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http://dx.doi.org/10.18419/opus-14353
Autor(en): | Upadhyaya, Devanshi Gay, Maël Polian, Ilia |
Titel: | Locking-enabled security analysis of cryptographic circuits |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 2024 |
Dokumentart: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
Seiten: | 25 |
Erschienen in: | Cryptography 8 (2024), No. 2 |
URI: | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:93-opus-ds-143722 http://elib.uni-stuttgart.de/handle/11682/14372 http://dx.doi.org/10.18419/opus-14353 |
ISSN: | 2410-387X |
Zusammenfassung: | Hardware implementations of cryptographic primitives require protection against physical attacks and supply chain threats. This raises the question of secure composability of different attack countermeasures, i.e., whether protecting a circuit against one threat can make it more vulnerable against a different threat. In this article, we study the consequences of applying logic locking, a popular design-for-trust solution against intellectual property piracy and overproduction, to cryptographic circuits. We show that the ability to unlock the circuit incorrectly gives the adversary new powerful attack options. We introduce LEDFA (locking-enabled differential fault analysis) and demonstrate for several ciphers and families of locking schemes that fault attacks become possible (or consistently easier) for incorrectly unlocked circuits. In several cases, logic locking has made circuit implementations prone to classical algebraic attacks with no fault injection needed altogether. We refer to this “zero-fault” version of LEDFA by the term LEDA, investigate its success factors in-depth and propose a countermeasure to protect the logic-locked implementations against LEDA. We also perform test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) of incorrectly unlocked AES implementations to show the effects of logic locking regarding side-channel leakage. Our results indicate that logic locking is not safe to use in cryptographic circuits, making them less rather than more secure. |
Enthalten in den Sammlungen: | 05 Fakultät Informatik, Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik |
Dateien zu dieser Ressource:
Datei | Beschreibung | Größe | Format | |
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cryptography-08-00002-v2.pdf | 761,31 kB | Adobe PDF | Öffnen/Anzeigen |
Diese Ressource wurde unter folgender Copyright-Bestimmung veröffentlicht: Lizenz von Creative Commons