Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dx.doi.org/10.18419/opus-10498
Authors: Müller, Johannes
Title: Design and cryptographic security analysis of e-voting protocols
Issue Date: 2019
metadata.ubs.publikation.typ: Dissertation
metadata.ubs.publikation.seiten: 190
URI: http://elib.uni-stuttgart.de/handle/11682/10515
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:93-opus-ds-105156
http://dx.doi.org/10.18419/opus-10498
Abstract: Electronic voting (e-voting) systems are used in numerous countries for political elections, but also for less critical elections within clubs and associations, and hence affect the lives of millions of people. It is therefore important to ensure that single voters' choices remain private, and to be able to verify that an election result coincides with the voters' intention. Unfortunately, for most e-voting systems employed in real elections, these fundamental security and privacy properties cannot be guaranteed, so that in particular the legitimacy of such political elections is challenged. This demonstrates the importance of employing e-voting systems that are rootedly designed to guarantee the required security. However, it turned out to be highly challenging to construct secure yet practical e-voting systems since one always has to find a balance between the (possibly conflicting) requirements of the given kind of election. In the first two chapters of the thesis' main part, we present two practical e-voting systems which are both meant for low-risk and non-political elections, e.g., within clubs or associations. We have implemented both systems to demonstrate their practicability. The first system, called sElect, is designed to be as simple as possible while still guaranteeing a good level of security. The second system, called Ordinos, provides a superior level of privacy as it only reveals the most necessary information about the election outcome, e.g., solely the winner's name but nothing else. We will rigorously analyze the security of sElect and Ordinos. To do this, we formally define the required security properties and then mathematically prove that sElect and Ordinos achieve them. In the third chapter of the thesis' main part, we provide substantial work on the fundamental notion of verifiability of e-voting systems. We analyze and compare all formal verifiability definitions from the literature regarding how meaningful, expressive, or general they are.
Appears in Collections:05 Fakultät Informatik, Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik

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