Bank: Israel prefers to endanger its security with terrorist attacks rather than to cede territory, the very same symbol of its sovereignty and security. The following sentence grasps perfectly the fear of losing one's identity through land: a "loss of that land, or the threat of its loss [...] implies the loss of the self" (Northrup 1989, 68f.). Since the Plan does not radically change the scope of its territorial possessions and gives the possibility to control and erect borders, Israel's interests and identities are being satisfied positively (+). Identities and interests from the West Bank and Gaza diverge in some important respects, since they have been formed in two distinct spaces, making Trump's Plan more acceptable for Gaza and Israel than for the West Bank.

## 5.2. Politics, Polities, Policies

Trump's proposals in the political domain are representative of a broad classical discourse, willing to remind values that Wendt would characterize as socially constructed, including "effectiveness", "pragmatism", and "realism".

**United Nations and international support.** Quite remarkable is the criticism of the involvement of the United Nations in the peace process and the Plan's appeal to ignore existing resolutions. Yet, the Palestinian Authority shows a growing desire for visibility on the world stage and mostly through the United Nations. For example, it applied to be recognized as a non-voting state by the organization. Since 2012, the "State of Palestine" (as it is referred to by the United Nations) possesses the status of non-member observer state and is allowed to join some international bodies and treaties, such as the International Criminal Court. Moreover, President of the Palestinian Authority Abbas rejected Trump's Plan officially in front of the United Nations Security Council. He stated on February 11, 2020, that the Plan "legitimized what is illegal" and he reaffirmed "the Palestinian position that rejects the Israeli-American proposal" (Anadolu Agency 2020). While the Palestinian Authority receives some international attention, Hamas in Gaza is hardly considered as a political party, but rather as a terror organization by the United States, Israel and the European Union among others. It is also absent and isolated from the international stage, increasing the gap between the West Bank and Gaza. The Plan leaves Gaza isolated, making its interests and identities unsatisfied by it (- -). Nevertheless, both territories seek help and recognition from Arab states. This identification to the Arab or pan-Arab identity was triggered mostly by the 1948 "catastrophe" that gave birth to the state of Israel, the *Nakba* (Mi'ari 2009, 583), as thousands of Palestinians fled to neighboring Arab countries. Nowadays, the Arab identity resonates mainly with cultural roots, solidarity among Arab people in the Middle East and enables to gather Arab Palestinian people living in Israel (Amara and Schnell 2004, 187). This Arab solidarity has eroded. As proof, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have concluded a deal with Israel and the United States on August 14, 2020, in order to normalize diplomatic relations. In return, Israel proposed to delay the annexation of settlements in the West Bank. This may mark the end of a friendship in the Wendtian sense (entities recognizing their rights of existence and helping each other when one of them is being threatened) between the Palestinian Territories and some Arab states. The Palestinian political leader Hanan Ashravi declared: "May you never be sold out by your 'friends'" on August 13, 2020, on Twitter (n.p. 2020). Following the Plan's release and the conclusion of this deal, the United States and Palestine have cut all diplomatic relations; the United States have even imposed economic sanctions on the territory (Laurentin 2020).

**Israeli "go-it-alone attitude".** Israel believes itself to be an exceptional (Siniver 2012, 25) or *sui generis* state, due to an ongoing feeling of past powerlessness (Hadar 2019, 14). It

generates a sense of differentiation and superiority, and a behavior influenced by patriotism, mobilization, action, solidarity and unity within the country (Hadar 2019, 13). While Palestinians are looking for allies, Israelis cultivate their independence and "go-it-alone attitude" (Siniver 2012, 32). As described by two Neo-realist scholars, Mearsheimer and Walt (2008), the Israeli "go-it-alone attitude" complicates the communication between the United States and Israel, despite their privileged relationship. For example, here are some telling headings of the Israeli newspaper *The Jerusalem Post*, all issued on August 11, 2020: "Placing annexation in Trump's hands will cost Netanyahu at the ballot box" (Lazaroff 2020), "After Charlottesville, Trump violated Washington's promise to US Jews" (Shapiro 2020), "Is the US really the reason Netanyahu is not annexing settlements?" (Harkov 2020), "America's unpredictability casts doubt on annexation" (Keinon 2020), "PA renews security coordination with the US after annexation halt" (n.p. 2020). This also reveals that the Israeli-American friendship may suffer from mistrust, perhaps coming from the Israeli constant feeling of vulnerability (Hadar 2019, 13). Because the Plan gives Israel a significant autonomy in its interpretation and implementation, Israel's identities and interests to be independent are being satisfied positively (+). The categorization (++) cannot be given because of Israel's "go-it-alone attitude" that implies its relative detachment from world politics.

In the French language, *politiques* designates at the same time politics, polities, and policies. The distinction is important. Here, politics refer to the strategic competition for power, the formulation and politicization of social cleavages and the interaction of a state with its social environment (Leca 2012). After having described the positions of the three actors towards the "politics" of Trump's Plan, let us do the same with the polities (the institutional system, the structure, the rules: symbols of states' identities or interests) and policies (what states do, their objectives and roles, how they deal with issues, their political solutions).

**Internal cohesion.** The Plan requires Palestine to organize a system of government in order to be recognized as a state. However, while the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has governed intermittently for more than one decade, creating a relative stability, Palestine is torn between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas-led government in Gaza. The lack of internal cohesion is mainly due to two factors. Firstly, the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas, leading to a bloody conflict between 2006 and 2011, has profoundly transformed the identities and interests from the West Bank and Gaza. Fatah members in Gaza and Hamas members in the West Bank are sometimes either forced to flee or are being imprisoned, tortured by their rivals (Arte G.E.I.E. 2020). Rivalries even occur within political parties, Fatah being for example highly corrupt. Secondly, the Palestinian political system is marked by loyalties to clans and local leaders; "parochial identities" (Mi'ari 2009, 580). Corruption, poverty, the fragmentation of Palestinian Territories and the failure of political peace processes have increased the importance of this identity. Moreover, Palestinian parties are getting weaker and the Palestinian Authority supports these clans, or

tribes (*ibid.*, 594). The importance of tribal councils and of the tribal judiciary system reveals a pluralism in the formal and informal justice systems, which complicates the organization of a unified democratic rule (Khalil 2009, 181). This contributes to the disconnect between inhabitants of Gaza and of the West Bank. Contrary to the loyalty to a strong government expected by the Plan, a future State of Palestine will probably struggle to unify politically in order to apply the same polities. For example, the Plan requires Hamas to let Fatah govern in Gaza if Hamas does not reject violence. Therefore, the West Bank's interests and identities are being satisfied positively (++) , since the Plan proposes to legitimize Fatah's rule over Gaza, but the internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas makes it illusory.

**Institutional-legal orders.** Wendt does not focus on domestic politics but on world politics. However, he recognizes that "some state identities and interests stem primarily from relations to domestic society ('liberal', 'democratic'), others from international society ('hegemon', 'balancer')" (Wendt 1994, 385). Thus, domestic society and "institutional-legal orders" (Wendt 1999, 203), that are the political, judicial and educational systems, form who states are. Indeed, the educational system contributes to the formation of societies' identities and interests. This explains the importance given to the Plan's section dedicated to this matter. Education and the formation of a Jewish culture are constructed by the Israeli government, leading some to call "for the turning of 'Jewish' into a product of the educational effort instead of a tautological prefix" (Bekerman 2001, 469). Israelis project on the Palestinians their consciousness of creating a patriot responding to the "Sabra" archetype, rather than to the "ugly Israeli" (Sela-Sheffy 2004, 479). Therefore, the Plan requires Palestinians to reform what they teach the younger generation to promote peace, since "[e]ducation policy tries to teach children to become loyal citizens" (Wendt 1999, 210). Israelis demonstrate a very profound sense of belonging (Hadar 2019, 17) and give much importance to citizenship. At school, but not only, a secularization movement operates a shift from "Jewishness" to "Israeliness" (Hadar 2019, 8). Overall, the Israeli society appears to defend "post-Zionism", the emphasis of democratic values rather than religious ones (*ibid.*, 19). Israel indeed defines itself as a democratic state in one of its fourteen Basic Laws: "The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state" (The Knesset 1992). All this could explain the relative discretion of the Plan regarding religious matters, and the emphasis on the importance of education and democratic rule in a future State of Palestine. Speaking of national and religious identities, Palestinians struggle to build, or rebuild, a Palestinian identity. Although the latter was particularly strong during the Second Intifada in the 2000's, the Muslim identity is slowly gaining importance thanks to the popularity of the Islamic party of Hamas (Mi'ari 2009, 591). For example, in July-August 2001, inhabitants identified mainly with the Palestinian identity (19,3-point difference with the Muslim identity), but in April 2006, the gap had reduced to a 7,6-point difference, making the religious identity a determining feature of the Palestinian society: the adult population in the West Bank and in the Gaza

Strip identified mainly with the Palestinian identity (50,5%), closely followed by the Muslim and Christian identities (42,9%) (Mi'ari 2009, 590). The gap between both identifications had decreased. Diverging identities make it difficult to articulate common interests.

### 5.3. Between Physical and Ontological Security

The security argument reveals competing identities and interests. All three actors share characteristics and attributes (a social identity) in this domain: they are mutually hostile, suspicious and demonize the Other (Hadar 2019, 8). Yet, this shared identity involves different role identities, which "take the dependency on culture and thus Others one step further." (Wendt 1999, 227).

**Military culture.** To begin with, Israelis have a military culture that shapes their behavior. Israel is one of a few countries to possess nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. This culture is also notably illustrated by the paramount importance of the compulsory army service and the Israel Defense Forces as socializing agents (Hadar 2019, 10). The need for a reliable and strong defense system comes from the feeling that each military threat is a potential new Holocaust and from a "rhetoric of enemy Nazification" (ibid., 16). Physical and ontological securities are basic interests, parts of a state's corporate identity (Wendt 1994, 385). Therefore, the Plan repeatedly spotlights the "security criteria" and the fight against terrorism to protect Israel. For these reasons, Israel's interests and identities are being satisfied positively by the Plan (++).

**Ontological security.** Often, security threats are intersubjective and socially constructed, since they are the result of interactions: "Identities and interests are relationship-specific, not intrinsic attributes of a 'portfolio'" (Wendt 1992, 408f.). Siniver's constructivist framework (2012) enables a thorough analysis of "Israeli identities and the politics of threat". He argues that the demographic threat represented by the rapidly growing Palestinian population contributes to the Israeli feeling of insecurity and fear for survival. Israelis truly believe that they have no "room for error" (Siniver 2012, 37). Trump's plan itself emphasizes that "the State of Israel has no margin for error" in terms of security (The White House 2020, 7). This recalls the post-positivist notion of "securitization", the making of an issue into a security issue. Thus, identity and security are strongly linked. Threats to security induce threats to identities: "Self-help security systems evolve from cycles of interaction in which each party acts in ways that the other feels are threatening to the self, creating expectations that the other is not to be trusted. Competitive or egoistic identities are caused by such insecurity" (Wendt 1992, 406). In order not to be threatened and to preserve their ontological security, states need to secure their identities (Lupovici 2012). An "ontological dissonance" occurs when several identities are threatened simultaneously and that solving the issues implies contradicting solutions. For example, the Second Intifada was perceived as a multiple



threat to Israeli identities. As a result, Israel decided to build a separation barrier and to disengage from the Gaza Strip. These responses, avoidance and unilateralism, aggravated the situation (Lupovici 2012, 810). This example of ontological dissonance illustrates perfectly the causal effects of real and perceived threats to an identity on the actor's reaction. Trump's Plan potentially represents an ontological dissonance for Palestinians. The qualitative analysis of the Plan indeed demonstrates that people from Gaza and from the West Bank are likely to perceive the Plan as a multiple source of threat to their identities and interests. As underlined by the introduction, this may explain Palestinians' quiet reaction: they prefer to avoid confrontation, as a result of an ontological dissonance.

**Demilitarization and armed struggle.** The Israel-Palestine enmity can be explained with "processes of identity-formation under anarchy [which] are concerned first and foremost with preservation or 'security' of the self" (Wendt 1992, 399). And contrary to a collective security system such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Israel and Palestine identify cognitively negatively with each other. The realist notion of security dilemma is to Wendt "a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each others' intentions" (Wendt 1995, 73). To cope with the security dilemma and to defend itself, Israel has an organized and powerful army, while Palestine uses militias and smaller independent groups. Indeed, the Palestinian master narrative includes four aspects: unjust land dispossession (5.1 Territory), powerlessness (5.2 Politics) and above all, "existential security under risk" and resistance (Hammack 2010 in Silva Guimarães 2010, 542). Trump's Plan requires that the West Bank and Gaza fully demilitarize and delegate their defense and security to Israel. Yet, these entities have built their identities upon the idea of (armed) resistance against the enemy. In addition, Palestinian political parties cultivate an ambiguous stance towards armed struggle and terrorism (like suicide attacks). Hamas still claims violence: "Resisting the occupation with all means and methods is a legitimate right [...]. At a heart of these, lies armed resistance" (Hamas 2017, 7). As a result, Gaza's interests and identities are not being satisfied by the Plan, mainly because of the requirement to demilitarize (- -). The West Bank and Gaza once again have formed diverging identities and interests. Indeed, Fatah (meaning "to conquer") abandoned terrorism in 1988, as a will to negotiate with Israel and to choose the "diplomatic way". Moreover, both parties apply different methods: while Hamas attracts and recruits in universities and mosques by spotlighting a strong ideology, Fatah relies mainly on international support as well as financial funds (Tahhan 2017, n.p.). Although the West Bank's interests and identities are not being satisfied by the Plan (-), it does not radically change the current situation since Palestinian security forces already cooperate with the Israeli ones. Just like Trump's Plan, Fatah has asked Hamas to abandon armed resistance in an attempt to reconcile in 2017, but Hamas relies on violence to make the party legitimate in the eyes of the population and is not eager to abandon it. Nevertheless, Hamas takes part in elections since 2005 and its political branch seems to distance itself from the

military one. For example, when a Hamas official declared on July 12, 2019 that Palestinians should attack Jews, Hamas responded immediately: "Hamas has condemned and continues to condemn any attacks against the Jews and their worship houses worldwide" (Einhorn and Joffre 2019, n.p.). All in all, Gaza is not likely to accept to disarm, contrary to the West Bank. This is one of the core issues regarding the implementation of Trump's Plan and the establishment of a State of Palestine. Although security seems to be a realist topic, Wendt gives credibility to this "objective interest" (Wendt 1999, 234), that explains the reluctance of both Israelis and Palestinians to implement the Plan.

#### 5.4. Population, Society

A popular uprising could endanger the peace process, making the following category crucial for the Plan's success. Wendt uses the term "society" rather than "population" and he often describes the importance of "state-society relations": "State actors are differentiated from their societies, but internally related to them: no society, no state." (Wendt 1999, 209).

**Victimhood, victimization and trauma.** Trump's Plan proposes to contribute to Palestinians' well-being by building a Dead Sea resort area under Israeli control, accessible to everybody. Two other controversial proposals affect first and foremost the population: the management of prisoners and refugees. Israelis and Palestinians share, in their identities, senses of victimhood, victimization and trauma due to their history. In Israel, to the Holocaust. In Palestine, to the exodus following the *Nakba* and the 1967 Six-Day War. In both cases, thousands of people were forced to flee, making Israelis and Palestinians understand each other in some respect. Some call it "shared destiny", "collective victimhood", but also a "competitive victimhood" to know who has suffered the most (Hadar 2019, 8). Israel tries to overcome its wounds thanks to policies of redemption (Falah 2004, 973), for example land grabs. Quite remarkably, Israel has implemented the "Absentees' Property Law" in 1950, stipulating that possessions of Palestinian refugees should be taken in charge by Israel until their return. This law was lastly amended in 2009. The Knesset operated a legal shift allowing the privatization of land against UN General Assembly Resolution 194. The amended Prescription Law stipulates that farmers must prove that they cultivated or occupied their land during a number of years ("prescription period") in order to take it back (The State of Israel 2009), which makes the procedure more complex. This issue among others, preventing the return of Palestinian refugees, is not dealt with in the Plan.

**Right to return.** This issue reiterates that land is crucial in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (cf. 5.1), although this is not only a matter of territory, but also of people. Palestinian refugees are torn between their identity as refugees "living in a condition of 'permanent temporariness'" and their willingness to build a proper life in Palestine (Salih 2020). Even if they were eager to chose the second option, the right to return, cherished by international law, is not being



accorded to Palestinian refugees. In contrast, Israel has benefited from the "Law of Return" since 1950: "every Jew has the right to come to this country as an *oleh* [immigrant]" (The Knesset 1950). The legal apparatus reinforces the gap between some Israelis, whose status has changed from settlers to citizens, and some Palestinians, whose status has downgraded from citizens to refugees or "second-zone citizens". This generates a significant sense of alienation among them (Yiftachel 2006, 4). Trump's Plan wants to terminate the right to return, as well as financial compensations to refugees. Israel's interests and identities are being satisfied positively (++)), since the right to return of Palestinian refugees represented a source of demographic threat for Israel, but this reinforces the resentment between Israelis and Palestinians. Thus, the West Bank's and Gaza's interests and identities are not being satisfied by the Plan (- -). Moreover, those laws separate not only Israel and Palestine, but also Palestinians among themselves. The Palestine Liberation Organization defends three inalienable rights: the rights of self determination, to an independent state and to return (Palestine Liberation Organization 1974). The right to return of refugees being a milestone of Palestinian identity, the rivalry between supporters of Fatah and Hamas was heightened by the following affair. The 2011 Palestine Papers revealed misunderstandings and disagreements between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. On this occasion, the Arab newspaper Al Jazeera published secret documents from negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel (of which Gaza was not part). It appeared that the Palestinian President Abbas had given up on the right of return: only 10,000 refugees would be allowed to return, while some others could potentially be resettled in South America. Hamas took this opportunity to reject the Palestinian Authority's methods. Senior Hamas official in Gaza al-Zahar declared that the "Palestinian Authority officials should be ashamed of themselves" (n.p. 2011).

**Art and culture.** Not only political programs but also art and culture influence the way populations perceive dispossession, oppression, and reconciliation (Tibawi 1963). The Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish dedicated a major part of his work to the issue of refugees: "what will we do without exile?" (Darwish 2007). His poetry expresses an important aspect of Palestinian identity : "You ask: What is the meaning of 'refugee'? They will say: One who is uprooted from his homeland.You ask: What is the meaning of 'homeland'? They will say: The house, the mulberry tree, the chicken coop, the beehive, the smell of bread, and the first sky. You ask: Can a word of eight letters be big enough for all of these, yet too small for us?" (Darwish 2011, 38). Also a political activist, Darwish exposed his ambivalent views on Hamas: "we woke up from a coma to see a monocolored flag (of Hamas) do away with the four-color flag (of Palestine)" (n.p. 2008). In addition, he declared himself skeptical regarding the reunion of both Palestines: "we became independent. Gaza became independent of the West Bank, and for one people, two countries, two prisons" (n.p. 2007). Darwish's art illustrates how much the refugee issue splits Israel and Palestine but also Palestine itself. In comparison, Israel tries to make the diverse origins of its population a strength to its Jewish

identity. It is, according to the American model, a "melting pot" (Hadar 2019, 10), but also an "ethnocracy", in which the Jewish majority controls the state to satisfy its interests (Yiftachel 2006, 32). Society is "what people make of it", often through imitation (Wendt 1999, 325). Prisoners and refugees are constitutive of the Palestinian society though they are not physically present on Palestinian territory. Whereas the Palestinian Authority appears to be willing to compromise, Hamas in Gaza holds to the right to return for refugees and prisoners. Therefore, abolishing the latter would complicate the implementation a two-state solution.

### 5.5. Economic Well-Being

One spontaneously relates the economic argument to the "material" rather than the "social" and therefore to a rationalist more than a reflectivist analysis. However, Wendt identifies the economic well-being as one of the four needs linked with national objective interests (with physical survival, autonomy and collective self-esteem) (Wendt 1999, 198).

**Inequalities.** The state of each actors' economy is telling of the huge gaps between the development of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. In 2018, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita equated 37,994.181 USD in Israel (World Economic Outlook Database 2019) and 3198.9 USD in the West Bank and Gaza (The World Bank Data n.d.). The West Bank and Gaza also show significant differences in their GDP per capita (Makovsky and Felder 2011), whose evolution was more than two times lower in Gaza in 2014 (International Monetary Fund 2016, 4). Israel is a welfare state, perfectly integrated in the global market. It is "Very Highly Developed" according the United Nations Human Development Index, thanks to its number of startups (the second highest after the United States), its high technologies and R&D (Katz 2018). In contrast, Palestine relies on foreign aid, mainly from Israel and the United Nations, suffers from unemployment and low living conditions (Makovsky and Felder 2011). Gaza, which relies on the Palestinian Authority to fund many salaries and infrastructures, faces a disastrous economic situation. All in all, it is fair to say that Israel has an ambitious and developed economy. Meanwhile, the West Bank tries to emerge economically and Gaza tries to survive in a tense humanitarian situation. Palestinian Territories are highly dependent on Israel, since Israel is able to use economic ties as a means of pressure to obtain political concessions. The economic argument makes it necessary to "refer to violence that is not really force, like the 'structural' violence to which disadvantaged groups may be subjected by structures of economic, racial, or other kinds of oppression" (Wendt 1999, 204).

**Water issue.** Palestinians experience this oppression in their daily lives, for example through the prism of water and energy restrictions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a social environmental conflict, analyzed through Ide's constructivist framework (2016). Israel and Palestinian Territories fight over this resource. Water is crucial in the traditional Zionist

ideology, because it enables to cultivate land, and hence, to settle and create a "Jewish homeland" (Ide 2016, 77). Therefore, the *chalutz*, or pioneer, contributes to the building of a Jewish state thanks to water, enabling a redemption following the Holocaust. For Palestinians, water represents an "attribute of the land", the latter being occupied by the Israelis. Thus, a loss of control over water means a loss of control over the land, and by extension the abandon of the principles of self determination and of the formation of a Palestinian state. Palestinian identity builds itself around the "myth of the *fellah*, who works and sustains his land even in the worst of circumstances (and needs water to do that)" (emphasis in the original, Ide 2016, 78). Therefore, water has symbolic, security-related and economic meaning. Since "[e]conomic well-being refers to the maintenance of the mode of production in a society and, by extension, the state's resource base" (emphasis in the original, Wendt 1999, 236), outcomes of peace negotiations highly depend on the repartition of water. Trump's Plan proposes to reform the management of water and wastewater treatment, which can only be welcomed positively by Gaza and the West Bank (+ +).

**Capitalism.** The Plan wants to give "prosperity" to the future Palestinian state, but it is also an opportunity for Israel to expand economically by finding new outputs among Arab states and multiplying free trade agreements. Therefore, it satisfies its interest and identities economically (+ +), since the need for economic well-being has become part of Israel's "historically contingent type identities" (Wendt 1999, 236). Indeed, Israel is a capitalist state since 1967 (Hadar 2019, 18). It has transformed its system from a "state-controlled mixed market and later toward globalizing neoliberalism" (Yiftachel 2006, 7). Moreover, the Israeli political debate has been transformed by capitalism. The left-right polarization concerns no longer the management of social and economic issues, but the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Right-wing parties, such as Netanyahu's conservative Likud, are less willing to negotiate with Palestinian Territories. In its political platform, the Likud claims for example that the "Palestinians can run their lives freely in the framework of self-rule, but not as an independent and sovereign state" (The State of Israel 1999, 3).

**Cooperation.** Wendt emphasizes that cooperation is possible as a consequence of the transformation of identities and interests (Wendt 1992, 395). Accordingly, the Israeli capitalist identity does not exclude cooperation. Since the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel and the Palestinian Authority cooperate (Hendrix and Balousha 2020): Israel collects taxes and import duties, which compose two thirds of the Palestinian Authority's revenues, and issues work and travel permits for Palestinians. Meanwhile, both countries' military forces cooperate in order to limit violence. However, cooperation was terminated by Abbas, as Netanyahu confirmed his willingness to annex Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinian intransigence, also present in the Israeli identity, is also a means of pressure against Israel. Gaza's dramatic humanitarian situation, already reinforced by the Coronavirus crisis, should

not be deteriorated by what could be seen as Israeli restrictions, tarnishing Israel's image on the world stage. Indeed, some ask why the European Union, though sanctioning Russia economically because of its actions in Crimea, and its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, does not reduce its economic ties with Israel (Kamel 2020). As a matter of fact, the European Union is Israel's largest trading partner and this relationship is protected by a free-trade agreement between them. Accordingly, the multiplication of free trade agreements and the increase of goods and assets mobility are key goals of Trump's Plan. For purposes of mobility, Gaza and the West Bank should be allowed to use port facilities to export and import goods. The Palestinian identity is characterized by a high ability of resilience (Pirinoli 2005, 77), due to its long-lasting economic dependence on external aids and infrastructures. Sharing port facilities could be a way to satisfy the Palestinian Territories' interests.

"Some economists see the market as an institution constituted by shared ideas, others see only material forces." (Wendt 1999, 16): in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, economy influences people's way of life and serves as a means of political pressure, of oppression. Thus, the material element is convincing to analyze social structures, identities and interests.

## 6. Concluding Remarks

### 6.1. Israel, Gaza, and West Bank: why not a Three-State Solution?

#### - Interpretation of the findings


The outcomes of the qualitative analysis are gathered in the following table and radar chart. Graph 1 enables to find out whether Israel, the West Bank or the Gaza Strip are closer to satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The closer to the center, the less the country is satisfied.

Table 2: Degree of compatibility of the identities and interests of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, applied to categories of the Trump Plan's proposals

	<i>Israel</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Gaza Strip</i>
Territory	+	--	++
Politics	+	++	--
Security	++	-	--
Population	++	--	--
Economy	++	++	++

Own illustration

Graph 1: Degree of compatibility of the interests and identities of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, applied to categories of Trump's Plan's proposals



Own illustration

- Israel's chart gets close to the ideal case (in green), where identities and interested are fully satisfied, except the categories Politics and Territory, where Trump's proposals did not trigger any major change in the current situation. Israel's identities and interests are overall corroborated by the proposed two-state solution, even though this kind of chart does not enable to go into details.
- The West Bank's chart illustrates mixed results: whereas its identities and interests are corroborated by two categories, Politics and Economy, the proposals from the other three categories violate its identities and interests.
- Likewise, the Gaza Strip's identities and interests are not satisfied by a majority of proposals, since only two categories corroborate them (Territory and Economy), while the others contradict them.

This leads to the first conclusion: while Israel's identities and interests are predominantly corroborated by the proposed two-state solution, this is less so in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Three out of five categories of Trump's Plan contradict their identities and interests. In addition, the outcomes of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip differ. While the West Bank's identities and interests are satisfied by the category Politics, those of the Gaza Strip are corroborated by the category Territory. Both agree on "Economy". Moreover, the West Bank and Gaza do not always feel concerned by the same categories: the West Bank is less negatively concerned by "Security" than the Gaza Strip. Both agree on "Population", which is viewed negatively. These findings lead to the second conclusion: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, who are supposed to form a unified State of Palestine, have different and

sometimes opposing interests and identities, leading to different stances toward the proposed two-state solution. In sum, the quantitative analysis of Trump's Peace Plan has given two interesting outcomes for the research question: (1) Israel has competing interests and identities with the West Bank and Gaza and is often favored by Trump's proposals and (2) the interests and identities of the West Bank and Gaza are not similar. This paper did not only aim at determining the actors' satisfaction with Trump's Plan but has also made an assessment of the relations between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Between socio-economical differences, making two different populations, and political rivalries, leading to bloody conflicts, it appears less and less credible to gather these two territories in one state. A state is of course composed of different identities and interests and is not homogeneous, but forming a common state necessitates that both territories identify with each other and form a collective identity, in a Kantian anarchy in the Wendtian sense.

The will to build a unified Palestinian State, presented in the Plan, is the current paradigm in peace negotiations for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it is seriously being questioned by the second outcome of the analysis. Now, the difficulties to organize a two-state solution leads to an alternative: the three-state solution. This paper wants to set the so-called two-state solution aside, and to privilege a "three-state solution", where the Gaza Strip and the West Bank would be two different states, with different modes of functioning, identities and interests. This situation is not so far from reality: the West Bank and Gaza form two distinct territories (territory); they are governed by two different entities, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza (politics); both governments have different stances regarding the organization of defense and security, including demilitarization (security); there is no or rare communication between both populations, either because of the difficulty to travel between both territories or to access means of telecommunication (population). Inhabitants from the West Bank also tend to be willing to reproduce the Israeli way of life inspired by a "Western" one, by speaking English rather than Arab for example (Arte G.E.I.E. 2020). Gaza remains relatively dependent on financial contributions from the Palestinian Authority (economy). On-the-ground realities have a major influence on both territories' identities and interests. Consciously or unconsciously, they have developed two different state embryos. Therefore, the difficulty to implement a two-state solution is being reinforced by the difficulty to organize a unified State of Palestine. A three-state solution does not solve all issues and requires compromise from all parties, but to the question whether Palestine should be reunited or separated, the three-state solution makes the choice to separate conflicting territories, in order to enable a peace process between Israel and both territories separately. With a three-state solution,

- Gaza could organize its state around the newly acquired territory on behalf of the Plan. Its next challenges would be to be recognized on the world stage as a sovereign and independent entity (Politics). A conservative Hamas-led government would probably mean



the reinforcement of the place of religion in society. Another challenge would be to control the demographic explosion in order to limit poverty. It would have to increase its economic activities in order to decrease its dependence to aid, and abandon armed struggle and violence, apart from the monopoly of legitimate violence characterizing modern states (Security). If Gaza refuses to abandon belligerent stances towards Israel, the latter would certainly oppose itself to the creation of a state.

- Comparatively, the West Bank is closer to the reality of a state. The Palestinian Authority could play with its international resonance to defend its territory and look for funds to launch its economy. The West Bank's next challenges would be to manage corruption in order to give credibility to the authority. One of its greatest difficulties is the relationship to Israel: are they willing to recognize each other as sovereign and independent states and to introduce a Kantian friendship in the Wendtian sense?
- Israel's identities and interests are not fundamentally challenged by Trump's Plan. The latter aims at confirming, legalizing some controversial issues, such as Israeli settlements in the West Bank or the control over Jerusalem. Israel is often accused of breaking international law and oppressing Palestinians, which does not better its image within the international community. By implementing a three-state solution, Israel would benefit from a better image and gain trade allies, especially within the Arab world. As Israel has different relationships and levels of trust with Gaza and the West Bank, it would launch separate talks with the two territories.

## 6.2. Imagining a Future for a tormented Region - Discussion

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in constant evolution. Trump's Peace Plan contributes to this evolution, even though it has sometimes been seen a political maneuver to win votes for former President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and has not brought meaningful change in the region so far. Either way, this paper aimed to put the issue back on the table, given the absence of significant reactions after the Plan's release. It discussed whether the two-state solution, especially Trump's version, remains an appropriate tool to achieve peace. It appears that it does not, but that it brings new perspectives to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Trump's Plan could have been an opportunity to fuel Palestinians' desire to reconnect, as was the case with the peace processes preceding the Second Intifada. Hamas and Fatah have attempted to reconcile several times in 2020, in Istanbul and Doha for example. They even agreed on organizing legislative elections (Laurentin 2020). Yet, this does not prevent the identities and interests of the West Bank and Gaza to diverge due to territorial, political, security-related, social and economic issues. Speaking of a two-state solution is unproductive, since it is unclear whether both Palestinian Territories want and are able to form a unified State of Palestine. The idea of a *Three-State Solution* responds to the need to redefine the power constellation in the region. This could be an opportunity for both territories to adapt the peace process with Israel to their special needs, and the path towards

peace and prosperity could perhaps be facilitated with the decrease of the tensions between West Bank and Gaza.

A majority of the identities and interests of Gaza and the West Bank are still being violated by the Plan's proposals. This paper demonstrated that Israel's interests and identities are overall being satisfied by the proposed two-state solution, contrary to the ones of Gaza and the West Bank; maybe because the Palestinian Authority has been only marginally included in negotiations, and Hamas, not at all. This asymmetry represents another obstacle to the implementation of any solution. Of course, the three-state solution raises issues. To begin with, Gaza and the West Bank would still need to organize their governance according to some predefined "Western" models in order to be recognized as states by the international community. Then, it is uncertain if Israel would be willing to accept having two potential enemies instead of one. Finally, some Palestinians certainly still believe in the possibility to build a common state. Let us see what states will make of Trump's Plan. It is likely that the Iranian question as well as the new partnerships between the United States, Israel and some Arab states outweigh the Palestinian cause. Even Donald Trump has stopped defending his two-state solution until the end of his term (Laurentin 2020). Each new U.S. Presidency may potentially trigger a change in the region. What will be the repercussions of Joe Biden's visit in July 2022? In Israel, the unstable political situation will probably be an obstacle to a discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This paper's analysis remained not strictly systemic, but rather "reductionist" in that it aimed to speak of agents rather than structure. In that, it departs from Wendt's systemic analysis (Wendt 1999, 11ff.), but it has hopefully achieved to promote the use of constructivist theories to analyze conflicts and peace processes, more precisely Wendt's theories on states' interests and identities. Focusing on agents has made the limit between International Relations, Sociology and even Psychology quite thin and perhaps opened the possibility to build bridges between them. From a formal perspective, quantitative methods could be useful in order to know whether Palestinians are still eager to form a common state (opinion polls or interviews for example). This is indeed one of the limits of this paper's method: it could be valuable to add quantitative to qualitative data. I would also like encourage those who have been interested in this paper to continue the debate by examining interests and identities in greater depth, in order to find the most appropriate solutions and increase the credibility of the three-state solution.



**Annex: Table 3: Summary and categorization of Trump's Plan (own illustration)**

Title of the Section	Summary of the Content	Main Topics/ Key words	Category
<i>Introduction</i>	<p>The introduction gives the general framework of the Plan: even if the Plan cannot perfectly satisfy all parties, it is necessary and wanted by Palestine (self-determination, social betterment,...) and Israel (who has already exchanged territory with Egypt and Jordan to achieve peace). The Plan follows some guidelines already negotiated with the Oslo Accords, whose greatest achievement was a security cooperation between the Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces. The Plan aims at finding solutions to issues unresolved in 1993.</p> <p>To do that, it presents a "realistic Two-State solution", with the creation of a State of Palestine, whose security matters and airspace would be controlled by Israel. This part recognizes the political divisions between the West Bank and Gaza.</p> <p>(Economic) goals and requirements to the creation of a State of Palestine are being presented, as well as a broader purpose that is to develop relations between Israel and Arab countries to face common security threats, favor human and goods mobility.</p>	<p>Normalization of relations, economic and political goals, peace in the Middle East, Oslo Accords.</p>	<b>Politics</b>
<i>The approach</i>	<p>The Plan recognizes the efforts made by the United Nations to solve the conflict, which are however not enough. This part presents the ideology (compromise, dialogue, openness) and the goals of the Plan (prosperity and security, over sovereignty). Thus, it reminds the "Current Realities", as well as other topics further addressed in sections of the Plan (Jewish and Palestinian refugees, ideology in and control of Gaza, Jerusalem, international assistance...).</p> <p>Israel, already suffering from "extraordinary geographic and geostrategic challenges", should withdraw from some of its territories acquired during a war (in 1967). Terrorism is an important issue.</p> <p>While the United States are a "facilitator", Israel and Palestine should be deciders.</p>	<p>Compromise, learning from the past, recommendations, future.</p>	<b>Politics</b>
<i>A vision for peace between the state of Israel, the Palestinians and the region</i>	<p>Compromise should allow Israel and Palestine to eventually achieve peace thanks to legally binding decisions, and this could hopefully apply to the relationships between Israel and other Arab States.</p>	<p>Political goals, peace for the Middle East, peace between Arab States and Israel.</p>	<b>Politics</b>
<i>Borders</i>	<p>Land swaps should be operated: the Jordan Valley should belong to Israel, the Triangle Communities to Palestine, Gaza should gain territory, 97% of Israeli settlements in the West Bank should be integrated to Israel, 97% of Palestinians in the West Bank should be incorporated in a Palestinian territory, creating both Israeli and Palestinian enclaves. Israeli and Palestinian territories, as well as neighboring countries, should be linked with infrastructures financed by an international fund. Border crossings should be newly built.</p> <p>Religious sites should be accessed by both Israelis and Palestinians.</p> <p>All in all, Israel should not be forced to give 100% of pre-1967 (pre-Six Days War) borders to Palestine as prone by Resolution 242 of the United Nations, but only to give a territory "reasonably comparable" in size. Israel should keep its sovereignty over territorial waters.</p>	<p>Integration, mobility, territorial claims, land swaps, secured borders.</p>	<b>Territory</b>

Title of the Section	Summary of the Content	Main Topics/ Key words	Category
<i>Jerusalem</i>	<p>Jerusalem has strong religious meanings for Christians, Jews and Muslims. That is why it should remain accessible to everybody. Israel should be in charge of taking care of holy sites like it has done since the Six Days War in 1967.</p> <p>Jerusalem should not be physically divided and is recognized by the United States as the capital of Israel, should be internationally. The existing border between Jerusalem and Arab neighborhoods (Al Quds, East of Jerusalem, possibly defined as Palestine's capital) should remain. Arab residents should choose to become citizens of Israel, Palestine or permanent residents in Israel. Embassies should be located in the new capitals (Jerusalem and Al Quds).</p> <p>A tourism zone should be built to satisfy the welcoming of Muslim tourists in Palestine to visit holy sites. Still to be negotiated are a mechanism to allow Palestinian tour guides to work in the Old City and the creation of a Joint Tourism Development Authority to promote tourism, financed by Israel's collection of tax revenues made out of tourism.</p>	<p>Religious status quo, holy sites, capitals, borders, Arab residents, tourism, sovereignty.</p>	<b>Territory</b>
<i>The Trump Economic Plan</i>	<p>The Economic Plan (cf. second part of the Plan) should be implemented after the signing of a peace agreement. Based on the support of three pillars of the Palestinian society (economy, people, government), the Plan aims at investing \$50 million over ten years. This should allow Palestine to fight poverty and develop its own economy thanks to new infrastructures and reforms based on sustainability, transparency, accountability and anti-corruption. The goal is to develop the public and private sectors, in order to enhance education, health, culture, finance, and to reduce unemployment.</p> <p>These measures are bound to three criteria: the establishment of reliable financial institutions able to engage in the international market, a reliable governance system and a legal system in the economic domain.</p>	<p>Prosperity, investment, opportunities, reforms.</p>	<b>Economy</b>
<i>Security</i>	<p>Security is the domain in which no compromise is possible. Security coordination between all actors should be privileged (for example, joint-cooperation with Palestinian Forces, creation of a Security review committee &amp; Regional security committee, a new multi-national security force). Palestine should not dramatically increase its budget for this purpose, since it should be financed by the United States and Israel, the latter "maintaining overriding security responsibility" until Palestine is able to do so (internal security, counterterrorism and others). Palestine should remain "fully demilitarized".</p> <p>Israel should use aerial equipment, maintain an early-warning station and control the security next to Israeli borders in Palestine. A pilot program should be implemented in Palestine in order to make sure that security criteria and objectives are being respected.</p>	<p>Terrorism, demilitarization, cooperation, responsibility.</p>	<b>Security</b>
<i>Crossings</i>	<p>Goods and people should cross borders more rapidly. To do that, Israel should secure and organize borders, while keeping the visibility of its role to a minimum.</p> <p>A "Crossings Board" composed of Israelis, Palestinians and an American should oversee the flow and treatment of people in order to improve it, thanks to non-binding recommendations. This board should also deal with disputes over trade. Even though Palestine should have its own trade policy, it should not be allowed to enter "weapons, dual-use or other security-risk related items" in its territory.</p>	<p>Crossings Board, trade, weapons, borders.</p>	<b>Territory</b>

Title of the Section	Summary of the Content	Main Topics/ Key words	Category
<i>Gaza Criteria</i>	<p>After Israel's disengagement 15 years ago, Hamas' rule over Gaza has led to attacks against Israel, to the diversion of international funds at the cost of the population and to poverty in Gaza. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and all militias, terror organizations should be disarmed, Gaza demilitarized and controlled by either the Palestinian Authority or another responsible body. Moreover, all Israeli captives should be released. If Hamas wants to take part in a government, it should recognize Israel, abandon violence and accept previous agreements. These are prerequisites to the implementation of the Economic Plan.</p>	<p>Terrorism, demilitarization, violence, Hamas.</p>	<b>Security</b>
<i>Free Trade Zone</i>	<p>A Free Trade zone should be established between Palestine and Jordan (goods being exported from an airport located in Jordan).</p>	<p>Economic cooperation, goods, trade.</p>	<b>Economy</b>
<i>Trade agreement with the United States</i>	<p>The United States should negotiate free trade agreements with Palestine. Other countries are encouraged to do so. Meanwhile, already existing duty-free treatments should remain.</p>	<p>Free trade agreements, duty-free.</p>	<b>Economy</b>
<i>Port Facilities</i>	<p>In order for Palestine to develop economically and be integrated in regional and world markets, it should have the opportunity to use two ports in Israel and one in Jordan in order to use cargo ships. Security should be guaranteed by these two states, whereas Palestine should be required to cooperate, assist and finance a part of these infrastructures and to respect Israel's or Jordan's environmental and labor laws. Palestine could have to pay a rental fee to Jordan. Five years following the signing of the Plan, Palestine should be allowed to build its own port on an artificial island in Gaza and an airport for small aircraft.</p>	<p>Earmarked port facility, economic development, transportation.</p>	<b>Economy</b>
<i>Dead Sea resort area</i>	<p>Palestine should be allowed to build a resort area in the North of the Dead Sea with Israel's agreement. Israel should control the road linking the resort area to Palestine and the shorelines, in order to keep on allowing Israeli exchanges of natural resources with Jordan.</p>	<p>Resort area, travel, access to the Sea.</p>	<b>Population</b>
<i>Water and Wastewater Treatment</i>	<p>Israel and Palestine should share existing sources of water, while building new ones thanks to technologies, in order to provide sustainable, "reasonably priced", easy and equal access to water to both populations. Likewise, the treatment of wastewater should be examined in order to avoid pollution and use water efficiently.</p>	<p>Access to water, recycling, pollution.</p>	<b>Economy</b>
<i>Prisoners</i>	<p>Palestinian prisoners should be released (transfer, resettlement) if: they did not commit or aim at committing murder, they are not Israeli, they agree to accept and promote co-existence between Israel and Palestine by signing a pledge. They should become citizens of Palestine. Most "fragile" prisoners should be released first, then others who "have served over half their sentence". For the others, Israeli should consent, individually. Moreover, all Israeli captives should be previously released.</p>	<p>Conditions and clauses of release, detainees, sentences.</p>	<b>Population</b>



Title of the Section	Summary of the Content	Main Topics/ Key words	Category
<i>Refugees</i>	<p>While Israeli refugees have been resettled and should benefit from financial compensations, Palestinian refugees have been isolated (for instance in Kuwait and Lebanon) and deserve proper treatment. They should be absorbed either by Palestine (in a reasonable number), integrated locally in current host countries or resettled "in individual Organization of Islamic Cooperation member countries" (maximum 50000 in total). Financial aid should be redirected to the Economic Plan rather than to refugee compensation in Palestine. However, Palestine should decide how it administers funds thanks to two trustees.</p> <p>A committee should be created to discuss Palestinians' return from a zone hostile to Israel.</p> <p>The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees should be dismantled and "Palestinian refugee status will cease to exist", suppressing the right of return.</p>	<p>Financial compensations, resettlement, refugee status, right of return.</p>	<b>Population</b>
<i>Foundations of a Palestinian State</i>	<p>This part summarizes all conditions for Palestine to become a state: "a governing system with a constitution" organizing basic freedoms, an independent judiciary system, reliable financial institutions, membership to the International Monetary Fund, the end of programs promoting violence and hatred, the demilitarization of the population and its control with civilian and law enforcement.</p> <p>To do that, Palestine should receive the help of the international community, mainly Jordan, so that it can become a member of these international community and organizations, and establishes diplomatic relations.</p>	<p>Conditions to become a state, governance, international community.</p>	<b>Politics</b>
<i>Education and culture of peace</i>	<p>The education of new generations with a culture of peace (end of glorification of violence, of propaganda, of all critique of the Peace Agreement, among others) should be overseen by a joint Commission on Acceptance and Tolerance.</p>	<p>Coexistence, dialogue, acceptance.</p>	<b>Politics</b>
<i>Israeli-Arab relationships; regional economic partnerships</i>	<p>The Plan should be the starting point of a "significant and broader cooperation" between Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and other neighboring states. They should normalize their relations with Israel in order to strengthen economic ties (to become a global hub), counter Iran's policies as well as extremist groups, and to "protect the freedom of navigation through international straits".</p> <p>To do that, these countries should abandon any attempt to boycott Israel (cf. Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement). An Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East should be created to prevent and manage conflicts.</p>	<p>Cooperation, shared interests, economic ties, Iran, boycott.</p>	<b>Economy</b>
<i>Mutual recognition between nation states</i>	<p>The Nation-State of Palestine should recognize the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People. The Nation-State of Israel should recognize the State of Palestine as the nation state of the Palestinian People.</p>	<p>Recognition, nation states.</p>	<b>Politics</b>
<i>End of claims, end of conflict</i>	<p>The Agreement should put an end to all conflicts and claims and this should be confirmed in a United Nations Security Council resolution and a General Assembly resolution.</p>	<p>End of conflict, United Nations resolutions.</p>	<b>Politics</b>

Title of the Section	Summary of the Content	Main Topics/ Key words	Category
<i>Conduct during negotiations</i>	<p>During negotiations, Israelis should not further expand in parts of the West Bank susceptible to become part of Palestine, or demolish existing constructions (except in cases where security is being threatened or in cases of punishment of terrorist acts).</p> <p>Palestinians should not try to join any international organization if Israel does not agree, not sue Israel, the United States and their citizens in an international court, tribunal, non-Israeli or non-American legal system or Interpol.</p> <p>They should also cease any prisoner and martyr payment and redirect these funds to humanitarian and welfare programs, and should develop institutions for self-governance.</p> <p>The United States should "allow the Office of the General Delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to reopen", "open a liaison mission to the Palestinian Authority", begin to put an end to American assistance to Palestinian Territories, "work with the international community".</p>	Prerequisites to further negotiations, guidelines to action.	<b>Politics</b>
<i>Appendix 1: Conceptual Maps</i>	Two maps: "The State of Israel" and "A Future State of Palestine" with captions presenting some future infrastructures.	/	<b>Territory</b>
<i>Appendix 2A: Security Considerations</i>	<p>Israel should be guaranteed special security needs. Indeed, it is currently at war with Lebanon and Syria, faces threat from Iran, who tries to establish a "land bridge" in the Middle East, and from terrorists. Geographic components (like the north-south hill ridge in the West Bank) also increase threats.</p> <p>To counter that, Israel should control the Jordan Valley (cf. secure lines of supply for its forces), organize a special protection for Ben Gurion Airport, the control of the airspace in the West Bank, and should apply its first doctrine: to be able to defend itself by itself, meaning without the help of international forces.</p>	Security threats, defense, permanent state of war, independence.	<b>Security</b>
<i>Appendix 2B: Security Criteria</i>	The Appendix defines the framework to counter terrorism in Palestine. Non-binding metrics (minimum standards) should be established. A system including all elements of counterterrorism and a legal system should be built (to ban terrorism, prosecute and stop rewarding terrorists). The efficiency of such "anti-terror activities" should be assessed by different criteria defined in the paragraph.	Counterterrorism, legal systems, efficient and systematic.	<b>Security</b>
<i>Appendix 2C: Demilitarization Criteria and other Security Arrangements</i>	<p>Israel should make sure that Palestine does not possess or acquire any type of weapons and should destroy them if necessary. The same should apply to Palestinian capabilities outside Palestine. To that purpose, Israel should control international crossings into Palestine, the shores of Gaza, the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.</p> <p>Palestine should not be allowed to join or forge agreements with countries seen as adversary by Israel.</p>	Prohibited weapons, demilitarization, capabilities, blockade.	<b>Security</b>

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