Federalism and party democracy in West Germany

Abstract

According to Gerhard Lehmbruch, there is a growing inconsistency in West Germany between the principles of a federal polity and party democracy, primarily because the former relies on bargaining, and the latter relies on majority rule as a mechanism of conflict regulation. However, comparative analyses have shown that federalism and party competition are not incompatible. Generally, federal structures are neither detrimental nor conducive to the recruitment function of parties. Competence and experience as a parliamentary leader or as a specialist is the most essential precondition for advancement to national executive positions. The integrative capacities of political parties may even be strengthened by the federal division of power. Only in the area of the formulation and implementation of public policy may an inconsistency between the federal system and party democracy arise because the strain on consensus-building inherent in German cooperative federalism may, under specific conditions, prevent the national majority party from converting its programs into public policy.