Browsing by Author "Keren, Osnat"

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Open Access
Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules
(2020) Gay, Mael; Karp, Batya; Keren, Osnat; Polian, Ilia
Today’s electronic systems must simultaneously fulfill strict requirements on security and reliability. In particular, their cryptographic modules are exposed to faults, which can be due to natural failures (e.g., radiation or electromagnetic noise) or malicious fault-injection attacks. We present an architecture based on a new class of error-detecting codes that combine robustness properties with a minimal distance. The new architecture guarantees (with some probability) the detection of faults injected by an intelligent and strategic adversary who can precisely control the disturbance. At the same time it supports automatic correction of low-multiplicity faults. To this end, we discuss an efficient technique to correct single nibble/byte errors while avoiding full syndrome analysis. We also examine a Compact Protection Code (CPC)-based system level fault manager that considers this code an inner code (and the CPC as its outer code). We report experimental results obtained by physical fault injection on the SAKURA-G FPGA board. The experimental results reconfirm the assumption that faults may cause an arbitrary number of bit flips. They indicate that a combined inner-outer coding scheme can significantly reduce the number of fault events that go undetected due to erroneous corrections of the inner code.
Open Access
IPM-RED : combining higher-order masking with robust error detection
(2020) Keren, Osnat; Polian, Ilia
Cryptographic hardware becomes increasingly vulnerable to physical attacks - both passive side-channel analysis and active fault injections - performed by skillful and well-equipped adversaries. In this paper, we introduce a technique that provides very high security against both types of attacks. It combines inner product masking (IPM), which offers higher-order side-channel attack resistance on word level and on bit level, with nonlinear security-oriented error-detection codes that provide robustness, i.e., strong detection guarantees for arbitrary faults. We prove that our scheme has the same security against side-channel attacks that an earlier, non-robust IPM-based solution has and in addition preserves robustness during addition and multiplication (and therefore arbitrary computations). Moreover, we prove that the information leakage from the checker is small and that the attack will be detected far before the attacker will gain significant information.