

Responding to Policy Signals? An Experimental Study on Information about Policy Adoption and Data Retention Policy Support in Germany

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Objective. We analyze whether and how individuals react to information about the adoption of a particular policy, with a focus on the role of conservatism. *Methods.* We conducted an online survey experiment on support for data retention in Germany. A recent law on this issue allowed us to test the effects of two policy signals, information about the adoption of a new law (law signal) and information that this followed a Constitutional Court decision (law and court signal), on separate groups of respondents. *Results.* Our results show a positive effect of each policy signal on support for data retention. The effect of the law signal was even slightly stronger for individuals with conservative beliefs. *Conclusion.* Illustrating how lock-in effects of policies can work, our study contributes to research on attitudinal policy feedback: creating new legislation also means legitimizing the policy position in question and stating that this norm should be accepted.

The question whether people react to information about political decisions is crucial to the study of attitudinal policy feedback, policy mood, and political representation. For example, if information about the existence of a law increases support for the underlying policy position, such a mechanism might not only contribute to policy legitimacy but also increase congruence between policies and public opinion without requiring extra effort of political elites to represent citizens' views.

Against this background, studies from various theoretical perspectives examine people's responses to newly adopted policies. Following various approaches, research on policy feedback addresses the question of whether a policy creates support for its expansion or continued provision, or whether it produces self-undermining feedback effects (Pierson, 1993; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Busemeyer, Abrassart, and Nezi, 2019). Another theoretical strand provides insights into how people's policy attitudes are influenced by the particular framing of an issue, by priming effects, and by the use of elite cues as information shortcuts. Recent studies show how much people's acceptance of policies depends on various

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conditions such as the nature of the issue, the strength of the message, or the credibility of the sender (e.g., Lecheler, de Vreese, and Slothuus, 2009; Druckman et al., 2010).

Studies investigating the question whether mere information on the adoption of a policy is sufficient to influence support for this policy, that is, whether there is an adoption effect, can contribute to this research. Several recent studies have analyzed the presence or absence of effects of new laws on related policy attitudes but without directly focusing on if and how individuals' attitudes toward a particular policy change in response to information about the adoption of this policy (e.g., Flores and Barclay, 2016; Kreitzer, Hamilton, and Tolbert, 2014; Pacheco, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, only two U.S. studies on support for civil liberties focus specifically on signals about policy adoption. They provide experimental evidence that public support for a policy increases when people are made aware that it corresponds to current law, that is, it has legal status (Brooks and Manza, 2013; Wallace, 2013).

At the same time, we know that on an individual level, people's ideological orientation is relevant for how they respond to new policies. Does this finding apply to the adoption effect (i.e., the information that a proposal has been enacted) as well, even when there are no explicit cues to specific politicians or parties? Do people with different ideological orientations respond differently to information that a policy position has legal status?

This article addresses these research gaps: It examines the effects of policy signals on public attitudes in Germany, using the example of a policy proposal on data retention requiring telecommunication service providers to store call detail data in an effort to help law enforcement agencies to combat crime and terrorism. It builds on a growing body of literature on the psychological effects of conservatism (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009) and argues that conservative respondents are more likely than others to react positively to the information that a policy position reflects the status quo, in particular because acceptance and preservation of the existing (political) order are central tenets of conservatism.

Choosing the data retention example enables us to examine policy signals on an issue that has virtually no redistributive relevance compared to social policy fields, for example, which reduces the importance of potentially confounding factors, such as the respondents' material interest. There have also been various laws and court decisions on this issue. The current law was adopted in 2015, and the Federal Constitutional Court was involved in the policy-making process. This allows us to test whether people react to information about the adoption of a policy and whether information about the involvement of the Constitutional Court makes a difference.

Policy support might not only be affected by signals about policy adoption, but also by signals about the involvement of particular institutions in the policy-making process. This has been shown, for example, in the literature on source cues (e.g., Nicholson and Hansford, 2014) or legitimation effects (see Tyler, 2006). Constitutional courts are of particular importance here because of their role as legitimizing institutions (e.g., Franklin and Kosaki, 1989). Studies on policy signals from constitutional courts have so far focused on the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., Franklin and Kosaki, 1989; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence, 2005; Hoekstra, 1995). With our study, we can contribute to the findings on signals from the German Federal Constitutional Court.

With the help of an online survey experiment, we are able to identify causal effects of information about policy adoption (*law signal*) and the involvement of the Federal Constitutional Court before the current policy was adopted (*law and court signal*) on public support for data retention. We show that both signals lead to higher levels of support for this policy among the survey participants in Germany. Conservative beliefs affect people's response to the law signal but not to the combined law and court signal.

Hypotheses About the Effects of Policy Signals on Policy Support

Various theoretical approaches provide arguments for why information that a policy position has legal status should promote public support for this position. These approaches can supplement findings of studies on frames and cues. First, information about the existence of a law that incorporates a certain policy position informs individuals about the political status quo. According to research on status quo bias (e.g., Eidelman, Crandall, and Pattershall, 2009; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), individuals tend to favor the status quo as they are guided by the “assumption of goodness due to mere existence” (Eidelman and Crandall, 2012:270).

Second, cognitive dissonance theory emphasizes psychological pressures that cause people to react to policy changes. Individuals tend to adjust their attitudes to (political) realities in order to avoid the psychologically uncomfortable state of cognitive dissonance: “the reality which impinges on a person will exert pressures in the direction of bringing the appropriate cognitive elements into correspondence with that reality” (Festinger, 1957:11).

From this perspective, signals about the adoption of a law incorporating a policy position should lead to higher levels of support for this position as it represents the new political reality.

Third, referring to legitimacy theory, emphasizing that a policy position has legal status might be interpreted as a signal of legitimacy and thus enhance public support for this policy (e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence, 2005:190). From an institutionalist perspective, new laws establish rules and create structural constraints relevant for individuals’ thoughts and behavior by “legitimizing certain social norms” (Kreitzer, Hamilton, and Tolbert, 2014:798). They might also convey the message that elected representatives and experts from the ministries have carefully considered the underlying policy position. Based on these arguments, we expect the following *law signal* effect:

The provision of information about the adoption of a law incorporating a policy position leads to higher levels of support for this policy position than when this information is not provided (H1a).

Public opinion about a policy position may not only be influenced by information that it has legal status but also by information about the involvement of specific institutions in the policy-making process. In our study, we can compare the expected effect of the law signal with the effect of a signal that indicates not only the passing of the law but also the involvement of a highly respected institution. In particular, the role of the U.S. Supreme Court has been widely discussed in this context (e.g., in early studies by Franklin and Kosaki, 1989; Marshall, 1987), and experimental evidence suggest that under certain conditions, the Supreme Court is capable of shifting public opinion of a policy (e.g., Bartels and Mutz, 2009, with an overview).

It is uncertain, however, whether these findings can be transferred to constitutional courts in other countries. For example, there is no study to date on the effects of policy signals from the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany, even though this institution is highly respected by the public. It is one of the constitutional courts with the highest levels of support in the world (e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird, 1998; Kneip, 2013). In addition, it is a relevant actor in decisions concerning potential tradeoffs between domestic security and civil liberties. Particularly in this context, the Court’s decisions have been highly visible (e.g., Glaeßner, 2010).

We, therefore, transfer the arguments relating to the U.S. Supreme Court to the German Federal Constitutional Court. According to the legitimation hypothesis, the Court’s

rulings confer legitimacy on the position it favors (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989:752). An important reason for this is certainly the Court's public prestige, which represents a kind of political capital and can confer authority on policy decisions made by this institution (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg, 2001:569). Other factors strengthening the legitimacy-conferring role of the Constitutional Court are its association with the constitution, the rule of law, and the protection of essential rights (Hoekstra, 1995: 111).

Based on these considerations, the following *law and court signal* hypothesis can be formulated:

The provision of information about the adoption of a law incorporating a policy position following an intervention by the Federal Constitutional Court leads to higher levels of support for this policy position than when this information is not provided (H1b).

Hypotheses About Conservatism and Reactions to Policy Signals

Individuals' attitudes to certain issues are often based on ideological beliefs. In this article, the analysis of the effects of ideological beliefs on policy attitudes is based on a psychological approach to political ideology. According to this understanding of political ideology, it comprises a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved" (Erikson and Tedin, 2003:64). In our case, we expect conservatives to rate the proposal on data retention more positively than liberals, as conservatives are inclined to avoid uncertainty and insecurity (Davis, 2007:71) and tend to support security and law-and-order positions (McClosky and Brill-Scheuer, 1983).

At the same time, there is reason to believe that conservatism affects individuals' reactions to information that the proposal was approved and passed into law (law signal). The disposition to accept and preserve the existing (political) order is a key element of conservative ideology (Jost et al., 2003:342). Although conservatives might be skeptical about a new policy proposal that changes current regulation, once this proposal is adopted, they are more likely to react positively to the information that the policy position reflects the legal status quo. Another reason why people with conservative beliefs are particularly likely to react to such a law signal is that laws create predictability, which these people value highly (Jost et al., 2007). We thus expect conservatives to react more positively to the law signal than liberals.

In addition, we expect conservatives to respond positively to information about the involvement of the Federal Constitutional Court in the policy-making process (law and court signal). After all, conservatives tend to follow the lead of traditional and trusted institutions such as the Federal Constitutional Court, which is one of the most respected political actors in Germany. On the other hand, liberals can also be expected to hold the Court in high regard because it has repeatedly expressed liberal positions on domestic security and thus defended civil rights against state intervention. Consequently, the difference between conservatives' and liberals' response to the law and court signal is likely to be smaller than to the law signal.

We thus hypothesize that

the more conservative the people are, the stronger the effect of a signal about the adoption of a law on their support for the underlying policy position (H2a). A positive but weaker interaction is expected between conservatism and a signal about the involvement of the Constitutional Court (H2b).

Data, Experimental Design, and Variables

To test these hypotheses on policy support regarding a proposal on data retention, we conducted an online survey experiment with a sample drawn from the SoSci Panel. The panel is based on a pool of more than 60,000 active panelists. Registered pool members were mainly recruited from previous online surveys (see Leiner, 2016, with further information on the composition and limitations of this noncommercial panel). The survey was fielded in the period from January 25 to February 17, 2017. Email invitations were sent to 4,012 pool members, and 1,433 respondents participated in our survey experiment. As we concentrate on policy signals in Germany, participants from countries other than Germany were excluded.¹ Our analyses are based on a sample of 1,305 respondents, of which 1,255 answered all questions relevant for our analyses.


Our analyses are not based on a representative population sample, but this does not compromise the internal validity of our experimental findings. However, the overrepresentation of certain population groups among the respondents may limit the generalizability of our results to the larger population. To provide an impression of the quality of our convenience sample, we compare the distributions of several key variables in our survey and the 2016 General German Social Survey (ALLBUS; see supplementary Appendix Table 1). The respondents in our survey are somewhat younger and more interested in politics, and the proportion of females is slightly higher in our survey than in the ALLBUS. The only big difference is the proportion of respondents who completed tertiary education, which is more than twice as high in our study. We will therefore conduct additional analyses to test whether our results remain stable if we weight the data by age, gender, and education.

The experiment focuses on the issue of data retention—an issue that is particularly suitable for answering our research question for three reasons: First, the introduction of the law on data retention was preceded by a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. Choosing this political issue thus allows us to empirically test the effect of the two policy signals on which we have formulated hypotheses. Second, in contrast to many other political issues, data retention has practically no redistributive significance. Hence, potentially confounding factors such as respondents' material interest hardly play any role. Third, while the issue has no connection to conflicts related to economic redistribution, it is clearly linked to the other dimension of ideological conflict in Western democracies—the conflict between liberal and authoritarian values (Kitschelt, 1994). The issue of data retention policy deals with the question of the extent to which people's fundamental rights may be restricted to defend law and order. This makes it ideally suited for exploring potential effects of conservative ideology on people's attitudes.

A law regulating the storage of call detail records of telephony and Internet traffic became effective in Germany in December 2015. This legislation affects every German resident, as it makes the preventive storage of call detail records by telecommunication service providers compulsory. Its predecessor was adopted in 2008 but declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2010 because it violated the fundamental rights granted by Article 10 of the German constitution: privacy of correspondence, confidentiality of telecommunication, and postal secrecy. Under the new law, the terms regulating the retention of data and government access to them are much stricter.

¹In a survey quality control, interviews of very short duration were deleted (according to our tests, respondents in interviews with a duration of less than three minutes were not able to read each question, so these cases were excluded from our analyses).

FIGURE 1
Experimental Design



To map support for data retention as defined above, the following description of the policy was presented to all respondents²:

Details on telephone and internet connections are to be stored by the service providers for several weeks. When a mobile device is used, the location should also be recorded. Government agencies are then able to access the data with a court order.

Respondents were asked to express their support for the policy on a five-point scale (against, somewhat against, neither, somewhat in favor, in favor). In our survey, the overall mean support for this policy is 2.05 on a 0–4 scale. Figure 1 shows the design of the online experiment and the exact wording of the treatment conditions.

Participants were randomly assigned to three groups. Respondents in the first group (control) were asked to rate the policy position on data retention without being provided any information of its legal status. The second group (law signal) was informed that the policy position they were asked to rate had been passed into law one year earlier. In the third group (law and court signal), the policy position was presented as a new law introduced after the Federal Constitutional Court had declared a previous law on this issue unconstitutional. This treatment thus not only mentions the name of the Court but introduces it together with its function of reviewing laws for constitutionality to present a realistic profile of the institution.

Our measure of conservatism captures key elements of conservative beliefs, focusing on the acceptance of an existing order and the opposition to change. It is based on respondents' agreement with two statements on the relevance of good and proven practices and conventional behavior.³ The two items were combined to form an additive index of conservatism with a reliability of Cronbach's alpha of 0.68.


Apart from conservatism, we introduced an individual's left-right orientation as a broader measure of ideological beliefs into our explanatory model. This variable has the additional benefit of tapping into potential partisan effects on people's rating of data retention: Both laws were passed at a time when Germany was governed by a grand coalition of

²We decided to keep the description of the issue in the survey as brief as possible because the more comprehensive a description is, the more likely the respondents' attention is drawn into specific directions by certain details, which could skew the results.

³What do you think of the following statements? Good practices should not be questioned. It is always best to do things the conventional way. Completely disagree (0) ... completely agree (4).

FIGURE 2

Comparison of Support for Data Retention Between Experimental Groups



NOTE: Policy signals survey 2017; $F = 15.717^{***}$ ($p < 0.001$).

the conservative CDU/CSU and the social-democratic SPD. In both instances, the Greens and the Left Party voted unanimously against the proposal. A quarter of the SPD members of parliament voted against the second bill, even though it had been presented by a grand coalition government. Thus, opposition to data retention is predominantly found on the left side of the political spectrum.⁴ Consequently, we expect left-right orientation to have an effect on support for data retention, but not on the influence of the policy signals due to the lack of theoretical justification for such an effect. We also control for the usual sociodemographic factors age, gender, and education (see supplementary Appendix Table 2 for descriptive information on the variables employed in our study).

Results

Figure 2 displays the support for data retention in the three groups. As expected, support for the policy is higher than in the control group if respondents are informed that it has legal status. Support is even higher if respondents are made aware of the Federal Constitutional Court’s role in the passing of the new law. In this case, the average difference from the control group is half a point on a five-point scale. In line with our hypotheses 1a and 1b, both groups differ significantly from the control group ($p < 0.002$; post hoc Scheffé test).

In the next step, we analyze the effect of conservatism on attitudes to data retention and on the relevance of policy signals for this attitude (Table 1). The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first model, we test the effect of the predictors without interactions; in the second, we have conservatism interacting with both policy signals; in the third, we calculate the interaction with left-right orientation to confirm that this broader measure

⁴The liberal FDP is somewhat of an exception: In 2007, its MPs voted against the bill. In 2015, the party was not represented in parliament.


TABLE 1
Predictors of Support for Data Retention (Linear Regression)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Law signal | 0.330*** (0.087) | 0.340*** (0.086) | 0.331*** (0.087) | 0.340*** (0.086) |
| Law and court signal | 0.444*** (0.084) | 0.446*** (0.084) | 0.446*** (0.084) | 0.447*** (0.084) |
| Conservatism | 0.164*** (0.043) | 0.051 (0.068) | 0.161*** (0.043) | 0.066 (0.070) |
| Left-right orientation | 0.175*** (0.020) | 0.172*** (0.020) | 0.130*** (0.035) | 0.140*** (0.036) |
| Conservatism x law signal | | 0.232* (0.094) | | 0.208* (0.099) |
| Conservatism x law and court signal | | 0.129 (0.094) | | 0.101 (0.098) |
| Left-right orientation x law signal | | | 0.073 (0.048) | 0.045 (0.051) |
| Left-right orientation x law and court signal | | | 0.066 (0.045) | 0.055 (0.047) |
| Age | 0.016*** (0.002) | 0.016*** (0.002) | 0.016*** (0.002) | 0.016*** (0.002) |
| Gender (female) | 0.339*** (0.072) | 0.332*** (0.072) | 0.338*** (0.072) | 0.332*** (0.071) |
| Higher secondary education | -0.022 (0.128) | -0.044 (0.128) | -0.030 (0.128) | -0.048 (0.128) |
| Tertiary education | -0.063 (0.116) | -0.076 (0.116) | -0.064 (0.115) | -0.075 (0.115) |
| Intercept | 1.656*** (0.129) | 1.672*** (0.129) | 1.658*** (0.128) | 1.672*** (0.128) |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.160 | 0.163 | 0.161 | 0.163 |

NOTE: Policy signals survey 2017. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed). $N = 1,255$. Unstandardized b coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. Conservatism, left-right orientation, and age are grand mean-centered. Reference category: lower secondary education.

FIGURE 3

Conservatism and Conditional Marginal Effects of Law Signal on Support for Data Retention



NOTE: Policy signals survey 2017.


of ideological beliefs does not influence the effect of the policy signals. The final model includes all four interaction terms.

In the first model, the effects of both policy signals are confirmed even after controlling for additional predictors. And as expected, the more conservative and the further to the right of the political spectrum respondents are, the greater their support for data retention. Support among older respondents and women is stronger than in other groups. In line with our expectations (H2a), model 2 shows that conservatism affects people’s response to the law signal: The provision of information that the data retention policy has legal status further increases conservative respondents’ support. This interaction effect remains significant even after controlling for the simultaneous interaction of left-right orientation with the policy signals (model 4). Interactions between conservatism and the law and court signal (H2b, models 2 and 4) and between left-right orientation and both policy signals (models 3 and 4) were not found to be significant, confirming our expectations.

In the next step, we use model 4 of Table 1 to take a closer look at the two interactions with conservatism that are the focus of our second hypothesis. Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of the law signal for all levels of the conservatism scale. While people with a conservatism score of up to 0.5 who received the law signal do not differ significantly in their support for data retention policies, this signal increases support among the more conservative subjects. For the most conservative respondents, the law signal increases their support for data retention policies by an estimated 0.9 points, which is nearly 20 percent of the support scale. Furthermore, the four bins estimated according to Hainmueller, Mumolo, and Xu (2019) show that the assumption of a linear interaction effect cannot be rejected. Thus, the linear interpretation of this interaction is valid. One limit of our study is the clearly nonequal distribution of the data regarding conservatism (see histogram). Since only about 10 percent of all subjects have a conservatism score of higher than two, we have to be careful in interpreting the law signal effect for these very conservative people. Yet, the picture clearly shows that even for people in the middle of the conservatism

FIGURE 4

Conservatism and Conditional Marginal Effects of Law and Court Signal on Support for Data Retention



NOTE: Policy signals survey 2017.

scale, the law signal has a significant and positive effect on their support for data retention policies, while this is not the case for nonconservatives.

In Figure 4, we take a closer look at the interaction between the law and court signal and conservatism. In contrast to the interaction between conservatism and the law signal, this effect is not statistically significant. The law and court signal has a positive impact on all respondents, regardless of their level of conservatism.⁵

With respect to certain sociodemographic characteristics, the distribution of participants in our survey does not perfectly match the one in the German population. In particular, our sample includes a higher share of people with tertiary education. We, therefore, conduct additional weighted analyses to test whether our results are robust. For this purpose, we reestimate the models from Table 1 applying weights for age, gender, and education (see supplementary Appendix Table 3). The effects of the policy signals (H1a, H1b) are even stronger when weighted data are used, while the interaction between the law and court signal and conservatism (H2b) remains weak and insignificant as expected. The interaction between conservatism and a signal about the adoption of the law (H2a) remains significant if we weight the data by age and gender and by tertiary education, respectively. Applying a combined weight (age, gender, and tertiary education) also produces this effect, which is significant at the 10 percent level until the two interactions with left-right orientation are included in the model as well. Thus, using the weighted data, there is still some evidence confirming H2a, but the expected effect is not very pronounced.

To wrap up: the provision of both the information that the policy position has legal status (H1a) and the information that this law was passed after an intervention by the Federal Constitutional Court (H1b) leads to a higher level of support for this policy position than when this information is not provided. The analyses also show that the more conservative

⁵Only when we apply the binning estimator approach we find no significant effect of the law and court signal for the very first bin (i.e., containing the respondents who are not conservative at all).

people are, the stronger the effect of a signal about the adoption of a law on their support for the underlying policy position (H2a) tends to be, even if this effect falls short of statistical significance when the data are weighted for age, gender, and tertiary education and all four interaction terms are included. Thus, our theoretical expectations were largely confirmed.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to study the influence of policy signals on policy support and thus to assess a key mechanism behind potential linkages between public opinion and policy. Our experiment focuses on support for data retention in Germany and shows that the public is receptive to policy signals: first, information about the adoption of a new law on data retention significantly increases support for this policy position. This confirmation of an adoption effect supplements research on the importance of the political environment (e.g., Jacobs and Mettler, 2018) and specific elite messages (e.g., Bullock, 2011) for policy attitudes.

Second, information about the involvement of the Federal Constitutional Court in the policy-making process also increases support for this policy position. This result is particularly relevant regarding the discussions on the political and legal image of courts (e.g., Krewson and Schroedel, 2020).

Third, nonconservatives and conservatives differ in their response to information that a policy position has legal status. We already know that ideological orientations and partisanship affect individuals' evaluation of policies, especially when these individuals belong to clear political camps and the policies in question are highly controversial. Our study adds to this by emphasizing psychological effects at work when conservatives and nonconservatives interpret signals about new laws.

Our results about the effects of policy signals are all the more important considering that the stimuli we use in our study are relatively weak. If people respond to variations in question-wording in our survey, they are also likely to react to similar signals about new policies in other situations, for example, when watching media news or discussing political matters with friends and family members.

We are cautious about generalizing our findings, as our online experiment is based on a convenience sample and concentrates on one issue of domestic security policy. The case we study allows us to test two types of policy signals. This implies that the law has a specific history (a stricter version was rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court) about which people may be informed to a greater or lesser extent. The question how specific knowledge about a policy affects the dynamics of policy support in the population requires further analysis. In addition, more experiments with similar designs and different types of policies should be conducted to further examine the effects of policy signals and their interplay with ideological beliefs, as we know that for attitudinal policy feedback, the nature of a policy matters. Of particular interest should be the question of how conservatism influences policy support when the signals inform respondents about the adoption of liberal policies, that is, policies that conservatives are less likely to agree with than with data retention.

Our study does add to previous contributions in several respects. First, it illustrates how lock-in effects of policies can work: Creating a new law also means legitimizing the policy position in question and stating that this norm should be accepted (see the early contribution of Pierson, 1993 on "interpretive" feedback effects and, for example, a recent study

by Busemeyer and Goerres, 2019). In the light of our findings and taking new typologies of feedback effects into account (e.g., Busemeyer, Abrassart, and Nezi, 2019), it should be analyzed whether repeated references by politicians or the media to a newly adopted law facilitate more expansive policies in this domain or possibly also impede reforms intended to reverse such policies.

Second, regarding the influence of judicial institutions on public support for certain policies, we can confirm the transferability of a research finding made for the United States (e.g., Christenson and Glick, 2015; Flores and Barclay, 2016) to another Western democracy. Further studies on other countries, including those with a less powerful and less respected constitutional court, would be helpful to determine the finding's wider applicability.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

Table 1: Comparing our Study With the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) 2016

Table 2: Descriptive Information on Variables

Table 3: Additional Analysis With Weighted Data